Executive summary
zio/zio-query falls short of our standard for a preview release, in part because we found no recorded design decisions and no architecture document or diagram. It scores 55 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, and 50 of its 51 critical findings are security problems in the build pipeline.
Maturity, at 47, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is recording design decisions, worth about 8 points. Having someone learn and document the eight files no active contributor knows comes next, worth about 5 points. Raising Maturity to 62 would lift the score to about 59.
Thirty-seven pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Thirteen secrets can leak from the build pipeline, and one part of the code is no longer understood by anyone working on it. Having someone learn the forgotten files, pinning each tool to an exact version and limiting each secret to its own step would close these risks.
The product code is 4,132 lines, about €4,800 to rebuild.
If Maturity rose from 47 to 62, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 55 to about 59.
New since the last survey: 50 findings
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- Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned knowledge zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/ZQuery.scala
- Deployment & Rollback · No deployment automation
Fixed since the last survey: 41 findings
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: REDACTED .github/workflows/auto-approve.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: watchdog-secret-into-unpinned-action .github/workflows/auto-approve.yml
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- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: watchdog-secret-interpolated-into-run REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium: watchdog-eol-node-runtime-in-workflow REDACTED
- Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Fork-triggerable workflow runs with an unscoped write token .github/workflows/auto-approve.yml
- Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Workflow token permissions not restricted REDACTED
- Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Workflow token permissions not restricted REDACTED
Rebuild cost: about €4,800 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €1,600 to €8,100, for 27 to 85 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.8 at a score of 55. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 4,132 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture — module dependency graph
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 zio | 2 zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests | 3 zio.query.internal | 4 zio.query | 5 zio.query.internal.QueryScope | 6 zio.query.internal.Result | 7 zio.query.Cache | 8 zio.query.CompletedRequestMap | 9 zio.query.DataSource | 10 zio.query.Described | 11 zio.query.UtilsVersionSpecific | 12 zio.query.ZQuery | 13 zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder | 14 zio.query.internal.Continue | 15 zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 zio | |||||||||||||||
| 2 zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests | 6 | 2 | |||||||||||||
| 3 zio.query.internal | 1 | 9 | |||||||||||||
| 4 zio.query | 1 | ||||||||||||||
| 5 zio.query.internal.QueryScope | 2 | ||||||||||||||
| 6 zio.query.internal.Result | 5 | ||||||||||||||
| 7 zio.query.Cache | 2 | ||||||||||||||
| 8 zio.query.CompletedRequestMap | 5 | ||||||||||||||
| 9 zio.query.DataSource | 2 | ||||||||||||||
| 10 zio.query.Described | 1 | ||||||||||||||
| 11 zio.query.UtilsVersionSpecific | 1 | ||||||||||||||
| 12 zio.query.ZQuery | 1 | 11 | |||||||||||||
| 13 zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder | 2 | 4 | 4 | ||||||||||||
| 14 zio.query.internal.Continue | 2 | 5 | |||||||||||||
| 15 zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult | 2 | 2 |
2→3 zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests uses zio.query.internal part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 6 pairs of types, where a type in zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests uses a type in zio.query.internal.
- The types involved
zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Both→zio.query.internal.BlockedRequestszio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Empty→zio.query.internal.BlockedRequestszio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder→zio.query.internal.BlockedRequestzio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Single→zio.query.internal.BlockedRequestzio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Single→zio.query.internal.BlockedRequestszio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Then→zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests
- Direction
- zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests uses zio.query.internal, so a change to zio.query.internal can break zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests, while a change to zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests can't break zio.query.internal.
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
2→4 zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests uses zio.query part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests uses a type in zio.query.
- The types involved
zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder→zio.query.DataSourcezio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Single→zio.query.DataSource
- Direction
- zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests uses zio.query, so a change to zio.query can break zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests, while a change to zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests can't break zio.query.
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
3→2 zio.query.internal uses zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in zio.query.internal uses a type in zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.
- The types involved
zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests→zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder
- Direction
- zio.query.internal uses zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests, so a change to zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests can break zio.query.internal, while a change to zio.query.internal can't break zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query.internal uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
3→4 zio.query.internal uses zio.query part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 9 pairs of types, where a type in zio.query.internal uses a type in zio.query.
- The types involved
zio.query.internal.BlockedRequest→zio.query.Requestzio.query.internal.BlockedRequests→zio.query.DataSourceAspectzio.query.internal.BlockedRequests→zio.query.Describedzio.query.internal.Continue→zio.query.DataSourceAspectzio.query.internal.Continue→zio.query.Describedzio.query.internal.Parallel→zio.query.DataSourcezio.query.internal.Result→zio.query.DataSourceAspectzio.query.internal.Result→zio.query.Describedzio.query.internal.Sequential→zio.query.DataSource
- Direction
- zio.query.internal uses zio.query, so a change to zio.query can break zio.query.internal, while a change to zio.query.internal can't break zio.query.
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
4→3 zio.query uses zio.query.internal✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in zio.query uses a type in zio.query.internal.
- The types involved
zio.query.ZQuery→zio.query.internal.Result
- Direction
- zio.query uses zio.query.internal, so a change to zio.query.internal can break zio.query, while a change to zio.query can't break zio.query.internal.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
5→3 zio.query.internal.QueryScope uses zio.query.internal✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in zio.query.internal.QueryScope uses a type in zio.query.internal.
- The types involved
zio.query.internal.QueryScope.Default→zio.query.internal.QueryScopezio.query.internal.QueryScope.NoOp→zio.query.internal.QueryScope
- Direction
- zio.query.internal.QueryScope uses zio.query.internal, so a change to zio.query.internal can break zio.query.internal.QueryScope, while a change to zio.query.internal.QueryScope can't break zio.query.internal.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query.internal.QueryScope uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
6→3 zio.query.internal.Result uses zio.query.internal✕
- Connections
- 5 pairs of types, where a type in zio.query.internal.Result uses a type in zio.query.internal.
- The types involved
zio.query.internal.Result.Blocked→zio.query.internal.BlockedRequestszio.query.internal.Result.Blocked→zio.query.internal.Continuezio.query.internal.Result.Blocked→zio.query.internal.Resultzio.query.internal.Result.Done→zio.query.internal.Resultzio.query.internal.Result.Fail→zio.query.internal.Result
- Direction
- zio.query.internal.Result uses zio.query.internal, so a change to zio.query.internal can break zio.query.internal.Result, while a change to zio.query.internal.Result can't break zio.query.internal.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query.internal.Result uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
7→4 zio.query.Cache uses zio.query✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in zio.query.Cache uses a type in zio.query.
- The types involved
zio.query.Cache.Default→zio.query.Cachezio.query.Cache.Default→zio.query.Request
- Direction
- zio.query.Cache uses zio.query, so a change to zio.query can break zio.query.Cache, while a change to zio.query.Cache can't break zio.query.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query.Cache uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
8→4 zio.query.CompletedRequestMap uses zio.query✕
- Connections
- 5 pairs of types, where a type in zio.query.CompletedRequestMap uses a type in zio.query.
- The types involved
zio.query.CompletedRequestMap.Immutable→zio.query.CompletedRequestMapzio.query.CompletedRequestMap.Mutable→zio.query.CompletedRequestMapzio.query.CompletedRequestMap.Mutable→zio.query.Requestzio.query.CompletedRequestMap.UnsafeApi→zio.query.CompletedRequestMapzio.query.CompletedRequestMap.UnsafeApi→zio.query.Request
- Direction
- zio.query.CompletedRequestMap uses zio.query, so a change to zio.query can break zio.query.CompletedRequestMap, while a change to zio.query.CompletedRequestMap can't break zio.query.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query.CompletedRequestMap uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
9→4 zio.query.DataSource uses zio.query✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in zio.query.DataSource uses a type in zio.query.
- The types involved
zio.query.DataSource.Batched→zio.query.CompletedRequestMapzio.query.DataSource.Batched→zio.query.DataSource
- Direction
- zio.query.DataSource uses zio.query, so a change to zio.query can break zio.query.DataSource, while a change to zio.query.DataSource can't break zio.query.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query.DataSource uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
10→4 zio.query.Described uses zio.query✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in zio.query.Described uses a type in zio.query.
- The types involved
zio.query.Described.AnySyntax→zio.query.Described
- Direction
- zio.query.Described uses zio.query, so a change to zio.query can break zio.query.Described, while a change to zio.query.Described can't break zio.query.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query.Described uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
11→4 zio.query.UtilsVersionSpecific uses zio.query✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in zio.query.UtilsVersionSpecific uses a type in zio.query.
- The types involved
zio.query.UtilsVersionSpecific.LiftCoSyntax→zio.query.Request
- Direction
- zio.query.UtilsVersionSpecific uses zio.query, so a change to zio.query can break zio.query.UtilsVersionSpecific, while a change to zio.query.UtilsVersionSpecific can't break zio.query.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query.UtilsVersionSpecific uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
12→3 zio.query.ZQuery uses zio.query.internal✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in zio.query.ZQuery uses a type in zio.query.internal.
- The types involved
zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult→zio.query.internal.Result
- Direction
- zio.query.ZQuery uses zio.query.internal, so a change to zio.query.internal can break zio.query.ZQuery, while a change to zio.query.ZQuery can't break zio.query.internal.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query.ZQuery uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
12→4 zio.query.ZQuery uses zio.query✕
- Connections
- 11 pairs of types, where a type in zio.query.ZQuery uses a type in zio.query.
- The types involved
zio.query.ZQuery.EnvironmentWithPartiallyApplied→zio.query.ZQueryzio.query.ZQuery.EnvironmentWithQueryPartiallyApplied→zio.query.ZQueryzio.query.ZQuery.EnvironmentWithZIOPartiallyApplied→zio.query.ZQueryzio.query.ZQuery.ProvideSomeLayer→zio.query.ZQueryzio.query.ZQuery.Release→zio.query.ZQueryzio.query.ZQuery.ReleaseExit→zio.query.ZQueryzio.query.ZQuery.ServiceWithPartiallyApplied→zio.query.ZQueryzio.query.ZQuery.ServiceWithQueryPartiallyApplied→zio.query.ZQueryzio.query.ZQuery.ServiceWithZIOPartiallyApplied→zio.query.ZQueryzio.query.ZQuery.TimeoutTo→zio.query.ZQueryzio.query.ZQuery.unsafe→zio.query.ZQuery
- Direction
- zio.query.ZQuery uses zio.query, so a change to zio.query can break zio.query.ZQuery, while a change to zio.query.ZQuery can't break zio.query.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query.ZQuery uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→2 zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder uses zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder uses a type in zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.
- The types involved
zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder.MapDataSources→zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folderzio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder.ProvideSomeEnvironment→zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder
- Direction
- zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder uses zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests, so a change to zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests can break zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder, while a change to zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder can't break zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→3 zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder uses zio.query.internal✕
- Connections
- 4 pairs of types, where a type in zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder uses a type in zio.query.internal.
- The types involved
zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder.MapDataSources→zio.query.internal.BlockedRequestzio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder.MapDataSources→zio.query.internal.BlockedRequestszio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder.ProvideSomeEnvironment→zio.query.internal.BlockedRequestzio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder.ProvideSomeEnvironment→zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests
- Direction
- zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder uses zio.query.internal, so a change to zio.query.internal can break zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder, while a change to zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder can't break zio.query.internal.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→4 zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder uses zio.query✕
- Connections
- 4 pairs of types, where a type in zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder uses a type in zio.query.
- The types involved
zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder.MapDataSources→zio.query.DataSourcezio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder.MapDataSources→zio.query.DataSourceAspectzio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder.ProvideSomeEnvironment→zio.query.DataSourcezio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder.ProvideSomeEnvironment→zio.query.Described
- Direction
- zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder uses zio.query, so a change to zio.query can break zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder, while a change to zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder can't break zio.query.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query.internal.BlockedRequests.Folder uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
14→3 zio.query.internal.Continue uses zio.query.internal✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in zio.query.internal.Continue uses a type in zio.query.internal.
- The types involved
zio.query.internal.Continue.Effect→zio.query.internal.Continuezio.query.internal.Continue.Get→zio.query.internal.Continue
- Direction
- zio.query.internal.Continue uses zio.query.internal, so a change to zio.query.internal can break zio.query.internal.Continue, while a change to zio.query.internal.Continue can't break zio.query.internal.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query.internal.Continue uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
14→4 zio.query.internal.Continue uses zio.query✕
- Connections
- 5 pairs of types, where a type in zio.query.internal.Continue uses a type in zio.query.
- The types involved
zio.query.internal.Continue.Effect→zio.query.DataSourceAspectzio.query.internal.Continue.Effect→zio.query.Describedzio.query.internal.Continue.Effect→zio.query.ZQueryzio.query.internal.Continue.Get→zio.query.DataSourceAspectzio.query.internal.Continue.Get→zio.query.Described
- Direction
- zio.query.internal.Continue uses zio.query, so a change to zio.query can break zio.query.internal.Continue, while a change to zio.query.internal.Continue can't break zio.query.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query.internal.Continue uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
15→3 zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult uses zio.query.internal✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult uses a type in zio.query.internal.
- The types involved
zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult.Effectful→zio.query.internal.Resultzio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult.Pure→zio.query.internal.Result
- Direction
- zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult uses zio.query.internal, so a change to zio.query.internal can break zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult, while a change to zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult can't break zio.query.internal.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
15→12 zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult uses zio.query.ZQuery✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult uses a type in zio.query.ZQuery.
- The types involved
zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult.Effectful→zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResultzio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult.Pure→zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult
- Direction
- zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult uses zio.query.ZQuery, so a change to zio.query.ZQuery can break zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult, while a change to zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult can't break zio.query.ZQuery.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: zio.query.ZQuery.CachedResult uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2025 — Injection | 50 | High / Critical |
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 4 | Medium |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality; Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them; Resolve the 8 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with DataSource.scala, Continue.scala, BlockedRequests.scala.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. | +7.7 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Resolve the 8 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with DataSource.scala, Continue.scala, BlockedRequests.scala. | +5.3 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +6.3 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. | +2.8 pts | Low | Bus Factor |
| Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with ZQuery.scala. | +2.2 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 1 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with .nvmrc. | +2.0 pts | Low | Platform End-of-Life |
| Resolve the 12 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2). | +3.8 pts | Medium | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +1.2 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 4.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 4.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 4.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 4.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/ZQuery.scala | 7.1 | Near-clean | Cyclomatic Complexity: ZQuery.collectResults (cyclomatic 23) |
| .nvmrc | 7.9 | Near-clean | Platform End-of-Life: End-of-life runtime: Node.js 20 |
| zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/Cache.scala | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/DataSource.scala | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 58 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 58 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 70 of 82 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.scala) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`addSbtPlugin("org.scoverage" % "sbt-scoverage" % "<version>")` in `project/plugins.sbt`, then `sbt clean coverage test coverageReport`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (`addSbtPlugin("org.scoverage" % "sbt-scoverage" % "<version>")` in `project/plugins.sbt`, then `sbt clean coverage test coverageReport`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.scala) and this repository declares an sbt build (repository root, 2 test files), but it was not re-run: the analyzer environment could not run it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This repository's dependency manifests (an sbt build (build.sbt) and package.json) were found, but this pass cannot parse them for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D30 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
- D14 License Compliance — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored — this repository's 1 sbt build file(s) (build.sbt and project/*.scala) were read and none of the production library dependencies they declare carries a version this pass can resolve from the file itself (1 declared with a version computed rather than written as a literal, or cross-built with `%%` where the build states no scalaVersion to form the Scala binary suffix from). sbt is a program rather than a manifest: a val holding one string literal is read, but anything computed would need the build run, and this pass does not run it. Licences are resolved from the POMs Maven Central publishes, which requires an exact coordinate to ask about. NOT a finding that this repository's licences are compliant: this dimension asserts nothing about its licensing in either direction.
- D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's deterministic naming rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. Until then its declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether its names are consistent.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (project/plugins.sbt), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) (npm) WERE scanned and every vulnerability they reported is included in this result; osv was not, so this dimension's score covers less than the dependency surface this repository declares, and nothing here is evidence that osv is free of known-vulnerable dependencies. osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. This is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass. osv-scanner documents exit 128 as "no package sources found" — but this scan only invoked it because the tree declares a source it supports (`pom.xml` and the resolved lockfiles among them), so the tool's report and this repository disagree. Check that those sources are reachable from the directory the scan ran in before concluding anything is missing. If this tree really does commit only range-pinned manifests, commit the lockfile your package manager produces — but only where your ecosystem HAS one and commits it: Maven has none at all (osv-scanner reads `pom.xml` directly) and Gradle writes one only under opt-in dependency locking, while a published Composer package and a published Dart library both deliberately exclude theirs. In those three, generate one in CI before the scan instead — a resolved dependency list or an SBOM fed to the scanner.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) (npm) WERE scanned and every vulnerability they reported is included in this result; osv was not, so this dimension's score covers less than the dependency surface this repository declares, and nothing here is evidence that osv is free of known-vulnerable dependencies. osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. This is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass. osv-scanner documents exit 128 as "no package sources found" — but this scan only invoked it because the tree declares a source it supports (`pom.xml` and the resolved lockfiles among them), so the tool's report and this repository disagree. Check that those sources are reachable from the directory the scan ran in before concluding anything is missing. If this tree really does commit only range-pinned manifests, commit the lockfile your package manager produces — but only where your ecosystem HAS one and commits it: Maven has none at all (osv-scanner reads `pom.xml` directly) and Gradle writes one only under opt-in dependency locking, while a published Composer package and a published Dart library both deliberately exclude theirs. In those three, generate one in CI before the scan instead — a resolved dependency list or an SBOM fed to the scanner.
- C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
- C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ZQuery.collectResults at 23.
What to do
- Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with ZQuery.collectResults (cyclomatic 23). — Refactoring it lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.5 to about 10.0/10.
- Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ZQuery.collectResults at 35.
What to do
- Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with ZQuery.collectResults (cognitive 35). — Refactoring it lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.0 to about 10.0/10.
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D3 · God Classes
3 god class(es) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with ZQuery.scala (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with ZQuery.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D4 · Code Duplication
2 duplicated block group(s) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with DataSource.scala, ZQuery.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D5 · Coupling
3 production modules (sbt), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; a dependsOn spread (deps: _*) and a project whose directory a helper computes are not visible there; 1 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 1 of the 3 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, declare types in source no model reads, or have no source directory of their own).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 6 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D9 · Test Distribution
57 test methods: 57 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The Scala suite contributes 57 test case(s) across 1 file(s) in a test source set declaring at least one — every `test("…")`, `it("…")`, `property("…")` and `"…" in {…}` registration and every JUnit `@Test`, which is how munit, ScalaTest, utest, ZIO Test and specs2 declare a case; a case registered under a computed name is not counted, so this is a floor. Its tier split is INFERRED from paths and file names, except sbt's src/it source set, which the build declares.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
3 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/ZQuery.scala. Counted over 11 of the 27 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D17 · Explicit Debt
1 deducted task-comment markers across 4132 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Cache.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 1 build units (sbt) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
50 finding(s): 0 critical, 50 high, 0 medium, 0 low. 37 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens.
What to do
- Resolve the 12 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 37 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (37 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable dependencies in the 1 ecosystem(s) that were scanned (npm). Partial dependency scan: 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) were scanned (npm), and the findings above are real and complete for them. osv was not scanned (osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned), so this is not the whole dependency surface and the result is reported at reduced confidence.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
9 of 11 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/ZQuery.scala. Counted over 11 of the 27 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 8 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with DataSource.scala, Continue.scala, BlockedRequests.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with ZQuery.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
1/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No known-vulnerable dependencies in the 1 ecosystem(s) that were scanned (npm). Partial dependency scan: 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) were scanned (npm), and the findings above are real and complete for them. osv was not scanned (osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned), so this is not the whole dependency surface and the result is reported at reduced confidence.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
1 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with .nvmrc. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX6 · Interface segregation
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 1 of 1 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
P1 · CI/CD gates
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add scalafix or scapegoat (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 20340 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — .github/workflows/auto-approve.yml:7
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: scalafix or scapegoat — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- No release automation was found in CI — neither a deploy stage (Helm/Kubernetes/compose manifests, an orchestrated rollout) nor a publish job that ships the built artifact. Releases appear to be run by hand, which is slower, less repeatable and harder to reverse.
What to do
- Automate the release in CI — a deploy stage for a service (Helm/Kubernetes manifests or an equivalent rollout), or a tag-triggered publish job for an artifact — so releases are repeatable and reversible.
P6 · Release Hygiene
PF1 · Benchmark discipline
- A JMH/Jetpack Benchmark suite exists but nothing turns on its allocation measurement — allocations (the main way hot code pressures a garbage collector or allocator) aren't being measured. — benchmarks/src/main/scala/zio/query/CollectAllBenchmark.scala
What to do
- Run JMH with the GC profiler (`-prof gc`, or addProfiler(GCProfiler.class)) so allocation rate regressions are visible, not just time.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
X1 · Async correctness
X12 · Unreachable branch
X13 · Undrained process stream
X14 · Bypassable address classification
X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader
X16 · Unfloored truncation loop
X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document
X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness
X19 · Unrestored process-global state
X20 · Mistyped argument guard
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X22 · Contradicted release guard
X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped
X25 · Inert configuration knob
X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff
X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard
X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element
X3 · Exception handling
X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects
X5 · Nullable reference types
- No build over this repository's 20 Scala product file(s) passes `-Yexplicit-nulls`, enables WartRemover's `Null` wart or runs Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls`, so every reference type admits null and nothing reports a `null` written into the code or returned from a Java API — the first one to reach a method call is a `NullPointerException`. `Option` by convention is a habit no tool here holds the code to.
What to do
- On Scala 3, add `-Yexplicit-nulls` to `scalacOptions` so `String` and `String | Null` mean different things, and type each Java API's result as nullable where it can return null; on Scala 2 (or as a first step), enable WartRemover's `Null` wart (`wartremoverErrors += Wart.Null`) or Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls = true` so the code holds absence in `Option`. Then pay the assertions down rather than adding to them: each `.nn` is a null the compiler could not rule out — wrap the Java value in `Option(…)` at the boundary, pattern-match on `null` once there, or change the API so the null cannot arrive; an `unsafeNulls` import switches the checking off for everything after it.
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 74% | Adequate — gated by X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 98% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 47% | Adequate — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 62% | Adequate — gated by P4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 49% | Adequate — gated by D29, D36 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Performance | 91% | Exemplary | Solid. |
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 59 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's Scala imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — No container singleton was found, so there is no shared instance for concurrent requests to race on. No class in this Scala code is a Play controller, a Cask routes object, a Scalatra servlet, a Finatra controller, an Akka/Pekko HTTP routes holder or a JSR-330/Spring singleton, so no instance is shared between request threads.
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — This repository has nothing the runtime tiers could boot or serve — no markup, no UI framework or web-server dependency, no UI component source, no native UI project and no API definition — nothing here is a surface to boot — so runtime a11y/egress/header evidence has no subject here. Not applicable: this is neither a gap in the scan nor a finding about your code.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named column (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone_number, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, a MongoDB or Cassandra driver, JDBC) imported either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, JDBC, MongoDB, Cassandra, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, JDBC, MongoDB, Cassandra, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
- D10 Test Quality — ~736 lines of test source are present (.scala) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .scala suite was found but not re-run
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — sbt licences not graded — no production declaration in build.sbt carries a literal version
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D19 Documentation Quality — No runnable or published unit to look for an example in, and no multi-project root README to look for a map in; the other documentation kinds are withheld (see the gaps), so documentation quality is not applicable here.
- D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency is measured on C# and TypeScript only; Scala not measured.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only — this repository's production source is .scala, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.scala), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (1 of 2 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 13 value object(s)
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 9 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P2 Observability — This repository's JVM source (1 module(s), 20 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JVM source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`addSbtPlugin("org.scoverage" % "sbt-scoverage" % "<version>")` in `project/plugins.sbt`, then `sbt clean coverage test coverageReport`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface: 20 Scala file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source, disabled TLS certificate validation and obsolete TLS versions, and none was found. This repository serves no HTTP of its own — no HTTP-server artifact (akka-http, pekko-http, http4s, Play, Finagle, zio-http, cask, Scalatra, a tapir server, Jetty, Undertow, …) outside test scope in its build, and no server package imported or server bound in its production source — so HTTPS enforcement, HSTS, cookie flags and input validation are N/A here, as they are for a C# library or worker. If this codebase starts serving HTTP, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Scala was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Scala request takes no token: a Future cannot be cancelled, and cats-effect, ZIO and Monix interrupt the fiber that made the request from outside the call, not through a parameter
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Scala was read, and it logs through none that an interpolated message defeats: scala-logging takes an `s"…"` message apart into SLF4J's pattern and arguments at compile time, and log4s, grizzled-slf4j, Play's Logger, Akka's LoggingAdapter, sbt's Logger and Spark's Logging take one finished message (as log4net does in C#). Calls made straight through SLF4J (`org.slf4j.Logger`) would be judged.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 51 finding(s)
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- Orphaned knowledge zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/ZQuery.scala:1
Serious — 13 finding(s)
- TooManyMethods: ZQuery zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/ZQuery.scala:64
- TooManyMethods: ZQuery zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/ZQuery.scala:1083
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/DataSource.scala:316
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/ZQuery.scala:1051
- ZQuery.collectResults (cyclomatic 23) zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/ZQuery.scala:2005
- TodoComment zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/Cache.scala:106
- ZQuery.collectResults (cognitive 35) zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/ZQuery.scala:2005
- FileTooLong: query/ZQuery.scala zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/ZQuery.scala
- REDACTED
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- End-of-life runtime: Node.js 20 .nvmrc:1
- Off the main sequence: zioQuery
- No deployment automation
Minor — 18 finding(s)
- Orphaned file zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/DataSource.scala:1
- Orphaned file zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/internal/Continue.scala:1
- Orphaned file zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/internal/BlockedRequests.scala:1
- Orphaned file zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/CompletedRequestMap.scala:1
- Orphaned file zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/Cache.scala:1
- Orphaned file zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/internal/Result.scala:1
- Orphaned file zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/QueryAspect.scala:1
- Orphaned file zio-query/shared/src/main/scala/zio/query/DataSourceAspect.scala:1
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
- No ADRs found
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
- REDACTED
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- No ADRs
- No architecture diagram/doc
- No SAST .github/workflows/auto-approve.yml:7
- Benchmarks don't track allocations benchmarks/src/main/scala/zio/query/CollectAllBenchmark.scala
- Scala's null is not held to the type system everywhere
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-dbb8ee64d69b48448d220addad41b825/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-dbb8ee64d69b48448d220addad41b825/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt --exclude docs . | 50 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 0 | — |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |