Public report of zaproxy/zest, published 17 November 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.11.4). Assert signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey → Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 17 November 2026, 15:38 UTC · Survey ID cd_b2b21e1cde8e4ba7b572461997b15e01

zaproxy/zest

Measured 17 November 2026, 15:37 UTC, at code version f1f0900

First survey, so nothing to compare with yet Knowledge freshness: not measured

Knowledge freshness is not measured: Freshness signal contradicted by repo activity.

CAI score 52.7out of 100 Adequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

A small codebase: 11,604 lines of product code in 1 project, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Code Health, 33.5

Findings by how serious they are

15 critical 80 serious 67 minor

12 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, we either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard we look for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Assert small markCanine Code Analyzer
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Canine Code Analyzer engine 1.0.0
Measured
17 November 2026, 15:37 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds the Canine Code Analyzer. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today the Canine Code Analyzer is the only one that does.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. We work it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸

46of 46 dimensions measured by tools.
106of 162 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 56 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
46dimensions across 5 lenses, read from 11,604 lines of product code in 1 project.
Chapters

Executive summary

zaproxy/zest falls short of our standard for a template or a sample, held back most by its Code Health lens, the quality of the code itself. It scores 52.7 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, and three of its 15 critical findings are security problems in the build pipeline and in its automatic dependency updates.

Code Health, at 33.5, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is fixing the 12 tests that passed on some runs and failed on others, worth about 7.1 points. Adding type checking would lift Code Health itself, worth about 6.2 points. Raising Code Health to 63 would lift the score to about 65.5.

Two pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. One automatic update takes new releases before a bad one can be spotted. Pinning each tool to an exact version and setting a waiting period for automatic updates would close both risks.

The product code is 11,604 lines, about €20,000 to rebuild.

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Code Health 33.5 · counts for 47%Production Readiness 57.7 · counts for 26%Security and Compliance 75.3 · counts for 14%Maturity 85.7 · counts for 8%Architecture 97.3 · counts for 4%

If Code Health rose from 33.5 to 63, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 52.7 to about 65.5.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Product code 57%Tests 43%
Rebuild cost: about €20,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild€6,600 to €33,000, for 109 to 346 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problemStandard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.7 at a score of 53. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeSmall: 11,604 lines of product code
What it is notNot a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one.

How the estimate is made: We price the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Resolve the 12 Flaky test finding(s) in Test Reliability.
Raises the score by about 7.1 points · Medium effort · Test Reliability
2
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
Raises the score by about 6.2 points · Medium effort · Type Safety
3
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
Raises the score by about 6.2 points · Medium effort · Dead Code

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €20,000 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Code Health, at 33.5 (Weak). Code Health is about how easy the code is to read and change safely, and code that is hard to read is slow and risky to change, so every future change costs more than it should. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Code Health also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Code Health grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Code Health actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Resolve the 12 Flaky test finding(s) in Test Reliability. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 7.1 points for medium effort, because it clears the 12 Test Reliability findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

6 modules, with 1 dependency between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →1 js2 org.zaproxy.zest.core.v13 org.zaproxy.zest.impl.jackson4 org.zaproxy.zest.impl.jackson.module5 org.zaproxy.zest.impl.jackson.ser6 org.zaproxy.zest.impl
1 js
2 org.zaproxy.zest.core.v1
3 org.zaproxy.zest.impl.jackson
4 org.zaproxy.zest.impl.jackson.module
5 org.zaproxy.zest.impl.jackson.ser
6 org.zaproxy.zest.impl28
Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself
1 js2 org.zaproxy.zest.core.v13 org.zaproxy.zest.impl.jackson4 org.zaproxy.zest.impl.jackson.module5 org.zaproxy.zest.impl.jackson.ser6 org.zaproxy.zest.impljs1org.zaproxy.zest.core.v12org.zaproxy.zest.impl.jackson3org.zaproxy.zest.impl.jackson.module4org.zaproxy.zest.impl.jackson.ser5org.zaproxy.zest.impl628

At a glance — Code Health · 33.5 · Weak · gated by R1, R7, X5 ·

At a glance — Architecture · 97.3 · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Maturity · 85.7 · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Readiness · 57.7 · Adequate · gated by D11, P3 ·

At a glance — Security · 75.3 · Checked 4 of 10 · gated by D36 ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A05:2025 — Injection10High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures4Medium

Roadmap

Top priorities: Resolve the 12 Flaky test finding(s) in Test Reliability; Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up; Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 12 Flaky test finding(s) in Test Reliability.+7.1 ptsMediumTest Reliability
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.+6.2 ptsMediumType Safety
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.+6.2 ptsMediumDead Code
Declare the default where Java declares it: `@NullMarked` (org.jspecify.annotations) in each package's `package-info.java`, or once in `module-info.java`, and run NullAway (Error Prone) or the Checker Framework so the declaration is enforced. Then annotate the real exceptions `@Nullable` and resolve the suppressions rather than adding to them: a `@SuppressWarnings("NullAway")` or `castToNonNull(x)` on a value the checker could show to be null is a `NullPointerException` waiting for the path that makes it true — where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (a null check, `Objects.requireNonNull`, a non-null field initialised in the constructor).+4.3 ptsMediumNullable reference types
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+3.3 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Resolve the 13 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with TestRuntime.java (6), ZestStructuredExpressionUnitTest.java (2), ZestScriptUnitTest.java.+2.6 ptsMediumExplicit Debt
Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.+2.6 ptsMediumCode Duplication
Resolve the 1 `ZestExpressionURL` spells `URL` where 14 names in the project spell it… finding(s) in Naming Consistency — start with ZestExpressionURL.java.+1.0 ptsLowNaming Consistency

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 36 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 0% slop · 3% mixed · 97% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED3.7MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestBasicRunner.java6.0Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
REDACTED6.0Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/TestRuntime.java6.5Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestPrinter.java7.1Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: ZestPrinter.list (cyclomatic 30)
REDACTED7.1Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: ZestActionInvoke.invoke (cyclomatic 18)
src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoop.java7.1Near-cleanGod Classes: TooManyMethods: ZestLoop
REDACTED7.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: FixmeComment
src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/CmdLine.java7.2Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: CmdLine.main (cyclomatic 39)
REDACTED7.2Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestStructuredExpressionUnitTest.java7.3Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestConditional.java7.4Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: ZestConditional.getStatement (cognitive 16)
src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopClientElements.java7.4Near-cleanCode Duplication: Edited copies of one member (3 members, 10+ corresponding lines)
src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientLaunch.java7.8Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: ZestClientLaunch.invoke (cyclomatic 24)
src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopTokenClientElementsSet.java7.8Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: ZestLoopTokenClientElementsSet.getConvertedSet (cyclomatic 16)
src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopFile.java7.8Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (5 lines × 2)
src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestClientElementSubmitUnitTest.java7.8Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: shouldSubmitExistingElement
src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestJSONUnitTest.java7.8Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: shouldFailOnBadOptions
src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestScriptUnitTest.java8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestUtils.java8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 15

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 80

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 67

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 12

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 46 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.

Every figure here is one of two kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10.

What we checked — 46 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D6D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D19D21D27D28D29D35D36D44AX10AX3AX4AX6GD1IC1M1M3P1P2P3P6R1R10R2R3R7R9X12X13X16X23X27X3X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 106 of 162 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a1ea28-5881-730a-b47a-8ce24ab09ca8.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.java, .js) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo.
  • D10 Test Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 409 test(s) behind this row are the ones the code-model census could read, and this repository also carries at least 1 test source file(s) (.js) that it cannot: it reads the test types the .java frontend declared, so a suite in any other language is invisible to it. Skipped tests, zero-assertion tests and the other quality signals on this row are UNMEASURED in that suite — their absence from the counts above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that those tests are sound.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Currency was graded against Maven Central, but whether an artifact is DEPRECATED is not: Maven Central publishes no deprecation marker, exactly as rubygems.org does not. Whether one is UNMAINTAINED is not graded either — no registry publishes a maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Two of this dimension's four signals are therefore unread on a Gradle tree, and its score reflects currency alone.
  • D21 Naming Consistency — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. PREREGISTRATION version 20's fallback (adjudication D21-sample3-v3): this rule kind was adjudicated below the 95 % precision gate, so its candidates are counted here and not published, and the score covers only the acronym-spelling and awaitable-suffix rules. The kind returns as rows only after it shows a measured precision; this says nothing about whether these names are consistent.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict. For npm the surface is what a published package.json's entry points (exports, main, module, types) export, followed through the source; an entry that names build output the tree does not commit (dist/, build/) is not followed back to source, because only a tsconfig outDir/rootDir pair states that mapping and a bundler's input lives in executable configuration this engine does not evaluate.
  • D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. File-level freshness contradicts repo activity: 33 commits in the last 90 days, yet 45 of 48 significant files carry no living knowledge. Those two readings cannot both be true, so the per-file recency signal is treated as unreliable here and freshness is not scored for this run.
  • C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
  • C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
  • C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
  • C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
  • P1 CI/CD gates — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — so either the gate runs tests through a step this pass could not recognise, or "test" is incidental here (a path, "latest", a reporter). Which of the two it is cannot be settled from this dimension's evidence; the coverage dimensions report whether a suite exists at all. You can widen what we reach: name the test runner explicitly in the pipeline step (your stack's test command, or a job named for the suite) so the gate is unambiguous to a reader and to this pass.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
  • X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust, Go, Swift, Erlang, F# and Visual Basic source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP log through no library that carries a message's values as fields (pino, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr; Python's logging, structlog; PHP's PSR-3 loggers), so its log calls cannot be judged, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — we run the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming consistency compares each name with the convention its structural peers follow in this repository: it cannot tell whether a consistently used name is a good one, and languages other than C# and TypeScript are not measured.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

7 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was CmdLine.main at 39.

CmdLine.main (cyclomatic 39)src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/CmdLine.java:38
ZestPrinter.list (cyclomatic 30)src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestPrinter.java:103
ZestClientLaunch.invoke (cyclomatic 24)src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientLaunch.java:160
ZestBasicRunner.runStatement (cyclomatic 20)src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestBasicRunner.java:166
ZestActionInvoke.invoke (cyclomatic 18)REDACTED:89

+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Bring the 1 body over 30 down to 30 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with CmdLine.main (cyclomatic 39). — Refactoring it lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 8.4 to about 8.7/10.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was CmdLine.main at 65.

CmdLine.main (cognitive 65)src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/CmdLine.java:38
ZestPrinter.list (cognitive 46)src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestPrinter.java:103
ZestClientLaunch.invoke (cognitive 40)src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientLaunch.java:160
ZestActionInvoke.invoke (cognitive 29)REDACTED:89
ZestPrinter.printExpression (cognitive 27)src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestPrinter.java:235

+ 5 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Bring the 3 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with CmdLine.main (cognitive 65), ZestPrinter.list (cognitive 46), ZestClientLaunch.invoke (cognitive 40). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 3 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 7.7 to about 8.5/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 30; a cleaner split scores higher.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

8 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: ZestScript · ×6src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestScript.java:20
MethodTooLong: CmdLine.main · ×2src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/CmdLine.java:38

What to do

  1. Resolve the 6 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with ZestScript.java, ZestBasicRunner.java, ZestLoop.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 MethodTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with CmdLine.java, ZestPrinter.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the production code is copy-pasted: the share of production lines inside a reported copy (every copy of a duplicated block or of an edited member, each line once), 10 at none and 0 at a quarter of the lines.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), scored on the share of production lines inside a reported copy (each line once; 10 at none, 0 at a quarter). Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

14 duplicated block group(s) detected. 3.6 % of the production lines (413 of 11,604) are in a reported copy. A further 8 rows report members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it.

Edited copy of a member (14 corresponding lines) · ×2REDACTED:279
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×2src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestConditional.java:341
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×2src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoop.java:257
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) · ×2src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientWindowClose.java:45
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×2src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopFile.java:58

+ 12 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Edited copy of a member (14 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with REDACTED, ZestLoop.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with ZestConditional.java, ZestLoop.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with ZestLoop.java (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 23 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality9.7 / 10Stronggated by 7 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 7 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 409 tests. Measured on the .java suite only — at least 1 test source file(s) (.js) went unread, so its test quality is unmeasured and is not in these counts.

No assertions: shouldSubmitExistingElement · ×7src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestClientElementSubmitUnitTest.java:149

What to do

  1. Resolve the 7 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with ZestClientElementSubmitUnitTest.java (2), ZestJSONUnitTest.java (2), ZestConditionalRegexComplexUnitTest.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

12 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). Java/Kotlin (repository root, Gradle): measured (12 flaky).

Flaky test: org.zaproxy.zest.test.v1.ZestClientElementClickUnitTest$ShadowDom."Chrome" [closed, closed] · ×12

What to do

  1. Resolve the 12 Flaky test finding(s) in Test Reliability. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, not deprecated, and not bloated. Known vulnerabilities are D30's.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (capped-linear for deprecation, prerelease and outdated) per KLoC. Known-vulnerable packages are D30's and are not charged here (rubric-2026.11.2). Exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

This repository's Gradle dependency graph was RESOLVED BY A BUILD, across every subproject rather than the root alone: 101 artifact(s) resolved, 101 of them gradable against Maven Central, and 38 behind a shipped release. Where a version was requested and a different one won conflict resolution, the RESOLVED version is what is graded — grading the request would recommend an upgrade already applied. Known CVEs in the same graph are a separate question again, reported under D30.

Outdated (compile): io.github.classgraph:classgraph · ×38

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 2 declared JVM dependency artifact(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from the POMs Maven Central publishes, over the coordinates this repository's 2 Maven/Gradle manifest(s) declare with a version resolvable from the manifest itself — the same declaration-site closure this analysis reads for dependency currency. The JVM has no lockfile a checkout is guaranteed to carry, so this is deliberately NOT the transitive closure.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author. Counted over 21 of the 114 production source files in this repository: 66 are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over, and the remaining 27 have no attributable history left to measure.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.4 / 10Stronggated by 15 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

43 deducted task-comment markers across 11604 LoC (0.3/KLoC) → score 9.4. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

TodoComment · ×13src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/TestRuntime.java:97
FixmeCommentREDACTED:156
TodoComment repeated across 27 filessrc/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestAction.java:6

What to do

  1. Resolve the 13 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with TestRuntime.java (6), ZestStructuredExpressionUnitTest.java (2), ZestScriptUnitTest.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 FixmeComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 TodoComment repeated across 27 files finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with ZestAction.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Every README, docs/ document and root guide parsed by its markup and measured in Unicode letters. Published: a runnable or packaged .NET project whose README (or a document it links, or a root guide) shows no example, and a root README naming none of three or more projects. Overview, licence, boilerplate, wall-of-text, empty-section and XML-doc rows are measured and withheld (counted in gaps) after adjudication. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 1 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency3.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Seven vocabulary-free rules (N1-N7) mine each naming convention from the repository and flag a name that breaks a convention its structural peers in the same unit follow; production C# and TypeScript, each its own population. Deterministic, no model, no sample. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 naming inconsistencies among 15 declarations measured against a convention their peers follow.

`ZestExpressionURL` spells `URL` where 14 names in the project spell it `Url`src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestExpressionURL.java:11

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 `ZestExpressionURL` spells `URL` where 14 names in the project spell it… finding(s) in Naming Consistency — start with ZestExpressionURL.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D27 · Navigability8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 % of calls cross a namespace and 21 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)7.6 / 10Adequategated by 3 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 7 low. 2 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `gradlew` (line 74, line 180) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
  3. No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 2 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 2 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX10 · Code composition10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

  • `ZestRunner` declares 26 abstract methods: `getStopOnAssertFail`, `getStopOnTestFail`, `getVariable`, `getVariables`, `handleAction`, `handleAssignment`, `handleClient`, `handleLoop`, `handleResponse`, `isDebug`, `responseFailed`, `responseFailed`, `responsePassed`, `responsePassed`, `run`, `run`, `runScript`, `runScript`, `runStatement`, `send`, `setDebug`, `setOutputWriter`, `setScriptEngineFactory`, `setStopOnAssertFail`, `setStopOnTestFail`, `setVariable`. Counted over its ABSTRACT methods, once per signature; `default`, `static` and `private` methods and constants are not counted, because no implementer is forced to write them. Those 26 declarations carry 22 distinct name(s), so part of the width is overloading rather than separate responsibilities — but 22 operations clears the >15 bar on its own, so the row is about responsibilities, not signatures. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestRunner.java:13

What to do

  • Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue in this repository's Java: methods whose whole body only throws a "not implemented" or bare unsupported-operation exception, or returns a default value (or nothing) under a TODO/FIXME marker, and placeholder text (lorem ipsum, changeme/replace_me…) left in strings of non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords, in this repository's Java: methods that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant or do nothing, dead `if (false)` branches, and skeleton classes most of whose methods are holes.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something. (×12) — src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestExpressionAndUnitTest.java:22, src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestExpressionAndUnitTest.java:27, src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestExpressionAndUnitTest.java:32, …

What to do

  • Clear the softer debt: re-enable or delete @Disabled/@Ignore tests, decide whether each empty method or UnsupportedOperationException is deliberate (and say so in a comment), and replace @SuppressWarnings("all") with targeted, justified suppressions.
M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository and its projects have a README, and whether it is substantive.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository is organised deliberately: production code and tests are set apart in a way its ecosystem or the repository itself declares.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`./gradlew test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.
P2 · Observability5.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 1/2 runnable modules use logging (modules with no entry point or server are excluded — they are libraries a runnable module hosts). Silent: `.`.
  • `js/node-operations.js` reports through `console.*` at line 27 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — js/node-operations.js:27
  • `js/node-operations.js` reports through `console.*` at line 33 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — js/node-operations.js:33
  • `js/zestscript.js` reports through `console.*` at line 106 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — js/zestscript.js:106

What to do

  • Extend structured logging to the remaining runnable modules so everything you run is diagnosable in production.
  • Route service-code `console.*` output through the module's structured logger (with named fields), so delivery outcomes and failures reach the log pipeline with a level.
P3 · Security & performance tooling3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add spotbugs with find-sec-bugs (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:7

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

  • 0 typed · 5 plain JS — the untyped files are js/log.js, js/node-operations.js, js/zest-test.js, js/zest.js, js/zestscript.js.

What to do

  • Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
R10 · Code Duplication4.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — The share of the scored frontend lines inside a near-exact copy-pasted block of substantial extent (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386; each line once, 10 at none and 0 at a quarter of the lines, as D4): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.

Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Scored on the share of the scored frontend lines inside a reported copy, on the same curve as D4. Deterministic.

  • js/zestscript.js:135 · js/zestscript.js:151 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — js/zestscript.js:135
  • js/zest-test.js:29 · js/zest.js:1 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 76 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — js/zest-test.js:29

What to do

  • Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

R7 · Dead Code0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 2 application, 0 tooling and 2 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. This repository declares no build, type-check or test script, so nothing here would fail on a wrong deletion — confirm by hand that nothing loads each file (including by a path built at runtime) before removing it. An undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (2 application, 0 tooling, 2 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (js/zest-test.js, js/zest.js) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — js/zestscript.js
  • no import path from any entry point (2 application, 0 tooling, 2 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (js/zest.js) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — js/node-operations.js
  • no import path from any entry point (2 application, 0 tooling, 2 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make (×2) — js/zest-test.js, js/zest.js
  • no import path from any entry point (2 application, 0 tooling, 2 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (js/zestscript.js) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — js/log.js

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X13 · Undrained process stream3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

  • The JDK merges `stderr` into `stdout` here (`redirectErrorStream(true)`), and that one stream is still a pipe — and `p.waitFor()` is written before stdout is read, so nothing drains it while the parent waits. The JDK's own `Process` documentation warns that failing to read a child's output promptly "may cause the process to block, or even deadlock": once the child writes more than the pipe holds (measured on OpenJDK 25 / Linux: 60,000 bytes finishes, 70,000 hangs forever), it blocks on the write, never exits, and the wait never returns. Nothing fails loudly. Read every piped stream before (or while) waiting — a thread or `CompletableFuture` per stream — merge them with `redirectErrorStream(true)` and read the one stream before `waitFor`, or discard what you do not want with `redirectOutput`/`redirectError(ProcessBuilder.Redirect.DISCARD)` (or a file). — REDACTED:146

What to do

  • Each finding names the span that makes the branch dead and the span it is dead because of. Confirm from the two, then delete the dead arm or fix the predicate that was meant to be reachable.
X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an enhanced `for` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is iterating invalidates the fail-fast iterator it is holding, so the next `next()` throws `ConcurrentModificationException` and the remaining elements are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X5 · Nullable reference types2.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether Java packages are null-marked and not undermined by heavy nullness suppression — a package under `@NullMarked` (or `@NonNullApi`, `@ParametersAreNonnullByDefault`, `@NonNullByDefault`, or a NullAway/Checker Framework configuration naming it) makes an unannotated reference exclude null, and `@SuppressWarnings("NullAway")`, `("nullness")`, `("null")` and `castToNonNull(…)` are what silence it.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 0/6 of this repository's Java package directories are under a non-null default: a `package-info.java` declaring `@NullMarked` (JSpecify) or `@NonNullApi`, `@ParametersAreNonnullByDefault`, `@NonNullByDefault`, `@DefaultQualifier(NonNull.class)`; a `module-info.java` declaring `@NullMarked`; every type in it `@NullMarked`; or a build that runs NullAway with the package in `AnnotatedPackages`, or the Checker Framework's `NullnessChecker`. Elsewhere every reference admits null and no checker warns on the dereference that throws a `NullPointerException`.

What to do

  • Declare the default where Java declares it: `@NullMarked` (org.jspecify.annotations) in each package's `package-info.java`, or once in `module-info.java`, and run NullAway (Error Prone) or the Checker Framework so the declaration is enforced. Then annotate the real exceptions `@Nullable` and resolve the suppressions rather than adding to them: a `@SuppressWarnings("NullAway")` or `castToNonNull(x)` on a value the checker could show to be null is a `NullPointerException` waiting for the path that makes it true — where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (a null check, `Objects.requireNonNull`, a non-null field initialised in the constructor).

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health33.5Weak — gated by R1, R7, X5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture97.3ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity85.7ExemplarySolid.
Readiness57.7Adequate — gated by D11, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security75.3Checked 4 of 10Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not evidenced — 5 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 76 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's Java imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — No container singleton was found, so there is no shared instance for concurrent requests to race on. No class in this Java code is a Spring, JSR-330 or CDI singleton bean. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — This repository has nothing the runtime tiers could boot or serve — no markup, no UI framework or web-server dependency, no UI component source, no native UI project and no API definition — nothing here is a surface to boot — so runtime a11y/egress/header evidence has no subject here. Not applicable: this is neither a gap in the scan nor a finding about your code.
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .java source were not judged.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (11832 LoC, 115 module-visible types across 6 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Gradle build (build.gradle/build.gradle.kts) and a Gradle version catalogue — not scanned yet).
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — knowledge concentrated in recent work — freshness signal contradicted by repo activity
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Gradle build (build.gradle/build.gradle.kts) and a Gradle version catalogue — not scanned yet).
  • D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this Gradle build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (1 value object(s))
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 1 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks.
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JVM, JavaScript/TypeScript source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
  • P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `@Benchmark` in a Java, Kotlin or Scala file importing JMH or kotlinx-benchmark, Jetpack Benchmark's `measureRepeated` in a file importing androidx.benchmark, or JMH/kotlinx-benchmark/androidx.benchmark in a pom.xml, Gradle or sbt build, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: this repository declares no async functions, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • R4 Test Coverage — 2 test file(s) reach none of 5 production file(s) via imports — exercised outside the JS import graph (integration/bundled), not import-reachable
  • R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D30 (Dependency Vulnerabilities), which answers every ecosystem
  • R6 Tooling — no package.json in the repository — test/lint/typecheck wiring is read from package.json scripts (corroborated against CI), so this project's own toolchain isn't measured here
  • R8 Dependency Hygiene — Not measured — no package.json declares any dependency, so there is nothing to check imports against (imports may resolve through a host runtime rather than node).
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Java was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Java request off Android takes no token: it is cancelled through the handle it returns (Future.cancel, Call.cancel, a Disposable), ambiently (io.grpc.Context) or by interrupting its thread, not through a parameter
  • X20 Mistyped argument guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 15 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Flaky test · ×12
  • Flaky test: org.zaproxy.zest.test.v1.ZestClientElementClickUnitTest$ShadowDom."Chrome" [closed, closed] — Passed 6×, failed 12× across repeated runs.
  • Flaky test: org.zaproxy.zest.test.v1.ZestClientElementClickUnitTest$ShadowDom."Chrome" [closed, open] — Passed 6×, failed 12× across repeated runs.
  • Flaky test: org.zaproxy.zest.test.v1.ZestClientElementClickUnitTest$ShadowDom."Chrome" [closed] — Passed 6×, failed 12× across repeated runs.
  • Flaky test: org.zaproxy.zest.test.v1.ZestClientElementClickUnitTest$ShadowDom."Chrome" [open, closed] — Passed 6×, failed 12× across repeated runs.
  • Flaky test: org.zaproxy.zest.test.v1.ZestClientElementClickUnitTest$ShadowDom."Chrome" [open, open] — Passed 6×, failed 12× across repeated runs.
  • Flaky test: org.zaproxy.zest.test.v1.ZestClientElementClickUnitTest$ShadowDom."Chrome" [open] — Passed 6×, failed 12× across repeated runs.
  • Flaky test: org.zaproxy.zest.test.v1.ZestClientElementClickUnitTest$ShadowDom."Firefox" [closed, closed] — Passed 6×, failed 12× across repeated runs.
  • Flaky test: org.zaproxy.zest.test.v1.ZestClientElementClickUnitTest$ShadowDom."Firefox" [closed, open] — Passed 6×, failed 12× across repeated runs.
  • Flaky test: org.zaproxy.zest.test.v1.ZestClientElementClickUnitTest$ShadowDom."Firefox" [closed] — Passed 6×, failed 12× across repeated runs.
  • Flaky test: org.zaproxy.zest.test.v1.ZestClientElementClickUnitTest$ShadowDom."Firefox" [open, closed] — Passed 6×, failed 12× across repeated runs.
  • Flaky test: org.zaproxy.zest.test.v1.ZestClientElementClickUnitTest$ShadowDom."Firefox" [open, open] — Passed 6×, failed 12× across repeated runs.
  • Flaky test: org.zaproxy.zest.test.v1.ZestClientElementClickUnitTest$ShadowDom."Firefox" [open] — Passed 6×, failed 12× across repeated runs.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
Serious — 80 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×13
  • TodoComment src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/TestRuntime.java:97 — // TODO Auto-generated method stub — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/TestRuntime.java:103 — // TODO Auto-generated method stub — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/TestRuntime.java:109 — // TODO Auto-generated method stub — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/TestRuntime.java:115 — // TODO Auto-generated method stub — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/TestRuntime.java:121 — // TODO Auto-generated method stub — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/TestRuntime.java:127 — // TODO Auto-generated method stub — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestScriptUnitTest.java:266 — // TODO check more containers — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestStructuredExpressionUnitTest.java:91 — // TODO to many booleans — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestStructuredExpressionUnitTest.java:114 — // TODO maybe an exception raises if a — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestBasicRunner.java:494 — // TODO support credentials — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestUtils.java:27 — // TODO support form names — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/jackson/JacksonConfig.java:82 — // TODO Remove runtime dependency on ClassGraph — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment REDACTED:25 — // TODO this dependant on protocol, eg http / ws / ?? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D10 · Test Quality · No assertions · ×7
  • No assertions: shouldSubmitExistingElement src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestClientElementSubmitUnitTest.java:149 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
  • No assertions: shouldSubmitIfInputElementNotInForm src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestClientElementSubmitUnitTest.java:353 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
  • No assertions: testEvaluateAlone src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestConditionalRegexComplexUnitTest.java:12 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
  • No assertions: testDeepCopy src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestExpressionAndUnitTest.java:17 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
  • No assertions: shouldFailOnBadOptions src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestJSONUnitTest.java:191 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
  • No assertions: shouldSetOptions src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestJSONUnitTest.java:166 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
  • No assertions: testOpenFile src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestLoopFileUnitTest.java:22 — This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×6
  • TooManyMethods: ZestScript src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestScript.java:20 — TooManyMethods — 52 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 22 over it, 1.73× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: ZestBasicRunner src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestBasicRunner.java:42 — TooManyMethods — 48 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 18 over it, 1.60× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: ZestLoop src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoop.java:19 — TooManyMethods — 41 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 11 over it, 1.37× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: ZestAssignFromElement src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestAssignFromElement.java:14 — TooManyMethods — 33 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 3 over it, 1.10× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: ZestConditional src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestConditional.java:14 — TooManyMethods — 33 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 3 over it, 1.10× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: ZestRequest REDACTED:15 — TooManyMethods — 33 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 3 over it, 1.10× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
D3 · God Classes · MethodTooLong · ×2
  • MethodTooLong: CmdLine.main src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/CmdLine.java:38 — MethodTooLong — main runs 136 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 36 over it, 1.36× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
  • MethodTooLong: ZestPrinter.list src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestPrinter.java:103 — MethodTooLong — list runs 116 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 16 over it, 1.16× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (14 corresponding lines) · ×2
  • Edited copy of a member (14 corresponding lines) REDACTED:279 — REDACTED:279-292 | REDACTED:299-312 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 14 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
  • Edited copy of a member (14 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoop.java:217 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoop.java:217-230 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestScript.java:281-296 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 14 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestConditional.java:341 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestConditional.java:341-353 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestScript.java:284-296 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestConditional.java:341` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoop.java:141 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoop.java:141-153 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestScript.java:236-248 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoop.java:257 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoop.java:257-265 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestScript.java:612-620 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoop.java:393 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoop.java:393-401 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestScript.java:641-649 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientWindowClose.java:45 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientWindowClose.java:45-50 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientWindowOpenUrl.java:45-50 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopStateInteger.java:38 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopStateInteger.java:38-43 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopStateString.java:44-49 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopFile.java:58 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopFile.java:58-62 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopString.java:37-41 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopFile.java:71 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopFile.java:71-75 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopString.java:60-64 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · CmdLine.main (cyclomatic 39) · ×1
  • CmdLine.main (cyclomatic 39) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/CmdLine.java:38 — CmdLine.main has cyclomatic complexity 39 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · ZestPrinter.list (cyclomatic 30) · ×1
  • ZestPrinter.list (cyclomatic 30) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestPrinter.java:103 — ZestPrinter.list has cyclomatic complexity 30 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · ZestClientLaunch.invoke (cyclomatic 24) · ×1
  • ZestClientLaunch.invoke (cyclomatic 24) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientLaunch.java:160 — ZestClientLaunch.invoke has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · ZestBasicRunner.runStatement (cyclomatic 20) · ×1
  • ZestBasicRunner.runStatement (cyclomatic 20) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestBasicRunner.java:166 — ZestBasicRunner.runStatement has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · ZestActionInvoke.invoke (cyclomatic 18) · ×1
  • ZestActionInvoke.invoke (cyclomatic 18) REDACTED:89 — ZestActionInvoke.invoke has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · ZestPrinter.printExpression (cyclomatic 17) · ×1
  • ZestPrinter.printExpression (cyclomatic 17) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestPrinter.java:235 — ZestPrinter.printExpression has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · ZestLoopTokenClientElementsSet.getConvertedSet (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • ZestLoopTokenClientElementsSet.getConvertedSet (cyclomatic 16) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopTokenClientElementsSet.java:61 — ZestLoopTokenClientElementsSet.getConvertedSet has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D17 · Explicit Debt · FixmeComment · ×1
  • FixmeComment REDACTED:156 — // FIXME: Why is here a hard-coded port (80)? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment repeated across 27 files · ×1
  • TodoComment repeated across 27 files src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestAction.java:6 — The identical TodoComment appears in 27 files (29 occurrences) — almost certainly one boilerplate line from a single migration or decision, not 29 independent debts. Fix the systemic cause once rather than file-by-file. Text: "// TODO: Auto-generated Javadoc". Source code is not a task system: track the cleanup where tasks live. (Every occurrence still counts toward the score and metrics.)
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · CmdLine.main (cognitive 65) · ×1
  • CmdLine.main (cognitive 65) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/CmdLine.java:38 — CmdLine.main has cognitive complexity 65 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 29 (52 pts), error handling 4 (8 pts), boolean chains 2, loops 2, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 27). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ZestPrinter.list (cognitive 46) · ×1
  • ZestPrinter.list (cognitive 46) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestPrinter.java:103 — ZestPrinter.list has cognitive complexity 46 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 25 (30 pts), loops 6 (14 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 13). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ZestClientLaunch.invoke (cognitive 40) · ×1
  • ZestClientLaunch.invoke (cognitive 40) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientLaunch.java:160 — ZestClientLaunch.invoke has cognitive complexity 40 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 20 (33 pts), error handling 2 (3 pts), boolean chains 2, loops 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ZestActionInvoke.invoke (cognitive 29) · ×1
  • ZestActionInvoke.invoke (cognitive 29) REDACTED:89 — ZestActionInvoke.invoke has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13 (18 pts), loops 3 (7 pts), error handling 2 (3 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ZestPrinter.printExpression (cognitive 27) · ×1
  • ZestPrinter.printExpression (cognitive 27) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestPrinter.java:235 — ZestPrinter.printExpression has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13 (15 pts), loops 2 (6 pts), ternaries 2 (6 pts) (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ZestBasicRunner.runStatement (cognitive 26) · ×1
  • ZestBasicRunner.runStatement (cognitive 26) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestBasicRunner.java:166 — ZestBasicRunner.runStatement has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15 (16 pts), loops 2 (6 pts), boolean chains 2, error handling 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ZestLoopTokenClientElementsSet.getConvertedSet (cognitive 24) · ×1
  • ZestLoopTokenClientElementsSet.getConvertedSet (cognitive 24) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopTokenClientElementsSet.java:61 — ZestLoopTokenClientElementsSet.getConvertedSet has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14 (20 pts), boolean chains 2, loops 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ZestVariables.replaceInString (cognitive 21) · ×1
  • ZestVariables.replaceInString (cognitive 21) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestVariables.java:192 — ZestVariables.replaceInString has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (16 pts), error handling 1 (3 pts), boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ZestLoopTokenRegexSet.getConvertedSet (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • ZestLoopTokenRegexSet.getConvertedSet (cognitive 20) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopTokenRegexSet.java:60 — ZestLoopTokenRegexSet.getConvertedSet has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (17 pts), loops 1 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ZestConditional.getStatement (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • ZestConditional.getStatement (cognitive 16) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestConditional.java:328 — ZestConditional.getStatement has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (14 pts), loops 2 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestBasicRunner.java:245 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestBasicRunner.java:245-257 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestBasicRunner.java:347-359 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 13 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copies of one member (3 members, 10+ corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copies of one member (3 members, 10+ corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopClientElements.java:36 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopClientElements.java:36-45 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopFile.java:78-92 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopRegex.java:40-49 — These 3 members are one piece of code written 3 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 10 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 3 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (15 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (15 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoop.java:140 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoop.java:140-154 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestScript.java:235-250 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 15 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestBasicRunner.java:542 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestBasicRunner.java:542-551 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestBasicRunner.java:559-567 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 9 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (11 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (11 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientWindowOpenUrl.java:58 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientWindowOpenUrl.java:58-70 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientWindowResize.java:63-73 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 11 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (7 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (7 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientElement.java:30 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientElement.java:30-36 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopTokenClientElementsSet.java:46-53 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 7 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (19–20 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (19–20 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestScriptEngine.java:30 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestScriptEngine.java:30-49 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestScriptEngine.java:53-71 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15–16 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (15–16 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientWindowHandle.java:82 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientWindowHandle.java:82-96 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientWindowHandle.java:99-114 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientWindowHandle.java:82` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12–15 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12–15 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestPrinter.java:284 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestPrinter.java:284-295 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestPrinter.java:298-312 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/ZestPrinter.java:298` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/CmdLine.java:73 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/CmdLine.java:73-80 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/CmdLine.java:95-102 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/impl/CmdLine.java:73` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5–6 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (5–6 lines × 3) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopClientElements.java:40 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopClientElements.java:40-45 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopFile.java:83-87 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopRegex.java:44-49 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from all 3 call sites, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopClientElements.java:40` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The `return` at the foot of the matched lines is the enclosing body's own terminal exit, not an early one: it moves with them unchanged, and each site calls the extracted unit from the position that `return` occupied — no decision has to be handed back and re-acted on. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 5) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 5) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopClientElements.java:73 — src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopClientElements.java:73-78 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopFile.java:145-150 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopInteger.java:151-156 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopRegex.java:80-85 | src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestLoopString.java:133-138 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from all 5 call sites, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
R1 · Type Safety · Type Safety · ×1
  • Type Safety — 0 typed · 5 plain JS — the untyped files are js/log.js, js/node-operations.js, js/zest-test.js, js/zest.js, js/zestscript.js.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) js/zestscript.js:135 — js/zestscript.js:135 · js/zestscript.js:151 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block with local edits (9 matched lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block with local edits (9 matched lines × 2 locations) js/zest-test.js:29 — js/zest-test.js:29 · js/zest.js:1 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 76 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~186 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~186 LoC) js/zestscript.js — no import path from any entry point (2 application, 0 tooling, 2 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (js/zest-test.js, js/zest.js) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~43 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~43 LoC) js/node-operations.js — no import path from any entry point (2 application, 0 tooling, 2 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (js/zest.js) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~39 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~39 LoC) js/zest-test.js — no import path from any entry point (2 application, 0 tooling, 2 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~27 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~27 LoC) js/log.js — no import path from any entry point (2 application, 0 tooling, 2 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (js/zestscript.js) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~11 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~11 LoC) js/zest.js — no import path from any entry point (2 application, 0 tooling, 2 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
X13 · Undrained process stream · Redirected process stream is never drained (deadlock) · ×1
  • Redirected process stream is never drained (deadlock) REDACTED:146 — The JDK merges `stderr` into `stdout` here (`redirectErrorStream(true)`), and that one stream is still a pipe — and `p.waitFor()` is written before stdout is read, so nothing drains it while the parent waits. The JDK's own `Process` documentation warns that failing to read a child's output promptly "may cause the process to block, or even deadlock": once the child writes more than the pipe holds (measured on OpenJDK 25 / Linux: 60,000 bytes finishes, 70,000 hangs forever), it blocks on the write, never exits, and the wait never returns. Nothing fails loudly. Read every piped stream before (or while) waiting — a thread or `CompletableFuture` per stream — merge them with `redirectErrorStream(true)` and read the one stream before `waitFor`, or discard what you do not want with `redirectOutput`/`redirectError(ProcessBuilder.Redirect.DISCARD)` (or a file).
Minor — 29 finding(s)
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Disabled test · ×12
  • Disabled test src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestExpressionAndUnitTest.java:22 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
  • Disabled test src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestExpressionAndUnitTest.java:27 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
  • Disabled test src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestExpressionAndUnitTest.java:32 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
  • Disabled test src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestExpressionAndUnitTest.java:37 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
  • Disabled test src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestExpressionAndUnitTest.java:42 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
  • Disabled test src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestExpressionAndUnitTest.java:47 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
  • Disabled test src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestExpressionAndUnitTest.java:52 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
  • Disabled test src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestExpressionAndUnitTest.java:57 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
  • Disabled test src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestExpressionAndUnitTest.java:62 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
  • Disabled test src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestExpressionAndUnitTest.java:67 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
  • Disabled test src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestExpressionAndUnitTest.java:72 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
  • Disabled test src/test/java/org/zaproxy/zest/test/v1/ZestExpressionAndUnitTest.java:77 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
P2 · Observability · Console output used as the logging channel · ×3
  • Console output used as the logging channel js/node-operations.js:27 — `js/node-operations.js` reports through `console.*` at line 27 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
  • Console output used as the logging channel js/node-operations.js:33 — `js/node-operations.js` reports through `console.*` at line 33 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
  • Console output used as the logging channel js/zestscript.js:106 — `js/zestscript.js` reports through `console.*` at line 106 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
AX6 · Interface segregation · Fat interface · ×1
  • Fat interface: ZestRunner (26 abstract methods) src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestRunner.java:13 — `ZestRunner` declares 26 abstract methods: `getStopOnAssertFail`, `getStopOnTestFail`, `getVariable`, `getVariables`, `handleAction`, `handleAssignment`, `handleClient`, `handleLoop`, `handleResponse`, `isDebug`, `responseFailed`, `responseFailed`, `responsePassed`, `responsePassed`, `run`, `run`, `runScript`, `runScript`, `runStatement`, `send`, `setDebug`, `setOutputWriter`, `setScriptEngineFactory`, `setStopOnAssertFail`, `setStopOnTestFail`, `setVariable`. Counted over its ABSTRACT methods, once per signature; `default`, `static` and `private` methods and constants are not counted, because no implementer is forced to write them. Those 26 declarations carry 22 distinct name(s), so part of the width is overloading rather than separate responsibilities — but 22 operations clears the >15 bar on its own, so the row is about responsibilities, not signatures. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces.
D21 · Naming Consistency · `ZestExpressionURL` spells `URL` where 14 names in the project spell it `Url` · ×1
  • `ZestExpressionURL` spells `URL` where 14 names in the project spell it `Url` src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestExpressionURL.java:11 — 14 of 15 names in project zest spell the token `Url` (14 of 15; unit: names in project zest containing `Url`). Peers: ZestClientLaunch.getUrl (src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientLaunch.java:108); ZestClientLaunch.setUrl (src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientLaunch.java:112); ZestClientWindowHandle.getUrl (src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientWindowHandle.java:39); ZestClientWindowHandle.setUrl (src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientWindowHandle.java:43); org.zaproxy.zest.core.v1.ZestClientWindowOpenUrl (src/main/java/org/zaproxy/zest/core/v1/ZestClientWindowOpenUrl.java:13). Rename to `ZestExpressionUrl`. [rule N6]
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
P2 · Observability · Logging is not universal · ×1
  • Logging is not universal — Only 1/2 runnable modules use logging (modules with no entry point or server are excluded — they are libraries a runnable module hosts). Silent: `.`.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1
  • No SAST REDACTED:7 — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add spotbugs with find-sec-bugs (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
X5 · Nullable reference types · Java packages are not null-marked everywhere · ×1
  • Java packages are not null-marked everywhere — 0/6 of this repository's Java package directories are under a non-null default: a `package-info.java` declaring `@NullMarked` (JSpecify) or `@NonNullApi`, `@ParametersAreNonnullByDefault`, `@NonNullByDefault`, `@DefaultQualifier(NonNull.class)`; a `module-info.java` declaring `@NullMarked`; every type in it `@NullMarked`; or a build that runs NullAway with the package in `AnnotatedPackages`, or the Checker Framework's `NullnessChecker`. Elsewhere every reference admits null and no checker warns on the dereference that throws a `NullPointerException`.
Minor — 38 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile) · ×38
  • Outdated (compile): io.github.classgraph:classgraph — io.github.classgraph:classgraph 5.0.1 → 6.0.2 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.github.classgraph:classgraph-classpath — io.github.classgraph:classgraph-classpath 5.0.1 → 6.0.2 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.github.classgraph:classgraph-vfs — io.github.classgraph:classgraph-vfs 5.0.1 → 6.0.2 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.github.classgraph:classgraph-base — io.github.classgraph:classgraph-base 5.0.1 → 6.0.2 available.
  • Outdated (compile): commons-codec:commons-codec — commons-codec:commons-codec 1.11 → 1.23.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.yaml:snakeyaml — org.yaml:snakeyaml 2.5 → 2.7 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.seleniumhq.selenium:htmlunit3-driver — org.seleniumhq.selenium:htmlunit3-driver 4.51.0 → 4.52.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): net.bytebuddy:byte-buddy — net.bytebuddy:byte-buddy 1.18.15 → 1.18.17 available.
  • Outdated (compile): com.google.guava:guava — com.google.guava:guava 33.7.2-jre → 33.8.0-android available.
  • Outdated (compile): com.google.errorprone:error_prone_annotations — com.google.errorprone:error_prone_annotations 2.50.0 → 2.52.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-api — io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-api 1.67.0 → 1.68.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-context — io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-context 1.67.0 → 1.68.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-common — io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-common 1.67.0 → 1.68.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-exporter-logging — io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-exporter-logging 1.67.0 → 1.68.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-sdk — io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-sdk 1.67.0 → 1.68.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-sdk-common — io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-sdk-common 1.67.0 → 1.68.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-sdk-trace — io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-sdk-trace 1.67.0 → 1.68.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-sdk-metrics — io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-sdk-metrics 1.67.0 → 1.68.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-sdk-logs — io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-sdk-logs 1.67.0 → 1.68.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-sdk-extension-autoconfigure-spi — io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-sdk-extension-autoconfigure-spi 1.67.0 → 1.68.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-sdk-extension-autoconfigure — io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-sdk-extension-autoconfigure 1.67.0 → 1.68.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.htmlunit:htmlunit — org.htmlunit:htmlunit 5.6.0 → 5.7.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.htmlunit:htmlunit-core-js — org.htmlunit:htmlunit-core-js 5.6.0 → 5.7.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.htmlunit:neko-htmlunit — org.htmlunit:neko-htmlunit 5.6.0 → 5.7.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.htmlunit:htmlunit-cssparser — org.htmlunit:htmlunit-cssparser 5.6.0 → 5.7.0 available.
  • + 13 more in this group — see findings.md.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=0 --max-count=200" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-51bb9cee0d1c4a90ab56f6eea31c70b1/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=200 --max-count=620" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-51bb9cee0d1c4a90ab56f6eea31c70b1/history-1.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history-1.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-51bb9cee0d1c4a90ab56f6eea31c70b1/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt .10artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (dependency manifest found, not scanned for vulnerabilities here)—none (dependency manifest found, not scanned for vulnerabilities here): not applicable — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Gradle build (build.gradle/build.gradle.kts) and a Gradle version catalogue — not scanned yet).0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciesnone (dependency manifest found, not scanned for vulnerabilities here)—none (dependency manifest found, not scanned for vulnerabilities here): not applicable — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Gradle build (build.gradle/build.gradle.kts) and a Gradle version catalogue — not scanned yet).0—

Run 01a1ea28-5881-730a-b47a-8ce24ab09ca8 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md