Public report of websockets/ws, published 15 November 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of
findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known
vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive reportMeasured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.11.4). Assert signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey →
Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 15 November 2026, 03:40 UTC · Survey ID cd_19d9b01303c147369360dbeaeb51a66d
websockets/ws
Measured 15 November 2026, 03:40 UTC, at code version fc667e4
Supply-chain provenance & signing is not measured: Supply-chain provenance is not scored (this pipeline releases no artifact), but its build steps or GitHub Actions workflows have integrity defects, or nothing watches its dependency set for published advisories.
CAI scoreWeak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
Down 1 since the last survey
The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.
A small codebase: 4,863 lines of product code in 1 project, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: under 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Code Health, 35
Findings by how serious they are
8 critical83 serious30 minor
9 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, we either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard we look for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.
This survey was produced by
Canine Code Analyzer
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Canine Code Analyzer engine 1.0.0
Measured
15 November 2026, 03:40 UTC
A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number
together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee
the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds the Canine Code Analyzer. It is open to any tool that
implements it, and today the Canine Code Analyzer is the only one that does.
The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. We work it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸
49of 49 dimensions measured by tools.
110of 121 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 11 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
49dimensions across 6 lenses, read from 4,863 lines of product code in 1 project.
websockets/ws falls short of our standard for production, held back most by its Code Health lens, the quality of the code itself. It scores 46 out of 100 and is rated Weak, and all eight of its critical findings are security problems.
Code Health, at 35, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step for the work it takes is simplifying the most tangled methods, worth about 3 points. Adding type checking would lift Code Health itself, worth about 5 points. Raising Code Health to 70 would lift the score to about 54.
Four pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Two secrets can leak from the build pipeline, and one automatic update takes new releases before a bad one can be spotted. Pinning each tool to an exact version, limiting each secret to its own step and setting a waiting period for automatic updates would close these risks. Fixing the weaknesses the scanner points to would fix the security weakness in the code.
The product code is 4,863 lines, about €12,000 to rebuild.
A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.
How the score is built: what each lens counts forThe lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Large Files · lib/websocket.js: 1282 lines of code lib/websocket.js
Large Files · lib/receiver.js: 649 lines of code lib/receiver.js
Large Files · lib/websocket-server.js: 495 lines of code lib/websocket-server.js
Large Files · lib/permessage-deflate.js: 461 lines of code lib/permessage-deflate.js
We compare every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.
Fixed since the last survey: 7 findings
These 7 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 29 October 2026, and are gone from this one.
Large Files · lib/websocket.js: 1232 lines of code lib/websocket.js
Large Files · lib/receiver.js: 642 lines of code lib/receiver.js
Large Files · lib/websocket-server.js: 492 lines of code lib/websocket-server.js
Large Files · lib/permessage-deflate.js: 462 lines of code lib/permessage-deflate.js
Rebuild cost: about €12,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild
€4,100 to €21,000, for 68 to 216 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem
Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor
×0.7 at a score of 46. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size
Small: 4,863 lines of product code
What it is not
Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one.
How the estimate is made: We price the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.
Top priorities
The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.
1
Bring the 2 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with websocket.initAsClient (cyclomatic 80), extension.parse (cyclomatic 65).
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
Raises the score by about 5 points · Medium effort · Type Safety
3
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
Raises the score by about 5 points · Medium effort · Large Files
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.
Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €12,000 to build again, under 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Code Health, at 35 (Weak). Code Health is about how easy the code is to read and change safely, and code that is hard to read is slow and risky to change, so every future change costs more than it should. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Code Health also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Code Health grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Code Health actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Bring the 2 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 3 points for medium effort. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort
What hard-to-read code costs each year · Cost
Four dimensions measure how easy the code is to work in: two measure how tangled its logic is, one how much of it is copied, and one how well each part sticks to a single job. In this codebase they average 5.5 out of 10. Code at that level is slower to change than clean code, and we estimate the extra work at 6% to 14% on every change. The history of the code shows how much it changes: about 629 lines over the last 90 days, which is about 2,551 lines a year. At that pace, the extra work comes to an estimated 0.4 to 2.4 engineer-days a year, and it grows as more code changes.
How this is estimated: The number of changed lines is measured from the history of the code. The rest rests on two assumptions of our own: code scoring 8 out of 10 or more adds no extra work, and each point below 8 adds 2.5% to 5.6% to every change, never less than 2% to 5% and never more than 40% to 60% in all; and an engineer changes 150 to 400 lines in a day. The result is a range for planning, not a measurement.
Based on: Cyclomatic Complexity · Cognitive Complexity · Cohesion (LCOM4) · the code's change history
What to do: Start with the files listed under Churn × Complexity Hotspots, which change often and are hard to read, because that is where the extra work is paid most often.
At a glance — Code Health · 35% · Weak · gated by D2, R1, R3 ·
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2025 — Injection
13
High / Critical
Roadmap
Top priorities: Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up; Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package; Bring the 4 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with extension.parse (cognitive 138), initAsClient (cognitive 120), Receiver.getInfo (cognitive 33).
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Bring the 2 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with websocket.initAsClient (cyclomatic 80), extension.parse (cyclomatic 65).
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
Bring the 4 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with extension.parse (cognitive 138), initAsClient (cognitive 120), Receiver.getInfo (cognitive 33).
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this
survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.
Critical — 8
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a
missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here
tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 83
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades
the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to
carry for two years either.
Minor — 30
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions.
Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 9
Something this survey could not settle
from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no
positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves
nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean
result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither
rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each
one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 49 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
Every figure here is one of two kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10.
What we checked — 49 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 110 of 121 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D4 Code Duplication — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. The language model for this repository listed its production source (.html) but exposed no token stream for any of it, so nothing reached the token comparison.
D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. This repository's 3 package.json manifest(s) WERE read and their pinning discipline assessed; what went unanswered is the currency half, because answering it needs a lockfile resolved to CONCRETE versions and this repository commits none — a package.json states version RANGES, and a range names no particular release to be behind. So registry.npmjs.org was never asked, and there was nothing here for it to grade. This is a true statement about the repository and NOT a gap on our side: no lockfile reader we could write would find anything here to read, so there is no capability behind this row to build.
D14 License Compliance — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored — this repository declares package.json manifests but commits no lockfile this pass can resolve (npm, pnpm, yarn and bun each write a different one, and `bun.lockb` is a binary format with no published shape), so the set of packages it actually ships is not resolvable from the checkout: its declarations carry version RANGES, and grading whichever release happens to be newest today would be a verdict about a dependency graph this repository has not pinned. Commit the lock and this dimension grades its production dependencies against registry.npmjs.org. NOT a finding that this repository's licences are compliant: this dimension asserts nothing about its licensing in either direction.
D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's naming rules read C# through Roslyn and every other language through its sidecar model; these languages are left out (PHP's reading is its own change, a Roslyn-loaded VB or F# project has no population builder yet). Their declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether their names are consistent.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22's deterministic call-shape rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. This says nothing about whether that surface is consistent.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) (npm) WERE scanned and every vulnerability they reported is included in this result; osv was not, so this dimension's score covers less than the dependency surface this repository declares, and nothing here is evidence that osv is free of known-vulnerable dependencies. osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. This is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass. osv-scanner documents exit 128 as "no package sources found" — but this scan only invoked it because the tree declares a source it supports (`pom.xml` and the resolved lockfiles among them), so the tool's report and this repository disagree. Check that those sources are reachable from the directory the scan ran in before concluding anything is missing. If this tree really does commit only range-pinned manifests, commit the lockfile your package manager produces — but only where your ecosystem HAS one and commits it: Maven has none at all (osv-scanner reads `pom.xml` directly) and Gradle writes one only under opt-in dependency locking, while a published Composer package and a published Dart library both deliberately exclude theirs. In those three, generate one in CI before the scan instead — a resolved dependency list or an SBOM fed to the scanner.
D43 Malicious Dependencies — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) (npm) WERE scanned and every vulnerability they reported is included in this result; osv was not, so this dimension's score covers less than the dependency surface this repository declares, and nothing here is evidence that osv is free of known-vulnerable dependencies. osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. This is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass. osv-scanner documents exit 128 as "no package sources found" — but this scan only invoked it because the tree declares a source it supports (`pom.xml` and the resolved lockfiles among them), so the tool's report and this repository disagree. Check that those sources are reachable from the directory the scan ran in before concluding anything is missing. If this tree really does commit only range-pinned manifests, commit the lockfile your package manager produces — but only where your ecosystem HAS one and commits it: Maven has none at all (osv-scanner reads `pom.xml` directly) and Gradle writes one only under opt-in dependency locking, while a published Composer package and a published Dart library both deliberately exclude theirs. In those three, generate one in CI before the scan instead — a resolved dependency list or an SBOM fed to the scanner.
D44 Platform End-of-Life — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This dimension reads a project's own statement about the platform it runs on: a TargetFramework in a .NET project file, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain file or Cargo.toml rust-version, a .go-version, .java-version, .ruby-version, .tool-versions or .sdkmanrc, a go.mod go directive, a Maven or Gradle Java level or toolchain, a Gemfile's ruby directive, a mix.exs elixir requirement, a rebar.config minimum_otp_vsn, a pubspec.yaml SDK constraint, a build.sbt scalaVersion, or a framework major pinned by a dependency constraint. This repository carries none of them, so nothing about its platform was established. That is a gap in this analyzer's coverage, NOT a finding that the platform is supported — a language whose runtime is declared elsewhere (Package.swift, a Dockerfile) is simply not read here yet.
AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and none applies: this repository publishes a library and deploys nothing (no container, IaC or deployment manifest), so it holds no runtime state of its own. Any data-access dependency it declares is the store it is a CLIENT for, not one it operates. The DR control belongs to whoever runs that data.
X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, PHP, Dart, Kotlin, Ruby, Scala, Java, Python and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and no named async function in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, nor any Go, PHP or Dart function or Kotlin suspend function, makes a request that can be cancelled (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http; net/http, net.Dial; amphp; Dio; Ktor, OkHttp), so there is nothing to judge, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside our isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — we run the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value is measured as redundancy only: a comment that repeats its code's words is found, but a paraphrase in other words, a vague comment, or one the code contradicts is not, and whether a comment is valuable is not claimed. Comments in other scripts or languages, and outside C#, are not judged.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Bring the 2 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with websocket.initAsClient (cyclomatic 80), extension.parse (cyclomatic 65). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 2 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 4.4 to about 6.9/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 30; a cleaner split scores higher.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 10 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Bring the 4 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with extension.parse (cognitive 138), initAsClient (cognitive 120), Receiver.getInfo (cognitive 33). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 2.0 to about 5.6/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 30; a cleaner split scores higher.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D3 · God Classes7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.
Method: Coverage from the analyzer's own run of the suite, computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. A coverage report found in the repository is never read. When the suite can't be built/run in-image, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.
Line coverage 99.3%. Measured from the JavaScript/TypeScript suite (mocha + nyc via `npm install --ignore-scripts` (no lockfile) in the repository root).
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.
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D10 · Test Quality9.5 / 10Stronggated by 16 serious findings✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
14 skipped (14 with a documented reason), 16 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 450 tests.
No assertions: handles backpressure (1/3) · ×16test/create-websocket-stream.test.js:388
Skipped (documented): honors the 'blob' binary type · ×14test/receiver.test.js:1179
What to do
Resolve the 16 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with websocket-server.test.js (9), websocket.test.js (5), create-websocket-stream.test.js (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.
Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.
0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). JavaScript/TypeScript (mocha via `npm install --ignore-scripts` (no lockfile) in the repository root (453 tests)): measured (0 flaky).
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Resolve the 1 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with websocket.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D16 · Bus Factor9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
1 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is lib/sender.js. Counted over 11 of the 20 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Every README, docs/ document and root guide parsed by its markup and measured in Unicode letters. Published: a runnable or packaged .NET project whose README (or a document it links, or a root guide) shows no example, and a root README naming none of three or more projects. Overview, licence, boilerplate, wall-of-text, empty-section and XML-doc rows are measured and withheld (counted in gaps) after adjudication. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Every inline C# comment compared word by word with the identifiers, literals and constructs of the code it annotates (taken from the syntax); a comment whose words that code already contains is redundant, as are closing-brace labels and generator template text. Comments giving a reason or a reference are kept; other scripts and languages are not judged. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
26 % of calls cross a namespace and 0 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
13 finding(s): 0 critical, 8 high, 2 medium, 3 low. 4 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 1 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 4 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.
Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): every row is a match against a vulnerability database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.
No known-vulnerable dependencies in the 1 ecosystem(s) that were scanned (npm). Partial dependency scan: 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) were scanned (npm), and the findings above are real and complete for them. osv was not scanned (osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned), so this is not the whole dependency surface and the result is reported at reduced confidence.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 11 of the 20 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Reported apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.
Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): the malicious-package feed is a database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.
No known-vulnerable dependencies in the 1 ecosystem(s) that were scanned (npm). Partial dependency scan: 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) were scanned (npm), and the findings above are real and complete for them. osv was not scanned (osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned), so this is not the whole dependency surface and the result is reported at reduced confidence.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript: functions whose whole body still throws a "not implemented" error, and placeholder text (lorem ipsum, changeme/replace_me…) left in strings and JSX of non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords, in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript: functions that only throw a "not implemented" error, functions that take inputs and return a constant or do nothing, async functions that never await, dead `if (false)` branches, and skeleton classes most of whose methods are holes.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository and its projects have a README, and whether it is substantive.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository is organised deliberately: production code and tests are set apart in a way its ecosystem or the repository itself declares.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the project's current-state documentation describes the code that exists.
Method: Every current-state document's checkable claims looked up in the tree (links, versions, and artefact counts an order of magnitude off), plus two README checks: an advertised infrastructure product with no footprint, and a module the CHANGELOG records as removed. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.
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P1 · CI/CD gates8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
A CI pipeline exists but no build step was matched — changes may merge without the build ever running. A build step may be invoked directly as a command, or declared as a task that a runner named in the pipeline resolves.
What to do
Add an explicit build step to your CI pipeline — your stack's own build command, or, if the pipeline delegates to a task runner, a build task that runner executes in CI — so every change is built before merge.
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P10 · Library API & versioning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.
Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries; off .NET, a library is the ecosystem's publication act (an npm package that is not private and names an entry point, a PyPI distribution with a build system, a Rust library crate, a Maven/Gradle module that publishes, a Go module with no package main, a gemspec, a Composer library, a SwiftPM library product, a pub.dev or Hex package), its surface is the share of types the language's code model records as public (Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, Go, Dart; not measured where the model records no type visibility or, as in TypeScript, only module-level export), and its version is read from the manifest, a semver CHANGELOG, release tooling or semver git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
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P2 · Observability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.
No logging call was found in the 16 JavaScript/TypeScript production file(s) this check read across 1 module(s). Each was searched for its ecosystem's logging libraries (JavaScript/TypeScript: pino, winston, bunyan, log4js, loglevel, consola, the NestJS Logger) and for a call on a receiver named `log`/`logger` (or ending in `Logger`/`_logger`) with a level verb. It cannot see logging through a repo-local wrapper named otherwise, or in source it did not read — this is 'no logging found by this walk', not a verdict that nothing here logs. If it is right, production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
Adopt pino (or winston) and log at meaningful points in the services you run.
Add a health-check endpoint (@godaddy/terminus or a /health route) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:5
`package.json` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — package.json:57
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI; off .NET, the same ladder over Go testing.B, Rust criterion/#[bench]/divan, JMH/kotlinx-benchmark, pytest-benchmark/asv/pyperf, tinybench/mitata/vitest bench/benchmark.js and Swift package-benchmark — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
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R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
0 typed · 32 plain JS — the untyped files are browser.js, REDACTED, lib/buffer-util.js, lib/constants.js, lib/event-target.js, lib/extension.js (+26 more).
What to do
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
React / JS · Code Health — The share of the scored frontend lines inside a near-exact copy-pasted block of substantial extent (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386; each line once, 10 at none and 0 at a quarter of the lines, as D4): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.
Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Scored on the share of the scored frontend lines inside a reported copy, on the same curve as D4. Deterministic.
lib/sender.js:242 · lib/sender.js:294 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — lib/sender.js:242
lib/websocket.js:388 · lib/websocket.js:420 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — lib/websocket.js:388
lib/permessage-deflate.js:328 · lib/permessage-deflate.js:393 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — lib/permessage-deflate.js:328
lib/validation.js:71 · lib/validation.js:84 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — lib/validation.js:71
lib/extension.js:44 · lib/subprotocol.js:21 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — lib/extension.js:44
What to do
Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
parse has cyclomatic complexity 65 and cognitive complexity 138; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — lib/extension.js:27
initAsClient has cyclomatic complexity 55 and cognitive complexity 90; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — lib/websocket.js:691
getInfo has cyclomatic complexity 25 and cognitive complexity 33; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — lib/receiver.js:208
_isValidUTF8 has cyclomatic complexity 25 and cognitive complexity 26; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — lib/validation.js:57
frame has cyclomatic complexity 24 and cognitive complexity 33; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — lib/sender.js:79
handleUpgrade has cyclomatic complexity 20 and cognitive complexity 25; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — lib/websocket-server.js:247
parse has cyclomatic complexity 17 and cognitive complexity 28; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — lib/subprotocol.js:12
(anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 17 and cognitive complexity 21; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — lib/websocket.js:980
constructor has cyclomatic complexity 14 and cognitive complexity 11; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — lib/websocket-server.js:68
send has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 19; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — lib/sender.js:354
constructor has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 23; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — lib/websocket.js:55
dataMessage has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 18; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — lib/receiver.js:585
(anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 16; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — lib/permessage-deflate.js:249
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R3 · Large Files0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
lib/websocket.js has 1282 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module. — lib/websocket.js:1
lib/receiver.js has 649 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module. — lib/receiver.js:1
lib/sender.js has 538 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module. — lib/sender.js:1
lib/websocket-server.js has 495 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module. — lib/websocket-server.js:1
lib/permessage-deflate.js has 461 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module. — lib/permessage-deflate.js:1
What to do
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
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R4 · Test Coverage10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
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R6 · Tooling6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
What to do
Add type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
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R7 · Dead Code9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
This script imports the product ('..'), so it is an authored benchmark, not measurement input — but nothing invokes it: no package.json script, no CI workflow or build recipe, no Dockerfile, no other file under bench/, and no in-repo reference to its name at all. It runs only if someone remembers to type `node bench/speed.js`, and it silently rots against the API it measures. Wire it into a script or workflow the way its wired siblings are, or delete it. — bench/speed.js
This script imports the product ('..'), so it is an authored benchmark, not measurement input — but nothing invokes it: no package.json script, no CI workflow or build recipe, no Dockerfile, no other file under bench/, and no in-repo reference to its name at all. It runs only if someone remembers to type `node bench/parser.benchmark.js`, and it silently rots against the API it measures. Wire it into a script or workflow the way its wired siblings are, or delete it. — bench/parser.benchmark.js
This script imports the product ('../'), so it is an authored benchmark, not measurement input — but nothing invokes it: no package.json script, no CI workflow or build recipe, no Dockerfile, no other file under bench/, and no in-repo reference to its name at all. It runs only if someone remembers to type `node bench/sender.benchmark.js`, and it silently rots against the API it measures. Wire it into a script or workflow the way its wired siblings are, or delete it. — bench/sender.benchmark.js
What to do
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Other · Security — Read from this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript source: cryptographic hygiene (weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source) and outbound TLS (certificate validation, protocol version) — facts about code that hold whether or not it serves anything itself. Of the server controls, two are read where the source shows them: every session or sign-in cookie the code sets is read for HttpOnly, Secure and SameSite at the line that sets it (a raw `Set-Cookie` header, Express, Fastify, Hono, Koa, Next.js, `cookie.serialize`, express-session and cookie-session), and every Node listener for HTTPS enforcement. HSTS, security response headers and input validation are NOT assessed for JavaScript/TypeScript: each is scored as an absence, an absence is only reportable over the production HTTP server, and in this ecosystem the file that opens the port is build output or a framework launcher rather than a file in the source tree. Their absence here is not a finding about this repository. Its Node HTTP listeners were read for HTTPS enforcement alone — TLS served, a redirect to https:// or HSTS, or a TLS-terminating proxy configuration committed beside the server — each judged per server package.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.
MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`createHash("sha256")`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call. (×2) — lib/websocket-server.js:390, lib/websocket.js:998
`_server.listen(…)` serves plain HTTP on a network address, and nothing in its package enforces HTTPS: no TLS served (`https.createServer`, Fastify `https`, Nest `httpsOptions`), no redirect of plain requests to `https://`, no `Strict-Transport-Security` (helmet sends it by default), and no TLS-terminating proxy configuration committed beside it — so a browser may talk to it in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.) — lib/websocket-server.js:115
What to do
Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (xxhash, murmurhash) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key. This repository constructs a collision-broken hash (MD5/SHA1) at 2 sites, not one: `lib/websocket-server.js:390` (createHash("sha1")), `lib/websocket.js:998` (createHash("sha1")). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place.
Enforce HTTPS on each listed server: serve TLS itself, or redirect plain requests to `https://` and send `Strict-Transport-Security` (`helmet()` does by default) behind the TLS-terminating proxy — and commit that proxy's configuration beside the service. A server only this machine reaches should bind `127.0.0.1`.
Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. (×2) — lib/buffer-util.js:142, lib/validation.js:149
What to do
Swallowed exception (empty catch)
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Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Unscored — 3 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.
P12 CI test-gate honesty — 1 observation(s) recorded · Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 3 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
X10 Duplicated predicate — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 2 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.
P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 74 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — This repository has nothing the runtime tiers could boot or serve — no markup, no UI framework or web-server dependency, no UI component source, no native UI project and no API definition — nothing here is a surface to boot — so runtime a11y/egress/header evidence has no subject here. Not applicable: this is neither a gap in the scan nor a finding about your code.
C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect. If it does persist personal data (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the controls belong to wherever that data is stored.
C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — this repository stands up no server (no Express, Fastify, Koa, Hono, NestJS or similar app, no Next.js/SvelteKit/Nuxt server route, no edge function), creates no Supabase tables and talks to no hosted backend. Access control is therefore N/A here — a browser application or library is authorized by the server it calls, not by itself; a client-side route guard hides a page and authorizes nothing. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the limit belongs wherever that data is stored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the rights are served wherever that data is stored.
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency currency not established — this repository commits no lockfile to resolve
D14 License Compliance — npm licences not graded — this npm repository commits no lockfile this pass can resolve
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency does not read html yet; not measured.
D22 Internal API Consistency — API consistency is measured on C# only; the exposed JavaScript surface was not measured.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (4659 LoC, 24 module-visible types across 4 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline publishes no artifact — no package publish, container push or release with files to download. Supply-chain provenance, signing and an SBOM describe a PUBLISHED artifact for the people who obtain it, so there is nothing to attest here; a deployment of the service itself publishes nothing for anyone else to verify. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts publishing artifacts (a package, a container image, or a release with downloadable files). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
D4 Code Duplication — Duplication not measured — .html not exposed to the token comparison
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D44 Platform End-of-Life — Platform end-of-life not assessed — this repository declares no platform this pass reads
D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this npm build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HTTP client call or construction in the JavaScript/TypeScript source (service entry point: lib/websocket-server.js:106 (http.createServer())
P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present for 14 file(s), but no domain-layer files were identified: no covered file's path contains any of the markers this check keys on (/domain/, /aggregates/, /valueobjects/, /domainmodel/, .domain/, /entities/), which are matched case-insensitively anywhere in the path. With no domain partition there is nothing to compare the web/controller layer against — if this repository keeps its business rules under a folder named none of those, that naming is what the check cannot see, not the domain logic.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: this repository declares no async functions, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D30 (Dependency Vulnerabilities), which answers every ecosystem
X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — Not applicable: this check looks for a loop whose body adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is walking, invalidating the enumerator it holds, and in this repository's languages that cannot happen. JavaScript and TypeScript have no iterator that a change can invalidate: an `Array` is walked by index against its live length, and a `Map` or `Set` by the ECMAScript specification's live entry list, so a body that adds to, removes from or empties what it walks raises nothing — every loop form (`for…of`, `for…in`, `forEach`, `map`, `filter`, `reduce`, `entries()`) on every built-in collection (`Array`, `Map`, `Set`, plain objects, `URLSearchParams`, `Headers`, `FormData`) runs to completion. Such a loop can still skip an element or never end, which is a different defect and not the one this check asks about. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — Not applicable: this check asks whether the null-typed discipline a language offers is switched on, and how much of that the assertion operator takes back, and in this repository's languages there is no such switch and no such operator. Plain JavaScript carries no type annotations and commits no tsconfig, so it states no null-typed discipline for this check to grade: there is nothing here that switches null checking on or off, and TypeScript (or `// @ts-check`) is how a repository acquires one — advice, not a defect this card measures. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
No assertions: handles backpressure (1/3) test/create-websocket-stream.test.js:388— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure*, in the test body and in the helpers it calls in the test and test-support code (a helper there that throws when its check fails counts as an assertion) — so verification routed through a callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness in production code that fails by throwing, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: can be destroyed (2/2) test/create-websocket-stream.test.js:542— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure*, in the test body and in the helpers it calls in the test and test-support code (a helper there that throws when its check fails counts as an assertion) — so verification routed through a callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness in production code that fails by throwing, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: honors the `autoPong` option test/websocket-server.test.js:129— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure*, in the test body and in the helpers it calls in the test and test-support code (a helper there that throws when its check fails counts as an assertion) — so verification routed through a callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness in production code that fails by throwing, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: emits an error if http server bind fails test/websocket-server.test.js:218— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure*, in the test body and in the helpers it calls in the test and test-support code (a helper there that throws when its check fails counts as an assertion) — so verification routed through a callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness in production code that fails by throwing, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: starts a server on a given port test/websocket-server.test.js:228— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure*, in the test body and in the helpers it calls in the test and test-support code (a helper there that throws when its check fails counts as an assertion) — so verification routed through a callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness in production code that fails by throwing, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: uses a precreated http server test/websocket-server.test.js:246— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure*, in the test body and in the helpers it calls in the test and test-support code (a helper there that throws when its check fails counts as an assertion) — so verification routed through a callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness in production code that fails by throwing, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: does not throw if called multiple times test/websocket-server.test.js:340— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure*, in the test body and in the helpers it calls in the test and test-support code (a helper there that throws when its check fails counts as an assertion) — so verification routed through a callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness in production code that fails by throwing, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: doesn't close a precreated server test/websocket-server.test.js:350— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure*, in the test body and in the helpers it calls in the test and test-support code (a helper there that throws when its check fails counts as an assertion) — so verification routed through a callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness in production code that fails by throwing, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: invokes the callback in noServer mode test/websocket-server.test.js:373— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure*, in the test body and in the helpers it calls in the test and test-support code (a helper there that throws when its check fails counts as an assertion) — so verification routed through a callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness in production code that fails by throwing, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: emits the 'close' event if client tracking is disabled test/websocket-server.test.js:429— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure*, in the test body and in the helpers it calls in the test and test-support code (a helper there that throws when its check fails counts as an assertion) — so verification routed through a callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness in production code that fails by throwing, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: can accept client asynchronously test/websocket-server.test.js:1189— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure*, in the test body and in the helpers it calls in the test and test-support code (a helper there that throws when its check fails counts as an assertion) — so verification routed through a callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness in production code that fails by throwing, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: honors the `autoPong` option test/websocket.test.js:243— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure*, in the test body and in the helpers it calls in the test and test-support code (a helper there that throws when its check fails counts as an assertion) — so verification routed through a callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness in production code that fails by throwing, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: emits a 'ping' event test/websocket.test.js:991— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure*, in the test body and in the helpers it calls in the test and test-support code (a helper there that throws when its check fails counts as an assertion) — so verification routed through a callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness in production code that fails by throwing, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: emits a 'pong' event test/websocket.test.js:1003— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure*, in the test body and in the helpers it calls in the test and test-support code (a helper there that throws when its check fails counts as an assertion) — so verification routed through a callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness in production code that fails by throwing, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: connects to secure websocket server test/websocket.test.js:4208— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure*, in the test body and in the helpers it calls in the test and test-support code (a helper there that throws when its check fails counts as an assertion) — so verification routed through a callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness in production code that fails by throwing, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: cannot connect to secure websocket server via ws:// test/websocket.test.js:4260— This method's body runs code, and no assertion call was recognised in it. Recognised by name: Assert*, *Should*/ShouldBe*, Verify, Expect, Throws, Record, Received/DidNotReceive, MustHaveHappened/MustNotHaveHappened, EnsureSuccessStatusCode and *AndEnsure*, in the test body and in the helpers it calls in the test and test-support code (a helper there that throws when its check fails counts as an assertion) — so verification routed through a callback object whose members hold the assertions, or through a harness in production code that fails by throwing, is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene· JavaScript dependencies are not locked · ×3
JavaScript dependencies are not locked examples/express-session-parse/package.json:6— examples/express-session-parse/package.json declares dependencies that no committed lockfile resolves — there is no package-lock.json / yarn.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml / bun.lock beside it, and no locked workspace above it names it — so its installs aren't reproducible (SSDF PW.4.4). Commit its package manager's lockfile (or add it to the locked workspace) and install from it (`npm ci`, `yarn --immutable`, `pnpm i --frozen-lockfile` or `bun i --frozen-lockfile`). Advisory — never scored.
JavaScript dependencies are not locked examples/server-stats/package.json:6— examples/server-stats/package.json declares dependencies that no committed lockfile resolves — there is no package-lock.json / yarn.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml / bun.lock beside it, and no locked workspace above it names it — so its installs aren't reproducible (SSDF PW.4.4). Commit its package manager's lockfile (or add it to the locked workspace) and install from it (`npm ci`, `yarn --immutable`, `pnpm i --frozen-lockfile` or `bun i --frozen-lockfile`). Advisory — never scored.
JavaScript dependencies are not locked package.json:45— package.json declares dependencies that no committed lockfile resolves — there is no package-lock.json / yarn.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml / bun.lock beside it, and no locked workspace above it names it — so its installs aren't reproducible (SSDF PW.4.4). Commit its package manager's lockfile (or add it to the locked workspace) and install from it (`npm ci`, `yarn --immutable`, `pnpm i --frozen-lockfile` or `bun i --frozen-lockfile`). Advisory — never scored.
Weak hash algorithm lib/websocket-server.js:390— MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`createHash("sha256")`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call.
Weak hash algorithm lib/websocket.js:998— MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`createHash("sha256")`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) lib/buffer-util.js:142— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) lib/validation.js:149— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
websocket.initAsClient (cyclomatic 80) lib/websocket.js:691— websocket.initAsClient has cyclomatic complexity 80 (threshold 15). Of this number, 55 points are the body's own statements and 25 belong to 3 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
extension.parse (cyclomatic 65) lib/extension.js:27— extension.parse has cyclomatic complexity 65 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
validation._isValidUTF8 (cyclomatic 25) lib/validation.js:57— validation._isValidUTF8 has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
Receiver.getInfo (cyclomatic 25) lib/receiver.js:208— Receiver.getInfo has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Sender.frame (cyclomatic 24) lib/sender.js:79— Sender.frame has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
WebSocketServer.handleUpgrade (cyclomatic 22) lib/websocket-server.js:247— WebSocketServer.handleUpgrade has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). Of this number, 20 points are the body's own statements and 2 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
PerMessageDeflate.acceptAsServer (cyclomatic 17) lib/permessage-deflate.js:160— PerMessageDeflate.acceptAsServer has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 8 of the 17 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 162). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
subprotocol.parse (cyclomatic 17) lib/subprotocol.js:12— subprotocol.parse has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Hotspot: lib/websocket.js lib/websocket.js:691— lib/websocket.js changed 8 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 80 in websocket.initAsClient at line 691. 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, and the other 4 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-08-15..2026-11-13, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-15 15:35:26 +01:00' --until='2026-11-13 15:35:26 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- lib/websocket.js`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
extension.parse (cognitive 138) lib/extension.js:27— extension.parse has cognitive complexity 138 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 51 (120 pts), boolean chains 17, loops 1 (nesting depth added 69). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
initAsClient (cognitive 120) lib/websocket.js:691— initAsClient has cognitive complexity 120 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 49 (70 pts), ternaries 9 (18 pts), boolean chains 16, error handling 5 (10 pts), loops 2 (6 pts) (nesting depth added 39). Of this number, 90 points are the body's own statements and 30 belong to 4 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Receiver.getInfo (cognitive 33) lib/receiver.js:208— Receiver.getInfo has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 20 (27 pts), boolean chains 6 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
frame (cognitive 33) lib/sender.js:79— frame has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18 (25 pts), boolean chains 4, ternaries 3 (4 pts) (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
WebSocketServer.handleUpgrade (cognitive 29) lib/websocket-server.js:247— WebSocketServer.handleUpgrade has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12 (17 pts), boolean chains 6, error handling 2 (4 pts), ternaries 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 8). Of this number, 25 points are the body's own statements and 4 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
subprotocol.parse (cognitive 28) lib/subprotocol.js:12— subprotocol.parse has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (22 pts), boolean chains 5, loops 1 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
_isValidUTF8 (cognitive 26) lib/validation.js:57— _isValidUTF8 has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (15 pts), boolean chains 10, loops 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
WebSocket.constructor (cognitive 23) lib/websocket.js:55— WebSocket.constructor has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13 (21 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
send (cognitive 19) lib/sender.js:354— send has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12 (14 pts), ternaries 2 (4 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
Receiver.dataMessage (cognitive 18) lib/receiver.js:585— Receiver.dataMessage has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12 (16 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Receiver.controlMessage (cognitive 17) lib/receiver.js:661— Receiver.controlMessage has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (12 pts), ternaries 2 (4 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 7). Of this number, 15 points are the body's own statements and 2 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
WebSocketServer.close (cognitive 17) lib/websocket-server.js:172— WebSocketServer.close has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (16 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
acceptAsServer (cognitive 17) lib/permessage-deflate.js:160— acceptAsServer has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 8, if/else 7, ternaries 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 1). Most of this is not in the body itself: 7 of the 17 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 162). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
PerMessageDeflate.normalizeParams (cognitive 16) lib/permessage-deflate.js:247— PerMessageDeflate.normalizeParams has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (15 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 5). None of this is in the body itself: all 16 points belong to one function literal inside it that branches (line 249). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
createWebSocketStream (cognitive 16) lib/stream.js:51— createWebSocketStream has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13 (14 pts), boolean chains 1, ternaries 1 (nesting depth added 1). None of this is in the body itself: all 16 points belong to 12 function items inside it that branch (_final, message, _destroy, …). Those helpers are already separate functions, so extracting the branching again is not available. To reduce it, move them out of the body to the enclosing scope, where each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
FunctionTooLong: websocket.initAsClient lib/websocket.js:691— FunctionTooLong — initAsClient runs 252 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 152 over it, 2.52× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
FileTooLong: lib/websocket.js lib/websocket.js— FileTooLong — 684 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded; the length bar is tripled for a single-responsibility module of 4 or fewer top-level units). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 184 over it, 1.37× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
MethodTooLong: Receiver.getInfo lib/receiver.js:208— MethodTooLong — getInfo runs 121 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 21 over it, 1.21× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
ClassTooLong: Receiver lib/receiver.js:30— ClassTooLong — 414 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 14 methods. The bar is 400 significant lines; this is 14 over it, 1.04× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
P12 · CI test-gate honesty· Coverage collected but not gated · ×1
Coverage collected but not gated — CI collects a coverage report but no step enforces a minimum — coverage could halve and CI stays green. Add a step that fails the build when coverage drops below a floor (your coverage tool's minimum-threshold flag, or a coverage-gate action) so the number guards something. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: this repository's CI files AND its coverage configuration — the well-known coverage and test-runner config files, read at the repository root and inside workspace package directories two levels down, so a floor declared beside the tests rather than in the pipeline is credited — matched against the threshold settings this check knows by name. A floor set in your coverage service's web UI rather than in a committed file, or under a setting whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
No structured logging — No logging call was found in the 16 JavaScript/TypeScript production file(s) this check read across 1 module(s). Each was searched for its ecosystem's logging libraries (JavaScript/TypeScript: pino, winston, bunyan, log4js, loglevel, consola, the NestJS Logger) and for a call on a receiver named `log`/`logger` (or ending in `Logger`/`_logger`) with a level verb. It cannot see logging through a repo-local wrapper named otherwise, or in source it did not read — this is 'no logging found by this walk', not a verdict that nothing here logs. If it is right, production issues will be hard to diagnose.
Duplicated block (43 lines × 2 locations) lib/sender.js:242— lib/sender.js:242 · lib/sender.js:294 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (23 lines × 2 locations) lib/websocket.js:388— lib/websocket.js:388 · lib/websocket.js:420 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2 locations) lib/permessage-deflate.js:328— lib/permessage-deflate.js:328 · lib/permessage-deflate.js:393 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) lib/validation.js:71— lib/validation.js:71 · lib/validation.js:84 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2 locations) lib/extension.js:44— lib/extension.js:44 · lib/subprotocol.js:21 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it.
Complex function parse (cyclomatic 65, cognitive 138) lib/extension.js:27— parse has cyclomatic complexity 65 and cognitive complexity 138; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function initAsClient (cyclomatic 55, cognitive 90) lib/websocket.js:691— initAsClient has cyclomatic complexity 55 and cognitive complexity 90; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function getInfo (cyclomatic 25, cognitive 33) lib/receiver.js:208— getInfo has cyclomatic complexity 25 and cognitive complexity 33; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function _isValidUTF8 (cyclomatic 25, cognitive 26) lib/validation.js:57— _isValidUTF8 has cyclomatic complexity 25 and cognitive complexity 26; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function frame (cyclomatic 24, cognitive 33) lib/sender.js:79— frame has cyclomatic complexity 24 and cognitive complexity 33; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function handleUpgrade (cyclomatic 20, cognitive 25) lib/websocket-server.js:247— handleUpgrade has cyclomatic complexity 20 and cognitive complexity 25; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function parse (cyclomatic 17, cognitive 28) lib/subprotocol.js:12— parse has cyclomatic complexity 17 and cognitive complexity 28; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 17, cognitive 21) lib/websocket.js:980— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 17 and cognitive complexity 21; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function constructor (cyclomatic 14, cognitive 11) lib/websocket-server.js:68— constructor has cyclomatic complexity 14 and cognitive complexity 11; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function send (cyclomatic 13, cognitive 19) lib/sender.js:354— send has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 19; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function constructor (cyclomatic 12, cognitive 23) lib/websocket.js:55— constructor has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 23; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function dataMessage (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 18) lib/receiver.js:585— dataMessage has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 18; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 16) lib/permessage-deflate.js:249— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 16; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
lib/websocket.js: 1282 lines of code lib/websocket.js:1— lib/websocket.js has 1282 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module.
lib/receiver.js: 649 lines of code lib/receiver.js:1— lib/receiver.js has 649 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module.
lib/sender.js: 538 lines of code lib/sender.js:1— lib/sender.js has 538 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module.
lib/websocket-server.js: 495 lines of code lib/websocket-server.js:1— lib/websocket-server.js has 495 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module.
lib/permessage-deflate.js: 461 lines of code lib/permessage-deflate.js:1— lib/permessage-deflate.js has 461 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module.
No typecheck script — test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
Benchmark script nothing runs (~116 LoC) bench/speed.js— This script imports the product ('..'), so it is an authored benchmark, not measurement input — but nothing invokes it: no package.json script, no CI workflow or build recipe, no Dockerfile, no other file under bench/, and no in-repo reference to its name at all. It runs only if someone remembers to type `node bench/speed.js`, and it silently rots against the API it measures. Wire it into a script or workflow the way its wired siblings are, or delete it.
Benchmark script nothing runs (~96 LoC) bench/parser.benchmark.js— This script imports the product ('..'), so it is an authored benchmark, not measurement input — but nothing invokes it: no package.json script, no CI workflow or build recipe, no Dockerfile, no other file under bench/, and no in-repo reference to its name at all. It runs only if someone remembers to type `node bench/parser.benchmark.js`, and it silently rots against the API it measures. Wire it into a script or workflow the way its wired siblings are, or delete it.
Benchmark script nothing runs (~49 LoC) bench/sender.benchmark.js— This script imports the product ('../'), so it is an authored benchmark, not measurement input — but nothing invokes it: no package.json script, no CI workflow or build recipe, no Dockerfile, no other file under bench/, and no in-repo reference to its name at all. It runs only if someone remembers to type `node bench/sender.benchmark.js`, and it silently rots against the API it measures. Wire it into a script or workflow the way its wired siblings are, or delete it.
Duplicated predicate lib/extension.js:47— `i !== 0 && (code === 0x20 || code === 0x09)` appears character-identically in 2 files — lib/extension.js, lib/subprotocol.js. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate lib/websocket-server.js:260— `upgrade === undefined || upgrade.toLowerCase() !== 'websocket'` appears character-identically in 2 files — lib/websocket-server.js, lib/websocket.js. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 1 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: lib/sender.js. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
M2 · Architecture documentation· No architecture diagram/doc · ×1
No architecture diagram/doc — No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
P1 · CI/CD gates· CI build step not evidenced · ×1
CI build step not evidenced — A CI pipeline exists but no build step was matched — changes may merge without the build ever running. A build step may be invoked directly as a command, or declared as a task that a runner named in the pipeline resolves.
No SAST REDACTED:5— No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
No dependency-update automation package.json:57— `package.json` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`.
No changelog — No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected lib/websocket-server.js:115— `_server.listen(…)` serves plain HTTP on a network address, and nothing in its package enforces HTTPS: no TLS served (`https.createServer`, Fastify `https`, Nest `httpsOptions`), no redirect of plain requests to `https://`, no `Strict-Transport-Security` (helmet sends it by default), and no TLS-terminating proxy configuration committed beside it — so a browser may talk to it in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.)
Skipped (documented): honors the 'blob' binary type test/receiver.test.js:1179— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: skipped at run time by a this.skip()/t.skip() call
Skipped (documented): can send a `Blob` as ping payload test/sender.test.js:316— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: skipped at run time by a this.skip()/t.skip() call
Skipped (documented): can send a `Blob` as ping payload test/sender.test.js:403— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: skipped at run time by a this.skip()/t.skip() call
Skipped (documented): fails if the Upgrade header cannot be read test/websocket-server.test.js:729— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: skipped at run time by a this.skip()/t.skip() call
Skipped (documented): emits an 'error' event if an error occurs (2/2) test/websocket.test.js:758— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: skipped at run time by a this.skip()/t.skip() call
Skipped (documented): emits the 'error' event only once (1/2) test/websocket.test.js:798— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: skipped at run time by a this.skip()/t.skip() call
Skipped (documented): emits the 'error' event only once (2/2) test/websocket.test.js:854— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: skipped at run time by a this.skip()/t.skip() call
Skipped (documented): does not emit 'error' after 'close' test/websocket.test.js:906— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: skipped at run time by a this.skip()/t.skip() call
Skipped (documented): does not re-emit `net.Socket` errors test/websocket.test.js:952— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: skipped at run time by a this.skip()/t.skip() call
Skipped (documented): fails if the Upgrade header cannot be read test/websocket.test.js:1054— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: skipped at run time by a this.skip()/t.skip() call
Skipped (documented): can send a `Blob` test/websocket.test.js:3135— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: skipped at run time by a this.skip()/t.skip() call
Skipped (documented): calls the callback if the socket is forcibly closed test/websocket.test.js:3185— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: skipped at run time by a this.skip()/t.skip() call
Skipped (documented): works around a double 'error' event bug in Node.js test/websocket.test.js:4349— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: skipped at run time by a this.skip()/t.skip() call
Skipped (documented): can send a `Blob` test/websocket.test.js:4969— Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: skipped at run time by a this.skip()/t.skip() call
Dependency hygiene PARTLY measured — npm pinning read, dependency currency not (no committed lockfile, so no resolved version to grade) — This repository's npm dependencies were read for PINNING discipline: 3 production declaration(s) plus 11 development one(s) across 3 package.json (1 of them the product — the rest are example, documentation or fixture manifests, which are read and counted but screened off the rules below, because both prescribe a MOVE and "align your example apps" is not a remedy), against 0 committed lockfile(s). No pinning defect was found. That is only PART of dependency hygiene, so this dimension is NOT SCORED: whether any of these packages has a newer, deprecated or abandoned release is the dependency-CURRENCY question, and answering it needs a lockfile resolved to concrete versions, which this repository does not commit: a package.json states version RANGES, and a range names no particular release to be behind. So there was nothing here for the registry to grade — that is a fact about the repository, not a reader we are missing, and no lockfile reader we could write would change it. A clean pinning pass is NOT an all-clear for these dependencies, and it is not a finding that they are all USED. Note also what is deliberately NOT charged here: a workspace legitimately carries ONE lockfile for many manifests, so no row is raised off the lockfile count, only reported. Known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question again, reported under D30 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
doc comments repeat the names lib/event-target.js:254— 20 of 281 documented parameters and 2 of 120 summaries in `ws` only repeat the member or parameter name (e.g. "Remove an event listener." for `removeEventListener`). Delete the restating tags, or add what the name does not say.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
Run 01a1dd4a-e411-7fc7-8575-6ce851c51e3b · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 8 · Warnings: 83 · Recommendations: 14 · Info: 16 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by the Canine Code Analyzer: deterministic code-health analysis. 15-11-2026 @ 03:40 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.