Executive summary
thomaspark/bootswatch is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, most of them in the packages it uses. Its score is held back in part because one file is no longer known to anyone active in the project. It scores 52 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged.
Maturity, at 41, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is having someone learn and document the file no active contributor knows, worth about 8 points. Improving the documentation is another step, worth about 3 points. Raising Maturity to 70 would lift the score to about 61.
Thirteen known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Four pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with, and two automatic updates take new releases before a bad one can be spotted. Updating the vulnerable packages, pinning each tool to an exact version and setting a waiting period for automatic updates would close these risks.
The product code is 2,981 lines, about €2,900 to rebuild.
If Maturity rose from 41 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 52 to about 61.
Fixed since the last survey: 2 findings
- Secret Scanning · Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential REDACTED
- Secret Scanning · Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential REDACTED
Rebuild cost: about €2,900 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €980 to €4,900, for 16 to 52 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.7 at a score of 52. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 2,981 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 20 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 8 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Resolve the 1 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with Gruntfile.js; Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness; Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with Gruntfile.js. | +8.0 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +8.0 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 1 Documentation finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. | +2.8 pts | Low | Documentation Quality |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +5.5 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Reconcile the README with reality: docs/3/bower_components/bootstrap-sass-official/README.md names Bootstrap 3, but the manifest declares `bootstrap` ^5.3.8; docs/3/bower_components/bootstrap-sass/README.md names Bootstrap 3, but the manifest declares `bootstrap` ^5.3.8; docs/3/bower_components/bootstrap/README.md names Bootstrap 4, but the manifest declares `bootstrap` ^5.3.8; docs/3/bower_components/jquery/README.md links to `nodejs.org`, but `docs/3/bower_components/jquery/nodejs.org` does not exist. | +5.5 pts | Medium | Documentation accuracy |
| Write a diagnostic trail the user can hand back with a bug report: a log file under the platform's per-user data directory, switchable with a `--verbose`/`--debug` flag. Start with the error paths that emit nothing — a discarded error is the failure the user cannot describe and you cannot reproduce. | +5.1 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Adopt a checker and raise it file by file: with Sorbet, `srb init` (or `bundle exec tapioca init`) commits `sorbet/config`, then move each file's sigil from `# typed: false` to `# typed: true` and on to `strict` as its methods get `sig`s — `spoom bump` does the moving; with Steep, write RBS signatures and `check` the product directories in the `Steepfile` under `D::Ruby.default` or `strict`, not `lenient`. Then pay down the assertions rather than adding to them: each `T.must` is a nil the checker could not rule out — narrow it (`return unless x`, `x&.`, `if (y = x)`), make the attribute non-nilable and set it in `initialize`, or change the method so the nil cannot arrive. | +4.2 pts | Medium | Nullable reference types |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: brakeman for Rails apps, otherwise `semgrep --config=auto` or CodeQL's ruby pack — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +3.2 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.6 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| docs/3/Gruntfile.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: Gruntfile.default (cognitive 17) |
| docs/2/bower_components/jquery/README.md | 9.5 | Near-clean | Documentation Quality: Documentation: no build, run or usage example |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 36 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 36 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 41 of 47 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: the test suite could not be built/run in-image (commonly external-service dependencies — a database, a broker — we won't provision). To have it measured, make the suite runnable without them. For context only, test code is ≈ 2% of production LoC (73 test / 2,981 production) — a rough proxy, NOT a coverage measurement, so it is excluded from the score. You can widen what we reach: optional: make the suite runnable without a database, broker or other service we do not provision, and real coverage is measured on the next scan.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares composer.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its gem dependencies. Nothing was read about its Composer dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its gem dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (95 contributor(s) across 2347 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 84% of the history; the other 94 hold 0.2% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's naming rules read C# through Roslyn and every other language through its sidecar model; these languages are left out (PHP's reading is its own change, a Roslyn-loaded VB or F# project has no population builder yet). Their declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether their names are consistent.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22's deterministic call-shape rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. This says nothing about whether that surface is consistent.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/docs/assets/js/jquery.js` produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
- AC1 Text alternatives — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This repository renders user interface from a TEMPLATE LANGUAGE — 1 Mustache template file(s) carrying 1182 markup element(s) (e.g. docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/docs/templates/pages/javascript.mustache) — and the accessibility cards on this run were measured over the 1 parsed markup document(s) ONLY. The markup model reads .html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx, html`…` templates and DOM-assigned HTML strings in .ts/.js, the .erb/.ejs/.eex/.heex/.leex/.twig/.jinja/.j2/.liquid/.njk/.hbs/.mustache/.blade.php/.gohtml template languages, .astro/.templ/.pug/.jade/.haml/.slim, and the kotlinx.html/Compose HTML/kotlin-react, Giraffe/Falco/Fable.React/Feliz/Bolero and Jaspr builder DSLs; the file(s) above were REFUSED rather than unsupported — a template whose element NAME comes from an expression, or an Astro component whose frontmatter fence is never closed, leaves the element's identity unknown, and every accessibility rule is a statement about a NAMED element — so those views were not merely unparsed but unenumerated: not one of their elements entered the population any card scored. Their absence from the counts above is a gap in this analyzer's frontend coverage — not a finding that they carry text alternatives, labels, keyboard semantics or correct ARIA.
- AC2 Forms & labels — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This repository renders user interface from a TEMPLATE LANGUAGE — 1 Mustache template file(s) carrying 1182 markup element(s) (e.g. docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/docs/templates/pages/javascript.mustache) — and the accessibility cards on this run were measured over the 1 parsed markup document(s) ONLY. The markup model reads .html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx, html`…` templates and DOM-assigned HTML strings in .ts/.js, the .erb/.ejs/.eex/.heex/.leex/.twig/.jinja/.j2/.liquid/.njk/.hbs/.mustache/.blade.php/.gohtml template languages, .astro/.templ/.pug/.jade/.haml/.slim, and the kotlinx.html/Compose HTML/kotlin-react, Giraffe/Falco/Fable.React/Feliz/Bolero and Jaspr builder DSLs; the file(s) above were REFUSED rather than unsupported — a template whose element NAME comes from an expression, or an Astro component whose frontmatter fence is never closed, leaves the element's identity unknown, and every accessibility rule is a statement about a NAMED element — so those views were not merely unparsed but unenumerated: not one of their elements entered the population any card scored. Their absence from the counts above is a gap in this analyzer's frontend coverage — not a finding that they carry text alternatives, labels, keyboard semantics or correct ARIA.
- AC3 Page structure — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This repository renders user interface from a TEMPLATE LANGUAGE — 1 Mustache template file(s) carrying 1182 markup element(s) (e.g. docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/docs/templates/pages/javascript.mustache) — and the accessibility cards on this run were measured over the 1 parsed markup document(s) ONLY. The markup model reads .html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx, html`…` templates and DOM-assigned HTML strings in .ts/.js, the .erb/.ejs/.eex/.heex/.leex/.twig/.jinja/.j2/.liquid/.njk/.hbs/.mustache/.blade.php/.gohtml template languages, .astro/.templ/.pug/.jade/.haml/.slim, and the kotlinx.html/Compose HTML/kotlin-react, Giraffe/Falco/Fable.React/Feliz/Bolero and Jaspr builder DSLs; the file(s) above were REFUSED rather than unsupported — a template whose element NAME comes from an expression, or an Astro component whose frontmatter fence is never closed, leaves the element's identity unknown, and every accessibility rule is a statement about a NAMED element — so those views were not merely unparsed but unenumerated: not one of their elements entered the population any card scored. Their absence from the counts above is a gap in this analyzer's frontend coverage — not a finding that they carry text alternatives, labels, keyboard semantics or correct ARIA.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This repository renders user interface from a TEMPLATE LANGUAGE — 1 Mustache template file(s) carrying 1182 markup element(s) (e.g. docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/docs/templates/pages/javascript.mustache) — and the accessibility cards on this run were measured over the 1 parsed markup document(s) ONLY. The markup model reads .html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx, html`…` templates and DOM-assigned HTML strings in .ts/.js, the .erb/.ejs/.eex/.heex/.leex/.twig/.jinja/.j2/.liquid/.njk/.hbs/.mustache/.blade.php/.gohtml template languages, .astro/.templ/.pug/.jade/.haml/.slim, and the kotlinx.html/Compose HTML/kotlin-react, Giraffe/Falco/Fable.React/Feliz/Bolero and Jaspr builder DSLs; the file(s) above were REFUSED rather than unsupported — a template whose element NAME comes from an expression, or an Astro component whose frontmatter fence is never closed, leaves the element's identity unknown, and every accessibility rule is a statement about a NAMED element — so those views were not merely unparsed but unenumerated: not one of their elements entered the population any card scored. Their absence from the counts above is a gap in this analyzer's frontend coverage — not a finding that they carry text alternatives, labels, keyboard semantics or correct ARIA.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This repository renders user interface from a TEMPLATE LANGUAGE — 1 Mustache template file(s) carrying 1182 markup element(s) (e.g. docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/docs/templates/pages/javascript.mustache) — and the accessibility cards on this run were measured over the 1 parsed markup document(s) ONLY. The markup model reads .html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx, html`…` templates and DOM-assigned HTML strings in .ts/.js, the .erb/.ejs/.eex/.heex/.leex/.twig/.jinja/.j2/.liquid/.njk/.hbs/.mustache/.blade.php/.gohtml template languages, .astro/.templ/.pug/.jade/.haml/.slim, and the kotlinx.html/Compose HTML/kotlin-react, Giraffe/Falco/Fable.React/Feliz/Bolero and Jaspr builder DSLs; the file(s) above were REFUSED rather than unsupported — a template whose element NAME comes from an expression, or an Astro component whose frontmatter fence is never closed, leaves the element's identity unknown, and every accessibility rule is a statement about a NAMED element — so those views were not merely unparsed but unenumerated: not one of their elements entered the population any card scored. Their absence from the counts above is a gap in this analyzer's frontend coverage — not a finding that they carry text alternatives, labels, keyboard semantics or correct ARIA.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This repository renders user interface from a TEMPLATE LANGUAGE — 1 Mustache template file(s) carrying 1182 markup element(s) (e.g. docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/docs/templates/pages/javascript.mustache) — and the accessibility cards on this run were measured over the 1 parsed markup document(s) ONLY. The markup model reads .html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx, html`…` templates and DOM-assigned HTML strings in .ts/.js, the .erb/.ejs/.eex/.heex/.leex/.twig/.jinja/.j2/.liquid/.njk/.hbs/.mustache/.blade.php/.gohtml template languages, .astro/.templ/.pug/.jade/.haml/.slim, and the kotlinx.html/Compose HTML/kotlin-react, Giraffe/Falco/Fable.React/Feliz/Bolero and Jaspr builder DSLs; the file(s) above were REFUSED rather than unsupported — a template whose element NAME comes from an expression, or an Astro component whose frontmatter fence is never closed, leaves the element's identity unknown, and every accessibility rule is a statement about a NAMED element — so those views were not merely unparsed but unenumerated: not one of their elements entered the population any card scored. Their absence from the counts above is a gap in this analyzer's frontend coverage — not a finding that they carry text alternatives, labels, keyboard semantics or correct ARIA.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. A badge or prose version claim scored 9/17 in its adjudication (docs/plans/deterministic-engine/adjudication/M4-v3.md: badges 9/9, prose 0/8, where prose versions are minimums or history), short of the 95 % precision gate, so by the pre-registered fallback it publishes no row until a re-measurement shows it does. The candidates are counted here, not reported as findings, and the score does not include them. The .NET and Node.js version checks are a different kind and still publish.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. 8 JavaScript/TypeScript file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source, disabled certificate validation, obsolete TLS versions, plaintext password storage and session cookies set without HttpOnly, Secure or SameSite, and none was found. The server controls this dimension also scores were not assessed, so no score is given.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Gruntfile.default at 17.
What to do
- Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with Gruntfile.default (cognitive 17). — Refactoring it lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.8 to about 10.0/10.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected. 0.0 % of the production lines (0 of 2,981) are in a reported copy.
D5 · Coupling
5 production modules (npm), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations, and main-sequence distance (abstractness) is not computed for these modules yet.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated direct gem(s), 0 pinning defect(s). 6 declaration(s) graded against rubygems.org, none of them against a committed Gemfile.lock — this repository commits none, which a published gem correctly does not, so currency is read off the declared requirements: a declaration that does not cap below the current release resolves to it on `bundle install`. 5 declaration(s) carry a requirement that EXCLUDES the current release; that is a deliberate constraint (a supported-version ceiling or a held-back CI pin) and is counted, not charged. Whether any of these gems is DEPRECATED or YANKED is not graded — rubygems.org publishes no deprecation marker, and a yank removes a version rather than flagging it. Whether any is UNMAINTAINED is not graded either: no registry publishes a maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is a source question, not a registry one. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 2 shipped gem(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from rubygems.org over the 2 runtime gem(s) this repository declares. It commits no Gemfile.lock to close that set over, so the verdict covers the declarations rather than the whole resolved graph. Development-group and `add_development_dependency` gems are excluded: they are not distributed with this repository. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's gem dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares composer.json and package.json, and the licences of those dependency graphs were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted task-comment markers across 16 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 2 documentation facets pass in full; short on: F2 example. 18 document(s) read across 8 unit(s).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 9 build units (Composer, npm) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
8 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 2 medium, 0 low. 4 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 16 file(s) — `docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/docs/assets/js/jquery.js`, `docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/docs/components.html` (lines 1152–1156, lines 1225–1233), `docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/docs/customize.html` (line 165), `docs/2/bower_components/jquery/jquery.js`, `docs/3/bower_components/font-awesome/src/_includes/navbar.html` (line 13, line 14, line 17, …), … (+11 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 4 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
20 finding(s): 1 critical, 12 high, 6 medium, 1 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 12 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (12). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level).
- Resolve the 6 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
1 of 1 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is Gruntfile.js.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with Gruntfile.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 0 platform declaration(s) and 6 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Nothing in the layout marks which files are the product and which are its tooling: no production source was found set apart in a directory of its own.
M4 · Documentation accuracy
- docs/3/bower_components/bootstrap-sass-official/README.md names Bootstrap 3, but the manifest declares `bootstrap` ^5.3.8. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — docs/3/bower_components/bootstrap-sass-official/README.md:310
- docs/3/bower_components/bootstrap-sass/README.md names Bootstrap 3, but the manifest declares `bootstrap` ^5.3.8. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — docs/3/bower_components/bootstrap-sass/README.md:310
- docs/3/bower_components/bootstrap/README.md names Bootstrap 4, but the manifest declares `bootstrap` ^5.3.8. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — docs/3/bower_components/bootstrap/README.md:74
- docs/3/bower_components/jquery/README.md links to `nodejs.org`, but `docs/3/bower_components/jquery/nodejs.org` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — docs/3/bower_components/jquery/README.md:50
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: docs/3/bower_components/bootstrap-sass-official/README.md names Bootstrap 3, but the manifest declares `bootstrap` ^5.3.8; docs/3/bower_components/bootstrap-sass/README.md names Bootstrap 3, but the manifest declares `bootstrap` ^5.3.8; docs/3/bower_components/bootstrap/README.md names Bootstrap 4, but the manifest declares `bootstrap` ^5.3.8; docs/3/bower_components/jquery/README.md links to `nodejs.org`, but `docs/3/bower_components/jquery/nodejs.org` does not exist.
P1 · CI/CD gates
P10 · Library API & versioning
P2 · Observability
- No logging or diagnostics emission found. This repository ships a binary its users launch rather than a service you operate, so there is no operator to page — but when a run fails on a user's machine, neither they nor you have anything to read.
What to do
- Write a diagnostic trail the user can hand back with a bug report: a log file under the platform's per-user data directory, switchable with a `--verbose`/`--debug` flag. Start with the error paths that emit nothing — a discarded error is the failure the user cannot describe and you cannot reproduce.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add brakeman for Rails apps, otherwise `semgrep --config=auto` or CodeQL's ruby pack as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:8
- `REDACTED` schedules updates, but no `package-ecosystem` entry covers `npm`, `composer`, `bundler`, which this tree depends on — so those dependencies get no update pull requests and no advisory pressure, however complete the dep-scan credit looks. Add the missing entries to the `updates:` list. — REDACTED:2
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: brakeman for Rails apps, otherwise `semgrep --config=auto` or CodeQL's ruby pack — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Dependabot is configured but does not watch `npm`, `composer`, `bundler` — add those `package-ecosystem` entries to REDACTED so those dependencies get the same automatic update and advisory pressure as the ones it already covers.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
X12 · Unreachable branch
X16 · Unfloored truncation loop
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X5 · Nullable reference types
- This repository commits no Sorbet configuration (`sorbet/config`) and no `Steepfile`, so nothing type-checks its 1 Ruby product file(s): a nilable value reaches a method call silently and raises `NoMethodError: undefined method … for nil` the first time it is nil. A `# typed:` sigil does nothing without a `sorbet/config` beside the code; a Steep run configured only on a command line is not something this check can read.
What to do
- Adopt a checker and raise it file by file: with Sorbet, `srb init` (or `bundle exec tapioca init`) commits `sorbet/config`, then move each file's sigil from `# typed: false` to `# typed: true` and on to `strict` as its methods get `sig`s — `spoom bump` does the moving; with Steep, write RBS signatures and `check` the product directories in the `Steepfile` under `D::Ruby.default` or `strict`, not `lenient`. Then pay down the assertions rather than adding to them: each `T.must` is a nil the checker could not rule out — narrow it (`return unless x`, `x&.`, `if (y = x)`), make the attribute non-nilable and set it in `initialize`, or change the method so the nil cannot arrive.
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 65% | Adequate — gated by X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 41% | Weak — gated by D34, M2, M4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 48% | Weak — gated by P2, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 88% | Strong | Solid. |
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 4 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 2 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 78 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend markup is written in a template language — 1 Mustache template file(s) carrying 1182 markup element(s) (e.g. docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/docs/templates/pages/javascript.mustache), which the static markup model does not read — so accessibility is NOT MEASURED. Only 2 statically-readable DOM element(s) were found; this is a blind spot in the scan, not a small frontend.
- AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend markup is written in a template language — 1 Mustache template file(s) carrying 1182 markup element(s) (e.g. docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/docs/templates/pages/javascript.mustache), which the static markup model does not read — so accessibility is NOT MEASURED. Only 2 statically-readable DOM element(s) were found; this is a blind spot in the scan, not a small frontend.
- AC3 Page structure — Frontend markup is written in a template language — 1 Mustache template file(s) carrying 1182 markup element(s) (e.g. docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/docs/templates/pages/javascript.mustache), which the static markup model does not read — so accessibility is NOT MEASURED. Only 2 statically-readable DOM element(s) were found; this is a blind spot in the scan, not a small frontend.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend markup is written in a template language — 1 Mustache template file(s) carrying 1182 markup element(s) (e.g. docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/docs/templates/pages/javascript.mustache), which the static markup model does not read — so accessibility is NOT MEASURED. Only 2 statically-readable DOM element(s) were found; this is a blind spot in the scan, not a small frontend.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend markup is written in a template language — 1 Mustache template file(s) carrying 1182 markup element(s) (e.g. docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/docs/templates/pages/javascript.mustache), which the static markup model does not read — so accessibility is NOT MEASURED. Only 2 statically-readable DOM element(s) were found; this is a blind spot in the scan, not a small frontend.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend markup is written in a template language — 1 Mustache template file(s) carrying 1182 markup element(s) (e.g. docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/docs/templates/pages/javascript.mustache), which the static markup model does not read — so accessibility is NOT MEASURED. Only 2 statically-readable DOM element(s) were found; this is a blind spot in the scan, not a small frontend.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — No container singleton was found, so there is no shared instance for concurrent requests to race on. No class in this Ruby code is a Rails controller, a Sinatra, Grape or Roda app, a Hanami action or a Rack app (an instance `call(env)`), so no request handler shares state between request threads. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — no class or module declares an abstract method
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — This repository has nothing the runtime tiers could boot or serve — 1 markup document under demonstration, documentation or developer-tool trees (or modules the build marks non-production) but none in the product; no UI framework or web-server dependency, no UI component source, no native UI project and no API definition — those pages are demos or docs for the code, not something this tier can boot — so runtime a11y/egress/header evidence has no subject here. Not applicable: this is neither a gap in the scan nor a finding about your code.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect. If it does persist personal data (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the controls belong to wherever that data is stored.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — this repository stands up no server (no Express, Fastify, Koa, Hono, NestJS or similar app, no Next.js/SvelteKit/Nuxt server route, no edge function), creates no Supabase tables and talks to no hosted backend. Access control is therefore N/A here — a browser application or library is authorized by the server it calls, not by itself; a client-side route guard hides a page and authorizes nothing. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the limit belongs wherever that data is stored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the rights are served wherever that data is stored.
- D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
- D11 Test Reliability — No test suite was found to re-run, so reliability couldn't be assessed. Two searches produced that zero and both came back empty: the classifier that reads the loaded workspace recognised no suite it could run, and a walk of the source on disk — which covers the JS/TS `*.test.*` and `*.spec.*` conventions and probes for a Pester suite — found no test source in any other ecosystem either. Neither search reaches a suite that is missing from the loaded workspace and carries no name either walk recognises, so this is 'no suite found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none.
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency does not read html yet; not measured.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — API consistency is measured on C# only; the exposed Ruby surface was not measured.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .rb source were not judged.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 1 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline publishes no artifact — no package publish, container push or release with files to download. Supply-chain provenance, signing and an SBOM describe a PUBLISHED artifact for the people who obtain it, so there is nothing to attest here; a deployment of the service itself publishes nothing for anyone else to verify. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts publishing artifacts (a package, a container image, or a release with downloadable files).
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (1 value object(s))
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — reported, not scored — this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript declares no class method or module-scope function, and this score is a density of unfinished work per function, which has no denominator here. The file-level signals below were still collected and are shown in full
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: Ruby has no async/await function colour, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: 8 JavaScript/TypeScript file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source, disabled TLS certificate validation, obsolete TLS versions, passwords stored or checked as plaintext and session cookies set without HttpOnly, Secure or SameSite, and none was found. That half of the dimension is clean, but it is not scored on its own: a C# repository with the same clean reading is scored on its server controls as well, or is N/A for having no web surface, and neither can be decided here. Of the server controls, two are read where the source shows them: every session or sign-in cookie the code sets is read for HttpOnly, Secure and SameSite at the line that sets it (a raw `Set-Cookie` header, Express, Fastify, Hono, Koa, Next.js, `cookie.serialize`, express-session and cookie-session), and every Node listener for HTTPS enforcement. HSTS, security response headers and input validation are NOT assessed for JavaScript/TypeScript: each is scored as an absence, an absence is only reportable over the production HTTP server, and in this ecosystem the file that opens the port is build output or a framework launcher rather than a file in the source tree. Their absence here is not a finding about this repository.
- X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Ruby was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Ruby request takes no token: Net::HTTP, Faraday and async-http are stopped from outside the call (Async::Task#stop, Thread#raise, Timeout), not through a parameter
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X3 Exception handling — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Ruby was read, and it logs through none: the standard library's Logger, which Rails.logger is, takes one finished message and no template arguments or fields (as log4net does in C#), so an interpolated message there loses nothing the API could have kept. The console gem (`Console.info`), SemanticLogger, Ougai and dry-logger would be judged.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 19 finding(s)
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Serious — 14 finding(s)
- REDACTED
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- REDACTED
- REDACTED
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- JavaScript dependencies are not locked docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/package.json:19
- JavaScript dependencies are not locked docs/3/bower_components/font-awesome/package.json:40
- JavaScript dependencies are not locked docs/3/bower_components/html5shiv/package.json:9
- JavaScript dependencies are not locked docs/3/bower_components/respond/package.json:24
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Gruntfile.default (cognitive 17) docs/3/Gruntfile.js:1
- No structured logging
Minor — 14 finding(s)
- README/code drift docs/3/bower_components/bootstrap-sass-official/README.md:310
- README/code drift docs/3/bower_components/bootstrap-sass/README.md:310
- README/code drift docs/3/bower_components/bootstrap/README.md:74
- README/code drift docs/3/bower_components/jquery/README.md:50
- Documentation: no build, run or usage example docs/2/bower_components/jquery/README.md:1
- REDACTED
- Orphaned files with no living knowledge
- Orphaned file Gruntfile.js:1
- No ADRs
- No src/ separation
- No SAST REDACTED:8
- Dependabot does not watch npm/composer/bundler REDACTED:2
- No changelog
- Ruby's type checker does not check nil everywhere
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-9043d541b5ee4f758565ec425af204a7/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-9043d541b5ee4f758565ec425af204a7/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt --exclude docs/3/assets/css --exclude docs/3/bower_components/bootstrap --exclude docs/4/_assets/css --exclude docs/_assets/css . | 8 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 20 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 1 file(s) — `docs/2/bower_components/bootstrap/docs/assets/js/jquery.js` — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover them at all. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline publishes no artifact — no package publish, container push or release with files to download. Supply-chain provenance, signing and an SBOM describe a PUBLISHED artifact for the people who obtain it, so there is nothing to attest here; a deployment of the service itself publishes nothing for anyone else to verify. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts publishing artifacts (a package, a container image, or a release with downloadable files). | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |