Executive summary
stride-nyc/remote_retro is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, most of them in the packages it uses. Its score is held back in part because it has packages with a known security hole. It scores 47 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged.
Security and Compliance, at 39, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is replacing the two exposed passwords or keys and switching the old ones off, worth about 6 points. Fixing the two runtimes or frameworks that no longer get security updates comes next, worth about 4 points. Raising Security and Compliance to 70 would lift the score to about 53.
Seventy-four known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Two passwords or keys are open to anyone who can read the repository, and six buttons or links have no name a screen reader can say. Updating the vulnerable packages, replacing each exposed password or key and naming the buttons and links would close these risks. Loading the key from a secret store instead of the code would fix the two encryption keys written into the code, and pinning each tool to an exact version would deal with the two pipeline tools referenced by a changeable name. The five form fields without a label need a label.
The product code is 6,827 lines, about €9,200 to rebuild.
If Security and Compliance rose from 39 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 47 to about 53.
New since the last survey: 16 findings
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency 'mock-css-modules'
- Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency 'mock-local-storage'
- Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency 'phoenix_html'
- Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency 'react-dnd-touch-backend'
- Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency 'semantic-ui-offline'
Fixed since the last survey: 18 findings
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/stage_change_info_prime_directive.jsx
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/ideation_interface.jsx
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/stage_change_info_groups_labeling.jsx
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/stage_change_info_voting.jsx
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/room.jsx
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/stage_change_info_idea_generation_builder.jsx
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/stage_change_info_groups_voting.jsx
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file web/static/js/dev-utils/intercept_overeager_reactredux_warning.js
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/stage_change_info_closed.jsx
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file web/static/js/dev-utils/store_enhancer.js
Rebuild cost: about €9,200 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €3,000 to €15,000, for 51 to 161 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.7 at a score of 47. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 6,827 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 (global) | 2 Mix.Tasks | 3 RemoteRetro.OAuth | 4 RemoteRetroWeb.Plugs | 5 web.static.js | 6 web.static.js.components | 7 web.static.js.components.alert | 8 web.static.js.components.category_column | 9 web.static.js.components.group_label_input | 10 web.static.js.components.grouping_idea_card | 11 web.static.js.components.grouping_stage | 12 web.static.js.components.groups_container | 13 web.static.js.components.idea_column_list_container | 14 web.static.js.components.idea_edit_form | 15 web.static.js.components.idea_group | 16 web.static.js.components.idea_list | 17 web.static.js.components.idea_submission_form | 18 web.static.js.components.overflow_detector | 19 web.static.js.components.remote_retro | 20 web.static.js.components.share_retro_link_modal | 21 web.static.js.components.stage_progression_button | 22 web.static.js.components.voting_interface | 23 web.static.js.dev-utils | 24 web.static.js.redux | 25 web.static.js.services | 26 web.static.js.services.retro_channel | 27 web.static.js.services.user_activity | 28 RemoteRetro | 29 RemoteRetroWeb |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (global) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2 Mix.Tasks | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3 RemoteRetro.OAuth | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4 RemoteRetroWeb.Plugs | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5 web.static.js | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6 web.static.js.components | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 7 web.static.js.components.alert | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8 web.static.js.components.category_column | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 9 web.static.js.components.group_label_input | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 10 web.static.js.components.grouping_idea_card | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 11 web.static.js.components.grouping_stage | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 12 web.static.js.components.groups_container | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 13 web.static.js.components.idea_column_list_container | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 14 web.static.js.components.idea_edit_form | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 15 web.static.js.components.idea_group | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 16 web.static.js.components.idea_list | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 17 web.static.js.components.idea_submission_form | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 18 web.static.js.components.overflow_detector | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 19 web.static.js.components.remote_retro | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20 web.static.js.components.share_retro_link_modal | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21 web.static.js.components.stage_progression_button | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22 web.static.js.components.voting_interface | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 23 web.static.js.dev-utils | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 24 web.static.js.redux | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 25 web.static.js.services | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 26 web.static.js.services.retro_channel | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 27 web.static.js.services.user_activity | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 28 RemoteRetro | 6 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 29 RemoteRetroWeb | 9 |
28→1 RemoteRetro uses (global)✕
- Connections
- 6 pairs of types, where a type in RemoteRetro uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
RemoteRetro.Group→RemoteRetroWebRemoteRetro.Idea→RemoteRetroWebRemoteRetro.Participation→RemoteRetroWebRemoteRetro.Retro→RemoteRetroWebRemoteRetro.User→RemoteRetroWebRemoteRetro.Vote→RemoteRetroWeb
- Direction
- RemoteRetro uses (global), so a change to (global) can break RemoteRetro, while a change to RemoteRetro can't break (global).
- Position
- Below the diagonal: RemoteRetro uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
29→1 RemoteRetroWeb uses (global)✕
- Connections
- 9 pairs of types, where a type in RemoteRetroWeb uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
RemoteRetroWeb.AuthController→RemoteRetroWebRemoteRetroWeb.ErrorView→RemoteRetroWebRemoteRetroWeb.LayoutView→RemoteRetroWebRemoteRetroWeb.PageController→RemoteRetroWebRemoteRetroWeb.PageView→RemoteRetroWebRemoteRetroWeb.RetroChannel→RemoteRetroWebRemoteRetroWeb.RetroController→RemoteRetroWebRemoteRetroWeb.RetroView→RemoteRetroWebRemoteRetroWeb.Router→RemoteRetroWeb
- Direction
- RemoteRetroWeb uses (global), so a change to (global) can break RemoteRetroWeb, while a change to RemoteRetroWeb can't break (global).
- Position
- Below the diagonal: RemoteRetroWeb uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Accessibility
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 118 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 3 | High / Critical |
| A07:2025 — Authentication Failures | 2 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Load cryptographic key and salt material from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager rather than fixing it in the source, and fail fast at startup when it is absent — a default that silently works is the one that reaches production. Rotate anything already committed: it must be treated as disclosed. Salts should be generated per password and stored with the hash, never shared across installations. This repository constructs key or salt material fixed at compile time at 2 sites, not one: `REDACTED:16` (secret key, `secret_key_base`), `config/prod.exs:22` (secret key, `secret_key_base`). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place; Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2); Resolve the 2 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with .tool-versions (2).
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2). | +6.0 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Resolve the 2 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with .tool-versions (2). | +4.0 pts | Low | Platform End-of-Life |
| Load cryptographic key and salt material from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager rather than fixing it in the source, and fail fast at startup when it is absent — a default that silently works is the one that reaches production. Rotate anything already committed: it must be treated as disclosed. Salts should be generated per password and stored with the hash, never shared across installations. This repository constructs key or salt material fixed at compile time at 2 sites, not one: `REDACTED:16` (secret key, `secret_key_base`), `config/prod.exs:22` (secret key, `secret_key_base`). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place. | +6.6 pts | Medium | Web-Security Posture |
| Resolve the 1 Retired release finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +2.7 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +4.0 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). | +1.8 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with Procfile. | +1.6 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. | +1.5 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 0.3 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.8 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED |
| .tool-versions | 6.9 | Mixed | Platform End-of-Life: End-of-life runtime: Elixir 1.11 |
| lib/remote_retro_web/controllers/retro_controller.ex | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| web/static/js/redux/ideas.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cyclomatic Complexity: ideas.reducer (cyclomatic 16) |
| test/redux/ideas_test.js | 9.1 | Near-clean | Test Quality: Mock-dominated test: tells the retro channel to dispatch an IDEA_UPDATE_COMMITTED action on success |
| test/components/overflow_detector_test.js | 9.5 | Near-clean | Test Quality: Mock-dominated test: does *not* invoke the `onOverflowChange` callback |
| Procfile | 9.5 | Near-clean | ADR Quality: No ADRs found |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 52 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 52 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 205 of 240 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D10 Test Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 549 test(s) behind this row are the ones the JavaScript/TypeScript census could read, and this repository also carries at least 46 test source file(s) (.exs, .ex) that it cannot: it reads JavaScript/TypeScript test declarations off disk, so a JUnit/pytest-style suite is invisible to it. Skipped tests, zero-assertion tests and the other quality signals on this row are UNMEASURED in that suite — their absence from the counts above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that those tests are sound.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test reliability NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript suite could not be re-run in the analyzer sandbox — the dependency install for the repository root failed in the analyzer sandbox (yarn install v1.22.22), so the suite never ran. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — it is excluded from the score.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test reliability for the mocha suite in the repository root was NOT MEASURED: the dependency install for the repository root failed in the analyzer sandbox (yarn install v1.22.22), so the suite never ran. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repository, and the suite is excluded from the measurement rather than counted against it.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its Hex package dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (59 contributor(s) across 2955 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 83% of the history; the other 58 hold 0.3% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. PREREGISTRATION version 20's fallback (adjudication D21-sample3-v3): this rule kind was adjudicated below the 95 % precision gate, so its candidates are counted here and not published, and the score covers only the acronym-spelling and awaitable-suffix rules. The kind returns as rows only after it shows a measured precision; this says nothing about whether these names are consistent.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
- D26 Project Cohesion — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `(repository root)` (5688 LoC, 134 module-visible types across 17 directories) is over its size bounds, and whether one unit is a coherent whole or a grab-bag is read from its type references: the parts of it that reach the rest only through its shared core. Those are read over the C#/VB code model, which this unit's source did not supply. Its size alone is no verdict on its cohesion, so none is published.
- D27 Navigability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. File-level freshness contradicts repo activity: 43 commits in the last 90 days, yet 28 of 31 significant files carry no living knowledge. Those two readings cannot both be true, so the per-file recency signal is treated as unreliable here and freshness is not scored for this run.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Subject: 71 markup document(s) — HTML, Razor, JSX, Vue, Svelte or server templates. The Runtime Evidence tier boots an app only via docker-compose, an Aspire AppHost, a Dockerfile, an npm dev script, a web service's own toolchain entry point (cargo, go, dotnet, Python, Spring Boot), or an Android app's own Gradle wrapper (run on an emulator); an Apple or Flutter app needs a host it lacks. None applied, so no live runtime a11y/egress/header evidence was collected. You can widen what we reach: add a docker-compose.yml (or an Aspire AppHost) that brings the app up with its dependencies. We then boot it in an isolated sandbox and gathers real runtime evidence — you change nothing in your pipeline (no CI step, no SDK).
- C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
- R4 Test Coverage — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. 10 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 50.
- X12 Unreachable branch — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, PHP, Dart, Kotlin, Ruby, Scala, Java, Python and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and no named async function in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, nor any Go, PHP or Dart function or Kotlin suspend function, makes a request that can be cancelled (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http; net/http, net.Dial; amphp; Dio; Ktor, OkHttp), so there is nothing to judge, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded, no Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found, and this repository's Elixir is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. X7 measured the part of this repository it reads (C#, Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, Rust, Go, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Ruby, Swift and Dart), and its Elixir source is outside the check's reach, so the card covers only part of the product. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the unread source is free of silent defaults.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
2 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ideas.reducer at 16.
What to do
- Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with ideas.reducer (cyclomatic 16). — Refactoring it lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.8 to about 10.0/10.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 549 tests. Measured on the JavaScript/TypeScript suite only — at least 46 test source file(s) (.exs, .ex) went unread, so its test quality is unmeasured and is not in these counts.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
11 outdated, 1 retired direct Hex dependencies, 0 pinning defect(s). Whether any of these packages is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — hex.pm publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: a Hex app name does not determine the modules it provides (`ecto_sql` provides Ecto.Adapters.SQL), and a large idiomatic class of BEAM dependencies — runtime adapters, codec plugins, protocol implementations and OTP applications the release starts — is correctly declared and never referenced in source, so absence of a reference is not evidence of an unused dependency. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from REDACTED there.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Retired release finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D13 · Secret Scanning
2 secret(s) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 54 shipped Hex package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from hex.pm over the packages a consumer installs — this repository's REDACTED closed over the declarations its mix.exs files do not gate behind `only:`. Packages it asks for ONLY under `only: [:dev, :test]` (or any other non-prod environment, such as `:docs`) are excluded: they are not installed by anything that depends on this repository. Each licence is the one hex.pm publishes for the package's current release. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's Hex package dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares package.json, and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt
1 deducted task-comment markers across 2537 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with retro_controller.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 2 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with Procfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
3 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
113 finding(s): 14 critical, 60 high, 34 medium, 5 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 57 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (50), REDACTED (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (57 issue-level).
- Resolve the 13 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (13). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 High vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/3 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
2 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 4 platform declaration(s) and 50 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with .tool-versions (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
- An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×2) — lib/remote_retro_web/templates/retro/index.html.heex:91, lib/remote_retro_web/templates/retro/index.html.heex:108
What to do
- Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels
- This control has no associated label. Add a <label htmlFor> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×4) — web/static/js/components/email_opt_in_toggle.jsx:22, web/static/js/components/high_contrast_button.jsx:16, web/static/js/components/idea_edit_form.jsx:101, …
- This <label> has no htmlFor and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label htmlFor="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id. (×2) — web/static/js/components/email_opt_in_toggle.jsx:23, web/static/js/components/high_contrast_button.jsx:17
- This <i> carries a click handler, which makes it a control, but it has no text, aria-label or labelled child (the icon-only case), so assistive tech has no name to announce for it. Note that switching it to <button type="button"> — the right fix for its keyboard operability — does not give it a name either: an icon-only button still needs one. Add visible text or an aria-label. — web/static/js/components/error.jsx:21
- This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label htmlFor>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. — web/static/js/components/group_label_input.jsx:63
- This <i> carries a click handler, which makes it a control, and its only name is a title attribute. A plain element maps to role="generic", which does not support a name from the author, so the title is announced as nothing at all — it is a mouse-only tooltip, unreachable on touch. Give it role="button" (which it needs anyway to be operable) so the title becomes a real name, or add an aria-label. (×2) — web/static/js/components/idea_edit_delete_icons.jsx:27, web/static/js/components/idea_edit_delete_icons.jsx:33
- A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one). (×3) — web/static/js/components/share_retro_link_modal.jsx:67, web/static/js/components/voting_interface.jsx:48, web/static/js/components/voting_interface.jsx:56
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×2) — lib/remote_retro_web/templates/error/404.html.heex:2, lib/remote_retro_web/templates/error/500.html.heex:2
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics
AC5 · ARIA correctness
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- `:global(.ReactModal__Content.ReactModal__Content--after-open:focus)` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — web/static/css/app.css:384
- `.wrapper` moves (`transition: transform 250ms ease-in-out`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — web/static/js/components/css_modules/alert.css:51
- `.wrapper` moves (`transition: transform 250ms ease-out`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — web/static/js/components/css_modules/contact_stride_cta.css:5
- `.wrapper :global(.ui.dimmer.transition.visible.active):global(.device) :global(.mobile.alternate.icon)` moves (`animation: deviceRotate 4s infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — web/static/js/components/css_modules/grouping_stage.css:30
- `:global(.translateY-appear.translateY-appear-active)` moves (`transition: transform 400ms ease-out`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — web/static/js/components/css_modules/lower_third_animation_wrapper.css:18
- `:global(.translateY-enter.translateY-enter-active)` moves (`transition: transform 400ms ease-out`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — web/static/js/components/css_modules/lower_third_animation_wrapper.css:28
- `:global(.translateY-exit.translateY-exit-active)` moves (`transition: transform 400ms ease-out`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — web/static/js/components/css_modules/lower_third_animation_wrapper.css:38
- `:global(.increment-enter.increment-enter-active)` moves (`transition: transform 250ms ease-out`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — web/static/js/components/css_modules/voting_interface.css:9
- `:global(.increment-exit.increment-exit-active)` moves (`transition: transform 250ms ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — web/static/js/components/css_modules/voting_interface.css:18
- `.toggle :global(.ui.toggle.checkbox) :global(label):after` moves (`transition: background 0.3s ease-out 0s, right 0.3s ease-out 0s`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — web/static/js/components/css_modules/shared/toggle.css:28
- `.toggle :global(.ui.toggle.checkbox) :global(input:checked + label:after)` moves (`transition: background 0.3s ease-out 0s, right 0.3s ease-out 0s`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — web/static/js/components/css_modules/shared/toggle.css:43
- `:global(.nested-action-items-list) i` moves (`transition: 50ms transform ease-out`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — web/static/css/app.css:358
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
M1 · Documentation (README)
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P2 · Observability
What to do
- Add a health-check endpoint (@godaddy/terminus or a /health route) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
- `package.json` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — package.json:19
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
R1 · Type Safety
- 0 typed · 100 plain JS — the untyped files are test/contact_stride_cta_test.js, test/services/collisions_test.js, test/services/color_picker_test.js, test/services/contact_us_test.js, test/services/drag_coordinates_test.js, test/services/idea_permissions_test.js (+94 more).
What to do
- Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
R10 · Code Duplication
- web/static/js/components/alert.jsx:68 · web/static/js/components/error.jsx:33 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — web/static/js/components/alert.jsx:68
- web/static/js/components/centered_content_lower_third_wrapper.jsx:15 · web/static/js/components/grouping_lower_third_content.jsx:22 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the SHAPE of this repetition could not be determined. It is not a run of declarations, a listing, a declaration header, a type body or a slice through a construct — and it was not measured as a run of executable statements either, so this row cannot tell you whether a function can stand where these lines are. Read the two spans before acting, because the move is opposite in the two cases. Where they are statements, the ordinary answer holds: give the shared part one home and call it from each site. Where they turn out to be declarations, a literal's entries, or the cases of an enumeration, there is no call site to call anything from, and collapsing them would delete what each copy pins — a shared base type, a generated set, or one exported constant each site refers to is the move instead, and sometimes the honest answer is that there is nothing to extract at all. Reported because the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is true whichever of those they are. — web/static/js/components/centered_content_lower_third_wrapper.jsx:15
- web/static/js/components/stage_change_info_prime_directive.jsx:1 · web/static/js/components/stage_change_info_voting.jsx:1 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 75 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — web/static/js/components/stage_change_info_prime_directive.jsx:1
What to do
- Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
R11 · Import Boundaries
- web/static/js/app.js:16 imports react-dnd-multi-backend/lib/HTML5toTouch, reaching past a declared dependency's public entry into its build output — that path is the package's toolchain layout, not its API, and a minor version bump can relocate it with no semver signal. Import from the package's documented entry point instead. — web/static/js/app.js:16
What to do
- Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
R3 · Large Files
R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×40) — web/static/js/components/idea_submission_form.jsx:1, web/static/js/components/groups_container.jsx:1, web/static/js/components/grouping_idea_card.jsx:1, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling
- test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
What to do
- Add type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it. (×8)
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- `secret_key_base` is the secret key and is a compile-time constant, so the secret this operation depends on is published with the source. A key that ships with the source is not secret: every contributor, fork, mirror and released binary carries it, so anyone holding the repository can decrypt what any installation encrypted, and there is no way to invalidate what was already protected because every deployment built from this source shares the value. Where the constant is a password salt the consequence differs but is no smaller — one global salt means precomputation amortises across every installation, which is the property salting exists to destroy. Read the value from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager at startup and FAIL FAST when it is absent, so a missing key stops the process instead of silently falling back to a shared default; treat the committed value as disclosed and rotate it rather than only deleting the line. For a salt, generate a fresh random one per password and store it alongside the hash. (×2) — REDACTED:16, config/prod.exs:22
- `https://js.honeybadger.io/v4.0/honeybadger.min.js` is executed by this page with no Subresource Integrity. Whoever can answer that request — the CDN, anyone who compromises it, anyone on the network path — runs arbitrary script in this page's origin, with its session. — lib/remote_retro_web/templates/layout/app.html.heex:44
- Set: Referrer-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies. Missing: Content-Security-Policy — the four headers that carry the points of this card's security-headers term (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options), 0.5 each.(−0.5 on this card.) The server: lib/remote_retro_web/endpoint.ex:2 — `Phoenix.Endpoint`.
What to do
- Load cryptographic key and salt material from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager rather than fixing it in the source, and fail fast at startup when it is absent — a default that silently works is the one that reaches production. Rotate anything already committed: it must be treated as disclosed. Salts should be generated per password and stored with the hash, never shared across installations. This repository constructs key or salt material fixed at compile time at 2 sites, not one: `REDACTED:16` (secret key, `secret_key_base`), `config/prod.exs:22` (secret key, `secret_key_base`). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place.
- Pin third-party scripts and verify them: name an exact version in the URL and add an `integrity="sha384-…"` hash alongside `crossorigin="anonymous"` (both are required — an integrity hash on a cross-origin script without `crossorigin` is not evaluated, it blocks the script). Where the vendor ships a continuously-updated loader and publishes no stable hash (tag managers, analytics, chat widgets), Subresource Integrity is not available: constrain it instead with a `Content-Security-Policy` that names the exact origins allowed to execute, and drop the script from the pages that do not need it. Where the page is shipped inside a package that others host, prefer vendoring the asset and serving it from the app’s own origin, so no consumer inherits a third-party dependency they did not choose.
- Add Content-Security-Policy beside the headers the Elixir server already sets.
X12 · Unreachable branch
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped
- `config.confirmationMessageHTML` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — web/static/js/components/stage_progression_button.jsx:57
What to do
- Each finding names the expression, the attribute it lands in and the line. Confirm the value's origin from the read this analyzer traced, then escape it at the sink or validate it against the shape the attribute accepts before interpolating.
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC4 · Keyboard semantics | 2.1.1, 2.4.3 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 70% | Adequate — gated by R1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 77% | Strong | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 61% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 42% | Weak — gated by D13, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 39% | Weak — gated by D36, D44, S1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Accessibility | 60% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — 1 observation(s) recorded · Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (an audit-log table or schema — a module, Ecto schema or migration table named for it — ExAudit, PaperTrail, AshPaperTrail or Carbonite recording each change, or a Commanded / EventStore event-sourced store beside one) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
- C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 71 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: the BEAM has no dependency-injection container — state lives in processes, and no process is handed an instance whose lifetime another one scopes; this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: Elixir processes share no mutable memory — state lives in a process's own mailbox — so there is no shared object to race on. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — C1 reached only 37% of this repository's production lines — javascript (4,290 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- C2 Access Controls — C2 reached only 37% of this repository's production lines — javascript (4,290 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite did not run
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D21 Naming Consistency — D21 withholds its case and prefix conventions rows: 1 candidate(s) found and not reported.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .ex, .exs source were not judged.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — D26 could not read how the parts of this repository's one build unit reference each other, so its cohesion was not measured. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — D27 reads resolved call sites in the languages it reads only — this repository's production source is .exs, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — knowledge concentrated in recent work — freshness signal contradicted by repo activity
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D4 Code Duplication — This repository's production source (.js, .jsx) is not read by D4's token comparison, which compares .NET source: duplication in it is measured by R10 Code Duplication, the frontend lens's card running the same clone algorithm over the JS/TS token stream. Not scored here — read the R10 card for this repository's duplication. The rest — .exs (755 lines, 11.9% of production source) — is compared by neither card, so duplication there is unmeasured; it is a corner of this repository, not its product.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this OTP build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured: of the 45 type(s) found, none both holds instance state and has two or more methods whose shared use of it could be read (20 with fewer than two methods, 25 stateless), so LCOM4 is undefined for every type in this repository. Not scored — the metric does not apply here, and this is not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — the repository root runs mocha but declares no coverage provider, so the suite can run and still produce no lcov — add `c8` (or `nyc`) as a devDependency so the suite can be wrapped for coverage. Coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. The named suite step is one the repository's maintainers can perform; once it passes, the real number is measured on the next scan.
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HTTP client call or construction in the Elixir, JavaScript/TypeScript source (service entry point: lib/remote_retro_web.ex:62 (use Phoenix.Router))
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: Elixir has no async/await function colour, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
- R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D30 (Dependency Vulnerabilities), which answers every ecosystem
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Elixir processes share no heap: a value sent to another process arrives as a copy, so no collection is reachable from two processes at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X3 Exception handling — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — Not applicable: this check asks whether the null-typed discipline a language offers is switched on, and how much of that the assertion operator takes back, and in this repository's languages there is no such switch and no such operator. Elixir's `nil` is an atom in a dynamically typed language: `@spec`s are checked by an external analysis that has no nullability operator, so there is no null-typed discipline in the language to adopt. Plain JavaScript carries no type annotations and commits no tsconfig, so it states no null-typed discipline for this check to grade: there is nothing here that switches null checking on or off, and TypeScript (or `// @ts-check`) is how a repository acquires one — advice, not a defect this card measures. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 96 finding(s)
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- <input> without a programmatic label web/static/js/components/email_opt_in_toggle.jsx:22
- <input> without a programmatic label web/static/js/components/group_label_input.jsx:63
- <input> without a programmatic label web/static/js/components/high_contrast_button.jsx:16
- <input> without a programmatic label web/static/js/components/share_retro_link_modal.jsx:82
- <button> with no accessible text web/static/js/components/share_retro_link_modal.jsx:67
- <button> with no accessible text web/static/js/components/voting_interface.jsx:48
- <button> with no accessible text web/static/js/components/voting_interface.jsx:56
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- <img> without a text alternative lib/remote_retro_web/templates/retro/index.html.heex:91
- <img> without a text alternative lib/remote_retro_web/templates/retro/index.html.heex:108
- <label> that labels no control web/static/js/components/email_opt_in_toggle.jsx:23
- <label> that labels no control web/static/js/components/high_contrast_button.jsx:17
- Custom control named only by title on <i> web/static/js/components/idea_edit_delete_icons.jsx:27
- Custom control named only by title on <i> web/static/js/components/idea_edit_delete_icons.jsx:33
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- Cryptographic key material is a compile-time constant REDACTED:16
- Cryptographic key material is a compile-time constant config/prod.exs:22
- Custom control with no accessible name on <i> web/static/js/components/error.jsx:21
- <textarea> without a programmatic label web/static/js/components/idea_edit_form.jsx:101
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Serious — 112 finding(s)
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/idea_submission_form.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/groups_container.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/grouping_idea_card.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/remote_retro.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/stage_progression_button.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/share_retro_link_modal.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/idea_group.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/category_column.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/grouping_board.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/alert.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/group_label_input.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/app.js:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/user_list_item.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/grouping_stage.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/viewport_meta_tag.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/idea_submission_lower_third_content.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/error.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/lower_third.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/user_list.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/lobby_stage.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/centered_text_stage_wrapper.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/group_label_container.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/grouping_lower_third_content.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/votes_left.jsx:1
- No test reaches this file web/static/js/components/prime_directive_stage.jsx:1
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- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard web/static/js/components/css_modules/alert.css:51
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard web/static/js/components/css_modules/contact_stride_cta.css:5
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard web/static/js/components/css_modules/grouping_stage.css:30
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard web/static/js/components/css_modules/lower_third_animation_wrapper.css:18
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard web/static/js/components/css_modules/lower_third_animation_wrapper.css:28
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard web/static/js/components/css_modules/lower_third_animation_wrapper.css:38
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard web/static/js/components/css_modules/voting_interface.css:9
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard web/static/js/components/css_modules/voting_interface.css:18
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard web/static/js/components/css_modules/shared/toggle.css:28
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard web/static/js/components/css_modules/shared/toggle.css:43
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard web/static/css/app.css:358
- Page without a main landmark lib/remote_retro_web/templates/error/404.html.heex:2
- Page without a main landmark lib/remote_retro_web/templates/error/500.html.heex:2
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- End-of-life runtime: Elixir 1.11 .tool-versions:1
- End-of-life runtime: Erlang/OTP 24 .tool-versions:1
- Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement web/static/css/app.css:384
- ideas.reducer (cyclomatic 16) web/static/js/redux/ideas.js:145
- Retired release: timex
- TodoComment lib/remote_retro_web/controllers/retro_controller.ex:24
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- Coverage not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite
- Coverage collected but not gated
- Type Safety
- Duplicated block (19 lines × 2 locations) web/static/js/components/alert.jsx:68
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 2 locations) web/static/js/components/centered_content_lower_third_wrapper.jsx:15
- Duplicated block with local edits (14 matched lines × 2 locations) web/static/js/components/stage_change_info_prime_directive.jsx:1
- Boundary violation [package:third-party-deep-import] web/static/js/app.js:16
- No typecheck script
- Unused dependency 'cryptiles'
- Unused dependency 'env-test'
- Unused dependency 'jsdom-global'
- Unused dependency 'mock-css-modules'
- Unused dependency 'mock-local-storage'
- Unused dependency 'phoenix_html'
- Unused dependency 'react-dnd-touch-backend'
- Unused dependency 'semantic-ui-offline'
- Third-party script without Subresource Integrity lib/remote_retro_web/templates/layout/app.html.heex:44
- Untrusted text written into markup unescaped web/static/js/components/stage_progression_button.jsx:57
Minor — 21 finding(s)
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- Mock-dominated test: tells the retro channel to dispatch an IDEA_UPDATE_COMMITTED action on success test/redux/ideas_test.js:453
- Mock-dominated test: tells the retro channel to dispatch an IDEA_UPDATE_REJECTED an error test/redux/ideas_test.js:470
- Mock-dominated test: notifies honeybadger of the error test/redux/ideas_test.js:487
- Mock-dominated test: does *not* invoke the `onOverflowChange` callback test/components/overflow_detector_test.js:165
- No ADRs found Procfile:1
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- No ADRs
- No architecture diagram/doc
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- No dependency-update automation package.json:19
- No release approval gate
- No changelog
- Security headers incomplete
Minor — 11 finding(s)
- Outdated: brotli
- Outdated: ecto_dev_logger
- Outdated: honeybadger
- Outdated: jason
- Outdated: libcluster
- Outdated: mock
- Outdated: oauth2
- Outdated: phoenix_ecto
- Outdated: phoenix_pubsub
- Outdated: plug_canonical_host
- Outdated: plug_cowboy
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-267c1eaa07a64f0bb005e11f2f3f9bef/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-267c1eaa07a64f0bb005e11f2f3f9bef/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt --exclude priv/static/js --exclude test/components --exclude test/redux --exclude test/support/js --exclude web/static/js/configs . | 3 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 113 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |