Public report of serpro69/kotlin-faker, published 17 November 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.11.4). Assert signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey → Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 17 November 2026, 21:46 UTC · Survey ID cd_0f5891ac777645a491c25bfcfd28d639

serpro69/kotlin-faker

Measured 17 November 2026, 21:46 UTC, at code version 4476577

First survey, so nothing to compare with yet
CAI score 62.6out of 100 Adequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

A small codebase: 11,296 lines of product code in 26 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Security and Compliance, 57.6

Findings by how serious they are

45 critical 105 serious 95 minor

10 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, we either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard we look for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Assert small markCanine Code Analyzer
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Canine Code Analyzer engine 1.0.0
Measured
17 November 2026, 21:46 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds the Canine Code Analyzer. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today the Canine Code Analyzer is the only one that does.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. We work it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸

47of 47 dimensions measured by tools.
150of 245 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 95 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
47dimensions across 6 lenses, read from 11,296 lines of product code in 26 projects.
Chapters

Executive summary

serpro69/kotlin-faker falls short of our standard for production, in part because it has pipeline tools referenced by a changeable name. It scores 62.6 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, and 39 of its 45 critical findings are security problems in the build pipeline.

Security and Compliance, at 57.6, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step for the work it takes is recording design decisions, worth about 2.1 points. Making the controls keyboard-usable comes next, worth about 4.0 points. Raising Security and Compliance to 70 would lift the score to about 65.8.

Twenty-eight pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Six secrets can leak from the build pipeline, and four pipeline steps put outside input straight into a shell command, so an attacker can run commands in the build pipeline. Pinning each tool to an exact version, limiting each secret to its own step and passing outside input through environment variables would close these risks. The pipeline step that runs a download without checking it needs each download checked against a known checksum first.

The product code is 11,296 lines, about €20,000 to rebuild.

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Security and Compliance 57.6 · counts for 46%Accessibility 58.2 · counts for 25%Maturity 68.8 · counts for 14%Production Readiness 70.8 · counts for 8%Code Health 91.5 · counts for 4%Architecture 94.9 · counts for 2%

If Security and Compliance rose from 57.6 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 62.6 to about 65.8.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Product code 64%Tests 36%
Rebuild cost: about €20,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild€6,600 to €33,000, for 109 to 347 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problemStandard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.9 at a score of 63. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeSmall: 11,296 lines of product code
What it is notNot a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one.

How the estimate is made: We price the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with build.gradle.kts.
Raises the score by about 2.1 points · Low effort · ADR Quality
2
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Raises the score by about 4.0 points · Medium effort · Keyboard semantics
3
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Raises the score by about 2.9 points · Medium effort · Visual & motion safety

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €20,000 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Security and Compliance, at 57.6 (Adequate). Security and Compliance is about how well the product is protected, and how it handles personal data. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Security and Compliance also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Security and Compliance grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Security and Compliance actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 2.1 points for low effort, because it clears the 1 ADR Quality findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways, which only happens where the projects form a dependency cycle. A graph without cycles has none.

arch :cli-bot :cli-bot :kotlin-faker :kotlin-faker :cli-bot->:kotlin-faker :extension :extension :extension:blns :extension:blns :extension:kotest-property :extension:kotest-property :faker :faker :faker:books :faker:books :faker:commerce :faker:commerce :faker:creatures :faker:creatures :faker:databases :faker:databases :faker:edu :faker:edu :faker:games :faker:games :faker:humor :faker:humor :faker:japmedia :faker:japmedia :faker:lorem :faker:lorem :faker:misc :faker:misc :faker:movies :faker:movies :faker:music :faker:music :faker:pictures :faker:pictures :faker:sports :faker:sports __more__ +6 more projects

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

90 modules, with 198 dependencies between them. 19 loops run through 43 of the modules, marked above the diagonal.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 50 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →1 dictionary2 provider.unique3 provider4 provider.misc5 FakerConfig6 io.github.serpro69.kfaker7 AbstractFaker8 blns9 books.provider10 commerce.provider11 creatures.provider12 databases.provider13 edu.provider14 games.provider15 humor.provider16 japmedia.provider17 lorem.provider18 misc.provider19 movies.provider20 music.provider21 pictures.provider22 sports.provider23 tech.provider24 travel.provider25 tv.provider26 books27 commerce28 creatures29 databases30 edu31 games32 humor33 japmedia34 lorem35 misc36 movies37 music38 pictures39 sports40 tech
1 dictionary
2 provider.unique21
3 provider191718
4 provider.misc3338
5 FakerConfig11
6 io.github.serpro69.kfaker311471
7 AbstractFaker11
8 blns2
9 books.provider13121213
10 commerce.provider22222223
11 creatures.provider13777
12 databases.provider11668
13 edu.provider7777
14 games.provider51303030
15 humor.provider7555
16 japmedia.provider13131313
17 lorem.provider9999
18 misc.provider8888
19 movies.provider20202021
20 music.provider17171717
21 pictures.provider11
22 sports.provider10101010
23 tech.provider13131313
24 travel.provider14131313
25 tv.provider38383838
26 books210
27 commerce220
28 creatures26
29 databases26
30 edu24
31 games228
32 humor25
33 japmedia210
34 lorem29
35 misc28
36 movies220
37 music214
38 pictures21
39 sports210
40 tech212
Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself
1 dictionary2 provider.unique3 provider4 provider.misc5 FakerConfig6 io.github.serpro69.kfaker7 AbstractFaker8 blns9 books.provider10 commerce.provider11 creatures.provider12 databases.provider13 edu.provider14 games.provider15 humor.provider16 japmedia.provider17 lorem.provider18 misc.provider19 movies.provider20 music.provider21 pictures.provider22 sports.provider23 tech.provider24 travel.provider25 tv.provider26 books27 commerce28 creatures29 databases30 edu31 games32 humor33 japmedia34 lorem35 misc36 movies37 music38 pictures39 sports40 techdictionary1provider.unique2provider3provider.misc4FakerConfig5io.github.serpro69.kfaker6AbstractFaker7blns8books.provider9commerce.provider10creatures.provider11databases.provider12edu.provider13games.provider14humor.provider15japmedia.provider16lorem.provider17misc.provider18movies.provider19music.provider20pictures.provider21sports.provider22tech.provider23travel.provider24tv.provider25books26commerce27creatures28databases29edu30games31humor32japmedia33lorem34misc35movies36music37pictures38sports39tech402119171833381131147111213121213222222231377711668777751303030755513131313999988882020202117171717111010101013131313141313133838383821022026262422825210292822021421210212+50 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 91.5 · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Architecture · 94.9 · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Maturity · 68.8 · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 70.8 · Strong ·

At a glance — Security · 57.6 · Adequate · gated by D29, D36 ·

At a glance — Accessibility · 58.2 · Adequate · gated by AC4 ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A05:2025 — Injection59High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures9Medium

Roadmap

Top priorities: Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href; Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1; Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with build.gradle.kts.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with build.gradle.kts.+2.1 ptsLowADR Quality
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.+4.0 ptsMediumKeyboard semantics
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.+2.9 ptsMediumVisual & motion safety
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.+2.1 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED.+1.0 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 5 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2).+1.0 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED.+0.8 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED.+0.5 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 34 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 9% slop · 44% mixed · 47% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED1.3SlopStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED2.3SlopStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED2.7SlopStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED5.7MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/FakerService.kt6.0MixedExplicit Debt: TodoComment
faker/music/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/music/provider/Opera.kt6.9MixedExplicit Debt: TodoComment
.codex/scripts/guard/guard.py7.0MixedCyclomatic Complexity: guard._shell_scan (cyclomatic 57)
faker/sports/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/sports/provider/WorldCup.kt7.3MixedExplicit Debt: TodoComment
core/src/jvmTest/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/provider/misc/RandomClassProviderTest.kt7.3MixedExplicit Debt: TodoComment
core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/helper/Char.kt7.4MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (32 lines × 2)
core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/provider/misc/RandomClassProvider.kt7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: RandomClassProvider.randomClassInstance (cyclomatic 24)
core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/provider/AbstractFakeDataProvider.kt7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: AbstractFakeDataProvider.resolveUniqueValue (cyclomatic 17)
REDACTED7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
faker/travel/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/travel/TravelFaker.kt8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
faker/travel/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/travel/provider/Compass.kt8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 45

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 105

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 95

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 10

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 47 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.

Every figure here is one of two kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10.

What we checked — 47 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D12D13D14D15D17D19D20D26D27D28D29D30D34D35D36D43D44AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AX10AX3AX4AX6M1M2M3P1P10P2P3P4P6X12X16X21X27X3X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 150 of 245 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a1eb79-815e-7153-b9e2-b128508bc73f.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.kt) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo.
  • D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.kt) and this repository declares a JVM test suite (repository root, Gradle), but it was not re-run: no test result was produced. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Currency was graded against Maven Central, but whether an artifact is DEPRECATED is not: Maven Central publishes no deprecation marker, exactly as rubygems.org does not. Whether one is UNMAINTAINED is not graded either — no registry publishes a maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Two of this dimension's four signals are therefore unread on a Gradle tree, and its score reflects currency alone.
  • D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), but the licence verdict published here was taken over its JVM dependencies. Nothing was read about its Python dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
  • D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (21 contributor(s) across 889 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 97% of the history; the other 20 hold 0.2% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This kind did not reach the 95 % precision gate in three adjudicated runs (docs/plans/deterministic-engine/adjudication/D19-sample3-v3.md), so by the pre-registered fallback it publishes no row until a re-measurement shows it does. The candidates are counted here, not reported as findings, and the score does not include them.
  • D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's naming rules read C# through Roslyn and every other language through its sidecar model; these languages are left out (PHP's reading is its own change, a Roslyn-loaded VB or F# project has no population builder yet). Their declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether their names are consistent.
  • D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. PREREGISTRATION version 20's fallback (adjudication D21-sample3-v3): this rule kind was adjudicated below the 95 % precision gate, so its candidates are counted here and not published, and the score covers only the acronym-spelling and awaitable-suffix rules. The kind returns as rows only after it shows a measured precision; this says nothing about whether these names are consistent.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (bom/build.gradle.kts), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict. For npm the surface is what a published package.json's entry points (exports, main, module, types) export, followed through the source; an entry that names build output the tree does not commit (dist/, build/) is not followed back to source, because only a tsconfig outDir/rootDir pair states that mapping and a bundler's input lives in executable configuration this engine does not evaluate.
  • D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/Faker.kt`, `core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/FakerConfig.kt`, `core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/RandomService.kt`, `core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/dictionary/RawExpression.kt`, `core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/provider/misc/RandomClassProvider.kt`, … (+18 more) produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
  • AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Subject: 9 markup document(s) — HTML, Razor, JSX, Vue, Svelte or server templates. The Runtime Evidence tier boots an app only via docker-compose, an Aspire AppHost, a Dockerfile, an npm dev script, a web service's own toolchain entry point (cargo, go, dotnet, Python, Spring Boot), or an Android app's own Gradle wrapper (run on an emulator); an Apple or Flutter app needs a host it lacks. None applied, so no live runtime a11y/egress/header evidence was collected. You can widen what we reach: add a docker-compose.yml (or an Aspire AppHost) that brings the app up with its dependencies. We then boot it in an isolated sandbox and gathers real runtime evidence — you change nothing in your pipeline (no CI step, no SDK).
  • C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Java source only, and this repository's Kotlin, Python is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and this repository's Kotlin, Python is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

11 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was guard._shell_scan at 57.

guard._shell_scan (cyclomatic 57).codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:888
guard.check_command (cyclomatic 49).codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1563
guard.mutation_operands (cyclomatic 42).codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1085
guard.compile_policy (cyclomatic 35).codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:417
guard.check_inline_code (cyclomatic 32).codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1369

+ 6 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Bring the 11 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with guard._shell_scan (cyclomatic 57), guard.check_command (cyclomatic 49), guard.mutation_operands (cyclomatic 42). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 11 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 7.7 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity5.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

22 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was guard._shell_scan at 145.

guard._shell_scan (cognitive 145).codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:888
guard.check_command (cognitive 99).codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1563
guard.compile_policy (cognitive 69).codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:417
guard.check_inline_code (cognitive 50).codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1369
guard.mutation_operands (cognitive 43).codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1085

+ 17 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Bring the 3 bodies over 60 down to 60 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with guard._shell_scan (cognitive 145), guard.check_command (cognitive 99), guard.compile_policy (cognitive 69). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 3 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 5.9 to about 6.8/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 60; a cleaner split scores higher.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: RandomService · ×2core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/RandomService.kt:26
FileTooLong: guard/guard.py.codex/scripts/guard/guard.py

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with RandomService.kt, RandomProvider.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with guard.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.2 / 10Stronggated by 5 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the production code is copy-pasted: the share of production lines inside a reported copy (every copy of a duplicated block or of an edited member, each line once), 10 at none and 0 at a quarter of the lines.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), scored on the share of production lines inside a reported copy (each line once; 10 at none, 0 at a quarter). Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 duplicated block group(s) detected. 1.9 % of the production lines (214 of 11,296) are in a reported copy. One further row reports members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it.

Edited copy of a member (45 corresponding lines)core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/FakerService.kt:410
Duplicated block (32 lines × 2)core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/helper/Char.kt:44
Duplicated block (31 lines × 2)core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/helper/Char.kt:119
Duplicated block (17 lines × 4)core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/helper/Char.kt:57
Duplicated block (7–10 lines × 2)core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/FakerService.kt:418

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (45 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with FakerService.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (32 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with Char.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (31 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with Char.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling9.7 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

26 production modules (Gradle), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; edges a convention plugin adds from buildSrc or build-logic are not visible there; 1 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 22 of the 26 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, declare types in source no model reads, or have no source directory of their own).

Off the main sequence: :kotlin-faker

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 8 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, not deprecated, and not bloated. Known vulnerabilities are D30's.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (capped-linear for deprecation, prerelease and outdated) per KLoC. Known-vulnerable packages are D30's and are not charged here (rubric-2026.11.2). Exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

This repository's Gradle dependency graph was RESOLVED BY A BUILD, across every subproject rather than the root alone: 101 artifact(s) resolved, 101 of them gradable against Maven Central, and 87 behind a shipped release. Where a version was requested and a different one won conflict resolution, the RESOLVED version is what is graded — grading the request would recommend an upgrade already applied. Known CVEs in the same graph are a separate question again, reported under D30.

Outdated (compile): org.ow2.asm:asm · ×87

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 24 declared JVM dependency artifact(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from the POMs Maven Central publishes, over the coordinates this repository's 28 Maven/Gradle manifest(s) declare with a version resolvable from the manifest itself — the same declaration-site closure this analysis reads for dependency currency. The JVM has no lockfile a checkout is guaranteed to carry, so this is deliberately NOT the transitive closure. A further 1 coordinate(s) are not published to Maven Central — another repository (Google's Maven hosts androidx), a SNAPSHOT, or a private artifact — so their licences are not readable from here and they are outside this verdict. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's JVM dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.7 / 10Stronggated by 20 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

20 deducted task-comment markers across 11296 LoC (0.2/KLoC) → score 9.7. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

TodoComment · ×20faker/travel/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/travel/TravelFaker.kt:30

What to do

  1. Resolve the 20 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Opera.kt (3), WorldCup.kt (2), RandomClassProviderTest.kt (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Every README, docs/ document and root guide parsed by its markup and measured in Unicode letters. Published: a runnable or packaged .NET project whose README (or a document it links, or a root guide) shows no example, and a root README naming none of three or more projects. Overview, licence, boilerplate, wall-of-text, empty-section and XML-doc rows are measured and withheld (counted in gaps) after adjudication. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 of 2 documentation facets pass in full. 353 document(s) read across 25 unit(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Every ADR read by its section structure: nine located rules (a missing Decision, Context or Consequences section, a stale status, two records deciding the same question, a dangling supersede link, a number-only title, a single option, no named cost, no status where the log uses one, no enforcement field where the log adopted one), each a fixed deduction from 10; the score is the mean over evaluated records. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs foundcli-bot/build.gradle.kts:11

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with build.gradle.kts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 23 build units (Gradle) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

20 % of calls cross a namespace and 0 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.5 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

59 finding(s): 0 critical, 39 high, 20 medium, 0 low. 28 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 70 file(s) — `.claude/toolbox/scripts/semver-compare.sh` (line 44), `.claude/toolbox/scripts/statusline_enhanced.sh` (lines 3–421), `.codex/scripts/session-start.sh` (lines 36–41), `core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/RandomService.kt` (line 247), `core/src/jvmMain/resources/locales/ar.yml`, … (+65 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 2 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
  3. No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 28 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (28 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): every row is a match against a vulnerability database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable dependencies in any ecosystem this repository declares.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 51 of the 326 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling9.9 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: Introspector.kt↔Renderer.kt 64%

Change coupling: Introspector.kt ↔ Renderer.ktcli-bot/src/main/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/app/cli/Introspector.kt:1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with Introspector.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Reported apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): the malicious-package feed is a database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 3 platform declaration(s) and 34 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC2 · Forms & labels10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

AC3 · Page structure10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no element the repo's own CSS styles `cursor: pointer` without giving it any of the three, no unfocusable element whose only binding is a mouse enter/leave pair or a double-click, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

Coverage: Population: elements that pose a keyboard-semantics question, in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) — a non-natively-interactive element carrying a click handler, a double-click or hover enter/leave binding, a pointer-only gesture on a tabindex="0" element, or `cursor: pointer` from the repo's own CSS; an href-less or placeholder-href (#, javascript:) anchor; and any element with a positive tabindex. Natively interactive elements used correctly (<button>, <a href>, form controls) are NOT in the population — there is nothing to judge — so a page of nothing but correct controls gives AC4 nothing to measure. Keyboard reachability is judged from the markup, never from a rendered page. ★ An interactive element declared in a tagged-template (html`…`) or hyperscript frontend is NOT in this population — no producer reads either — so an empty population is reported as an analyzer gap, never as "this repository has no interactive elements".

  • A script attaches a click listener to this <span>, but it has no role, no tabindex and no key handler, so it can only be operated with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×6) — REDACTED:587, REDACTED:588, REDACTED:589, …

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

Coverage: Population: elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) that carry a role or an aria-* attribute; roles and token values are checked against the ARIA enums exhaustively within that set. An expression-valued (dynamic) role or aria-* value is skipped rather than guessed, and markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety5.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

  • `.lp-col` moves (`animation: lpScrollUp 20s linear infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — REDACTED:63
  • `.lp-glitch::before` moves (`animation: lpG1 3s infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — REDACTED:102
  • `.lp-glitch::after` moves (`animation: lpG2 3s infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — REDACTED:103
  • `.lp-warn-title::before` moves (`animation: lpG1 4s infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — REDACTED:245
  • `.lp-warn-title::after` moves (`animation: lpG2 4s infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — REDACTED:250
  • `.md-back` moves (`transition: color 125ms, background-color 125ms, transform 125ms cubic-bezier(0.4, 0, 0.2, 1), opacity 125ms`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. (×4) — material/pages/extensions.html:15, material/pages/fakers.html:15, material/pages/locales.html:15, …
  • `.md-back` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. (×4) — material/pages/extensions.html:13, material/pages/fakers.html:13, material/pages/locales.html:13, …
  • `.md-header__button.md-logo` moves (`transition: filter 0.25s ease, transform 0.25s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — docs/assets/stylesheets/main.css:209
  • `html body .md-typeset h1[data-text]::before` moves (`animation: lpG1 3s infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — docs/assets/stylesheets/main.css:359
  • `html body .md-typeset h1[data-text]::after` moves (`animation: lpG2 3s infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — docs/assets/stylesheets/main.css:366

What to do

  • Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AX10 · Code composition10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

  • `IRandom` declares 16 abstract methods: `nextInt`, `randomValue`, `nextLetter`, `randomString`, `nextBoolean`, `nextLong`, `nextFloat`, `nextDouble`, `nextChar`, `nextEnum`, `nextUUID`, `randomSublist`, `randomSubset`, `randomPastDate`, `randomFutureDate`, `randomDate`. Counted over its public functions with no body, once per name; default-bodied functions and properties are not counted, because no implementer is forced to write them. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/IRandom.kt:9

What to do

  • Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
M1 · Documentation (README)9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository and its projects have a README, and whether it is substantive.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository is organised deliberately: production code and tests are set apart in a way its ecosystem or the repository itself declares.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P10 · Library API & versioning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries; off .NET, a library is the ecosystem's publication act (an npm package that is not private and names an entry point, a PyPI distribution with a build system, a Rust library crate, a Maven/Gradle module that publishes, a Go module with no package main, a gemspec, a Composer library, a SwiftPM library product, a pub.dev or Hex package), its surface is the share of types the language's code model records as public (Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, Go, Dart; not measured where the model records no type visibility or, as in TypeScript, only module-level export), and its version is read from the manifest, a semver CHANGELOG, release tooling or semver git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 1/2 runnable modules use logging (modules with no entry point or server are excluded — they are libraries a runnable module hosts). Silent: `cli-bot`.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging to the remaining runnable modules so everything you run is diagnosable in production.
P3 · Security & performance tooling4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • `buildSrc/build.gradle.kts` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — buildSrc/build.gradle.kts:12

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an enhanced `for` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is iterating invalidates the fail-fast iterator it is holding, so the next `next()` throws `ConcurrentModificationException` and the remaining elements are never seen. Whether a `for` loop leaves the `dict`, `set` or `deque` it is walking alone — CPython's iterators over those check that the collection has not changed size since the loop began, so a body that removes from (or empties) the very collection the loop is walking makes the next step raise `RuntimeError: dictionary changed size during iteration` and the remaining items are never seen. Whether a `for (x in c)` or `c.forEach { … }` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a `mutableListOf`/`ArrayList`, `mutableMapOf`/`HashMap` or `mutableSetOf`/`HashSet` is a `java.util` collection on the JVM and is walked by its own fail-fast iterator, so a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is walking makes the next step throw `ConcurrentModificationException` and the remaining elements are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X5 · Nullable reference types10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether Kotlin's null safety is not undermined by not-null assertions — `String` cannot hold null and `String?` must be checked before use in every Kotlin module, and each `!!` is a run-time `NullPointerException` the author has told the compiler cannot happen.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 12 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (22%; ≈24% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 43 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only

Not statically assessed — these 43 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.1.1, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health91.5ExemplarySolid.
Architecture94.9ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity68.8Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness70.8StrongSolid.
Security57.6Adequate — gated by D29, D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Accessibility58.2Adequate — gated by AC4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 69 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's Java imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's Kotlin imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's Python imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — No container singleton was found, so there is no shared instance for concurrent requests to race on. No class in this Java code is a Spring, JSR-330 or CDI singleton bean. No class in this Kotlin code is a Spring, JSR-330 or CDI singleton bean. No function in this Python code is served by a threaded web framework (a Flask, Bottle or FastAPI route, a Django or Pyramid view), so no module is shared between request threads. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Room, JPA or MongoDB entity, an Exposed or Ktorm table, or in a SQL CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store client (Room, Exposed, SQLDelight, Realm, JPA, JDBC, MongoDB, Firebase, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named column (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone_number, …) or stored credential on a Room, JPA or MongoDB entity, an Exposed or Ktorm table, or a SQL CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store client (Room, Exposed, SQLDelight, Realm, JPA, JDBC, MongoDB, Firebase, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Room, JPA or MongoDB entity, an Exposed or Ktorm table, or in a SQL CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store client (Room, Exposed, SQLDelight, Realm, JPA, JDBC, MongoDB, Firebase, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Room, JPA or MongoDB entity, an Exposed or Ktorm table, or in a SQL CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store client (Room, Exposed, SQLDelight, Realm, JPA, JDBC, MongoDB, Firebase, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~6278 lines of test source are present (.kt) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .kt suite was found but not re-run
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency does not read html yet; not measured.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .java, .kt, .py source were not judged.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 23 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (37 value object(s))
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Java, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 200 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks.
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JVM, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
  • P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `@Benchmark` in a Java, Kotlin or Scala file importing JMH or kotlinx-benchmark, Jetpack Benchmark's `measureRepeated` in a file importing androidx.benchmark, or JMH/kotlinx-benchmark/androidx.benchmark in a pom.xml, Gradle or sbt build, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: this repository declares no async functions, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Java, Python and Kotlin were read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller (Ktor, OkHttp's newCall or a URL stream, from a suspend function) — a Java request off Android takes no token: it is cancelled through the handle it returns (Future.cancel, Call.cancel, a Disposable), ambiently (io.grpc.Context) or by interrupting its thread, not through a parameter; a Python request takes no token: asyncio cancels the task and trio or anyio the scope that made it, from outside the call, and requests, httpx, aiohttp and gRPC take a timeout, not a cancellation; a Kotlin request outside a suspend function has no caller's cancellation to honour
  • X20 Mistyped argument guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Kotlin was read, and it logs through none that an assembled message defeats: Android's `Log` and Timber, java.util.logging and log4j-api-kotlin take one finished message (as log4net does in C#), or it makes no call through a named logger at all. Calls made through SLF4J, log4j 2 or kotlin-logging (`LoggerFactory.getLogger`, `KotlinLogging.logger {}`) would be judged.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 45 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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  • + 3 more in this group — see findings.md.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics · Click handler on a non-interactive <span> · ×6
  • Click handler on a non-interactive <span> REDACTED:587 — A script attaches a click listener to this <span>, but it has no role, no tabindex and no key handler, so it can only be operated with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
  • Click handler on a non-interactive <span> REDACTED:588 — A script attaches a click listener to this <span>, but it has no role, no tabindex and no key handler, so it can only be operated with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
  • Click handler on a non-interactive <span> REDACTED:589 — A script attaches a click listener to this <span>, but it has no role, no tabindex and no key handler, so it can only be operated with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
  • Click handler on a non-interactive <span> REDACTED:590 — A script attaches a click listener to this <span>, but it has no role, no tabindex and no key handler, so it can only be operated with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
  • Click handler on a non-interactive <span> REDACTED:591 — A script attaches a click listener to this <span>, but it has no role, no tabindex and no key handler, so it can only be operated with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
  • Click handler on a non-interactive <span> REDACTED:592 — A script attaches a click listener to this <span>, but it has no role, no tabindex and no key handler, so it can only be operated with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
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Serious — 105 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×20
  • TodoComment faker/travel/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/travel/TravelFaker.kt:30 — // TODO: val compass: Compass by lazy {Compass(fakerService) } — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment faker/travel/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/travel/provider/Compass.kt:22 — // TODO: 3/7/2019 this needs some custom logic for the resolver function — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment faker/sports/src/jvmTest/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/sports/provider/CrossfitTest.kt:10 — // TODO: is there a better way to test a provider directly w/o exposing constructors of — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment faker/movies/src/jvmTest/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/movies/provider/StarWarsTest.kt:10 — // TODO: is there a better way to test a provider directly w/o exposing constructors of — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment faker/sports/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/sports/provider/WorldCup.kt:29 — // TODO: 3/10/2019 better resolving of group names — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment faker/sports/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/sports/provider/WorldCup.kt:33 — // TODO: 3/10/2019 better resoving of rooster for different countries and types — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment faker/music/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/music/provider/Opera.kt:28 — // TODO: 24.11.2019 fun italian() // resolves to a random italian opera — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment faker/music/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/music/provider/Opera.kt:29 — // TODO: fun german() // resolves to a random german opera — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment faker/music/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/music/provider/Opera.kt:30 — // TODO: fun french() // resolves to a random french opera — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment faker/movies/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/movies/provider/Tron.kt:43 — // todo functions with enum type parameters should by default return a random value? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment faker/commerce/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/commerce/CommerceFaker.kt:58 — // TODO: not implemented — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment core/src/jvmTest/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/FakerServiceTest.kt:389 — // TODO: 3/12/2019 not currently used in any of the dictionary files — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment core/src/jvmTest/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/provider/misc/RandomClassProviderTest.kt:150 — // val byte: Byte, // TODO: 11.06.19 — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment core/src/jvmTest/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/provider/misc/RandomClassProviderTest.kt:154 — // val array: Array<String> // TODO: 12.06.19 — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment core/src/jvmTest/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/integration/provider/MoneyIT.kt:18 — // TODO: other locales — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/Faker.kt:63 — // TODO: val source: Source by lazy { Source(fakerService) } — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/FakerService.kt:127 — // TODO: make internal and add tests — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/FakerService.kt:241 — // TODO: can this be improved by doing smth along the lines of — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/provider/Source.kt:20 — // TODO: 3/10/2019 not sure how this is used. See original faker ruby gem for insights — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/provider/unique/LocalUniqueDataProvider.kt:26 — // get() = TODO("Not yet implemented") — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×20
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AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard · ×12
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard REDACTED:63 — `.lp-col` moves (`animation: lpScrollUp 20s linear infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard REDACTED:102 — `.lp-glitch::before` moves (`animation: lpG1 3s infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard REDACTED:103 — `.lp-glitch::after` moves (`animation: lpG2 3s infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard REDACTED:245 — `.lp-warn-title::before` moves (`animation: lpG1 4s infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard REDACTED:250 — `.lp-warn-title::after` moves (`animation: lpG2 4s infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard material/pages/extensions.html:15 — `.md-back` moves (`transition: color 125ms, background-color 125ms, transform 125ms cubic-bezier(0.4, 0, 0.2, 1), opacity 125ms`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard material/pages/fakers.html:15 — `.md-back` moves (`transition: color 125ms, background-color 125ms, transform 125ms cubic-bezier(0.4, 0, 0.2, 1), opacity 125ms`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard material/pages/locales.html:15 — `.md-back` moves (`transition: color 125ms, background-color 125ms, transform 125ms cubic-bezier(0.4, 0, 0.2, 1), opacity 125ms`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard material/pages/providers.html:15 — `.md-back` moves (`transition: color 125ms, background-color 125ms, transform 125ms cubic-bezier(0.4, 0, 0.2, 1), opacity 125ms`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard docs/assets/stylesheets/main.css:209 — `.md-header__button.md-logo` moves (`transition: filter 0.25s ease, transform 0.25s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard docs/assets/stylesheets/main.css:359 — `html body .md-typeset h1[data-text]::before` moves (`animation: lpG1 3s infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard docs/assets/stylesheets/main.css:366 — `html body .md-typeset h1[data-text]::after` moves (`animation: lpG2 3s infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a · ×4
  • Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement material/pages/extensions.html:13 — `.md-back` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
  • Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement material/pages/fakers.html:13 — `.md-back` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
  • Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement material/pages/locales.html:13 — `.md-back` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
  • Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement material/pages/providers.html:13 — `.md-back` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×2
  • TooManyMethods: RandomService core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/RandomService.kt:26 — TooManyMethods — 35 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 5 over it, 1.17× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: RandomProvider core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/provider/misc/RandomProvider.kt:30 — TooManyMethods — 35 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 5 over it, 1.17× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED
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D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · guard._shell_scan (cyclomatic 57) · ×1
  • guard._shell_scan (cyclomatic 57) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:888 — guard._shell_scan has cyclomatic complexity 57 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 8 of the 11 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 152 of the 174 points over it (87%), 13.8× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 11). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · guard.check_command (cyclomatic 49) · ×1
  • guard.check_command (cyclomatic 49) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1563 — guard.check_command has cyclomatic complexity 49 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 8 of the 11 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 152 of the 174 points over it (87%), 13.8× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 11). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · guard.mutation_operands (cyclomatic 42) · ×1
  • guard.mutation_operands (cyclomatic 42) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1085 — guard.mutation_operands has cyclomatic complexity 42 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 8 of the 11 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 152 of the 174 points over it (87%), 13.8× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 11). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · guard.compile_policy (cyclomatic 35) · ×1
  • guard.compile_policy (cyclomatic 35) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:417 — guard.compile_policy has cyclomatic complexity 35 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 8 of the 11 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 152 of the 174 points over it (87%), 13.8× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 11). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · guard.check_inline_code (cyclomatic 32) · ×1
  • guard.check_inline_code (cyclomatic 32) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1369 — guard.check_inline_code has cyclomatic complexity 32 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 8 of the 11 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 152 of the 174 points over it (87%), 13.8× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 11). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · REDACTED.document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded") (cyclomatic 26) · ×1
  • REDACTED.document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded") (cyclomatic 26) REDACTED:807 — REDACTED.document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded") has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 11 of the 26 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 4 function items inside it that branch (updateHero, doTw, showCat, …). Those helpers are already separate functions, so extracting the branching again is not available. To reduce it, move them out of the body to the enclosing scope, where each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · RandomClassProvider.randomClassInstance (cyclomatic 24) · ×1
  • RandomClassProvider.randomClassInstance (cyclomatic 24) core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/provider/misc/RandomClassProvider.kt:129 — RandomClassProvider.randomClassInstance has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · guard.spawned_commands (cyclomatic 21) · ×1
  • guard.spawned_commands (cyclomatic 21) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1285 — guard.spawned_commands has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 8 of the 11 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 152 of the 174 points over it (87%), 13.8× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 11). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · guard.inline_code (cyclomatic 20) · ×1
  • guard.inline_code (cyclomatic 20) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1015 — guard.inline_code has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 8 of the 11 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 152 of the 174 points over it (87%), 13.8× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 11). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · AbstractFakeDataProvider.resolveUniqueValue (cyclomatic 17) · ×1
  • AbstractFakeDataProvider.resolveUniqueValue (cyclomatic 17) core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/provider/AbstractFakeDataProvider.kt:52 — AbstractFakeDataProvider.resolveUniqueValue has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · guard.context_from_payload (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • guard.context_from_payload (cyclomatic 16) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:206 — guard.context_from_payload has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 8 of the 11 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 152 of the 174 points over it (87%), 13.8× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 11). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · guard._shell_scan (cognitive 145) · ×1
  • guard._shell_scan (cognitive 145) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:888 — guard._shell_scan has cognitive complexity 145 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 26 (76 pts), ternaries 8 (34 pts), loops 5 (18 pts), boolean chains 17 (nesting depth added 89). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 17 of the 22 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 434 of the 508 points over it (85%), 19.7× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 22). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · guard.check_command (cognitive 99) · ×1
  • guard.check_command (cognitive 99) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1563 — guard.check_command has cognitive complexity 99 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 20 (49 pts), loops 11 (24 pts), boolean chains 14, ternaries 4 (12 pts) (nesting depth added 50). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 17 of the 22 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 434 of the 508 points over it (85%), 19.7× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 22). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · guard.compile_policy (cognitive 69) · ×1
  • guard.compile_policy (cognitive 69) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:417 — guard.compile_policy has cognitive complexity 69 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13 (35 pts), loops 8 (14 pts), boolean chains 8, error handling 2 (6 pts), ternaries 3 (6 pts) (nesting depth added 35). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 17 of the 22 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 434 of the 508 points over it (85%), 19.7× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 22). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · guard.check_inline_code (cognitive 50) · ×1
  • guard.check_inline_code (cognitive 50) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1369 — guard.check_inline_code has cognitive complexity 50 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (17 pts), boolean chains 11, ternaries 4 (11 pts), loops 6 (8 pts), error handling 1 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 20). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 17 of the 22 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 434 of the 508 points over it (85%), 19.7× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 22). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · guard.mutation_operands (cognitive 43) · ×1
  • guard.mutation_operands (cognitive 43) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1085 — guard.mutation_operands has cognitive complexity 43 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (23 pts), boolean chains 18, loops 2 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 17 of the 22 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 434 of the 508 points over it (85%), 19.7× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 22). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · guard.inline_code (cognitive 37) · ×1
  • guard.inline_code (cognitive 37) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1015 — guard.inline_code has cognitive complexity 37 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (24 pts), ternaries 4 (8 pts), boolean chains 4, loops 1 (nesting depth added 18). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 17 of the 22 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 434 of the 508 points over it (85%), 19.7× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 22). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · guard.env_options (cognitive 37) · ×1
  • guard.env_options (cognitive 37) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1504 — guard.env_options has cognitive complexity 37 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (22 pts), loops 3 (7 pts), ternaries 2 (6 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 24). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 17 of the 22 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 434 of the 508 points over it (85%), 19.7× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 22). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · REDACTED.document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded") (cognitive 37) · ×1
  • REDACTED.document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded") (cognitive 37) REDACTED:807 — REDACTED.document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded") has cognitive complexity 37 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 20 (26 pts), loops 2 (5 pts), boolean chains 4, ternaries 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 10). Most of this is not in the body itself: 12 of the 37 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 4 function items inside it that branch (doTw, updateHero, showCat, …). Those helpers are already separate functions, so extracting the branching again is not available. To reduce it, move them out of the body to the enclosing scope, where each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · AbstractFakeDataProvider.resolveUniqueValue (cognitive 35) · ×1
  • AbstractFakeDataProvider.resolveUniqueValue (cognitive 35) core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/provider/AbstractFakeDataProvider.kt:52 — AbstractFakeDataProvider.resolveUniqueValue has cognitive complexity 35 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13 (20 pts), match/switch 3 (9 pts), boolean chains 6 (nesting depth added 13). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · guard.spawned_commands (cognitive 33) · ×1
  • guard.spawned_commands (cognitive 33) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1285 — guard.spawned_commands has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (16 pts), boolean chains 10, loops 3 (5 pts), ternaries 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 17 of the 22 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 434 of the 508 points over it (85%), 19.7× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 22). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · guard.program_indices (cognitive 30) · ×1
  • guard.program_indices (cognitive 30) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:719 — guard.program_indices has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (21 pts), loops 3 (7 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 19). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 17 of the 22 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 434 of the 508 points over it (85%), 19.7× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 22). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · FakerService.getRawValue (cognitive 26) · ×1
  • FakerService.getRawValue (cognitive 26) core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/FakerService.kt:464 — FakerService.getRawValue has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 4 (14 pts), if/else 8 (12 pts) (nesting depth added 14). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · RandomClassProvider.randomClassInstance (cognitive 26) · ×1
  • RandomClassProvider.randomClassInstance (cognitive 26) core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/provider/misc/RandomClassProvider.kt:129 — RandomClassProvider.randomClassInstance has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (13 pts), boolean chains 6, match/switch 3 (4 pts), error handling 2 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · RendererKt.renderProvider (cognitive 25) · ×1
  • RendererKt.renderProvider (cognitive 25) cli-bot/src/main/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/app/cli/Renderer.kt:60 — RendererKt.renderProvider has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13 (18 pts), match/switch 2 (5 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · guard.check_patch (cognitive 23) · ×1
  • guard.check_patch (cognitive 23) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1687 — guard.check_patch has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (15 pts), boolean chains 3, loops 2 (3 pts), ternaries 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 17 of the 22 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 434 of the 508 points over it (85%), 19.7× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 22). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · guard.check_destructive (cognitive 21) · ×1
  • guard.check_destructive (cognitive 21) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1536 — guard.check_destructive has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 3 (10 pts), loops 3 (6 pts), ternaries 2 (4 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 17 of the 22 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 434 of the 508 points over it (85%), 19.7× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 22). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · guard.check_capy_tool (cognitive 21) · ×1
  • guard.check_capy_tool (cognitive 21) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1737 — guard.check_capy_tool has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (15 pts), error handling 1 (3 pts), loops 1 (2 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 17 of the 22 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 434 of the 508 points over it (85%), 19.7× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 22). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · guard.code_string_value (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • guard.code_string_value (cognitive 17) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1194 — guard.code_string_value has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (14 pts), boolean chains 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 17 of the 22 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 434 of the 508 points over it (85%), 19.7× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 22). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · guard.context_from_payload (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • guard.context_from_payload (cognitive 16) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:206 — guard.context_from_payload has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (11 pts), boolean chains 5 (nesting depth added 1). To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 17 of the 22 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 434 of the 508 points over it (85%), 19.7× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 22). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · guard.validate_glob (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • guard.validate_glob (cognitive 16) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:315 — guard.validate_glob has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (10 pts), boolean chains 4, loops 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 3). To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 17 of the 22 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 434 of the 508 points over it (85%), 19.7× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 22). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · guard.user_exceptions (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • guard.user_exceptions (cognitive 16) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:538 — guard.user_exceptions has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (9 pts), boolean chains 5, loops 2 (nesting depth added 3). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 17 of the 22 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 434 of the 508 points over it (85%), 19.7× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 22). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · guard.targets_under_tmp (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • guard.targets_under_tmp (cognitive 16) .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py:1479 — guard.targets_under_tmp has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 5 (10 pts), boolean chains 5, loops 1 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py holds 17 of the 22 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 434 of the 508 points over it (85%), 19.7× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 22). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×1
  • FileTooLong: guard/guard.py .codex/scripts/guard/guard.py — FileTooLong — 1348 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 848 over it, 2.70× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×1
  • Change coupling: Introspector.kt ↔ Renderer.kt cli-bot/src/main/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/app/cli/Introspector.kt:1 — `cli-bot/src/main/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/app/cli/Introspector.kt` and `cli-bot/src/main/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/app/cli/Renderer.kt` change together 64% of the time (7 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 7 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `2aacff8c` Include Person provider in CLI introspector (#286); `37f1d520` Update cli-bot 'list' and 'lookup' commands to use all fakers; `f9c69f4a` Render sub-providers functions in cli output — run `git show` on any of them.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
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D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (45 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (45 corresponding lines) core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/FakerService.kt:410 — core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/FakerService.kt:410-454 | core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/FakerService.kt:469-532 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 45 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (32 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (32 lines × 2) core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/helper/Char.kt:44 — core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/helper/Char.kt:44-75 | core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/helper/Char.kt:77-108 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (31 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (31 lines × 2) core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/helper/Char.kt:119 — core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/helper/Char.kt:119-149 | core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/helper/Char.kt:151-181 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 4) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 4) core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/helper/Char.kt:57 — core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/helper/Char.kt:57-73 | core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/helper/Char.kt:90-106 | core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/helper/Char.kt:129-145 | core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/helper/Char.kt:161-177 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7–10 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (7–10 lines × 2) core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/FakerService.kt:418 — core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/FakerService.kt:418-424 | core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/FakerService.kt:480-489 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/FakerService.kt:418` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: :kotlin-faker — :kotlin-faker: abstractness 0.03, instability 0.00, distance 0.97 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 1 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Minor — 8 finding(s)
AX6 · Interface segregation · Fat interface · ×1
  • Fat interface: IRandom (16 abstract methods) core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/IRandom.kt:9 — `IRandom` declares 16 abstract methods: `nextInt`, `randomValue`, `nextLetter`, `randomString`, `nextBoolean`, `nextLong`, `nextFloat`, `nextDouble`, `nextChar`, `nextEnum`, `nextUUID`, `randomSublist`, `randomSubset`, `randomPastDate`, `randomFutureDate`, `randomDate`. Counted over its public functions with no body, once per name; default-bodied functions and properties are not counted, because no implementer is forced to write them. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found cli-bot/build.gradle.kts:11 — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`. ADRs are expected here because `cli-bot/build.gradle.kts` makes this repository a deployable product (line 11).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1
  • No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
P2 · Observability · Logging is not universal · ×1
  • Logging is not universal — Only 1/2 runnable modules use logging (modules with no entry point or server are excluded — they are libraries a runnable module hosts). Silent: `cli-bot`.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · No dependency-update automation · ×1
  • No dependency-update automation buildSrc/build.gradle.kts:12 — `buildSrc/build.gradle.kts` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`.
Minor — 87 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (compile) · ×87
  • Outdated (compile): org.ow2.asm:asm — org.ow2.asm:asm 9.6 → 9.11.1 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.ow2.asm:asm-tree — org.ow2.asm:asm-tree 9.6 → 9.11.1 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-bom — org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-bom 2.1.21 → 2.4.21 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-stdlib-jdk8 — org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-stdlib-jdk8 2.1.21 → 2.4.21 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-stdlib-common — org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-stdlib-common 2.1.21 → 2.4.21 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-reflect — org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-reflect 2.1.21 → 2.4.21 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-stdlib — org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-stdlib 2.1.21 → 2.4.21 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-stdlib-jdk7 — org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-stdlib-jdk7 2.1.21 → 2.4.21 available.
  • Outdated (compile): com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind — com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind 2.21.1 → 2.23.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-annotations — com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-annotations 2.21 → 2.23 available.
  • Outdated (compile): com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core — com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core 2.21.1 → 2.23.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): com.fasterxml.jackson:jackson-bom — com.fasterxml.jackson:jackson-bom 2.21.1 → 2.23.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): com.fasterxml.jackson.module:jackson-module-kotlin — com.fasterxml.jackson.module:jackson-module-kotlin 2.21.1 → 2.23.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.kotest:kotest-property — io.kotest:kotest-property 5.9.1 → 6.2.7 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.kotest:kotest-common — io.kotest:kotest-common 5.9.1 → 6.2.7 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.jetbrains.kotlinx:kotlinx-coroutines-core — org.jetbrains.kotlinx:kotlinx-coroutines-core 1.8.0 → 1.11.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.jetbrains.kotlinx:atomicfu — org.jetbrains.kotlinx:atomicfu 0.23.1 → 0.33.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.kotest:kotest-assertions-shared — io.kotest:kotest-assertions-shared 5.9.1 → 6.2.7 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.kotest:kotest-runner-junit5 — io.kotest:kotest-runner-junit5 5.9.1 → 6.2.7 available.
  • Outdated (compile): io.kotest:kotest-assertions-core — io.kotest:kotest-assertions-core 5.9.1 → 6.2.7 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-metadata-jvm — org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-metadata-jvm 2.1.21 → 2.4.21 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.jetbrains:annotations — org.jetbrains:annotations 13.0 → 26.1.0 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-compiler-embeddable — org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-compiler-embeddable 2.1.21 → 2.4.21 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-script-runtime — org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-script-runtime 2.1.21 → 2.4.21 available.
  • Outdated (compile): org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-daemon-embeddable — org.jetbrains.kotlin:kotlin-daemon-embeddable 2.1.21 → 2.4.21 available.
  • + 62 more in this group — see findings.md.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=0 --max-count=200" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-22b2bd6598454e70bb1f1af65a69ac79/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=200 --max-count=697" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-22b2bd6598454e70bb1f1af65a69ac79/history-1.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history-1.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-22b2bd6598454e70bb1f1af65a69ac79/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt --exclude .codex/rules .59artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm .0artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 23 file(s) — `core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/Faker.kt`, `core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/FakerConfig.kt`, `core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/RandomService.kt`, `core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/dictionary/RawExpression.kt`, `core/src/jvmMain/kotlin/io/github/serpro69/kfaker/provider/misc/RandomClassProvider.kt`, … (+18 more) — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm .0artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 01a1eb79-815e-7153-b9e2-b128508bc73f · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md