Executive summary
react-native-async-storage/async-storage is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, most of them in the packages it uses. Its score is held back because we found no logging, tracing or health checks in the code and no automated security scanning of the code, its secrets or its dependencies. It scores 48 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged.
Production Readiness, at 34, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first steps are adopting a logging library and adding automated security scanning, each worth about 6 points. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 60.
Forty-three known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Twenty-seven pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with, and two secrets can leak from the build pipeline. Updating the vulnerable packages, pinning each tool to an exact version and limiting each secret to its own step would close these risks. Fixing the weaknesses the scanner points to would fix the security weakness in the code. Adding the tests the test command is meant to run would take care of the test command with no tests behind it.
The product code is 2,897 lines, about €2,900 to rebuild.
If Production Readiness rose from 34 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 48 to about 60.
New since the last survey: 15 findings
- Code Duplication · Duplicated block (45 lines × 2) packages/async-storage/android/src/newarch/org/asyncstorage/AsyncStorageModule.kt
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Observability · No structured logging
Fixed since the last survey: 10 findings
- Code Duplication · Duplicated block (45 lines × 2) packages/async-storage/android/src/newarch/org/asyncstorage/AsyncStorageModule.kt
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
Rebuild cost: about €2,900 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €970 to €4,900, for 16 to 51 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.7 at a score of 48. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 2,897 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture — module dependency graph
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 org.asyncstorage.AsyncStorageModule | 2 org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage | 3 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.StorageDatabase | 4 packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage | 5 packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorageError | 6 packages.async-storage.src.native-module.NativeAsyncStorage | 7 packages.async-storage.src.web-module.IndexedDBConnectionRegistry | 8 packages.expo-with-async-storage | 9 packages.expo-with-async-storage.src | 10 repository | 11 org.asyncstorage | 12 org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.LegacyStorageModule | 13 org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageDb | 14 org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageSupplier | 15 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database | 16 packages.async-storage.src | 17 packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_windows | 18 packages.async-storage.src.jest | 19 packages.async-storage.src.jest.AsyncStorageMock | 20 packages.async-storage.src.web-module.IndexedDBStorage | 21 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage | 22 packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage | 23 packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native | 24 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.PlatformContext | 25 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorage | 26 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.StorageException | 27 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles | 28 org.asyncstorage.storage |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 org.asyncstorage.AsyncStorageModule | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2 org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.StorageDatabase | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4 packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5 packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorageError | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6 packages.async-storage.src.native-module.NativeAsyncStorage | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 7 packages.async-storage.src.web-module.IndexedDBConnectionRegistry | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8 packages.expo-with-async-storage | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 9 packages.expo-with-async-storage.src | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 10 repository | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 11 org.asyncstorage | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 12 org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.LegacyStorageModule | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 13 org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageDb | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 14 org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageSupplier | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 15 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 16 packages.async-storage.src | 3 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 17 packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_windows | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 18 packages.async-storage.src.jest | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 19 packages.async-storage.src.jest.AsyncStorageMock | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20 packages.async-storage.src.web-module.IndexedDBStorage | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage | 4 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22 packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage | 2 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 23 packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native | 2 | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 24 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.PlatformContext | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 25 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorage | 4 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 26 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.StorageException | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 27 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles | 2 | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 28 org.asyncstorage.storage | 3 |
11→2 org.asyncstorage uses org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in org.asyncstorage uses a type in org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.
- The types involved
org.asyncstorage.AsyncStorageModule→org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.LegacyStorageModule
- Direction
- org.asyncstorage uses org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage, so a change to org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage can break org.asyncstorage, while a change to org.asyncstorage can't break org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: org.asyncstorage uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
12→2 org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.LegacyStorageModule uses org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.LegacyStorageModule uses a type in org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.
- The types involved
org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.LegacyStorageModule.Companion→org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.AsyncStorageAccess
- Direction
- org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.LegacyStorageModule uses org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage, so a change to org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage can break org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.LegacyStorageModule, while a change to org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.LegacyStorageModule can't break org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.LegacyStorageModule uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→2 org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageDb uses org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageDb uses a type in org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.
- The types involved
org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageDb.Companion→org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageDb
- Direction
- org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageDb uses org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage, so a change to org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage can break org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageDb, while a change to org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageDb can't break org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageDb uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
14→2 org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageSupplier uses org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageSupplier uses a type in org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.
- The types involved
org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageSupplier.Companion→org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.AsyncStorageAccess
- Direction
- org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageSupplier uses org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage, so a change to org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage can break org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageSupplier, while a change to org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageSupplier can't break org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: org.asyncstorage.legacy_storage.StorageSupplier uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
15→21 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database uses org.asyncstorage.shared_storage part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database uses a type in org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.
- The types involved
org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFilesKt→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.PlatformContext
- Direction
- org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database uses org.asyncstorage.shared_storage, so a change to org.asyncstorage.shared_storage can break org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database, while a change to org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database can't break org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
16→4 packages.async-storage.src uses packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in packages.async-storage.src uses a type in packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.
- The types involved
packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage→packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.AsyncStoragepackages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage.native→packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.AsyncStoragepackages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage.windows→packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.AsyncStorage
- Direction
- packages.async-storage.src uses packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage, so a change to packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage can break packages.async-storage.src, while a change to packages.async-storage.src can't break packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: packages.async-storage.src uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
17→4 packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_windows uses packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_windows uses a type in packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.
- The types involved
packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_windows.LegacyAsyncStorageImpl→packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.AsyncStorage
- Direction
- packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_windows uses packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage, so a change to packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage can break packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_windows, while a change to packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_windows can't break packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_windows uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
18→4 packages.async-storage.src.jest uses packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in packages.async-storage.src.jest uses a type in packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.
- The types involved
packages.async-storage.src.jest.AsyncStorageMock→packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.AsyncStorage
- Direction
- packages.async-storage.src.jest uses packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage, so a change to packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage can break packages.async-storage.src.jest, while a change to packages.async-storage.src.jest can't break packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: packages.async-storage.src.jest uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
19→4 packages.async-storage.src.jest.AsyncStorageMock uses packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in packages.async-storage.src.jest.AsyncStorageMock uses a type in packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.
- The types involved
packages.async-storage.src.jest.AsyncStorageMock.AsyncStorageMemoryImpl→packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.AsyncStorage
- Direction
- packages.async-storage.src.jest.AsyncStorageMock uses packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage, so a change to packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage can break packages.async-storage.src.jest.AsyncStorageMock, while a change to packages.async-storage.src.jest.AsyncStorageMock can't break packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: packages.async-storage.src.jest.AsyncStorageMock uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
20→5 packages.async-storage.src.web-module.IndexedDBStorage uses packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorageError✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in packages.async-storage.src.web-module.IndexedDBStorage uses a type in packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorageError.
- The types involved
packages.async-storage.src.web-module.IndexedDBStorage.IndexedDBStorage→packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorageError.AsyncStorageError
- Direction
- packages.async-storage.src.web-module.IndexedDBStorage uses packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorageError, so a change to packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorageError can break packages.async-storage.src.web-module.IndexedDBStorage, while a change to packages.async-storage.src.web-module.IndexedDBStorage can't break packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorageError.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: packages.async-storage.src.web-module.IndexedDBStorage uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
21→15 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage uses org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database✕
- Connections
- 4 pairs of types, where a type in org.asyncstorage.shared_storage uses a type in org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.
- The types involved
org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.EntryKt→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.StorageEntryorg.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorageImpl→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFilesorg.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorageImpl→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.StorageDaoorg.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorageImpl→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.StorageDatabase
- Direction
- org.asyncstorage.shared_storage uses org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database, so a change to org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database can break org.asyncstorage.shared_storage, while a change to org.asyncstorage.shared_storage can't break org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: org.asyncstorage.shared_storage uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
22→4 packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage uses packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage uses a type in packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.
- The types involved
packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage.AsyncStorageWebImpl→packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.AsyncStoragepackages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage.LegacyAsyncStorageWebImpl→packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.AsyncStorage
- Direction
- packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage uses packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage, so a change to packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage can break packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage, while a change to packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage can't break packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
22→5 packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage uses packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorageError✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage uses a type in packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorageError.
- The types involved
packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage.AsyncStorageWebImpl→packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorageError.AsyncStorageError
- Direction
- packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage uses packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorageError, so a change to packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorageError can break packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage, while a change to packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage can't break packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorageError.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
22→20 packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage uses packages.async-storage.src.web-module.IndexedDBStorage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage uses a type in packages.async-storage.src.web-module.IndexedDBStorage.
- The types involved
packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage.AsyncStorageWebImpl→packages.async-storage.src.web-module.IndexedDBStorage.IndexedDBStorage
- Direction
- packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage uses packages.async-storage.src.web-module.IndexedDBStorage, so a change to packages.async-storage.src.web-module.IndexedDBStorage can break packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage, while a change to packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage can't break packages.async-storage.src.web-module.IndexedDBStorage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
23→4 packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native uses packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native uses a type in packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.
- The types involved
packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native.AsyncStorageImpl→packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.AsyncStoragepackages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native.LegacyAsyncStorageImpl→packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.AsyncStorage
- Direction
- packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native uses packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage, so a change to packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage can break packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native, while a change to packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native can't break packages.async-storage.src.AsyncStorage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
23→17 packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native uses packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_windows✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native uses a type in packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_windows.
- The types involved
packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native.AsyncStorageImpl→packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_windows.NativeAsyncStorageSpecpackages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native.LegacyAsyncStorageImpl→packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_windows.NativeAsyncStorageSpec
- Direction
- packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native uses packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_windows, so a change to packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_windows can break packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native, while a change to packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native can't break packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_windows.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: packages.async-storage.src.createAsyncStorage_native uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
24→21 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.PlatformContext uses org.asyncstorage.shared_storage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.PlatformContext uses a type in org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.
- The types involved
org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.PlatformContext.Instance→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.PlatformContext
- Direction
- org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.PlatformContext uses org.asyncstorage.shared_storage, so a change to org.asyncstorage.shared_storage can break org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.PlatformContext, while a change to org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.PlatformContext can't break org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.PlatformContext uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
25→21 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorage uses org.asyncstorage.shared_storage✕
- Connections
- 4 pairs of types, where a type in org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorage uses a type in org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.
- The types involved
org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorage.androidKt→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.PlatformContextorg.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorage.androidKt→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorageorg.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorage.appleKt→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.PlatformContextorg.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorage.appleKt→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorage
- Direction
- org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorage uses org.asyncstorage.shared_storage, so a change to org.asyncstorage.shared_storage can break org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorage, while a change to org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorage can't break org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorage uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
26→21 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.StorageException uses org.asyncstorage.shared_storage✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.StorageException uses a type in org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.
- The types involved
org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.StorageException.OtherException→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.StorageExceptionorg.asyncstorage.shared_storage.StorageException.SqliteException→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.StorageException
- Direction
- org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.StorageException uses org.asyncstorage.shared_storage, so a change to org.asyncstorage.shared_storage can break org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.StorageException, while a change to org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.StorageException can't break org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.StorageException uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
27→15 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles uses org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles uses a type in org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.
- The types involved
org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles.androidKt→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFilesorg.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles.appleKt→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles
- Direction
- org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles uses org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database, so a change to org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database can break org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles, while a change to org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles can't break org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
27→21 org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles uses org.asyncstorage.shared_storage✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles uses a type in org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.
- The types involved
org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles.androidKt→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.PlatformContextorg.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles.appleKt→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.PlatformContext
- Direction
- org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles uses org.asyncstorage.shared_storage, so a change to org.asyncstorage.shared_storage can break org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles, while a change to org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles can't break org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.database.DatabaseFiles uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
28→21 org.asyncstorage.storage uses org.asyncstorage.shared_storage✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in org.asyncstorage.storage uses a type in org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.
- The types involved
org.asyncstorage.storage.EntryExtKt→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.Entryorg.asyncstorage.storage.RNStorage→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorageorg.asyncstorage.storage.StorageRegistry→org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.SharedStorage
- Direction
- org.asyncstorage.storage uses org.asyncstorage.shared_storage, so a change to org.asyncstorage.shared_storage can break org.asyncstorage.storage, while a change to org.asyncstorage.storage can't break org.asyncstorage.shared_storage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: org.asyncstorage.storage uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 67 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 31 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Adopt SLF4J (with a Logback or Log4j2 JSON encoder) and log at meaningful points in the modules you run; Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing; Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adopt SLF4J (with a Logback or Log4j2 JSON encoder) and log at meaningful points in the modules you run. | +6.1 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +6.1 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +6.1 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +5.5 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Resolve the 15 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with LegacyStorageSupplier.kt, createAsyncStorage.windows.ts, createAsyncStorage.native.ts. | +5.4 pts | Medium | Knowledge Freshness |
| Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value. | +2.3 pts | Medium | Dead Code |
| Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite. | +1.7 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies. | +1.3 pts | Medium | Dependency Hygiene |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.3 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.4 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical vulnerability: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 3.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 3.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 4.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Mixed | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: REDACTED |
| packages/async-storage/android/src/newarch/org/asyncstorage/AsyncStorageModule.kt | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (45 lines × 2) |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 51 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 51 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 127 of 141 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D4 Code Duplication — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 1 duplicated block group(s) on this row were found in the languages this pass could tokenize, and they do NOT cover all of this repository's production source: .mm (914 lines, 24% of production source) went unread, because no language model this pass could load exposed a clone-unit token stream for those file kinds. Duplication in that source is UNMEASURED — its absence from the count above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that the code is free of duplication. Duplication in .ts, .tsx is measured by R10 Code Duplication and is not part of this gap.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test reliability not scored — the JavaScript/TypeScript suite (jest via `yarn install --immutable --mode=skip-build` in examples/react-native/ (0 tests)) ran but surfaced no test cases to the runner, so flakiness couldn't be exercised.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `dotnet list package` did not return usable output (restore or query failed); no outdated/vulnerable/deprecated data to assess. The tool said: `dotnet list package` exited 1 with no output.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares a Gradle build (build.gradle/build.gradle.kts), but the licence verdict published here was taken over its gem dependencies. Nothing was read about its Gradle dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares REDACTED, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its gem dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22's deterministic call-shape rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. This says nothing about whether that surface is consistent.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
- D26 Project Cohesion — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Project size and spread are measured over build units whose source a code model reads. This repository's .mm, .tsx source is a material share of its production lines and was read by none, so the score is a verdict about the units that were read. Not a finding that the unread source is cohesive — it is unmeasured.
- D27 Navigability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `packages/async-storage/android/src/main/kotlin/org/asyncstorage/storage/EntryExt.kt` produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DevServer (start). the dev server (`npm run start`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (the repository): REDACTED has no "start" script, so `npm run start` could not start the app. Last output: "npm error Missing script: "start" / npm error / npm error Did you mean one of these? / npm error npm star # Mark your favorite packages / npm error npm stars # View packages marked as favorites / npm error / npm error To see a list of scripts, run: / npm error npm run / npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: <path>" No runtime evidence was gathered.
- C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
- C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
- C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
- C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Kotlin, Swift, c, cpp, objectivec is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Kotlin, Swift, c, cpp, objectivec is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
- X1 Async correctness — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
- X12 Unreachable branch — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, PHP, Dart, Kotlin, Ruby, Scala, Java, Python and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and no named async function in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, nor any Go, PHP or Dart function or Kotlin suspend function, makes a request that can be cancelled (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http; net/http, net.Dial; amphp; Dio; Ktor, OkHttp), so there is nothing to judge, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
- X3 Exception handling — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
- Package restore incomplete — third-party types were unresolved in part of the solution — NuGet restore did not complete for one or more projects, so those projects were analysed with framework references only: every check keyed on a third-party type saw an error type there and reported nothing. Findings on those projects are a lower bound; run `dotnet restore` on them and rescan.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned REDACTED, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
1 duplicated block group(s) detected. Measured on part of this repository only: .mm (24% of production source) was not exposed to the token comparison, so duplication there is unmeasured and is not in this count. Measured on part of this repository only: .ts, .tsx (43% of production source) was not exposed to THIS dimension's token comparison and is not in this count; duplication there is measured by R10 Code Duplication, the frontend lens's card running the same clone algorithm over the JS/TS token stream.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (45 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with AsyncStorageModule.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D5 · Coupling
6 production modules (Gradle+npm), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; edges a convention plugin adds from buildSrc or build-logic are not visible there; 0 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 5 of the 6 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, declare types in source no model reads, or have no source directory of their own).
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 4 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 45 shipped gem(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from rubygems.org over the 45 gem(s) a consumer installs — this repository's runtime declarations closed transitively over its committed REDACTED. Development-group and `add_development_dependency` gems are excluded: they are not distributed with this repository. 2 of them publish no licence on rubygems.org; that is missing data, not a violation, and none of them is charged. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's gem dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares a Gradle build (build.gradle/build.gradle.kts) and REDACTED, and the licences of those dependency graphs were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
1 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is packages/async-storage/src/AsyncStorageError.ts. Counted over 16 of the 40 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D19 · Documentation Quality
2 of 2 documentation facets pass in full. 13 document(s) read across 4 unit(s).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 4 build units (Gradle, npm) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent. This repository's .mm, .tsx source was read by no build unit, so this covers part of the tree, not all of it.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
31 finding(s): 0 critical, 30 high, 1 medium, 0 low. 24 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 3 file(s) — `docs/overrides/main.html` (lines 1–4, line 8), `examples/react-native/android/gradlew` (line 72, line 178), `gradlew` (line 74, line 180) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 1 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) charged to Static Analysis (SAST) — the other 24 are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which charges them once. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (27 issue-level, 3 of them charged here).
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
62 finding(s): 4 critical, 39 high, 15 medium, 4 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 39 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (34), REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (39 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Critical vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
15 of 16 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is packages/async-storage/android/src/main/kotlin/org/asyncstorage/legacy_storage/LegacyStorageSupplier.kt. Counted over 16 of the 40 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 15 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with LegacyStorageSupplier.kt, createAsyncStorage.windows.ts, createAsyncStorage.native.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
2/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 4 platform declaration(s) and 21 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX8 · Test isolation
AX9 · CQS / query purity
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
P1 · CI/CD gates
P10 · Library API & versioning
P2 · Observability
- No logging call was found in the 37 Swift, JavaScript/TypeScript, JVM production file(s) this check read across 6 module(s). Each was searched for its ecosystem's logging libraries (JVM: SLF4J, Log4j2, java.util.logging, Logback, kotlin-logging, scala-logging; JavaScript/TypeScript: pino, winston, bunyan, log4js, loglevel, consola, the NestJS Logger; Swift: os.Logger/os_log/NSLog, swift-log, CocoaLumberjack, SwiftyBeaver, XCGLogger) and for a call on a receiver named `log`/`logger` (or ending in `Logger`/`_logger`) with a level verb. It cannot see logging through a repo-local wrapper named otherwise, or in source it did not read — this is 'no logging found by this walk', not a verdict that nothing here logs. If it is right, production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt SLF4J (with a Logback or Log4j2 JSON encoder) and log at meaningful points in the modules you run.
- Add a health-check endpoint (Spring Boot Actuator's /actuator/health, or a /health route) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add spotbugs with find-sec-bugs (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 4 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:3
- `packages/async-storage/windows/ReactNativeAsyncStorage/packages.config` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — packages/async-storage/windows/ReactNativeAsyncStorage/packages.config:3
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
R1 · Type Safety
R10 · Code Duplication
- packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.ts:56 · packages/async-storage/src/web-module/IndexedDBStorage.ts:60 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 116 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.ts:56
- packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts:119 · packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.windows.ts:24 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts:119
- packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.windows.ts:64 · packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.windows.ts:80 · packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.windows.ts:117 · packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.windows.ts:133 · +1 more site(s) not listed — all 5 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. — packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.windows.ts:64
- packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts:36 · packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts:140 · packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.windows.ts:37 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts:36
- packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts:73 · packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts:177 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts:73
- packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts:173 · packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.ts:46 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts:173
- packages/async-storage/src/web-module/IndexedDBStorage.ts:8 · packages/async-storage/src/web-module/IndexedDBStorage.ts:30 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — packages/async-storage/src/web-module/IndexedDBStorage.ts:8
What to do
- Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
R3 · Large Files
R4 · Test Coverage
- 0% of 11 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph — 'production' here is the RESIDUE: every source file left once tests, tooling, generated output, config, declarations and declaration-only modules, fixture corpora, type fixtures, behaviour-free data modules, re-export barrels, registration/constant data modules and service workers are set aside, so the percentage is taken over a smaller denominator than the workspace's file count
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling
R7 · Dead Code
- 1 file(s) (~17 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package.
- Unreachable from the 6 application, 3 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on `yarn run build` — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (6 application, 3 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make (×2) — packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.windows.ts, packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts
- no import path from any entry point (6 application, 3 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — packages/async-storage/src/native-module/NativeAsyncStorage.ts
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Imported but not declared in any reachable REDACTED — installs work only by hoisting accident. — packages/expo-with-async-storage/src/index.ts:1
- Declared in packages/async-storage/REDACTED but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
- Declared in packages/eslint-config/REDACTED but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports
X1 · Async correctness
X12 · Unreachable branch
X16 · Unfloored truncation loop
X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document
- `mergeWith` is public and takes its `JSONObject` receiver from its caller, and it calls itself at line 240 with a piece of its receiver — the function is not `tailrec`, so every call is a real frame — and nowhere in `mergeWith` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. On the JVM's default 1 MB thread stack a recursive walk throws `StackOverflowError` from about 500–2,000 levels on a cold first call and 6,000–17,000 once warmed up (OpenJDK 21 and 25; Android's threads are smaller). kotlinx.serialization's `parseToJsonElement` accepts nested arrays to any depth and Android's built-in `org.json` sets no limit, while Jackson 2.15+ stops at 1,000 — on a cold JVM past the point the walk fails; Gson 2.12+ and Moshi stop at 255. `StackOverflowError` is an `Error`, not an `Exception`: a `catch (e: Exception)` around the call does not stop it, and on Android an uncaught one ends the process. Thread a depth argument through `mergeWith` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack or a `DeepRecursiveFunction`. — packages/async-storage/android/src/main/kotlin/org/asyncstorage/legacy_storage/LegacyStorageSupplier.kt:240
What to do
- Each finding names the externally-callable member that accepts the document and the self-call that descends, and states that no depth parameter or counter exists anywhere in the walk. Confirm from the two, then thread a depth argument through the walk and reject documents past a fixed maximum, or rewrite it with an explicit stack.
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X3 · Exception handling
- `catch (_: Exception)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter. — shared-storage/src/androidMain/kotlin/org/asyncstorage/shared_storage/SharedStorage.android.kt:56
What to do
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded)
X5 · Nullable reference types
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 62% | Adequate — gated by R7 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 99% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 48% | Weak — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 34% | Weak — gated by R4, P2, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 71% | Checked 4 of 10 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Performance | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 73 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's Kotlin imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's Swift imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's TypeScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — No container singleton was found, so there is no shared instance for concurrent requests to race on. No class in this Kotlin code is a Spring, JSR-330 or CDI singleton bean. No Swift request handler (a Vapor, Hummingbird, Kitura, Swifter or Perfect route handler, as a method or a registered closure) is declared, so no state is shared between request threads. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — AX6 reached only 44% of this repository's production lines — kotlin (993 lines), objectivec (914 lines), swift (203 lines), c (84 lines), cpp (1 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — the dev server (`npm run start`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (the repository): REDACTED has no "start" script, so `npm run start` could not start the app. Last output: "npm error Missing script: "start" / npm error / npm error Did you mean one of these? / npm error npm star # Mark your favorite packages / npm error npm stars # View packages marked as favorites / npm error / npm error To see a list of scripts, run: / npm error npm run / npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: <path>" No runtime evidence was gathered. This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~284 lines of test source are present (.kt, .tsx) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — No tests discovered
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured
- D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a C#/VB .NET solution; this repository's .NET projects are all F# (.fsproj), which the C#/VB workspace does not load, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (619 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
- D22 Internal API Consistency — API consistency is measured on C# only; the exposed Kotlin, TypeScript surface was not measured.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .kt, .swift source were not judged.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — D27 reads resolved call sites in the languages it reads only — this repository's production source is .cpp, .mm, .swift, .ts, .tsx, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 1 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — the jest suite in examples/react-native/ ran and not one test passed (No tests found, exiting with code 1), so the coverage would describe the failed run, not the code. Coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. The named suite step is one the repository's maintainers can perform; once it passes, the real number is measured on the next scan.
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (3 value object(s))
- ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and this analysis resolves a call's owner only where the receiver's type is written down in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 13 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks. 16 claim(s) of kinds M4 does not check were not checked (command argument 8, install 6, package 2); M4 checks only links and versions and artefact counts.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JVM, JavaScript/TypeScript, Swift source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `@Benchmark` in a Java, Kotlin or Scala file importing JMH or kotlinx-benchmark, Jetpack Benchmark's `measureRepeated` in a file importing androidx.benchmark, or JMH/kotlinx-benchmark/androidx.benchmark in a pom.xml, Gradle or sbt build, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D30 (Dependency Vulnerabilities), which answers every ecosystem
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Kotlin was read, and it logs through none that an assembled message defeats: Android's `Log` and Timber, java.util.logging and log4j-api-kotlin take one finished message (as log4net does in C#), or it makes no call through a named logger at all. Calls made through SLF4J, log4j 2 or kotlin-logging (`LoggerFactory.getLogger`, `KotlinLogging.logger {}`) would be judged.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 75 finding(s)
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- Test suite declares a test script but contains no test files: examples/react-native/
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- Unlisted import '@expo/config-plugins' packages/expo-with-async-storage/src/index.ts:1
Serious — 37 finding(s)
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- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2 locations) packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts:173
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2 locations) packages/async-storage/src/web-module/IndexedDBStorage.ts:8
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- Duplicated block (45 lines × 2) packages/async-storage/android/src/newarch/org/asyncstorage/AsyncStorageModule.kt:16
- Coverage not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite
- No structured logging
- Duplicated block with local edits (30 matched lines × 2 locations) packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.ts:56
- Duplicated block (19 lines × 2 locations) packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts:119
- Duplicated block (15 lines × 5 locations) packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.windows.ts:64
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 3 locations) packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts:36
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts:73
- Test Coverage
- Dead file (~243 LoC) packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.windows.ts
- Dead file (~221 LoC) packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts
- Dead file (~33 LoC) packages/async-storage/src/native-module/NativeAsyncStorage.ts
- Unused dependency '@react-native-community/cli'
- Unused dependency '@eslint/eslintrc'
- Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap packages/async-storage/android/src/main/kotlin/org/asyncstorage/legacy_storage/LegacyStorageSupplier.kt:240
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) shared-storage/src/androidMain/kotlin/org/asyncstorage/shared_storage/SharedStorage.android.kt:56
Minor — 29 finding(s)
- Orphaned file packages/async-storage/android/src/main/kotlin/org/asyncstorage/legacy_storage/LegacyStorageSupplier.kt:1
- Orphaned file packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.windows.ts:1
- Orphaned file packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.native.ts:1
- Orphaned file packages/async-storage/src/createAsyncStorage.ts:1
- Orphaned file packages/async-storage/apple/storage/RNStorage.swift:1
- Orphaned file shared-storage/src/appleMain/kotlin/org/asyncstorage/shared_storage/database/DatabaseFiles.apple.kt:1
- Orphaned file packages/async-storage/android/src/main/kotlin/org/asyncstorage/legacy_storage/LegacyStorageModule.kt:1
- Orphaned file packages/async-storage/android/src/main/kotlin/org/asyncstorage/storage/RNStorage.kt:1
- Orphaned file shared-storage/build.gradle.kts:1
- Orphaned file packages/async-storage/src/web-module/IndexedDBStorage.ts:1
- Orphaned file shared-storage/src/commonMain/kotlin/org/asyncstorage/shared_storage/SharedStorageImpl.kt:1
- Orphaned file packages/async-storage/android/build.gradle:1
- Orphaned file packages/async-storage/android/config.gradle:1
- Orphaned file packages/async-storage/src/AsyncStorage.ts:1
- Orphaned file packages/async-storage/android/src/oldarch/asyncstorage/AsyncStorageModule.kt:1
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- No dependency-update automation packages/async-storage/windows/ReactNativeAsyncStorage/packages.config:3
- No release approval gate
- Silent fallback default in catch shared-storage/src/androidMain/kotlin/org/asyncstorage/shared_storage/SharedStorage.android.kt:56
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-0d036fe49159419bb872a538743ad281/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-0d036fe49159419bb872a538743ad281/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 3 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 31 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 62 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 1 file(s) — `packages/async-storage/android/src/main/kotlin/org/asyncstorage/storage/EntryExt.kt` — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |