Public report of pglombardo/PasswordPusher, published 14 November 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.11.4). Assert signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey → Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 14 November 2026, 14:20 UTC · Survey ID cd_9ba0355a6c324679b151ccc844f460cb

pglombardo/PasswordPusher

Measured 14 November 2026, 14:19 UTC, at code version f0fb2e5

CAI score 40out of 100 Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
Up 1 since the last survey

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

A small codebase: 7,348 lines of product code in 2 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Accessibility, 34

Findings by how serious they are

40 critical 162 serious 47 minor

6 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, we either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard we look for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Assert small markCanine Code Analyzer
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Canine Code Analyzer engine 1.0.0
Measured
14 November 2026, 14:19 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds the Canine Code Analyzer. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today the Canine Code Analyzer is the only one that does.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. We work it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸

76of 76 dimensions measured by tools.
200of 249 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 49 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
76dimensions across 8 lenses, read from 7,348 lines of product code in 2 projects.
Chapters

Executive summary

pglombardo/PasswordPusher falls short of our standard for production, held back most by its Accessibility lens, the interface's usability with a keyboard or assistive technology. It scores 40 out of 100 and is rated Weak, and 13 of its 40 critical findings are security problems.

Accessibility, at 34, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first steps are making the controls keyboard-usable and fixing focus, motion and contrast, each worth about 4 points. Raising Accessibility to 70 would lift the score to about 45.

Five passwords or keys are open to anyone who can read the repository. Three weaknesses in the code could be used by an attacker, and six form fields can't be read by a screen reader. Replacing each exposed password or key, fixing the weaknesses the scanner points to and labelling the form fields would close these risks. Setting a waiting period for automatic updates would fix the automatic dependency update that takes a new release at once, and the three unsafe settings in infrastructure or container files need changing to safe values. The 17 labels or groups of fields with no name need connecting to their fields or naming.

The product code is 7,348 lines, about €22,000 to rebuild.

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Accessibility 34 · counts for 45%Production Readiness 37 · counts for 25%Code Health 44 · counts for 14%Domain Modelling 53 · counts for 8%Security and Compliance 61 · counts for 4%Maturity 61 · counts for 2%Architecture 81 · counts for 1%Performance 100 · counts for 1%

If Accessibility rose from 34 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 40 to about 45.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Product code 29%Tests 71%
New since the last survey: 62 findings

These 62 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 26 October 2026.

We compare every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 357 findings

These 357 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 26 October 2026, and are gone from this one. The first 100 are listed here.

  • Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) db/migrate/20241008192458_add_solid_queue.rb
  • REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret REDACTED
  • Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot: REDACTED REDACTED
  • Exception handling · Swallowed exception (empty catch) app/javascript/controllers/theme_controller.js
  • Exception handling · Swallowed exception (empty catch) app/javascript/controllers/theme_controller.js
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.0:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.3:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.5:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.4:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.1:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/journal.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.9:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/lumen.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.0:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/lux.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/materia.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.3:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/minty.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.2:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/morph.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.0:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/quartz.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.0:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/sandstone.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.9:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/simplex.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.1:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/sketchy.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.6:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/slate.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.1:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/solar.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.4:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/superhero.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.6:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/united.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.5:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/vapor.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.5:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/varpor.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.8:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/yeti.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.7:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/zephyr.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/brite.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/brite.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/brite.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/brite.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/brite.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/brite.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/brite.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/brite.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/brite.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/brite.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/brite.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/brite.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css
  • Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css
Rebuild cost: about €22,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild€7,200 to €36,000, for 120 to 379 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problemStandard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.7 at a score of 40. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeSmall: 7,348 lines of product code
What it is notNot a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one.

How the estimate is made: We price the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Raises the score by about 4 points · Medium effort · Keyboard semantics
2
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Raises the score by about 4 points · Medium effort · Visual & motion safety
3
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Raises the score by about 3 points · Medium effort · Test Coverage

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €22,000 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Accessibility, at 34 (Weak). Accessibility is about whether the interface is built so that everyone can use it, including people who can't see the screen or can't use a mouse. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Accessibility also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Accessibility grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Accessibility actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 4 points for medium effort. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

33 modules, with 13 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →1 ActiveStorage2 Madmin.ActiveStorage3 Madmin.SolidQueue4 PasswordPusher5 PasswordPusher.EnvOrFile6 Push7 Pwpush8 Pwpush.Generator9 Rack10 SolidQueue11 User12 app.javascript13 app.javascript.controllers14 app.javascript.controllers.copy_controller15 app.javascript.controllers.countdown_controller16 app.javascript.controllers.form_controller17 app.javascript.controllers.gdpr_controller18 app.javascript.controllers.knobs_controller19 app.javascript.controllers.multi_upload_controller20 app.javascript.controllers.passphrase_field_controller21 app.javascript.controllers.passwords_controller22 app.javascript.controllers.payload_visibility_controller23 app.javascript.controllers.pwgen_controller24 app.javascript.controllers.select_dropdown_controller25 app.javascript.controllers.theme_controller26 public27 (global)28 Admin29 Api30 Madmin31 Users32 Api.V133 Api.V2
1 ActiveStorage
2 Madmin.ActiveStorage
3 Madmin.SolidQueue
4 PasswordPusher
5 PasswordPusher.EnvOrFile
6 Push
7 Pwpush
8 Pwpush.Generator
9 Rack
10 SolidQueue
11 User
12 app.javascript
13 app.javascript.controllers
14 app.javascript.controllers.copy_controller
15 app.javascript.controllers.countdown_controller
16 app.javascript.controllers.form_controller
17 app.javascript.controllers.gdpr_controller
18 app.javascript.controllers.knobs_controller
19 app.javascript.controllers.multi_upload_controller
20 app.javascript.controllers.passphrase_field_controller
21 app.javascript.controllers.passwords_controller
22 app.javascript.controllers.payload_visibility_controller
23 app.javascript.controllers.pwgen_controller
24 app.javascript.controllers.select_dropdown_controller
25 app.javascript.controllers.theme_controller
26 public
27 (global)41
28 Admin2
29 Api1
30 Madmin1
31 Users2
32 Api.V1132
33 Api.V21121
Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself
1 ActiveStorage2 Madmin.ActiveStorage3 Madmin.SolidQueue4 PasswordPusher5 PasswordPusher.EnvOrFile6 Push7 Pwpush8 Pwpush.Generator9 Rack10 SolidQueue11 User12 app.javascript13 app.javascript.controllers14 app.javascript.controllers.copy_controller15 app.javascript.controllers.countdown_controller16 app.javascript.controllers.form_controller17 app.javascript.controllers.gdpr_controller18 app.javascript.controllers.knobs_controller19 app.javascript.controllers.multi_upload_controller20 app.javascript.controllers.passphrase_field_controller21 app.javascript.controllers.passwords_controller22 app.javascript.controllers.payload_visibility_controller23 app.javascript.controllers.pwgen_controller24 app.javascript.controllers.select_dropdown_controller25 app.javascript.controllers.theme_controller26 public27 (global)28 Admin29 Api30 Madmin31 Users32 Api.V133 Api.V2ActiveStorage1Madmin.ActiveStorage2Madmin.SolidQueue3PasswordPusher4PasswordPusher.EnvOrFile5Push6Pwpush7Pwpush.Generator8Rack9SolidQueue10User11app.javascript12app.javascript.controllers13app.javascript.controllers.copy_controller14app.javascript.controllers.countdown_controller15app.javascript.controllers.form_controller16app.javascript.controllers.gdpr_controller17app.javascript.controllers.knobs_controller18app.javascript.controllers.multi_upload_controller19app.javascript.controllers.passphrase_field_controller20app.javascript.controllers.passwords_controller21app.javascript.controllers.payload_visibility_controller22app.javascript.controllers.pwgen_controller23app.javascript.controllers.select_dropdown_controller24app.javascript.controllers.theme_controller25public26(global)27Admin28Api29Madmin30Users31Api.V132Api.V2334121121321121

At a glance — Code Health · 44% · Weak · gated by R1, X5 ·

At a glance — Architecture · 81% · Strong ·

At a glance — Maturity · 61% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 37% · Weak · gated by R4, R6, R8 ·

At a glance — Security · 61% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36 ·

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 53% · Adequate ·

At a glance — Accessibility · 34% · Weak · gated by AC4, AC6 ·

At a glance — Performance · 100% · Exemplary ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration50High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection11High / Critical
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures6High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures4Medium

Roadmap

Top priorities: Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href; Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1; Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.+4.2 ptsMediumKeyboard semantics
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.+4.2 ptsMediumVisual & motion safety
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+2.5 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) and eslint and type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.+2.5 ptsMediumTooling
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.+2.5 ptsMediumForms & labels
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.+2.2 ptsMediumPage structure
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.+1.7 ptsMediumType Safety
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+1.6 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 35 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 6% slop · 63% mixed · 31% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED1.6SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED1.9SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED5.0MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED5.8MixedSecrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED6.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED6.2MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED
app/models/push.rb6.7MixedExplicit Debt: FixmeComment
app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb7.1MixedCode Duplication: Edited copy of a member (32 corresponding lines)
REDACTED7.2MixedSecrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedSecrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedSecrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedSecrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED
app/javascript/spoiler_alert.js7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: spoiler_alert.spoilerAlert (cyclomatic 20)
app/controllers/api/base_controller.rb7.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: BaseController.require_api_authentication (cyclomatic 16)
config/routes/public_pushes.rb7.8MixedCode Duplication: Edited copy of a member (15 corresponding lines)
db/migrate/20221222153323_create_file_pushes.rb7.8MixedCode Duplication: Edited copy of a member (17 corresponding lines)

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 40

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 162

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 47

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 6

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 76 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.

Every figure here is one of two kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10.

What we checked — 76 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D12D13D14D15D17D19D20D28D29D30D31D34D35D36D37D40D41D43D44AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AX10AX2AX3AX4C1C2C3C4DM6GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P6P7P8PF3R1R10R2R3R4R6R7R8R9S1X1X12X14X16X2X21X23X24X25X3X30X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 200 of 249 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a1da6d-4f63-71c7-a242-191dafc9f1ae.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.rb) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo.
  • D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.rb) and this repository declares a Ruby test suite (minitest: repository root, 170 test files), but it was not re-run: no test result was produced. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its gem dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
  • D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (66 contributor(s) across 5096 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 94% of the history; the other 65 hold 0.1% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
  • D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's naming rules read C# through Roslyn and every other language through its sidecar model; these languages are left out (PHP's reading is its own change, a Roslyn-loaded VB or F# project has no population builder yet). Their declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether their names are consistent.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict. For npm the surface is what a published package.json's entry points (exports, main, module, types) export, followed through the source; an entry that names build output the tree does not commit (dist/, build/) is not followed back to source, because only a tsconfig outDir/rootDir pair states that mapping and a bundler's input lives in executable configuration this engine does not evaluate.
  • D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
  • D26 Project Cohesion — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `(repository root)` (9174 LoC, 235 module-visible types across 32 directories) is over its size bounds, and whether one unit is a coherent whole or a grab-bag is read from its type references: the parts of it that reach the rest only through its shared core. Those are read over the C#/VB code model, which this unit's source did not supply. Its size alone is no verdict on its cohesion, so none is published.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Containers/helm/templates/deployment.yaml:2 did not read as a pod spec (a templated manifest such as Helm's that is not YAML until rendered, or a workload whose pod spec this check does not locate), so the seccomp/AppArmor profile in force there was not judged and no row about them can appear on this card.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. 401 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 441.
  • C1 Data Protection — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
  • C2 Access Controls — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
  • C3 Audit Trail — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
  • C4 Data Retention — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
  • R10 Code Duplication — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The filesystem refused the listing or the read of: public/flags. Every other path was read.

Repo exclusion declarations: 2 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
  • C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was PushesController.check_allowed at 30.

PushesController.check_allowed (cyclomatic 30)REDACTED:499
spoiler_alert.spoilerAlert (cyclomatic 20)app/javascript/spoiler_alert.js:27
PushesController.update (cyclomatic 18)REDACTED:173
BaseController.require_api_authentication (cyclomatic 16)app/controllers/api/base_controller.rb:67

What to do

  1. Bring the 4 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with PushesController.check_allowed (cyclomatic 30), spoiler_alert.spoilerAlert (cyclomatic 20), PushesController.update (cyclomatic 18). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 8.9 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

9 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was PushesController.check_allowed at 42.

PushesController.check_allowed (cognitive 42)REDACTED:499
PushesController.update (cognitive 25)REDACTED:173
spoilerAlert (cognitive 22)app/javascript/spoiler_alert.js:27
BaseController.require_api_authentication (cognitive 20)app/controllers/api/base_controller.rb:67
Push.claim_view! (cognitive 19)app/models/push.rb:219

+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Bring the 1 body over 30 down to 30 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with PushesController.check_allowed (cognitive 42). — Refactoring it lifts Cognitive Complexity from 8.2 to about 8.6/10.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the production code is copy-pasted: the share of production lines inside a reported copy (every copy of a duplicated block or of an edited member, each line once), 10 at none and 0 at a quarter of the lines.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), scored on the share of production lines inside a reported copy (each line once; 10 at none, 0 at a quarter). Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

7 duplicated block group(s) detected. 3.9 % of the production lines (285 of 7,348) are in a reported copy. A further 9 rows report members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it.

Edited copy of a member (17 corresponding lines) · ×2db/migrate/20221222153323_create_file_pushes.rb:5
Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) · ×2app/controllers/api/v2/pushes_controller.rb:106
Edited copy of a member (15 corresponding lines)config/routes/public_pushes.rb:2
Edited copy of a member (32 corresponding lines)app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb:152
Edited copy of a member (21 corresponding lines)app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb:261

+ 9 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Edited copy of a member (17 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with 20221222153323_create_file_pushes.rb, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with REDACTED, 20120102210559_create_rails_admin_histories_table.rb. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (15 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with public_pushes.rb. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 production modules (npm+RubyGems), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations, and main-sequence distance (abstractness) is not computed for these modules yet.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 15 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, not deprecated, and not bloated. Known vulnerabilities are D30's.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (capped-linear for deprecation, prerelease and outdated) per KLoC. Known-vulnerable packages are D30's and are not charged here (rubric-2026.11.2). Exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

7 outdated direct gem(s), 0 pinning defect(s). 67 declaration(s) graded against rubygems.org, 66 of them against a version resolved in a committed Gemfile.lock. Whether any of these gems is DEPRECATED or YANKED is not graded — rubygems.org publishes no deprecation marker, and a yank removes a version rather than flagging it. Whether any is UNMAINTAINED is not graded either: no registry publishes a maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is a source question, not a registry one. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.

Outdated: aws-sdk-s3 · ×7

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · REDACTED Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

REDACTED scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 182 shipped gem(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from rubygems.org over the 182 gem(s) a consumer installs — this repository's runtime declarations closed transitively over its committed Gemfile.lock. Development-group and `add_development_dependency` gems are excluded: they are not distributed with this repository. 2 of them publish no licence on rubygems.org; that is missing data, not a violation, and none of them is charged. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's gem dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares package.json, and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 deducted task-comment markers across 7348 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

FixmeCommentapp/models/push.rb:96

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 FixmeComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with push.rb. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Every README, docs/ document and root guide parsed by its markup and measured in Unicode letters. Published: a runnable or packaged .NET project whose README (or a document it links, or a root guide) shows no example, and a root README naming none of three or more projects. Overview, licence, boilerplate, wall-of-text, empty-section and XML-doc rows are measured and withheld (counted in gaps) after adjudication. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 4 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Every ADR read by its section structure: nine located rules (a missing Decision, Context or Consequences section, a stale status, two records deciding the same question, a dangling supersede link, a number-only title, a single option, no named cost, no status where the log uses one, no enforcement field where the log adopted one), each a fixed deduction from 10; the score is the mean over evaluated records. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs foundProcfile:1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with Procfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)3.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

11 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 5 medium, 1 low. semgrep hit a parse error in 42 file(s) — `config/defaults/settings.yml`, `config/locales/localization.ca.yml`, `config/locales/localization.da.yml`, `config/locales/localization.de.yml`, `config/locales/localization.es.yml`, … (+37 more) — so no absence of findings in them is evidence of anything, and nothing in them was analysed. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities9.8 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): every row is a match against a vulnerability database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

50 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 31 medium, 16 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 31 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (22), REDACTED (4), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (31 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 16 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (7), REDACTED (5), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 25 of the 211 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling9.9 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: development.rb↔production.rb 57%

Change coupling: development.rb ↔ production.rbconfig/environments/development.rb:1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with development.rb. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.

D40 · Network Egress Confinement6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads restrict network EGRESS with a NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy), limiting where a compromised pod can send data or reach a command-and-control server. Presence of committed egress-restricting policy, not runtime enforcement.

Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn — language-agnostic): Kubernetes workloads gate applicability; credits a NetworkPolicy / Cilium policy that restricts egress (policyTypes: [Egress] / egress rules). Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10, never a deduction — baseline misconfigs stay with D31). Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/2 network-egress controls present (network policy, egress restriction).

No network policy

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No network policy finding(s) in Network Egress Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d40_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads confine the kernel boundary — a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) plus an AppArmor/SELinux mandatory-access-control layer — shrinking the syscall attack surface a container escape would use. Presence of committed confinement config, not runtime enforcement.

Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) and an AppArmor/SELinux MAC layer. Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10); NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/2 workload(s) run every container under a seccomp profile; 0/2 declare an AppArmor/SELinux profile.

No seccomp profile · ×2REDACTED:3

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d41_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Reported apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): the malicious-package feed is a database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 2 platform declaration(s) and 88 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC2 · Forms & labels5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

  • This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×6) — app/views/application/_secret_url_bar.html.erb:3, app/views/devise/registrations/new.html.erb:7, app/views/devise/registrations/new.html.erb:12, …
  • A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one). — app/views/application/_secret_url_bar.html.erb:39
  • This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id. (×17) — app/views/devise/sessions/new.html.erb:17, app/views/madmin/application/show.html.erb:40, app/views/madmin/dashboard/show.html.erb:172, …

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure5.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

  • Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×11) — app/views/admin/_navigation.html.erb:37, app/views/admin/custom_css/edit.html.erb:68, app/views/devise/registrations/edit.html.erb:13, …
  • No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×5) — app/views/layouts/application.html.erb:2, app/views/layouts/bare.html.erb:2, app/views/layouts/mailer.html.erb:2, …
  • A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. — app/views/layouts/mailer.html.erb:2

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no element the repo's own CSS styles `cursor: pointer` without giving it any of the three, no unfocusable element whose only binding is a mouse enter/leave pair or a double-click, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

Coverage: Population: elements that pose a keyboard-semantics question, in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) — a non-natively-interactive element carrying a click handler, a double-click or hover enter/leave binding, a pointer-only gesture on a tabindex="0" element, or `cursor: pointer` from the repo's own CSS; an href-less or placeholder-href (#, javascript:) anchor; and any element with a positive tabindex. Natively interactive elements used correctly (<button>, <a href>, form controls) are NOT in the population — there is nothing to judge — so a page of nothing but correct controls gives AC4 nothing to measure. Keyboard reachability is judged from the markup, never from a rendered page. ★ An interactive element declared in a tagged-template (html`…`) or hyperscript frontend is NOT in this population — no producer reads either — so an empty population is reported as an analyzer gap, never as "this repository has no interactive elements".

  • The repo's own CSS styles .spoiler with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. — app/views/devise/registrations/token.html.erb:21

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

Coverage: Population: elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) that carry a role or an aria-* attribute; roles and token values are checked against the ARIA enums exhaustively within that set. An expression-valued (dynamic) role or aria-* value is skipped rather than guessed, and markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

  • `html[data-bs-theme="dark"] .button.is-danger` sets color: #fff on background-color: #d9534f — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/views/layouts/mission_control/jobs/_theme_styles.html.erb:146
  • `html[data-bs-theme="dark"] .pagination-link.is-current` sets color: #fff on background-color: #4582ec — 3.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/views/layouts/mission_control/jobs/_theme_styles.html.erb:174
  • `.badge` sets color: #667eea on background-color: #eef2ff — 3.3:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — public/maintenance.html:29
  • `.dropdown-item.active, .dropdown-item:active` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2fa4e7 — 2.8:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css:3677
  • `.nav-pills .nav-link.active, .nav-pills .show > .nav-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2fa4e7 — 2.8:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css:3907
  • `.page-link.active, .active > .page-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2fa4e7 — 2.8:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css:4796
  • `.dropdown-item.active, .dropdown-item:active` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2780e3 — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css:3630
  • `.nav-pills .nav-link.active, .nav-pills .show > .nav-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2780e3 — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css:3825
  • `.page-link.active, .active > .page-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2780e3 — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css:4633
  • `.btn:hover` sets color: #99d1eb on background-color: #adafae — 1.3:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css:3025
  • `.btn:focus-visible` sets color: #99d1eb on background-color: #adafae — 1.3:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css:3035
  • `.btn-check:checked + .btn, :not(.btn-check) + .btn:active, .btn:first-child:active, .btn.active, .btn.show` sets color: #99d1eb on background-color: #adafae — 1.3:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css:3047
  • `.dropdown-item.active, .dropdown-item:active` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2a9fd6 — 3.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css:3683
  • `.nav-pills .nav-link.active, .nav-pills .show > .nav-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2a9fd6 — 3.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css:3913
  • `.page-link:hover` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2a9fd6 — 3.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css:4789
  • `.page-link.active, .active > .page-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2a9fd6 — 3.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css:4802
  • `.page-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #00bc8c — 2.4:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css:4769
  • `.page-link:hover` sets color: #fff on background-color: #00efb2 — 1.5:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css:4785
  • `.page-link.active, .active > .page-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #00efb2 — 1.5:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css:4798
  • `.btn:hover` sets color: #99a2ab on background-color: #7b8a8b — 1.4:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css:3019
  • `.btn:focus-visible` sets color: #99a2ab on background-color: #7b8a8b — 1.4:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css:3029
  • `.btn-check:checked + .btn, :not(.btn-check) + .btn:active, .btn:first-child:active, .btn.active, .btn.show` sets color: #99a2ab on background-color: #7b8a8b — 1.4:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css:3041
  • `.page-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #18bc9c — 2.4:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css:4767
  • `.page-link:focus` sets color: #99a2ab on background-color: #343a40 — 4.4:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css:4789
  • `.page-link.disabled, .disabled > .page-link` sets color: #ecf0f1 on background-color: #3be6c4 — 1.4:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css:4802
  • `.dropdown-item.active, .dropdown-item:active` sets color: #fff on background-color: #eb6864 — 3.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/journal.css:3678
  • `.nav-pills .nav-link.active, .nav-pills .show > .nav-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #eb6864 — 3.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/journal.css:3908
  • `.page-link:hover` sets color: #fff on background-color: #eb6864 — 3.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/journal.css:4784
  • `.page-link.active, .active > .page-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #eb6864 — 3.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/journal.css:4797
  • `.input-group-text` sets color: #ddd on background-color: #e9ecef — 1.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/litera.css:2766
  • `.dropdown-item.active, .dropdown-item:active` sets color: #fff on background-color: #4582ec — 3.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/litera.css:3720
  • `.nav-pills .nav-link.active, .nav-pills .show > .nav-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #4582ec — 3.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/litera.css:3950
  • `.page-link.active, .active > .page-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #4582ec — 3.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/litera.css:4839
  • `.btn:hover` sets color: #8fc8de on background-color: #555 — 4.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/lumen.css:3019
  • `.btn:focus-visible` sets color: #8fc8de on background-color: #555 — 4.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/lumen.css:3029
  • `.btn-check:checked + .btn, :not(.btn-check) + .btn:active, .btn:first-child:active, .btn.active, .btn.show` sets color: #8fc8de on background-color: #555 — 4.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/lumen.css:3041
  • `.dropdown-item.active, .dropdown-item:active` sets color: #fff on background-color: #158cba — 3.8:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/lumen.css:3677
  • `.nav-pills .nav-link.active, .nav-pills .show > .nav-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #158cba — 3.8:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/lumen.css:3907
  • `.page-link` sets color: #555 on background-color: #2b2b2b — 1.9:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/lumen.css:4767
  • `.page-link:hover` sets color: #555 on background-color: #2b2b2b — 1.9:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — app/assets/stylesheets/themes/lumen.css:4783

What to do

  • Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AX10 · Code composition4.1 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

C1 · Data Protection4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (AWS KMS / Secrets Manager, GCP KMS / REDACTED Manager, HashiCorp Vault — kms_encrypted or vault-rails, not only the master key beside credentials.yml.enc) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (encrypts, lockbox) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
C2 · Access Controls7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect.

What to do

  • Name the access rules — Pundit or Action Policy classes (a PostPolicy), a CanCanCan Ability, or rolify roles — and consult them where access is checked (authorize @record, load_and_authorize_resource, authorize!), so the rule set is reviewable and testable on its own.
C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

  • An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: a write-side hook every change flows through (a change-history gem declared on the model, or an ActiveRecord callback / Sequel hook recording each change), per-model coverage (has_paper_trail / audited / has_logidze on each model that needs a who-changed-what trail).

What to do

  • Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: a change-history gem on each model that needs a who-changed-what trail (paper_trail's has_paper_trail, audited, Logidze) or an ActiveRecord after_commit callback writing each sensitive change to an audit-log table, with the acting user and time on every entry.
C4 · Data Retention6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).

Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.

  • A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: an expiry limit — a declared maximum age / TTL after which the data is no longer kept, a documented retention period / data-expiry.

What to do

  • Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (ActiveRecord/Sequel/ROM) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

  • `Push` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository). — app/models/push.rb:5

What to do

  • Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + mapper; leave the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository).
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue in this repository's Ruby: methods whose whole body still raises NotImplementedError where nothing overrides them, or a "not implemented" error, and placeholder text (lorem ipsum, changeme/replace_me…) left in strings of non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords, in this repository's Ruby: methods that only raise NotImplementedError or a "not implemented" error where nothing overrides them, methods that take inputs and return a constant or do nothing, dead `if false` branches, and skeleton classes most of whose methods are holes.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something. (×2) — test/system/file_pushes_test.rb:7, test/system/urls_test.rb:7

What to do

  • Clear the softer debt: re-enable or delete `xit`/`skip`ped tests, decide whether each empty method or NotImplementedError refusal is deliberate (and say so in a comment), and replace `# rubocop:disable all` with targeted, justified disables.
M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository and its projects have a README, and whether it is substantive.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
  • No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.

What to do

  • Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository is organised deliberately: production code and tests are set apart in a way its ecosystem or the repository itself declares.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the project's current-state documentation describes the code that exists.

Method: Every current-state document's checkable claims looked up in the tree (links, versions, and artefact counts an order of magnitude off), plus two README checks: an advertised infrastructure product with no footprint, and a module the CHANGELOG records as removed. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a health-check endpoint (Rails' /up (rails/health#show) or a /health route) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
P3 · Security & performance tooling6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency but is not wired into CI — run it as a required step on push/PR (e.g. `composer phpstan` / `mix sobelow` / `bundle exec brakeman` / the spotbugs Gradle task / `sbt scalafixAll --check` / `golangci-lint run` / `rebar3 lint`) so a regression fails the build instead of relying on someone running it locally.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever reaches the release trigger goes to production unreviewed, so a mistaken merge or tag is live before anyone can stop it.

What to do

  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

What to do

  • Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.

P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether database schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than being auto-created from the model at startup.

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage; off .NET, a file scan of dependency manifests, migration histories (Flyway, Liquibase, Alembic, Django, Rails, Prisma, TypeORM, Knex/Sequelize, golang-migrate, goose, Laravel, Doctrine, Diesel/sqlx) and schema auto-create in production source or config. Exhaustive, deterministic.

PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from each language's code model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

  • 0 typed · 20 plain JS — the untyped files are app/assets/config/manifest.js, app/javascript/application.js, app/javascript/controllers/application.js, app/javascript/controllers/copy_controller.js, app/javascript/controllers/countdown_controller.js, app/javascript/controllers/form_controller.js (+14 more).

What to do

  • Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
R10 · Code Duplication8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — The share of the scored frontend lines inside a near-exact copy-pasted block of substantial extent (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386; each line once, 10 at none and 0 at a quarter of the lines, as D4): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.

Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Scored on the share of the scored frontend lines inside a reported copy, on the same curve as D4. Deterministic.

  • app/javascript/controllers/copy_controller.js:11 · app/javascript/controllers/copy_controller.js:41 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — app/javascript/controllers/copy_controller.js:11
  • app/javascript/controllers/knobs_controller.js:61 · app/javascript/controllers/knobs_controller.js:73 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — app/javascript/controllers/knobs_controller.js:61
  • app/javascript/controllers/passphrase_field_controller.js:103 · app/javascript/controllers/pwgen_controller.js:155 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 128 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — app/javascript/controllers/passphrase_field_controller.js:103

What to do

  • Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • 0% of 20 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph — 'production' here is the RESIDUE: every source file left once tests, tooling, generated output, config, declarations and declaration-only modules, fixture corpora, type fixtures, behaviour-free data modules, re-export barrels, registration/constant data modules and service workers are set aside, so the percentage is taken over a smaller denominator than the workspace's file count

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✗ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.

What to do

  • Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) and eslint and type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

R8 · Dependency Hygiene3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it. (×13)

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Read from this repository's Ruby source: cryptographic hygiene (weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source) and outbound TLS (certificate validation, protocol version) — facts about code that hold whether or not it serves anything itself. This repository commits the configuration that serves its own HTTP surface, so that configuration was read in full for the security response headers it sets. The server controls — HTTPS enforcement, HSTS, cookie flags, input validation — are NOT assessed for Ruby: this reading covers the code's own cryptography and the TLS connections it opens as a client, and a Rails, Rack or Sinatra application's transport, header and validation settings are not modelled. Their absence here is not a finding about this repository.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

  • None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. This is reported because `REDACTED` is committed to this repository and declares the server that serves it, so the configuration that would carry these headers is in this repository and was read in full. (−2.0 on this card.) — REDACTED:37

What to do

  • Set security response headers on the surface this repository serves: an `add_header` directive per header in the nginx/Caddy/Apache config, a `_headers` / `vercel.json` / `netlify.toml` entry for a static host, or `helmet()` in the HTTP server. `Content-Security-Policy` is the one that pays for itself first — it is what contains an injected script once one reaches the page — followed by `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` and a frame policy (`X-Frame-Options: DENY`, or CSP `frame-ancestors`). Where the app is served from a build container, the header configuration belongs in the image beside the built assets, so it ships with them rather than depending on where it lands.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X2 · Cancellation propagation4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async functions that make a cancellable request accept or pass on an AbortSignal (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 0/2 async functions that make a cancellable request (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http) accept an AbortSignal or pass one on, so a request keeps running after whatever wanted it has given up — a page navigated away from, an unmounted component, a timed-out job. Take a `signal` (or an options object that carries one) and hand it to the request; where nothing could ever cancel the call, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against how the function is used.
  • `requestGeneration` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. (×2) — app/javascript/controllers/passphrase_field_controller.js:130, app/javascript/controllers/pwgen_controller.js:343

What to do

  • Thread an AbortSignal through async functions that make requests, so the work stops when its caller gives up.
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped2.2 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

  • `originalContent` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — app/javascript/controllers/copy_controller.js:58
  • `this.langSavedValue` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — app/javascript/controllers/knobs_controller.js:100
  • `fileCount+` file(s) selected. You can upload up to ${maxFiles} files per push.`` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — app/javascript/controllers/multi_upload_controller.js:143

What to do

  • Each finding names the expression, the attribute it lands in and the line. Confirm the value's origin from the read this analyzer traced, then escape it at the sink or validate it against the shape the attribute accepts before interpolating.
X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X3 · Exception handling6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

  • An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. (×3) — app/javascript/controllers/payload_visibility_controller.js:60, app/javascript/controllers/theme_controller.js:52, app/javascript/controllers/theme_controller.js:107

What to do

  • Swallowed exception (empty catch)
X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X5 · Nullable reference types2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether Ruby's type checker checks nil and is not undermined by assertions — a file Sorbet reads at `# typed: true` or above, or a Steep target `check`s under its default or strict diagnostics, is one where a method call on a `T.nilable(String)` / `String?` is an error, and each `T.must`, `#: as !nil` or `# steep:ignore NoMethod` is the author telling the checker a value cannot be nil.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • This repository commits no Sorbet configuration (`sorbet/config`) and no `Steepfile`, so nothing type-checks its 209 Ruby product file(s): a nilable value reaches a method call silently and raises `NoMethodError: undefined method … for nil` the first time it is nil. A `# typed:` sigil does nothing without a `sorbet/config` beside the code; a Steep run configured only on a command line is not something this check can read.

What to do

  • Adopt a checker and raise it file by file: with Sorbet, `srb init` (or `bundle exec tapioca init`) commits `sorbet/config`, then move each file's sigil from `# typed: false` to `# typed: true` and on to `strict` as its methods get `sig`s — `spoom bump` does the moving; with Steep, write RBS signatures and `check` the product directories in the `Steepfile` under `D::Ruby.default` or `strict`, not `lenient`. Then pay down the assertions rather than adding to them: each `T.must` is a nil the checker could not rule out — narrow it (`return unless x`, `x&.`, `if (y = x)`), make the attribute non-nilable and set it in `initialize`, or change the method so the nil cannot arrive.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 12 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (22%; ≈24% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 43 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only

Not statically assessed — these 43 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.1.1, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health44%Weak — gated by R1, X5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture81%StrongSolid.
Maturity61%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness37%Weak — gated by R4, R6, R8Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security61%Adequate — gated by D29, D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling53%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Accessibility34%Weak — gated by AC4, AC6Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Unscored — 4 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

  • AXH1 Runtime security headers — 11 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • AXI1 Runtime container hardening — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility (rendered) — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X10 Duplicated predicate — 4 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
Not included — 51 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's Ruby imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — no class or module declares an abstract method
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXA1 Runtime unauthenticated reachability — This run crawled public routes only — it had no logged-in session, so there is no authenticated surface to compare anonymous access against and nothing was measured. This is a statement about this run, not about your application: nothing here says access control is missing, and nothing here says it is present.
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • AXS1 Runtime exposed surface — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~18031 lines of test source are present (.rb) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .rb suite was found but not re-run
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency does not read html yet; not measured.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Aggregate roots were found in only one source directory (models), which is a layered codebase, not two contexts. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .rb source were not judged.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — D26 could not read how the parts of this repository's one build unit reference each other, so its cohesion was not measured. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `x.report(…)` entries in a `Benchmark.ips`/`bm`/`bmbm`/`benchmark`/`memory` block, `benchmark:` entries in a benchmark-driver YAML under a bench* directory, rspec-benchmark `perform_*` expectations where the gem is installed, or benchmark-ips, benchmark-memory, rspec-benchmark or benchmark-driver in a Gemfile or gemspec, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D30 (Dependency Vulnerabilities), which answers every ecosystem
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Ruby was read, and it logs through none: the standard library's Logger, which Rails.logger is, takes one finished message and no template arguments or fields (as log4net does in C#), so an interpolated message there loses nothing the API could have kept. The console gem (`Console.info`), SemanticLogger, Ougai and dry-logger would be judged.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 40 finding(s)
AC2 · Forms & labels · <label> that labels no control · ×17
  • <label> that labels no control app/views/devise/sessions/new.html.erb:17 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
  • <label> that labels no control app/views/madmin/application/show.html.erb:40 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
  • <label> that labels no control app/views/madmin/dashboard/show.html.erb:172 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
  • <label> that labels no control app/views/madmin/dashboard/show.html.erb:180 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
  • <label> that labels no control app/views/madmin/dashboard/show.html.erb:188 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
  • <label> that labels no control app/views/madmin/dashboard/show.html.erb:198 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
  • <label> that labels no control app/views/madmin/users/show.html.erb:39 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
  • <label> that labels no control app/views/pages/generate_key.html.erb:33 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
  • <label> that labels no control app/views/pages/generate_key.html.erb:43 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
  • <label> that labels no control app/views/pushes/_files_form.html.erb:121 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
  • <label> that labels no control app/views/pushes/_files_form.html.erb:130 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
  • <label> that labels no control app/views/pushes/_form.html.erb:164 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
  • <label> that labels no control app/views/pushes/_form.html.erb:173 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
  • <label> that labels no control app/views/pushes/_qr_form.html.erb:144 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
  • <label> that labels no control app/views/pushes/_qr_form.html.erb:154 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
  • <label> that labels no control app/views/pushes/_url_form.html.erb:90 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
  • <label> that labels no control app/views/shared/_notify_emails_to.html.erb:4 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
AC2 · Forms & labels · <input> without a programmatic label · ×6
  • <input> without a programmatic label app/views/application/_secret_url_bar.html.erb:3 — This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
  • <input> without a programmatic label app/views/devise/registrations/new.html.erb:7 — This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
  • <input> without a programmatic label app/views/devise/registrations/new.html.erb:12 — This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
  • <input> without a programmatic label app/views/devise/registrations/new.html.erb:21 — This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
  • <input> without a programmatic label app/views/pages/generate_key.html.erb:35 — This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
  • <input> without a programmatic label app/views/pages/generate_key.html.erb:45 — This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
D28 · Secrets (history) · REDACTED · ×5
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×3
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
AC2 · Forms & labels · <button> with no accessible text · ×1
  • <button> with no accessible text app/views/application/_secret_url_bar.html.erb:39 — A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
AC3 · Page structure · Document without a <title> · ×1
  • Document without a <title> app/views/layouts/mailer.html.erb:2 — A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics · Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable · ×1
  • Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable app/views/devise/registrations/token.html.erb:21 — The repo's own CSS styles .spoiler with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain fused to persistence infrastructure · ×1
  • Domain fused to persistence infrastructure: Push app/models/push.rb:5 — `Push` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository).
Serious — 162 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×31
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  • + 6 more in this group — see findings.md.
AXH1 · Runtime security headers · Runtime security header not set · ×11
  • Runtime security header not set: content-security-policy — The live app's responses did not include content-security-policy (restricts the sources a page may load — mitigates XSS/injection). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
  • Runtime security header not set: cross-origin-embedder-policy — The live app's responses did not include cross-origin-embedder-policy (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: require-corp)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
  • Runtime security header not set: cross-origin-opener-policy — The live app's responses did not include cross-origin-opener-policy (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: same-origin)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
  • Runtime security header not set: cross-origin-resource-policy — The live app's responses did not include cross-origin-resource-policy (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: same-origin)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
  • Runtime security header not set: permissions-policy — The live app's responses did not include permissions-policy (restricts powerful browser features (camera, geolocation, …)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
  • Runtime security header not set: referrer-policy — The live app's responses did not include referrer-policy (limits referrer leakage to third parties). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
  • Runtime security header not set: strict-transport-security — The live app's responses did not include strict-transport-security (forces HTTPS on subsequent requests — mitigates downgrade/MITM). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
  • Runtime security header not set: x-content-type-options — The live app's responses did not include x-content-type-options (stops MIME-sniffing (expects 'nosniff')). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
  • Runtime security header not set: x-dns-prefetch-control — The live app's responses did not include x-dns-prefetch-control (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: off)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
  • Runtime security header not set: x-frame-options — The live app's responses did not include x-frame-options (blocks clickjacking via framing (or use CSP frame-ancestors)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
  • Runtime security header not set: x-permitted-cross-domain-policies — The live app's responses did not include x-permitted-cross-domain-policies (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: none)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
AC3 · Page structure · Page without a main landmark · ×5
  • Page without a main landmark app/views/layouts/application.html.erb:2 — No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
  • Page without a main landmark app/views/layouts/bare.html.erb:2 — No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
  • Page without a main landmark app/views/layouts/mailer.html.erb:2 — No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
  • Page without a main landmark app/views/layouts/mission_control/jobs/application.html.erb:2 — No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
  • Page without a main landmark app/views/layouts/naked.html.erb:2 — No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.0 · ×4
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.0:1) app/views/layouts/mission_control/jobs/_theme_styles.html.erb:146 — `html[data-bs-theme="dark"] .button.is-danger` sets color: #fff on background-color: #d9534f — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.0:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css:3630 — `.dropdown-item.active, .dropdown-item:active` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2780e3 — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.0:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css:3825 — `.nav-pills .nav-link.active, .nav-pills .show > .nav-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2780e3 — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.0:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cosmo.css:4633 — `.page-link.active, .active > .page-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2780e3 — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.7 · ×4
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.7:1) app/views/layouts/mission_control/jobs/_theme_styles.html.erb:174 — `html[data-bs-theme="dark"] .pagination-link.is-current` sets color: #fff on background-color: #4582ec — 3.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.7:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/litera.css:3720 — `.dropdown-item.active, .dropdown-item:active` sets color: #fff on background-color: #4582ec — 3.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.7:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/litera.css:3950 — `.nav-pills .nav-link.active, .nav-pills .show > .nav-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #4582ec — 3.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.7:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/litera.css:4839 — `.page-link.active, .active > .page-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #4582ec — 3.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.0 · ×4
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.0:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css:3683 — `.dropdown-item.active, .dropdown-item:active` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2a9fd6 — 3.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.0:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css:3913 — `.nav-pills .nav-link.active, .nav-pills .show > .nav-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2a9fd6 — 3.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.0:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css:4789 — `.page-link:hover` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2a9fd6 — 3.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.0:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css:4802 — `.page-link.active, .active > .page-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2a9fd6 — 3.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.4 · ×4
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.4:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css:3019 — `.btn:hover` sets color: #99a2ab on background-color: #7b8a8b — 1.4:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.4:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css:3029 — `.btn:focus-visible` sets color: #99a2ab on background-color: #7b8a8b — 1.4:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.4:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css:3041 — `.btn-check:checked + .btn, :not(.btn-check) + .btn:active, .btn:first-child:active, .btn.active, .btn.show` sets color: #99a2ab on background-color: #7b8a8b — 1.4:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.4:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css:4802 — `.page-link.disabled, .disabled > .page-link` sets color: #ecf0f1 on background-color: #3be6c4 — 1.4:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.1 · ×4
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.1:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/journal.css:3678 — `.dropdown-item.active, .dropdown-item:active` sets color: #fff on background-color: #eb6864 — 3.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.1:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/journal.css:3908 — `.nav-pills .nav-link.active, .nav-pills .show > .nav-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #eb6864 — 3.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.1:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/journal.css:4784 — `.page-link:hover` sets color: #fff on background-color: #eb6864 — 3.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.1:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/journal.css:4797 — `.page-link.active, .active > .page-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #eb6864 — 3.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC3 · Page structure · Heading level jumps from h2 to h5 · ×3
  • Heading level jumps from h2 to h5 app/views/devise/registrations/edit.html.erb:13 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
  • Heading level jumps from h2 to h5 app/views/devise/registrations/token.html.erb:17 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
  • Heading level jumps from h2 to h5 app/views/pages/about.html.erb:102 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8 · ×3
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css:3677 — `.dropdown-item.active, .dropdown-item:active` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2fa4e7 — 2.8:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css:3907 — `.nav-pills .nav-link.active, .nav-pills .show > .nav-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2fa4e7 — 2.8:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cerulean.css:4796 — `.page-link.active, .active > .page-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #2fa4e7 — 2.8:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.3 · ×3
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.3:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css:3025 — `.btn:hover` sets color: #99d1eb on background-color: #adafae — 1.3:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.3:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css:3035 — `.btn:focus-visible` sets color: #99d1eb on background-color: #adafae — 1.3:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.3:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/cyborg.css:3047 — `.btn-check:checked + .btn, :not(.btn-check) + .btn:active, .btn:first-child:active, .btn.active, .btn.show` sets color: #99d1eb on background-color: #adafae — 1.3:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.1 · ×3
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.1:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/lumen.css:3019 — `.btn:hover` sets color: #8fc8de on background-color: #555 — 4.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.1:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/lumen.css:3029 — `.btn:focus-visible` sets color: #8fc8de on background-color: #555 — 4.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.1:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/lumen.css:3041 — `.btn-check:checked + .btn, :not(.btn-check) + .btn:active, .btn:first-child:active, .btn.active, .btn.show` sets color: #8fc8de on background-color: #555 — 4.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped · Untrusted text written into markup unescaped · ×3
  • Untrusted text written into markup unescaped app/javascript/controllers/copy_controller.js:58 — `originalContent` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
  • Untrusted text written into markup unescaped app/javascript/controllers/knobs_controller.js:100 — `this.langSavedValue` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
  • Untrusted text written into markup unescaped app/javascript/controllers/multi_upload_controller.js:143 — `fileCount+` file(s) selected. You can upload up to ${maxFiles} files per push.`` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
X3 · Exception handling · Swallowed exception (empty catch) · ×3
  • Swallowed exception (empty catch) app/javascript/controllers/payload_visibility_controller.js:60 — An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
  • Swallowed exception (empty catch) app/javascript/controllers/theme_controller.js:52 — An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
  • Swallowed exception (empty catch) app/javascript/controllers/theme_controller.js:107 — An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
AC3 · Page structure · Heading level jumps from h1 to h6 · ×2
  • Heading level jumps from h1 to h6 app/views/admin/_navigation.html.erb:37 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
  • Heading level jumps from h1 to h6 app/views/madmin/application/_navigation.html.erb:42 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
AC3 · Page structure · Heading level jumps from h1 to h4 · ×2
  • Heading level jumps from h1 to h4 app/views/madmin/dashboard/show.html.erb:40 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
  • Heading level jumps from h1 to h4 app/views/push_created_mailer/notify.html.erb:11 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
AC3 · Page structure · Heading level jumps from h2 to h6 · ×2
  • Heading level jumps from h2 to h6 app/views/madmin/dashboard/show.html.erb:66 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
  • Heading level jumps from h2 to h6 app/views/pages/generate_key.html.erb:71 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.4 · ×2
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.4:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css:4769 — `.page-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #00bc8c — 2.4:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.4:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css:4767 — `.page-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #18bc9c — 2.4:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.5 · ×2
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.5:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css:4785 — `.page-link:hover` sets color: #fff on background-color: #00efb2 — 1.5:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.5:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/darkly.css:4798 — `.page-link.active, .active > .page-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #00efb2 — 1.5:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.8 · ×2
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.8:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/lumen.css:3677 — `.dropdown-item.active, .dropdown-item:active` sets color: #fff on background-color: #158cba — 3.8:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.8:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/lumen.css:3907 — `.nav-pills .nav-link.active, .nav-pills .show > .nav-link` sets color: #fff on background-color: #158cba — 3.8:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.9 · ×2
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.9:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/lumen.css:4767 — `.page-link` sets color: #555 on background-color: #2b2b2b — 1.9:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.9:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/lumen.css:4783 — `.page-link:hover` sets color: #555 on background-color: #2b2b2b — 1.9:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (17 corresponding lines) · ×2
  • Edited copy of a member (17 corresponding lines) db/migrate/20221222153323_create_file_pushes.rb:5 — db/migrate/20221222153323_create_file_pushes.rb:5-21 | db/migrate/20221228160730_create_urls.rb:5-21 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 17 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
  • Edited copy of a member (17 corresponding lines) app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb:367 — app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb:367-383 | app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb:426-442 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 17 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) · ×2
  • Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) app/controllers/api/v2/pushes_controller.rb:106 — app/controllers/api/v2/pushes_controller.rb:106-114 | REDACTED:414-432 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 9 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
  • Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) db/migrate/20120102210559_create_rails_admin_histories_table.rb:5 — db/migrate/20120102210559_create_rails_admin_histories_table.rb:5-14 | db/migrate/20210901122057_drop_unused_tables.rb:11-19 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 9 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async function without AbortSignal · ×2
  • Async function without AbortSignal: requestGeneration app/javascript/controllers/passphrase_field_controller.js:130 — `requestGeneration` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`.
  • Async function without AbortSignal: requestGeneration app/javascript/controllers/pwgen_controller.js:343 — `requestGeneration` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`.
AC3 · Page structure · Heading level jumps from h1 to h5 · ×1
  • Heading level jumps from h1 to h5 app/views/admin/custom_css/edit.html.erb:68 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
AC3 · Page structure · Heading level jumps from h2 to h4 · ×1
  • Heading level jumps from h2 to h4 app/views/pages/api.html.erb:75 — Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.3 · ×1
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.3:1) public/maintenance.html:29 — `.badge` sets color: #667eea on background-color: #eef2ff — 3.3:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.4 · ×1
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.4:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/flatly.css:4789 — `.page-link:focus` sets color: #99a2ab on background-color: #343a40 — 4.4:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.1 · ×1
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.1:1) app/assets/stylesheets/themes/litera.css:2766 — `.input-group-text` sets color: #ddd on background-color: #e9ecef — 1.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AXI1 · Runtime container hardening · Container process runs as root · ×1
  • Container process runs as root: pwpush-and-nginx-proxy-1 — 'pwpush-and-nginx-proxy-1' (nginx) runs as uid 0 — no user was specified, or one resolving to root was. Observed on the running container, which is the only place the answer is settled: an image's own USER, a base image's inherited one and a compose override are all invisible to a REDACTED reader. Advisory evidence for CRA Annex I (2)(b).
AXR1 · Runtime accessibility (rendered) · WCAG 3.1.1 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface · ×1
  • WCAG 3.1.1 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface — axe-core rule(s) html-has-lang failed on: html. Runtime evidence (advisory — not scored); fix and re-scan to verify it clears.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · PushesController.check_allowed (cyclomatic 30) · ×1
  • PushesController.check_allowed (cyclomatic 30) REDACTED:499 — PushesController.check_allowed has cyclomatic complexity 30 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: REDACTED holds 2 of the 4 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 18 of the 24 points over it (75%), 3.6× the next-largest file (app/javascript/spoiler_alert.js at 5). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · spoiler_alert.spoilerAlert (cyclomatic 20) · ×1
  • spoiler_alert.spoilerAlert (cyclomatic 20) app/javascript/spoiler_alert.js:27 — spoiler_alert.spoilerAlert has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 3 of the 20 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 7 function items inside it that branch (processElement::resolveAutoReblurMs, processElement::parseSecondsToMs, a function literal at line 103, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · PushesController.update (cyclomatic 18) · ×1
  • PushesController.update (cyclomatic 18) REDACTED:173 — PushesController.update has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: REDACTED holds 2 of the 4 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 18 of the 24 points over it (75%), 3.6× the next-largest file (app/javascript/spoiler_alert.js at 5). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · BaseController.require_api_authentication (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • BaseController.require_api_authentication (cyclomatic 16) app/controllers/api/base_controller.rb:67 — BaseController.require_api_authentication has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
D17 · Explicit Debt · FixmeComment · ×1
  • FixmeComment app/models/push.rb:96 — # FIXME: default host? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · PushesController.check_allowed (cognitive 42) · ×1
  • PushesController.check_allowed (cognitive 42) REDACTED:499 — PushesController.check_allowed has cognitive complexity 42 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19 (34 pts), boolean chains 5, match/switch 2 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 16). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: REDACTED holds 2 of the 7 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 37 of the 55 points over it (67%), 5.3× the next-largest file (app/javascript/spoiler_alert.js at 7). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · PushesController.update (cognitive 25) · ×1
  • PushesController.update (cognitive 25) REDACTED:173 — PushesController.update has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18 (25 pts) (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: REDACTED holds 2 of the 7 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 37 of the 55 points over it (67%), 5.3× the next-largest file (app/javascript/spoiler_alert.js at 7). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · spoilerAlert (cognitive 22) · ×1
  • spoilerAlert (cognitive 22) app/javascript/spoiler_alert.js:27 — spoilerAlert has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (14 pts), boolean chains 6, loops 1, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 3). Most of this is not in the body itself: 2 of the 22 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 10 function items inside it that branch (processElement::resolveAutoReblurMs, processElement::parseSecondsToMs, a function literal at line 103, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BaseController.require_api_authentication (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • BaseController.require_api_authentication (cognitive 20) app/controllers/api/base_controller.rb:67 — BaseController.require_api_authentication has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15 (19 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Push.claim_view! (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • Push.claim_view! (cognitive 19) app/models/push.rb:219 — Push.claim_view! has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (14 pts), boolean chains 5 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · NotifiableByEmail.validate_notify_by_email_availability (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • NotifiableByEmail.validate_notify_by_email_availability (cognitive 16) app/models/concerns/pwpush/notifiable_by_email.rb:59 — NotifiableByEmail.validate_notify_by_email_availability has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (16 pts) (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · knobs_controller.loadSettings (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • knobs_controller.loadSettings (cognitive 16) app/javascript/controllers/knobs_controller.js:53 — knobs_controller.loadSettings has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (14 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×1
  • REDACTED
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×1
  • Change coupling: development.rb ↔ production.rb config/environments/development.rb:1 — `config/environments/development.rb` and `config/environments/production.rb` change together 57% of the time (13 of the 23 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 13 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `8f367146` Resolve client IPs only through trusted proxy peers. (#4990); `437dbd86` Trust CIDR ranges in PWP__TRUSTED_PROXIES (#4957); `3f89ac9d` Expand trusted proxies to all private IP address ranges (#4289) — run `git show` on any of them.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (15 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (15 corresponding lines) config/routes/public_pushes.rb:2 — config/routes/public_pushes.rb:2-16 | config/routes/pushes.rb:1-23 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 15 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (32 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (32 corresponding lines) app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb:152 — app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb:152-189 | app/controllers/api/v2/pushes_controller.rb:20-51 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 32 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (21 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (21 corresponding lines) app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb:261 — app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb:261-281 | app/controllers/api/v2/pushes_controller.rb:55-77 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 21 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) REDACTED:436 — REDACTED:436-447 | REDACTED:451-463 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 12 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (1 corresponding lines) · ×1
  • Edited copy of a member (1 corresponding lines) app/jobs/purge_expired_pushes_job.rb:47 — app/jobs/purge_expired_pushes_job.rb:47-47 | config/initializers/validate_settings.rb:24-24 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 1 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (26–33 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (26–33 lines × 2) app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb:152 — app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb:152-184 | app/controllers/api/v2/pushes_controller.rb:20-45 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. ★ These copies have DRIFTED, and that is worth reading before extracting anything: just after the matched lines, `app/controllers/api/v2/pushes_controller.rb:46` calls `log_creation_email_send` and `app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb:186` does not — after which the two agree again for 4 more lines. One of those two behaviours is the intended one and the other is what a copy-paste left behind, so decide which BEFORE unifying them: extracting the shared part will silently settle it, and if the copy that skips the call is the wrong one, that bug is already live.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb:261 — app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb:261-280 | app/controllers/api/v2/pushes_controller.rb:57-76 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15–16 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (15–16 lines × 2) db/migrate/20250515121325_create_pushes.rb:3 — db/migrate/20250515121325_create_pushes.rb:3-18 | db/migrate/20250515121325_create_pushes.rb:29-43 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) config/routes/public_pushes.rb:2 — config/routes/public_pushes.rb:2-12 | config/routes/pushes.rb:3-13 — before extracting anything, compare `config/routes/public_pushes.rb` and `config/routes/pushes.rb` as WHOLE FILES: 85% of the shorter file's lines also appear in the other, so this reads as one file having been copied from the other rather than as a helper waiting to be extracted. The 1 duplicated block(s) this scan matched between them are fragments of that copy, not the extent of it — treat the file pair as the unit. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) REDACTED:438 — REDACTED:438-447 | REDACTED:454-463 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `REDACTED:438` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9–10 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (9–10 lines × 2) db/migrate/20221222153323_create_file_pushes.rb:6 — db/migrate/20221222153323_create_file_pushes.rb:6-14 | db/migrate/20221228160730_create_urls.rb:6-15 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 4) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 4) app/jobs/clean_up_pushes_job.rb:48 — app/jobs/clean_up_pushes_job.rb:48-53 | app/jobs/cleanup_cache_job.rb:47-52 | app/jobs/expire_pushes_job.rb:34-40 | app/jobs/purge_expired_pushes_job.rb:51-56 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from all 4 call sites, so a change lands once.
R1 · Type Safety · Type Safety · ×1
  • Type Safety — 0 typed · 20 plain JS — the untyped files are app/assets/config/manifest.js, app/javascript/application.js, app/javascript/controllers/application.js, app/javascript/controllers/copy_controller.js, app/javascript/controllers/countdown_controller.js, app/javascript/controllers/form_controller.js (+14 more).
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) app/javascript/controllers/copy_controller.js:11 — app/javascript/controllers/copy_controller.js:11 · app/javascript/controllers/copy_controller.js:41 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) app/javascript/controllers/knobs_controller.js:61 — app/javascript/controllers/knobs_controller.js:61 · app/javascript/controllers/knobs_controller.js:73 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block with local edits (6 matched lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block with local edits (6 matched lines × 2 locations) app/javascript/controllers/passphrase_field_controller.js:103 — app/javascript/controllers/passphrase_field_controller.js:103 · app/javascript/controllers/pwgen_controller.js:155 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 128 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
R4 · Test Coverage · Test Coverage · ×1
  • Test Coverage — 0% of 20 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph — 'production' here is the RESIDUE: every source file left once tests, tooling, generated output, config, declarations and declaration-only modules, fixture corpora, type fixtures, behaviour-free data modules, re-export barrels, registration/constant data modules and service workers are set aside, so the percentage is taken over a smaller denominator than the workspace's file count
R6 · Tooling · No test, lint or typecheck script · ×1
  • No test, lint or typecheck script — test ✗ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@fontsource/cabin-sketch' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@fontsource/cabin-sketch' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@fontsource/inter' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@fontsource/inter' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@fontsource/lato' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@fontsource/lato' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@fontsource/montserrat' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@fontsource/montserrat' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@fontsource/neucha' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@fontsource/neucha' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@fontsource/news-cycle' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@fontsource/news-cycle' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@fontsource/nunito' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@fontsource/nunito' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@fontsource/nunito-sans' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@fontsource/nunito-sans' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@fontsource/open-sans' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@fontsource/open-sans' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@fontsource/roboto' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@fontsource/roboto' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@fontsource/source-sans-pro' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@fontsource/source-sans-pro' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@fontsource/ubuntu' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@fontsource/ubuntu' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@popperjs/core' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@popperjs/core' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
Minor — 40 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×16
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
X10 · Duplicated predicate · Duplicated predicate · ×4
  • Duplicated predicate app/javascript/controllers/copy_controller.js:16 — `navigator.clipboard && navigator.clipboard.writeText` appears character-identically in 2 files — app/javascript/controllers/copy_controller.js, app/javascript/controllers/passphrase_field_controller.js. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb:46 — `@push.passphrase.present? && !@push.expired?` appears character-identically in 2 files — app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb, REDACTED. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate app/helpers/application_helper.rb:55 — `params["push_locale"].present? && Settings.enabled_language_codes.include?(params["push_locale"])` appears character-identically in 2 files — app/helpers/application_helper.rb, app/helpers/share_message_helper.rb. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb:169 — `request.path.include?("/p.json") && permitted_params.key?(:files)` appears character-identically in 2 files — app/controllers/api/v1/pushes_controller.rb, app/controllers/api/v2/pushes_controller.rb. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement · No seccomp profile · ×2
  • No seccomp profile REDACTED:3 — The workload runs a container with no seccomp profile in force (neither RuntimeDefault nor a Localhost profile, on the container or the pod), so Kubernetes runs it Unconfined. Seccomp blocks the syscalls a container never needs, shrinking the kernel attack surface a container escape would use.
  • No seccomp profile REDACTED:3 — The workload runs a container with no seccomp profile in force (neither RuntimeDefault nor a Localhost profile, on the container or the pod), so Kubernetes runs it Unconfined. Seccomp blocks the syscalls a container never needs, shrinking the kernel attack surface a container escape would use.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Disabled test · ×2
  • Disabled test test/system/file_pushes_test.rb:7 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
  • Disabled test test/system/urls_test.rb:7 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
C2 · Access Controls · No named authorization policies · ×1
  • No named authorization policies — Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect.
C3 · Audit Trail · Partial audit-trail evidence · ×1
  • Partial audit-trail evidence — An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: a write-side hook every change flows through (a change-history gem declared on the model, or an ActiveRecord callback / Sequel hook recording each change), per-model coverage (has_paper_trail / audited / has_logidze on each model that needs a who-changed-what trail).
C4 · Data Retention · Partial data-retention evidence · ×1
  • Partial data-retention evidence — A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: an expiry limit — a declared maximum age / TTL after which the data is no longer kept, a documented retention period / data-expiry.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found Procfile:1 — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`. ADRs are expected here because `Procfile` makes this repository a deployable product (line 1).
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • REDACTED
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D40 · Network Egress Confinement · No network policy · ×1
  • No network policy — No Kubernetes NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy) found. Without one, every pod can talk to every other pod and reach out to the internet by default. Add a default-deny policy and open only the flows you need.
M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1
  • No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
M2 · Architecture documentation · No architecture diagram/doc · ×1
  • No architecture diagram/doc — No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback · No release approval gate · ×1
  • No release approval gate — Deployment is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever reaches the release trigger goes to production unreviewed, so a mistaken merge or tag is live before anyone can stop it.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×1
  • No security response headers detected REDACTED:37 — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. This is reported because `REDACTED` is committed to this repository and declares the server that serves it, so the configuration that would carry these headers is in this repository and was read in full. (−2.0 on this card.)
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Not all async functions that make a request accept an AbortSignal · ×1
  • Not all async functions that make a request accept an AbortSignal — Only 0/2 async functions that make a cancellable request (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http) accept an AbortSignal or pass one on, so a request keeps running after whatever wanted it has given up — a page navigated away from, an unmounted component, a timed-out job. Take a `signal` (or an options object that carries one) and hand it to the request; where nothing could ever cancel the call, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against how the function is used.
X5 · Nullable reference types · Ruby's type checker does not check nil everywhere · ×1
  • Ruby's type checker does not check nil everywhere — This repository commits no Sorbet configuration (`sorbet/config`) and no `Steepfile`, so nothing type-checks its 209 Ruby product file(s): a nilable value reaches a method call silently and raises `NoMethodError: undefined method … for nil` the first time it is nil. A `# typed:` sigil does nothing without a `sorbet/config` beside the code; a Steep run configured only on a command line is not something this check can read.
Minor — 7 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×7
  • Outdated: aws-sdk-s3 — `aws-sdk-s3` is resolved to 1.240.0 in the committed Gemfile.lock but 1.242.0 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update aws-sdk-s3` and commit the updated Gemfile.lock.
  • Outdated: google-cloud-storage — `google-cloud-storage` is resolved to 1.62.1 in the committed Gemfile.lock but 1.62.2 is the current release on rubygems.org, and it already satisfies the `"~> 1.62"` requirement declared in Gemfile — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update google-cloud-storage` and commit the updated Gemfile.lock.
  • Outdated: i18n-tasks — `i18n-tasks` is resolved to 1.2.0 in the committed Gemfile.lock but 1.2.1 is the current release on rubygems.org, and it already satisfies the `"~> 1.2.0"` requirement declared in Gemfile — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update i18n-tasks` and commit the updated Gemfile.lock.
  • Outdated: lockbox — `lockbox` is resolved to 2.2.0 in the committed Gemfile.lock but 2.3.0 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update lockbox` and commit the updated Gemfile.lock.
  • Outdated: minitest — `minitest` is resolved to 5.27.0 in the committed Gemfile.lock but 6.1.0 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. This crosses a major version, so read the changelog before taking it. Run `bundle update minitest` and commit the updated Gemfile.lock.
  • Outdated: overcommit — `overcommit` is resolved to 0.75.0 in the committed Gemfile.lock but 0.76.0 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update overcommit` and commit the updated Gemfile.lock.
  • Outdated: puma — `puma` is resolved to 8.0.2 in the committed Gemfile.lock but 8.0.3 is the current release on rubygems.org, and Gemfile declares no version requirement for it, so nothing but the lockfile is holding it back. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update puma` and commit the updated Gemfile.lock.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-1277799a112846a2b2fcf2533c9c8b0b/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .6artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-1277799a112846a2b2fcf2533c9c8b0b/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .2artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt --exclude app/assets/stylesheets/themes .11artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** .1artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .50artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** .0artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json

Run 01a1da6d-4f63-71c7-a242-191dafc9f1ae · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md