Executive summary
pauljamescleary/scala-pet-store is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, most of them in the build pipeline. Its score is held back because nine files are no longer known to anyone active in the project and the project keeps no record of its design decisions. It scores 62 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged.
Maturity, at 58, is the weakest lens, level with Production Readiness, and counts most in the score. The best first steps are recording design decisions and having someone learn and document the nine files no active contributor knows, each worth about 4 points. Raising Maturity to 70 would lift the score to about 65.
Seven pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Two known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers, and one pipeline step installs packages that can change without warning. Pinning each tool to an exact version, updating the vulnerable packages and pinning what the pipeline installs would close these risks. The place where the code runs text as code or as a command needs a direct call instead.
The product code is 1,350 lines, about €3,400 to rebuild.
If Maturity rose from 58 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 62 to about 65.
New since the last survey: 5 findings
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/PetEndpoints.scala
- Code Duplication · Edited copies of one member (3 members, 12+ corresponding lines) src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/PetEndpoints.scala
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/PetEndpoints.scala
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (7 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/OrderEndpoints.scala
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (7 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/OrderEndpoints.scala
Rebuild cost: about €3,400 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €1,100 to €5,600, for 19 to 59 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | High, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.9 at a score of 62. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Very small: 1,350 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 petstore | 2 petstore.config | 3 petstore.domain | 4 petstore.domain.orders | 5 petstore.infrastructure | 6 petstore.infrastructure.endpoint.Pagination | 7 petstore.infrastructure.endpoint.PetEndpoints | 8 petstore.infrastructure.repository.doobie | 9 petstore.infrastructure.repository.inmemory | 10 petstore.domain.orders.OrderStatus | 11 petstore.domain.pets | 12 petstore.domain.users | 13 petstore.domain.authentication | 14 petstore.domain.pets.PetStatus | 15 petstore.infrastructure.endpoint |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 petstore | |||||||||||||||
| 2 petstore.config | |||||||||||||||
| 3 petstore.domain | |||||||||||||||
| 4 petstore.domain.orders | |||||||||||||||
| 5 petstore.infrastructure | |||||||||||||||
| 6 petstore.infrastructure.endpoint.Pagination | |||||||||||||||
| 7 petstore.infrastructure.endpoint.PetEndpoints | |||||||||||||||
| 8 petstore.infrastructure.repository.doobie | |||||||||||||||
| 9 petstore.infrastructure.repository.inmemory | |||||||||||||||
| 10 petstore.domain.orders.OrderStatus | 3 | ||||||||||||||
| 11 petstore.domain.pets | 3 | ||||||||||||||
| 12 petstore.domain.users | 3 | ||||||||||||||
| 13 petstore.domain.authentication | 2 | ||||||||||||||
| 14 petstore.domain.pets.PetStatus | 3 | ||||||||||||||
| 15 petstore.infrastructure.endpoint | 2 | 1 |
10→4 petstore.domain.orders.OrderStatus uses petstore.domain.orders✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in petstore.domain.orders.OrderStatus uses a type in petstore.domain.orders.
- The types involved
io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.orders.OrderStatus.Approved→io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.orders.OrderStatusio.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.orders.OrderStatus.Delivered→io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.orders.OrderStatusio.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.orders.OrderStatus.Placed→io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.orders.OrderStatus
- Direction
- petstore.domain.orders.OrderStatus uses petstore.domain.orders, so a change to petstore.domain.orders can break petstore.domain.orders.OrderStatus, while a change to petstore.domain.orders.OrderStatus can't break petstore.domain.orders.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: petstore.domain.orders.OrderStatus uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
11→3 petstore.domain.pets uses petstore.domain✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in petstore.domain.pets uses a type in petstore.domain.
- The types involved
io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.pets.PetService→io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.PetAlreadyExistsErrorio.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.pets.PetValidationAlgebra→io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.PetAlreadyExistsErrorio.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.pets.PetValidationInterpreter→io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.PetAlreadyExistsError
- Direction
- petstore.domain.pets uses petstore.domain, so a change to petstore.domain can break petstore.domain.pets, while a change to petstore.domain.pets can't break petstore.domain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: petstore.domain.pets uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
12→3 petstore.domain.users uses petstore.domain✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in petstore.domain.users uses a type in petstore.domain.
- The types involved
io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.users.UserService→io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.UserAlreadyExistsErrorio.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.users.UserValidationAlgebra→io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.UserAlreadyExistsErrorio.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.users.UserValidationInterpreter→io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.UserAlreadyExistsError
- Direction
- petstore.domain.users uses petstore.domain, so a change to petstore.domain can break petstore.domain.users, while a change to petstore.domain.users can't break petstore.domain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: petstore.domain.users uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→12 petstore.domain.authentication uses petstore.domain.users✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in petstore.domain.authentication uses a type in petstore.domain.users.
- The types involved
io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.authentication.Auth→io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.users.Roleio.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.authentication.Auth→io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.users.User
- Direction
- petstore.domain.authentication uses petstore.domain.users, so a change to petstore.domain.users can break petstore.domain.authentication, while a change to petstore.domain.authentication can't break petstore.domain.users.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: petstore.domain.authentication uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
14→11 petstore.domain.pets.PetStatus uses petstore.domain.pets✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in petstore.domain.pets.PetStatus uses a type in petstore.domain.pets.
- The types involved
io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.pets.PetStatus.Adopted→io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.pets.PetStatusio.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.pets.PetStatus.Available→io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.pets.PetStatusio.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.pets.PetStatus.Pending→io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.pets.PetStatus
- Direction
- petstore.domain.pets.PetStatus uses petstore.domain.pets, so a change to petstore.domain.pets can break petstore.domain.pets.PetStatus, while a change to petstore.domain.pets.PetStatus can't break petstore.domain.pets.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: petstore.domain.pets.PetStatus uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
15→12 petstore.infrastructure.endpoint uses petstore.domain.users✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in petstore.infrastructure.endpoint uses a type in petstore.domain.users.
- The types involved
io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.infrastructure.endpoint.OrderEndpoints→io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.users.Userio.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.infrastructure.endpoint.PetEndpoints→io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.users.User
- Direction
- petstore.infrastructure.endpoint uses petstore.domain.users, so a change to petstore.domain.users can break petstore.infrastructure.endpoint, while a change to petstore.infrastructure.endpoint can't break petstore.domain.users.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: petstore.infrastructure.endpoint uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
15→13 petstore.infrastructure.endpoint uses petstore.domain.authentication✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in petstore.infrastructure.endpoint uses a type in petstore.domain.authentication.
- The types involved
io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.infrastructure.endpoint.PetEndpoints→io.github.pauljamescleary.petstore.domain.authentication.Auth
- Direction
- petstore.infrastructure.endpoint uses petstore.domain.authentication, so a change to petstore.domain.authentication can break petstore.infrastructure.endpoint, while a change to petstore.infrastructure.endpoint can't break petstore.domain.authentication.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: petstore.infrastructure.endpoint uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Domain Modelling
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2025 — Injection | 12 | High / Critical |
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 2 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with REDACTED; Resolve the 9 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with UserEndpoints.scala, PetEndpoints.scala, pet_store_client.py; Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: scalafix or scapegoat — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with REDACTED. | +4.4 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Resolve the 9 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with UserEndpoints.scala, PetEndpoints.scala, pet_store_client.py. | +4.4 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: scalafix or scapegoat — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +3.7 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +3.4 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release. | +2.7 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +1.3 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| On Scala 3, add `-Yexplicit-nulls` to `scalacOptions` so `String` and `String | Null` mean different things, and type each Java API's result as nullable where it can return null; on Scala 2 (or as a first step), enable WartRemover's `Null` wart (`wartremoverErrors += Wart.Null`) or Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls = true` so the code holds absence in `Option`. Then pay the assertions down rather than adding to them: each `.nn` is a null the compiler could not rule out — wrap the Java value in `Option(…)` at the boundary, pattern-match on `null` once there, or change the API so the null cannot arrive; an `unsafeNulls` import switches the checking off for everything after it. | +1.7 pts | Medium | Nullable reference types |
| Resolve the 2 Edited copy of a member (7 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with OrderEndpoints.scala (2). | +0.3 pts | Low | Code Duplication |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.5 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.3 | Mixed | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/PetEndpoints.scala | 7.4 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) |
| src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/UserEndpoints.scala | 7.8 | Mixed | Cognitive Complexity: UserEndpoints.loginEndpoint (cognitive 35) |
| src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/OrderEndpoints.scala | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (7 corresponding lines) |
| src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/Server.scala | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: Server.createServer (cognitive 36) |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 38 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 38 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 34 of 43 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.scala, .py) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.scala, .py) and this repository declares an sbt build (repository root, 11 test files), but it was not re-run: the analyzer environment could not run it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), but the licence verdict published here was taken over its sbt dependencies. Nothing was read about its Python dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. All 9 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness). Counted over 5 of the 40 production source files in this repository: 31 are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over, and the remaining 4 have no attributable history left to measure.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This dimension reads a project's own statement about the platform it runs on: a TargetFramework in a .NET project file, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain file or Cargo.toml rust-version, a .go-version, .java-version, .ruby-version, .tool-versions or .sdkmanrc, a go.mod go directive, a Maven or Gradle Java level or toolchain, a Gemfile's ruby directive, a mix.exs elixir requirement, a rebar.config minimum_otp_vsn, a pubspec.yaml SDK constraint, a REDACTED scalaVersion, or a framework major pinned by a dependency constraint. This repository carries none of them, so nothing about its platform was established. That is a gap in this analyzer's coverage, NOT a finding that the platform is supported — a language whose runtime is declared elsewhere (Package.swift, a Dockerfile) is simply not read here yet.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection singletons in C#, Spring/JSR-330/CDI singletons in Java and Kotlin, module state in Python request handlers, handler state in Go and Swift, Play controllers, Cask routes, Scalatra servlets, Finatra controllers, Akka/Pekko HTTP routes and JSR-330 singletons in Scala, Rails, Sinatra, Grape, Roda and Hanami handlers and Rack apps in Ruby, and module state in F# request handlers (Giraffe, Saturn, Falco, Oxpecker and Suave handlers and ASP.NET Core controllers) only, and this repository's product is written in Scala (http4s), which was left unread, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
- C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
- C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
- C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
- DM8 Value-object opportunities — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check finds primitive parameters that travel together through several signatures of the domain (a missing value object). Its deterministic rule has not yet shown 95 % precision on adjudicated rows, so the clumps it finds are counted here and not published as findings, and the card carries no score. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
3 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Server.createServer at 36.
What to do
- Bring the 3 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with Server.createServer (cognitive 36), UserEndpoints.loginEndpoint (cognitive 35), UserEndpoints.signupEndpoint (cognitive 17). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 3 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 8.8 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected. 7.6 % of the production lines (103 of 1,350) are in a reported copy. A further 5 rows report members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Edited copy of a member (7 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with OrderEndpoints.scala (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with PetEndpoints.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Edited copies of one member (3 members, 12+ corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with PetEndpoints.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 3 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
4 outdated direct sbt declarations. An sbt declaration names an EXACT version, so the remedy is an edit to the build file — there is no lockfile refresh that would move it. Test-, Provided- and it-scoped declarations are excluded, because a consumer of this project never receives them. A version held in a Scala val is read only when the val is one string literal: sbt is a program rather than a manifest, and evaluating a computed version would invent the measurement rather than take it. Whether any artifact is DEPRECATED or ABANDONED is not graded and cannot be — Maven Central publishes no such marker, and release age does not stand in for one: the most widely depended-upon libraries are routinely the stalest, being finished rather than abandoned. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 4 declared sbt dependency artifact(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from the POMs Maven Central publishes, over the production coordinates this repository's 1 sbt build file(s) (REDACTED and project/*.scala) declare with a literal version, directly or through a string-literal val — `%%` resolved to the Scala binary suffix Central publishes under, test-scoped declarations excluded — the same declaration-site closure this analysis reads for dependency currency. sbt has no lockfile a checkout carries, so this is deliberately NOT the transitive closure. 22 further production coordinate(s) are declared with a version the build computes rather than writes as a literal — sbt is a program, and this pass does not run it — and are NOT graded: this verdict covers what the build pins literally or through a string-literal val, not the full graph. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's sbt dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted task-comment markers across 1350 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
12 finding(s): 0 critical, 9 high, 3 medium, 0 low. 7 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 1 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 7 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
2 finding(s): 1 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
9 of 9 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/UserEndpoints.scala. Counted over 9 of the 40 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 9 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with UserEndpoints.scala, PetEndpoints.scala, pet_store_client.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX5 · Architecture & structure
AX6 · Interface segregation
DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
DM9 · Scattered domain decisions
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
M1 · Documentation (README)
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add scalafix or scapegoat (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:4
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: scalafix or scapegoat — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
P8 · Schema migrations
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
X12 · Unreachable branch
X5 · Nullable reference types
- No build over this repository's 36 Scala product file(s) passes `-Yexplicit-nulls`, enables WartRemover's `Null` wart or runs Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls`, so every reference type admits null and nothing reports a `null` written into the code or returned from a Java API — the first one to reach a method call is a `NullPointerException`. `Option` by convention is a habit no tool here holds the code to.
What to do
- On Scala 3, add `-Yexplicit-nulls` to `scalacOptions` so `String` and `String | Null` mean different things, and type each Java API's result as nullable where it can return null; on Scala 2 (or as a first step), enable WartRemover's `Null` wart (`wartremoverErrors += Wart.Null`) or Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls = true` so the code holds absence in `Option`. Then pay the assertions down rather than adding to them: each `.nn` is a null the compiler could not rule out — wrap the Java value in `Option(…)` at the boundary, pattern-match on `null` once there, or change the API so the null cannot arrive; an `unsafeNulls` import switches the checking off for everything after it.
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 68% | Adequate — gated by X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 69% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Maturity | 58% | Adequate — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 58% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 80% | Checked 3 of 10 | Solid. |
| Domain Modelling | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Performance | 100% | Exemplary | Solid. |
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — 1 observation(s) recorded · The CI pipeline publishes no artifact — no package publish, container push or release with files to download. Supply-chain provenance, signing and an SBOM describe a PUBLISHED artifact for the people who obtain it, so there is nothing to attest here; a deployment of the service itself publishes nothing for anyone else to verify. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts publishing artifacts (a package, a container image, or a release with downloadable files). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
Not evidenced — 5 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 83 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's Python imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's Scala imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — This repository has nothing the runtime tiers could boot or serve — no markup, no UI framework or web-server dependency, no UI component source, no native UI project and no API definition — nothing here is a surface to boot — so runtime a11y/egress/header evidence has no subject here. Not applicable: this is neither a gap in the scan nor a finding about your code.
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~867 lines of test source are present (.scala, .py) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .scala suite was found but not re-run
- D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D19 Documentation Quality — No runnable or published unit to look for an example in, and no multi-project root README to look for a map in; the other documentation kinds are withheld (see the gaps), so documentation quality is not applicable here.
- D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (494 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only — this repository's production source is .py, .scala, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (1198 LoC, 76 module-visible types across 10 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
- D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.scala), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life — Platform end-of-life not assessed — this repository declares no platform this pass reads
- D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this sbt build ships 0 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — no aggregates detected — aggregate-boundary check not applicable
- DM10 One transaction, one aggregate — no repository writes detected — no operation to judge against the one-aggregate rule
- DM11 Constructible invalid state — no entities detected — construction-time invariants not assessable
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model — no data-bearing entities detected — rich-vs-anemic model not assessable
- DM5 Encapsulated state — no domain entities found — DM5 grades how entities protect their state, and this repository declares none
- DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
- DM8 Value-object opportunities — not scored — the deterministic rule found 0 candidate clump(s); its rows are withheld until it has a measured precision of 95 % (a sample of fewer than 10 rows cannot show one)
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P2 Observability — This repository's JVM, Python source (2 module(s), 38 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JVM source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `@Benchmark` in a Java, Kotlin or Scala file importing JMH or kotlinx-benchmark, Jetpack Benchmark's `measureRepeated` in a file importing androidx.benchmark, or JMH/kotlinx-benchmark/androidx.benchmark in a pom.xml, Gradle or sbt build, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Scala was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Scala request takes no token: a Future cannot be cancelled, and cats-effect, ZIO and Monix interrupt the fiber that made the request from outside the call, not through a parameter
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X3 Exception handling — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Scala was read, and it logs through none that an interpolated message defeats: scala-logging takes an `s"…"` message apart into SLF4J's pattern and arguments at compile time, and log4s, grizzled-slf4j, Play's Logger, Akka's LoggingAdapter, sbt's Logger and Spark's Logging take one finished message (as log4net does in C#). Calls made straight through SLF4J (`org.slf4j.Logger`) would be judged.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 11 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
Serious — 12 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Edited copy of a member (7 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/OrderEndpoints.scala:34
- Edited copy of a member (7 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/OrderEndpoints.scala:42
- Server.createServer (cognitive 36) src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/Server.scala:26
- UserEndpoints.loginEndpoint (cognitive 35) src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/UserEndpoints.scala:31
- UserEndpoints.signupEndpoint (cognitive 17) src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/UserEndpoints.scala:60
- REDACTED
- Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/PetEndpoints.scala:90
- Edited copies of one member (3 members, 12+ corresponding lines) src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/PetEndpoints.scala:36
- Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/PetEndpoints.scala:80
Minor — 16 finding(s)
- Orphaned file src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/UserEndpoints.scala:1
- Orphaned file src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/endpoint/PetEndpoints.scala:1
- Orphaned file functional_test/pet_store_client.py:1
- Orphaned file src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/repository/doobie/DoobiePetRepositoryInterpreter.scala:1
- Orphaned file src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/repository/doobie/DoobieUserRepositoryInterpreter.scala:1
- Orphaned file REDACTED:1
- Orphaned file src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/infrastructure/repository/doobie/DoobieAuthRepositoryInterpreter.scala:1
- Orphaned file src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/Server.scala:1
- Orphaned file src/main/scala/io/github/pauljamescleary/petstore/domain/authentication/Auth.scala:1
- No ADRs found REDACTED:63
- Orphaned files with no living knowledge
- REDACTED
- No ADRs
- No SAST REDACTED:4
- No changelog
- Scala's null is not held to the type system everywhere
Minor — 4 finding(s)
- Outdated: ch.qos.logback:logback-classic
- Outdated: com.h2database:h2
- Outdated: org.flywaydb:flyway-core
- Outdated: org.slf4j:slf4j-api
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-c73cc41fce7d43ca9e846571dbdb5281/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-c73cc41fce7d43ca9e846571dbdb5281/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt --exclude project/project . | 12 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . /tmp/codehealth-osv-sbom-ac2b0f5f1438474287622142a0d07ddd | 2 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . /tmp/codehealth-osv-sbom-ac2b0f5f1438474287622142a0d07ddd | 0 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |