Executive summary
openai/harmony meets our standard for a preview release. It scores 72 out of 100 and is rated Strong, and three of its eight critical findings are security problems in the packages it uses.
Every lens scores high enough to be rated Strong, so no single lens holds the score back. The best first step is adding tests for untested code, worth about 8 points. Having someone learn and document the five files no active contributor knows comes next, worth about 4 points.
Three known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Five parts of the code are no longer understood by anyone working on it. Having someone learn the forgotten files and updating the vulnerable packages would close both risks.
The product code is 5,913 lines, about €9,600 to rebuild.
Every lens already scores high enough to be rated Strong, so no single lens holds the score back.
New since the last survey: 17 findings
- Code Duplication · Edited copies of one member (3 members, 22+ corresponding lines) src/wasm_module.rs
- Code Duplication · Edited copies of one member (4 members, 21+ corresponding lines) src/py_module.rs
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (38 corresponding lines) src/registry.rs
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (19 corresponding lines) src/py_module.rs
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) src/py_module.rs
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines) src/encoding.rs
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (6 corresponding lines) src/py_module.rs
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (6 corresponding lines) src/py_module.rs
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (6 corresponding lines) src/py_module.rs
- Code Coverage · Low coverage: src/chat.rs src/chat.rs
- Code Coverage · Low coverage: src/encoding.rs src/encoding.rs
- Code Coverage · Low coverage: src/lib.rs src/lib.rs
- Code Coverage · Low coverage: src/registry.rs src/registry.rs
- Code Coverage · Low coverage: src/tiktoken.rs src/tiktoken.rs
- Code Coverage · Low coverage: src/tiktoken_ext/public_encodings.rs src/tiktoken_ext/public_encodings.rs
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Fixed since the last survey: 1 finding
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
Rebuild cost: about €9,600 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €3,200 to €16,000, for 53 to 169 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×1.1 at a score of 72. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 5,913 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture — module dependency graph
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 openai_harmony.chat | 2 openai_harmony.registry | 3 openai_harmony.tiktoken | 4 openai_harmony.tiktoken_ext.public_encodings | 5 python.openai_harmony | 6 openai_harmony.encoding | 7 python | 8 openai_harmony.py_module | 9 openai_harmony.wasm_module |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 openai_harmony.chat | |||||||||
| 2 openai_harmony.registry | |||||||||
| 3 openai_harmony.tiktoken | |||||||||
| 4 openai_harmony.tiktoken_ext.public_encodings | |||||||||
| 5 python.openai_harmony | |||||||||
| 6 openai_harmony.encoding | 9 | 1 | |||||||
| 7 python | 1 | ||||||||
| 8 openai_harmony.py_module | 2 | ||||||||
| 9 openai_harmony.wasm_module | 2 |
6→1 openai_harmony.encoding uses openai_harmony.chat✕
- Connections
- 9 pairs of types, where a type in openai_harmony.encoding uses a type in openai_harmony.chat.
- The types involved
openai_harmony.encoding.HarmonyEncoding→openai_harmony.chat.Contentopenai_harmony.encoding.HarmonyEncoding→openai_harmony.chat.DeveloperContentopenai_harmony.encoding.HarmonyEncoding→openai_harmony.chat.Messageopenai_harmony.encoding.HarmonyEncoding→openai_harmony.chat.Roleopenai_harmony.encoding.HarmonyEncoding→openai_harmony.chat.SystemContentopenai_harmony.encoding.HarmonyEncoding→openai_harmony.chat.TextContentopenai_harmony.encoding.ParsedHeader→openai_harmony.chat.Authoropenai_harmony.encoding.StreamableParser→openai_harmony.chat.Messageopenai_harmony.encoding.StreamableParser→openai_harmony.chat.Role
- Direction
- openai_harmony.encoding uses openai_harmony.chat, so a change to openai_harmony.chat can break openai_harmony.encoding, while a change to openai_harmony.encoding can't break openai_harmony.chat.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: openai_harmony.encoding uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
6→3 openai_harmony.encoding uses openai_harmony.tiktoken✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in openai_harmony.encoding uses a type in openai_harmony.tiktoken.
- The types involved
openai_harmony.encoding.HarmonyEncoding→openai_harmony.tiktoken.CoreBPE
- Direction
- openai_harmony.encoding uses openai_harmony.tiktoken, so a change to openai_harmony.tiktoken can break openai_harmony.encoding, while a change to openai_harmony.encoding can't break openai_harmony.tiktoken.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: openai_harmony.encoding uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
7→5 python uses python.openai_harmony✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in python uses a type in python.openai_harmony.
- The types involved
python.openai_harmony→python.openai_harmony.HarmonyEncoding
- Direction
- python uses python.openai_harmony, so a change to python.openai_harmony can break python, while a change to python can't break python.openai_harmony.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: python uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
8→6 openai_harmony.py_module uses openai_harmony.encoding✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in openai_harmony.py_module uses a type in openai_harmony.encoding.
- The types involved
openai_harmony.py_module.PyHarmonyEncoding→openai_harmony.encoding.HarmonyEncodingopenai_harmony.py_module.PyStreamableParser→openai_harmony.encoding.StreamableParser
- Direction
- openai_harmony.py_module uses openai_harmony.encoding, so a change to openai_harmony.encoding can break openai_harmony.py_module, while a change to openai_harmony.py_module can't break openai_harmony.encoding.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: openai_harmony.py_module uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
9→6 openai_harmony.wasm_module uses openai_harmony.encoding✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in openai_harmony.wasm_module uses a type in openai_harmony.encoding.
- The types involved
openai_harmony.wasm_module.JsHarmonyEncoding→openai_harmony.encoding.HarmonyEncodingopenai_harmony.wasm_module.JsStreamableParser→openai_harmony.encoding.StreamableParser
- Direction
- openai_harmony.wasm_module uses openai_harmony.encoding, so a change to openai_harmony.encoding can break openai_harmony.wasm_module, while a change to openai_harmony.wasm_module can't break openai_harmony.encoding.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: openai_harmony.wasm_module uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 18 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Resolve the 6 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with chat.rs, encoding.rs, lib.rs; Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them; Resolve the 5 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with encoding.rs, tests.rs, __init__.py.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 6 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with chat.rs, encoding.rs, lib.rs. | +7.6 pts | Low | Code Coverage |
| Resolve the 5 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with encoding.rs, tests.rs, __init__.py. | +4.2 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 4 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with chat.rs, py_module.rs, wasm_module.rs. | +3.4 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +5.8 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate. | +3.2 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release. | +2.4 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +0.8 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Bring the 1 body over 60 down to 60 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with HarmonyEncoding::json_schema_to_typescript (cognitive 431). | +0.9 pts | Medium | Cognitive Complexity |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.9 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High vulnerability: REDACTED |
| src/encoding.rs | 4.0 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: HarmonyEncoding::json_schema_to_typescript (cyclomatic 87) |
| src/tiktoken_ext/public_encodings.rs | 5.7 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) |
| src/tiktoken.rs | 6.0 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| src/registry.rs | 7.0 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (38 corresponding lines) |
| src/chat.rs | 7.0 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) |
| src/py_module.rs | 7.0 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copies of one member (4 members, 21+ corresponding lines) |
| src/wasm_module.rs | 7.8 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copies of one member (3 members, 22+ corresponding lines) |
| src/lib.rs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Coverage: Low coverage: src/lib.rs |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 39 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 1.0, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 39 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 71 of 88 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), but the licence verdict published here was taken over its crate dependencies. Nothing was read about its Python dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its crate dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This kind did not reach the 95 % precision gate in three adjudicated runs (docs/plans/deterministic-engine/adjudication/D19-sample3-v3.md), so by the pre-registered fallback it publishes no row until a re-measurement shows it does. The candidates are counted here, not reported as findings, and the score does not include them.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22's deterministic call-shape rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. This says nothing about whether that surface is consistent.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
- D27 Navigability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `npm run` found no package.json in the folder where our sandbox ran it. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. (rule: no-root-manifest). The renderer reported: the dev server (`npm run dev`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (our sandbox): `npm run` found no package.json in the folder where our sandbox ran it. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. Last output: "npm error code ENOENT / npm error syscall open / npm error path <repo>/package.json / npm error errno -2 / npm error enoent Could not read package.json: Error: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '<repo>/package.json' / npm error enoent This is related to npm not being able to find a file. / npm error enoent / npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: <path>" No runtime evidence was gathered.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DevServer (dev). the dev server (`npm run dev`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (our sandbox): `npm run` found no package.json in the folder where our sandbox ran it. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. Last output: "npm error code ENOENT / npm error syscall open / npm error path <repo>/package.json / npm error errno -2 / npm error enoent Could not read package.json: Error: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '<repo>/package.json' / npm error enoent This is related to npm not being able to find a file. / npm error enoent / npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: <path>" No runtime evidence was gathered.
- C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
- C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
- C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
- C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and no C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby or Scala was found, and this repository's Python, Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and no C#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby or Scala was found, and this repository's Python, Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
- X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala or PHP was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X3 Exception handling — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and MSBuild project configuration, TypeScript source and its tsconfig files, Java source and its package and module declarations, PHP source and its PHPStan and Psalm configuration, Dart source and its pubspec language version, Ruby source and its Sorbet and Steep configuration, Scala source and its build's explicit-nulls, WartRemover and Scalafix settings, and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded, no TypeScript was found, and this repository's Python, Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside our isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — we run the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
4 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was HarmonyEncoding::json_schema_to_typescript at 87.
What to do
- Bring the 1 body over 30 down to 30 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with HarmonyEncoding::json_schema_to_typescript (cyclomatic 87). — Refactoring it lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 7.8 to about 9.0/10.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
8 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was HarmonyEncoding::json_schema_to_typescript at 431.
What to do
- Bring the 1 body over 60 down to 60 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with HarmonyEncoding::json_schema_to_typescript (cognitive 431). — Refactoring it lifts Cognitive Complexity from 4.9 to about 7.5/10.
D3 · God Classes
4 god class(es) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 MethodTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with encoding.rs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with encoding.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 ClassTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with encoding.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D4 · Code Duplication
11 duplicated block group(s) detected. 8.0 % of the production lines (474 of 5,913) are in a reported copy. A further 9 rows report members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Edited copy of a member (6 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with py_module.rs (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with public_encodings.rs, encoding.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Edited copies of one member (3 members, 22+ corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with wasm_module.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D5 · Coupling
2 production modules (Cargo+npm), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; 0 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 1 of the 2 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, declare types in source no model reads, or have no source directory of their own).
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
1 of 7 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with encoding.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D8 · Code Coverage
Line coverage 4.4% — 6 file(s) below 50%. Measured from the Rust suite (repository root: `cargo test --workspace` instrumented over 7 production file(s), 1 test binaries and 1 doc-test binaries).
What to do
- Resolve the 6 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with chat.rs, encoding.rs, lib.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
D11 · Test Reliability
0 flaky across 2 measured tier(s). Python (repository root, 1 test file): measured (0 flaky); Rust (repository root, 2 test files): measured (0 flaky).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
12 outdated, 0 yanked direct Cargo dependencies. Only DIRECT edges are graded: a transitive crate cannot be moved past what its parent's requirement admits, so reporting one would be advice its owner cannot take. A newer release is reported only where this repository's OWN requirement already admits it, so the remedy is `cargo update` and never a manifest edit — which means a release outside the declared range is deliberately NOT charged, because a written-down constraint is a decision rather than a defect. Note that a bare requirement is a CARET, and for a 0.x crate its ceiling is the minor. Whether any crate is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — crates.io publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from REDACTED there.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 307 shipped crate(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from crates.io over the crates a consumer compiles — this repository's REDACTED closed over its manifests' `[dependencies]` and `[build-dependencies]`. Crates it asks for ONLY under `[dev-dependencies]` are excluded: they are not compiled by anything that depends on this repository. This repository publishes itself under Apache-2.0, which is its own choice and is not judged here. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's crate dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry) and package.json, and the licences of those dependency graphs were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author. Counted over 9 of the 11 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D17 · Explicit Debt
2 deducted task-comment markers across 5913 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 9.9. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with tiktoken.rs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 6 document(s) read across 3 unit(s).
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
16 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 13 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 4 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
9 of 9 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/encoding.rs. Counted over 9 of the 11 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 5 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with encoding.rs, tests.rs, __init__.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
- Resolve the 4 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with chat.rs, py_module.rs, wasm_module.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
3/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 1 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX9 · CQS / query purity
M1 · Documentation (README)
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P10 · Library API & versioning
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- `demo/harmony-demo/package.json` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — demo/harmony-demo/package.json:12
What to do
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
X1 · Async correctness
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 88% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 98% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 66% | Adequate — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 64% | Adequate — gated by D8 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 94% | Checked 4 of 10 | Solid. |
| Performance | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Not evidenced — 5 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 74 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's Python imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; Rust with no dependency-injection crate has no container to hand one lifetime's instance to another — every value is owned by the code that builds it, and the borrow checker rejects a longer-lived value keeping a borrow of a shorter-lived one; this repository's TypeScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — No container singleton was found, so there is no shared instance for concurrent requests to race on. No function in this Python code is served by a threaded web framework (a Flask, Bottle or FastAPI route, a Django or Pyramid view), so no module is shared between request threads. Rust's compiler refuses unsynchronised shared mutation — a value shared across threads must be Sync — so the race this check looks for cannot be written. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — no exported interface declares behaviour
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — the dev server (`npm run dev`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (our sandbox): `npm run` found no package.json in the folder where our sandbox ran it. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. Last output: "npm error code ENOENT / npm error syscall open / npm error path <repo>/package.json / npm error errno -2 / npm error enoent Could not read package.json: Error: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '<repo>/package.json' / npm error enoent This is related to npm not being able to find a file. / npm error enoent / npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: <path>" No runtime evidence was gathered. This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~1025 lines of test source are present (.py, .rs) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (720 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
- D22 Internal API Consistency — API consistency is measured on C# only; the exposed Rust surface was not measured.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .py, .rs source were not judged.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (5235 LoC, 55 module-visible types across 3 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
- D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.rs), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (7 value object(s))
- ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and a call made through an inferred or generic receiver has no resolvable owner in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P2 Observability — This repository's Python, Rust source (2 module(s), 11 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the Python, Rust source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present for 7 file(s), but no domain-layer files were identified: no covered file's path contains any of the markers this check keys on (/domain/, /aggregates/, /valueobjects/, /domainmodel/, .domain/, /entities/), which are matched case-insensitively anywhere in the path. With no domain partition there is nothing to compare the web/controller layer against — if this repository keeps its business rules under a folder named none of those, that naming is what the check cannot see, not the domain logic.
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `#[bench]`, criterion's `bench_function`/`bench_with_input`, `#[divan::bench]` or `#[library_benchmark]` in any `.rs` file, or criterion, divan, iai or a `[[bench]]` target in a Cargo.toml, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X12 Unreachable branch — X12 reached only 21% of this repository's production lines — rust (4,665 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Python and Rust were read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Python request takes no token: asyncio cancels the task and trio or anyio the scope that made it, from outside the call, and requests, httpx, aiohttp and gRPC take a timeout, not a cancellation; a Rust request takes no token: a future is cancelled by dropping it, from outside the call (select!, a timeout, an aborted task), and reqwest, hyper and tonic take none
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X3 Exception handling — X3 reached only 21% of this repository's production lines — rust (4,665 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Rust was read, and it logs through none: the `log` crate's macros take one finished message (as log4net does in C#; its `kv` values are an opt-in its backends mostly drop), `println!`/`eprintln!` are not loggers, or it makes no log call outside its tests and examples at all. Calls through `tracing` (`tracing::info!`, or `info!` imported from it) would be judged.
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 8 finding(s)
- Orphaned knowledge src/encoding.rs:1
- Orphaned knowledge src/tests.rs:1
- Orphaned knowledge python/openai_harmony/__init__.py:1
- Orphaned knowledge src/tiktoken.rs:1
- Orphaned knowledge src/tiktoken_ext/public_encodings.rs:1
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
Serious — 58 finding(s)
- Low coverage: src/chat.rs src/chat.rs:1
- Low coverage: src/encoding.rs src/encoding.rs:1
- Low coverage: src/lib.rs src/lib.rs:1
- Low coverage: src/registry.rs src/registry.rs:1
- Low coverage: src/tiktoken.rs src/tiktoken.rs:1
- Low coverage: src/tiktoken_ext/public_encodings.rs src/tiktoken_ext/public_encodings.rs:1
- HarmonyEncoding::json_schema_to_typescript (cognitive 431) src/encoding.rs:407
- HarmonyEncoding::render (cognitive 31) src/encoding.rs:814
- HarmonyEncoding::template_tools_section (cognitive 25) src/encoding.rs:756
- HarmonyEncoding::render (cognitive 20) src/encoding.rs:945
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Edited copy of a member (6 corresponding lines) src/py_module.rs:286
- Edited copy of a member (6 corresponding lines) src/py_module.rs:294
- Edited copy of a member (6 corresponding lines) src/py_module.rs:326
- HarmonyEncoding::json_schema_to_typescript (cyclomatic 87) src/encoding.rs:407
- HarmonyEncoding::render (cyclomatic 16) src/encoding.rs:814
- StreamableParser::parse_header_from_string (cyclomatic 23) src/encoding.rs:1332
- StreamableParser::process_next (cyclomatic 21) src/encoding.rs:1118
- TodoComment src/tiktoken.rs:350
- TodoComment src/tiktoken.rs:383
- StreamableParser::process_next (cognitive 53) src/encoding.rs:1118
- StreamableParser::parse_header_from_string (cognitive 45) src/encoding.rs:1332
- CoreBPE::_encode_unstable_native (cognitive 22) src/tiktoken.rs:331
- CoreBPE::encode (cognitive 17) src/tiktoken.rs:236
- MethodTooLong: HarmonyEncoding.json_schema_to_typescript src/encoding.rs:407
- MethodTooLong: StreamableParser.process_next src/encoding.rs:1118
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/tiktoken_ext/public_encodings.rs:139
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/encoding.rs:452
- FileTooLong: src/encoding.rs src/encoding.rs
- ClassTooLong: HarmonyEncoding src/encoding.rs:84
- Edited copies of one member (3 members, 22+ corresponding lines) src/wasm_module.rs:79
- Edited copies of one member (4 members, 21+ corresponding lines) src/py_module.rs:92
- Edited copy of a member (38 corresponding lines) src/registry.rs:45
- Edited copy of a member (19 corresponding lines) src/py_module.rs:216
- Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) src/py_module.rs:256
- Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines) src/encoding.rs:132
- Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/tiktoken_ext/public_encodings.rs:144
- Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/wasm_module.rs:85
- Duplicated block (13–14 lines × 3) src/py_module.rs:106
- Duplicated block (12–14 lines × 2) src/encoding.rs:431
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/encoding.rs:134
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/chat.rs:369
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/encoding.rs:1182
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/tiktoken_ext/public_encodings.rs:161
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 4) src/tiktoken_ext/public_encodings.rs:141
- Low cohesion: HarmonyEncoding (LCOM4 4) src/encoding.rs:84
Minor — 10 finding(s)
- Orphaned file src/chat.rs:1
- Orphaned file src/py_module.rs:1
- Orphaned file src/wasm_module.rs:1
- Orphaned file src/registry.rs:1
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- No ADRs
- No dependency-update automation demo/harmony-demo/package.json:12
- No changelog
Minor — 12 finding(s)
- Outdated: anyhow
- Outdated: bstr
- Outdated: clap
- Outdated: futures
- Outdated: image
- Outdated: regex
- Outdated: serde
- Outdated: serde_json
- Outdated: serde_with
- Outdated: thiserror
- Outdated: wasm-bindgen
- Outdated: wasm-bindgen-futures
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-482c5448a1c3412e9e00de68707a7e07/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-482c5448a1c3412e9e00de68707a7e07/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 0 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 16 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |