Executive summary
nicholas-fedor/watchtower meets our standard for production. It scores 80.2 out of 100 and is rated Strong, and all four of its critical findings are security problems in its servers and containers and in its automatic dependency updates.
Every lens scores high enough to be rated Strong, so no single lens holds the score back. The best first steps are fixing the part of the code only one person knows and recording design decisions, each worth about 8.4 points.
Three settings leave the servers or containers unsafe. One automatic update takes new releases before a bad one can be spotted. Correcting the unsafe settings and setting a waiting period for automatic updates would close both risks.
The product code is 50,928 lines, about €260,000 to rebuild.
Every lens already scores high enough to be rated Strong, so no single lens holds the score back.
Rebuild cost: about €260,000 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €87,000 to €440,000, for 1,451 to 4,604 hours of work, about 1.8 person-years for 1 to 4 engineers |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×1.4 at a score of 80. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Medium: 50,928 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration | 8 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 4 | High / Critical |
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 2 | Medium |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor; Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with main.go; Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with script.js.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. | +8.4 pts | Low | Bus Factor |
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with main.go. | +8.4 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with script.js. | +7.4 pts | Low | Comment Value |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +5.3 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) | +2.4 pts | Medium | Exception handling |
| Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite. | +2.3 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Interpolated log message defeats structured logging | +1.6 pts | Medium | Structured logging |
| Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. | +0.2 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| internal/observability/notify/notifier_test.go | 6.4 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| internal/settings/flags.go | 6.6 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| internal/observability/notify/format/message_test.go | 6.6 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| internal/observability/notify/notifier.go | 6.9 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| internal/settings/config/api/endpoints.go | 7.3 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| internal/observability/notify/legacy/slack/slack.go | 7.3 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| internal/observability/notify/legacy/msteams/msteams.go | 7.3 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| internal/observability/notify/legacy/gotify/gotify.go | 7.3 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| internal/observability/notify/legacy/email/email.go | 7.3 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED |
| internal/settings/flags_test.go | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| internal/settings/flags/utils/deprecate.go | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| internal/settings/config/notify/notify.go | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| internal/observability/notify/format/format_fuzz_test.go | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| internal/container/client/container_source.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: container_source.go ↔ container_target.go |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 43 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 43 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 100 of 105 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Most of this repository's production source (.go) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it: no function bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Most of this repository's production source (.go) had no cognitive complexity computed for it: no function bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load.
- D4 Code Duplication — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Most of this repository's production source (.go) was not read by duplication detection: no source of those file kinds was exposed to the token comparison by any language model this pass could load.
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: the Go half could not be measured — the Go suite could not be run in the analyzer image (no test ran). Coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — a coverage step in CI (`go test -timeout 60s -coverprofile="coverage.out" -covermode`), uploaded by `codecov/codecov-action` shows coverage is measured in your own CI.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.go) and this repository declares a Go test suite (2 modules), but it was not re-run: the analyzer environment could not run it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (252907 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .go, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This kind did not reach the 95 % precision gate in three adjudicated runs (docs/plans/deterministic-engine/adjudication/D19-sample3-v3.md), so by the pre-registered fallback it publishes no row until a re-measurement shows it does. The candidates are counted here, not reported as findings, and the score does not include them.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (go.mod), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
- D24 Comment Value — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
- D26 Project Cohesion — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Project size and spread are measured over build units (a .NET project, a Maven or Gradle module, an npm, Deno or JSR package, a Go module, a Cargo crate, a Python, Composer, Bundler, RubyGems, Mix, rebar3, sbt, SwiftPM or pub package, an OTP application, an Xcode project or XcodeGen spec, or a checkout that declares no build at all) whose source a code model reads. This repository's production source is in a language no model reads, or in units whose build tool D26 does not recognise. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository's projects are cohesive.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `internal/registry/ratelimit/retry.go` produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection registrations in C# and Spring beans in Java/Kotlin only, and this repository defines its own container in internal/update/sorter/graph.go, whose lifetimes are not modelled yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. The image build failed, and its output does not match a cause we recognise. (rule: unrecognised-build-failure). The renderer reported: compose up failed (exit 17 — an image could not be built) — resolve : lstat examples/metrics/dockerfiles: no such file or directory; likely cause (not identified): the image build failed, and its output does not match a cause we recognise; runtime evidence skipped.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (examples/metrics/docker-compose.yml). compose up failed (exit 17 — an image could not be built) — resolve : lstat examples/metrics/dockerfiles: no such file or directory; likely cause (not identified): the image build failed, and its output does not match a cause we recognise; runtime evidence skipped.
- C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
- C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
- C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
- C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Java source only, and this repository's Go is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and this repository's Go is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
- X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin or Rust was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Scala, Ruby and Python source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Scala, Ruby or Python was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value is measured as redundancy only: a comment that repeats its code's words is found, but a paraphrase in other words, a vague comment, or one the code contradicts is not, and whether a comment is valuable is not claimed. Comments in other scripts or languages, and outside C#, are not judged.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D5 · Coupling
2 production modules (Go), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations, and main-sequence distance (abstractness) is not computed for these modules yet.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 1 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
1 outdated, 0 author-deprecated direct Go module(s), 0 pinning or checksum defect(s). Whether any of these modules is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — proxy.golang.org publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: that is a source question, not a registry one. Known CVEs in this module graph are D30's question, read from go.mod and go.sum there.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 202 required Go module(s) use a banned license. Licences were read per module version from the licence files pkg.go.dev detects (via api.deps.dev), over every module this repository's go.mod requires, direct and indirect, at the version the build uses. Go records no test-only scope at module level, so modules only this repository's own tests import are included.
D16 · Bus Factor
101 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is internal/registry/digest/digest.go. Counted over 157 of the 334 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D17 · Explicit Debt
32 deducted task-comment markers across 50928 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.9. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What to do
- Resolve the 32 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with notifier_test.go (7), flags.go (4), message_test.go (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (32 warning-level).
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 62 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with main.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D24 · Comment Value
7 of 113 judged comments only repeat the code they sit on (6.2 %). 1 comment(s) in another language or script were not judged.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with script.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D27 · Navigability
0 % of calls cross a namespace and 14 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 2 medium, 1 low. semgrep hit a parse error in 2 file(s) — `internal/registry/ratelimit/retry.go` (lines 51–295), `internal/testutil/logcapture/logcapture.go` (line 43, line 58) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 1 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable dependencies in any ecosystem this repository declares.
D31 · IaC & Container Security
8 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 1 medium, 4 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 4 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 157 of the 334 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: container_source.go↔container_target.go 50%
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with container_source.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
Build pipeline generates provenance, signs artifacts and produces an SBOM.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy
A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 3 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX6 · Interface segregation
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P2 · Observability
What to do
- Add a health-check endpoint (a /healthz handler) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
P6 · Release Hygiene
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience
PF1 · Benchmark discipline
X14 · Bypassable address classification
X2 · Cancellation propagation
X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff
X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard
X3 · Exception handling
- `if err != nil` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter. (×27) — internal/update/rebuild/build.go:138, internal/update/rebuild/notice.go:141, internal/registry/ratelimit/parse.go:71, …
- `host, path, _ := splitReference(c.ImageName())` writes the call's error to `_` and then uses `host` as if the call succeeded. When `splitReference` fails, `host` is its zero value (nil for a pointer, a map or an interface), so the program panics later or goes on with a default it never chose, and nothing records why. Check the error before using `host` (return it, wrapped with what was being done), or, if the failure genuinely cannot matter, say why in a comment on the line. — internal/update/changelog/resolver.go:568
- `val, _ := flags.GetString("schedule")` writes the call's error to `_` and then uses `val` as if the call succeeded. When `flags.GetString` fails, `val` is its zero value (nil for a pointer, a map or an interface), so the program panics later or goes on with a default it never chose, and nothing records why. Check the error before using `val` (return it, wrapped with what was being done), or, if the failure genuinely cannot matter, say why in a comment on the line. — internal/settings/flags.go:349
- `val, _ := flags.GetInt("interval")` writes the call's error to `_` and then uses `val` as if the call succeeded. When `flags.GetInt` fails, `val` is its zero value (nil for a pointer, a map or an interface), so the program panics later or goes on with a default it never chose, and nothing records why. Check the error before using `val` (return it, wrapped with what was being done), or, if the failure genuinely cannot matter, say why in a comment on the line. — internal/settings/flags.go:353
- `interval, _ := flags.GetInt("interval")` writes the call's error to `_` and then uses `interval` as if the call succeeded. When `flags.GetInt` fails, `interval` is its zero value (nil for a pointer, a map or an interface), so the program panics later or goes on with a default it never chose, and nothing records why. Check the error before using `interval` (return it, wrapped with what was being done), or, if the failure genuinely cannot matter, say why in a comment on the line. — internal/settings/flags.go:363
- `host, _ := auth.GetRegistryAddress(log, name)` writes the call's error to `_` and then uses `host` as if the call succeeded. When `auth.GetRegistryAddress` fails, `host` is its zero value (nil for a pointer, a map or an interface), so the program panics later or goes on with a default it never chose, and nothing records why. Check the error before using `host` (return it, wrapped with what was being done), or, if the failure genuinely cannot matter, say why in a comment on the line. — internal/registry/manifest/manifest.go:56
- `host, _ := GetRegistryAddress(log, imageRef.Name())` writes the call's error to `_` and then uses `host` as if the call succeeded. When `GetRegistryAddress` fails, `host` is its zero value (nil for a pointer, a map or an interface), so the program panics later or goes on with a default it never chose, and nothing records why. Check the error before using `host` (return it, wrapped with what was being done), or, if the failure genuinely cannot matter, say why in a comment on the line. — internal/registry/auth/auth.go:188
What to do
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded)
X4 · Structured logging
- `Msg` at line 603 is handed a message assembled at the call — `fmt.Sprintf` with values, or a string concatenated with a value — so the logger receives one finished string: the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass a constant message and the values as attributes instead: `slog.Msg("order moved", "order_id", orderID, "status", status)` with log/slog, `logger.Msg("order moved", zap.String("order_id", orderID))` with zap, `log.WithFields(log.Fields{"order_id": orderID}).Msg("order moved")` with logrus, or `log.Info().Str("order_id", orderID).Msg("order moved")` with zerolog. — internal/update/notify.go:603
- `Msg` at line 616 is handed a message assembled at the call — `fmt.Sprintf` with values, or a string concatenated with a value — so the logger receives one finished string: the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass a constant message and the values as attributes instead: `slog.Msg("order moved", "order_id", orderID, "status", status)` with log/slog, `logger.Msg("order moved", zap.String("order_id", orderID))` with zap, `log.WithFields(log.Fields{"order_id": orderID}).Msg("order moved")` with logrus, or `log.Info().Str("order_id", orderID).Msg("order moved")` with zerolog. — internal/update/notify.go:616
- `Msg` at line 311 is handed a message assembled at the call — `fmt.Sprintf` with values, or a string concatenated with a value — so the logger receives one finished string: the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass a constant message and the values as attributes instead: `slog.Msg("order moved", "order_id", orderID, "status", status)` with log/slog, `logger.Msg("order moved", zap.String("order_id", orderID))` with zap, `log.WithFields(log.Fields{"order_id": orderID}).Msg("order moved")` with logrus, or `log.Info().Str("order_id", orderID).Msg("order moved")` with zerolog. — internal/update/schedule/scheduling.go:311
- `Msg` at line 108 is handed a message assembled at the call — `fmt.Sprintf` with values, or a string concatenated with a value — so the logger receives one finished string: the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass a constant message and the values as attributes instead: `slog.Msg("order moved", "order_id", orderID, "status", status)` with log/slog, `logger.Msg("order moved", zap.String("order_id", orderID))` with zap, `log.WithFields(log.Fields{"order_id": orderID}).Msg("order moved")` with logrus, or `log.Info().Str("order_id", orderID).Msg("order moved")` with zerolog. — internal/observability/logging/startup.go:108
- `Msg` at line 157 is handed a message assembled at the call — `fmt.Sprintf` with values, or a string concatenated with a value — so the logger receives one finished string: the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass a constant message and the values as attributes instead: `slog.Msg("order moved", "order_id", orderID, "status", status)` with log/slog, `logger.Msg("order moved", zap.String("order_id", orderID))` with zap, `log.WithFields(log.Fields{"order_id": orderID}).Msg("order moved")` with logrus, or `log.Info().Str("order_id", orderID).Msg("order moved")` with zerolog. — internal/observability/logging/startup.go:157
- `Msg` at line 227 is handed a message assembled at the call — `fmt.Sprintf` with values, or a string concatenated with a value — so the logger receives one finished string: the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass a constant message and the values as attributes instead: `slog.Msg("order moved", "order_id", orderID, "status", status)` with log/slog, `logger.Msg("order moved", zap.String("order_id", orderID))` with zap, `log.WithFields(log.Fields{"order_id": orderID}).Msg("order moved")` with logrus, or `log.Info().Str("order_id", orderID).Msg("order moved")` with zerolog. — internal/observability/logging/startup.go:227
- `Msg` at line 106 is handed a message assembled at the call — `fmt.Sprintf` with values, or a string concatenated with a value — so the logger receives one finished string: the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass a constant message and the values as attributes instead: `slog.Msg("order moved", "order_id", orderID, "status", status)` with log/slog, `logger.Msg("order moved", zap.String("order_id", orderID))` with zap, `log.WithFields(log.Fields{"order_id": orderID}).Msg("order moved")` with logrus, or `log.Info().Str("order_id", orderID).Msg("order moved")` with zerolog. — cmd/notify-upgrade.go:106
- `Msg` at line 113 is handed a message assembled at the call — `fmt.Sprintf` with values, or a string concatenated with a value — so the logger receives one finished string: the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Pass a constant message and the values as attributes instead: `slog.Msg("order moved", "order_id", orderID, "status", status)` with log/slog, `logger.Msg("order moved", zap.String("order_id", orderID))` with zap, `log.WithFields(log.Fields{"order_id": orderID}).Msg("order moved")` with logrus, or `log.Info().Str("order_id", orderID).Msg("order moved")` with zerolog. — cmd/notify-upgrade.go:113
What to do
- Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 81.4 | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 95.7 | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 70.7 | Adequate — gated by D16 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 95.1 | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Security | 93.8 | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Performance | 95.0 | Exemplary | Solid. |
Unscored — 2 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- X10 Duplicated predicate — 10 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 68 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (13 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — No container singleton was found, so there is no shared instance for concurrent requests to race on. No Go request handler (a net/http, Gin, Echo, Fiber or fasthttp handler, or a gRPC service method) is declared as a method or function, and no handler function literal writes a value captured from outside it, so no state is shared between request goroutines. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 17 — an image could not be built) — resolve : lstat examples/metrics/dockerfiles: no such file or directory; likely cause (not identified): the image build failed, and its output does not match a cause we recognise; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — cyclomatic complexity not measured — .go exposed no member bodies
- D10 Test Quality — ~95570 lines of test source are present (.go) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .go suite was found but not re-run
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .go — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — cognitive complexity not measured — .go exposed no member bodies
- D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (40 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — D26 measured no build unit over this repository's .go source. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.go) was not read by god-class detection, so type and module size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's type and module size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 1 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
- D4 Code Duplication — Duplication not measured — .go not exposed to the token comparison
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — Go suite
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 2 signals this lens looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Java, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: Go has no async/await function colour, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X12 Unreachable branch — X12 reached only 1% of this repository's production lines — go (50,928 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — X29 reached only 1% of this repository's production lines — go (50,928 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X5 Nullable reference types — Not applicable: this check asks whether the null-typed discipline a language offers is switched on, and how much of that the assertion operator takes back, and in this repository's languages there is no such switch and no such operator. Go's type system has no nullable and non-nullable types — every pointer, map, slice and interface is nil-able at every position, there is no switch that turns null checking on, and the compiler produces no nullability warning for an operator to silence. Plain JavaScript carries no type annotations and commits no tsconfig, so it states no null-typed discipline for this check to grade: there is nothing here that switches null checking on or off, and TypeScript (or `// @ts-check`) is how a repository acquires one — advice, not a defect this card measures. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 4 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
Serious — 70 finding(s)
- TodoComment internal/settings/flags.go:102
- TodoComment internal/settings/flags.go:104
- TodoComment internal/settings/flags.go:106
- TodoComment internal/settings/flags.go:108
- TodoComment internal/settings/flags_test.go:23
- TodoComment internal/settings/flags/utils/deprecate.go:12
- TodoComment internal/settings/config/notify/notify.go:55
- TodoComment internal/settings/config/api/endpoints.go:137
- TodoComment internal/settings/config/api/endpoints.go:209
- TodoComment internal/observability/notify/notifier.go:149
- TodoComment internal/observability/notify/notifier.go:249
- TodoComment internal/observability/notify/notifier.go:376
- TodoComment internal/observability/notify/notifier_test.go:95
- TodoComment internal/observability/notify/notifier_test.go:147
- TodoComment internal/observability/notify/notifier_test.go:337
- TodoComment internal/observability/notify/notifier_test.go:421
- TodoComment internal/observability/notify/notifier_test.go:454
- TodoComment internal/observability/notify/notifier_test.go:960
- TodoComment internal/observability/notify/notifier_test.go:1057
- TodoComment internal/observability/notify/legacy/slack/slack.go:25
- TodoComment internal/observability/notify/legacy/msteams/msteams.go:19
- TodoComment internal/observability/notify/legacy/gotify/gotify.go:21
- TodoComment internal/observability/notify/legacy/email/email.go:20
- TodoComment internal/observability/notify/legacy/slack/slack.go:76
- TodoComment internal/observability/notify/legacy/msteams/msteams.go:44
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/update/rebuild/build.go:138
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/update/rebuild/notice.go:141
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/registry/ratelimit/parse.go:71
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/registry/ratelimit/parse.go:218
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/registry/digest/digest.go:1711
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/registry/digest/digest.go:1716
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/registry/auth/auth.go:142
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/registry/auth/client.go:145
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/registry/auth/trust.go:124
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) REDACTED:88
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/observability/notify/format/funcs.go:63
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/observability/notify/format/funcs.go:119
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/git/auth.go:233
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/git/detect.go:124
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/git/urls.go:220
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/git/project/checkout.go:607
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/git/project/checkout.go:640
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/git/project/checkout.go:785
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/container/redact/redact.go:136
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/container/provenance/changelog.go:230
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/container/image/build.go:206
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/container/image/mirror.go:212
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/container/filters/filters.go:682
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/container/filters/filters.go:742
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) internal/container/filters/filters.go:747
- Discarded error (assigned to `_`, then its result used) internal/update/changelog/resolver.go:568
- Discarded error (assigned to `_`, then its result used) internal/settings/flags.go:349
- Discarded error (assigned to `_`, then its result used) internal/settings/flags.go:353
- Discarded error (assigned to `_`, then its result used) internal/settings/flags.go:363
- Discarded error (assigned to `_`, then its result used) internal/registry/manifest/manifest.go:56
- Discarded error (assigned to `_`, then its result used) internal/registry/auth/auth.go:188
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Change coupling: container_source.go ↔ container_target.go internal/container/client/container_source.go:1
- REDACTED
Minor — 30 finding(s)
- Duplicated predicate internal/container/container.go:379
- Duplicated predicate internal/git/auth.go:118
- Duplicated predicate internal/container/client/exec.go:360
- Duplicated predicate internal/container/redact/redact.go:283
- Duplicated predicate internal/api/routes/check.go:31
- Duplicated predicate internal/container/metadata.go:714
- Duplicated predicate internal/observability/notify/format/funcs.go:112
- Duplicated predicate internal/container/image/build.go:138
- Duplicated predicate internal/container/redact/redact.go:275
- Duplicated predicate internal/container/redact/redact.go:41
- Interpolated log message defeats structured logging internal/update/notify.go:603
- Interpolated log message defeats structured logging internal/update/notify.go:616
- Interpolated log message defeats structured logging internal/update/schedule/scheduling.go:311
- Interpolated log message defeats structured logging internal/observability/logging/startup.go:108
- Interpolated log message defeats structured logging internal/observability/logging/startup.go:157
- Interpolated log message defeats structured logging internal/observability/logging/startup.go:227
- Interpolated log message defeats structured logging cmd/notify-upgrade.go:106
- Interpolated log message defeats structured logging cmd/notify-upgrade.go:113
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Subsumed condition operand internal/container/ephemeral/ephemeral.go:712
- Subsumed condition operand internal/container/ephemeral/ephemeral.go:743
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
- No ADRs found main.go:39
- redundant comment docs/notifications/template-preview/script.js:32
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- No ADRs
Minor — 1 finding(s)
- Outdated: github.com/compose-spec/compose-go/v2
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=0 --max-count=200" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-71ed55e7d8884569a6a056d467905758/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=200 --max-count=800" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-71ed55e7d8884569a6a056d467905758/history-1.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history-1.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=1000 --max-count=3200" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-71ed55e7d8884569a6a056d467905758/history-2.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history-2.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=4200 --max-count=331" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-71ed55e7d8884569a6a056d467905758/history-3.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history-3.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-71ed55e7d8884569a6a056d467905758/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt --exclude cmd/mocks --exclude internal/api/handlers/check/mocks --exclude internal/api/handlers/containers/details/mocks --exclude internal/api/handlers/containers/mocks --exclude internal/api/handlers/health/mocks --exclude internal/api/handlers/images/mocks --exclude internal/api/routes/mocks --exclude internal/compose/apply/mocks --exclude internal/container/client/mocks --exclude internal/container/filters/mocks --exclude internal/container/hooks/mocks --exclude internal/container/mocks --exclude internal/git/mocks --exclude internal/observability/logging/mocks --exclude internal/observability/notify/mocks --exclude internal/registry/auth/mocks --exclude internal/update/changelog/mocks --exclude internal/update/cleanup/mocks --exclude internal/update/rebuild/mocks --exclude internal/update/restart/mocks --exclude internal/update/selfupdate/mocks --exclude tools/tplprev/internal/notify/testdata --exclude tools/tplprev/internal/preview/testdata --exclude tools/tplprev/internal/report/testdata . | 4 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . /tmp/codehealth-osv-sbom-7312e6b7c86045a2915f1c512d5bed17 | 0 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 8 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 1 file(s) — `internal/registry/ratelimit/retry.go` — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . /tmp/codehealth-osv-sbom-7312e6b7c86045a2915f1c512d5bed17 | 0 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |