Executive summary
mirego/telemetry_ui falls short of our standard for production because two passwords or keys sit in the current code and we found no automated security scanning of the code, its secrets or its dependencies. It scores 54 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, and 21 of its 24 critical findings are security problems.
Production Readiness, at 43, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is replacing the two exposed passwords or keys and switching the old ones off, worth about 10 points. Putting upper bounds on the open-ended dependency requirements comes next, worth about 5 points. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 63.
Nine known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Nine pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with, and two passwords or keys are open to anyone who can read the repository. Updating the vulnerable packages, pinning each tool to an exact version and replacing each exposed password or key would close these risks. Loading the key from a secret store instead of the code would fix the encryption key written into the code. The three form fields without a label need a label.
The product code is 4,655 lines, about €5,700 to rebuild.
If Production Readiness rose from 43 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 54 to about 63.
New since the last survey: 9 findings
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (36 corresponding lines) lib/telemetry_ui/web/components/time_series.ex
- Code Duplication · Edited copies of one member (4 members, 15+ corresponding lines) lib/telemetry_ui/internal_metrics.ex
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) lib/telemetry_ui/backend/ecto_postgres/migrations/v03.ex
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Forms & labels · <select> without a programmatic label lib/telemetry_ui/web/layout.ex
- Forms & labels · <select> without a programmatic label lib/telemetry_ui/web/layout.ex
- Forms & labels · <select> without a programmatic label lib/telemetry_ui/web/layout.ex
- Page structure · Page without a main landmark lib/telemetry_ui/web/layout.ex
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard assets/css/app.css
Rebuild cost: about €5,700 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €1,900 to €9,500, for 32 to 100 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.8 at a score of 54. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 4,655 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 (global) | 2 TelemetryUI | 3 TelemetryUI.Backend | 4 TelemetryUI.Backend.EctoPostgres | 5 TelemetryUI.Backend.EctoPostgres.Migrations | 6 TelemetryUI.Digest | 7 TelemetryUI.Scraper | 8 TelemetryUI.Web | 9 TelemetryUI.Web.Component | 10 TelemetryUI.Web.Components | 11 TelemetryUI.Web.VegaLite | 12 TelemetryUI.Web.VegaLite.Spec | 13 TelemetryUI.WriteBuffer | 14 assets.js.app | 15 TelemetryUI.Backend.TelemetryUI.Backend | 16 TelemetryUI.Digest.Service.TelemetryUI.Digest | 17 TelemetryUI.Metrics | 18 TelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics | 19 assets.js |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (global) | |||||||||||||||||||
| 2 TelemetryUI | |||||||||||||||||||
| 3 TelemetryUI.Backend | |||||||||||||||||||
| 4 TelemetryUI.Backend.EctoPostgres | |||||||||||||||||||
| 5 TelemetryUI.Backend.EctoPostgres.Migrations | |||||||||||||||||||
| 6 TelemetryUI.Digest | |||||||||||||||||||
| 7 TelemetryUI.Scraper | |||||||||||||||||||
| 8 TelemetryUI.Web | |||||||||||||||||||
| 9 TelemetryUI.Web.Component | |||||||||||||||||||
| 10 TelemetryUI.Web.Components | |||||||||||||||||||
| 11 TelemetryUI.Web.VegaLite | |||||||||||||||||||
| 12 TelemetryUI.Web.VegaLite.Spec | |||||||||||||||||||
| 13 TelemetryUI.WriteBuffer | |||||||||||||||||||
| 14 assets.js.app | |||||||||||||||||||
| 15 TelemetryUI.Backend.TelemetryUI.Backend | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||
| 16 TelemetryUI.Digest.Service.TelemetryUI.Digest | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||
| 17 TelemetryUI.Metrics | 12 | ||||||||||||||||||
| 18 TelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics | 13 | ||||||||||||||||||
| 19 assets.js | 1 |
15→2 TelemetryUI.Backend.TelemetryUI.Backend uses TelemetryUI✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in TelemetryUI.Backend.TelemetryUI.Backend uses a type in TelemetryUI.
- The types involved
TelemetryUI.Backend.TelemetryUI.Backend.EctoPostgres→TelemetryUI.Backend
- Direction
- TelemetryUI.Backend.TelemetryUI.Backend uses TelemetryUI, so a change to TelemetryUI can break TelemetryUI.Backend.TelemetryUI.Backend, while a change to TelemetryUI.Backend.TelemetryUI.Backend can't break TelemetryUI.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: TelemetryUI.Backend.TelemetryUI.Backend uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
16→6 TelemetryUI.Digest.Service.TelemetryUI.Digest uses TelemetryUI.Digest✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in TelemetryUI.Digest.Service.TelemetryUI.Digest uses a type in TelemetryUI.Digest.
- The types involved
TelemetryUI.Digest.Service.TelemetryUI.Digest.Slack→TelemetryUI.Digest.Service
- Direction
- TelemetryUI.Digest.Service.TelemetryUI.Digest uses TelemetryUI.Digest, so a change to TelemetryUI.Digest can break TelemetryUI.Digest.Service.TelemetryUI.Digest, while a change to TelemetryUI.Digest.Service.TelemetryUI.Digest can't break TelemetryUI.Digest.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: TelemetryUI.Digest.Service.TelemetryUI.Digest uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
17→2 TelemetryUI.Metrics uses TelemetryUI✕
- Connections
- 12 pairs of types, where a type in TelemetryUI.Metrics uses a type in TelemetryUI.
- The types involved
TelemetryUI.Metrics.Average→TelemetryUI.MetricsTelemetryUI.Metrics.AverageList→TelemetryUI.MetricsTelemetryUI.Metrics.AverageOverTime→TelemetryUI.MetricsTelemetryUI.Metrics.CountList→TelemetryUI.MetricsTelemetryUI.Metrics.CountOverTime→TelemetryUI.MetricsTelemetryUI.Metrics.Counter→TelemetryUI.MetricsTelemetryUI.Metrics.CounterValue→TelemetryUI.MetricsTelemetryUI.Metrics.Distribution→TelemetryUI.MetricsTelemetryUI.Metrics.LastValue→TelemetryUI.MetricsTelemetryUI.Metrics.Median→TelemetryUI.MetricsTelemetryUI.Metrics.MedianOverTime→TelemetryUI.MetricsTelemetryUI.Metrics.Sum→TelemetryUI.Metrics
- Direction
- TelemetryUI.Metrics uses TelemetryUI, so a change to TelemetryUI can break TelemetryUI.Metrics, while a change to TelemetryUI.Metrics can't break TelemetryUI.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: TelemetryUI.Metrics uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
18→8 TelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics uses TelemetryUI.Web✕
- Connections
- 13 pairs of types, where a type in TelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics uses a type in TelemetryUI.Web.
- The types involved
TelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics.Average→TelemetryUI.Web.ComponentTelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics.AverageList→TelemetryUI.Web.ComponentTelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics.AverageOverTime→TelemetryUI.Web.ComponentTelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics.CountList→TelemetryUI.Web.ComponentTelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics.CountOverTime→TelemetryUI.Web.ComponentTelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics.Counter→TelemetryUI.Web.ComponentTelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics.CounterValue→TelemetryUI.Web.ComponentTelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics.Distribution→TelemetryUI.Web.ComponentTelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics.LastValue→TelemetryUI.Web.ComponentTelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics.Median→TelemetryUI.Web.ComponentTelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics.MedianOverTime→TelemetryUI.Web.ComponentTelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics.Sum→TelemetryUI.Web.ComponentTelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics.Title→TelemetryUI.Web.Component
- Direction
- TelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics uses TelemetryUI.Web, so a change to TelemetryUI.Web can break TelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics, while a change to TelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics can't break TelemetryUI.Web.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: TelemetryUI.Web.Component.TelemetryUI.Metrics uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
19→14 assets.js uses assets.js.app✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in assets.js uses a type in assets.js.app.
- The types involved
assets.js.app→assets.js.app.SelectOptions
- Direction
- assets.js uses assets.js.app, so a change to assets.js.app can break assets.js, while a change to assets.js can't break assets.js.app.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: assets.js uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Accessibility
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 23 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 13 | High / Critical |
| A07:2025 — Authentication Failures | 2 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2); Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing; Resolve the 1 Unbounded dependency requirement finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2). | +9.6 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Resolve the 1 Unbounded dependency requirement finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +5.3 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +8.2 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Set an explicit timeout on every client — `recv_timeout:` for HTTPoison, `receive_timeout:` for Req and Finch, `Tesla.Middleware.Timeout` (or the adapter's `recv_timeout`) for Tesla, `timeout:` for `:httpc` — and add retries with back-off (`Tesla.Middleware.Retry`, Req's `retry:`) and a breaker (`:fuse`, `ExternalService`) around dependencies that fail. | +4.4 pts | Medium | Outbound HTTP resilience |
| Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it. | +2.5 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +1.5 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| The findings name the configuration each number was taken from and, for the assertions, the files that hold them. Turn null checking on where it is off — `"strict": true` in the base tsconfig that the others extend switches `strictNullChecks` on with the rest of the family — and then resolve the assertions rather than adding to them. A `!` on a value the checker could show to be null is a promise the author cannot check from where they are standing, and each one is a `TypeError: Cannot read properties of null` waiting for the path that makes it true; where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (narrow it with a test, make the property required, drop the `?`). | +1.2 pts | Medium | Nullable reference types |
| Load cryptographic key and salt material from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager rather than fixing it in the source, and fail fast at startup when it is absent — a default that silently works is the one that reaches production. Rotate anything already committed: it must be treated as disclosed. Salts should be generated per password and stored with the hash, never shared across installations. | +0.8 pts | Medium | Web-Security Posture |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.6 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.3 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.0 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.8 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED |
| lib/telemetry_ui/internal_metrics.ex | 7.2 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Edited copies of one member (4 members, 15+ corresponding lines) |
| lib/telemetry_ui/web/components/time_series.ex | 7.4 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (36 corresponding lines) |
| lib/telemetry_ui/backend/ecto_postgres/migrations/v03.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) |
| lib/telemetry_ui/web/components/compare_aggregate.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (7–17 lines × 3) |
| lib/telemetry_ui/web/components/stat_list.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) |
| lib/telemetry_ui/pruner.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) |
| lib/telemetry_ui/web/components/stat.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) |
| lib/telemetry_ui/metrics/average.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 5) |
| lib/telemetry_ui/metrics/average_list.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) |
| lib/telemetry_ui/metrics/average_over_time.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 3) |
| lib/telemetry_ui/backend/ecto_postgres.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 43 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 43 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 60 of 88 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.exs, .ex) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.exs, .ex) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its Hex package dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (7 contributor(s) across 188 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 93% of the history; the other 6 hold 1.2% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (mix.exs), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Subject: 5 markup document(s) — HTML, Razor, JSX, Vue, Svelte or server templates. The Runtime Evidence tier boots an app only via docker-compose, an Aspire AppHost, a Dockerfile, an npm dev script, a web service's own toolchain entry point (cargo, go, dotnet, Python, Spring Boot), or an Android app's own Gradle wrapper (run on an emulator); an Apple or Flutter app needs a host it lacks. None applied, so no live runtime a11y/egress/header evidence was collected. You can widen what we reach: add a docker-compose.yml (or an Aspire AppHost) that brings the app up with its dependencies. We then boot it in an isolated sandbox and gathers real runtime evidence — you change nothing in your pipeline (no CI step, no SDK).
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Elixir is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Elixir is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
- X1 Async correctness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded, no Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found, and this repository's Elixir is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. X7 measured the part of this repository it reads (C#, Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, Rust, Go, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Ruby, Swift and Dart), and its Elixir source is outside the check's reach, so the card covers only part of the product. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the unread source is free of silent defaults.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
13 duplicated block group(s) detected. 7.0 % of the production lines (326 of 4,655) are in a reported copy. A further 3 rows report members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with internal_metrics.ex (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with stat.ex, time_series.ex, ecto_postgres.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with stat_list.ex, pruner.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
D5 · Coupling
2 production modules (npm+OTP), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; 0 module(s) off the main sequence.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 1 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
18 outdated, 0 retired direct Hex dependencies, 1 pinning defect(s). Whether any of these packages is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — hex.pm publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: a Hex app name does not determine the modules it provides (`ecto_sql` provides Ecto.Adapters.SQL), and a large idiomatic class of BEAM dependencies — runtime adapters, codec plugins, protocol implementations and OTP applications the release starts — is correctly declared and never referenced in source, so absence of a reference is not evidence of an unused dependency. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from REDACTED there.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Unbounded dependency requirement finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D13 · Secret Scanning
2 secret(s) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 26 shipped Hex package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from hex.pm over the packages a consumer installs — this repository's REDACTED closed over the declarations its mix.exs files do not gate behind `only:`. Packages it asks for ONLY under `only: [:dev, :test]` (or any other non-prod environment, such as `:docs`) are excluded: they are not installed by anything that depends on this repository. Each licence is the one hex.pm publishes for the package's current release. This repository publishes itself under BSD-3-Clause, which is its own choice and is not judged here. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's Hex package dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares package.json, and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted task-comment markers across 4655 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 1 document(s) read across 2 unit(s).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 2 build units (Mix, npm) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D27 · Navigability
41 % of calls cross a namespace and 2 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
13 finding(s): 0 critical, 9 high, 4 medium, 0 low. 9 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 9 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
16 finding(s): 0 critical, 9 high, 7 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 9 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (6), REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
- Resolve the 6 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (5), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Medium vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 20 of the 60 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 5 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
AC2 · Forms & labels
- This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×3) — lib/telemetry_ui/web/layout.ex:23, lib/telemetry_ui/web/layout.ex:57, lib/telemetry_ui/web/layout.ex:113
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — lib/telemetry_ui/web/layout.ex:1
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC5 · ARIA correctness
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- `.animation-loading` moves (`animation: loading 1s linear infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — assets/css/app.css:122
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
M1 · Documentation (README)
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P10 · Library API & versioning
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 2 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:3
- `assets/package.json` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — assets/package.json:9
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience
- `:httpc.request(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. — lib/telemetry_ui/digest/slack.ex:38
What to do
- Set an explicit timeout on every client — `recv_timeout:` for HTTPoison, `receive_timeout:` for Req and Finch, `Tesla.Middleware.Timeout` (or the adapter's `recv_timeout`) for Tesla, `timeout:` for `:httpc` — and add retries with back-off (`Tesla.Middleware.Retry`, Req's `retry:`) and a breaker (`:fuse`, `ExternalService`) around dependencies that fail.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- `secret_key_base` is the secret key and is a compile-time constant, so the secret this operation depends on is published with the source. A key that ships with the source is not secret: every contributor, fork, mirror and released binary carries it, so anyone holding the repository can decrypt what any installation encrypted, and there is no way to invalidate what was already protected because every deployment built from this source shares the value. Where the constant is a password salt the consequence differs but is no smaller — one global salt means precomputation amortises across every installation, which is the property salting exists to destroy. Read the value from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager at startup and FAIL FAST when it is absent, so a missing key stops the process instead of silently falling back to a shared default; treat the committed value as disclosed and rotate it rather than only deleting the line. For a salt, generate a fresh random one per password and store it alongside the hash. — REDACTED:35
What to do
- Load cryptographic key and salt material from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager rather than fixing it in the source, and fail fast at startup when it is absent — a default that silently works is the one that reaches production. Rotate anything already committed: it must be treated as disclosed. Salts should be generated per password and stored with the hash, never shared across installations.
X5 · Nullable reference types
- This repository commits no tsconfig, so whatever type-checks it uses tsc's own defaults, in which `strict` and `strictNullChecks` are OFF: `string` admits `null` and `undefined`, and a value that is null is compiled through to the property access that throws. If the build passes `--strict` on a command line instead, put it in a committed tsconfig — this check reads configuration, and configuration is all it can read.
What to do
- The findings name the configuration each number was taken from and, for the assertions, the files that hold them. Turn null checking on where it is off — `"strict": true` in the base tsconfig that the others extend switches `strictNullChecks` on with the rest of the family — and then resolve the assertions rather than adding to them. A `!` on a value the checker could show to be null is a promise the author cannot check from where they are standing, and each one is a `TypeError: Cannot read properties of null` waiting for the path that makes it true; where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (narrow it with a test, make the property required, drop the `?`).
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 63% | Adequate — gated by X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 85% | Strong | Solid. |
| Maturity | 61% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 43% | Weak — gated by D13, P3, P7 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 64% | Adequate — gated by D36 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Accessibility | 61% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Performance | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- X10 Duplicated predicate — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 73 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: the BEAM has no dependency-injection container — state lives in processes, and no process is handed an instance whose lifetime another one scopes; this repository's TypeScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: Elixir processes share no mutable memory — state lives in a process's own mailbox — so there is no shared object to race on. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — no exported interface declares behaviour
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (an Ecto repo, Postgrex, MyXQL, Exqlite, Mongo, Mnesia, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — this repository starts no server another machine can reach (no Phoenix.Endpoint, Plug.Cowboy or Bandit child). Access control is therefore N/A here — a library or OTP application is authorized by the application that serves it, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (Ecto, Postgrex, MyXQL, Mongo, EventStore, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (an Ecto repo, Postgrex, MyXQL, Exqlite, Mongo, Mnesia, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (an Ecto repo, Postgrex, MyXQL, Exqlite, Mongo, Mnesia, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
- D10 Test Quality — ~1142 lines of test source are present (.exs, .ex) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — no .exs test runner
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (697 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .ex, .exs source were not judged.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (7 value object(s))
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (1 Elixir aggregate(s) emitting domain events (%Event{} from execute/2))
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P2 Observability — This repository's Elixir, JavaScript/TypeScript source (2 module(s), 60 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for Benchee jobs (the entries of a `Benchee.run` job map) or Benchfella `bench "…"` blocks under `use Benchfella` in any `.ex`/`.exs` file, or benchee or benchfella in a mix.exs, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — X1 reached only 7% of this repository's production lines — elixir (4,320 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X12 Unreachable branch — X12 reached only 7% of this repository's production lines — elixir (4,320 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — X2 reached only 7% of this repository's production lines — elixir (4,320 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — X24 reached only 7% of this repository's production lines — elixir (4,320 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Elixir processes share no heap: a value sent to another process arrives as a copy, so no collection is reachable from two processes at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X3 Exception handling — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 24 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- <select> without a programmatic label lib/telemetry_ui/web/layout.ex:23
- <select> without a programmatic label lib/telemetry_ui/web/layout.ex:57
- <select> without a programmatic label lib/telemetry_ui/web/layout.ex:113
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Cryptographic key material is a compile-time constant REDACTED:35
Serious — 34 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) lib/telemetry_ui/internal_metrics.ex:106
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) lib/telemetry_ui/internal_metrics.ex:101
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) lib/telemetry_ui/internal_metrics.ex:167
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/telemetry_ui/web/components/stat.ex:78
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/telemetry_ui/web/components/time_series.ex:12
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) lib/telemetry_ui/backend/ecto_postgres.ex:149
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) lib/telemetry_ui/web/components/stat_list.ex:27
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) lib/telemetry_ui/pruner.ex:28
- Page without a main landmark lib/telemetry_ui/web/layout.ex:1
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard assets/css/app.css:122
- Unbounded dependency requirement: telemetry_metrics
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Edited copy of a member (36 corresponding lines) lib/telemetry_ui/web/components/time_series.ex:10
- Edited copies of one member (4 members, 15+ corresponding lines) lib/telemetry_ui/internal_metrics.ex:101
- Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) lib/telemetry_ui/backend/ecto_postgres/migrations/v03.ex:10
- Duplicated block (7–17 lines × 3) lib/telemetry_ui/web/components/compare_aggregate.ex:26
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) lib/telemetry_ui/web/components/time_series.ex:19
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 5) lib/telemetry_ui/metrics/average.ex:20
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) lib/telemetry_ui/metrics/average_list.ex:21
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 3) lib/telemetry_ui/metrics/average_over_time.ex:19
- Outbound HTTP without resilience lib/telemetry_ui/digest/slack.ex:38
Minor — 12 finding(s)
- Duplicated predicate lib/telemetry_ui/web/components/compare_aggregate.ex:20
- Duplicated predicate lib/telemetry_ui/web/components/buckets.ex:14
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- No ADRs
- No architecture diagram/doc
- No SAST REDACTED:3
- No dependency-update automation assets/package.json:9
- No release approval gate
- Strict null checking is not enabled everywhere the repository type-checks
Minor — 18 finding(s)
- Outdated: credo
- Outdated: ecto
- Outdated: ecto_sql
- Outdated: esbuild
- Outdated: ex_doc
- Outdated: factori
- Outdated: jason
- Outdated: mimic
- Outdated: oban
- Outdated: phoenix
- Outdated: phoenix_html
- Outdated: phoenix_live_reload
- Outdated: phoenix_live_view
- Outdated: postgrex
- Outdated: styler
- Outdated: tailwind
- Outdated: telemetry
- Outdated: telemetry_metrics
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-fb1030775aaf4bc7901a2dff2584f9de/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-fb1030775aaf4bc7901a2dff2584f9de/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 13 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 16 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |