Public report of microsoft/LangChain4j-for-Beginners, published 16 November 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of
findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known
vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive reportMeasured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.11.4). Assert signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey →
Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 16 November 2026, 21:48 UTC · Survey ID cd_6bc6a3d0e6ab4b4d80f1e1bfa6cd9136
microsoft/LangChain4j-for-Beginners
Measured 16 November 2026, 21:47 UTC, at code version a97b147
First survey, so nothing to compare with yet
CAI scoreAt risk
The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.
A small codebase: 3,049 lines of product code in 5 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: under 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Production Readiness, 25.7
Findings by how serious they are
35 critical107 serious127 minor
13 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, we either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard we look for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.
This survey was produced by
Canine Code Analyzer
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Canine Code Analyzer engine 1.0.0
Measured
16 November 2026, 21:47 UTC
A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number
together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee
the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds the Canine Code Analyzer. It is open to any tool that
implements it, and today the Canine Code Analyzer is the only one that does.
A critical security finding is open, such as a library with a known critical vulnerability or a password or key found in the code. The score itself is unchanged, but its band shows At risk until the finding is fixed. See the Security and Compliance lens.
The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. We work it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸
61of 61 dimensions measured by tools.
151of 269 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 118 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
61dimensions across 7 lenses, read from 3,049 lines of product code in 5 projects.
microsoft/LangChain4j-for-Beginners is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, all of them in the packages it uses. Its score is held back because we found no working pipeline that builds or tests changes to the code and no automated security scanning of the code, its secrets or its dependencies. It scores 39.9 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged.
Production Readiness, at 25.7, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is adding tests for untested code, worth about 6.2 points. Adding an automated build and test pipeline would lift Production Readiness itself, worth about 5.1 points. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 49.4.
Fourteen known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Updating the vulnerable packages would close this risk. The 11 pages that don't say their language need their language set.
The product code is 3,049 lines, about €3,500 to rebuild.
A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.
How the score is built: what each lens counts forThe lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
If Production Readiness rose from 25.7 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 39.9 to about 49.4.
Code composition: what the lines of code are
Product code 74%Tests 26%
Rebuild cost: about €3,500 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild
€1,200 to €5,800, for 19 to 61 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem
Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor
×0.7 at a score of 40. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size
Small: 3,049 lines of product code
What it is not
Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one.
How the estimate is made: We price the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.
Top priorities
The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.
1
Resolve the 33 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with WebController.java (3), LangChainConfig.java (3), Application.java (2).
Raises the score by about 6.2 points · Medium effort · Code Coverage
2
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Raises the score by about 5.1 points · Medium effort · CI/CD gates
3
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Raises the score by about 5.1 points · Medium effort · Test Coverage
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.
Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €3,500 to build again, under 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 25.7 (Weak). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Resolve the 33 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 6.2 points for medium effort, because it clears the 33 Code Coverage findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort
At a glance — Code Health · 36.8 · Weak · gated by R1, R10, X5 ·
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures
20
High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration
3
Medium
Roadmap
Top priorities: Resolve the 33 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with WebController.java (3), LangChainConfig.java (3), Application.java (2); Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR; Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 33 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with WebController.java (3), LangChainConfig.java (3), Application.java (2).
Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this
survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.
Critical — 35
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a
missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here
tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 107
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades
the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to
carry for two years either.
Minor — 127
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions.
Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 13
Something this survey could not settle
from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no
positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves
nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean
result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither
rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each
one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 61 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
Every figure here is one of two kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10.
What we checked — 61 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 151 of 269 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D12 Dependency Hygiene — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Currency was graded against Maven Central, but whether an artifact is DEPRECATED is not: Maven Central publishes no deprecation marker, exactly as rubygems.org does not. Whether one is UNMAINTAINED is not graded either — no registry publishes a maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Two of this dimension's four signals are therefore unread on a Maven tree, and its score reflects currency alone.
D14 License Compliance — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored — this repository's 6 Maven/Gradle manifest(s) were read and none of the dependency coordinates they declare carries a version resolvable from the manifest itself: every one is inherited from a parent POM, a <dependencyManagement> block, an imported BOM or a Gradle version reference the catalogue does not define. Licences are resolved from the POMs Maven Central publishes, which requires a version to ask about, and grading whichever release happens to be newest today would be a verdict about a dependency graph this repository has not pinned. NOT a finding that this repository's licences are compliant: this dimension asserts nothing about its licensing in either direction.
D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (9 contributor(s) across 1146 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 94% of the history; the other 8 hold 0.8% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This kind did not reach the 95 % precision gate in three adjudicated runs (docs/plans/deterministic-engine/adjudication/D19-sample3-v3.md), so by the pre-registered fallback it publishes no row until a re-measurement shows it does. The candidates are counted here, not reported as findings, and the score does not include them.
D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's naming rules read C# through Roslyn and every other language through its sidecar model; these languages are left out (PHP's reading is its own change, a Roslyn-loaded VB or F# project has no population builder yet). Their declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether their names are consistent.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict. For npm the surface is what a published package.json's entry points (exports, main, module, types) export, followed through the source; an entry that names build output the tree does not commit (dist/, build/) is not followed back to source, because only a tsconfig outDir/rootDir pair states that mapping and a bundler's input lives in executable configuration this engine does not evaluate.
D24 Comment Value — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
AX1 Captive dependencies — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via ToolchainServer (01-introduction). the service did not build — `mvn -B -q -DskipTests compile` exited 1: ; runtime evidence skipped (launch chosen because 01-introduction/pom.xml declares spring-boot-starter-web and the Spring Boot Maven plugin).
C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
X1 Async correctness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside our isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — we run the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value is measured as redundancy only: a comment that repeats its code's words is found, but a paraphrase in other words, a vague comment, or one the code contradicts is not, and whether a comment is valuable is not claimed. Comments in other scripts or languages, and outside C#, are not judged.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
Bring the 2 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with chat.html.sendMessageStreaming (cyclomatic 20), callPatternStreaming (cyclomatic 19). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 2 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.5 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Bring the 4 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with pattern-demo.callPatternStreaming (cognitive 24), chat.html.sendMessageStreaming::processSSEEvents (cognitive 18), callPatternStreaming::(anonymous)::processSSEEvents (cognitive 18). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.1 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D3 · God Classes9.0 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 ClassTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with Gpt5PromptService.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D4 · Code Duplication4.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How much of the production code is copy-pasted: the share of production lines inside a reported copy (every copy of a duplicated block or of an edited member, each line once), 10 at none and 0 at a quarter of the lines.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), scored on the share of production lines inside a reported copy (each line once; 10 at none, 0 at a quarter). Deterministic.
6 duplicated block group(s) detected. 13.3 % of the production lines (404 of 3,049) are in a reported copy. A further 5 rows report members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it.
Edited copy of a member (52 corresponding lines)02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:65
Edited copies of one member (3 members, 12+ corresponding lines)01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/app/ChatController.java:39
Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines)04-tools/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/agents/app/AgentController.java:40
Edited copy of a member (10 corresponding lines)02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:100
Edited copy of a member (8 corresponding lines)05-mcp/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/mcp/StdioTransportDemo.java:110
+ 6 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (52 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with Gpt5PromptService.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Edited copies of one member (3 members, 12+ corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with ChatController.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with AgentController.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
5 production modules (Maven), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; 0 module(s) off the main sequence.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.
Method: Coverage from the analyzer's own run of the suite, computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. A coverage report found in the repository is never read. When the suite can't be built/run in-image, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.
Line coverage 16.4% — 33 file(s) below 50%. Measured from the Java/Kotlin suite (repository root, Maven: the JaCoCo agent on the 3 run(s) test reliability made). Taken over 3 runs of the suite: a line counts as covered only when every run executed it.
Resolve the 33 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with WebController.java (3), LangChainConfig.java (3), Application.java (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (33 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D10 · Test Quality8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
0 skipped, 5 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 50 tests.
No assertions: testAskWithEmptyQuestion · ×503-rag/src/test/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/app/RagControllerTest.java:68
What to do
Resolve the 5 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with RagControllerTest.java (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.
Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, not deprecated, and not bloated. Known vulnerabilities are D30's.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (capped-linear for deprecation, prerelease and outdated) per KLoC. Known-vulnerable packages are D30's and are not charged here (rubric-2026.11.2). Exhaustive.
109 outdated artifact(s) of 125 resolved by the build, graded against Maven Central. The poms themselves state a version for only 0 of 38 declaration(s) — the rest are parent- or BOM-managed, which is why this is read from the resolved graph rather than from the manifests. 3 resolved artifact(s) could not be graded: Maven Central carries no such coordinate, or it publishes nothing but pre-releases. That is a definite answer and is counted, not charged. Whether any of these is DEPRECATED is not graded — Maven Central publishes no deprecation marker, exactly as rubygems.org does not. Whether any is UNMAINTAINED is not graded either: no registry publishes a maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Known CVEs in this graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
0 deducted task-comment markers across 3049 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Every README, docs/ document and root guide parsed by its markup and measured in Unicode letters. Published: a runnable or packaged .NET project whose README (or a document it links, or a root guide) shows no example, and a root README naming none of three or more projects. Overview, licence, boilerplate, wall-of-text, empty-section and XML-doc rows are measured and withheld (counted in gaps) after adjudication. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 505 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.
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D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Every ADR read by its section structure: nine located rules (a missing Decision, Context or Consequences section, a stale status, two records deciding the same question, a dangling supersede link, a number-only title, a single option, no named cost, no status where the log uses one, no enforcement field where the log adopted one), each a fixed deduction from 10; the score is the mean over evaluated records. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Every inline C# comment compared word by word with the identifiers, literals and constructs of the code it annotates (taken from the syntax); a comment whose words that code already contains is redundant, as are closing-brace labels and generator template text. Comments giving a reason or a reference are kept; other scripts and languages are not judged. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.
Resolve the 7 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with tools-demo.js (4), rag-demo.js (2), conversation-chat.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
45 % of calls cross a namespace and 2 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.
Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): every row is a match against a vulnerability database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.
Resolve the 8 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Resolve the 3 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 14 of the 46 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Reported apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.
Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): the malicious-package feed is a database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.
What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.
Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 7 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC2 · Forms & labels7.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×3) — 01-introduction/src/main/resources/templates/simple-chat.html:21, 03-rag/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:58, 04-tools/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:97
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC3 · Page structure5.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×11) — 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/dashboard.html:2, 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/analyze.html:2, 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/autonomous.html:2, …
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×11) — 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/dashboard.html:2, 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/analyze.html:2, 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/autonomous.html:2, …
Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. — 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/dashboard.html:26
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no element the repo's own CSS styles `cursor: pointer` without giving it any of the three, no unfocusable element whose only binding is a mouse enter/leave pair or a double-click, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
Coverage: Population: elements that pose a keyboard-semantics question, in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) — a non-natively-interactive element carrying a click handler, a double-click or hover enter/leave binding, a pointer-only gesture on a tabindex="0" element, or `cursor: pointer` from the repo's own CSS; an href-less or placeholder-href (#, javascript:) anchor; and any element with a positive tabindex. Natively interactive elements used correctly (<button>, <a href>, form controls) are NOT in the population — there is nothing to judge — so a page of nothing but correct controls gives AC4 nothing to measure. Keyboard reachability is judged from the markup, never from a rendered page. ★ An interactive element declared in a tagged-template (html`…`) or hyperscript frontend is NOT in this population — no producer reads either — so an empty population is reported as an analyzer gap, never as "this repository has no interactive elements".
The repo's own CSS styles .upload-area with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. — 03-rag/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:30
A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×6) — 04-tools/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:31, 04-tools/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:37, 04-tools/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:43, …
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
`.chat-message.agent .tool-badge` sets color: #3498db on background-color: #e9ecef — 2.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/css/tools-demo.css:244
`.btn-copy` sets color: white on background-color: #667eea — 3.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/css/prompt-demo.css:322
`.chat-message.user .message-content` sets color: white on background-color: #667eea — 3.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/css/prompt-demo.css:394
`.btn-primary` sets color: white on background-color: #007bff — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/css/style.css:95
`.btn-secondary` sets color: white on background-color: #28a745 — 3.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/css/style.css:104
`.message.user .message-bubble` sets color: white on background-color: #007bff — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/css/style.css:176
`.chat-form button` sets color: white on background-color: #007bff — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/css/style.css:213
`.chat-message` moves (`animation: slideIn 0.3s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/css/tools-demo.css:178
`.loading-dot` moves (`animation: bounce 1.4s infinite ease-in-out`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/css/tools-demo.css:266
`.progress-fill` moves (`transition: width 0.3s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — 03-rag/src/main/resources/static/css/rag-demo.css:151
`.pattern-card` moves (`transition: transform 0.2s, box-shadow 0.2s`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/css/prompt-demo.css:61
`.loading-spinner` moves (`animation: spin 1s linear infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/css/prompt-demo.css:295
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue in this repository's Java: methods whose whole body only throws a "not implemented" or bare unsupported-operation exception, or returns a default value (or nothing) under a TODO/FIXME marker, and placeholder text (lorem ipsum, changeme/replace_me…) left in strings of non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords, in this repository's Java: methods that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant or do nothing, dead `if (false)` branches, and skeleton classes most of whose methods are holes.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository and its projects have a README, and whether it is substantive.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository is organised deliberately: production code and tests are set apart in a way its ecosystem or the repository itself declares.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the project's current-state documentation describes the code that exists.
Method: Every current-state document's checkable claims looked up in the tree (links, versions, and artefact counts an order of magnitude off), plus two README checks: an advertised infrastructure product with no footprint, and a module the CHANGELOG records as removed. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.
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P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.
Only 3/5 runnable modules use logging (modules with no entry point or server are excluded — they are libraries a runnable module hosts). Silent: `01-introduction`, `05-mcp`.
What to do
Extend structured logging to the remaining runnable modules so everything you run is diagnosable in production.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add spotbugs with find-sec-bugs (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
`REDACTED` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — REDACTED:49
What to do
Run what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from each language's code model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
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R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
0 typed · 5 plain JS — the untyped files are 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/js/conversation-chat.js, 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/js/simple-chat.js, 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/js/pattern-demo.js, 03-rag/src/main/resources/static/js/rag-demo.js, 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/js/tools-demo.js.
What to do
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
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R10 · Code Duplication3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — The share of the scored frontend lines inside a near-exact copy-pasted block of substantial extent (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386; each line once, 10 at none and 0 at a quarter of the lines, as D4): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.
Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Scored on the share of the scored frontend lines inside a reported copy, on the same curve as D4. Deterministic.
01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/js/conversation-chat.js:66 · 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/js/simple-chat.js:10 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 301 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/js/conversation-chat.js:66
What to do
Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
processSSEEvents has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 18; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/js/pattern-demo.js:144
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R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
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R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
0% of 5 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph — 'production' here is the RESIDUE: every source file left once tests, tooling, generated output, config, declarations and declaration-only modules, fixture corpora, type fixtures, behaviour-free data modules, re-export barrels, registration/constant data modules and service workers are set aside, so the percentage is taken over a smaller denominator than the workspace's file count
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether async functions that make a cancellable request accept or pass on an AbortSignal (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 0/7 async functions that make a cancellable request (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http) accept an AbortSignal or pass one on, so a request keeps running after whatever wanted it has given up — a page navigated away from, an unmounted component, a timed-out job. Take a `signal` (or an options object that carries one) and hand it to the request; where nothing could ever cancel the call, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against how the function is used.
`startSession` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/js/tools-demo.js:19
`sendMessage` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/js/tools-demo.js:63
`clearChat` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/js/tools-demo.js:209
`handleFileUpload` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — 03-rag/src/main/resources/static/js/rag-demo.js:74
`askQuestion` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — 03-rag/src/main/resources/static/js/rag-demo.js:131
`callPattern` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/js/pattern-demo.js:1
`loadHistory` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/js/conversation-chat.js:103
What to do
Thread an AbortSignal through async functions that make requests, so the work stops when its caller gives up.
Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.
Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped3.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.
Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
`escapedText` is text this program did not author, and it is written into a script or style context through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. A script or style context needs its own escaping (or a JSON serialiser that escapes `<`); better, pass the value through a data attribute. — 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/js/pattern-demo.js:43
`text` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/js/pattern-demo.js:73
`err.message` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/js/pattern-demo.js:207
`source.filename` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — 03-rag/src/main/resources/static/js/rag-demo.js:175
`source.excerpt` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — 03-rag/src/main/resources/static/js/rag-demo.js:176
What to do
Each finding names the expression, the attribute it lands in and the line. Confirm the value's origin from the read this analyzer traced, then escape it at the sink or validate it against the shape the attribute accepts before interpolating.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. (×4) — 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:71, 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:119, 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:250, …
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether Java packages are null-marked and not undermined by heavy nullness suppression — a package under `@NullMarked` (or `@NonNullApi`, `@ParametersAreNonnullByDefault`, `@NonNullByDefault`, or a NullAway/Checker Framework configuration naming it) makes an unannotated reference exclude null, and `@SuppressWarnings("NullAway")`, `("nullness")`, `("null")` and `castToNonNull(…)` are what silence it.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
0/22 of this repository's Java package directories are under a non-null default: a `package-info.java` declaring `@NullMarked` (JSpecify) or `@NonNullApi`, `@ParametersAreNonnullByDefault`, `@NonNullByDefault`, `@DefaultQualifier(NonNull.class)`; a `module-info.java` declaring `@NullMarked`; every type in it `@NullMarked`; or a build that runs NullAway with the package in `AnnotatedPackages`, or the Checker Framework's `NullnessChecker`. Elsewhere every reference admits null and no checker warns on the dereference that throws a `NullPointerException`.
What to do
Declare the default where Java declares it: `@NullMarked` (org.jspecify.annotations) in each package's `package-info.java`, or once in `module-info.java`, and run NullAway (Error Prone) or the Checker Framework so the declaration is enforced. Then annotate the real exceptions `@Nullable` and resolve the suppressions rather than adding to them: a `@SuppressWarnings("NullAway")` or `castToNonNull(x)` on a value the checker could show to be null is a `NullPointerException` waiting for the path that makes it true — where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (a null check, `Objects.requireNonNull`, a non-null field initialised in the constructor).
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 12 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (22%; ≈24% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 43 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not evidenced — 5 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 61 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — the service did not build — `mvn -B -q -DskipTests compile` exited 1: ; runtime evidence skipped (launch chosen because 01-introduction/pom.xml declares spring-boot-starter-web and the Spring Boot Maven plugin) This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D14 License Compliance — JVM licences not graded — no declared coordinate carries a version the manifest itself resolves
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency does not read html yet; not measured.
D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HTTP client call or construction in the JVM, JavaScript/TypeScript source (service entry point: 04-tools/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/agents/AgentsApplication.java:10 (@SpringBootApplication))
P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present for 42 file(s), but no domain-layer files were identified: no covered file's path contains any of the markers this check keys on (/domain/, /aggregates/, /valueobjects/, /domainmodel/, .domain/, /entities/), which are matched case-insensitively anywhere in the path. With no domain partition there is nothing to compare the web/controller layer against — if this repository keeps its business rules under a folder named none of those, that naming is what the check cannot see, not the domain logic.
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `@Benchmark` in a Java, Kotlin or Scala file importing JMH or kotlinx-benchmark, Jetpack Benchmark's `measureRepeated` in a file importing androidx.benchmark, or JMH/kotlinx-benchmark/androidx.benchmark in a REDACTED, Gradle or sbt build, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D30 (Dependency Vulnerabilities), which answers every ecosystem
R6 Tooling — no package.json in the repository — test/lint/typecheck wiring is read from package.json scripts (corroborated against CI), so this project's own toolchain isn't measured here
R8 Dependency Hygiene — Not measured — no package.json declares any dependency, so there is nothing to check imports against (imports may resolve through a host runtime rather than node).
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
X1 Async correctness — X1 reached only 26% of this repository's production lines — java (3,049 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X12 Unreachable branch — X12 reached only 26% of this repository's production lines — java (3,049 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X20 Mistyped argument guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
<html> without a lang 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/dashboard.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/analyze.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/autonomous.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/chat.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/code.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/constrained.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/focused.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/reason.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/task.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang 03-rag/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang 04-tools/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
AC4 · Keyboard semantics· Click handler on a non-interactive <div> · ×6
Click handler on a non-interactive <div> 04-tools/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:31— A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
Click handler on a non-interactive <div> 04-tools/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:37— A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
Click handler on a non-interactive <div> 04-tools/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:43— A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
Click handler on a non-interactive <div> 04-tools/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:49— A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
Click handler on a non-interactive <div> 04-tools/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:55— A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
Click handler on a non-interactive <div> 04-tools/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:61— A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
AC2 · Forms & labels· <textarea> without a programmatic label · ×2
<textarea> without a programmatic label 03-rag/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:58— This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<textarea> without a programmatic label 04-tools/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:97— This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
AC2 · Forms & labels· <input> without a programmatic label · ×1
<input> without a programmatic label 01-introduction/src/main/resources/templates/simple-chat.html:21— This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics· Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable · ×1
Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable 03-rag/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:30— The repo's own CSS styles .upload-area with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities· High vulnerability · ×1
Low coverage: 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/app/Application.java 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/app/Application.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/3).
Low coverage: 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/app/ChatController.java 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/app/ChatController.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/11).
Low coverage: 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/app/ConversationController.java 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/app/ConversationController.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/37).
Low coverage: 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/app/WebController.java 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/app/WebController.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/4).
Low coverage: 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/config/LangChainConfig.java 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/config/LangChainConfig.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/8).
Low coverage: 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/model/ChatRequest.java 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/model/ChatRequest.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/5).
Low coverage: 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/model/ChatResponse.java 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/model/ChatResponse.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/3).
Low coverage: 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/app/Application.java 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/app/Application.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/3).
Low coverage: 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/config/LangChainConfig.java 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/config/LangChainConfig.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/14).
Low coverage: 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/controller/DemoWebController.java 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/controller/DemoWebController.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/10).
Low coverage: 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/controller/Gpt5PromptController.java 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/controller/Gpt5PromptController.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/58).
Low coverage: 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:1— 20.9% line coverage (37/177).
Low coverage: 03-rag/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/RagApplication.java 03-rag/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/RagApplication.java:1— 33.3% line coverage (1/3).
Low coverage: 03-rag/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/app/DocumentController.java 03-rag/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/app/DocumentController.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/25).
Low coverage: 03-rag/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/app/WebController.java 03-rag/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/app/WebController.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/2).
Low coverage: 03-rag/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/config/LangChainRagConfig.java 03-rag/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/config/LangChainRagConfig.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/15).
Low coverage: 03-rag/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/model/dto/DocumentResponse.java 03-rag/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/model/dto/DocumentResponse.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/3).
Low coverage: 03-rag/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/model/dto/DocumentUploadRequest.java 03-rag/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/model/dto/DocumentUploadRequest.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/6).
Low coverage: 03-rag/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/service/EmbeddingService.java 03-rag/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/service/EmbeddingService.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/14).
Low coverage: 03-rag/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/service/RagService.java 03-rag/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/service/RagService.java:1— 2.4% line coverage (1/41).
Low coverage: 04-tools/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/agents/AgentsApplication.java 04-tools/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/agents/AgentsApplication.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/3).
Low coverage: 04-tools/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/agents/app/AgentController.java 04-tools/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/agents/app/AgentController.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/70).
Low coverage: 04-tools/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/agents/app/WebController.java 04-tools/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/agents/app/WebController.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/2).
Low coverage: 04-tools/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/agents/config/LangChainConfig.java 04-tools/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/agents/config/LangChainConfig.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/14).
Low coverage: 04-tools/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/agents/exception/AgentException.java 04-tools/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/agents/exception/AgentException.java:1— 0.0% line coverage (0/4).
+ 8 more in this group — see findings.md.
AC3 · Page structure· Page without a main landmark · ×11
Page without a main landmark 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/dashboard.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/analyze.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/autonomous.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/chat.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/code.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/constrained.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/focused.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/reason.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/task.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark 03-rag/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark 04-tools/src/main/resources/templates/index.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
X2 · Cancellation propagation· Async function without AbortSignal · ×7
Async function without AbortSignal: startSession 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/js/tools-demo.js:19— `startSession` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: sendMessage 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/js/tools-demo.js:63— `sendMessage` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: clearChat 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/js/tools-demo.js:209— `clearChat` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: handleFileUpload 03-rag/src/main/resources/static/js/rag-demo.js:74— `handleFileUpload` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: askQuestion 03-rag/src/main/resources/static/js/rag-demo.js:131— `askQuestion` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: callPattern 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/js/pattern-demo.js:1— `callPattern` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: loadHistory 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/js/conversation-chat.js:103— `loadHistory` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety· Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard · ×5
Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/css/tools-demo.css:178— `.chat-message` moves (`animation: slideIn 0.3s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/css/tools-demo.css:266— `.loading-dot` moves (`animation: bounce 1.4s infinite ease-in-out`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard 03-rag/src/main/resources/static/css/rag-demo.css:151— `.progress-fill` moves (`transition: width 0.3s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/css/prompt-demo.css:61— `.pattern-card` moves (`transition: transform 0.2s, box-shadow 0.2s`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/css/prompt-demo.css:295— `.loading-spinner` moves (`animation: spin 1s linear infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
No assertions: testAskWithEmptyQuestion 03-rag/src/test/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/app/RagControllerTest.java:68— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: testAskWithNullQuestion 03-rag/src/test/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/app/RagControllerTest.java:80— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: testAskWithServiceException 03-rag/src/test/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/app/RagControllerTest.java:92— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: testAskWithValidQuestion 03-rag/src/test/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/app/RagControllerTest.java:41— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: testHealthEndpoint 03-rag/src/test/java/com/example/langchain4j/rag/app/RagControllerTest.java:108— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped· Untrusted text written into markup unescaped · ×5
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/js/pattern-demo.js:43— `escapedText` is text this program did not author, and it is written into a script or style context through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. A script or style context needs its own escaping (or a JSON serialiser that escapes `<`); better, pass the value through a data attribute.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/js/pattern-demo.js:73— `text` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/js/pattern-demo.js:207— `err.message` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped 03-rag/src/main/resources/static/js/rag-demo.js:175— `source.filename` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped 03-rag/src/main/resources/static/js/rag-demo.js:176— `source.excerpt` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:71— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:119— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:250— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:609— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.0:1) 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/css/style.css:95— `.btn-primary` sets color: white on background-color: #007bff — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.0:1) 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/css/style.css:176— `.message.user .message-bubble` sets color: white on background-color: #007bff — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.0:1) 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/css/style.css:213— `.chat-form button` sets color: white on background-color: #007bff — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.7:1) 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/css/prompt-demo.css:322— `.btn-copy` sets color: white on background-color: #667eea — 3.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.7:1) 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/css/prompt-demo.css:394— `.chat-message.user .message-content` sets color: white on background-color: #667eea — 3.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC3 · Page structure· Heading level jumps from h1 to h3 · ×1
Heading level jumps from h1 to h3 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/dashboard.html:26— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.7:1) 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/css/tools-demo.css:244— `.chat-message.agent .tool-badge` sets color: #3498db on background-color: #e9ecef — 2.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.1:1) 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/css/style.css:104— `.btn-secondary` sets color: white on background-color: #28a745 — 3.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
chat.html.sendMessageStreaming (cyclomatic 20) 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/chat.html:71— chat.html.sendMessageStreaming has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 5 of the 20 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 2 function items inside it that branch (processSSEEvents, a function literal at line 167). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
callPatternStreaming (cyclomatic 19) 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/js/pattern-demo.js:103— callPatternStreaming has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 2 of the 19 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 6 function items inside it that branch ((anonymous)::processSSEEvents, a function literal at line 188, a function literal at line 135, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
pattern-demo.callPatternStreaming (cognitive 24) 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/js/pattern-demo.js:103— pattern-demo.callPatternStreaming has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (17 pts), boolean chains 4, loops 2 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 8). None of this is in the body itself: all 24 points belong to 3 function literals inside it that branch (lines 144, 188, 135). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
chat.html.sendMessageStreaming::processSSEEvents (cognitive 18) 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/templates/patterns/chat.html:123— chat.html.sendMessageStreaming::processSSEEvents has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (12 pts), boolean chains 3, loops 2 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
callPatternStreaming::(anonymous)::processSSEEvents (cognitive 18) 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/js/pattern-demo.js:144— callPatternStreaming::(anonymous)::processSSEEvents has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (12 pts), boolean chains 3, loops 2 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
conversation-chat.loadHistory (cognitive 16) 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/js/conversation-chat.js:103— conversation-chat.loadHistory has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 5 (10 pts), ternaries 1 (3 pts), boolean chains 2, error handling 1 (nesting depth added 7). Most of this is not in the body itself: 3 of the 16 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 109). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
ClassTooLong: Gpt5PromptService 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:47— ClassTooLong — 433 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 19 methods. The bar is 400 significant lines; this is 33 over it, 1.08× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (52 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (52 corresponding lines) 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:65— 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:65-127 | 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:194-258 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 52 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copies of one member (3 members, 12+ corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copies of one member (3 members, 12+ corresponding lines) 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/app/ChatController.java:39— 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/app/ChatController.java:39-52 | 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/app/ConversationController.java:31-42 | 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/app/ConversationController.java:121-132 — These 3 members are one piece of code written 3 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 12 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 3 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines) 04-tools/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/agents/app/AgentController.java:40— 04-tools/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/agents/app/AgentController.java:40-52 | 04-tools/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/agents/app/AgentController.java:161-175 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 13 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (10 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (10 corresponding lines) 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:100— 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:100-109 | 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:589-599 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 10 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (8 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (8 corresponding lines) 05-mcp/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/mcp/StdioTransportDemo.java:110— 05-mcp/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/mcp/StdioTransportDemo.java:110-117 | 05-mcp/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/mcp/SupervisorAgentDemo.java:157-165 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 8 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
Duplicated block (35–37 lines × 2) 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:472— 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:472-508 | 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:525-559 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:472` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (27 lines × 3) 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:101— 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:101-127 | 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:232-258 | 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:591-617 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:101` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The `return` at the foot of the matched lines is the enclosing body's own terminal exit, not an early one: it moves with them unchanged, and each site calls the extracted unit from the position that `return` occupied — no decision has to be handed back and re-acted on. ★ These copies have DRIFTED, and that is worth reading before extracting anything: just before the matched lines, `02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:590` calls `add`, `aiMessage` and `02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:100` does not — after which the two agree again for 4 more lines. One of those two behaviours is the intended one and the other is what a copy-paste left behind, so decide which BEFORE unifying them: extracting the shared part will silently settle it, and if the copy that skips the call is the wrong one, that bug is already live.
Duplicated block (23 lines × 3) 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:78— 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:78-100 | 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:209-231 | 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:567-589 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:78` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. ★ These copies have DRIFTED, and that is worth reading before extracting anything: just after the matched lines, `02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:590` calls `add`, `aiMessage` and `02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/service/Gpt5PromptService.java:101` does not — after which the two agree again for 4 more lines. One of those two behaviours is the intended one and the other is what a copy-paste left behind, so decide which BEFORE unifying them: extracting the shared part will silently settle it, and if the copy that skips the call is the wrong one, that bug is already live.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) 05-mcp/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/mcp/StdioTransportDemo.java:96— 05-mcp/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/mcp/StdioTransportDemo.java:96-108 | 05-mcp/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/mcp/SupervisorAgentDemo.java:128-140 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/app/ChatController.java:44— 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/app/ChatController.java:44-52 | 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/app/ConversationController.java:76-86 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/app/ChatController.java:44` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (42 lines × 2) 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/config/LangChainConfig.java:1— 01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/config/LangChainConfig.java:1-42 | 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/prompts/config/LangChainConfig.java:1-59 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `01-introduction/src/main/java/com/example/langchain4j/config/LangChainConfig.java:1` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Type Safety — 0 typed · 5 plain JS — the untyped files are 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/js/conversation-chat.js, 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/js/simple-chat.js, 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/js/pattern-demo.js, 03-rag/src/main/resources/static/js/rag-demo.js, 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/js/tools-demo.js.
R10 · Code Duplication· Duplicated block with local edits (53 matched lines × 2 locations) · ×1
Duplicated block with local edits (53 matched lines × 2 locations) 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/js/conversation-chat.js:66— 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/js/conversation-chat.js:66 · 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/js/simple-chat.js:10 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 301 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
Complex function processSSEEvents (cyclomatic 12, cognitive 18) 02-prompt-engineering/src/main/resources/static/js/pattern-demo.js:144— processSSEEvents has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 18; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Test Coverage — 0% of 5 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph — 'production' here is the RESIDUE: every source file left once tests, tooling, generated output, config, declarations and declaration-only modules, fixture corpora, type fixtures, behaviour-free data modules, re-export barrels, registration/constant data modules and service workers are set aside, so the percentage is taken over a smaller denominator than the workspace's file count
redundant comment 01-introduction/src/main/resources/static/js/conversation-chat.js:11— "Load saved conversation ID from localStorage" repeats the code it sits on: 5 of its 6 words (saved, conversation, id, local, storage) are already in `const savedConversationId = localStorage.getItem('conversationId');`. Delete it, or replace it with what the code cannot say (why it is done here, a constraint, or a consequence).
redundant comment 03-rag/src/main/resources/static/js/rag-demo.js:73— "Handle File Upload" repeats the code it sits on: 3 of its 3 words (handle, file, upload) are already in `async function handleFileUpload(file)`. Delete it, or replace it with what the code cannot say (why it is done here, a constraint, or a consequence).
redundant comment 03-rag/src/main/resources/static/js/rag-demo.js:188— "Show Status Message" repeats the code it sits on: 3 of its 3 words (show, status, message) are already in `function showStatus(element, message, type)`. Delete it, or replace it with what the code cannot say (why it is done here, a constraint, or a consequence).
redundant comment 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/js/tools-demo.js:97— "Remove loading indicator" repeats the code it sits on: 3 of its 3 words (remove, loading, indicator) are already in `removeLoadingIndicator(loadingId);`. Delete it, or replace it with what the code cannot say (why it is done here, a constraint, or a consequence).
redundant comment 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/js/tools-demo.js:160— "Add Error Message" repeats the code it sits on: 3 of its 3 words (add, error, message) are already in `function addErrorMessage(errorText)`. Delete it, or replace it with what the code cannot say (why it is done here, a constraint, or a consequence).
redundant comment 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/js/tools-demo.js:177— "Add Loading Indicator" repeats the code it sits on: 3 of its 3 words (add, loading, indicator) are already in `function addLoadingIndicator()`. Delete it, or replace it with what the code cannot say (why it is done here, a constraint, or a consequence).
redundant comment 04-tools/src/main/resources/static/js/tools-demo.js:200— "Remove Loading Indicator" repeats the code it sits on: 3 of its 3 words (remove, loading, indicator) are already in `function removeLoadingIndicator(loadingId)`. Delete it, or replace it with what the code cannot say (why it is done here, a constraint, or a consequence).
No ADRs found REDACTED:123— No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`. ADRs are expected here because `REDACTED` makes this repository a deployable product (line 123).
No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
Logging is not universal — Only 3/5 runnable modules use logging (modules with no entry point or server are excluded — they are libraries a runnable module hosts). Silent: `01-introduction`, `05-mcp`.
No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add spotbugs with find-sec-bugs (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
No dependency-update automation REDACTED:49— `REDACTED` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`.
No changelog — No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
X2 · Cancellation propagation· Not all async functions that make a request accept an AbortSignal · ×1
Not all async functions that make a request accept an AbortSignal — Only 0/7 async functions that make a cancellable request (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http) accept an AbortSignal or pass one on, so a request keeps running after whatever wanted it has given up — a page navigated away from, an unmounted component, a timed-out job. Take a `signal` (or an options object that carries one) and hand it to the request; where nothing could ever cancel the call, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against how the function is used.
X5 · Nullable reference types· Java packages are not null-marked everywhere · ×1
Java packages are not null-marked everywhere — 0/22 of this repository's Java package directories are under a non-null default: a `package-info.java` declaring `@NullMarked` (JSpecify) or `@NonNullApi`, `@ParametersAreNonnullByDefault`, `@NonNullByDefault`, `@DefaultQualifier(NonNull.class)`; a `module-info.java` declaring `@NullMarked`; every type in it `@NullMarked`; or a build that runs NullAway with the package in `AnnotatedPackages`, or the Checker Framework's `NullnessChecker`. Elsewhere every reference admits null and no checker warns on the dereference that throws a `NullPointerException`.
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
Run 01a1e654-ce5b-79ae-b115-37857813c8cc · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 35 · Warnings: 107 · Recommendations: 18 · Info: 109 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by the Canine Code Analyzer: deterministic code-health analysis. 16-11-2026 @ 21:47 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.