Executive summary
membraneframework/membrane_demo falls short of our standard for a template or a sample, in part because we found no access checks on the code's endpoints or handlers. It scores 38 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, and 45 of its 53 critical findings are security problems.
Security and Compliance, at 19, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is adding access checks, worth about 13 points. Pinning the third-party scripts comes next, worth about 8 points. Raising Security and Compliance to 66 would lift the score to about 53.
Twenty-three known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Fifteen pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with, and four secrets can leak from the build pipeline. Updating the vulnerable packages, pinning each tool to an exact version and limiting each secret to its own step would close these risks. Giving the pull-request workflow read-only access would fix the pipeline that outsiders can trigger with write access, and the two passwords or keys in the code's history need replacing, with the old ones switched off. The six pages or frames without a title need a descriptive title.
The product code is 4,032 lines, about €3,500 to rebuild.
If Security and Compliance rose from 19 to 66, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 38 to about 53.
New since the last survey: 32 findings
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (37 corresponding lines) rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/application.ex
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (18 corresponding lines) camera_to_hls/camera_to_hls.exs
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web.ex
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Fixed since the last survey: 18 findings
- REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/config/dev.exs
- REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret: signing-key rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/config/dev.exs
- REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/config/test.exs
- REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret: signing-key rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/config/test.exs
- REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret rtmp_to_hls/config/dev.exs
- REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret: signing-key rtmp_to_hls/config/dev.exs
- REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret rtmp_to_hls/config/test.exs
- REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret: signing-key rtmp_to_hls/config/test.exs
- REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret webrtc_live_view/config/dev.exs
- REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret: signing-key webrtc_live_view/config/dev.exs
- REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret webrtc_live_view/config/test.exs
- REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret: signing-key webrtc_live_view/config/test.exs
- Secrets (history) · High secret: REDACTED webrtc/videoroom/assets/package-lock.json
- Secrets (history) · High secret: REDACTED webrtc/videoroom_advanced/assets/package-lock.json
- Secrets (history) · High secret: REDACTED webrtc_to_hls/assets/package-lock.json
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] REDACTED
- Page structure · Document without a <title> webrtc_live_view/lib/webrtc_live_view_web/components/layouts/root.html.heex
- A11y enforcement · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung
Rebuild cost: about €3,500 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €1,200 to €5,800, for 19 to 61 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.7 at a score of 38. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 4,032 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 (global) | 2 CameraToHlsNerves | 3 Gemini.Demo | 4 Gemini.Demo.Mic | 5 Membrane.Demo | 6 Membrane.Demo.RTP | 7 Membrane.Demo.RTSPToHLS | 8 Membrane.Demo.RtmpToAdaptiveHls | 9 Membrane.Demo.SimpleElement | 10 RtmpToAdaptiveHls | 11 RtmpToHls | 12 WebRTCLiveView | 13 WebrtcLiveView | 14 openai_realtime_with_membrane_webrtc.assets | 15 style_transfer.assets | 16 webrtc_live_view.assets.js | 17 yolo.assets | 18 RtmpToAdaptiveHlsWeb | 19 RtmpToHlsWeb | 20 WebrtcLiveViewWeb | 21 WebrtcLiveViewWeb.Live |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (global) | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 2 CameraToHlsNerves | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 3 Gemini.Demo | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 4 Gemini.Demo.Mic | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 5 Membrane.Demo | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 6 Membrane.Demo.RTP | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 7 Membrane.Demo.RTSPToHLS | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 8 Membrane.Demo.RtmpToAdaptiveHls | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 9 Membrane.Demo.SimpleElement | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 10 RtmpToAdaptiveHls | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 11 RtmpToHls | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 12 WebRTCLiveView | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 13 WebrtcLiveView | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 14 openai_realtime_with_membrane_webrtc.assets | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 15 style_transfer.assets | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 16 webrtc_live_view.assets.js | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 17 yolo.assets | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 18 RtmpToAdaptiveHlsWeb | 6 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 19 RtmpToHlsWeb | 6 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 20 WebrtcLiveViewWeb | 5 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 21 WebrtcLiveViewWeb.Live | 1 |
18→1 RtmpToAdaptiveHlsWeb uses (global)✕
- Connections
- 6 pairs of types, where a type in RtmpToAdaptiveHlsWeb uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
RtmpToAdaptiveHlsWeb.ErrorView→RtmpToAdaptiveHlsWebRtmpToAdaptiveHlsWeb.HlsController→RtmpToAdaptiveHlsWebRtmpToAdaptiveHlsWeb.LayoutView→RtmpToAdaptiveHlsWebRtmpToAdaptiveHlsWeb.PageController→RtmpToAdaptiveHlsWebRtmpToAdaptiveHlsWeb.PageView→RtmpToAdaptiveHlsWebRtmpToAdaptiveHlsWeb.Router→RtmpToAdaptiveHlsWeb
- Direction
- RtmpToAdaptiveHlsWeb uses (global), so a change to (global) can break RtmpToAdaptiveHlsWeb, while a change to RtmpToAdaptiveHlsWeb can't break (global).
- Position
- Below the diagonal: RtmpToAdaptiveHlsWeb uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
19→1 RtmpToHlsWeb uses (global)✕
- Connections
- 6 pairs of types, where a type in RtmpToHlsWeb uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
RtmpToHlsWeb.ErrorView→RtmpToHlsWebRtmpToHlsWeb.HlsController→RtmpToHlsWebRtmpToHlsWeb.LayoutView→RtmpToHlsWebRtmpToHlsWeb.PageController→RtmpToHlsWebRtmpToHlsWeb.PageView→RtmpToHlsWebRtmpToHlsWeb.Router→RtmpToHlsWeb
- Direction
- RtmpToHlsWeb uses (global), so a change to (global) can break RtmpToHlsWeb, while a change to RtmpToHlsWeb can't break (global).
- Position
- Below the diagonal: RtmpToHlsWeb uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
20→1 WebrtcLiveViewWeb uses (global)✕
- Connections
- 5 pairs of types, where a type in WebrtcLiveViewWeb uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
WebrtcLiveViewWeb.ErrorHTML→WebrtcLiveViewWebWebrtcLiveViewWeb.Layouts→WebrtcLiveViewWebWebrtcLiveViewWeb.PageController→WebrtcLiveViewWebWebrtcLiveViewWeb.PageHTML→WebrtcLiveViewWebWebrtcLiveViewWeb.Router→WebrtcLiveViewWeb
- Direction
- WebrtcLiveViewWeb uses (global), so a change to (global) can break WebrtcLiveViewWeb, while a change to WebrtcLiveViewWeb can't break (global).
- Position
- Below the diagonal: WebrtcLiveViewWeb uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
21→1 WebrtcLiveViewWeb.Live uses (global)✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in WebrtcLiveViewWeb.Live uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
WebrtcLiveViewWeb.Live.EchoLive→WebrtcLiveViewWeb
- Direction
- WebrtcLiveViewWeb.Live uses (global), so a change to (global) can break WebrtcLiveViewWeb.Live, while a change to WebrtcLiveViewWeb.Live can't break (global).
- Position
- Below the diagonal: WebrtcLiveViewWeb.Live uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Accessibility
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 58 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 22 | High / Critical |
| A07:2025 — Authentication Failures | 3 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do; Pin third-party scripts and verify them: name an exact version in the URL and add an `integrity="sha384-…"` hash alongside `crossorigin="anonymous"` (both are required — an integrity hash on a cross-origin script without `crossorigin` is not evaluated, it blocks the script). Where the vendor ships a continuously-updated loader and publishes no stable hash (tag managers, analytics, chat widgets), Subresource Integrity is not available: constrain it instead with a `Content-Security-Policy` that names the exact origins allowed to execute, and drop the script from the pages that do not need it. Where the page is shipped inside a package that others host, prefer vendoring the asset and serving it from the app’s own origin, so no consumer inherits a third-party dependency they did not choose; Resolve the 26 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (26).
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do. | +13.2 pts | Medium | Access Controls |
| Pin third-party scripts and verify them: name an exact version in the URL and add an `integrity="sha384-…"` hash alongside `crossorigin="anonymous"` (both are required — an integrity hash on a cross-origin script without `crossorigin` is not evaluated, it blocks the script). Where the vendor ships a continuously-updated loader and publishes no stable hash (tag managers, analytics, chat widgets), Subresource Integrity is not available: constrain it instead with a `Content-Security-Policy` that names the exact origins allowed to execute, and drop the script from the pages that do not need it. Where the page is shipped inside a package that others host, prefer vendoring the asset and serving it from the app’s own origin, so no consumer inherits a third-party dependency they did not choose. | +8.1 pts | Medium | Web-Security Posture |
| Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. | +3.0 pts | Low | Supply-chain Provenance & Signing |
| Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). | +2.9 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Resolve the 1 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED. | +1.8 pts | Low | Secrets (history) |
| Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED. | +1.8 pts | Low | Secrets (history) |
| Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. | +1.8 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. | +1.8 pts | Low | Supply-chain Provenance & Signing |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.3 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 0.6 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 0.6 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 0.8 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.3 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.7 | Mixed | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 3.7 | Mixed | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 3.7 | Mixed | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 3.7 | Mixed | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 4.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Near-clean | Secrets (history): High secret: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Near-clean | Secrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Near-clean | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| camera_to_hls/camera_to_hls.exs | 7.8 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (18 corresponding lines) |
| rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web/views/error_helpers.ex | 7.8 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Near-clean | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: REDACTED |
| rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/application.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (37 corresponding lines) |
| rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) |
| rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web/telemetry.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 45 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 45 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 114 of 179 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.exs) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.exs) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. All 11 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness). Counted over 11 of the 109 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
- D26 Project Cohesion — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Project size and spread are measured over build units whose source a code model reads. This repository's .exs source is a material share of its production lines and was read by none, so the score is a verdict about the units that were read. Not a finding that the unread source is cohesive — it is unmeasured.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This dimension reads a project's own statement about the platform it runs on: a TargetFramework in a .NET project file, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain file or Cargo.toml rust-version, a .go-version, .java-version, .ruby-version, .tool-versions or .sdkmanrc, a go.mod go directive, a Maven or Gradle Java level or toolchain, a Gemfile's ruby directive, a mix.exs elixir requirement, a rebar.config minimum_otp_vsn, a pubspec.yaml SDK constraint, a build.sbt scalaVersion, or a framework major pinned by a dependency constraint. This repository carries none of them, so nothing about its platform was established. That is a gap in this analyzer's coverage, NOT a finding that the platform is supported — a language whose runtime is declared elsewhere (Package.swift, a Dockerfile) is simply not read here yet.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Subject: 21 markup document(s) — HTML, Razor, JSX, Vue, Svelte or server templates. The Runtime Evidence tier boots an app only via docker-compose, an Aspire AppHost, a Dockerfile, an npm dev script, a web service's own toolchain entry point (cargo, go, dotnet, Python, Spring Boot), or an Android app's own Gradle wrapper (run on an emulator); an Apple or Flutter app needs a host it lacks. None applied, so no live runtime a11y/egress/header evidence was collected. You can widen what we reach: add a docker-compose.yml (or an Aspire AppHost) that brings the app up with its dependencies. We then boot it in an isolated sandbox and gathers real runtime evidence — you change nothing in your pipeline (no CI step, no SDK).
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and this repository's Elixir is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and this repository's Elixir is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
- X1 Async correctness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, PHP, Dart, Kotlin, Ruby, Scala, Java, Python and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and no named async function in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, nor any Go, PHP or Dart function or Kotlin suspend function, makes a request that can be cancelled (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http; net/http, net.Dial; amphp; Dio; Ktor, OkHttp), so there is nothing to judge, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded, no Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin or PHP was found, and this repository's Elixir is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust, Go, Swift, Erlang, F# and Visual Basic source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
5 duplicated block group(s) detected. 4.7 % of the production lines (188 of 4,032) are in a reported copy. A further 3 rows report members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (37 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (18 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with camera_to_hls.exs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D5 · Coupling
8 production modules (OTP), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; 0 module(s) off the main sequence.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
50 outdated, 0 retired direct Hex dependencies, 0 pinning defect(s). Whether any of these packages is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — hex.pm publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: a Hex app name does not determine the modules it provides (`ecto_sql` provides Ecto.Adapters.SQL), and a large idiomatic class of BEAM dependencies — runtime adapters, codec plugins, protocol implementations and OTP applications the release starts — is correctly declared and never referenced in source, so absence of a reference is not evidence of an unused dependency. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from REDACTED there.
D13 · REDACTED Scanning
REDACTED scan ran and found no leaked secrets. 12 detection(s) were excluded as holding no minted credential in material that runs: a name, reference or comparison rather than a value, a readable phrase or pattern, a value that declares itself fake, or development, test, example, mock or demo material.
D14 · License Compliance
1 of 157 shipped Hex package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from hex.pm over the packages a consumer installs — this repository's REDACTED closed over the declarations its mix.exs files do not gate behind `only:`. Packages it asks for ONLY under `only: [:dev, :test]` (or any other non-prod environment, such as `:docs`) are excluded: they are not installed by anything that depends on this repository. Each licence is the one hex.pm publishes for the package's current release.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted task-comment markers across 4032 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
D19 · Documentation Quality
0 of 1 documentation facets pass in full; short on: F2 example. 23 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Documentation finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 8 build units (Mix) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent. This repository's .exs source was read by no build unit, so this covers part of the tree, not all of it.
D28 · Secrets (history)
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
22 finding(s): 0 critical, 19 high, 3 medium, 0 low. 14 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens.
What to do
- Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 14 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
49 finding(s): 0 critical, 23 high, 26 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 26 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (26). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (26 warning-level).
- Resolve the 23 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (23). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (23 issue-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
7 of 11 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is rtsp_to_hls/.credo.exs. Counted over 11 of the 109 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 7 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with .credo.exs, target.exs, pipeline.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: pipeline.ex↔mix.exs 73%
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with pipeline.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
- An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. — webrtc_live_view/lib/webrtc_live_view_web/components/layouts/app.html.heex:5
What to do
- Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels
AC3 · Page structure
- A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. (×6) — camera_to_hls/stream.html:2, camera_to_hls_nerves/rootfs_overlay/stream.html:2, rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web/templates/layout/root.html.heex:2, …
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×7) — camera_to_hls/stream.html:2, camera_to_hls_nerves/rootfs_overlay/stream.html:2, rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web/templates/layout/root.html.heex:2, …
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics
AC5 · ARIA correctness
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
C2 · Access Controls
- This repository serves requests — a server (use Phoenix.Endpoint) (webrtc_live_view/lib/webrtc_live_view_web/endpoint.ex:2) — and no route guard, auth-gate middleware, global guard or imperative check that refuses a caller (401/403, an Unauthorized/Forbidden error) was found: its endpoints may be unprotected. — webrtc_live_view/lib/webrtc_live_view_web/endpoint.ex:2
What to do
- Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do.
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P2 · Observability
- Only 3/7 runnable modules use logging (modules with no entry point or server are excluded — they are libraries a runnable module hosts). Silent: `camera_to_hls_nerves`, `rtmp_to_adaptive_hls`, `rtmp_to_hls`, `webrtc_live_view`.
What to do
- Extend structured logging to the remaining runnable modules so everything you run is diagnosable in production.
- Add a health-check endpoint (a /health route in your Phoenix router or Plug) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 5 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:3
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
R1 · Type Safety
- 0 typed · 6 plain JS — the untyped files are openai_realtime_with_membrane_webrtc/assets/openai_realtime_demo.js, rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/assets/js/app.js, rtmp_to_hls/assets/js/app.js, style_transfer/assets/webrtc_player.js, webrtc_live_view/assets/js/app.js, yolo/assets/webrtc_player.js.
What to do
- Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
R10 · Code Duplication
- style_transfer/assets/webrtc_player.js:1 · yolo/assets/webrtc_player.js:1 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — style_transfer/assets/webrtc_player.js:1
- openai_realtime_with_membrane_webrtc/assets/openai_realtime_demo.js:72 · style_transfer/assets/webrtc_player.js:23 · yolo/assets/webrtc_player.js:23 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — openai_realtime_with_membrane_webrtc/assets/openai_realtime_demo.js:72
- openai_realtime_with_membrane_webrtc/assets/openai_realtime_demo.js:15 · openai_realtime_with_membrane_webrtc/assets/openai_realtime_demo.js:70 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — openai_realtime_with_membrane_webrtc/assets/openai_realtime_demo.js:15
What to do
- Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
R3 · Large Files
R7 · Dead Code
R9 · Circular Imports
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- `https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/hls.js@latest` is executed by this page with no Subresource Integrity. Whoever can answer that request — the CDN, anyone who compromises it, anyone on the network path — runs arbitrary script in this page's origin, with its session. The URL also names no version, so it resolves to whatever that origin serves at fetch time — the executed bytes can change with nobody touching this repository. 5 such include(s) across the repository's markup. — camera_to_hls/stream.html:5
- This repository runs an HTTP server and nothing in its Elixir source or production configuration secures the transport: no HTTPS served (an endpoint's `https: [...]`, `scheme: :https`, `Plug.Cowboy.https`, SiteEncrypt), no `force_ssl:` or `plug Plug.SSL` redirecting to HTTPS and sending HSTS, no `strict-transport-security` header, no `rewrite_on: [:x_forwarded_proto]` or `x-forwarded-proto` read for a TLS-terminating proxy — so its traffic may cross the network in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web/endpoint.ex:2 — `Phoenix.Endpoint`.
- Set: Referrer-Policy, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies. Missing: Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security — the four headers that carry the points of this card's security-headers term (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options), 0.5 each.(−1.0 on this card.) The server: rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web/endpoint.ex:2 — `Phoenix.Endpoint`.
- No handler of this repository's Elixir server answers 400, 413 or 422 (`put_status(conn, :bad_request)`, `:unprocessable_entity`, `send_resp(conn, 400, …)`), and nothing declares validation — no Ecto changeset `validate_required`/`validate_length`/`validate_format`, no OpenApiSpex `CastAndValidate`, ExJsonSchema or other schema validator, no `Plug.Parsers` `length:` cap — nothing shows inbound requests being checked, and refused, before a handler acts on them. A check that answers its failure with 200 and an error body is not seen. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web/endpoint.ex:2 — `Phoenix.Endpoint`.
What to do
- Pin third-party scripts and verify them: name an exact version in the URL and add an `integrity="sha384-…"` hash alongside `crossorigin="anonymous"` (both are required — an integrity hash on a cross-origin script without `crossorigin` is not evaluated, it blocks the script). Where the vendor ships a continuously-updated loader and publishes no stable hash (tag managers, analytics, chat widgets), Subresource Integrity is not available: constrain it instead with a `Content-Security-Policy` that names the exact origins allowed to execute, and drop the script from the pages that do not need it. Where the page is shipped inside a package that others host, prefer vendoring the asset and serving it from the app’s own origin, so no consumer inherits a third-party dependency they did not choose.
- Secure the server's transport: set `force_ssl: [rewrite_on: [:x_forwarded_proto], hsts: true]` on the endpoint in `config/prod.exs` (Plug.SSL redirects to HTTPS and sends `Strict-Transport-Security`; `rewrite_on` trusts the TLS-terminating proxy in front of it), or serve TLS itself with the endpoint's `https: [port: 443, cipher_suite: :strong, keyfile: …, certfile: …]`.
- Add Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security beside the headers the Elixir server already sets.
- Validate what the server reads from a request — path, query, headers, body size and shape — and answer what fails with 400 (413 for an oversized body, 422 for an invalid changeset) before a handler acts on it: cast params through an Ecto changeset with `validate_*` and render its errors with `put_status(:unprocessable_entity)`, or declare the request schema with OpenApiSpex's `CastAndValidate` plug.
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC4 · Keyboard semantics | 2.1.1, 2.4.3 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 49% | Adequate — gated by R1, R10 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 93% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 62% | Adequate — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 47% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 19% | Critical — gated by D29, D36, C2, S1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Accessibility | 59% | Adequate — gated by AC1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Performance | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Not evidenced — 2 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 80 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: the BEAM has no dependency-injection container — state lives in processes, and no process is handed an instance whose lifetime another one scopes.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: Elixir processes share no mutable memory — state lives in a process's own mailbox — so there is no shared object to race on. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (an Ecto repo, Postgrex, MyXQL, Exqlite, Mongo, Mnesia, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (Ecto, Postgrex, MyXQL, Mongo, EventStore, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (an Ecto repo, Postgrex, MyXQL, Exqlite, Mongo, Mnesia, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in an Ecto schema, an Ecto migration or an Ash resource — and no database or data-store client (an Ecto repo, Postgrex, MyXQL, Exqlite, Mongo, Mnesia, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
- D10 Test Quality — ~67 lines of test source are present (.exs) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — no .exs test runner
- D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
- D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (324 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .ex, .exs source were not judged.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life — Platform end-of-life not assessed — this repository declares no platform this pass reads
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured: of the 58 type(s) found, none both holds instance state and has two or more methods whose shared use of it could be read (32 with fewer than two methods, 26 stateless), so LCOM4 is undefined for every type in this repository. Not scored — the metric does not apply here, and this is not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HTTP client call or construction in the Elixir, JavaScript/TypeScript source (service entry point: webrtc_live_view/lib/webrtc_live_view_web.ex:24 (use Phoenix.Router))
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for Benchee jobs (the entries of a `Benchee.run` job map) or Benchfella `bench "…"` blocks under `use Benchfella` in any `.ex`/`.exs` file, or benchee or benchfella in a mix.exs, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R4 Test Coverage — the JS/TS workspace (6 production file(s)) has no JavaScript/TypeScript test, but it is 7.18% of this repository's production source and the other 92.82% carries 67 line(s) of test code this pass cannot read — an incidental frontend's reachability is not the repository's test posture, so it is not scored as one
- R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D30 (Dependency Vulnerabilities), which answers every ecosystem
- R6 Tooling — no package.json in the repository — test/lint/typecheck wiring is read from package.json scripts (corroborated against CI), so this project's own toolchain isn't measured here
- R8 Dependency Hygiene — Not measured — no package.json declares any dependency, so there is nothing to check imports against (imports may resolve through a host runtime rather than node).
- X1 Async correctness — X1 reached only 7% of this repository's production lines — elixir (4,032 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X12 Unreachable branch — X12 reached only 7% of this repository's production lines — elixir (4,032 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — X21 reached only 7% of this repository's production lines — elixir (4,032 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — X24 reached only 7% of this repository's production lines — elixir (4,032 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Elixir processes share no heap: a value sent to another process arrives as a copy, so no collection is reachable from two processes at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X3 Exception handling — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — Not applicable: this check asks whether the null-typed discipline a language offers is switched on, and how much of that the assertion operator takes back, and in this repository's languages there is no such switch and no such operator. Elixir's `nil` is an atom in a dynamically typed language: `@spec`s are checked by an external analysis that has no nullability operator, so there is no null-typed discipline in the language to adopt. Plain JavaScript carries no type annotations and commits no tsconfig, so it states no null-typed discipline for this check to grade: there is nothing here that switches null checking on or off, and TypeScript (or `// @ts-check`) is how a repository acquires one — advice, not a defect this card measures. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 53 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Document without a <title> camera_to_hls/stream.html:2
- Document without a <title> camera_to_hls_nerves/rootfs_overlay/stream.html:2
- Document without a <title> rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web/templates/layout/root.html.heex:2
- Document without a <title> rtmp_to_hls/lib/rtmp_to_hls_web/templates/layout/root.html.heex:2
- Document without a <title> rtp_to_hls/stream.html:2
- Document without a <title> rtsp_to_hls/stream.html:2
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- <img> without a text alternative webrtc_live_view/lib/webrtc_live_view_web/components/layouts/app.html.heex:5
- Banned license: nerves_system_rpi4
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
Serious — 55 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Page without a main landmark camera_to_hls/stream.html:2
- Page without a main landmark camera_to_hls_nerves/rootfs_overlay/stream.html:2
- Page without a main landmark rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web/templates/layout/root.html.heex:2
- Page without a main landmark rtmp_to_hls/lib/rtmp_to_hls_web/templates/layout/root.html.heex:2
- Page without a main landmark rtp_to_hls/stream.html:2
- Page without a main landmark rtsp_to_hls/stream.html:2
- Page without a main landmark webrtc_live_view/lib/webrtc_live_view_web/components/layouts/root.html.heex:2
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- No authorization webrtc_live_view/lib/webrtc_live_view_web/endpoint.ex:2
- Change coupling: pipeline.ex ↔ mix.exs rtsp_to_hls/lib/pipeline.ex:1
- REDACTED
- Edited copy of a member (37 corresponding lines) rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/application.ex:13
- Edited copy of a member (18 corresponding lines) camera_to_hls/camera_to_hls.exs:18
- Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web.ex:31
- Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web/telemetry.ex:23
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) camera_to_hls/camera_to_hls.exs:27
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web/controllers/hls_controller.ex:7
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web/views/error_helpers.ex:12
- Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web/views/error_helpers.ex:41
- Type Safety
- Duplicated block (48 lines × 2 locations) style_transfer/assets/webrtc_player.js:1
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 3 locations) openai_realtime_with_membrane_webrtc/assets/openai_realtime_demo.js:72
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2 locations) openai_realtime_with_membrane_webrtc/assets/openai_realtime_demo.js:15
- Third-party script without Subresource Integrity camera_to_hls/stream.html:5
Minor — 21 finding(s)
- Orphaned file rtsp_to_hls/.credo.exs:1
- Orphaned file camera_to_hls_nerves/config/target.exs:1
- Orphaned file rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/pipeline.ex:1
- Orphaned file rtp_to_hls/rtp_to_hls.exs:1
- Orphaned file rtp_to_hls/send.exs:1
- Orphaned file camera_to_hls/camera_to_hls.exs:1
- Orphaned file rtmp_to_adaptive_hls/lib/rtmp_to_adaptive_hls_web.ex:1
- Documentation: no build, run or usage example README.md:1
- REDACTED
- Orphaned files with no living knowledge
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- No ADRs
- Logging is not universal
- No SAST REDACTED:3
- No changelog
- No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected
- Security headers incomplete
- No inbound request validation detected
Minor — 50 finding(s)
- Outdated: bandit
- Outdated: credo
- Outdated: dialyxir
- Outdated: dialyxir
- Outdated: dialyxir
- Outdated: esbuild
- Outdated: esbuild
- Outdated: esbuild
- Outdated: ex_doc
- Outdated: ex_libsrtp
- Outdated: floki
- Outdated: floki
- Outdated: floki
- Outdated: membrane_aac_plugin
- Outdated: membrane_core
- Outdated: membrane_core
- Outdated: membrane_core
- Outdated: membrane_core
- Outdated: membrane_core
- Outdated: membrane_core
- Outdated: membrane_ffmpeg_swscale_plugin
- Outdated: membrane_file_plugin
- Outdated: membrane_file_plugin
- Outdated: membrane_file_plugin
- Outdated: membrane_framerate_converter_plugin
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=0 --max-count=200" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-82d0a18fb9b649eca1b6ea606d8ebca5/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=200 --max-count=421" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-82d0a18fb9b649eca1b6ea606d8ebca5/history-1.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 1 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history-1.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-82d0a18fb9b649eca1b6ea606d8ebca5/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 22 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 49 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 0 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |