Executive summary
mdabir1203/Modular-Rust-Learning falls short of our standard for a preview release, held back most by its Production Readiness lens, the way the code is tested, built, released and run. It scores 48 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, and ten of its 11 critical findings are security problems.
Production Readiness, at 42, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is recording design decisions, worth about 3 points. Adding automated security scanning would lift Production Readiness itself, also worth about 3. Raising Production Readiness to 62 would lift the score to about 52.
Four pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Three settings leave the servers or containers unsafe, and one password or key is open to anyone who can read the repository. Pinning each tool to an exact version, correcting the unsafe settings and replacing the exposed password or key would close these risks. Loading the key from a secret store instead of the code would fix the two encryption keys written into the code. The form field without a label needs a label.
The product code is 2,906 lines, about €2,800 to rebuild.
If Production Readiness rose from 42 to 62, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 48 to about 52.
Rebuild cost: about €2,800 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €930 to €4,700, for 15 to 49 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.7 at a score of 48. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 2,906 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 Auth | 2 Auth.errors | 3 Auth.jwt | 4 Auth.model | 5 Auth.routes | 6 Chatbot | 7 Module02.Web1.src | 8 Module02.Web2 | 9 Rust_Principles | 10 Rust_Principles.cli | 11 SimpleCalc | 12 Todo | 13 auth_server | 14 auth_server.handlers | 15 auth_server.jwt | 16 banking | 17 banking.config | 18 banking.db.account | 19 banking.errors | 20 banking.models.account | 21 banking.models.transaction | 22 banking.routes | 23 banking.routes.account | 24 banking.services.account_service | 25 btreemap.config | 26 btreemap.main | 27 btreemap.node | 28 btreemap.util | 29 cachecomponent | 30 cachecomponent.cache_component | 31 component_logger | 32 component_logger.utility | 33 crate.Module07.btreemap.src | 34 crate.Module07.btreemap.src.config | 35 crate.Module07.btreemap.src.node | 36 crate.Module07.btreemap.src.util | 37 Auth.auth | 38 banking.db | 39 btreemap.btree | 40 crate.Module07.btreemap.src.btree |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Auth | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2 Auth.errors | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3 Auth.jwt | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4 Auth.model | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5 Auth.routes | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6 Chatbot | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 7 Module02.Web1.src | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8 Module02.Web2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 9 Rust_Principles | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 10 Rust_Principles.cli | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 11 SimpleCalc | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 12 Todo | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 13 auth_server | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 14 auth_server.handlers | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 15 auth_server.jwt | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 16 banking | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 17 banking.config | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 18 banking.db.account | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 19 banking.errors | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20 banking.models.account | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21 banking.models.transaction | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22 banking.routes | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 23 banking.routes.account | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 24 banking.services.account_service | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 25 btreemap.config | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 26 btreemap.main | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 27 btreemap.node | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 28 btreemap.util | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 29 cachecomponent | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 30 cachecomponent.cache_component | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 31 component_logger | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 32 component_logger.utility | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 33 crate.Module07.btreemap.src | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 34 crate.Module07.btreemap.src.config | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 35 crate.Module07.btreemap.src.node | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 36 crate.Module07.btreemap.src.util | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 37 Auth.auth | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 38 banking.db | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 39 btreemap.btree | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 40 crate.Module07.btreemap.src.btree | 1 |
37→4 Auth.auth uses Auth.model✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in Auth.auth uses a type in Auth.model.
- The types involved
Auth.auth.auth$module→Auth.model.User
- Direction
- Auth.auth uses Auth.model, so a change to Auth.model can break Auth.auth, while a change to Auth.auth can't break Auth.model.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Auth.auth uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
38→17 banking.db uses banking.config✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in banking.db uses a type in banking.config.
- The types involved
banking.db.db$module→banking.config.Config
- Direction
- banking.db uses banking.config, so a change to banking.config can break banking.db, while a change to banking.db can't break banking.config.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: banking.db uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
39→27 btreemap.btree uses btreemap.node✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in btreemap.btree uses a type in btreemap.node.
- The types involved
btreemap.btree.BTree→btreemap.node.Node
- Direction
- btreemap.btree uses btreemap.node, so a change to btreemap.node can break btreemap.btree, while a change to btreemap.btree can't break btreemap.node.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: btreemap.btree uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
40→35 crate.Module07.btreemap.src.btree uses crate.Module07.btreemap.src.node✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in crate.Module07.btreemap.src.btree uses a type in crate.Module07.btreemap.src.node.
- The types involved
crate.Module07.btreemap.src.btree.BTree→crate.Module07.btreemap.src.node.Node
- Direction
- crate.Module07.btreemap.src.btree uses crate.Module07.btreemap.src.node, so a change to crate.Module07.btreemap.src.node can break crate.Module07.btreemap.src.btree, while a change to crate.Module07.btreemap.src.btree can't break crate.Module07.btreemap.src.node.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: crate.Module07.btreemap.src.btree uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Domain Modelling
At a glance — Accessibility
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2025 — Injection | 8 | High / Critical |
| A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration | 5 | High / Critical |
| A07:2025 — Authentication Failures | 2 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (AWS KMS / Secrets Manager, GCP KMS / REDACTED Manager, Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault — not a key read from an environment variable beside the data) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (an AEAD over the field before Diesel/sqlx write it, SQLCipher, pgcrypto) — partial coverage still leaves gaps; Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality; Resolve the 13 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with main.rs (7), colors.rs (2), node.rs (2).
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. | +3.1 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (AWS KMS / Secrets Manager, GCP KMS / REDACTED Manager, Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault — not a key read from an environment variable beside the data) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (an AEAD over the field before Diesel/sqlx write it, SQLCipher, pgcrypto) — partial coverage still leaves gaps. | +3.1 pts | Medium | Data Protection |
| Resolve the 13 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with main.rs (7), colors.rs (2), node.rs (2). | +3.1 pts | Medium | Knowledge Freshness |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: cargo-audit / cargo-deny (or clippy) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +2.7 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED. | +1.2 pts | Low | Secrets (history) |
| Resolve the 3 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (3). | +1.2 pts | Low | IaC & Container Security |
| Load cryptographic key and salt material from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager rather than fixing it in the source, and fail fast at startup when it is absent — a default that silently works is the one that reaches production. Rotate anything already committed: it must be treated as disclosed. Salts should be generated per password and stored with the hash, never shared across installations. This repository constructs key or salt material fixed at compile time at 2 sites, not one: `Module02/auth_server/src/jwt.rs:27` (token-signing key), `Module02/auth_server/src/jwt.rs:37` (token-signing key). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place. | +2.3 pts | Medium | Web-Security Posture |
| Give every client a whole-request bound: `reqwest::Client::builder().timeout(Duration::from_secs(10))` (never `reqwest::get` or `Client::new()`, which have none), ureq's `timeout_global`, or wrap the call in `tokio::time::timeout`; add retry with back-off (`reqwest-retry`'s `RetryTransientMiddleware`, `backoff`) around dependencies that fail. | +2.0 pts | Medium | Outbound HTTP resilience |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.8 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.0 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| Module07/btreemap/src/node.rs | 7.2 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Near-clean | Secrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED |
| Module03/data_vault_exx/src/main.rs | 7.8 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: data_vault_exx::main (cognitive 24) |
| Module09/tokenize/src/main.rs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: AdvancedTokenizer::tokenize (cognitive 18) |
| Module07/btreemap/src/main.rs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) |
| Module07/btreemap/src/btree.rs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) |
| Module07/btreemap/src/util.rs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) |
| REDACTED | 9.3 | Near-clean | Static Analysis (SAST): Low: REDACTED |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 56 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 56 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 47 of 58 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.rs) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo install cargo-llvm-cov`, then `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo install cargo-llvm-cov`, then `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored — 29 direct Cargo declaration(s) were read, but the outdated signal needs crates.io, and no committed Cargo.lock resolves them to versions, so this dimension's own question is only partly answered. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. All 13 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness). Counted over 13 of the 67 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's deterministic naming rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. Until then its declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether its names are consistent.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22's deterministic call-shape rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. This says nothing about whether that surface is consistent.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This dimension reads a project's own statement about the platform it runs on: a TargetFramework in a .NET project file, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain file or Cargo.toml rust-version, a .go-version, .java-version, .ruby-version, .tool-versions or .sdkmanrc, a go.mod go directive, a Maven or Gradle Java level or toolchain, a Gemfile's ruby directive, a mix.exs elixir requirement, a rebar.config minimum_otp_vsn, a pubspec.yaml SDK constraint, a build.sbt scalaVersion, or a framework major pinned by a dependency constraint. This repository carries none of them, so nothing about its platform was established. That is a gap in this analyzer's coverage, NOT a finding that the platform is supported — a language whose runtime is declared elsewhere (Package.swift, a REDACTED) is simply not read here yet.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via ToolchainServer (Module02/Auth). the service did not build — `cargo build --bin 'Auth'` exited 101: | 286 | pub fn bind_with_graceful_shutdown( | --------------------------- required by a bound in this associated function 287 | self, 288 | addr: impl Into<SocketAdd…; runtime evidence skipped (launch chosen because 'warp' dependency in Module02/Auth/Cargo.toml, binary 'Auth').
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and no C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby or Scala was found, and this repository's Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and no C#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby or Scala was found, and this repository's Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- P8 Schema migrations — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. The schema may be created by a runner, a deploy script or a config file outside what this check reads, so an absence here is our blind spot rather than a missing migration strategy. The card abstains instead of scoring. You can widen what we reach: if the schema is created and evolved by a tool this check does not name, naming it lets us teach the detector to read it.
- X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala or PHP was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or PHP was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java, TypeScript/JavaScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin or PHP was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Scala, Ruby and Python source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Scala, Ruby or Python was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Erlang, Python, Dart and Ruby source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Erlang, Python, Dart or Ruby was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X3 Exception handling — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and PHP, Java, Kotlin, Python, Ruby, Scala, Dart, Swift, Erlang, Go and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and no C# was loaded and no PHP, Java, Kotlin, Python, Ruby, Scala, Dart, Swift, Erlang, Go, JavaScript or TypeScript was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and MSBuild project configuration, TypeScript source and its tsconfig files, Java source and its package and module declarations, PHP source and its PHPStan and Psalm configuration, Dart source and its pubspec language version, Ruby source and its Sorbet and Steep configuration, Scala source and its build's explicit-nulls, WartRemover and Scalafix settings, and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded, no TypeScript was found, and this repository's Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — we run the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
- D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic domain model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
2 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was data_vault_exx::main at 24.
What to do
- Bring the 2 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with data_vault_exx::main (cognitive 24), AdvancedTokenizer::tokenize (cognitive 18). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 2 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.4 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
8 duplicated block group(s) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with btree.rs, node.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with main.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with node.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D5 · Coupling
20 production modules (Cargo), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; 0 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 15 of the 20 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, declare types in source no model reads, or have no source directory of their own).
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 10 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D9 · Test Distribution
39 test methods: 39 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The Rust suite contributes 39 `#[test]` function(s) across 15 file(s) declaring at least one; its unit/integration split is Cargo's own — 0 of those file(s) are integration-test targets under a crate's tests/ directory, and the rest are #[test] functions compiled into the crate they test.
D11 · Test Reliability
0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). Rust (Module07/valuetree, 15 test files): measured (0 flaky).
D13 · REDACTED Scanning
REDACTED scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 420 shipped crate(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from crates.io over the crates a consumer compiles — this repository commits no Cargo.lock, so its graph was resolved here: its manifests' `[dependencies]` and `[build-dependencies]` closed over the crates.io index, each crate at the newest release its requirement admits (what a fresh `cargo generate-lockfile` picks, not a graph the repository has pinned). Crates it asks for ONLY under `[dev-dependencies]` are excluded: they are not compiled by anything that depends on this repository.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted task-comment markers across 2906 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 15 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 20 build units (Cargo) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D28 · Secrets (history)
1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
8 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 3 medium, 1 low. 4 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 4 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D31 · IaC & Container Security
5 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 2 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
13 of 13 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is colors.rs. Counted over 13 of the 67 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 13 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with main.rs (7), colors.rs (2), node.rs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy
A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC2 · Forms & labels
- This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. — Module02/Web1/src/test.html:12
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×3) — Module02/Web1/src/404.html:2, Module02/Web1/src/test.html:2, Module02/Web2/404.html:2
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC5 · ARIA correctness
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- `.card-container` moves (`transition: transform 0.3s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — Module02/Web2/hello.html:49
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 4 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX9 · CQS / query purity
C1 · Data Protection
What to do
- Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (AWS KMS / Secrets Manager, GCP KMS / REDACTED Manager, Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault — not a key read from an environment variable beside the data) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (an AEAD over the field before Diesel/sqlx write it, SQLCipher, pgcrypto) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
- Enforce HTTPS on the server that receives this data: terminate TLS in it (axum-server/actix bind_rustls, tonic ServerTlsConfig, a tokio-rustls acceptor) and send Strict-Transport-Security, or run it behind a TLS-terminating proxy, so data in transit is always encrypted.
C2 · Access Controls
- Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect.
What to do
- Name the access rules — roles and permissions declared once (an enum Role/Permission, actix-web-grants #[protect(…)], axum-login's permission_required!, a casbin or oso policy) and consulted where access is checked, so the rule set is reviewable and testable on its own.
DM4 · Rich vs anemic domain model
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 7 of 20 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.7 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P10 · Library API & versioning
What to do
- Keep implementation types off the public surface (Rust: `pub(crate)`, or keep the module private) — even for a small library, every public type is a stability contract.
P2 · Observability
- Only 2/20 runnable modules use logging (modules with no entry point or server are excluded — they are libraries a runnable module hosts). Silent: `.`, `Module00`, `Module01/Todo`, `Module01/error`, `Module01/simple_calc` and 13 more.
What to do
- Extend structured logging to the remaining runnable modules so everything you run is diagnosable in production.
- Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (opentelemetry with tracing-opentelemetry) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add cargo-audit / cargo-deny (or clippy) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1715 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:7
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: cargo-audit / cargo-deny (or clippy) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience
- `reqwest::Client::new(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. — Module02/gitCheck/src/handlers.rs:9
What to do
- Give every client a whole-request bound: `reqwest::Client::builder().timeout(Duration::from_secs(10))` (never `reqwest::get` or `Client::new()`, which have none), ureq's `timeout_global`, or wrap the call in `tokio::time::timeout`; add retry with back-off (`reqwest-retry`'s `RetryTransientMiddleware`, `backoff`) around dependencies that fail.
PF1 · Benchmark discipline
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- The value is the token-signing key and is a compile-time constant, so the secret this operation depends on is published with the source. A key that ships with the source is not secret: every contributor, fork, mirror and released binary carries it, so anyone holding the repository can decrypt what any installation encrypted, and there is no way to invalidate what was already protected because every deployment built from this source shares the value. Where the constant is a password salt the consequence differs but is no smaller — one global salt means precomputation amortises across every installation, which is the property salting exists to destroy. Read the value from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager at startup and FAIL FAST when it is absent, so a missing key stops the process instead of silently falling back to a shared default; treat the committed value as disclosed and rotate it rather than only deleting the line. For a salt, generate a fresh random one per password and store it alongside the hash. (×2) — Module02/auth_server/src/jwt.rs:27, Module02/auth_server/src/jwt.rs:37
- This repository starts an HTTP server and nothing in its Rust source or committed `Rocket.toml` secures the transport: no TLS served (actix-web `bind_rustls`/`bind_openssl`, axum-server `bind_rustls` with a `RustlsConfig`, tonic `ServerTlsConfig`, a `TlsAcceptor`, Rocket's `[default.tls]`), no `Strict-Transport-Security` header, no `X-Forwarded-Proto` read from a TLS-terminating proxy — so its traffic may cross the network in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: `HttpServer::new(` (Module09/rust_backend/src/main.rs:28).
What to do
- Load cryptographic key and salt material from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager rather than fixing it in the source, and fail fast at startup when it is absent — a default that silently works is the one that reaches production. Rotate anything already committed: it must be treated as disclosed. Salts should be generated per password and stored with the hash, never shared across installations. This repository constructs key or salt material fixed at compile time at 2 sites, not one: `Module02/auth_server/src/jwt.rs:27` (token-signing key), `Module02/auth_server/src/jwt.rs:37` (token-signing key). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place.
- Secure the server's transport: serve TLS itself (`HttpServer::bind_rustls_0_23(addr, config)` in actix-web, `axum_server::bind_rustls(addr, RustlsConfig::from_pem_file(…))`, tonic's `Server::builder().tls_config(ServerTlsConfig::new().identity(…))`, Rocket's `[default.tls]`), or run it behind a TLS-terminating proxy and check `X-Forwarded-Proto`; send `Strict-Transport-Security` once it is HTTPS-only.
X1 · Async correctness
X14 · Bypassable address classification
X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard
X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element
X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 98% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 99% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 55% | Adequate — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 42% | Weak — gated by P3, P7 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 43% | Weak — gated by C1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Accessibility | 48% | Adequate — gated by AC6 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Performance | 91% | Exemplary | Solid. |
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — 1 observation(s) recorded · The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (an audit-log table or model — a struct, Diesel table, SeaORM entity or SQL migration table named for it — a SeaORM ActiveModelBehavior hook or database trigger that records each change, or an event-sourced store beside one) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
- C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 65 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: Rust with no dependency-injection crate has no container to hand one lifetime's instance to another — every value is owned by the code that builds it, and the borrow checker rejects a longer-lived value keeping a borrow of a shorter-lived one.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: Rust's compiler refuses unsynchronised shared mutation — a value shared across threads must be Sync — so the race this check looks for cannot be written.
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — the service did not build — `cargo build --bin 'Auth'` exited 101: | 286 | pub fn bind_with_graceful_shutdown( | --------------------------- required by a bound in this associated function 287 | self, 288 | addr: impl Into<SocketAdd…; runtime evidence skipped (launch chosen because 'warp' dependency in Module02/Auth/Cargo.toml, binary 'Auth') This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- D10 Test Quality — ~142 lines of test source are present (.rs) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Not scored — 29 direct Cargo declaration(s) were read, but the outdated signal needs crates.io, and no committed Cargo.lock resolves them to versions, so this dimension's own question is only partly answered. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
- D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency is measured on C# and TypeScript only; Rust, html not measured.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — API consistency is measured on C# only; the exposed Rust surface was not measured.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only — this repository's production source is .rs, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.rs), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Cargo manifest — not scanned yet).
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Cargo manifest — not scanned yet).
- D44 Platform End-of-Life — Platform end-of-life not assessed — this repository declares no platform this pass reads
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — this Rust crate declares no domain aggregate (a struct with private state and its own command methods), so DM1's aggregate-boundary read has no population to be taken over
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — the crate defines newtype typed-ids but declares no domain aggregate that could carry an id — so DM2's adoption ratio has no population to be taken over
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
- DM5 Encapsulated state — this Rust crate declares no type implementing a hand-rolled Hash/PartialEq, so DM5's value-identity encapsulation read has no population to be taken over
- DM7 Repository granularity — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
- ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and a call made through an inferred or generic receiver has no resolvable owner in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P8 Schema migrations — sqlx is declared, but the schema-migration mechanism could not be identified. Our limit, not a verdict on this repository.
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo install cargo-llvm-cov`, then `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X12 Unreachable branch — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X13 Undrained process stream — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Rust was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Rust request takes no token: a future is cancelled by dropping it, from outside the call (select!, a timeout, an aborted task), and reqwest, hyper and tonic take none
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Rust's compiler refuses the unsynchronised version: a collection shared between a callback's thread and the waiting body must be `Sync`, which a `Vec`, `VecDeque` or `HashMap` is only behind a `Mutex`/`RwLock`, so the race this check looks for cannot be written in safe Rust. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Rust was read, and it logs through none: the `log` crate's macros take one finished message (as log4net does in C#; its `kv` values are an opt-in its backends mostly drop), `println!`/`eprintln!` are not loggers, or it makes no log call outside its tests and examples at all. Calls through `tracing` (`tracing::info!`, or `info!` imported from it) would be judged.
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 11 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Cryptographic key material is a compile-time constant Module02/auth_server/src/jwt.rs:27
- Cryptographic key material is a compile-time constant Module02/auth_server/src/jwt.rs:37
- <input> without a programmatic label Module02/Web1/src/test.html:12
- REDACTED
Serious — 22 finding(s)
- Page without a main landmark Module02/Web1/src/404.html:2
- Page without a main landmark Module02/Web1/src/test.html:2
- Page without a main landmark Module02/Web2/404.html:2
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) Module07/btreemap/src/btree.rs:21
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) Module07/btreemap/src/node.rs:10
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard Module02/Web2/hello.html:49
- Accessibility enforcement below the top rung
- data_vault_exx::main (cognitive 24) Module03/data_vault_exx/src/main.rs:132
- AdvancedTokenizer::tokenize (cognitive 18) Module09/tokenize/src/main.rs:48
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) Module07/btreemap/src/main.rs:25
- Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) Module07/btreemap/src/node.rs:43
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) Module07/btreemap/src/node.rs:27
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) Module03/data_vault_exx/src/main.rs:170
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) Module07/btreemap/src/node.rs:63
- Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) Module07/btreemap/src/util.rs:11
- Outbound HTTP without resilience Module02/gitCheck/src/handlers.rs:9
Minor — 25 finding(s)
- Orphaned file colors.rs:1
- Orphaned file Module03/data_vault_exx/src/main.rs:1
- Orphaned file Module03/data_vault/src/colors.rs:1
- Orphaned file Module09/tokenize/src/main.rs:1
- Orphaned file Module07/valuetree/src/main.rs:1
- Orphaned file Module01/Todo/src/main.rs:1
- Orphaned file Module01/simple_calc/src/main.rs:1
- Orphaned file Module02/Chatbot/src/main.rs:1
- Orphaned file Module10/generic/src/higher_kind.rs:1
- Orphaned file Module09/rust_backend/src/middleware/auth.rs:1
- Orphaned file Module01/error/src/main.rs:1
- Orphaned file Module07/valuetree/src/node.rs:1
- Orphaned file Module07/btreemap/src/node.rs:1
- No named authorization policies
- No ADRs found
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Orphaned files with no living knowledge
- REDACTED
- No ADRs
- No src/ separation
- Logging is not universal
- No SAST REDACTED:7
- No changelog
- No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-7ef4694d58d5485eb2ff3527e48df1e8/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 1 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-7ef4694d58d5485eb2ff3527e48df1e8/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 8 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (dependency manifest found, not scanned for vulnerabilities here) | — | none (dependency manifest found, not scanned for vulnerabilities here): not applicable — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Cargo manifest — not scanned yet). | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 5 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | none (dependency manifest found, not scanned for vulnerabilities here) | — | none (dependency manifest found, not scanned for vulnerabilities here): not applicable — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Cargo manifest — not scanned yet). | 0 | — |