Public report of lissy93/web-check, published 14 November 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of
findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known
vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive reportMeasured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.11.4). Assert signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey →
Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 14 November 2026, 12:06 UTC · Survey ID cd_0bf8704f5d6c498db58b83abfa19658f
lissy93/web-check
Measured 14 November 2026, 12:05 UTC, at code version a701144
CAI scoreWeak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
No change since the last survey
The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.
A small codebase: 14,636 lines of product code in 1 project, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: under 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Production Readiness, 31
Findings by how serious they are
86 critical146 serious49 minor
5 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, we either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard we look for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.
This survey was produced by
Canine Code Analyzer
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Canine Code Analyzer engine 1.0.0
Measured
14 November 2026, 12:05 UTC
A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number
together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee
the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds the Canine Code Analyzer. It is open to any tool that
implements it, and today the Canine Code Analyzer is the only one that does.
The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. We work it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸
70of 70 dimensions measured by tools.
250of 281 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 31 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
70dimensions across 7 lenses, read from 14,636 lines of product code in 1 project.
lissy93/web-check falls short of our standard for production because the project has no automated tests and it has packages under a licence on your banned list. It scores 41 out of 100 and is rated Weak, and 65 of its 86 critical findings are security problems.
Production Readiness, at 31, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step for the work it takes is replacing the nine deprecated dependencies, worth about 5 points. Replacing the 14 packages under a banned licence would lift Production Readiness itself, worth about 8 points. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 49.
Forty-four pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Fourteen packages carry licence risk, and six passwords or keys are open to anyone who can read the repository. Pinning each tool to an exact version, replacing or clearing the banned-licence packages and replacing each exposed password or key would close these risks. Updating the vulnerable packages would fix the five packages with a known security hole, and limiting each secret to its own step would deal with the four secrets exposed to more of the pipeline than needed. The two images with no text description need a text description.
The product code is 14,636 lines, about €12,000 to rebuild.
A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.
How the score is built: what each lens counts forThe lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Forms & labels · <AnimatedInput> field component without a label src/components/form/ScanForm.astro
Forms & labels · <AnimatedInput> field component without a label src/components/homepage/HeroForm.astro
We compare every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.
Fixed since the last survey: 152 findings
These 152 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 26 October 2026, and are gone from this one. The first 100 are listed here.
Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
Large Files · src/client/components/misc/ProgressBar.tsx: 470 lines of code src/client/components/misc/ProgressBar.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~503 LoC) src/client/components/misc/ProgressBar.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~282 LoC) src/client/components/Form/Row.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~242 LoC) src/client/views/Results.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~178 LoC) src/client/components/misc/AdvisoryPanel.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~172 LoC) src/client/components/misc/Tooltip.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~109 LoC) src/client/components/Results/Threats.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~106 LoC) src/client/components/Form/Modal.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~100 LoC) src/client/components/Results/TlsConnection.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~97 LoC) api/screenshot.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~96 LoC) api/carbon.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~96 LoC) api/threats.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~95 LoC) api/ports.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~93 LoC) src/client/components/Results/SslCert.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~92 LoC) api/firewall.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~86 LoC) src/client/components/Form/Heading.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~85 LoC) src/client/components/Results/Rank.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~84 LoC) api/archives.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~80 LoC) api/security-txt.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~80 LoC) api/social-tags.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~80 LoC) src/client/components/Form/Button.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~80 LoC) src/client/components/misc/Icon.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~78 LoC) src/client/analysis/registry.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~75 LoC) src/client/components/Results/TlsClientCompat.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~73 LoC) src/data/about.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~72 LoC) src/client/components/Results/SecurityTxt.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~72 LoC) src/client/components/misc/DocContent.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~71 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/security-txt.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~71 LoC) src/client/components/Results/Cookies.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~69 LoC) src/client/components/Results/Lighthouse.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~69 LoC) src/client/components/Results/MixedContent.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~69 LoC) src/client/components/Results/SocialTags.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~68 LoC) api/status.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~66 LoC) src/client/components/Results/OpenPorts.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~65 LoC) src/client/views/NotFound.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~63 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/ssl.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~63 LoC) src/client/components/Form/Card.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~62 LoC) api/block-lists.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~62 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/tls-connection.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~62 LoC) src/client/components/Results/ServerLocation.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~62 LoC) src/client/components/misc/ErrorBoundary.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~61 LoC) src/client/components/Results/TraceRoute.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~61 LoC) src/client/components/Results/Vulnerabilities.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~60 LoC) src/client/components/Results/CarbonFootprint.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~60 LoC) src/client/components/misc/ActionButtons.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~59 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/robots-txt.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~58 LoC) api/trace-route.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~58 LoC) src/client/components/misc/ResultsMasonryGrid.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~58 LoC) src/client/components/misc/SelfScanMsg.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~57 LoC) src/client/components/Results/Trackers.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~55 LoC) src/client/components/Results/Redirects.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~55 LoC) src/client/utils/logger.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~54 LoC) api/breaches.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~54 LoC) api/linked-pages.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~54 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/hsts.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~53 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/tls-security-audit.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~53 LoC) src/client/utils/address-type-checker.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~52 LoC) src/client/components/Results/RobotsTxt.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~52 LoC) src/client/components/misc/LocationMap.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~50 LoC) api/cookies.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~48 LoC) api/tech-stack.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~47 LoC) api/robots-txt.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~47 LoC) src/client/components/Results/HttpSecurity.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~47 LoC) src/components/molecules/Icon.svelte
Dead Code · Dead file (~46 LoC) api/dns-server.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~46 LoC) src/client/utils/settings.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~45 LoC) api/ssl.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~44 LoC) api/_common/browser.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~44 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/trackers.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~43 LoC) api/redirects.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~43 LoC) src/client/components/Results/Breaches.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~43 LoC) src/layouts/scripts/theme.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~42 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/cookies.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~41 LoC) api/hsts.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~41 LoC) src/client/components/Results/ContentLinks.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~40 LoC) src/client/components/Results/CaaRecords.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~40 LoC) src/client/utils/format.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~39 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/domain-info.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~39 LoC) src/client/components/Results/ServerStatus.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~39 LoC) src/client/jobs/types.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~38 LoC) api/caa-records.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~38 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/redirects.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~38 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/tls-client-compat.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~37 LoC) api/dnssec.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~37 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/quality.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~36 LoC) src/client/components/Results/Hsts.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~34 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/social-presence.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~34 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/status.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~34 LoC) src/client/components/Results/DnsRecords.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~34 LoC) src/client/styles/dimensions.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~34 LoC) src/layouts/scripts/settings.js
Dead Code · Dead file (~33 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/ports.ts
Dead Code · Dead file (~33 LoC) src/client/components/Results/Sitemap.tsx
Dead Code · Dead file (~32 LoC) api/http-security.js
Rebuild cost: about €12,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild
€4,100 to €21,000, for 69 to 219 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem
Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor
×0.7 at a score of 41. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size
Small: 14,636 lines of product code
What it is not
Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one.
How the estimate is made: We price the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.
Top priorities
The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.
1
Resolve the 9 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (9).
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Raises the score by about 5 points · Medium effort · Test Coverage
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.
Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €12,000 to build again, under 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 31 (Weak). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Resolve the 9 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 5 points for low effort, because it clears the 9 Dependency Hygiene findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.
51 modules, with 31 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.
The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 11 more are left out to keep it readable.
Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
src.client.analysis.rules uses src.client.analysis.rules.mail-config, so a change to src.client.analysis.rules.mail-config can break src.client.analysis.rules, while a change to src.client.analysis.rules can't break src.client.analysis.rules.mail-config.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.analysis.rules uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.analysis.rules uses src.client.analysis.rules.mixed-content, so a change to src.client.analysis.rules.mixed-content can break src.client.analysis.rules, while a change to src.client.analysis.rules can't break src.client.analysis.rules.mixed-content.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.analysis.rules uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.analysis.rules uses src.client.analysis.types, so a change to src.client.analysis.types can break src.client.analysis.rules, while a change to src.client.analysis.rules can't break src.client.analysis.types.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.analysis.rules uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.Form.Button uses src.client.styles.dimensions, so a change to src.client.styles.dimensions can break src.client.components.Form.Button, while a change to src.client.components.Form.Button can't break src.client.styles.dimensions.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.Form.Button uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.Form.Row uses src.client.components.misc.Icon, so a change to src.client.components.misc.Icon can break src.client.components.Form.Row, while a change to src.client.components.Form.Row can't break src.client.components.misc.Icon.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.Form.Row uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.misc uses src.client.analysis.types, so a change to src.client.analysis.types can break src.client.components.misc, while a change to src.client.components.misc can't break src.client.analysis.types.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.misc uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.misc uses src.client.components.misc.AdditionalResources, so a change to src.client.components.misc.AdditionalResources can break src.client.components.misc, while a change to src.client.components.misc can't break src.client.components.misc.AdditionalResources.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.misc uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.misc uses src.client.components.misc.AdvisoryPanel, so a change to src.client.components.misc.AdvisoryPanel can break src.client.components.misc, while a change to src.client.components.misc can't break src.client.components.misc.AdvisoryPanel.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.misc uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.misc uses src.client.components.misc.Icon, so a change to src.client.components.misc.Icon can break src.client.components.misc, while a change to src.client.components.misc can't break src.client.components.misc.Icon.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.misc uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.misc uses src.client.components.misc.ProgressBar, so a change to src.client.components.misc.ProgressBar can break src.client.components.misc, while a change to src.client.components.misc can't break src.client.components.misc.ProgressBar.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.misc uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.jobs.types uses src.client.components.misc.ProgressBar, so a change to src.client.components.misc.ProgressBar can break src.client.jobs.types, while a change to src.client.jobs.types can't break src.client.components.misc.ProgressBar.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.jobs.types uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.styles uses src.client.styles.dimensions, so a change to src.client.styles.dimensions can break src.client.styles, while a change to src.client.styles can't break src.client.styles.dimensions.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.styles uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.utils uses src.client.utils.address-type-checker, so a change to src.client.utils.address-type-checker can break src.client.utils, while a change to src.client.utils can't break src.client.utils.address-type-checker.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.utils uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.utils uses src.client.utils.logger, so a change to src.client.utils.logger can break src.client.utils, while a change to src.client.utils can't break src.client.utils.logger.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.utils uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.utils uses src.client.utils.result-processor, so a change to src.client.utils.result-processor can break src.client.utils, while a change to src.client.utils can't break src.client.utils.result-processor.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.utils uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.Form uses src.client.components.Form.Card, so a change to src.client.components.Form.Card can break src.client.components.Form, while a change to src.client.components.Form can't break src.client.components.Form.Card.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.Form uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.Form uses src.client.components.Form.Heading, so a change to src.client.components.Form.Heading can break src.client.components.Form, while a change to src.client.components.Form can't break src.client.components.Form.Heading.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.Form uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.Form uses src.client.components.Form.Modal, so a change to src.client.components.Form.Modal can break src.client.components.Form, while a change to src.client.components.Form can't break src.client.components.Form.Modal.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.Form uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.Form uses src.client.components.misc.Icon, so a change to src.client.components.misc.Icon can break src.client.components.Form, while a change to src.client.components.Form can't break src.client.components.misc.Icon.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.Form uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.Form uses src.client.components.Form.Button, so a change to src.client.components.Form.Button can break src.client.components.Form, while a change to src.client.components.Form can't break src.client.components.Form.Button.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.Form uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.Form uses src.client.components.Form.Row, so a change to src.client.components.Form.Row can break src.client.components.Form, while a change to src.client.components.Form can't break src.client.components.Form.Row.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.Form uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.Results uses src.client.analysis.rules.mail-config, so a change to src.client.analysis.rules.mail-config can break src.client.components.Results, while a change to src.client.components.Results can't break src.client.analysis.rules.mail-config.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.Results uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.Results uses src.client.components.Results.Lighthouse, so a change to src.client.components.Results.Lighthouse can break src.client.components.Results, while a change to src.client.components.Results can't break src.client.components.Results.Lighthouse.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.Results uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.Results uses src.client.components.misc.Icon, so a change to src.client.components.misc.Icon can break src.client.components.Results, while a change to src.client.components.Results can't break src.client.components.misc.Icon.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.Results uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.Results uses src.client.components.Form.Row, so a change to src.client.components.Form.Row can break src.client.components.Results, while a change to src.client.components.Results can't break src.client.components.Form.Row.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.Results uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.components.misc.CheckDetail uses src.client.jobs.types, so a change to src.client.jobs.types can break src.client.components.misc.CheckDetail, while a change to src.client.components.misc.CheckDetail can't break src.client.jobs.types.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.components.misc.CheckDetail uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.hooks uses src.client.components.misc.ActionButtons, so a change to src.client.components.misc.ActionButtons can break src.client.hooks, while a change to src.client.hooks can't break src.client.components.misc.ActionButtons.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.hooks uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.hooks uses src.client.utils.address-type-checker, so a change to src.client.utils.address-type-checker can break src.client.hooks, while a change to src.client.hooks can't break src.client.utils.address-type-checker.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.hooks uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.hooks uses src.client.jobs.types, so a change to src.client.jobs.types can break src.client.hooks, while a change to src.client.hooks can't break src.client.jobs.types.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.hooks uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.jobs uses src.client.jobs.registry, so a change to src.client.jobs.registry can break src.client.jobs, while a change to src.client.jobs can't break src.client.jobs.registry.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.jobs uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
src.client.jobs uses src.client.jobs.types, so a change to src.client.jobs.types can break src.client.jobs, while a change to src.client.jobs can't break src.client.jobs.types.
Position
Below the diagonal: src.client.jobs uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health · 56% · Adequate · gated by R7 ·
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2025 — Injection
53
High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures
14
High / Critical
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures
7
High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration
5
High / Critical
Roadmap
Top priorities: Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage; Resolve the 14 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance — start with REDACTED (14); Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 9 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (9).
Bound every outbound call: pass `signal: AbortSignal.timeout(ms)` to `fetch`, set `timeout` on the axios instance (`axios.create({ timeout })`), and add retries with back-off (`axios-retry`, `p-retry`) and a breaker (`opossum`, `cockatiel`) around dependencies that fail.
Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this
survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.
Critical — 86
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a
missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here
tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 146
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades
the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to
carry for two years either.
Minor — 49
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions.
Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 5
Something this survey could not settle
from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no
positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves
nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean
result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither
rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each
one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 70 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
Every figure here is one of two kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10.
What we checked — 70 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 250 of 281 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (44 contributor(s) across 857 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 83% of the history; the other 43 hold 0.4% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
D26 Project Cohesion — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `(repository root)` (14579 LoC, 194 module-visible types across 20 directories) is over its size bounds, and whether one unit is a coherent whole or a grab-bag is read from its type references: the parts of it that reach the rest only through its shared core. Those are read over the C#/VB code model, which this unit's source did not supply. Its size alone is no verdict on its cohesion, so none is published.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `src/data/categories.ts`, `src/data/checks/archives.ts`, `src/data/checks/block-lists.ts`, `src/data/checks/breaches.ts`, `src/data/checks/caa-records.ts`, … (+41 more) produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via REDACTED (REDACTED). docker build failed (exit 1) — 18 | >>> yarn install --pure-lockfile --network-timeout 100000 && \ 19 | >>> rm -rf /app/node_modules/.cache 20 | -------------------- ERROR: failed to solve: process "/bin/sh -c npm pkg delete devDependencies && yarn install --pure-lockfile --network-timeout 100000 && rm -rf /app/node_modules/.cache" did not complete successfully: exit code: 1; runtime evidence skipped.
P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
R7 Dead Code — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. 134 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 174.
X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP log through no library that carries a message's values as fields (pino, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr; Python's logging, structlog; PHP's PSR-3 loggers), so its log calls cannot be judged, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside our isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value is measured as redundancy only: a comment that repeats its code's words is found, but a paraphrase in other words, a vague comment, or one the code contradicts is not, and whether a comment is valuable is not claimed. Comments in other scripts or languages, and outside C#, are not judged.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Bring the 1 body over 30 down to 30 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with Results.Results (cyclomatic 39). — Refactoring it lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 8.3 to about 8.6/10.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Bring the 8 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with Results.Results (cognitive 35), useJobs.useJobs (cognitive 22), Threats.MalwareCard (cognitive 21). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 8 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 8.2 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.1 / 10Stronggated by 3 serious findings✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 2 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with REDACTED, useJobs.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with glossary.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.
Method: Coverage from the analyzer's own run of the suite, computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. A coverage report found in the repository is never read. When the suite can't be built/run in-image, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, not deprecated, and not bloated. Known vulnerabilities are D30's.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (capped-linear for deprecation, prerelease and outdated) per KLoC. Known-vulnerable packages are D30's and are not charged here (rubric-2026.11.2). Exhaustive.
17 outdated direct production npm dependency(ies) of 40 graded, 0 pinning defect(s), across 1 package.json (1 of them the product) and 1 committed lockfile(s). Development dependencies are deliberately not graded for currency: that grade is about what SHIPS. 1 direct dependency(ies) — production, development or optional — are marked DEPRECATED by their publisher (the registry's per-version mark, or the lockfile's copy of it when the registry could not be asked); deprecated transitive packages are listed but not charged. Whether any is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — the registry publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: that is a source question, and the frontend dependency lens (R8) answers it in this same run. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.
Resolve the 9 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with package.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Outdated (npm) finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with package.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
14 of 678 shipped npm package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from registry.npmjs.org over the 678 package(s) this repository's committed lockfile installs for a consumer — its 40 production, optional and peer dependency(ies), across 1 product package.json manifest(s), and everything those install in turn. Its 14 `devDependencies` declaration(s), and every package only they reach, are excluded: a consumer installs none of them. ★ Each licence is the one the registry publishes for the package's CURRENT release rather than for the pinned version, which is the same caveat the Hex and RubyGems arms carry. 1 of them publish no licence this pass can read on registry.npmjs.org — an absent field, `UNLICENSED`, or a `SEE LICENSE IN <file>` pointer into a tarball this pass does not download; that is missing data, not a violation, and none of them is charged.
Resolve the 14 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance — start with REDACTED (14). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Resolve the 4 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with REDACTED, Threats.tsx, SocialTags.tsx. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
0 deducted task-comment markers across 10901 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Every README, docs/ document and root guide parsed by its markup and measured in Unicode letters. Published: a runnable or packaged .NET project whose README (or a document it links, or a root guide) shows no example, and a root README naming none of three or more projects. Overview, licence, boilerplate, wall-of-text, empty-section and XML-doc rows are measured and withheld (counted in gaps) after adjudication. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 2 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Every ADR read by its section structure: nine located rules (a missing Decision, Context or Consequences section, a stale status, two records deciding the same question, a dangling supersede link, a number-only title, a single option, no named cost, no status where the log uses one, no enforcement field where the log adopted one), each a fixed deduction from 10; the score is the mean over evaluated records. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with fly.toml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Every inline C# comment compared word by word with the identifiers, literals and constructs of the code it annotates (taken from the syntax); a comment whose words that code already contains is redundant, as are closing-brace labels and generator template text. Comments giving a reason or a reference are kept; other scripts and languages are not judged. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
20 % of calls cross a namespace and 0 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.
6 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
Resolve the 6 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (5), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
53 finding(s): 0 critical, 49 high, 4 medium, 0 low. 44 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 46 file(s) — `src/data/categories.ts` (line 137), `src/data/checks/archives.ts` (line 17), `src/data/checks/block-lists.ts` (line 23), `src/data/checks/breaches.ts` (line 14), `src/data/checks/caa-records.ts` (line 27), … (+41 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 3 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 44 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (44 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.
Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): every row is a match against a vulnerability database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.
Resolve the 6 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Resolve the 5 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Low CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 64 of the 219 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Reported apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.
Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): the malicious-package feed is a database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.
What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.
Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 0 platform declaration(s) and 40 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
Coverage: Population: image/media elements — img, area, input[type=image], svg, video, object, embed, canvas — across the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and dynamic-attribute elements are skipped. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is NOT read by any producer, so it contributes no element to this population; where such a frontend is present the card discloses it as an analyzer gap rather than scoring around it.
An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×2) — public/error.html:11, public/placeholder.html:11
What to do
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. — src/components/form/AnimatedInput.astro:20
This UI-library field component has no label / aria-label / aria-labelledby / id at this call site, and nothing written inside it here carries one either (a name prop is the form-submission key, not a label; an id, even one the component sets on what it renders, names nothing until a label points at it) — so it likely renders an unlabelled control. Name it whichever way this library supports: a label prop, an aria-label, or an id on the rendered control with a <label for> pointing at it. For a group of controls, name the group itself (aria-label, or a fieldset with a legend) — labelling each item leaves the set unnamed. (×2) — src/components/form/ScanForm.astro:20, src/components/homepage/HeroForm.astro:26
A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one). — src/components/molecules/OptionCards.astro:36
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×2) — public/error.html:2, public/placeholder.html:2
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no element the repo's own CSS styles `cursor: pointer` without giving it any of the three, no unfocusable element whose only binding is a mouse enter/leave pair or a double-click, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
Coverage: Population: elements that pose a keyboard-semantics question, in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) — a non-natively-interactive element carrying a click handler, a double-click or hover enter/leave binding, a pointer-only gesture on a tabindex="0" element, or `cursor: pointer` from the repo's own CSS; an href-less or placeholder-href (#, javascript:) anchor; and any element with a positive tabindex. Natively interactive elements used correctly (<button>, <a href>, form controls) are NOT in the population — there is nothing to judge — so a page of nothing but correct controls gives AC4 nothing to measure. Keyboard reachability is judged from the markup, never from a rendered page. ★ An interactive element declared in a tagged-template (html`…`) or hyperscript frontend is NOT in this population — no producer reads either — so an empty population is reported as an analyzer gap, never as "this repository has no interactive elements".
This <span> carries its own click handler, but it sits inside a <a> that performs a different action. A keyboard user reaches the <a> and activating it runs the <a>'s handler, never this one, so this action has no keyboard path at all. Role and tabindex cannot supply one: HTML forbids a <a> from containing interactive content or any descendant with a tabindex, so the browser will not put this element in the tab order however it is marked up. Move it out of the <a> and make it a sibling <button>, so each action has its own control. — src/client/components/misc/AdditionalResources.tsx:344
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Coverage: Population: elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) that carry a role or an aria-* attribute; roles and token values are checked against the ARIA enums exhaustively within that set. An expression-valued (dynamic) role or aria-* value is skipped rather than guessed, and markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
`ul li .body button.jump:focus-visible` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — src/client/components/misc/AdvisoryPanel.tsx:105
`details ul li button.docs:focus-visible` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — src/client/components/misc/ProgressBar.tsx:135
`iframe` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — src/client/components/misc/ViewRaw.tsx:34
`.css-in-js` moves (`transition: height 0.3s ease-in-out,
min-height 0.3s ease-in-out,
opacity 0.3s ease-in-out`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — src/client/components/misc/Loader.tsx:24
`div` moves (`transition: grid-template-rows 0.3s ease,
opacity 0.25s ease,
transform 0.3s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — src/client/components/misc/ProgressBar.tsx:61
`div` moves (`transition: opacity 0.15s ease-out,
transform 0.15s ease-out,
overlay 0.15s allow-discrete,
display 0.15s allow-discrete`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — src/client/components/misc/Tooltip.tsx:45
`div` moves (`animation: ________________ 1s linear infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — src/client/components/Form/Button.tsx:52
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C2 · Access Controls3.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect. — api/security-txt.js:32
Only 2 place(s) refuse an unauthorized caller — too few to demonstrate default-deny across handlers.
What to do
Name the access rules — roles/permissions declared once (a @Roles/@Permissions decorator with its guard, a CASL ability, a casbin model, or Supabase CREATE POLICY) and consulted where access is checked, so the rule set is reviewable and testable on its own.
Enforce authorization at every handler — a guard on each route, or a global authentication guard/middleware with explicit public opt-outs, so protected-by-default is demonstrable.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript: functions whose whole body still throws a "not implemented" error, and placeholder text (lorem ipsum, changeme/replace_me…) left in strings and JSX of non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords, in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript: functions that only throw a "not implemented" error, functions that take inputs and return a constant or do nothing, async functions that never await, dead `if (false)` branches, and skeleton classes most of whose methods are holes.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository and its projects have a README, and whether it is substantive.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository is organised deliberately: production code and tests are set apart in a way its ecosystem or the repository itself declares.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 15 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:15
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 16 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:16
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 248 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:248
`src/client/components/misc/ErrorBoundary.tsx` reports through `console.*` at line 34 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/client/components/misc/ErrorBoundary.tsx:34
What to do
Route service-code `console.*` output through the module's structured logger (with named fields), so delivery outcomes and failures reach the log pipeline with a level.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
`REDACTED` run(s) a static-analysis scan, but no workflow that runs one is triggered by a pull request (or a merge queue, or an unfiltered push) — the scan fires on a schedule or a manual dispatch only. A vulnerable change therefore merges clean and is reported on the next scheduled run, by which time it is on the default branch and the only remedy is a follow-up fix. Add the pull-request trigger to the workflow that runs the scan so the finding arrives before the merge rather than after it.
What to do
Trigger your SAST workflow on pull requests — a scan that only runs on a cron reports history, it does not gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.
Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.
`fetch(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. — healthcheck.js:5
What to do
Bound every outbound call: pass `signal: AbortSignal.timeout(ms)` to `fetch`, set `timeout` on the axios instance (`axios.create({ timeout })`), and add retries with back-off (`axios-retry`, `p-retry`) and a breaker (`opossum`, `cockatiel`) around dependencies that fail.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from each language's code model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
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R1 · Type Safety7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
React / JS · Code Health — The share of the scored frontend lines inside a near-exact copy-pasted block of substantial extent (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386; each line once, 10 at none and 0 at a quarter of the lines, as D4): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.
Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Scored on the share of the scored frontend lines inside a reported copy, on the same curve as D4. Deterministic.
src/client/analysis/rules/mail-config.ts:43 · src/client/analysis/rules/mail-config.ts:78 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/client/analysis/rules/mail-config.ts:43
src/client/analysis/rules/mixed-content.ts:24 · src/client/analysis/rules/mixed-content.ts:67 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — src/client/analysis/rules/mixed-content.ts:24
api/mail-config.js:46 · src/client/analysis/rules/mail-config.ts:21 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — api/mail-config.js:46
src/client/components/Results/Breaches.tsx:7 · src/client/components/Results/CaaRecords.tsx:23 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/client/components/Results/Breaches.tsx:7
src/client/components/Results/SocialPresence.tsx:67 · src/client/components/Results/TechStack.tsx:80 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 51 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — src/client/components/Results/SocialPresence.tsx:67
src/client/components/Results/TechStack.tsx:80 · src/client/components/Results/TxtRecords.tsx:10 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 61 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — src/client/components/Results/TechStack.tsx:80
api/_common/browser.js:29 · api/cookies.js:11 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 51 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — api/_common/browser.js:29
src/client/components/Results/Archives.tsx:5 · src/client/components/Results/Firewall.tsx:4 · src/client/components/Results/ServerStatus.tsx:13 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/client/components/Results/Archives.tsx:5
src/client/components/Results/Archives.tsx:3 · src/client/components/Results/DnsServer.tsx:2 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/client/components/Results/Archives.tsx:3
src/client/components/Results/DnsSec.tsx:133 · src/client/components/Results/HttpSecurity.tsx:31 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/client/components/Results/DnsSec.tsx:133
src/client/components/Results/DomainLookup.tsx:4 · src/client/components/Results/TlsConnection.tsx:24 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 56 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — src/client/components/Results/DomainLookup.tsx:4
src/client/components/Results/HttpSecurity.tsx:33 · src/client/components/Results/TechStack.tsx:80 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 51 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — src/client/components/Results/HttpSecurity.tsx:33
src/client/components/Results/HttpSecurity.tsx:33 · src/client/components/Results/SocialTags.tsx:29 · src/client/components/Results/TxtRecords.tsx:10 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/client/components/Results/HttpSecurity.tsx:33
src/client/components/Results/Rank.tsx:66 · src/client/components/Results/TechStack.tsx:80 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 50 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — src/client/components/Results/Rank.tsx:66
src/client/components/Results/Redirects.tsx:21 · src/client/components/Results/TechStack.tsx:80 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 50 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — src/client/components/Results/Redirects.tsx:21
src/client/components/Results/TechStack.tsx:80 · src/client/components/Results/Vulnerabilities.tsx:22 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 50 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — src/client/components/Results/TechStack.tsx:80
What to do
Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
(anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 and cognitive complexity 23; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/client/views/Results.tsx:77
(anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 23 and cognitive complexity 20; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/client/components/Results/Threats.tsx:17
isPrivateTarget has cyclomatic complexity 21 and cognitive complexity 17; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — api/_common/check-skipper.js:123
(anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 18 and cognitive complexity 16; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/client/components/Results/TlsConnection.tsx:28
getMtaSts has cyclomatic complexity 14 and cognitive complexity 16; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — api/mail-config.js:143
(anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 14 and cognitive complexity 13; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/client/components/Results/SslCert.tsx:42
securityTxtHandler has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 19; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — api/security-txt.js:36
(anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 12; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/client/components/Results/SocialTags.tsx:29
tlsSecurityAudit has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 13; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/client/analysis/rules/tls-security-audit.ts:27
upstreamError has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 11; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — api/_common/upstream.js:2
threats has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 11; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/client/analysis/rules/threats.ts:4
(anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 11; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/client/components/Results/DnsRecords.tsx:8
mailConfigHandler has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 10; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — api/mail-config.js:186
(anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 14; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/client/analysis/rules/mixed-content.ts:51
send has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 12; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — api/_common/http.js:93
(anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 10; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. (×3) — api/tls-connection.js:41, src/client/components/Results/DomainLookup.tsx:4, src/client/components/misc/ProgressBar.tsx:354
(anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 9; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/client/components/Results/SocialPresence.tsx:75
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R3 · Large Files9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
src/data/glossary.ts has 897 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module. — src/data/glossary.ts:1
src/client/components/misc/ProgressBar.tsx has 434 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module. — src/client/components/misc/ProgressBar.tsx:1
What to do
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
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R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
0% of 173 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph — 'production' here is the RESIDUE: every source file left once tests, tooling, generated output, config, declarations and declaration-only modules, fixture corpora, type fixtures, behaviour-free data modules, re-export barrels, registration/constant data modules and service workers are set aside, so the percentage is taken over a smaller denominator than the workspace's file count
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
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R6 · Tooling6.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
test ✗ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✓ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
What to do
Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
Unreachable from the 2 application, 7 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on `yarn run build` — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 7 in-repo import(s) from 7 other file(s) do name it (src/client/components/Form/Row.tsx, src/client/components/Results/DnsSec.tsx, src/client/components/Results/HttpSecurity.tsx and 4 more) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/data/glossary.ts
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 5 in-repo import(s) from 5 other file(s) do name it (src/client/components/misc/CheckDetail.tsx, src/client/components/misc/Loader.tsx, src/client/hooks/useJobs.ts and 2 more) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/client/components/misc/ProgressBar.tsx
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/client/analysis/registry.ts, src/client/views/Results.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/client/jobs/registry.ts
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/views/Results.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it (×7) — src/client/components/misc/AdditionalResources.tsx, src/client/hooks/useJobs.ts, src/client/components/misc/Loader.tsx, …
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make (×11) — api/social-presence.js, api/mail-config.js, src/components/homepage/HomeBackground.tsx, …
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 40 in-repo import(s) from 40 other file(s) do name it (src/client/components/Results/Archives.tsx, src/client/components/Results/BlockLists.tsx, src/client/components/Results/Breaches.tsx and 37 more) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/client/components/Form/Row.tsx
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/App.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it (×2) — src/client/views/Results.tsx, src/client/components/boundaries/PageError.tsx
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/client/analysis/registry.ts, src/client/components/Results/MailConfig.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/client/analysis/rules/mail-config.ts
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/client/components/misc/CheckDetail.tsx, src/client/views/Results.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/client/components/misc/AdvisoryPanel.tsx
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/client/analysis/registry.ts, src/client/components/Results/HttpSecurity.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/client/analysis/rules/http-security.ts
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/jobs/registry.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it (×6) — src/client/components/Results/DnsSec.tsx, src/client/components/Results/TlsSecurityAudit.tsx, src/client/components/Results/Threats.tsx, …
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/components/Form/Row.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/client/components/misc/Tooltip.tsx
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 13 in-repo import(s) from 13 other file(s) do name it (src/client/analysis/rules/vulnerabilities.ts, src/client/components/Results/ContentLinks.tsx, src/client/components/Results/Cookies.tsx and 10 more) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/client/utils/result-processor.ts
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 28 in-repo import(s) from 28 other file(s) do name it (api/archives.js, api/breaches.js, api/carbon.js and 25 more) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — api/_common/http.js
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/utils/settings.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/data/settings.ts
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 40 in-repo import(s) from 40 other file(s) do name it (api/archives.js, api/block-lists.js, api/breaches.js and 37 more) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — REDACTED
no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/client/analysis/registry.ts, src/client/components/Results/MixedContent.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — src/client/analysis/rules/mixed-content.ts
What to do
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it. (×4)
Every import is type-only — move it to devDependencies. — src/client/components/Results/SocialPresence.tsx:2
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Other · Security — Read from this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript source: cryptographic hygiene (weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source) and outbound TLS (certificate validation, protocol version) — facts about code that hold whether or not it serves anything itself. Markup this repository SHIPS is scored for third-party script integrity whether or not the repository serves it itself, since a page handed to a consumer runs in that consumer’s origin. This repository commits the configuration that serves its own HTTP surface, so that configuration was read in full for the security response headers it sets. Of the server controls, two are read where the source shows them: every session or sign-in cookie the code sets is read for HttpOnly, Secure and SameSite at the line that sets it (a raw `Set-Cookie` header, Express, Fastify, Hono, Koa, Next.js, `cookie.serialize`, express-session and cookie-session), and every Node listener for HTTPS enforcement. HSTS, security response headers and input validation are NOT assessed for JavaScript/TypeScript: each is scored as an absence, an absence is only reportable over the production HTTP server, and in this ecosystem the file that opens the port is build output or a framework launcher rather than a file in the source tree. Their absence here is not a finding about this repository.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.
`rejectUnauthorized: false` is set on a TLS client, so every peer certificate is accepted — including one an attacker presents. Chain, expiry, revocation and hostname are all skipped, so an attacker on the network path can present any certificate and read or rewrite the traffic — the connection is encrypted to the attacker, not to the intended host. Remove the option so Node validates the peer. If the server presents a self-signed or privately-issued certificate, trust THAT issuer rather than every certificate: pass its CA as `ca` (or set `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`), which keeps the chain and hostname checks on. A managed database or broker that documents `rejectUnauthorized: false` publishes a CA bundle for exactly this purpose. (×3) — api/ssl.js:18, api/tls-connection.js:25, api/tls-connection.js:98
`https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/swagger-ui/4.1.3/swagger-ui-bundle.js` is executed by this page with no Subresource Integrity. Whoever can answer that request — the CDN, anyone who compromises it, anyone on the network path — runs arbitrary script in this page's origin, with its session. — src/pages/web-check-api/spec.astro:29
What to do
Stop accepting every TLS certificate: delete `rejectUnauthorized: false` / `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` so the chain, hostname and expiry are verified, and trust a self-signed or private server by passing its CA (`ca`, or `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`) — never by switching verification off. This repository constructs a TLS client that accepts any certificate at 3 sites, not one: `api/ssl.js:18` (`rejectUnauthorized: false`), `api/tls-connection.js:25` (`rejectUnauthorized: false`), `api/tls-connection.js:98` (`rejectUnauthorized: false`). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place.
Pin third-party scripts and verify them: name an exact version in the URL and add an `integrity="sha384-…"` hash alongside `crossorigin="anonymous"` (both are required — an integrity hash on a cross-origin script without `crossorigin` is not evaluated, it blocks the script). Where the vendor ships a continuously-updated loader and publishes no stable hash (tag managers, analytics, chat widgets), Subresource Integrity is not available: constrain it instead with a `Content-Security-Policy` that names the exact origins allowed to execute, and drop the script from the pages that do not need it. Where the page is shipped inside a package that others host, prefer vendoring the asset and serving it from the app’s own origin, so no consumer inherits a third-party dependency they did not choose.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
`forEach` ignores what its callback returns, so the Promise each `async` call returns is dropped: nothing can await it, the code after this loop runs before any of the awaited work has finished (a function that `await`s around this loop still returns early), and a rejection is never handled — in Node.js an unhandled rejection terminates the process by default, and in a browser it is lost. Iterate with `for (const item of items) { await … }` when the work must run in order, or `await Promise.all(items.map(async (item) => { … }))` when it may run concurrently, so the enclosing function finishes only when the work does and its failures reach the caller. Where firing and forgetting is genuinely intended, make the callback's whole body a `try { … } catch (e) { … }` that handles the failure, so it cannot escape. — REDACTED:101
The function passed to `new Promise(…)` is `async`. The constructor ignores what its executor returns, so anything this executor throws — every throw inside an `async` function, including after an `await` — rejects a Promise nobody holds instead of the one being constructed: the outer Promise never settles, whoever awaits it hangs, and the error is reported nowhere. If the body needs `await`, it does not need `new Promise` at all: make the enclosing function `async` and `return` the value (or `throw`) directly. If it wraps a callback API, keep the executor synchronous — call the API and `resolve`/`reject` from its callback — and do the awaiting outside it. — REDACTED:144
Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
`hasData` is exported and takes `r: any` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 58 (`hasData`) with a piece of `r` (and at line 59) — and nowhere in `hasData` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. JavaScript sets no limit of its own on that nesting: `JSON.parse` accepts any depth, so a 100,000-byte body — inside Express's default 100kb limit — parses to 50,000 levels, and a walk like this one throws `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded` long before it reaches the bottom. Wherever that throw lands, the work fails: a request errors, and a walk running outside any `try` — an event handler, a timer, a promise nobody awaits — takes the Node process down with every other request in flight. Thread a depth argument through `hasData` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — src/client/utils/result-processor.ts:58
What to do
Each finding names the externally-callable member that accepts the document and the self-call that descends, and states that no depth parameter or counter exists anywhere in the walk. Confirm from the two, then thread a depth argument through the walk and reject documents past a fixed maximum, or rewrite it with an explicit stack.
Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether async functions that make a cancellable request accept or pass on an AbortSignal (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.
Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.
Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. (×5) — src/layouts/scripts/settings.js:25, src/layouts/scripts/theme.js:28, src/client/utils/settings.ts:33, …
`.catch(() => {})` handles the rejection by doing nothing — the failure is discarded with no log and no rethrow, and the chain carries on as if the work succeeded. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, hand it to a caller that can (`next(error)`, a returned rejection), or don't catch it. (×5) — api/carbon.js:48, api/cookies.js:16, api/trackers.js:71, …
Other · Code Health — Whether strict null checking is enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` assertion — TypeScript's `strictNullChecks` (which `strict` turns on) is what makes `string` exclude `null` and `undefined`, and the postfix `!` is the operator that silences it.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
~0.3 `!` null assertions per 1k TypeScript source lines — 3 assertion(s) across the 11817 source line(s) of the 165 TypeScript file(s) read, which is the only code the operator asserts anything in (a `!` in a `.js` file is not this operator and was not counted, and one in a file whose null checking is off silences nothing). Densest: src/client/analysis/rules/http-security.ts (1), src/client/components/Results/MailConfig.tsx (1), src/client/components/misc/Tooltip.tsx (1). Each one tells the compiler to trust the author about null, suppressing the very diagnostic `strictNullChecks` exists to produce. Many are correct: each is a claim the checker could not verify, and it is wrong only where the value can in fact be missing, so review the densest places first.
What to do
The findings name the configuration each number was taken from and, for the assertions, the files that hold them. Turn null checking on where it is off — `"strict": true` in the base tsconfig that the others extend switches `strictNullChecks` on with the rest of the family — and then resolve the assertions rather than adding to them. A `!` on a value the checker could show to be null is a promise the author cannot check from where they are standing, and each one is a `TypeError: Cannot read properties of null` waiting for the path that makes it true; where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (narrow it with a test, make the property required, drop the `?`).
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Unscored — 2 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.
X10 Duplicated predicate — 4 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 55 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's TypeScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — docker build failed (exit 1) — 18 | >>> yarn install --pure-lockfile --network-timeout 100000 && \ 19 | >>> rm -rf /app/node_modules/.cache 20 | -------------------- ERROR: failed to solve: process "/bin/sh -c npm pkg delete devDependencies && yarn install --pure-lockfile --network-timeout 100000 && rm -rf /app/node_modules/.cache" did not complete successfully: exit code: 1; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect. If it does persist personal data (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the controls belong to wherever that data is stored.
C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the limit belongs wherever that data is stored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the rights are served wherever that data is stored.
D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
D11 Test Reliability — No test suite was found to re-run, so reliability couldn't be assessed. Two searches produced that zero and both came back empty: the classifier that reads the loaded workspace recognised no suite it could run, and a walk of the source on disk — which covers the JS/TS `*.test.*` and `*.spec.*` conventions and probes for a Pester suite — found no test source in any other ecosystem either. Neither search reaches a suite that is missing from the loaded workspace and carries no name either walk recognises, so this is 'no suite found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none.
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (1331 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — D26 could not read how the parts of this repository's one build unit reference each other, so its cohesion was not measured. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 46 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
D4 Code Duplication — This repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) is not read by D4's token comparison, which compares .NET source: duplication in it is measured by R10 Code Duplication, the frontend lens's card running the same clone algorithm over the JS/TS token stream. Not scored here — read the R10 card for this repository's duplication.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this npm build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 2 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks. 8 claim(s) of kinds M4 does not check were not checked (command argument 3, environment variable 5); M4 checks only links and versions and artefact counts.
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D30 (Dependency Vulnerabilities), which answers every ecosystem
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — Not applicable: this check looks for a loop whose body adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is walking, invalidating the enumerator it holds, and in this repository's languages that cannot happen. JavaScript and TypeScript have no iterator that a change can invalidate: an `Array` is walked by index against its live length, and a `Map` or `Set` by the ECMAScript specification's live entry list, so a body that adds to, removes from or empties what it walks raises nothing — every loop form (`for…of`, `for…in`, `forEach`, `map`, `filter`, `reduce`, `entries()`) on every built-in collection (`Array`, `Map`, `Set`, plain objects, `URLSearchParams`, `Headers`, `FormData`) runs to completion. Such a loop can still skip an element or never end, which is a different defect and not the one this check asks about. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
Banned license: @img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64 REDACTED:1049— `@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64` 1.3.4 is published on registry.npmjs.org under `LGPL-3.0-or-later`, which this policy bans, and it is not declared by this repository but is installed by one of its production, optional or peer dependencies, as its committed lockfile resolves — a transitive dependency ships its licence just the same — so it is installed by everything that depends on this repository, not just by its build toolchain. A package offering SEVERAL licences is a choice and is only charged when every one of them is banned. Replace the package (or the dependency that pulls it in), or record an accepted exception. ★ The licence that makes this row is LGPL-3.0, and unmodified use is often permitted: the LGPL lets your code use an UNMODIFIED copy of the library that stays a separately installed package (its own entry in node_modules, site-packages or the gem path, which a user can replace) without your code coming under the LGPL. What it then asks is that you pass on its licence and notices and let users swap in their own build of it (LGPL-3.0 section 4). Modifying it, copying its code into yours, or merging it into one bundled or statically linked artifact is where the obligations grow, and this policy cannot see which you do — that is why it denies LGPL-3.0 by default. If you use it unmodified and separately installed, allow it in your repository's licence policy rather than replacing it: add `LGPL-3.0-only` / `LGPL-3.0-or-later` to the allow-list of the licence check your CI runs (`license-checker --onlyAllow`, the `allow-licenses` input of GitHub's dependency-review-action, `[licenses] allow` in cargo-deny's deny.toml), record why in the same change, and hide this row on the findings page with that reason. This scan's banned set is not read from that file, so the row stays until it is hidden.
Banned license: @img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64 REDACTED:1054— `@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64` 1.3.4 is published on registry.npmjs.org under `LGPL-3.0-or-later`, which this policy bans, and it is not declared by this repository but is installed by one of its production, optional or peer dependencies, as its committed lockfile resolves — a transitive dependency ships its licence just the same — so it is installed by everything that depends on this repository, not just by its build toolchain. A package offering SEVERAL licences is a choice and is only charged when every one of them is banned. Replace the package (or the dependency that pulls it in), or record an accepted exception. ★ The licence that makes this row is LGPL-3.0, and unmodified use is often permitted: the LGPL lets your code use an UNMODIFIED copy of the library that stays a separately installed package (its own entry in node_modules, site-packages or the gem path, which a user can replace) without your code coming under the LGPL. What it then asks is that you pass on its licence and notices and let users swap in their own build of it (LGPL-3.0 section 4). Modifying it, copying its code into yours, or merging it into one bundled or statically linked artifact is where the obligations grow, and this policy cannot see which you do — that is why it denies LGPL-3.0 by default. If you use it unmodified and separately installed, allow it in your repository's licence policy rather than replacing it: add `LGPL-3.0-only` / `LGPL-3.0-or-later` to the allow-list of the licence check your CI runs (`license-checker --onlyAllow`, the `allow-licenses` input of GitHub's dependency-review-action, `[licenses] allow` in cargo-deny's deny.toml), record why in the same change, and hide this row on the findings page with that reason. This scan's banned set is not read from that file, so the row stays until it is hidden.
Banned license: @img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm REDACTED:1064— `@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm` 1.3.4 is published on registry.npmjs.org under `LGPL-3.0-or-later`, which this policy bans, and it is not declared by this repository but is installed by one of its production, optional or peer dependencies, as its committed lockfile resolves — a transitive dependency ships its licence just the same — so it is installed by everything that depends on this repository, not just by its build toolchain. A package offering SEVERAL licences is a choice and is only charged when every one of them is banned. Replace the package (or the dependency that pulls it in), or record an accepted exception. ★ The licence that makes this row is LGPL-3.0, and unmodified use is often permitted: the LGPL lets your code use an UNMODIFIED copy of the library that stays a separately installed package (its own entry in node_modules, site-packages or the gem path, which a user can replace) without your code coming under the LGPL. What it then asks is that you pass on its licence and notices and let users swap in their own build of it (LGPL-3.0 section 4). Modifying it, copying its code into yours, or merging it into one bundled or statically linked artifact is where the obligations grow, and this policy cannot see which you do — that is why it denies LGPL-3.0 by default. If you use it unmodified and separately installed, allow it in your repository's licence policy rather than replacing it: add `LGPL-3.0-only` / `LGPL-3.0-or-later` to the allow-list of the licence check your CI runs (`license-checker --onlyAllow`, the `allow-licenses` input of GitHub's dependency-review-action, `[licenses] allow` in cargo-deny's deny.toml), record why in the same change, and hide this row on the findings page with that reason. This scan's banned set is not read from that file, so the row stays until it is hidden.
Banned license: @img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64 REDACTED:1059— `@img/sharp-libvips-linux-arm64` 1.3.4 is published on registry.npmjs.org under `LGPL-3.0-or-later`, which this policy bans, and it is not declared by this repository but is installed by one of its production, optional or peer dependencies, as its committed lockfile resolves — a transitive dependency ships its licence just the same — so it is installed by everything that depends on this repository, not just by its build toolchain. A package offering SEVERAL licences is a choice and is only charged when every one of them is banned. Replace the package (or the dependency that pulls it in), or record an accepted exception. ★ The licence that makes this row is LGPL-3.0, and unmodified use is often permitted: the LGPL lets your code use an UNMODIFIED copy of the library that stays a separately installed package (its own entry in node_modules, site-packages or the gem path, which a user can replace) without your code coming under the LGPL. What it then asks is that you pass on its licence and notices and let users swap in their own build of it (LGPL-3.0 section 4). Modifying it, copying its code into yours, or merging it into one bundled or statically linked artifact is where the obligations grow, and this policy cannot see which you do — that is why it denies LGPL-3.0 by default. If you use it unmodified and separately installed, allow it in your repository's licence policy rather than replacing it: add `LGPL-3.0-only` / `LGPL-3.0-or-later` to the allow-list of the licence check your CI runs (`license-checker --onlyAllow`, the `allow-licenses` input of GitHub's dependency-review-action, `[licenses] allow` in cargo-deny's deny.toml), record why in the same change, and hide this row on the findings page with that reason. This scan's banned set is not read from that file, so the row stays until it is hidden.
Banned license: @img/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64 REDACTED:1069— `@img/sharp-libvips-linux-ppc64` 1.3.4 is published on registry.npmjs.org under `LGPL-3.0-or-later`, which this policy bans, and it is not declared by this repository but is installed by one of its production, optional or peer dependencies, as its committed lockfile resolves — a transitive dependency ships its licence just the same — so it is installed by everything that depends on this repository, not just by its build toolchain. A package offering SEVERAL licences is a choice and is only charged when every one of them is banned. Replace the package (or the dependency that pulls it in), or record an accepted exception. ★ The licence that makes this row is LGPL-3.0, and unmodified use is often permitted: the LGPL lets your code use an UNMODIFIED copy of the library that stays a separately installed package (its own entry in node_modules, site-packages or the gem path, which a user can replace) without your code coming under the LGPL. What it then asks is that you pass on its licence and notices and let users swap in their own build of it (LGPL-3.0 section 4). Modifying it, copying its code into yours, or merging it into one bundled or statically linked artifact is where the obligations grow, and this policy cannot see which you do — that is why it denies LGPL-3.0 by default. If you use it unmodified and separately installed, allow it in your repository's licence policy rather than replacing it: add `LGPL-3.0-only` / `LGPL-3.0-or-later` to the allow-list of the licence check your CI runs (`license-checker --onlyAllow`, the `allow-licenses` input of GitHub's dependency-review-action, `[licenses] allow` in cargo-deny's deny.toml), record why in the same change, and hide this row on the findings page with that reason. This scan's banned set is not read from that file, so the row stays until it is hidden.
Banned license: @img/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64 REDACTED:1074— `@img/sharp-libvips-linux-riscv64` 1.3.4 is published on registry.npmjs.org under `LGPL-3.0-or-later`, which this policy bans, and it is not declared by this repository but is installed by one of its production, optional or peer dependencies, as its committed lockfile resolves — a transitive dependency ships its licence just the same — so it is installed by everything that depends on this repository, not just by its build toolchain. A package offering SEVERAL licences is a choice and is only charged when every one of them is banned. Replace the package (or the dependency that pulls it in), or record an accepted exception. ★ The licence that makes this row is LGPL-3.0, and unmodified use is often permitted: the LGPL lets your code use an UNMODIFIED copy of the library that stays a separately installed package (its own entry in node_modules, site-packages or the gem path, which a user can replace) without your code coming under the LGPL. What it then asks is that you pass on its licence and notices and let users swap in their own build of it (LGPL-3.0 section 4). Modifying it, copying its code into yours, or merging it into one bundled or statically linked artifact is where the obligations grow, and this policy cannot see which you do — that is why it denies LGPL-3.0 by default. If you use it unmodified and separately installed, allow it in your repository's licence policy rather than replacing it: add `LGPL-3.0-only` / `LGPL-3.0-or-later` to the allow-list of the licence check your CI runs (`license-checker --onlyAllow`, the `allow-licenses` input of GitHub's dependency-review-action, `[licenses] allow` in cargo-deny's deny.toml), record why in the same change, and hide this row on the findings page with that reason. This scan's banned set is not read from that file, so the row stays until it is hidden.
Banned license: @img/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x REDACTED:1079— `@img/sharp-libvips-linux-s390x` 1.3.4 is published on registry.npmjs.org under `LGPL-3.0-or-later`, which this policy bans, and it is not declared by this repository but is installed by one of its production, optional or peer dependencies, as its committed lockfile resolves — a transitive dependency ships its licence just the same — so it is installed by everything that depends on this repository, not just by its build toolchain. A package offering SEVERAL licences is a choice and is only charged when every one of them is banned. Replace the package (or the dependency that pulls it in), or record an accepted exception. ★ The licence that makes this row is LGPL-3.0, and unmodified use is often permitted: the LGPL lets your code use an UNMODIFIED copy of the library that stays a separately installed package (its own entry in node_modules, site-packages or the gem path, which a user can replace) without your code coming under the LGPL. What it then asks is that you pass on its licence and notices and let users swap in their own build of it (LGPL-3.0 section 4). Modifying it, copying its code into yours, or merging it into one bundled or statically linked artifact is where the obligations grow, and this policy cannot see which you do — that is why it denies LGPL-3.0 by default. If you use it unmodified and separately installed, allow it in your repository's licence policy rather than replacing it: add `LGPL-3.0-only` / `LGPL-3.0-or-later` to the allow-list of the licence check your CI runs (`license-checker --onlyAllow`, the `allow-licenses` input of GitHub's dependency-review-action, `[licenses] allow` in cargo-deny's deny.toml), record why in the same change, and hide this row on the findings page with that reason. This scan's banned set is not read from that file, so the row stays until it is hidden.
Banned license: @img/sharp-libvips-linux-x64 REDACTED:1084— `@img/sharp-libvips-linux-x64` 1.3.4 is published on registry.npmjs.org under `LGPL-3.0-or-later`, which this policy bans, and it is not declared by this repository but is installed by one of its production, optional or peer dependencies, as its committed lockfile resolves — a transitive dependency ships its licence just the same — so it is installed by everything that depends on this repository, not just by its build toolchain. A package offering SEVERAL licences is a choice and is only charged when every one of them is banned. Replace the package (or the dependency that pulls it in), or record an accepted exception. ★ The licence that makes this row is LGPL-3.0, and unmodified use is often permitted: the LGPL lets your code use an UNMODIFIED copy of the library that stays a separately installed package (its own entry in node_modules, site-packages or the gem path, which a user can replace) without your code coming under the LGPL. What it then asks is that you pass on its licence and notices and let users swap in their own build of it (LGPL-3.0 section 4). Modifying it, copying its code into yours, or merging it into one bundled or statically linked artifact is where the obligations grow, and this policy cannot see which you do — that is why it denies LGPL-3.0 by default. If you use it unmodified and separately installed, allow it in your repository's licence policy rather than replacing it: add `LGPL-3.0-only` / `LGPL-3.0-or-later` to the allow-list of the licence check your CI runs (`license-checker --onlyAllow`, the `allow-licenses` input of GitHub's dependency-review-action, `[licenses] allow` in cargo-deny's deny.toml), record why in the same change, and hide this row on the findings page with that reason. This scan's banned set is not read from that file, so the row stays until it is hidden.
Banned license: @img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-arm64 REDACTED:1089— `@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-arm64` 1.3.4 is published on registry.npmjs.org under `LGPL-3.0-or-later`, which this policy bans, and it is not declared by this repository but is installed by one of its production, optional or peer dependencies, as its committed lockfile resolves — a transitive dependency ships its licence just the same — so it is installed by everything that depends on this repository, not just by its build toolchain. A package offering SEVERAL licences is a choice and is only charged when every one of them is banned. Replace the package (or the dependency that pulls it in), or record an accepted exception. ★ The licence that makes this row is LGPL-3.0, and unmodified use is often permitted: the LGPL lets your code use an UNMODIFIED copy of the library that stays a separately installed package (its own entry in node_modules, site-packages or the gem path, which a user can replace) without your code coming under the LGPL. What it then asks is that you pass on its licence and notices and let users swap in their own build of it (LGPL-3.0 section 4). Modifying it, copying its code into yours, or merging it into one bundled or statically linked artifact is where the obligations grow, and this policy cannot see which you do — that is why it denies LGPL-3.0 by default. If you use it unmodified and separately installed, allow it in your repository's licence policy rather than replacing it: add `LGPL-3.0-only` / `LGPL-3.0-or-later` to the allow-list of the licence check your CI runs (`license-checker --onlyAllow`, the `allow-licenses` input of GitHub's dependency-review-action, `[licenses] allow` in cargo-deny's deny.toml), record why in the same change, and hide this row on the findings page with that reason. This scan's banned set is not read from that file, so the row stays until it is hidden.
Banned license: @img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-x64 REDACTED:1094— `@img/sharp-libvips-linuxmusl-x64` 1.3.4 is published on registry.npmjs.org under `LGPL-3.0-or-later`, which this policy bans, and it is not declared by this repository but is installed by one of its production, optional or peer dependencies, as its committed lockfile resolves — a transitive dependency ships its licence just the same — so it is installed by everything that depends on this repository, not just by its build toolchain. A package offering SEVERAL licences is a choice and is only charged when every one of them is banned. Replace the package (or the dependency that pulls it in), or record an accepted exception. ★ The licence that makes this row is LGPL-3.0, and unmodified use is often permitted: the LGPL lets your code use an UNMODIFIED copy of the library that stays a separately installed package (its own entry in node_modules, site-packages or the gem path, which a user can replace) without your code coming under the LGPL. What it then asks is that you pass on its licence and notices and let users swap in their own build of it (LGPL-3.0 section 4). Modifying it, copying its code into yours, or merging it into one bundled or statically linked artifact is where the obligations grow, and this policy cannot see which you do — that is why it denies LGPL-3.0 by default. If you use it unmodified and separately installed, allow it in your repository's licence policy rather than replacing it: add `LGPL-3.0-only` / `LGPL-3.0-or-later` to the allow-list of the licence check your CI runs (`license-checker --onlyAllow`, the `allow-licenses` input of GitHub's dependency-review-action, `[licenses] allow` in cargo-deny's deny.toml), record why in the same change, and hide this row on the findings page with that reason. This scan's banned set is not read from that file, so the row stays until it is hidden.
Banned license: @img/sharp-wasm32 REDACTED:1155— `@img/sharp-wasm32` 0.35.5 is published on registry.npmjs.org under `Apache-2.0 AND LGPL-3.0-or-later AND MIT`, which this policy bans, and it is not declared by this repository but is installed by one of its production, optional or peer dependencies, as its committed lockfile resolves — a transitive dependency ships its licence just the same — so it is installed by everything that depends on this repository, not just by its build toolchain. A package offering SEVERAL licences is a choice and is only charged when every one of them is banned. Replace the package (or the dependency that pulls it in), or record an accepted exception. ★ The licence that makes this row is LGPL-3.0, and unmodified use is often permitted: the LGPL lets your code use an UNMODIFIED copy of the library that stays a separately installed package (its own entry in node_modules, site-packages or the gem path, which a user can replace) without your code coming under the LGPL. What it then asks is that you pass on its licence and notices and let users swap in their own build of it (LGPL-3.0 section 4). Modifying it, copying its code into yours, or merging it into one bundled or statically linked artifact is where the obligations grow, and this policy cannot see which you do — that is why it denies LGPL-3.0 by default. If you use it unmodified and separately installed, allow it in your repository's licence policy rather than replacing it: add `LGPL-3.0-only` / `LGPL-3.0-or-later` to the allow-list of the licence check your CI runs (`license-checker --onlyAllow`, the `allow-licenses` input of GitHub's dependency-review-action, `[licenses] allow` in cargo-deny's deny.toml), record why in the same change, and hide this row on the findings page with that reason. This scan's banned set is not read from that file, so the row stays until it is hidden.
Banned license: @img/sharp-win32-arm64 REDACTED:1169— `@img/sharp-win32-arm64` 0.35.5 is published on registry.npmjs.org under `Apache-2.0 AND LGPL-3.0-or-later`, which this policy bans, and it is not declared by this repository but is installed by one of its production, optional or peer dependencies, as its committed lockfile resolves — a transitive dependency ships its licence just the same — so it is installed by everything that depends on this repository, not just by its build toolchain. A package offering SEVERAL licences is a choice and is only charged when every one of them is banned. Replace the package (or the dependency that pulls it in), or record an accepted exception. ★ The licence that makes this row is LGPL-3.0, and unmodified use is often permitted: the LGPL lets your code use an UNMODIFIED copy of the library that stays a separately installed package (its own entry in node_modules, site-packages or the gem path, which a user can replace) without your code coming under the LGPL. What it then asks is that you pass on its licence and notices and let users swap in their own build of it (LGPL-3.0 section 4). Modifying it, copying its code into yours, or merging it into one bundled or statically linked artifact is where the obligations grow, and this policy cannot see which you do — that is why it denies LGPL-3.0 by default. If you use it unmodified and separately installed, allow it in your repository's licence policy rather than replacing it: add `LGPL-3.0-only` / `LGPL-3.0-or-later` to the allow-list of the licence check your CI runs (`license-checker --onlyAllow`, the `allow-licenses` input of GitHub's dependency-review-action, `[licenses] allow` in cargo-deny's deny.toml), record why in the same change, and hide this row on the findings page with that reason. This scan's banned set is not read from that file, so the row stays until it is hidden.
Banned license: @img/sharp-win32-ia32 REDACTED:1174— `@img/sharp-win32-ia32` 0.35.5 is published on registry.npmjs.org under `Apache-2.0 AND LGPL-3.0-or-later`, which this policy bans, and it is not declared by this repository but is installed by one of its production, optional or peer dependencies, as its committed lockfile resolves — a transitive dependency ships its licence just the same — so it is installed by everything that depends on this repository, not just by its build toolchain. A package offering SEVERAL licences is a choice and is only charged when every one of them is banned. Replace the package (or the dependency that pulls it in), or record an accepted exception. ★ The licence that makes this row is LGPL-3.0, and unmodified use is often permitted: the LGPL lets your code use an UNMODIFIED copy of the library that stays a separately installed package (its own entry in node_modules, site-packages or the gem path, which a user can replace) without your code coming under the LGPL. What it then asks is that you pass on its licence and notices and let users swap in their own build of it (LGPL-3.0 section 4). Modifying it, copying its code into yours, or merging it into one bundled or statically linked artifact is where the obligations grow, and this policy cannot see which you do — that is why it denies LGPL-3.0 by default. If you use it unmodified and separately installed, allow it in your repository's licence policy rather than replacing it: add `LGPL-3.0-only` / `LGPL-3.0-or-later` to the allow-list of the licence check your CI runs (`license-checker --onlyAllow`, the `allow-licenses` input of GitHub's dependency-review-action, `[licenses] allow` in cargo-deny's deny.toml), record why in the same change, and hide this row on the findings page with that reason. This scan's banned set is not read from that file, so the row stays until it is hidden.
Banned license: @img/sharp-win32-x64 REDACTED:1179— `@img/sharp-win32-x64` 0.35.5 is published on registry.npmjs.org under `Apache-2.0 AND LGPL-3.0-or-later`, which this policy bans, and it is not declared by this repository but is installed by one of its production, optional or peer dependencies, as its committed lockfile resolves — a transitive dependency ships its licence just the same — so it is installed by everything that depends on this repository, not just by its build toolchain. A package offering SEVERAL licences is a choice and is only charged when every one of them is banned. Replace the package (or the dependency that pulls it in), or record an accepted exception. ★ The licence that makes this row is LGPL-3.0, and unmodified use is often permitted: the LGPL lets your code use an UNMODIFIED copy of the library that stays a separately installed package (its own entry in node_modules, site-packages or the gem path, which a user can replace) without your code coming under the LGPL. What it then asks is that you pass on its licence and notices and let users swap in their own build of it (LGPL-3.0 section 4). Modifying it, copying its code into yours, or merging it into one bundled or statically linked artifact is where the obligations grow, and this policy cannot see which you do — that is why it denies LGPL-3.0 by default. If you use it unmodified and separately installed, allow it in your repository's licence policy rather than replacing it: add `LGPL-3.0-only` / `LGPL-3.0-or-later` to the allow-list of the licence check your CI runs (`license-checker --onlyAllow`, the `allow-licenses` input of GitHub's dependency-review-action, `[licenses] allow` in cargo-deny's deny.toml), record why in the same change, and hide this row on the findings page with that reason. This scan's banned set is not read from that file, so the row stays until it is hidden.
TLS certificate validation disabled api/ssl.js:18— `rejectUnauthorized: false` is set on a TLS client, so every peer certificate is accepted — including one an attacker presents. Chain, expiry, revocation and hostname are all skipped, so an attacker on the network path can present any certificate and read or rewrite the traffic — the connection is encrypted to the attacker, not to the intended host. Remove the option so Node validates the peer. If the server presents a self-signed or privately-issued certificate, trust THAT issuer rather than every certificate: pass its CA as `ca` (or set `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`), which keeps the chain and hostname checks on. A managed database or broker that documents `rejectUnauthorized: false` publishes a CA bundle for exactly this purpose.
TLS certificate validation disabled api/tls-connection.js:25— `rejectUnauthorized: false` is set on a TLS client, so every peer certificate is accepted — including one an attacker presents. Chain, expiry, revocation and hostname are all skipped, so an attacker on the network path can present any certificate and read or rewrite the traffic — the connection is encrypted to the attacker, not to the intended host. Remove the option so Node validates the peer. If the server presents a self-signed or privately-issued certificate, trust THAT issuer rather than every certificate: pass its CA as `ca` (or set `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`), which keeps the chain and hostname checks on. A managed database or broker that documents `rejectUnauthorized: false` publishes a CA bundle for exactly this purpose.
TLS certificate validation disabled api/tls-connection.js:98— `rejectUnauthorized: false` is set on a TLS client, so every peer certificate is accepted — including one an attacker presents. Chain, expiry, revocation and hostname are all skipped, so an attacker on the network path can present any certificate and read or rewrite the traffic — the connection is encrypted to the attacker, not to the intended host. Remove the option so Node validates the peer. If the server presents a self-signed or privately-issued certificate, trust THAT issuer rather than every certificate: pass its CA as `ca` (or set `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`), which keeps the chain and hostname checks on. A managed database or broker that documents `rejectUnauthorized: false` publishes a CA bundle for exactly this purpose.
AC1 · Text alternatives· <img> without a text alternative · ×2
<img> without a text alternative public/error.html:11— An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative.
<img> without a text alternative public/placeholder.html:11— An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative.
AC2 · Forms & labels· <input> without a programmatic label · ×1
<input> without a programmatic label src/components/form/AnimatedInput.astro:20— This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
AC2 · Forms & labels· <button> with no accessible text · ×1
<button> with no accessible text src/components/molecules/OptionCards.astro:36— A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
AC4 · Keyboard semantics· Click handler on a <span> nested inside <a> · ×1
Click handler on a <span> nested inside <a> src/client/components/misc/AdditionalResources.tsx:344— This <span> carries its own click handler, but it sits inside a <a> that performs a different action. A keyboard user reaches the <a> and activating it runs the <a>'s handler, never this one, so this action has no keyboard path at all. Role and tabindex cannot supply one: HTML forbids a <a> from containing interactive content or any descendant with a tabindex, so the browser will not put this element in the tab order however it is marked up. Move it out of the <a> and make it a sibling <button>, so each action has its own control.
No automated tests — No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely. Start with the code you change most often: add a suite in a framework a runner can collect (Vitest, Jest, Mocha, or the runtime's built-in runner (`node --test`, `bun test`, `deno test`)), and run it in CI so the gap cannot reopen.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/layouts/scripts/settings.js:25— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/layouts/scripts/theme.js:28— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/client/utils/settings.ts:33— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/client/utils/settings.ts:44— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) api/carbon.js:48— `.catch(() => {})` handles the rejection by doing nothing — the failure is discarded with no log and no rethrow, and the chain carries on as if the work succeeded. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, hand it to a caller that can (`next(error)`, a returned rejection), or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) api/cookies.js:16— `.catch(() => {})` handles the rejection by doing nothing — the failure is discarded with no log and no rethrow, and the chain carries on as if the work succeeded. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, hand it to a caller that can (`next(error)`, a returned rejection), or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) api/rank.js:21— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) api/trackers.js:71— `.catch(() => {})` handles the rejection by doing nothing — the failure is discarded with no log and no rethrow, and the chain carries on as if the work succeeded. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, hand it to a caller that can (`next(error)`, a returned rejection), or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) api/trackers.js:74— `.catch(() => {})` handles the rejection by doing nothing — the failure is discarded with no log and no rethrow, and the chain carries on as if the work succeeded. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, hand it to a caller that can (`next(error)`, a returned rejection), or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) api/_common/browser.js:39— `.catch(() => {})` handles the rejection by doing nothing — the failure is discarded with no log and no rethrow, and the chain carries on as if the work succeeded. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, hand it to a caller that can (`next(error)`, a returned rejection), or don't catch it.
R10 · Code Duplication· Duplicated block with local edits (5 matched lines × 2 locations) · ×6
Duplicated block with local edits (5 matched lines × 2 locations) api/_common/browser.js:29— api/_common/browser.js:29 · api/cookies.js:11 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 51 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
Duplicated block with local edits (5 matched lines × 2 locations) src/client/components/Results/DomainLookup.tsx:4— src/client/components/Results/DomainLookup.tsx:4 · src/client/components/Results/TlsConnection.tsx:24 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 56 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
Duplicated block with local edits (5 matched lines × 2 locations) src/client/components/Results/HttpSecurity.tsx:33— src/client/components/Results/HttpSecurity.tsx:33 · src/client/components/Results/TechStack.tsx:80 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 51 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
Duplicated block with local edits (5 matched lines × 2 locations) src/client/components/Results/Rank.tsx:66— src/client/components/Results/Rank.tsx:66 · src/client/components/Results/TechStack.tsx:80 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 50 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
Duplicated block with local edits (5 matched lines × 2 locations) src/client/components/Results/Redirects.tsx:21— src/client/components/Results/Redirects.tsx:21 · src/client/components/Results/TechStack.tsx:80 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 50 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
Duplicated block with local edits (5 matched lines × 2 locations) src/client/components/Results/TechStack.tsx:80— src/client/components/Results/TechStack.tsx:80 · src/client/components/Results/Vulnerabilities.tsx:22 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 50 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety· Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard · ×4
Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard src/client/components/misc/Loader.tsx:24— `.css-in-js` moves (`transition: height 0.3s ease-in-out,
min-height 0.3s ease-in-out,
opacity 0.3s ease-in-out`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard src/client/components/misc/ProgressBar.tsx:61— `div` moves (`transition: grid-template-rows 0.3s ease,
opacity 0.25s ease,
transform 0.3s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard src/client/components/misc/Tooltip.tsx:45— `div` moves (`transition: opacity 0.15s ease-out,
transform 0.15s ease-out,
overlay 0.15s allow-discrete,
display 0.15s allow-discrete`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard src/client/components/Form/Button.tsx:52— `div` moves (`animation: ________________ 1s linear infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
Hotspot: src/client/views/Results.tsx src/client/views/Results.tsx:77— src/client/views/Results.tsx changed 12 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 39 in Results.Results at line 77. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, and the other 11 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-08-15..2026-11-13, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-15 21:33:16 +00:00' --until='2026-11-13 21:33:16 +00:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/client/views/Results.tsx`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: src/client/components/Results/Threats.tsx src/client/components/Results/Threats.tsx:17— src/client/components/Results/Threats.tsx changed 6 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 25 in Threats.MalwareCard at line 17. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-08-15..2026-11-13, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-15 21:33:16 +00:00' --until='2026-11-13 21:33:16 +00:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/client/components/Results/Threats.tsx`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: src/client/components/Results/SocialTags.tsx src/client/components/Results/SocialTags.tsx:29— src/client/components/Results/SocialTags.tsx changed 6 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 16 in SocialTags.SocialTagsCard at line 29. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-08-15..2026-11-13, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-15 21:33:16 +00:00' --until='2026-11-13 21:33:16 +00:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/client/components/Results/SocialTags.tsx`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: src/client/components/Results/TlsConnection.tsx src/client/components/Results/TlsConnection.tsx:24— src/client/components/Results/TlsConnection.tsx changed 4 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 20 in TlsConnection.TlsConnectionCard at line 24. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-08-15..2026-11-13, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-15 21:33:16 +00:00' --until='2026-11-13 21:33:16 +00:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/client/components/Results/TlsConnection.tsx`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety· Focus outline removed in CSS without a · ×3
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement src/client/components/misc/AdvisoryPanel.tsx:105— `ul li .body button.jump:focus-visible` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement src/client/components/misc/ProgressBar.tsx:135— `details ul li button.docs:focus-visible` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement src/client/components/misc/ViewRaw.tsx:34— `iframe` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 10) api/tls-connection.js:41— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 10; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 10) src/client/components/Results/DomainLookup.tsx:4— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 10; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 10) src/client/components/misc/ProgressBar.tsx:354— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 10; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
AC2 · Forms & labels· <AnimatedInput> field component without a label · ×2
<AnimatedInput> field component without a label src/components/form/ScanForm.astro:20— This UI-library field component has no label / aria-label / aria-labelledby / id at this call site, and nothing written inside it here carries one either (a name prop is the form-submission key, not a label; an id, even one the component sets on what it renders, names nothing until a label points at it) — so it likely renders an unlabelled control. Name it whichever way this library supports: a label prop, an aria-label, or an id on the rendered control with a <label for> pointing at it. For a group of controls, name the group itself (aria-label, or a fieldset with a legend) — labelling each item leaves the set unnamed.
<AnimatedInput> field component without a label src/components/homepage/HeroForm.astro:26— This UI-library field component has no label / aria-label / aria-labelledby / id at this call site, and nothing written inside it here carries one either (a name prop is the form-submission key, not a label; an id, even one the component sets on what it renders, names nothing until a label points at it) — so it likely renders an unlabelled control. Name it whichever way this library supports: a label prop, an aria-label, or an id on the rendered control with a <label for> pointing at it. For a group of controls, name the group itself (aria-label, or a fieldset with a legend) — labelling each item leaves the set unnamed.
AC3 · Page structure· Page without a main landmark · ×2
Page without a main landmark public/error.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark public/placeholder.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
FunctionTooLong: Results.Results src/client/views/Results.tsx:77— FunctionTooLong — Results runs 149 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 49 over it, 1.49× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
FunctionTooLong: useJobs.useJobs src/client/hooks/useJobs.ts:60— FunctionTooLong — useJobs runs 144 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 44 over it, 1.44× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) src/client/analysis/rules/mail-config.ts:43— src/client/analysis/rules/mail-config.ts:43 · src/client/analysis/rules/mail-config.ts:78 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) src/client/analysis/rules/mixed-content.ts:24— src/client/analysis/rules/mixed-content.ts:24 · src/client/analysis/rules/mixed-content.ts:67 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2 locations) api/mail-config.js:46— api/mail-config.js:46 · src/client/analysis/rules/mail-config.ts:21 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2 locations) src/client/components/Results/Breaches.tsx:7— src/client/components/Results/Breaches.tsx:7 · src/client/components/Results/CaaRecords.tsx:23 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
R10 · Code Duplication· Duplicated block with local edits (6 matched lines × 2 locations) · ×2
Duplicated block with local edits (6 matched lines × 2 locations) src/client/components/Results/SocialPresence.tsx:67— src/client/components/Results/SocialPresence.tsx:67 · src/client/components/Results/TechStack.tsx:80 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 51 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
Duplicated block with local edits (6 matched lines × 2 locations) src/client/components/Results/TechStack.tsx:80— src/client/components/Results/TechStack.tsx:80 · src/client/components/Results/TxtRecords.tsx:10 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 61 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 3 locations) src/client/components/Results/Archives.tsx:5— src/client/components/Results/Archives.tsx:5 · src/client/components/Results/Firewall.tsx:4 · src/client/components/Results/ServerStatus.tsx:13 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 3 locations) src/client/components/Results/HttpSecurity.tsx:33— src/client/components/Results/HttpSecurity.tsx:33 · src/client/components/Results/SocialTags.tsx:29 · src/client/components/Results/TxtRecords.tsx:10 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2 locations) src/client/components/Results/Archives.tsx:3— src/client/components/Results/Archives.tsx:3 · src/client/components/Results/DnsServer.tsx:2 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2 locations) src/client/components/Results/DnsSec.tsx:133— src/client/components/Results/DnsSec.tsx:133 · src/client/components/Results/HttpSecurity.tsx:31 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Dead file (~135 LoC) src/client/components/boundaries/PageError.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/App.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~135 LoC) src/data/settings.ts— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/utils/settings.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~125 LoC) api/sitemap.js— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~125 LoC) src/client/components/misc/NoResults.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/views/Results.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~124 LoC) api/tls-connection.js— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~124 LoC) src/client/components/Results/TechStack.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/jobs/registry.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~108 LoC) src/client/components/Results/MailConfig.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/jobs/registry.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~108 LoC) src/client/components/misc/ViewRaw.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/views/Results.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Results.Results (cyclomatic 39) src/client/views/Results.tsx:77— Results.Results has cyclomatic complexity 39 (threshold 15). Of this number, 25 points are the body's own statements and 14 belong to 9 function items inside it that branch. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
Threats.MalwareCard (cyclomatic 25) src/client/components/Results/Threats.tsx:17— Threats.MalwareCard has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
useJobs.useJobs (cyclomatic 25) src/client/hooks/useJobs.ts:60— useJobs.useJobs has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 25 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to 9 function literals inside it that branch (lines 165, 209, 219, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
check-skipper.isPrivateTarget (cyclomatic 21) api/_common/check-skipper.js:123— check-skipper.isPrivateTarget has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
TlsConnection.TlsConnectionCard (cyclomatic 20) src/client/components/Results/TlsConnection.tsx:24— TlsConnection.TlsConnectionCard has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). Of this number, 18 points are the body's own statements and 2 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
middleware.commonMiddleware (cyclomatic 17) REDACTED:41— middleware.commonMiddleware has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 2 of the 17 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 2 function items inside it that branch (vercelHandler, netlifyHandler). Those helpers are already separate functions, so extracting the branching again is not available. To reduce it, move them out of the body to the enclosing scope, where each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
SocialTags.SocialTagsCard (cyclomatic 16) src/client/components/Results/SocialTags.tsx:29— SocialTags.SocialTagsCard has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). Of this number, 13 points are the body's own statements and 3 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
Deprecated: wappalyzer package.json:61— wappalyzer 6.10.66, declared in package.json, is marked deprecated by its publisher: "Package no longer supported. Contact Support at https://www.npmjs.com/support for more info.". Replace it with the package or version that message names, or record why this one must stay.
Results.Results (cognitive 35) src/client/views/Results.tsx:77— Results.Results has cognitive complexity 35 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 21, if/else 10, ternaries 4. Of this number, 21 points are the body's own statements and 14 belong to 9 function items inside it that branch. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
useJobs.useJobs (cognitive 22) src/client/hooks/useJobs.ts:60— useJobs.useJobs has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, boolean chains 6. None of this is in the body itself: all 22 points belong to 9 function literals inside it that branch (lines 165, 209, 196, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
Threats.MalwareCard (cognitive 21) src/client/components/Results/Threats.tsx:17— Threats.MalwareCard has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 21. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
securityTxtHandler (cognitive 19) api/security-txt.js:36— securityTxtHandler has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 3 (6 pts), ternaries 3 (6 pts), boolean chains 3, error handling 2 (3 pts), loops 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
check-skipper.isPrivateTarget (cognitive 17) api/_common/check-skipper.js:123— check-skipper.isPrivateTarget has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (10 pts), boolean chains 7 (nesting depth added 1). To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
middleware.commonMiddleware (cognitive 17) REDACTED:41— middleware.commonMiddleware has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: ternaries 5 (7 pts), boolean chains 4, if/else 4, error handling 2 (nesting depth added 2). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 17 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to 2 function items inside it that branch (vercelHandler, netlifyHandler). Those helpers are already separate functions, so extracting the branching again is not available. To reduce it, move them out of the body to the enclosing scope, where each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
useJobs.useJobs.runJob (cognitive 17) src/client/hooks/useJobs.ts:84— useJobs.useJobs.runJob has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (11 pts), boolean chains 3, ternaries 2 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 3). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 17 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to 2 function literals inside it that branch (lines 96, 122). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
getMtaSts (cognitive 16) api/mail-config.js:143— getMtaSts has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 5 (9 pts), boolean chains 2, error handling 2, loops 1, other 1, ternaries 1 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
FileTooLong: data/glossary.ts src/data/glossary.ts— FileTooLong — 756 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 256 over it, 1.51× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
P3 · Security & performance tooling· SAST runs, but gates no merge · ×1
SAST runs, but gates no merge — `REDACTED` run(s) a static-analysis scan, but no workflow that runs one is triggered by a pull request (or a merge queue, or an unfiltered push) — the scan fires on a schedule or a manual dispatch only. A vulnerable change therefore merges clean and is reported on the next scheduled run, by which time it is on the default branch and the only remedy is a follow-up fix. Add the pull-request trigger to the workflow that runs the scan so the finding arrives before the merge rather than after it.
Outbound HTTP without resilience healthcheck.js:5— `fetch(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 25, cognitive 23) src/client/views/Results.tsx:77— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 and cognitive complexity 23; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 23, cognitive 20) src/client/components/Results/Threats.tsx:17— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 23 and cognitive complexity 20; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function isPrivateTarget (cyclomatic 21, cognitive 17) api/_common/check-skipper.js:123— isPrivateTarget has cyclomatic complexity 21 and cognitive complexity 17; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 18, cognitive 16) src/client/components/Results/TlsConnection.tsx:28— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 18 and cognitive complexity 16; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function getMtaSts (cyclomatic 14, cognitive 16) api/mail-config.js:143— getMtaSts has cyclomatic complexity 14 and cognitive complexity 16; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 14, cognitive 13) src/client/components/Results/SslCert.tsx:42— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 14 and cognitive complexity 13; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function securityTxtHandler (cyclomatic 13, cognitive 19) api/security-txt.js:36— securityTxtHandler has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 19; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 13, cognitive 12) src/client/components/Results/SocialTags.tsx:29— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 12; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function tlsSecurityAudit (cyclomatic 12, cognitive 13) src/client/analysis/rules/tls-security-audit.ts:27— tlsSecurityAudit has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 13; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function upstreamError (cyclomatic 12, cognitive 11) api/_common/upstream.js:2— upstreamError has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 11; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function threats (cyclomatic 12, cognitive 11) src/client/analysis/rules/threats.ts:4— threats has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 11; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 12, cognitive 11) src/client/components/Results/DnsRecords.tsx:8— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 11; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function mailConfigHandler (cyclomatic 12, cognitive 10) api/mail-config.js:186— mailConfigHandler has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 10; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 14) src/client/analysis/rules/mixed-content.ts:51— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 14; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function send (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 12) api/_common/http.js:93— send has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 12; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 9) src/client/components/Results/SocialPresence.tsx:75— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 9; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
src/data/glossary.ts: 897 lines of code src/data/glossary.ts:1— src/data/glossary.ts has 897 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module.
R3 · Large Files· src/client/components/misc/ProgressBar.tsx · ×1
src/client/components/misc/ProgressBar.tsx: 434 lines of code src/client/components/misc/ProgressBar.tsx:1— src/client/components/misc/ProgressBar.tsx has 434 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module.
Test Coverage — 0% of 173 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph — 'production' here is the RESIDUE: every source file left once tests, tooling, generated output, config, declarations and declaration-only modules, fixture corpora, type fixtures, behaviour-free data modules, re-export barrels, registration/constant data modules and service workers are set aside, so the percentage is taken over a smaller denominator than the workspace's file count
No test script — test ✗ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✓ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
Dead file (~915 LoC) src/data/glossary.ts— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 7 in-repo import(s) from 7 other file(s) do name it (src/client/components/Form/Row.tsx, src/client/components/Results/DnsSec.tsx, src/client/components/Results/HttpSecurity.tsx and 4 more) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~465 LoC) src/client/components/misc/ProgressBar.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 5 in-repo import(s) from 5 other file(s) do name it (src/client/components/misc/CheckDetail.tsx, src/client/components/misc/Loader.tsx, src/client/hooks/useJobs.ts and 2 more) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~416 LoC) src/client/jobs/registry.ts— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/client/analysis/registry.ts, src/client/views/Results.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~376 LoC) src/client/components/misc/AdditionalResources.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/views/Results.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~344 LoC) api/social-presence.js— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~297 LoC) src/client/components/Form/Row.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 40 in-repo import(s) from 40 other file(s) do name it (src/client/components/Results/Archives.tsx, src/client/components/Results/BlockLists.tsx, src/client/components/Results/Breaches.tsx and 37 more) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~277 LoC) src/client/views/Results.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/App.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~259 LoC) src/client/hooks/useJobs.ts— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/views/Results.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~254 LoC) src/client/components/misc/Loader.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/views/Results.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~250 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/mail-config.ts— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/client/analysis/registry.ts, src/client/components/Results/MailConfig.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~235 LoC) api/mail-config.js— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~197 LoC) src/client/components/misc/AdvisoryPanel.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/client/components/misc/CheckDetail.tsx, src/client/views/Results.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~192 LoC) src/components/homepage/HomeBackground.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~183 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/http-security.ts— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/client/analysis/registry.ts, src/client/components/Results/HttpSecurity.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~181 LoC) src/client/components/Results/DnsSec.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/jobs/registry.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~177 LoC) src/client/components/misc/CheckDetail.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/views/Results.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~173 LoC) src/client/components/misc/Tooltip.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/components/Form/Row.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~165 LoC) src/client/utils/result-processor.ts— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 13 in-repo import(s) from 13 other file(s) do name it (src/client/analysis/rules/vulnerabilities.ts, src/client/components/Results/ContentLinks.tsx, src/client/components/Results/Cookies.tsx and 10 more) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~150 LoC) REDACTED— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~149 LoC) src/client/components/Results/TlsSecurityAudit.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/jobs/registry.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~145 LoC) api/_common/http.js— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 28 in-repo import(s) from 28 other file(s) do name it (api/archives.js, api/breaches.js, api/carbon.js and 25 more) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~143 LoC) api/trackers.js— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~140 LoC) api/mixed-content.js— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~131 LoC) api/whois.js— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~126 LoC) src/client/components/Results/Threats.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/jobs/registry.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~118 LoC) api/threats.js— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~115 LoC) REDACTED— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 40 in-repo import(s) from 40 other file(s) do name it (api/archives.js, api/block-lists.js, api/breaches.js and 37 more) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~111 LoC) src/client/components/Results/SocialPresence.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/jobs/registry.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~105 LoC) api/subdomains.js— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~104 LoC) src/client/analysis/rules/mixed-content.ts— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (src/client/analysis/registry.ts, src/client/components/Results/MixedContent.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~103 LoC) src/client/components/Form/Modal.tsx— no import path from any entry point (2 application, 7 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (src/client/views/Results.tsx) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Unused dependency '@emnapi/runtime' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
Unused dependency 'cookie' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
Unused dependency 'prop-types' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
Unused dependency 'react-is' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
Third-party script without Subresource Integrity src/pages/web-check-api/spec.astro:29— `https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/swagger-ui/4.1.3/swagger-ui-bundle.js` is executed by this page with no Subresource Integrity. Whoever can answer that request — the CDN, anyone who compromises it, anyone on the network path — runs arbitrary script in this page's origin, with its session.
`async` callback passed to `forEach` REDACTED:101— `forEach` ignores what its callback returns, so the Promise each `async` call returns is dropped: nothing can await it, the code after this loop runs before any of the awaited work has finished (a function that `await`s around this loop still returns early), and a rejection is never handled — in Node.js an unhandled rejection terminates the process by default, and in a browser it is lost. Iterate with `for (const item of items) { await … }` when the work must run in order, or `await Promise.all(items.map(async (item) => { … }))` when it may run concurrently, so the enclosing function finishes only when the work does and its failures reach the caller. Where firing and forgetting is genuinely intended, make the callback's whole body a `try { … } catch (e) { … }` that handles the failure, so it cannot escape.
`async` Promise executor REDACTED:144— The function passed to `new Promise(…)` is `async`. The constructor ignores what its executor returns, so anything this executor throws — every throw inside an `async` function, including after an `await` — rejects a Promise nobody holds instead of the one being constructed: the outer Promise never settles, whoever awaits it hangs, and the error is reported nowhere. If the body needs `await`, it does not need `new Promise` at all: make the enclosing function `async` and `return` the value (or `throw`) directly. If it wraps a callback API, keep the executor synchronous — call the API and `resolve`/`reject` from its callback — and do the awaiting outside it.
X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document· Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap · ×1
Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap src/client/utils/result-processor.ts:58— `hasData` is exported and takes `r: any` from its caller, and it calls itself at line 58 (`hasData`) with a piece of `r` (and at line 59) — and nowhere in `hasData` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. JavaScript sets no limit of its own on that nesting: `JSON.parse` accepts any depth, so a 100,000-byte body — inside Express's default 100kb limit — parses to 50,000 levels, and a walk like this one throws `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded` long before it reaches the bottom. Wherever that throw lands, the work fails: a request errors, and a walk running outside any `try` — an event handler, a timer, a promise nobody awaits — takes the Node process down with every other request in flight. Thread a depth argument through `hasData` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack.
Deprecated: @opentelemetry/sdk-trace-base REDACTED:1687— @opentelemetry/sdk-trace-base 2.12.0 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "Use @opentelemetry/sdk-trace package". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
Deprecated: @opentelemetry/sdk-trace-node REDACTED:1697— @opentelemetry/sdk-trace-node 2.12.0 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "Use @opentelemetry/sdk-trace package". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
Deprecated: glob REDACTED:5255— glob 7.2.3 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "Old versions of glob are not supported, and contain widely publicized security vulnerabilities, which have been fixed in the current version. Please update. Support for old versions may be purchased (at exorbitant rates) by contacting i@izs.me". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
Deprecated: glob REDACTED:5267— glob 9.3.5 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "Old versions of glob are not supported, and contain widely publicized security vulnerabilities, which have been fixed in the current version. Please update. Support for old versions may be purchased (at exorbitant rates) by contacting i@izs.me". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
Deprecated: inflight REDACTED:5615— inflight 1.0.6 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "This module is not supported, and leaks memory. Do not use it. Check out lru-cache if you want a good and tested way to coalesce async requests by a key value, which is much more comprehensive and powerful.". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
Deprecated: node-domexception REDACTED:6607— node-domexception 1.0.0 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "Use your platform's native DOMException instead". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
Deprecated: puppeteer REDACTED:7384— puppeteer 19.7.5 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "< 24.15.0 is no longer supported". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
Deprecated: rimraf REDACTED:7793— rimraf 2.7.1 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "Rimraf versions prior to v4 are no longer supported". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
Deprecated: whatwg-encoding REDACTED:9289— whatwg-encoding 3.1.1 is resolved in REDACTED and is marked deprecated by its publisher: "Use @exodus/bytes instead for a more spec-conformant and faster implementation". This repository does not declare it — a direct dependency pulls it in, so the move is to upgrade or replace that dependency.
P2 · Observability· Console output used as the logging channel · ×4
Console output used as the logging channel REDACTED:15— `REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 15 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel REDACTED:16— `REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 16 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel REDACTED:248— `REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 248 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel src/client/components/misc/ErrorBoundary.tsx:34— `src/client/components/misc/ErrorBoundary.tsx` reports through `console.*` at line 34 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Duplicated predicate api/hsts.js:16— `/max-age\s*=\s*"?(\d+)/.exec(lower)?.[1] || 0` appears character-identically in 2 files — api/hsts.js, src/client/analysis/rules/hsts.ts. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate api/_common/http.js:54— `error.name === 'TimeoutError' || error.name === 'AbortError'` appears character-identically in 2 files — api/_common/http.js, api/redirects.js. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate src/client/analysis/rules/http-security.ts:151— `key === 'xFrameOptions' && hasFrameAncestors(d)` appears character-identically in 2 files — src/client/analysis/rules/http-security.ts, src/client/components/Results/HttpSecurity.tsx. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate REDACTED:9— `process.env.PUBLIC_API_TIMEOUT_LIMIT || '40000'` appears character-identically in 3 files — REDACTED, api/screenshot.js, api/status.js. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
redundant comment api/_common/browser.js:17— "Launch headless Chromium with our default args" repeats the code it sits on: 4 of its 5 words (launch, headless, chromium, args) are already in `export const launchBrowser = async (options = {}) =>`. Delete it, or replace it with what the code cannot say (why it is done here, a constraint, or a consequence).
redundant comment api/ports.js:87— "Sort openPorts and failedPorts before returning" repeats the code it sits on: 4 of its 5 words (sort, open, ports, returning) are already in `openPorts.sort((a, b) => a - b);`. Delete it, or replace it with what the code cannot say (why it is done here, a constraint, or a consequence).
redundant comment REDACTED:84— "Create rate limiters for each time frame" repeats the code it sits on: 4 of its 5 words (rate, limiters, time, frame) are already in `const limiters = limits.map((limit) =>`. Delete it, or replace it with what the code cannot say (why it is done here, a constraint, or a consequence).
Silent fallback default in catch src/client/analysis/registry.ts:75— `runAnalysis` swallows every exception into `return []` — a data error becomes a silent behavior change with no trail. Log the failure or let it raise. If that constant is the correct answer rather than a stand-in for a value that could not be read, say so in a comment on the handler or in the docstring, and the row stops firing.
Silent fallback default in catch src/layouts/scripts/theme.js:9— `read` swallows every exception into `return 'dark'` — a data error becomes a silent behavior change with no trail. Log the failure or let it raise. If that constant is the correct answer rather than a stand-in for a value that could not be read, say so in a comment on the handler or in the docstring, and the row stops firing.
C2 · Access Controls· No named authorization policies · ×1
No named authorization policies api/security-txt.js:32— Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect.
Outdated (npm): @sparticuz/chromium package.json:36— @sparticuz/chromium is pinned at 148.0.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 153.0.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
No ADRs found fly.toml:1— No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`. ADRs are expected here because `fly.toml` makes this repository a deployable product (line 1).
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
M2 · Architecture documentation· No architecture diagram/doc · ×1
No architecture diagram/doc — No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene· Type-only dependency '@fortawesome/fontawesome-svg-core' in production deps · ×1
Type-only dependency '@fortawesome/fontawesome-svg-core' in production deps src/client/components/Results/SocialPresence.tsx:2— Every import is type-only — move it to devDependencies.
Null assertions (`!`) override strict null checking — ~0.3 `!` null assertions per 1k TypeScript source lines — 3 assertion(s) across the 11817 source line(s) of the 165 TypeScript file(s) read, which is the only code the operator asserts anything in (a `!` in a `.js` file is not this operator and was not counted, and one in a file whose null checking is off silences nothing). Densest: src/client/analysis/rules/http-security.ts (1), src/client/components/Results/MailConfig.tsx (1), src/client/components/misc/Tooltip.tsx (1). Each one tells the compiler to trust the author about null, suppressing the very diagnostic `strictNullChecks` exists to produce. Many are correct: each is a claim the checker could not verify, and it is wrong only where the value can in fact be missing, so review the densest places first.
Outdated (npm): @astrojs/node — @astrojs/node is pinned at 11.1.9; registry.npmjs.org publishes 11.1.13 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): @astrojs/react — @astrojs/react is pinned at 7.1.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 7.1.9 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): @ghostery/adblocker — @ghostery/adblocker is pinned at 2.17.3; registry.npmjs.org publishes 2.20.3 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): @ghostery/trackerdb — @ghostery/trackerdb is pinned at 1.0.956; registry.npmjs.org publishes 1.0.974 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): astro — astro is pinned at 7.4.2; registry.npmjs.org publishes 7.4.12 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): cookie — cookie is pinned at 2.0.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 2.0.2 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): dotenv — dotenv is pinned at 18.0.9; registry.npmjs.org publishes 18.0.10 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): express-rate-limit — express-rate-limit is pinned at 8.7.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 8.7.4 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): framer-motion — framer-motion is pinned at 14.6.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 14.14.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): puppeteer — puppeteer is pinned at 24.43.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 25.17.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): puppeteer-core — puppeteer-core is pinned at 24.43.1; registry.npmjs.org publishes 25.17.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): react-router — react-router is pinned at 8.5.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 8.5.1 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): react-toastify — react-toastify is pinned at 11.1.0; registry.npmjs.org publishes 11.2.0 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): svelte — svelte is pinned at 5.57.2; registry.npmjs.org publishes 5.57.3 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): typescript — typescript is pinned at 6.0.3; registry.npmjs.org publishes 7.0.2 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Outdated (npm): wappalyzer — wappalyzer is pinned at 6.10.66; registry.npmjs.org publishes 7.0.3 as the latest release. Upgrading is a judgement call — read that package's changelog for what changed between the two — but a direct production dependency several releases behind is where security and compatibility debt accumulates silently.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 46 file(s) — `src/data/categories.ts`, `src/data/checks/archives.ts`, `src/data/checks/block-lists.ts`, `src/data/checks/breaches.ts`, `src/data/checks/caa-records.ts`, … (+41 more) — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
Run 01a1d9f3-1824-70c4-90d3-e7dff3e7017e · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 86 · Warnings: 146 · Recommendations: 33 · Info: 16 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by the Canine Code Analyzer: deterministic code-health analysis. 14-11-2026 @ 12:05 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.