Executive summary
krisk/Fuse is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, most of them in the packages it uses. Its score is held back because it has form fields without a label. It scores 66 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged.
Accessibility, at 58, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is fixing focus, motion and contrast, worth about 6 points. Labelling the form fields and buttons comes next, worth about 5 points. Raising Accessibility to 70 would lift the score to about 71.
Nine known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Six form fields can't be read by a screen reader, and five pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Labelling the form fields, updating the vulnerable packages and pinning each tool to an exact version would close these risks. Setting a waiting period for automatic updates would fix the automatic dependency update that takes a new release at once, and limiting each secret to its own step would deal with the secret exposed to more of the pipeline than needed.
The product code is 8,214 lines, about €18,000 to rebuild.
If Accessibility rose from 58 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 66 to about 71.
New since the last survey: 8 findings
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.1:1) docs/.vitepress/theme/components/BitapDemo.vue
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) docs/.vitepress/theme/components/BitapDemo.vue
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) docs/.vitepress/theme/components/BitapDemo.vue
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.5:1) docs/.vitepress/theme/components/FuzzyMatchDemo.vue
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.9:1) docs/.vitepress/theme/components/FuzzyMatchDemo.vue
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.4:1) docs/.vitepress/theme/components/Sponsor.vue
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.6:1) docs/.vitepress/theme/components/WorkerDemo.vue
Fixed since the last survey: 2 findings
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file scripts/bump-docs.cjs
- A11y enforcement · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung
Rebuild cost: about €18,000 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €5,800 to €29,000, for 97 to 308 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.9 at a score of 66. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 8,214 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 docs.public | 2 scripts | 3 src | 4 src.helpers | 5 src.search.token.InvertedIndex | 6 src.search.token.analyzer | 7 src.types | 8 src.workers.worker | 9 src.core.queryParser | 10 src.search.bitap | 11 src.search.extended | 12 src.search.extended.matchers | 13 src.search.token | 14 src.tools.FuseIndex | 15 src.tools.KeyStore | 16 src.tools.MaxHeap | 17 src.workers | 18 src.workers.FuseWorker | 19 src.core | 20 src.search | 21 src.tools |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 docs.public | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 2 scripts | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 3 src | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 4 src.helpers | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 5 src.search.token.InvertedIndex | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 6 src.search.token.analyzer | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 7 src.types | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 8 src.workers.worker | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 9 src.core.queryParser | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 10 src.search.bitap | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 11 src.search.extended | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 12 src.search.extended.matchers | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 13 src.search.token | 1 | 4 | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||
| 14 src.tools.FuseIndex | 3 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 15 src.tools.KeyStore | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 16 src.tools.MaxHeap | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 17 src.workers | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 18 src.workers.FuseWorker | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 19 src.core | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
| 20 src.search | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 21 src.tools | 4 | 1 |
9→7 src.core.queryParser uses src.types✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.core.queryParser uses a type in src.types.
- The types involved
src.core.queryParser.ParsedLeaf→src.types.Searcher
- Direction
- src.core.queryParser uses src.types, so a change to src.types can break src.core.queryParser, while a change to src.core.queryParser can't break src.types.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.core.queryParser uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
10→7 src.search.bitap uses src.types✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in src.search.bitap uses a type in src.types.
- The types involved
src.search.bitap.BitapSearch→src.types.SearchResultsrc.search.bitap.search→src.types.SearchResult
- Direction
- src.search.bitap uses src.types, so a change to src.types can break src.search.bitap, while a change to src.search.bitap can't break src.types.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.search.bitap uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
11→7 src.search.extended uses src.types✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in src.search.extended uses a type in src.types.
- The types involved
src.search.extended.ExtendedSearch→src.types.SearchResultsrc.search.extended.objectQuery→src.types.Searcher
- Direction
- src.search.extended uses src.types, so a change to src.types can break src.search.extended, while a change to src.search.extended can't break src.types.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.search.extended uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
12→7 src.search.extended.matchers uses src.types✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.search.extended.matchers uses a type in src.types.
- The types involved
src.search.extended.matchers.Matcher→src.types.SearchResult
- Direction
- src.search.extended.matchers uses src.types, so a change to src.types can break src.search.extended.matchers, while a change to src.search.extended.matchers can't break src.types.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.search.extended.matchers uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→5 src.search.token uses src.search.token.InvertedIndex✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.search.token uses a type in src.search.token.InvertedIndex.
- The types involved
src.search.token.InvertedIndex→src.search.token.InvertedIndex.InvertedIndexData
- Direction
- src.search.token uses src.search.token.InvertedIndex, so a change to src.search.token.InvertedIndex can break src.search.token, while a change to src.search.token can't break src.search.token.InvertedIndex.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.search.token uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→6 src.search.token uses src.search.token.analyzer✕
- Connections
- 4 pairs of types, where a type in src.search.token uses a type in src.search.token.analyzer.
- The types involved
src.search.token.InvertedIndex→src.search.token.analyzer.Analyzersrc.search.token.TokenSearch→src.search.token.analyzer.Analyzersrc.search.token.analyzer→src.search.token.analyzer.Analyzersrc.search.token.analyzer→src.search.token.analyzer.AnalyzerOptions
- Direction
- src.search.token uses src.search.token.analyzer, so a change to src.search.token.analyzer can break src.search.token, while a change to src.search.token can't break src.search.token.analyzer.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.search.token uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→7 src.search.token uses src.types✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in src.search.token uses a type in src.types.
- The types involved
src.search.token.InvertedIndex→src.types.IndexRecordsrc.search.token.TokenSearch→src.types.SearchResult
- Direction
- src.search.token uses src.types, so a change to src.types can break src.search.token, while a change to src.search.token can't break src.types.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.search.token uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
14→7 src.tools.FuseIndex uses src.types✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in src.tools.FuseIndex uses a type in src.types.
- The types involved
src.tools.FuseIndex.FuseIndex→src.types.FuseIndexOptionssrc.tools.FuseIndex.FuseIndex→src.types.IndexRecordsrc.tools.FuseIndex.FuseIndex→src.types.NormInterface
- Direction
- src.tools.FuseIndex uses src.types, so a change to src.types can break src.tools.FuseIndex, while a change to src.tools.FuseIndex can't break src.types.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.tools.FuseIndex uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
15→7 src.tools.KeyStore uses src.types✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.tools.KeyStore uses a type in src.types.
- The types involved
src.tools.KeyStore.KeyStore→src.types.KeyObject
- Direction
- src.tools.KeyStore uses src.types, so a change to src.types can break src.tools.KeyStore, while a change to src.tools.KeyStore can't break src.types.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.tools.KeyStore uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
16→7 src.tools.MaxHeap uses src.types✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.tools.MaxHeap uses a type in src.types.
- The types involved
src.tools.MaxHeap.MaxHeap→src.types.InternalResult
- Direction
- src.tools.MaxHeap uses src.types, so a change to src.types can break src.tools.MaxHeap, while a change to src.tools.MaxHeap can't break src.types.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.tools.MaxHeap uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
17→8 src.workers uses src.workers.worker✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.workers uses a type in src.workers.worker.
- The types involved
src.workers.worker→src.workers.worker.WorkerMessage
- Direction
- src.workers uses src.workers.worker, so a change to src.workers.worker can break src.workers, while a change to src.workers can't break src.workers.worker.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.workers uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
18→7 src.workers.FuseWorker uses src.types✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in src.workers.FuseWorker uses a type in src.types.
- The types involved
src.workers.FuseWorker.FuseWorker→src.types.FuseSearchOptionssrc.workers.FuseWorker.FuseWorker→src.types.IFuseOptions
- Direction
- src.workers.FuseWorker uses src.types, so a change to src.types can break src.workers.FuseWorker, while a change to src.workers.FuseWorker can't break src.types.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.workers.FuseWorker uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
19→7 src.core uses src.types✕
- Connections
- 7 pairs of types, where a type in src.core uses a type in src.types.
- The types involved
src.core.Fuse→src.types.Expressionsrc.core.Fuse→src.types.FuseSearchOptionssrc.core.Fuse→src.types.IFuseOptionssrc.core.Fuse→src.types.Searchersrc.core.formatMatches→src.types.InternalResultsrc.core.queryParser→src.types.Expressionsrc.core.register→src.types.Searcher
- Direction
- src.core uses src.types, so a change to src.types can break src.core, while a change to src.core can't break src.types.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.core uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
19→9 src.core uses src.core.queryParser✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.core uses a type in src.core.queryParser.
- The types involved
src.core.queryParser→src.core.queryParser.ParsedNode
- Direction
- src.core uses src.core.queryParser, so a change to src.core.queryParser can break src.core, while a change to src.core can't break src.core.queryParser.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.core uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
19→14 src.core uses src.tools.FuseIndex✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.core uses a type in src.tools.FuseIndex.
- The types involved
src.core.Fuse→src.tools.FuseIndex.FuseIndex
- Direction
- src.core uses src.tools.FuseIndex, so a change to src.tools.FuseIndex can break src.core, while a change to src.core can't break src.tools.FuseIndex.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.core uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
19→15 src.core uses src.tools.KeyStore✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.core uses a type in src.tools.KeyStore.
- The types involved
src.core.Fuse→src.tools.KeyStore.KeyStore
- Direction
- src.core uses src.tools.KeyStore, so a change to src.tools.KeyStore can break src.core, while a change to src.core can't break src.tools.KeyStore.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.core uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
19→16 src.core uses src.tools.MaxHeap✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.core uses a type in src.tools.MaxHeap.
- The types involved
src.core.HeapSearchOptions→src.tools.MaxHeap.MaxHeap
- Direction
- src.core uses src.tools.MaxHeap, so a change to src.tools.MaxHeap can break src.core, while a change to src.core can't break src.tools.MaxHeap.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.core uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
20→11 src.search uses src.search.extended✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.search uses a type in src.search.extended.
- The types involved
src.search.index→src.search.extended.ExtendedSearchOptions
- Direction
- src.search uses src.search.extended, so a change to src.search.extended can break src.search, while a change to src.search can't break src.search.extended.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.search uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
21→7 src.tools uses src.types✕
- Connections
- 4 pairs of types, where a type in src.tools uses a type in src.types.
- The types involved
src.tools.FuseIndex→src.types.FuseIndexOptionssrc.tools.KeyStore→src.types.FuseOptionKeysrc.tools.KeyStore→src.types.KeyObjectsrc.tools.fieldNorm→src.types.NormInterface
- Direction
- src.tools uses src.types, so a change to src.types can break src.tools, while a change to src.tools can't break src.types.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.tools uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
21→14 src.tools uses src.tools.FuseIndex✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.tools uses a type in src.tools.FuseIndex.
- The types involved
src.tools.FuseIndex→src.tools.FuseIndex.FuseIndex
- Direction
- src.tools uses src.tools.FuseIndex, so a change to src.tools.FuseIndex can break src.tools, while a change to src.tools can't break src.tools.FuseIndex.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.tools uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Accessibility
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 13 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 10 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1; Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label; Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1. | +6.4 pts | Medium | Visual & motion safety |
| Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label. | +4.8 pts | Medium | Forms & labels |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +2.8 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +2.3 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite. | +1.2 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with object-query.test.js. | +0.3 pts | Low | Comment Value |
| Resolve the 7 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (7). | +0.3 pts | Low | Dependency Vulnerabilities |
| Resolve the 1 finding(s) in Type Safety. | +0.5 pts | Medium | Type Safety |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.6 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 3.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.7 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| src/core/index.ts | 7.4 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: Fuse.search (cyclomatic 18) |
| src/search/extended/objectQuery.ts | 7.4 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: objectQuery.compileClause (cyclomatic 17) |
| src/search/bitap/search.ts | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: search.search (cyclomatic 27) |
| src/helpers/get.ts | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: get.get (cyclomatic 16) |
| src/core/queryParser.ts | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: queryParser.parse::next (cyclomatic 16) |
| src/workers/FuseWorker.ts | 7.8 | Mixed | Cognitive Complexity: FuseWorker._assertNoFunctionOptions (cognitive 19) |
| src/tools/FuseIndex.ts | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: FuseIndex._createObjectRecord (cognitive 36) |
| src/search/extended/index.ts | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: ExtendedSearch.searchIn (cognitive 30) |
| src/search/token/index.ts | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: TokenSearch.searchIn (cognitive 25) |
| src/search/token/analyzer.ts | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: analyzer.resolveTokenize (cognitive 16) |
| package.json | 8.5 | Near-clean | Dependency Hygiene: Deprecated: eslint |
| test/object-query.test.js | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: redundant comment |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 56 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 56 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 105 of 111 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. This repository's 1 package.json manifest(s) and its 1 committed lockfile(s) WERE read; what went unanswered is the currency half, because it grades the production `dependencies` a lockfile resolves and these manifests declare none — only 18 devDependencies, which D12 does not grade. So registry.npmjs.org was never asked, and there was nothing here for it to grade. This is a true statement about the repository and NOT a gap on our side: the lockfile was resolved, and no reader we could write would find a production dependency in it.
- D14 License Compliance — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This repository declares no npm dependency a consumer installs, but 17 of the 17 code file(s) it ships carry a sign of vendored or bundled third-party code (for example `dist/fuse-worker.cjs` is committed build output, which a bundler can inline undeclared third-party code into; `dist/fuse-worker.d.cts` is committed build output, which a bundler can inline undeclared third-party code into; `dist/fuse-worker.d.ts` is committed build output, which a bundler can inline undeclared third-party code into; `dist/fuse-worker.mjs` is committed build output, which a bundler can inline undeclared third-party code into; `dist/fuse.basic.cjs` is committed build output, which a bundler can inline undeclared third-party code into). Code copied or bundled into a repository ships under its upstream licence, and this pass has no reader for it: it grades the licences of DECLARED packages only. So there is a licence to grade here and it was not graded — a missing collector, not a statement about this repository.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (86 contributor(s) across 1005 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 85% of the history; the other 85 hold 0.2% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
- D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's naming rules read C# through Roslyn and every other language through its sidecar model; these languages are left out (PHP's reading is its own change, a Roslyn-loaded VB or F# project has no population builder yet). Their declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether their names are consistent.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (package.json), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `docs/.vitepress/theme/index.ts` produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. The dev server exited, and its output does not match a cause we recognise. (rule: unrecognised-exit). The renderer reported: the dev server (`npm run dev`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (not identified): the dev server exited, and its output does not match a cause we recognise. Last output: "at async iterateAsync (file://<repo>/node_modules/quansync/dist/src-C2Pm6gXo.js:58:28) / at async iterateAsync (file://<repo>/node_modules/quansync/dist/src-C2Pm6gXo.js:58:28) / at async loadConfigFile (file://<repo>/node_modules/tsdown/dist/options-DWGUHu4D.mjs:604:19) / at async resolveConfig (file://<repo>/node_modules/tsdown/dist/build-BZshaq8i.mjs:93:51) / at async build$1 (file://<repo>/node_modules/tsdown/dist/build-BZshaq8i.mjs:718:40) / at async CAC.<anonymous> (file://<repo>/node_modules/tsdown/dist/run.mjs:21:2) / at async runCLI (file://<repo>/node_modules/tsdown/dist/run.mjs:45:3)" No runtime evidence was gathered.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DevServer (dev). the dev server (`npm run dev`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (not identified): the dev server exited, and its output does not match a cause we recognise. Last output: "at async iterateAsync (file://<repo>/node_modules/quansync/dist/src-C2Pm6gXo.js:58:28) / at async iterateAsync (file://<repo>/node_modules/quansync/dist/src-C2Pm6gXo.js:58:28) / at async loadConfigFile (file://<repo>/node_modules/tsdown/dist/options-DWGUHu4D.mjs:604:19) / at async resolveConfig (file://<repo>/node_modules/tsdown/dist/build-BZshaq8i.mjs:93:51) / at async build$1 (file://<repo>/node_modules/tsdown/dist/build-BZshaq8i.mjs:718:40) / at async CAC.<anonymous> (file://<repo>/node_modules/tsdown/dist/run.mjs:21:2) / at async runCLI (file://<repo>/node_modules/tsdown/dist/run.mjs:45:3)" No runtime evidence was gathered.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and none applies: this repository publishes a library and deploys nothing (no container, IaC or deployment manifest), so it holds no runtime state of its own. Any data-access dependency it declares is the store it is a CLIENT for, not one it operates. The DR control belongs to whoever runs that data.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. 38 JavaScript/TypeScript file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source, disabled certificate validation, obsolete TLS versions, plaintext password storage and session cookies set without HttpOnly, Secure or SameSite, and none was found. The server controls this dimension also scores were not assessed, so no score is given.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, PHP, Dart, Kotlin, Ruby, Scala, Java, Python and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and no named async function in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, nor any Go, PHP or Dart function or Kotlin suspend function, makes a request that can be cancelled (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http; net/http, net.Dial; amphp; Dio; Ktor, OkHttp), so there is nothing to judge, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — we run the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value is measured as redundancy only: a comment that repeats its code's words is found, but a paraphrase in other words, a vague comment, or one the code contradicts is not, and whether a comment is valuable is not claimed. Comments in other scripts or languages, and outside C#, are not judged.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
6 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was search.search at 27.
What to do
- Bring the 6 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with search.search (cyclomatic 27), parseQuery.tokenize (cyclomatic 19), Fuse.search (cyclomatic 18). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 6 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 8.4 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
14 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was search.search at 52.
What to do
- Bring the 4 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with search.search (cognitive 52), parseQuery.tokenize (cognitive 37), FuseIndex._createObjectRecord (cognitive 36). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 4.5 to about 6.5/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 30; a cleaner split scores higher.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 6 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D10 · Test Quality
1 skipped (1 with a documented reason), 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 418 tests.
D11 · Test Reliability
0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). JavaScript/TypeScript (vitest via `npm ci --ignore-scripts` in the repository root (449 tests)): measured (0 flaky).
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
Top hotspots: src/core/queryParser.ts (2×18=36)
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with queryParser.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted task-comment markers across 3820 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 16 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D24 · Comment Value
1 of 351 judged comments only repeat the code they sit on (0.3 %). 7 comment(s) in another language or script were not judged.
D27 · Navigability
38 % of calls cross a namespace and 6 % go through an interface, but 44 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
10 finding(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 3 medium, 0 low. 5 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `docs/.vitepress/theme/index.ts` (lines 21–62) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 5 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
13 finding(s): 1 critical, 8 high, 4 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 7 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 21 of the 47 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
AC2 · Forms & labels
- This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. — docs/.vitepress/theme/components/Playground.vue:5
- This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×5) — docs/.vitepress/theme/components/Playground.vue:63, docs/.vitepress/theme/components/SearchWindowDemo.vue:13, docs/.vitepress/theme/components/SearchWindowDemo.vue:18, …
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC5 · ARIA correctness
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- `.text-char.current.match-range` sets color: #fff on background-color: #28a745 — 3.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — docs/.vitepress/theme/components/BitapDemo.vue:436
- `.bit-cell.bit-empty` sets color: #999 on background-color: #f0f0f0 — 2.5:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — docs/.vitepress/theme/components/BitapDemo.vue:526
- `.dark .bit-cell.bit-empty` sets color: #666 on background-color: #2a2a2a — 2.5:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — docs/.vitepress/theme/components/BitapDemo.vue:531
- `.match-cell.pending` sets color: #ccc on background-color: #f5f5f5 — 1.5:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — docs/.vitepress/theme/components/FuzzyMatchDemo.vue:369
- `.dark .match-cell.pending` sets color: #555 on background-color: #2a2a2a — 1.9:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — docs/.vitepress/theme/components/FuzzyMatchDemo.vue:374
- `.sponsor-btn` sets color: #fff on background-color: #9066b8 — 4.4:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — docs/.vitepress/theme/components/Sponsor.vue:14
- `.run-btn` sets color: white on background-color: #94a3b8 — 2.6:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — docs/.vitepress/theme/components/WorkerDemo.vue:404
- `.sponsor-btn` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — docs/.vitepress/theme/components/Sponsor.vue:22
- `.sponsor-btn:focus` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — docs/.vitepress/theme/components/Sponsor.vue:33
- `.VPNavBar a:hover .VPImage.logo` moves (`animation: fuse-logo-spin 0.5s ease-in-out 1`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — docs/.vitepress/theme/style.css:87
- `.bar-fill` moves (`transition: width 0.2s`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — docs/.vitepress/theme/components/ThresholdDemo.vue:243
- `.threshold-line` moves (`transition: left 0.2s`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — docs/.vitepress/theme/components/ThresholdDemo.vue:265
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX6 · Interface segregation
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P10 · Library API & versioning
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 2 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:7
- `package.json` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — package.json:130
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P6 · Release Hygiene
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
R1 · Type Safety
- 38 typed · 22 plain JS — the untyped files are scripts/bump-docs.cjs, test/cache-invalidation.test.js, test/cjs-interop.test.js, test/extended-search.test.js, test/feature-flags.test.js, test/fuse-worker.test.js (+16 more). 0 production file(s) opt out entirely with @ts-nocheck · 1 @ts-ignore suppression(s).
R10 · Code Duplication
- src/core/index.ts:551 · src/core/index.ts:575 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/core/index.ts:551
- src/search/extended/objectQuery.ts:39 · src/search/extended/objectQuery.ts:182 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/search/extended/objectQuery.ts:39
- src/core/index.ts:305 · src/core/index.ts:449 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/core/index.ts:305
- src/workers/FuseWorker.ts:194 · src/workers/FuseWorker.ts:307 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/workers/FuseWorker.ts:194
What to do
- Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- match has cyclomatic complexity 55 and cognitive complexity 71; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/core/index.ts:59
- search has cyclomatic complexity 24 and cognitive complexity 48; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/search/bitap/search.ts:7
- tokenize has cyclomatic complexity 19 and cognitive complexity 37; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — REDACTED:12
- compileClause has cyclomatic complexity 17 and cognitive complexity 35; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/search/extended/objectQuery.ts:39
- (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 16 and cognitive complexity 29; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/core/queryParser.ts:61
- searchIn has cyclomatic complexity 15 and cognitive complexity 25; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/search/token/index.ts:70
- (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 14 and cognitive complexity 19; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/helpers/get.ts:19
- searchIn has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 32; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/search/extended/index.ts:87
- compileFieldQuery has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 22; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/search/extended/objectQuery.ts:178
- (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 19; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — test/package-types.test.ts:269
R3 · Large Files
- src/core/index.ts has 540 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module. — src/core/index.ts:1
What to do
- Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×2) — src/workers/worker.ts:1, src/search/bitap/computeScore.ts:1
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 · Dependency Freshness
R6 · Tooling
R7 · Dead Code
- Unreachable from the 5 application, 5 tooling and 28 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on `npm run build` — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (5 application, 5 tooling, 28 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make — src/search/bitap/computeScore.ts
- This script imports the product ('../dist/fuse.mjs'), so it is an authored benchmark, not measurement input — but nothing invokes it: no package.json script, no CI workflow or build recipe, no Dockerfile, no other file under bench/, and no in-repo reference to its name at all. It runs only if someone remembers to type `node bench/inverted-index-shape.mjs`, and it silently rots against the API it measures. Wire it into a script or workflow the way its wired siblings are, or delete it. — bench/inverted-index-shape.mjs
- This script imports the product ('../dist/fuse.mjs'), so it is an authored benchmark, not measurement input — but nothing invokes it: no package.json script, no CI workflow or build recipe, no Dockerfile, no other file under bench/, and no in-repo reference to its name at all. It runs only if someone remembers to type `node bench/direction-a-parity-check.mjs`, and it silently rots against the API it measures. Wire it into a script or workflow the way its wired siblings are, or delete it. — bench/direction-a-parity-check.mjs
- Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. — src/types.ts:29
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
R9 · Circular Imports
X1 · Async correctness
X12 · Unreachable branch
X16 · Unfloored truncation loop
X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document
- `get` is exported, takes a document from its caller (line 10) and hands it to `deepGet`, which calls itself at line 53 (`deepGet`) with a piece of `obj` (and at line 57) — and nowhere in `deepGet` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. JavaScript sets no limit of its own on that nesting: `JSON.parse` accepts any depth, so a 100,000-byte body — inside Express's default 100kb limit — parses to 50,000 levels, and a walk like this one throws `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded` long before it reaches the bottom. Wherever that throw lands, the work fails: a request errors, and a walk running outside any `try` — an event handler, a timer, a promise nobody awaits — takes the Node process down with every other request in flight. Thread a depth argument through `deepGet` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — src/helpers/get.ts:53
- `parse` is exported, takes a document from its caller (line 56) and hands it to `next`, which calls itself at line 140 (`next`) with a piece of `query` — and nowhere in `next` is there a depth parameter, a descent counter, or any other cap. The walk therefore spends one stack frame per LEVEL of the value it is handed, so the nesting of the caller's document — not this code — decides how deep the stack goes. JavaScript sets no limit of its own on that nesting: `JSON.parse` accepts any depth, so a 100,000-byte body — inside Express's default 100kb limit — parses to 50,000 levels, and a walk like this one throws `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded` long before it reaches the bottom. Wherever that throw lands, the work fails: a request errors, and a walk running outside any `try` — an event handler, a timer, a promise nobody awaits — takes the Node process down with every other request in flight. Thread a depth argument through `next` and reject the value past a fixed maximum, or rewrite the descent with an explicit stack. — src/core/queryParser.ts:140
What to do
- Each finding names the externally-callable member that accepts the document and the self-call that descends, and states that no depth parameter or counter exists anywhere in the walk. Confirm from the two, then thread a depth argument through the walk and reject documents past a fixed maximum, or rewrite it with an explicit stack.
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element
X3 · Exception handling
X5 · Nullable reference types
- ~5.6 `!` null assertions per 1k TypeScript source lines — 25 assertion(s) across the 4425 source line(s) of the 36 TypeScript file(s) read, which is the only code the operator asserts anything in (a `!` in a `.js` file is not this operator and was not counted, and one in a file whose null checking is off silences nothing). Densest: src/core/index.ts (10), src/tools/FuseIndex.ts (3), src/tools/KeyStore.ts (3). Each one tells the compiler to trust the author about null, suppressing the very diagnostic `strictNullChecks` exists to produce. Many are correct: each is a claim the checker could not verify, and it is wrong only where the value can in fact be missing, so review the densest places first.
What to do
- The findings name the configuration each number was taken from and, for the assertions, the files that hold them. Turn null checking on where it is off — `"strict": true` in the base tsconfig that the others extend switches `strictNullChecks` on with the rest of the family — and then resolve the assertions rather than adding to them. A `!` on a value the checker could show to be null is a promise the author cannot check from where they are standing, and each one is a `TypeError: Cannot read properties of null` waiting for the path that makes it true; where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (narrow it with a test, make the property required, drop the `?`).
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 80% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 98% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 67% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 70% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 87% | Strong | Solid. |
| Accessibility | 58% | Adequate — gated by AC6 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Performance | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Unscored — 2 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — 15 observation(s) recorded · Dependency currency not established — this repository declares no production dependency to grade
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — 1 observation(s) recorded · The CI pipeline publishes no artifact — no package publish, container push or release with files to download. Supply-chain provenance, signing and an SBOM describe a PUBLISHED artifact for the people who obtain it, so there is nothing to attest here; a deployment of the service itself publishes nothing for anyone else to verify. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts publishing artifacts (a package, a container image, or a release with downloadable files). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
Not evidenced — 2 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 69 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC3 Page structure — No structural check found in the parsed markup — AC3 not applicable here.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's TypeScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — the dev server (`npm run dev`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (not identified): the dev server exited, and its output does not match a cause we recognise. Last output: "at async iterateAsync (file://<repo>/node_modules/quansync/dist/src-C2Pm6gXo.js:58:28) / at async iterateAsync (file://<repo>/node_modules/quansync/dist/src-C2Pm6gXo.js:58:28) / at async loadConfigFile (file://<repo>/node_modules/tsdown/dist/options-DWGUHu4D.mjs:604:19) / at async resolveConfig (file://<repo>/node_modules/tsdown/dist/build-BZshaq8i.mjs:93:51) / at async build$1 (file://<repo>/node_modules/tsdown/dist/build-BZshaq8i.mjs:718:40) / at async CAC.<anonymous> (file://<repo>/node_modules/tsdown/dist/run.mjs:21:2) / at async runCLI (file://<repo>/node_modules/tsdown/dist/run.mjs:45:3)" No runtime evidence was gathered. This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect. If it does persist personal data (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the controls belong to wherever that data is stored.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — this repository stands up no server (no Express, Fastify, Koa, Hono, NestJS or similar app, no Next.js/SvelteKit/Nuxt server route, no edge function), creates no Supabase tables and talks to no hosted backend. Access control is therefore N/A here — a browser application or library is authorized by the server it calls, not by itself; a client-side route guard hides a page and authorizes nothing. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the limit belongs wherever that data is stored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the rights are served wherever that data is stored.
- D14 License Compliance — Vendored third-party code's licences not graded — D14 grades declared npm dependencies only
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency does not read html yet; not measured.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (4832 LoC, 77 module-visible types across 12 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 1 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D4 Code Duplication — This repository's production source (.cjs, .js, .mjs, .ts, .vue) is not read by D4's token comparison, which compares .NET source: duplication in it is measured by R10 Code Duplication, the frontend lens's card running the same clone algorithm over the JS/TS token stream. Not scored here — read the R10 card for this repository's duplication. The rest — .html (147 lines, 1.8% of production source) — is compared by neither card, so duplication there is unmeasured; it is a corner of this repository, not its product.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this npm build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — the repository root runs vitest but declares no coverage provider, so the suite can run and still produce no lcov — add `@vitest/coverage-v8` (or `@vitest/coverage-istanbul`) as a devDependency. Coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. The named suite step is one the repository's maintainers can perform; once it passes, the real number is measured on the next scan.
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P2 Observability — This repository's JavaScript/TypeScript source (1 module(s), 37 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JavaScript/TypeScript source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: 38 JavaScript/TypeScript file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source, disabled TLS certificate validation, obsolete TLS versions, passwords stored or checked as plaintext and session cookies set without HttpOnly, Secure or SameSite, and none was found. That half of the dimension is clean, but it is not scored on its own: a C# repository with the same clean reading is scored on its server controls as well, or is N/A for having no web surface, and neither can be decided here. Of the server controls, two are read where the source shows them: every session or sign-in cookie the code sets is read for HttpOnly, Secure and SameSite at the line that sets it (a raw `Set-Cookie` header, Express, Fastify, Hono, Koa, Next.js, `cookie.serialize`, express-session and cookie-session), and every Node listener for HTTPS enforcement. HSTS, security response headers and input validation are NOT assessed for JavaScript/TypeScript: each is scored as an absence, an absence is only reportable over the production HTTP server, and in this ecosystem the file that opens the port is build output or a framework launcher rather than a file in the source tree. Their absence here is not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — Not applicable: this check looks for a loop whose body adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is walking, invalidating the enumerator it holds, and in this repository's languages that cannot happen. JavaScript and TypeScript have no iterator that a change can invalidate: an `Array` is walked by index against its live length, and a `Map` or `Set` by the ECMAScript specification's live entry list, so a body that adds to, removes from or empties what it walks raises nothing — every loop form (`for…of`, `for…in`, `forEach`, `map`, `filter`, `reduce`, `entries()`) on every built-in collection (`Array`, `Map`, `Set`, plain objects, `URLSearchParams`, `Headers`, `FormData`) runs to completion. Such a loop can still skip an element or never end, which is a different defect and not the one this check asks about. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 22 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- <input> without a programmatic label docs/.vitepress/theme/components/Playground.vue:5
- <input> without a programmatic label docs/.vitepress/theme/components/SearchWindowDemo.vue:13
- <input> without a programmatic label docs/.vitepress/theme/components/SearchWindowDemo.vue:18
- <input> without a programmatic label docs/.vitepress/theme/components/SearchWindowDemo.vue:23
- <input> without a programmatic label docs/.vitepress/theme/components/ThresholdDemo.vue:12
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- <textarea> without a programmatic label docs/.vitepress/theme/components/Playground.vue:63
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
Serious — 66 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard docs/.vitepress/theme/style.css:87
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard docs/.vitepress/theme/components/ThresholdDemo.vue:243
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard docs/.vitepress/theme/components/ThresholdDemo.vue:265
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) docs/.vitepress/theme/components/BitapDemo.vue:526
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) docs/.vitepress/theme/components/BitapDemo.vue:531
- Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement docs/.vitepress/theme/components/Sponsor.vue:22
- Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement docs/.vitepress/theme/components/Sponsor.vue:33
- No test reaches this file src/workers/worker.ts:1
- No test reaches this file src/search/bitap/computeScore.ts:1
- Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap src/helpers/get.ts:53
- Recursive walk over a caller-supplied document has no depth cap src/core/queryParser.ts:140
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.1:1) docs/.vitepress/theme/components/BitapDemo.vue:436
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.5:1) docs/.vitepress/theme/components/FuzzyMatchDemo.vue:369
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (1.9:1) docs/.vitepress/theme/components/FuzzyMatchDemo.vue:374
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.4:1) docs/.vitepress/theme/components/Sponsor.vue:14
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.6:1) docs/.vitepress/theme/components/WorkerDemo.vue:404
- search.search (cyclomatic 27) src/search/bitap/search.ts:7
- parseQuery.tokenize (cyclomatic 19) REDACTED:12
- Fuse.search (cyclomatic 18) src/core/index.ts:227
- objectQuery.compileClause (cyclomatic 17) src/search/extended/objectQuery.ts:39
- get.get (cyclomatic 16) src/helpers/get.ts:10
- queryParser.parse::next (cyclomatic 16) src/core/queryParser.ts:61
- Deprecated: eslint package.json:136
- Hotspot: src/core/queryParser.ts src/core/queryParser.ts:56
- search.search (cognitive 52) src/search/bitap/search.ts:7
- parseQuery.tokenize (cognitive 37) REDACTED:12
- FuseIndex._createObjectRecord (cognitive 36) src/tools/FuseIndex.ts:188
- objectQuery.compileClause (cognitive 35) src/search/extended/objectQuery.ts:39
- ExtendedSearch.searchIn (cognitive 30) src/search/extended/index.ts:87
- queryParser.parse::next (cognitive 29) src/core/queryParser.ts:61
- TokenSearch.searchIn (cognitive 25) src/search/token/index.ts:70
- objectQuery.compileFieldQuery (cognitive 22) src/search/extended/objectQuery.ts:178
- Fuse.search (cognitive 21) src/core/index.ts:227
- get.get::deepGet (cognitive 19) src/helpers/get.ts:14
- FuseWorker._assertNoFunctionOptions (cognitive 19) src/workers/FuseWorker.ts:114
- Fuse._searchLogical (cognitive 18) src/core/index.ts:359
- FuseWorker.search (cognitive 17) src/workers/FuseWorker.ts:219
- analyzer.resolveTokenize (cognitive 16) src/search/token/analyzer.ts:32
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Coverage not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite
- Type Safety
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 2 locations) src/core/index.ts:551
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) src/search/extended/objectQuery.ts:39
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) src/core/index.ts:305
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2 locations) src/workers/FuseWorker.ts:194
- Complex function match (cyclomatic 55, cognitive 71) src/core/index.ts:59
- Complex function search (cyclomatic 24, cognitive 48) src/search/bitap/search.ts:7
- Complex function tokenize (cyclomatic 19, cognitive 37) REDACTED:12
- Complex function compileClause (cyclomatic 17, cognitive 35) src/search/extended/objectQuery.ts:39
- Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 16, cognitive 29) src/core/queryParser.ts:61
- Complex function searchIn (cyclomatic 15, cognitive 25) src/search/token/index.ts:70
- Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 14, cognitive 19) src/helpers/get.ts:19
- Complex function searchIn (cyclomatic 13, cognitive 32) src/search/extended/index.ts:87
- Complex function compileFieldQuery (cyclomatic 13, cognitive 22) src/search/extended/objectQuery.ts:178
- Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 12, cognitive 19) test/package-types.test.ts:269
- src/core/index.ts: 540 lines of code src/core/index.ts:1
- Dead file (~27 LoC) src/search/bitap/computeScore.ts
- Benchmark script nothing runs (~331 LoC) bench/inverted-index-shape.mjs
- Benchmark script nothing runs (~85 LoC) bench/direction-a-parity-check.mjs
Minor — 21 finding(s)
- Deprecated: conventional-changelog-atom REDACTED:3775
- Deprecated: conventional-changelog-codemirror REDACTED:3789
- Deprecated: conventional-changelog-core REDACTED:3823
- Deprecated: conventional-changelog-ember REDACTED:4016
- Deprecated: conventional-changelog-eslint REDACTED:4030
- Deprecated: conventional-changelog-express REDACTED:4044
- Deprecated: conventional-changelog-jquery REDACTED:4058
- Deprecated: conventional-changelog-jshint REDACTED:4072
- Deprecated: git-raw-commits REDACTED:5296
- Deprecated: git-semver-tags REDACTED:5331
- Deprecated: glob REDACTED:5369
- Deprecated: inflight REDACTED:5657
- Deprecated: q REDACTED:6812
- Deprecated: stringify-package REDACTED:7695
- redundant comment test/object-query.test.js:79
- REDACTED
- No ADRs
- No SAST REDACTED:7
- No dependency-update automation package.json:130
- Unused export 'SearcherConstructor' src/types.ts:29
- Null assertions (`!`) override strict null checking
Minor — 2 finding(s)
- Skipped (documented): (unnamed test) test/token-search-tokenizer.test.js:119
- Dependency hygiene PARTLY measured — npm pinning read, dependency currency not (the committed lockfile resolved no direct production dependency)
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-f6d7e96b28454132a6d4a9f2054fe949/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 1 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-f6d7e96b28454132a6d4a9f2054fe949/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt --exclude dist . | 10 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 13 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 1 file(s) — `docs/.vitepress/theme/index.ts` — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |