Executive summary
juliansteenbakker/mobile_scanner falls short of our standard for production because we found no recorded design decisions and no architecture document or diagram. It scores 65.5 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, and all 44 of its critical findings are security problems in the build pipeline.
Maturity, at 55.3, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is recording design decisions, worth about 8.8 points. Adding test instructions to the README comes next, worth about 3.0 points. Raising Maturity to 70 would lift the score to about 71.8.
Thirty-eight pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Six secrets can leak from the build pipeline. Pinning each tool to an exact version and limiting each secret to its own step would close both risks.
The product code is 12,323 lines, about €23,000 to rebuild.
If Maturity rose from 55.3 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 65.5 to about 71.8.
New since the last survey: 3 findings
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (18 corresponding lines) darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (8 corresponding lines) darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (18 corresponding lines) example/lib/widgets/buttons/pause_button.dart
Rebuild cost: about €23,000 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €7,800 to €39,000, for 129 to 411 hours of work, about 0.2 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.9 at a score of 66. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 12,323 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 darwin~mobile_scanner~mobile_scanner | 2 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.AutoTorch | 3 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.DeviceOrientationListener | 4 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.MobileScanner | 5 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.MobileScannerPermissions | 6 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects | 7 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.MobileScannerErrorCodes | 8 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.utils | 9 repository.src | 10 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner | 11 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats | 12 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.DetectionSpeed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 darwin~mobile_scanner~mobile_scanner | ||||||||||||
| 2 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.AutoTorch | ||||||||||||
| 3 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.DeviceOrientationListener | ||||||||||||
| 4 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.MobileScanner | ||||||||||||
| 5 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.MobileScannerPermissions | ||||||||||||
| 6 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects | ||||||||||||
| 7 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.MobileScannerErrorCodes | ||||||||||||
| 8 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.utils | ||||||||||||
| 9 repository.src | ||||||||||||
| 10 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner | 2 | 2 | ||||||||||
| 11 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats | 16 | |||||||||||
| 12 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.DetectionSpeed | 3 |
10→5 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner uses dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.MobileScannerPermissions✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner uses a type in dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.MobileScannerPermissions.
- The types involved
dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.MobileScannerPermissions→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.MobileScannerPermissions.ResultCallbackdev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.MobileScannerPermissionsListener→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.MobileScannerPermissions.ResultCallback
- Direction
- dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner uses dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.MobileScannerPermissions, so a change to dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.MobileScannerPermissions can break dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner, while a change to dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner can't break dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.MobileScannerPermissions.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
10→6 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner uses dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner uses a type in dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.
- The types involved
dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.MobileScanner→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.DetectionSpeeddev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.MobileScanner→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.MobileScannerStartParameters
- Direction
- dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner uses dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects, so a change to dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects can break dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner, while a change to dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner can't break dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
11→6 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats uses dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects✕
- Connections
- 16 pairs of types, where a type in dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats uses a type in dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.
- The types involved
dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats.ALL_FORMATS→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormatsdev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats.AZTEC→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormatsdev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats.CODABAR→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormatsdev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats.CODE_128→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormatsdev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats.CODE_39→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormatsdev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats.CODE_93→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormatsdev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats.Companion→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormatsdev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats.DATA_MATRIX→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormatsdev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats.EAN_13→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormatsdev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats.EAN_8→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormatsdev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats.ITF→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormatsdev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats.PDF417→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormatsdev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats.QR_CODE→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormatsdev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats.UNKNOWN→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormatsdev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats.UPC_A→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormatsdev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats.UPC_E→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats
- Direction
- dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats uses dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects, so a change to dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects can break dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats, while a change to dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats can't break dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.BarcodeFormats uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
12→6 dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.DetectionSpeed uses dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.DetectionSpeed uses a type in dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.
- The types involved
dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.DetectionSpeed.NORMAL→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.DetectionSpeeddev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.DetectionSpeed.NO_DUPLICATES→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.DetectionSpeeddev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.DetectionSpeed.UNRESTRICTED→dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.DetectionSpeed
- Direction
- dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.DetectionSpeed uses dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects, so a change to dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects can break dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.DetectionSpeed, while a change to dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.DetectionSpeed can't break dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: dev.steenbakker.mobile_scanner.objects.DetectionSpeed uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2025 — Injection | 44 | High / Critical |
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 5 | Medium |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them; Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite; Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +8.8 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite. | +3.0 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +2.9 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Resolve the 1 Further sole-owners (lower concentration) finding(s) in Bus Factor. | +1.1 pts | Low | Bus Factor |
| Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. | +1.1 pts | Low | Bus Factor |
| Make sure a person approves each release. The release job names an environment, but its approval rules live in the code host's settings, where we can't see them. Check that a reviewer must approve each release, or publish releases as drafts first, so a bad build can be stopped before anyone downloads it. | +2.1 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. | +1.0 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. | +0.5 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 2.3 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 4.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| android/src/main/kotlin/dev/steenbakker/mobile_scanner/MobileScanner.kt | 6.0 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift | 7.0 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: MobileScannerPlugin.start (cyclomatic 27) |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| test/mobile_scanner_widget/detect_barcode_test.dart | 7.3 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| lib/src/mobile_scanner_controller.dart | 7.4 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: MobileScannerController.start (cyclomatic 16) |
| test/overlay/barcode_painter_test.dart | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| test/mobile_scanner_controller/switch_camera_test.dart | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| lib/src/mobile_scanner.dart | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| lib/src/overlay/barcode_painter.dart | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| example/macos/RunnerTests/RunnerTests.swift | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| example/ios/RunnerTests/RunnerTests.swift | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| example/lib/main.dart | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerError.swift | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| android/src/main/kotlin/dev/steenbakker/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerHandler.kt | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 45 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 45 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 100 of 109 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT READ here — but this repository measures it: a coverage step in CI (`flutter test --coverage`), uploaded by `codecov/codecov-action` shows that coverage is collected and tracked in your own CI. The built-in collector has no runner for this ecosystem (.dart), so the analyzer could not read the number — a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not an unmeasured repo. Not scored.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.dart) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored — 3 Maven/Gradle manifest(s) were read, stating a version for 9 dependency(ies) and leaving 0 to a parent or an imported BOM, but no build resolved the dependency graph, so the outdated signal was not established. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its pub package dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares a Gradle build (build.gradle/build.gradle.kts), but the licence verdict published here was taken over its pub package dependencies. Nothing was read about its Gradle dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22's deterministic call-shape rules are gated per language (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5; C# and each NeutralApiArms arm pass): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. This says nothing about whether that surface is consistent.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) (npm) WERE scanned and every vulnerability they reported is included in this result; osv was not, so this dimension's score covers less than the dependency surface this repository declares, and nothing here is evidence that osv is free of known-vulnerable dependencies. osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. This is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass. osv-scanner documents exit 128 as "no package sources found" — but this scan only invoked it because the tree declares a source it supports (`pom.xml` and the resolved lockfiles among them), so the tool's report and this repository disagree. Check that those sources are reachable from the directory the scan ran in before concluding anything is missing. If this tree really does commit only range-pinned manifests, commit the lockfile your package manager produces — but only where your ecosystem HAS one and commits it: Maven has none at all (osv-scanner reads `pom.xml` directly) and Gradle writes one only under opt-in dependency locking, while a published Composer package and a published Dart library both deliberately exclude theirs. In those three, generate one in CI before the scan instead — a resolved dependency list or an SBOM fed to the scanner.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift` produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) (npm) WERE scanned and every vulnerability they reported is included in this result; osv was not, so this dimension's score covers less than the dependency surface this repository declares, and nothing here is evidence that osv is free of known-vulnerable dependencies. osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. This is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass. osv-scanner documents exit 128 as "no package sources found" — but this scan only invoked it because the tree declares a source it supports (`pom.xml` and the resolved lockfiles among them), so the tool's report and this repository disagree. Check that those sources are reachable from the directory the scan ran in before concluding anything is missing. If this tree really does commit only range-pinned manifests, commit the lockfile your package manager produces — but only where your ecosystem HAS one and commits it: Maven has none at all (osv-scanner reads `pom.xml` directly) and Gradle writes one only under opt-in dependency locking, while a published Composer package and a published Dart library both deliberately exclude theirs. In those three, generate one in CI before the scan instead — a resolved dependency list or an SBOM fed to the scanner.
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Subject: a native UI project (android/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml). The Runtime Evidence tier boots an app only via docker-compose, an Aspire AppHost, a Dockerfile, an npm dev script, a web service's own toolchain entry point (cargo, go, dotnet, Python, Spring Boot), or an Android app's own Gradle wrapper (run on an emulator); an Apple or Flutter app needs a host it lacks. None applied, so no live runtime a11y/egress/header evidence was collected. You can widen what we reach: add a docker-compose.yml (or an Aspire AppHost) that brings the app up with its dependencies. We then boot it in an isolated sandbox and gathers real runtime evidence — you change nothing in your pipeline (no CI step, no SDK).
- C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
- C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
- C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
- C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
- X1 Async correctness — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
- X12 Unreachable branch — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, PHP, Dart, Kotlin, Ruby, Scala, Java, Python and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and no named async function in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, nor any Go, PHP or Dart function or Kotlin suspend function, makes a request that can be cancelled (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http; net/http, net.Dial; amphp; Dio; Ktor, OkHttp), so there is nothing to judge, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Scala, Ruby and Python source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Scala, Ruby or Python was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
4 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was MobileScannerPlugin.start at 27. A further 5 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being BarcodeFormat.fromRawValue at 23 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score. 3 files carry no cyclomatic complexity row at all for this reason — every one of their over-threshold methods was excluded, so the exclusion is disclosed nowhere in the file itself: lib/src/enums/barcode_format.dart (BarcodeFormat.fromRawValue at 23), android/src/main/kotlin/dev/steenbakker/mobile_scanner/objects/BarcodeFormats.kt (BarcodeFormats.fromRawValue at 18), android/src/main/kotlin/dev/steenbakker/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerHandler.kt (MobileScannerHandler.onMethodCall at 17). They are named here because the per-file figures other dimensions report are taken BEFORE this exclusion, so such a file can show a high maximum complexity elsewhere in this report and nothing here, with nothing to reconcile the two.
What to do
- Bring the 4 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with MobileScannerPlugin.start (cyclomatic 27), MobileScannerPlugin.captureOutput (cyclomatic 20), MobileScanner.start (cyclomatic 17). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.1 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
7 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was MobileScannerPlugin.start at 40.
What to do
- Bring the 7 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with MobileScannerPlugin.start (cognitive 40), MobileScannerPlugin.captureOutput (cognitive 35), MobileScannerController.start (cognitive 28). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 7 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 8.4 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
D3 · God Classes
7 god class(es) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 ClassTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with MobileScannerPlugin.swift, MobileScanner.kt, mobile_scanner_controller.dart. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 MethodTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with MobileScannerPlugin.swift, MobileScanner.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with MobileScannerPlugin.swift. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D4 · Code Duplication
3 duplicated block group(s) detected. 1.0 % of the production lines (127 of 12,323) are in a reported copy. A further 3 rows report members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it. 1 of the 6 are in trees this repository does not ship — vendored, example/demo, project-template, fixture and benchmark code — and are ranked below the shipped groups rather than excluded from them: the duplication there is real and is still counted in this dimension's score. The dimensions that publish a production-file census leave those trees out of theirs, so this count is deliberately drawn over the wider population.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Edited copy of a member (18 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with MobileScannerPlugin.swift, pause_button.dart. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (8 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with MobileScannerPlugin.swift. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with address_type.dart. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D5 · Coupling
4 production modules (Gradle+npm+SwiftPM+pub), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; edges a convention plugin adds from buildSrc or build-logic are not visible there; 0 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 3 of the 4 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, declare types in source no model reads, or have no source directory of their own).
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
1 of 23 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with mobile_scanner_method_channel.dart. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 4 resolved pub package(s) use a banned license. Licences were read from pub.dev's analysis of each package's licence file. ★ This repository commits no pubspec.lock (Dart's guidance for a package), so the graph was closed here: the 4 package(s) its pubspec declares under dependencies, and transitively every package their published pubspecs declare, each at the newest release its constraint admits — the release a fresh `pub get` picks wherever constraints agree; where two disagree the first to reach the package was taken. dev_dependencies are not part of it. The packages the `flutter`, `flutter_web_plugins` SDK itself pins are the toolchain's and were not reached. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's pub package dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares package.json and a Gradle build (build.gradle/build.gradle.kts), and the licences of those dependency graphs were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
Top hotspots: darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift (4×27=108); lib/src/mobile_scanner_controller.dart (5×16=80)
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with MobileScannerPlugin.swift, mobile_scanner_controller.dart. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
D16 · Bus Factor
6 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is lib/src/utils/scan_window_utils.dart. Counted over 45 of the 96 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Further sole-owners (lower concentration) finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D17 · Explicit Debt
12 deducted task-comment markers across 12323 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.8. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What to do
- Resolve the 12 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with detect_barcode_test.dart (2), RunnerTests.swift (2), barcode_painter_test.dart. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 2 document(s) read across 3 unit(s).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 3 build units (Gradle, SwiftPM, npm) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
44 finding(s): 0 critical, 44 high, 0 medium, 0 low. 38 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens.
What to do
- Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 38 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (38 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable dependencies in the 1 ecosystem(s) that were scanned (npm). Partial dependency scan: 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) were scanned (npm), and the findings above are real and complete for them. osv was not scanned (osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned), so this is not the whole dependency surface and the result is reported at reduced confidence.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
1 of 45 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is lib/src/objects/switch_camera_option.dart. Counted over 45 of the 96 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
1/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy
A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No known-vulnerable dependencies in the 1 ecosystem(s) that were scanned (npm). Partial dependency scan: 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) were scanned (npm), and the findings above are real and complete for them. osv was not scanned (osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned), so this is not the whole dependency surface and the result is reported at reduced confidence.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 3 platform declaration(s) and 11 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX6 · Interface segregation
AX9 · CQS / query purity
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- `setFocusPoint`'s body only throws an UnsupportedError or an UnimplementedError that gives its reason — sometimes a deliberate refusal, often an unfinished stub. Confirm it's intentional. — lib/src/web/mobile_scanner_web.dart:435
What to do
- Clear the softer debt: re-enable or delete tests marked `skip:`, decide whether each empty method or UnsupportedError is deliberate (and say so in a comment), and replace `// ignore_for_file: type=lint` with targeted, justified ignores.
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
P1 · CI/CD gates
P10 · Library API & versioning
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 7 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:5
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Make sure a person approves each release. The release job names an environment, but its approval rules live in the code host's settings, where we can't see them. Check that a reviewer must approve each release, or publish releases as drafts first, so a bad build can be stopped before anyone downloads it.
P6 · Release Hygiene
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
X1 · Async correctness
X12 · Unreachable branch
X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness
- `MobileScannerWeb` carries a disposal duty — it declares its own release — and it creates `_barcodesController` itself (line 54, `StreamController.broadcast`), which makes that instance its own. Nothing in the class releases it — no `_barcodesController.close()`, no tear-off of it, on any path — nothing elsewhere in the library releases it through another instance, and it is never handed on as a value (passed positionally, returned, stored, collected), so no other owner can be ending it. Passing it as a named argument does not: a widget or animation never disposes a controller it was given. On what was read, `StreamController.broadcast` outlives the object that made it — its listeners, and through them this object and everything it references, stay reachable, and a ticker, timer or subscription keeps calling into a disposed object. Release it where the duty is discharged: `_barcodesController.close();` in `dispose()` before `super.dispose()`. — lib/src/web/mobile_scanner_web.dart:54
- `MobileScannerWeb` carries a disposal duty — it declares its own release — and it creates `_settingsController` itself (line 69, `StreamController.broadcast`), which makes that instance its own. Nothing in the class releases it — no `_settingsController.close()`, no tear-off of it, on any path — nothing elsewhere in the library releases it through another instance, and it is never handed on as a value (passed positionally, returned, stored, collected), so no other owner can be ending it. Passing it as a named argument does not: a widget or animation never disposes a controller it was given. On what was read, `StreamController.broadcast` outlives the object that made it — its listeners, and through them this object and everything it references, stay reachable, and a ticker, timer or subscription keeps calling into a disposed object. Release it where the duty is discharged: `_settingsController.close();` in `dispose()` before `super.dispose()`. — lib/src/web/mobile_scanner_web.dart:69
What to do
- Each finding names the value and the span that decides who owns it — the `new` that created it, or the constructor parameter that handed it over. Confirm ownership from that span, then make the disposal match it: release what this type created, leave what it was injected with to whoever created THAT, and drop a finalizer whose type holds nothing unmanaged to release.
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard
X3 · Exception handling
- `on Object catch (_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter. (×4) — lib/src/web/mobile_scanner_web.dart:211, lib/src/web/mobile_scanner_web.dart:368, lib/src/web/mobile_scanner_web.dart:400, …
- `on Object` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter. — lib/src/web/barcode_detector/barcode_detector_js.dart:13
- An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. — darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift:590
What to do
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded)
X5 · Nullable reference types
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 83.5 | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 93.9 | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 55.3 | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 67.3 | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 72.1 | Adequate — gated by D29, D36 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Performance | 100.0 | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Unscored — 3 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — 1 observation(s) recorded · Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — 3 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 67 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's Dart imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's Kotlin imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's Swift imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — No container singleton was found, so there is no shared instance for concurrent requests to race on. No class in this Kotlin code is a Spring, JSR-330 or CDI singleton bean. No Swift request handler (a Vapor, Hummingbird, Kitura, Swifter or Perfect route handler, as a method or a registered closure) is declared, so no state is shared between request threads. Dart isolates share no mutable memory, so no two requests write one object at the same instant.
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~7351 lines of test source are present (.dart) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — no .dart test runner
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Not scored — 3 Maven/Gradle manifest(s) were read, stating a version for 9 dependency(ies) and leaving 0 to a parent or an imported BOM, but no build resolved the dependency graph, so the outdated signal was not established. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (1460 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
- D22 Internal API Consistency — API consistency is measured on C#, TypeScript, Go only; the exposed Swift surface was not measured.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only — this repository's production source is .dart, .kt, .swift, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.dart), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 1 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and this analysis resolves a call's owner only where the receiver's type is written down in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
- ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, which this analysis does not build from source alone for this language. Reported as guidance rather than measured
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 2 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks. 2 claim(s) of kinds M4 does not check were not checked (path 1, environment variable 1); M4 checks only links and versions and artefact counts.
- P2 Observability — This repository's Dart, JVM, Swift source (3 module(s), 94 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the Dart, JVM, Swift source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for classes extending benchmark_harness's `BenchmarkBase`, `AsyncBenchmarkBase` or `PerfBenchmarkBase` (directly or through a base of your own), `benchmark(…)` calls under the pub `benchmark` package, Flutter's `benchmarkWidgets`, `watchPerformance` or `traceAction` in a test importing flutter_test, integration_test or flutter_driver, or benchmark_harness, benchmark or web_benchmarks in a pubspec.yaml, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface: 67 Dart file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source and disabled TLS certificate validation, and none was found. This repository serves no HTTP of its own — no server framework among its pubspec dependencies, no `HttpServer` bound and no shelf, dart_frog or serverpod import in its production source or `bin/`, no web build target — so HTTPS enforcement, HSTS, cookie flags and input validation are N/A here, as they are for a C# library or worker. If this codebase starts serving HTTP, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Dart was read, and it logs through none: package:logging, package:logger, talker and dart:developer take one finished message and no template arguments or fields (as log4net does in C#), so an interpolated message there loses nothing the API could have kept. Sentry's structured logs (`Sentry.logger`) would be judged.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 44 finding(s)
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Serious — 52 finding(s)
- TodoComment test/overlay/barcode_painter_test.dart:99
- TodoComment test/mobile_scanner_widget/detect_barcode_test.dart:7
- TodoComment test/mobile_scanner_widget/detect_barcode_test.dart:9
- TodoComment test/mobile_scanner_controller/switch_camera_test.dart:14
- TodoComment lib/src/mobile_scanner.dart:352
- TodoComment lib/src/overlay/barcode_painter.dart:18
- TodoComment example/macos/RunnerTests/RunnerTests.swift:13
- TodoComment example/ios/RunnerTests/RunnerTests.swift:13
- TodoComment example/lib/main.dart:170
- TodoComment darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerError.swift:9
- TodoComment android/src/main/kotlin/dev/steenbakker/mobile_scanner/MobileScanner.kt:438
- TodoComment android/src/main/kotlin/dev/steenbakker/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerHandler.kt:50
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) lib/src/web/mobile_scanner_web.dart:211
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) lib/src/web/mobile_scanner_web.dart:368
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) lib/src/web/mobile_scanner_web.dart:400
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) lib/src/web/preferred_device_storage.dart:14
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) lib/src/web/barcode_detector/barcode_detector_js.dart:13
- ClassTooLong: MobileScannerPlugin darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift:14
- ClassTooLong: MobileScanner android/src/main/kotlin/dev/steenbakker/mobile_scanner/MobileScanner.kt:61
- ClassTooLong: MobileScannerController lib/src/mobile_scanner_controller.dart:25
- Hotspot: darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift:450
- Hotspot: lib/src/mobile_scanner_controller.dart lib/src/mobile_scanner_controller.dart:458
- MethodTooLong: MobileScannerPlugin.start darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift:450
- MethodTooLong: MobileScanner.start android/src/main/kotlin/dev/steenbakker/mobile_scanner/MobileScanner.kt:413
- Edited copy of a member (18 corresponding lines) darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift:706
- Edited copy of a member (18 corresponding lines) example/lib/widgets/buttons/pause_button.dart:14
- Owned disposable field is never released lib/src/web/mobile_scanner_web.dart:54
- Owned disposable field is never released lib/src/web/mobile_scanner_web.dart:69
- MobileScannerPlugin.start (cyclomatic 27) darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift:450
- MobileScannerPlugin.captureOutput (cyclomatic 20) darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift:247
- MobileScanner.start (cyclomatic 17) android/src/main/kotlin/dev/steenbakker/mobile_scanner/MobileScanner.kt:413
- MobileScannerController.start (cyclomatic 16) lib/src/mobile_scanner_controller.dart:458
- MobileScannerPlugin.start (cognitive 40) darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift:450
- MobileScannerPlugin.captureOutput (cognitive 35) darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift:247
- MobileScannerController.start (cognitive 28) lib/src/mobile_scanner_controller.dart:458
- MobileScanner.start (cognitive 23) android/src/main/kotlin/dev/steenbakker/mobile_scanner/MobileScanner.kt:413
- MobileScannerCameraSelector.getBestCloseRangeScanningLens (cognitive 19) darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerCameraSelector.swift:166
- BarcodePayloadParser.parseQRPayload (cognitive 18) darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/BarcodePayloadParser.swift:24
- VNBarcodeObservation.toMap (cognitive 16) darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift:1211
- FileTooLong: mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift
- TooManyMethods: MobileScannerPlugin darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift:14
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- Edited copy of a member (8 corresponding lines) darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift:661
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) lib/src/enums/address_type.dart:14
- Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift:716
- Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift:1298
- Low cohesion: MethodChannelMobileScanner (LCOM4 6) lib/src/method_channel/mobile_scanner_method_channel.dart:22
- Coverage collected but not gated
- JavaScript dependencies are not locked package.json:5
- Swallowed exception (empty catch) darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift:590
Minor — 13 finding(s)
- Duplicated predicate lib/src/web/barcode_detector/barcode_detector_formats.dart:47
- Duplicated predicate lib/src/web/barcode_detector/barcode_detector_reader.dart:63
- Duplicated predicate lib/src/overlay/scan_window_overlay.dart:64
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
- Further sole-owners (lower concentration)
- Orphaned files with no living knowledge
- Orphaned file lib/src/objects/switch_camera_option.dart:1
- REDACTED
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- Member throws UnsupportedError lib/src/web/mobile_scanner_web.dart:435
- No ADRs
- No architecture diagram/doc
- No SAST REDACTED:5
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=0 --max-count=200" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-4bb242ed79e94353b2a0ada75dd1b03d/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=200 --max-count=800" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-4bb242ed79e94353b2a0ada75dd1b03d/history-1.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history-1.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=1000 --max-count=1645" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-4bb242ed79e94353b2a0ada75dd1b03d/history-2.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history-2.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-4bb242ed79e94353b2a0ada75dd1b03d/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 44 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 0 | — |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 1 file(s) — `darwin/mobile_scanner/Sources/mobile_scanner/MobileScannerPlugin.swift` — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |