Executive summary
jhao104/proxy_pool falls short of our standard for production, in part because we found no access checks on the code's endpoints or handlers. It scores 43.1 out of 100 and is rated Weak, and 32 of its 34 critical findings are security problems.
Security and Compliance, at 23.2, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is adding access checks, worth about 17.5 points. Fixing the password or key in the code comes next, worth about 4.4 points. Raising Security and Compliance to 70 would lift the score to about 60.0.
Thirteen pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Five secrets can leak from the build pipeline, and four passwords or keys in the code's history and one in the code are open to anyone who can read the repository. Replacing each exposed password or key, pinning each tool to an exact version and limiting each secret to its own step would close these risks. Updating the vulnerable packages would fix the three packages with a known security hole, and the four unsafe settings in infrastructure or container files need changing to safe values. The loop of parts of the code that depend on each other needs breaking by moving the shared parts into a project of their own.
The product code is 2,209 lines, about €3,900 to rebuild.
If Security and Compliance rose from 23.2 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 43.1 to about 60.0.
New since the last survey: 6 findings
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (25 corresponding lines) util/webRequest.py
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) db/redisClient.py
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (8 corresponding lines) helper/check.py
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (8 corresponding lines) REDACTED
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (7 corresponding lines) fetcher/sources/daili66.py
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) db/redisClient.py
Fixed since the last survey: 1 finding
- Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot: fetcher/sources/scdn.py fetcher/sources/scdn.py
Rebuild cost: about €3,900 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €1,300 to €6,500, for 21 to 68 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.7 at a score of 43. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 2,209 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture — module dependency graph
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 (global) | 2 api | 3 api.proxyApi | 4 db.redisClient | 5 db.ssdbClient | 6 fetcher.baseFetcher | 7 handler.logHandler | 8 handler.proxyHandler | 9 helper | 10 helper.check | 11 helper.fetch | 12 helper.proxy | 13 util | 14 util.lazyProperty | 15 util.singleton | 16 util.webRequest | 17 db.dbClient | 18 fetcher.sources.daili66 | 19 fetcher.sources.docip | 20 fetcher.sources.freevpnnode | 21 fetcher.sources.geonode | 22 fetcher.sources.goodips | 23 fetcher.sources.ihuan | 24 fetcher.sources.ip3366 | 25 fetcher.sources.ip89 | 26 fetcher.sources.kuaidaili | 27 fetcher.sources.kxdaili | 28 fetcher.sources.proxifly | 29 fetcher.sources.roundproxies | 30 fetcher.sources.scdn | 31 fetcher.sources.zdaye | 32 handler.configHandler | 33 helper.validator |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (global) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2 api | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3 api.proxyApi | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4 db.redisClient | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5 db.ssdbClient | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6 fetcher.baseFetcher | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 7 handler.logHandler | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8 handler.proxyHandler | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 9 helper | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 10 helper.check | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 11 helper.fetch | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 12 helper.proxy | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 13 util | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 14 util.lazyProperty | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 15 util.singleton | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 16 util.webRequest | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 17 db.dbClient | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 18 fetcher.sources.daili66 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 19 fetcher.sources.docip | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20 fetcher.sources.freevpnnode | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21 fetcher.sources.geonode | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22 fetcher.sources.goodips | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 23 fetcher.sources.ihuan | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 24 fetcher.sources.ip3366 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 25 fetcher.sources.ip89 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 26 fetcher.sources.kuaidaili | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 27 fetcher.sources.kxdaili | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 28 fetcher.sources.proxifly | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 29 fetcher.sources.roundproxies | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 30 fetcher.sources.scdn | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 31 fetcher.sources.zdaye | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 32 handler.configHandler | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 33 helper.validator | 1 |
17→15 db.dbClient uses util.singleton✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in db.dbClient uses a type in util.singleton.
- The types involved
db.dbClient.DbClient→util.singleton.Singleton
- Direction
- db.dbClient uses util.singleton, so a change to util.singleton can break db.dbClient, while a change to db.dbClient can't break util.singleton.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: db.dbClient uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
18→6 fetcher.sources.daili66 uses fetcher.baseFetcher✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in fetcher.sources.daili66 uses a type in fetcher.baseFetcher.
- The types involved
fetcher.sources.daili66.DaiLi66Fetcher→fetcher.baseFetcher.BaseFetcher
- Direction
- fetcher.sources.daili66 uses fetcher.baseFetcher, so a change to fetcher.baseFetcher can break fetcher.sources.daili66, while a change to fetcher.sources.daili66 can't break fetcher.baseFetcher.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: fetcher.sources.daili66 uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
19→6 fetcher.sources.docip uses fetcher.baseFetcher✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in fetcher.sources.docip uses a type in fetcher.baseFetcher.
- The types involved
fetcher.sources.docip.DocipFetcher→fetcher.baseFetcher.BaseFetcher
- Direction
- fetcher.sources.docip uses fetcher.baseFetcher, so a change to fetcher.baseFetcher can break fetcher.sources.docip, while a change to fetcher.sources.docip can't break fetcher.baseFetcher.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: fetcher.sources.docip uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
20→6 fetcher.sources.freevpnnode uses fetcher.baseFetcher✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in fetcher.sources.freevpnnode uses a type in fetcher.baseFetcher.
- The types involved
fetcher.sources.freevpnnode.FreeVPNNodeFetcher→fetcher.baseFetcher.BaseFetcher
- Direction
- fetcher.sources.freevpnnode uses fetcher.baseFetcher, so a change to fetcher.baseFetcher can break fetcher.sources.freevpnnode, while a change to fetcher.sources.freevpnnode can't break fetcher.baseFetcher.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: fetcher.sources.freevpnnode uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
21→6 fetcher.sources.geonode uses fetcher.baseFetcher✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in fetcher.sources.geonode uses a type in fetcher.baseFetcher.
- The types involved
fetcher.sources.geonode.GeonodeFetcher→fetcher.baseFetcher.BaseFetcher
- Direction
- fetcher.sources.geonode uses fetcher.baseFetcher, so a change to fetcher.baseFetcher can break fetcher.sources.geonode, while a change to fetcher.sources.geonode can't break fetcher.baseFetcher.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: fetcher.sources.geonode uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
22→6 fetcher.sources.goodips uses fetcher.baseFetcher✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in fetcher.sources.goodips uses a type in fetcher.baseFetcher.
- The types involved
fetcher.sources.goodips.GoodipsFetcher→fetcher.baseFetcher.BaseFetcher
- Direction
- fetcher.sources.goodips uses fetcher.baseFetcher, so a change to fetcher.baseFetcher can break fetcher.sources.goodips, while a change to fetcher.sources.goodips can't break fetcher.baseFetcher.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: fetcher.sources.goodips uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
23→6 fetcher.sources.ihuan uses fetcher.baseFetcher✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in fetcher.sources.ihuan uses a type in fetcher.baseFetcher.
- The types involved
fetcher.sources.ihuan.IhuanFetcher→fetcher.baseFetcher.BaseFetcher
- Direction
- fetcher.sources.ihuan uses fetcher.baseFetcher, so a change to fetcher.baseFetcher can break fetcher.sources.ihuan, while a change to fetcher.sources.ihuan can't break fetcher.baseFetcher.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: fetcher.sources.ihuan uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
24→6 fetcher.sources.ip3366 uses fetcher.baseFetcher✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in fetcher.sources.ip3366 uses a type in fetcher.baseFetcher.
- The types involved
fetcher.sources.ip3366.Ip3366Fetcher→fetcher.baseFetcher.BaseFetcher
- Direction
- fetcher.sources.ip3366 uses fetcher.baseFetcher, so a change to fetcher.baseFetcher can break fetcher.sources.ip3366, while a change to fetcher.sources.ip3366 can't break fetcher.baseFetcher.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: fetcher.sources.ip3366 uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
25→6 fetcher.sources.ip89 uses fetcher.baseFetcher✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in fetcher.sources.ip89 uses a type in fetcher.baseFetcher.
- The types involved
fetcher.sources.ip89.Ip89Fetcher→fetcher.baseFetcher.BaseFetcher
- Direction
- fetcher.sources.ip89 uses fetcher.baseFetcher, so a change to fetcher.baseFetcher can break fetcher.sources.ip89, while a change to fetcher.sources.ip89 can't break fetcher.baseFetcher.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: fetcher.sources.ip89 uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
26→6 fetcher.sources.kuaidaili uses fetcher.baseFetcher✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in fetcher.sources.kuaidaili uses a type in fetcher.baseFetcher.
- The types involved
fetcher.sources.kuaidaili.KuaidailiFetcher→fetcher.baseFetcher.BaseFetcher
- Direction
- fetcher.sources.kuaidaili uses fetcher.baseFetcher, so a change to fetcher.baseFetcher can break fetcher.sources.kuaidaili, while a change to fetcher.sources.kuaidaili can't break fetcher.baseFetcher.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: fetcher.sources.kuaidaili uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
27→6 fetcher.sources.kxdaili uses fetcher.baseFetcher✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in fetcher.sources.kxdaili uses a type in fetcher.baseFetcher.
- The types involved
fetcher.sources.kxdaili.KxdailiFetcher→fetcher.baseFetcher.BaseFetcher
- Direction
- fetcher.sources.kxdaili uses fetcher.baseFetcher, so a change to fetcher.baseFetcher can break fetcher.sources.kxdaili, while a change to fetcher.sources.kxdaili can't break fetcher.baseFetcher.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: fetcher.sources.kxdaili uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
28→6 fetcher.sources.proxifly uses fetcher.baseFetcher✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in fetcher.sources.proxifly uses a type in fetcher.baseFetcher.
- The types involved
fetcher.sources.proxifly.ProxiFlyFetcher→fetcher.baseFetcher.BaseFetcher
- Direction
- fetcher.sources.proxifly uses fetcher.baseFetcher, so a change to fetcher.baseFetcher can break fetcher.sources.proxifly, while a change to fetcher.sources.proxifly can't break fetcher.baseFetcher.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: fetcher.sources.proxifly uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
29→6 fetcher.sources.roundproxies uses fetcher.baseFetcher✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in fetcher.sources.roundproxies uses a type in fetcher.baseFetcher.
- The types involved
fetcher.sources.roundproxies.RoundProxiesFetcher→fetcher.baseFetcher.BaseFetcher
- Direction
- fetcher.sources.roundproxies uses fetcher.baseFetcher, so a change to fetcher.baseFetcher can break fetcher.sources.roundproxies, while a change to fetcher.sources.roundproxies can't break fetcher.baseFetcher.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: fetcher.sources.roundproxies uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
30→6 fetcher.sources.scdn uses fetcher.baseFetcher✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in fetcher.sources.scdn uses a type in fetcher.baseFetcher.
- The types involved
fetcher.sources.scdn.ScdnFetcher→fetcher.baseFetcher.BaseFetcher
- Direction
- fetcher.sources.scdn uses fetcher.baseFetcher, so a change to fetcher.baseFetcher can break fetcher.sources.scdn, while a change to fetcher.sources.scdn can't break fetcher.baseFetcher.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: fetcher.sources.scdn uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
31→6 fetcher.sources.zdaye uses fetcher.baseFetcher✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in fetcher.sources.zdaye uses a type in fetcher.baseFetcher.
- The types involved
fetcher.sources.zdaye.ZdayeFetcher→fetcher.baseFetcher.BaseFetcher
- Direction
- fetcher.sources.zdaye uses fetcher.baseFetcher, so a change to fetcher.baseFetcher can break fetcher.sources.zdaye, while a change to fetcher.sources.zdaye can't break fetcher.baseFetcher.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: fetcher.sources.zdaye uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
32→15 handler.configHandler uses util.singleton✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in handler.configHandler uses a type in util.singleton.
- The types involved
handler.configHandler.ConfigHandler→util.singleton.Singleton
- Direction
- handler.configHandler uses util.singleton, so a change to util.singleton can break handler.configHandler, while a change to handler.configHandler can't break util.singleton.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: handler.configHandler uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
33→15 helper.validator uses util.singleton✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in helper.validator uses a type in util.singleton.
- The types involved
helper.validator.ProxyValidator→util.singleton.Singleton
- Direction
- helper.validator uses util.singleton, so a change to util.singleton can break helper.validator, while a change to helper.validator can't break util.singleton.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: helper.validator uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2025 — Injection | 23 | High / Critical |
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 13 | High / Critical |
| A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration | 7 | High / Critical |
| A07:2025 — Authentication Failures | 6 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do; Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED; Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do. | +17.5 pts | Medium | Access Controls |
| Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED. | +4.4 pts | Low | REDACTED Scanning |
| Resolve the 5 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2), REDACTED. | +2.5 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. | +2.3 pts | Low | Supply-chain Provenance & Signing |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +3.8 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +2.9 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Resolve the 2 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. | +1.4 pts | Low | Secrets (history) |
| Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (2). | +1.4 pts | Low | Secrets (history) |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 1.3 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.3 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.0 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.4 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.5 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 3.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| db/redisClient.py | 4.3 | Mixed | Secrets (history): High secret: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | REDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): High secret: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (8 corresponding lines) |
| api/proxyApi.py | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| fetcher/sources/scdn.py | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: ScdnFetcher.fetch (cognitive 24) |
| util/webRequest.py | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (25 corresponding lines) |
| helper/check.py | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (8 corresponding lines) |
| fetcher/sources/daili66.py | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (7 corresponding lines) |
| fetcher/sources/geonode.py | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) |
| fetcher/sources/freevpnnode.py | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 45 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 45 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 68 of 87 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: the Python half could not be measured — the pytest suite ran no test, so nothing was measured (its dependency install failed (pip exit 1: no error line printed), so its suite was not run against dependencies it does not declare). Coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — a coverage step in CI (`pytest --cov=. --cov-report=term-missing --cov`), uploaded by `codecov/codecov-action` shows coverage is measured in your own CI.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.py) and this repository declares a Python test suite (repository root, 17 test files), but it was not re-run: its dependency install failed (pip exit 1: no error line printed), so its suite was not run against dependencies it does not declare. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (pyproject.toml), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (REDACTED). compose up failed (exit 1 — a container did not start, exited, or never became healthy) — proxy_pool Built container proxy_pool exited (127); runtime evidence skipped.
- C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
- C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. 'redis.exceptions' is imported (db/redisClient.py:17), but no entity, schema, table or model declaration this check reads was found beside it, so whether personal data is stored could not be decided.
- C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. 'redis.exceptions' is imported (db/redisClient.py:17), but no entity, schema, table or model declaration this check reads was found beside it, so whether personal data is stored could not be decided.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. 'redis.exceptions' is imported (db/redisClient.py:17), but no entity, schema, table or model declaration this check reads was found beside it, so whether personal data is stored could not be decided.
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Java source only, and no C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Java was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Rust was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin or Rust was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala, PHP and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala, PHP or Rust was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript (Vue and Svelte components included), Java, Rust, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Rust, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and MSBuild project configuration, TypeScript source and its tsconfig files, Java source and its package and module declarations, PHP source and its PHPStan and Psalm configuration, Dart source and its pubspec language version, Ruby source and its Sorbet and Steep configuration, Scala source and its build's explicit-nulls, WartRemover and Scalafix settings, Kotlin source, and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, no TypeScript was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned REDACTED, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ScdnFetcher.fetch at 24.
What to do
- Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with ScdnFetcher.fetch (cognitive 24). — Refactoring it lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.4 to about 10.0/10.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
6 duplicated block group(s) detected. 11.2 % of the production lines (247 of 2,209) are in a reported copy. A further 6 rows report members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Edited copy of a member (8 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with check.py, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with freevpnnode.py, redisClient.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (25 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with webRequest.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D5 · Coupling
7 production modules (source-import), 1 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). No manifest declares this repository's modules, so the modules are its top-level source directories and the edges the imports between them; 1 module(s) off the main sequence.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Circular dependency finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 8 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
6 outdated, 0 yanked pinned Python distributions. 6 of 8 shipped distributions were graded against pypi.org (0 not published there, 2 declared without an exact pin, which installs the newest release the declaration admits and so cannot be behind one). Only EXACT pins are graded for currency: a floor or a range already installs the newest release it admits, so reporting one would report this repository for being current. Whether a deliberate upper cap has itself gone stale is a different and weaker question, and is not asked. Whether any distribution is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — PyPI publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Lockfiles are not read (poetry.lock, uv.lock, Pipfile.lock, pdm.lock), so a lock-resolved install is outside this verdict. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question.
D13 · REDACTED Scanning
1 secret(s) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 24 shipped Python distribution(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from PyPI over the distributions a consumer installs — this repository's 8 declared runtime requirement(s) closed transitively over each distribution's published `requires_dist` (16 reached that way). Requirements it states ONLY under an extra, a PEP 735 dependency group, a Poetry dev group or a dev-named requirements file are excluded: pip does not install any of them for a consumer. ★ This repository commits no dependency lockfile that this pass reads, so each licence is the one PyPI publishes for the distribution's CURRENT release rather than for a pinned version. 2 of them publish no licence on PyPI this pass can read; that is missing data, not a violation, and none of them is charged.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
1 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is helper/fetch.py. Counted over 11 of the 41 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D17 · Explicit Debt
1 deducted task-comment markers across 2209 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with proxyApi.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 9 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D27 · Navigability
82 % of calls cross a namespace and 0 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
D28 · Secrets (history)
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
23 finding(s): 0 critical, 20 high, 2 medium, 1 low. 13 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens.
What to do
- Resolve the 5 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 13 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 1 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D31 · IaC & Container Security
7 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 2 medium, 1 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 11 of the 41 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 0 platform declaration(s) and 8 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
AX2 · Stateful singletons
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
- The projects (root) → handler → (root) (one cycle inside a mutually-dependent group of 7 projects) form a reference cycle. Cyclic dependencies prevent independent build/test/deploy, blur ownership, and tend to grow into a big ball of mud. Break the cycle by extracting the shared types into a separate project both can reference.
What to do
- Break project reference cycles by extracting shared abstractions into a separate project; keep the graph a DAG.
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX8 · Test isolation
C2 · Access Controls
- This repository serves requests — a request handler (@app.route() (api/proxyApi.py:54) — and no route guard, auth-gate middleware, global guard or imperative check that refuses a caller (401/403, an Unauthorized/Forbidden error) was found: its endpoints may be unprotected. — api/proxyApi.py:54
What to do
- Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do.
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Most of the production code is in directories of its own, but 2 application file(s) sit at the repository root beside the build and tooling files (`proxyPool.py`, `REDACTED`).
P1 · CI/CD gates
P2 · Observability
What to do
- Add a health-check endpoint (a /health route) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 4 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:6
- `requirements-test.txt` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — requirements-test.txt:1
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse. — REDACTED:31
What to do
- Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P6 · Release Hygiene
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience
X12 · Unreachable branch
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped
X25 · Inert configuration knob
X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard
X3 · Exception handling
- `except` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter. — helper/check.py:85
- `except Exception` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter. (×2) — REDACTED:67, REDACTED:79
What to do
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded)
X4 · Structured logging
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 79.4 | Strong | Strongest area. |
| Architecture | 89.8 | Adequate — gated by D5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Maturity | 58.8 | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 51.7 | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 23.2 | Critical — gated by D29, D36, C2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Unscored — 3 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — 1 observation(s) recorded · Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: this repository stores data through 'redis.exceptions' (db/redisClient.py:17) but declares no persisted model this check reads (Django, SQLAlchemy, SQLModel, Peewee, Tortoise and MongoEngine model fields, Alembic and Django migration columns, CREATE TABLE and ALTER TABLE … ADD columns in SQL files). Personal data may be written through raw SQL or a hosted backend, so whether its changes need an audit trail could not be established, and the trail's absence is not scored.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: this repository stores data through 'redis.exceptions' (db/redisClient.py:17) but declares no persisted model this check reads (Django, SQLAlchemy, SQLModel, Peewee, Tortoise and mongoengine model fields, Alembic and Django migration columns, SQL schemas). Personal data may be written through raw SQL or a hosted backend, so whether a retention limit applies here could not be established, and its absence is not scored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: this repository stores data through 'redis.exceptions' (db/redisClient.py:17) but declares no persisted model this check reads (Django, SQLAlchemy, SQLModel, Peewee, Tortoise and mongoengine model fields, Alembic and Django migration columns, CREATE TABLE and ALTER TABLE … ADD columns in SQL files). Personal data may be written through raw SQL or a hosted backend, so whether data-subject rights apply here could not be established, and their absence is not scored.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 64 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's Python imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — no interface, protocol or abstract type declares an operation an implementer must write
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 1 — a container did not start, exited, or never became healthy) — proxy_pool Built container proxy_pool exited (127); runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~2253 lines of test source are present (.py) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .py suite was found but not re-run
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (357 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only — this repository's production source is .py, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (2209 LoC, 39 module-visible types across 8 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — Python suite
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Java, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 9 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks. 31 claim(s) of kinds M4 does not check were not checked (path 8, command argument 7, environment variable 15, setting 1); M4 checks only links and versions and artefact counts.
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for a pytest-benchmark or pytest-codspeed dependency with tests taking the `benchmark` fixture, an asv.conf.json with its `time_`/`mem_`/`peakmem_` benchmarks, or a pyperf Runner, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: this repository declares no async functions, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Python was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Python request takes no token: asyncio cancels the task and trio or anyio the scope that made it, from outside the call, and requests, httpx, aiohttp and gRPC take a timeout, not a cancellation
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 34 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
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- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Project dependency cycle
- REDACTED
- Circular dependency
Serious — 30 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) helper/check.py:85
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) REDACTED:67
- Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) REDACTED:79
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Edited copy of a member (8 corresponding lines) helper/check.py:116
- Edited copy of a member (8 corresponding lines) REDACTED:60
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) fetcher/sources/freevpnnode.py:33
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) db/redisClient.py:127
- No authorization api/proxyApi.py:54
- TodoComment api/proxyApi.py:75
- ScdnFetcher.fetch (cognitive 24) fetcher/sources/scdn.py:32
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Edited copy of a member (25 corresponding lines) util/webRequest.py:63
- Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) db/redisClient.py:52
- Edited copy of a member (7 corresponding lines) fetcher/sources/daili66.py:30
- Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) db/redisClient.py:109
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) db/redisClient.py:143
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) fetcher/sources/geonode.py:35
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) db/redisClient.py:35
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) db/redisClient.py:75
- Off the main sequence: util
- Coverage collected but not gated
Minor — 17 finding(s)
- Hand-rolled JSON/XML parsing via regex fetcher/sources/ip3366.py:35
- Hand-rolled JSON/XML parsing via regex fetcher/sources/ip89.py:30
- Silent fallback default in catch REDACTED:67
- Silent fallback default in catch REDACTED:79
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- No ADRs
- No src/ separation
- No SAST REDACTED:6
- No dependency-update automation requirements-test.txt:1
- No rollback/health safety REDACTED:31
Minor — 6 finding(s)
- Outdated: apscheduler
- Outdated: click
- Outdated: flask
- Outdated: gunicorn
- Outdated: lxml
- Outdated: requests
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=0 --max-count=200" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-d03d3cf4b4e3465eb5925e445ba21fd1/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=200 --max-count=529" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-d03d3cf4b4e3465eb5925e445ba21fd1/history-1.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 2 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history-1.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-d03d3cf4b4e3465eb5925e445ba21fd1/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 23 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 4 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 7 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 0 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |