Executive summary
jaliss/securesocial falls short of our standard for production, in part because it has images with no text description. It scores 36 out of 100 and is rated Weak, and none of its eight critical findings concern security.
Accessibility, at 19, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is recording design decisions, worth about 10 points. Making the controls keyboard-usable would lift Accessibility itself, worth about 5 points. Raising Accessibility to 70 would lift the score to about 50.
Three images have no description for people who can't see them. Describing the images would close this risk. The three pages or frames without a title need a descriptive title.
The product code is 6,683 lines, about €6,100 to rebuild.
If Accessibility rose from 19 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 36 to about 50.
New since the last survey: 43 findings
- Code Duplication · Edited copies of one member (3 members, 27+ corresponding lines) module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/FacebookProvider.scala
- Code Duplication · Edited copies of one member (3 members, 20+ corresponding lines) module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/GitHubProvider.scala
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (23 corresponding lines) module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/PasswordReset.scala
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) module-code/app/securesocial/core/OAuth2Provider.scala
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) module-code/app/securesocial/core/authenticator/CookieAuthenticator.scala
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (8 corresponding lines) module-code/app/securesocial/core/authenticator/CookieAuthenticator.scala
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (5 corresponding lines) module-code/app/securesocial/core/OAuth1Provider.scala
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (14 corresponding lines) samples/java/demo/app/service/InMemoryUserService.java
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) samples/scala/demo/app/service/InMemoryUserService.scala
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair (2.8:1) docs/src/manual/source/index.html.erb
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.6:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.3:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.6:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.3:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.6:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.3:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
Fixed since the last survey: 30 findings
- Cognitive Complexity · bootstrap.backdrop (cognitive 16) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/js/bootstrap.js
- God Classes · FileTooLong: js/bootstrap.js module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/js/bootstrap.js
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css
- A11y enforcement · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung
Rebuild cost: about €6,100 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €2,000 to €10,000, for 34 to 107 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.7 at a score of 36. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 6,683 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture — module dependency graph
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 controllers.BaseLoginApi | 2 core.authenticator | 3 core.providers.SlackProvider | 4 core.authenticator.AuthenticatorStore | 5 core.authenticator.IdGenerator | 6 core.providers | 7 core.providers.utils | 8 core.utils | 9 core.providers.utils.PasswordValidator | 10 core.services | 11 core | 12 core.services.AvatarService | 13 core.services.CacheService | 14 core.services.HttpService | 15 core.services.RoutesService | 16 core.AuthenticationResult | 17 core.OAuth1Client | 18 core.OAuth2Client | 19 core.OAuth2Provider | 20 core.SecureSocial | 21 core.java | 22 core.providers.utils.Mailer | 23 core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher | 24 controllers | 25 controllers.MailTemplates | 26 controllers.ViewTemplates | 27 core.RuntimeEnvironment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 controllers.BaseLoginApi | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2 core.authenticator | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3 core.providers.SlackProvider | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4 core.authenticator.AuthenticatorStore | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5 core.authenticator.IdGenerator | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6 core.providers | 2 | 52 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 7 core.providers.utils | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8 core.utils | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 9 core.providers.utils.PasswordValidator | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 10 core.services | 2 | 1 | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 11 core | 3 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| 12 core.services.AvatarService | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 13 core.services.CacheService | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 14 core.services.HttpService | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 15 core.services.RoutesService | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 16 core.AuthenticationResult | 5 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 17 core.OAuth1Client | 1 | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 18 core.OAuth2Client | 1 | 3 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 19 core.OAuth2Provider | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20 core.SecureSocial | 2 | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21 core.java | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 5 | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22 core.providers.utils.Mailer | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 23 core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 24 controllers | 1 | 12 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 25 controllers.MailTemplates | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 26 controllers.ViewTemplates | 3 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 27 core.RuntimeEnvironment | 1 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 2 |
4→2 core.authenticator.AuthenticatorStore uses core.authenticator✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.authenticator.AuthenticatorStore uses a type in core.authenticator.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.authenticator.AuthenticatorStore.Default→securesocial.core.authenticator.AuthenticatorStore
- Direction
- core.authenticator.AuthenticatorStore uses core.authenticator, so a change to core.authenticator can break core.authenticator.AuthenticatorStore, while a change to core.authenticator.AuthenticatorStore can't break core.authenticator.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.authenticator.AuthenticatorStore uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
5→2 core.authenticator.IdGenerator uses core.authenticator✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.authenticator.IdGenerator uses a type in core.authenticator.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.authenticator.IdGenerator.Default→securesocial.core.authenticator.IdGenerator
- Direction
- core.authenticator.IdGenerator uses core.authenticator, so a change to core.authenticator can break core.authenticator.IdGenerator, while a change to core.authenticator.IdGenerator can't break core.authenticator.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.authenticator.IdGenerator uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
6→3 core.providers uses core.providers.SlackProvider✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in core.providers uses a type in core.providers.SlackProvider.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.providers.SlackProvider→securesocial.core.providers.SlackProvider.AuthTestResponsesecuresocial.core.providers.SlackProvider→securesocial.core.providers.SlackProvider.CommonResponse
- Direction
- core.providers uses core.providers.SlackProvider, so a change to core.providers.SlackProvider can break core.providers, while a change to core.providers can't break core.providers.SlackProvider.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.providers uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
6→11 core.providers uses core part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 52 pairs of types, where a type in core.providers uses a type in core. Showing 25 of them; the rest are in namespace-graph.json in this report's bundle.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.providers.ConcurProvider→securesocial.core.BasicProfilesecuresocial.core.providers.ConcurProvider→securesocial.core.OAuth2Infosecuresocial.core.providers.ConcurProvider→securesocial.core.OAuth2Providersecuresocial.core.providers.DropboxProvider→securesocial.core.BasicProfilesecuresocial.core.providers.DropboxProvider→securesocial.core.OAuth2Infosecuresocial.core.providers.DropboxProvider→securesocial.core.OAuth2Providersecuresocial.core.providers.FacebookProvider→securesocial.core.BasicProfilesecuresocial.core.providers.FacebookProvider→securesocial.core.OAuth2Infosecuresocial.core.providers.FacebookProvider→securesocial.core.OAuth2Providersecuresocial.core.providers.FoursquareProvider→securesocial.core.BasicProfilesecuresocial.core.providers.FoursquareProvider→securesocial.core.OAuth2Infosecuresocial.core.providers.FoursquareProvider→securesocial.core.OAuth2Providersecuresocial.core.providers.GitHubProvider→securesocial.core.BasicProfilesecuresocial.core.providers.GitHubProvider→securesocial.core.OAuth2Infosecuresocial.core.providers.GitHubProvider→securesocial.core.OAuth2Providersecuresocial.core.providers.GoogleProvider→securesocial.core.BasicProfilesecuresocial.core.providers.GoogleProvider→securesocial.core.OAuth2Infosecuresocial.core.providers.GoogleProvider→securesocial.core.OAuth2Providersecuresocial.core.providers.InstagramProvider→securesocial.core.BasicProfilesecuresocial.core.providers.InstagramProvider→securesocial.core.OAuth2Infosecuresocial.core.providers.InstagramProvider→securesocial.core.OAuth2Providersecuresocial.core.providers.LinkedInOAuth2Provider→securesocial.core.BasicProfilesecuresocial.core.providers.LinkedInOAuth2Provider→securesocial.core.OAuth2Infosecuresocial.core.providers.LinkedInOAuth2Provider→securesocial.core.OAuth2Providersecuresocial.core.providers.LinkedInProvider→securesocial.core.BasicProfile
- Direction
- core.providers uses core, so a change to core can break core.providers, while a change to core.providers can't break core.
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
7→11 core.providers.utils uses core part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in core.providers.utils uses a type in core.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.providers.utils.Mailer→securesocial.core.BasicProfilesecuresocial.core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher→securesocial.core.PasswordInfo
- Direction
- core.providers.utils uses core, so a change to core can break core.providers.utils, while a change to core.providers.utils can't break core.
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
8→2 core.utils uses core.authenticator✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.utils uses a type in core.authenticator.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.utils.SimpleResultMethods→securesocial.core.authenticator.Authenticator
- Direction
- core.utils uses core.authenticator, so a change to core.authenticator can break core.utils, while a change to core.utils can't break core.authenticator.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.utils uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
9→7 core.providers.utils.PasswordValidator uses core.providers.utils✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.providers.utils.PasswordValidator uses a type in core.providers.utils.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.providers.utils.PasswordValidator.Default→securesocial.core.providers.utils.PasswordValidator
- Direction
- core.providers.utils.PasswordValidator uses core.providers.utils, so a change to core.providers.utils can break core.providers.utils.PasswordValidator, while a change to core.providers.utils.PasswordValidator can't break core.providers.utils.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.providers.utils.PasswordValidator uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
10→2 core.services uses core.authenticator✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in core.services uses a type in core.authenticator.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.services.AuthenticatorService→securesocial.core.authenticator.Authenticatorsecuresocial.core.services.AuthenticatorService→securesocial.core.authenticator.AuthenticatorBuilder
- Direction
- core.services uses core.authenticator, so a change to core.authenticator can break core.services, while a change to core.services can't break core.authenticator.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.services uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
10→6 core.services uses core.providers✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.services uses a type in core.providers.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.services.UserService→securesocial.core.providers.MailToken
- Direction
- core.services uses core.providers, so a change to core.providers can break core.services, while a change to core.services can't break core.providers.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.services uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
10→11 core.services uses core part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in core.services uses a type in core.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.services.UserService→securesocial.core.BasicProfilesecuresocial.core.services.UserService→securesocial.core.PasswordInfo
- Direction
- core.services uses core, so a change to core can break core.services, while a change to core.services can't break core.
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
11→2 core uses core.authenticator✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in core uses a type in core.authenticator.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment→securesocial.core.authenticator.CookieConfigsecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment→securesocial.core.authenticator.HttpHeaderConfigsecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment→securesocial.core.authenticator.IdGenerator
- Direction
- core uses core.authenticator, so a change to core.authenticator can break core, while a change to core can't break core.authenticator.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
11→6 core uses core.providers✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core uses a type in core.providers.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment→securesocial.core.providers.UsernamePasswordConfig
- Direction
- core uses core.providers, so a change to core.providers can break core, while a change to core can't break core.providers.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
11→7 core uses core.providers.utils✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in core uses a type in core.providers.utils.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment→securesocial.core.providers.utils.Mailersecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment→securesocial.core.providers.utils.PasswordHashersecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment→securesocial.core.providers.utils.PasswordValidator
- Direction
- core uses core.providers.utils, so a change to core.providers.utils can break core, while a change to core can't break core.providers.utils.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
11→10 core uses core.services✕
- Connections
- 7 pairs of types, where a type in core uses a type in core.services.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.OAuth2Client→securesocial.core.services.HttpServicesecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment→securesocial.core.services.AuthenticatorServicesecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment→securesocial.core.services.AvatarServicesecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment→securesocial.core.services.CacheServicesecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment→securesocial.core.services.HttpServicesecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment→securesocial.core.services.RoutesServicesecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment→securesocial.core.services.UserService
- Direction
- core uses core.services, so a change to core.services can break core, while a change to core can't break core.services.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
11→24 core uses controllers part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in core uses a type in controllers.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment→securesocial.controllers.MailTemplatessecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment→securesocial.controllers.ViewTemplates
- Direction
- core uses controllers, so a change to controllers can break core, while a change to core can't break controllers.
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
12→10 core.services.AvatarService uses core.services✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.services.AvatarService uses a type in core.services.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.services.AvatarService.Default→securesocial.core.services.AvatarService
- Direction
- core.services.AvatarService uses core.services, so a change to core.services can break core.services.AvatarService, while a change to core.services.AvatarService can't break core.services.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.services.AvatarService uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→10 core.services.CacheService uses core.services✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.services.CacheService uses a type in core.services.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.services.CacheService.Default→securesocial.core.services.CacheService
- Direction
- core.services.CacheService uses core.services, so a change to core.services can break core.services.CacheService, while a change to core.services.CacheService can't break core.services.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.services.CacheService uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
14→10 core.services.HttpService uses core.services✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.services.HttpService uses a type in core.services.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.services.HttpService.Default→securesocial.core.services.HttpService
- Direction
- core.services.HttpService uses core.services, so a change to core.services can break core.services.HttpService, while a change to core.services.HttpService can't break core.services.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.services.HttpService uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
15→10 core.services.RoutesService uses core.services✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.services.RoutesService uses a type in core.services.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.services.RoutesService.Default→securesocial.core.services.RoutesService
- Direction
- core.services.RoutesService uses core.services, so a change to core.services can break core.services.RoutesService, while a change to core.services.RoutesService can't break core.services.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.services.RoutesService uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
16→11 core.AuthenticationResult uses core✕
- Connections
- 5 pairs of types, where a type in core.AuthenticationResult uses a type in core.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.AuthenticationResult.AccessDenied→securesocial.core.AuthenticationResultsecuresocial.core.AuthenticationResult.Authenticated→securesocial.core.AuthenticationResultsecuresocial.core.AuthenticationResult.Authenticated→securesocial.core.BasicProfilesecuresocial.core.AuthenticationResult.Failed→securesocial.core.AuthenticationResultsecuresocial.core.AuthenticationResult.NavigationFlow→securesocial.core.AuthenticationResult
- Direction
- core.AuthenticationResult uses core, so a change to core can break core.AuthenticationResult, while a change to core.AuthenticationResult can't break core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.AuthenticationResult uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
17→10 core.OAuth1Client uses core.services✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.OAuth1Client uses a type in core.services.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.OAuth1Client.Default→securesocial.core.services.HttpService
- Direction
- core.OAuth1Client uses core.services, so a change to core.services can break core.OAuth1Client, while a change to core.OAuth1Client can't break core.services.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.OAuth1Client uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
17→11 core.OAuth1Client uses core✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in core.OAuth1Client uses a type in core.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.OAuth1Client.Default→securesocial.core.OAuth1Clientsecuresocial.core.OAuth1Client.Default→securesocial.core.OAuth1Info
- Direction
- core.OAuth1Client uses core, so a change to core can break core.OAuth1Client, while a change to core.OAuth1Client can't break core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.OAuth1Client uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
18→10 core.OAuth2Client uses core.services✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.OAuth2Client uses a type in core.services.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.OAuth2Client.Default→securesocial.core.services.HttpService
- Direction
- core.OAuth2Client uses core.services, so a change to core.services can break core.OAuth2Client, while a change to core.OAuth2Client can't break core.services.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.OAuth2Client uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
18→11 core.OAuth2Client uses core✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in core.OAuth2Client uses a type in core.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.OAuth2Client.Default→securesocial.core.OAuth2Clientsecuresocial.core.OAuth2Client.Default→securesocial.core.OAuth2Infosecuresocial.core.OAuth2Client.Default→securesocial.core.OAuth2Settings
- Direction
- core.OAuth2Client uses core, so a change to core can break core.OAuth2Client, while a change to core.OAuth2Client can't break core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.OAuth2Client uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
19→11 core.OAuth2Provider uses core✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.OAuth2Provider uses a type in core.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.OAuth2Provider.LoginJson→securesocial.core.OAuth2Info
- Direction
- core.OAuth2Provider uses core, so a change to core can break core.OAuth2Provider, while a change to core.OAuth2Provider can't break core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.OAuth2Provider uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
20→2 core.SecureSocial uses core.authenticator✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in core.SecureSocial uses a type in core.authenticator.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.SecureSocial.RequestWithUser→securesocial.core.authenticator.Authenticatorsecuresocial.core.SecureSocial.SecuredRequest→securesocial.core.authenticator.Authenticator
- Direction
- core.SecureSocial uses core.authenticator, so a change to core.authenticator can break core.SecureSocial, while a change to core.SecureSocial can't break core.authenticator.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.SecureSocial uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
20→11 core.SecureSocial uses core✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in core.SecureSocial uses a type in core.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.SecureSocial.SecuredAction→securesocial.core.Authorizationsecuresocial.core.SecureSocial.SecuredActionBuilder→securesocial.core.Authorization
- Direction
- core.SecureSocial uses core, so a change to core can break core.SecureSocial, while a change to core.SecureSocial can't break core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.SecureSocial uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
21→2 core.java uses core.authenticator✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in core.java uses a type in core.authenticator.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.java.CheckAuthenticator→securesocial.core.authenticator.Authenticatorsecuresocial.core.java.InvokeDelegate→securesocial.core.authenticator.Authenticator
- Direction
- core.java uses core.authenticator, so a change to core.authenticator can break core.java, while a change to core.java can't break core.authenticator.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.java uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
21→6 core.java uses core.providers✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in core.java uses a type in core.providers.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.java.BaseUserService→securesocial.core.providers.MailTokensecuresocial.core.java.Token→securesocial.core.providers.MailToken
- Direction
- core.java uses core.providers, so a change to core.providers can break core.java, while a change to core.java can't break core.providers.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.java uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
21→7 core.java uses core.providers.utils✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in core.java uses a type in core.providers.utils.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.java.BasePasswordHasher→securesocial.core.providers.utils.PasswordHashersecuresocial.core.java.BasePasswordValidator→securesocial.core.providers.utils.PasswordValidator
- Direction
- core.java uses core.providers.utils, so a change to core.providers.utils can break core.java, while a change to core.java can't break core.providers.utils.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.java uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
21→10 core.java uses core.services✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in core.java uses a type in core.services.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.java.BaseUserService→securesocial.core.services.SaveModesecuresocial.core.java.BaseUserService→securesocial.core.services.UserService
- Direction
- core.java uses core.services, so a change to core.services can break core.java, while a change to core.java can't break core.services.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.java uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
21→11 core.java uses core✕
- Connections
- 5 pairs of types, where a type in core.java uses a type in core.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.java.BaseUserService→securesocial.core.BasicProfilesecuresocial.core.java.BaseUserService→securesocial.core.PasswordInfosecuresocial.core.java.SecureSocial→securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironmentsecuresocial.core.java.Secured→securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironmentsecuresocial.core.java.UserAware→securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment
- Direction
- core.java uses core, so a change to core can break core.java, while a change to core.java can't break core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.java uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
22→7 core.providers.utils.Mailer uses core.providers.utils✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.providers.utils.Mailer uses a type in core.providers.utils.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.providers.utils.Mailer.Default→securesocial.core.providers.utils.Mailer
- Direction
- core.providers.utils.Mailer uses core.providers.utils, so a change to core.providers.utils can break core.providers.utils.Mailer, while a change to core.providers.utils.Mailer can't break core.providers.utils.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.providers.utils.Mailer uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
22→11 core.providers.utils.Mailer uses core✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.providers.utils.Mailer uses a type in core.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.providers.utils.Mailer.Default→securesocial.core.BasicProfile
- Direction
- core.providers.utils.Mailer uses core, so a change to core can break core.providers.utils.Mailer, while a change to core.providers.utils.Mailer can't break core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.providers.utils.Mailer uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
23→7 core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher uses core.providers.utils✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher uses a type in core.providers.utils.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher.Default→securesocial.core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher
- Direction
- core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher uses core.providers.utils, so a change to core.providers.utils can break core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher, while a change to core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher can't break core.providers.utils.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
23→11 core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher uses core✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher uses a type in core.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher.Default→securesocial.core.PasswordInfo
- Direction
- core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher uses core, so a change to core can break core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher, while a change to core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher can't break core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.providers.utils.PasswordHasher uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
24→6 controllers uses core.providers✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in controllers uses a type in core.providers.
- The types involved
securesocial.controllers.MailTokenBasedOperations→securesocial.core.providers.MailToken
- Direction
- controllers uses core.providers, so a change to core.providers can break controllers, while a change to controllers can't break core.providers.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: controllers uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
24→11 controllers uses core✕
- Connections
- 12 pairs of types, where a type in controllers uses a type in core.
- The types involved
securesocial.controllers.BaseLoginApi→securesocial.core.SecureSocialControllersecuresocial.controllers.BaseLoginPage→securesocial.core.SecureSocialsecuresocial.controllers.BasePasswordChange→securesocial.core.SecureSocialsecuresocial.controllers.BaseProviderController→securesocial.core.SecureSocialsecuresocial.controllers.LoginApi→securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironmentsecuresocial.controllers.LoginPage→securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironmentsecuresocial.controllers.MailTemplates→securesocial.core.BasicProfilesecuresocial.controllers.MailTokenBasedOperations→securesocial.core.SecureSocialsecuresocial.controllers.PasswordChange→securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironmentsecuresocial.controllers.PasswordReset→securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironmentsecuresocial.controllers.ProviderController→securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironmentsecuresocial.controllers.Registration→securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment
- Direction
- controllers uses core, so a change to core can break controllers, while a change to controllers can't break core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: controllers uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
24→20 controllers uses core.SecureSocial✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in controllers uses a type in core.SecureSocial.
- The types involved
securesocial.controllers.BasePasswordChange→securesocial.core.SecureSocial.SecuredRequest
- Direction
- controllers uses core.SecureSocial, so a change to core.SecureSocial can break controllers, while a change to controllers can't break core.SecureSocial.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: controllers uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
25→11 controllers.MailTemplates uses core✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in controllers.MailTemplates uses a type in core.
- The types involved
securesocial.controllers.MailTemplates.Default→securesocial.core.BasicProfile
- Direction
- controllers.MailTemplates uses core, so a change to core can break controllers.MailTemplates, while a change to controllers.MailTemplates can't break core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: controllers.MailTemplates uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
25→24 controllers.MailTemplates uses controllers✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in controllers.MailTemplates uses a type in controllers.
- The types involved
securesocial.controllers.MailTemplates.Default→securesocial.controllers.MailTemplates
- Direction
- controllers.MailTemplates uses controllers, so a change to controllers can break controllers.MailTemplates, while a change to controllers.MailTemplates can't break controllers.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: controllers.MailTemplates uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
26→24 controllers.ViewTemplates uses controllers✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in controllers.ViewTemplates uses a type in controllers.
- The types involved
securesocial.controllers.ViewTemplates.Default→securesocial.controllers.ChangeInfosecuresocial.controllers.ViewTemplates.Default→securesocial.controllers.RegistrationInfosecuresocial.controllers.ViewTemplates.Default→securesocial.controllers.ViewTemplates
- Direction
- controllers.ViewTemplates uses controllers, so a change to controllers can break controllers.ViewTemplates, while a change to controllers.ViewTemplates can't break controllers.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: controllers.ViewTemplates uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
27→2 core.RuntimeEnvironment uses core.authenticator✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.RuntimeEnvironment uses a type in core.authenticator.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment.Default→securesocial.core.authenticator.IdGenerator
- Direction
- core.RuntimeEnvironment uses core.authenticator, so a change to core.authenticator can break core.RuntimeEnvironment, while a change to core.RuntimeEnvironment can't break core.authenticator.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.RuntimeEnvironment uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
27→7 core.RuntimeEnvironment uses core.providers.utils✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in core.RuntimeEnvironment uses a type in core.providers.utils.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment.Default→securesocial.core.providers.utils.Mailersecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment.Default→securesocial.core.providers.utils.PasswordHashersecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment.Default→securesocial.core.providers.utils.PasswordValidator
- Direction
- core.RuntimeEnvironment uses core.providers.utils, so a change to core.providers.utils can break core.RuntimeEnvironment, while a change to core.RuntimeEnvironment can't break core.providers.utils.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.RuntimeEnvironment uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
27→10 core.RuntimeEnvironment uses core.services✕
- Connections
- 5 pairs of types, where a type in core.RuntimeEnvironment uses a type in core.services.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment.Default→securesocial.core.services.AuthenticatorServicesecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment.Default→securesocial.core.services.AvatarServicesecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment.Default→securesocial.core.services.CacheServicesecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment.Default→securesocial.core.services.HttpServicesecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment.Default→securesocial.core.services.RoutesService
- Direction
- core.RuntimeEnvironment uses core.services, so a change to core.services can break core.RuntimeEnvironment, while a change to core.RuntimeEnvironment can't break core.services.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.RuntimeEnvironment uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
27→11 core.RuntimeEnvironment uses core✕
- Connections
- 5 pairs of types, where a type in core.RuntimeEnvironment uses a type in core.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment.Default→securesocial.core.EventListenersecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment.Default→securesocial.core.IdentityProvidersecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment.Default→securesocial.core.OAuth1Clientsecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment.Default→securesocial.core.OAuth2Clientsecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment.Default→securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment
- Direction
- core.RuntimeEnvironment uses core, so a change to core can break core.RuntimeEnvironment, while a change to core.RuntimeEnvironment can't break core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.RuntimeEnvironment uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
27→24 core.RuntimeEnvironment uses controllers✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in core.RuntimeEnvironment uses a type in controllers.
- The types involved
securesocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment.Default→securesocial.controllers.MailTemplatessecuresocial.core.RuntimeEnvironment.Default→securesocial.controllers.ViewTemplates
- Direction
- core.RuntimeEnvironment uses controllers, so a change to controllers can break core.RuntimeEnvironment, while a change to core.RuntimeEnvironment can't break controllers.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.RuntimeEnvironment uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Accessibility
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 4 | Medium |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with REDACTED; Resolve the 39 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with OAuth2Provider.scala, Registration.scala, SecureSocial.scala; Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with REDACTED. | +9.6 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Resolve the 1 `callbackURL` spells `URL` where 40 names in the project spell it `Url` finding(s) in Naming Consistency — start with OAuth1Provider.scala. | +5.0 pts | Low | Naming Consistency |
| Resolve the 39 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with OAuth2Provider.scala, Registration.scala, SecureSocial.scala. | +9.5 pts | Medium | Knowledge Freshness |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +6.3 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href. | +5.2 pts | Medium | Keyboard semantics |
| Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1. | +5.2 pts | Medium | Visual & motion safety |
| Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video. | +5.2 pts | Medium | Text alternatives |
| Add a root README: what the system is, how to build/run it, and a map of the projects. | +5.1 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/ProviderController.scala | 6.7 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/Registration.scala | 6.7 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/LoginApi.scala | 6.7 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| module-code/app/securesocial/core/OAuth2Provider.scala | 6.7 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| module-code/app/securesocial/core/OAuth1Provider.scala | 7.3 | Mixed | Cognitive Complexity: OAuth1Provider.authenticate (cognitive 17) |
| module-code/app/securesocial/core/authenticator/IdGenerator.scala | 7.3 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/GitHubProvider.scala | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Edited copies of one member (3 members, 20+ corresponding lines) |
| module-code/app/securesocial/core/authenticator/CookieAuthenticator.scala | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) |
| module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/LinkedInOAuth2Provider.scala | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (9–10 lines × 2) |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Mixed | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: REDACTED |
| module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/FacebookProvider.scala | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copies of one member (3 members, 27+ corresponding lines) |
| module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/PasswordReset.scala | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (23 corresponding lines) |
| module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/GoogleProvider.scala | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) |
| samples/java/demo/app/service/InMemoryUserService.java | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (14 corresponding lines) |
| samples/scala/demo/app/service/InMemoryUserService.scala | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) |
| REDACTED | 9.5 | Near-clean | ADR Quality: No ADRs found |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 51 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 51 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 130 of 143 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.scala) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.scala) and this repository declares an sbt build (repository root, 6 test files), but it was not re-run: the analyzer environment could not run it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares an sbt build (REDACTED), but the licence verdict published here was taken over its gem dependencies. Nothing was read about its sbt dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Every one of the 39 significant source file(s) was last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains, so there is no concentration to measure — the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (project/plugins.sbt), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/ConcurProvider.scala` produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. 24 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 64.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection registrations in C# and Spring beans in Java/Kotlin only, and this repository's container is Guice and Play dependency injection, whose lifetimes are not modelled yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Subject: 11 markup document(s) — HTML, Razor, JSX, Vue, Svelte or server templates. The Runtime Evidence tier boots an app only via docker-compose, an Aspire AppHost, a Dockerfile, an npm dev script, a web service's own toolchain entry point (cargo, go, dotnet, Python, Spring Boot), or an Android app's own Gradle wrapper (run on an emulator); an Apple or Flutter app needs a host it lacks. None applied, so no live runtime a11y/egress/header evidence was collected. You can widen what we reach: add a docker-compose.yml (or an Aspire AppHost) that brings the app up with its dependencies. We then boot it in an isolated sandbox and gathers real runtime evidence — you change nothing in your pipeline (no CI step, no SDK).
- C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
- C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
- X1 Async correctness — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
- X12 Unreachable branch — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming consistency compares each name with the convention its structural peers follow in this repository: it cannot tell whether a consistently used name is a good one, and languages other than C# and TypeScript are not measured.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
4 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was BaseProviderController.handleAuth at 31.
What to do
- Bring the 4 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with BaseProviderController.handleAuth (cognitive 31), BaseRegistration.handleSignUp (cognitive 19), BaseLoginApi.authenticate (cognitive 17). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 8.9 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
4 duplicated block group(s) detected. 4.6 % of the production lines (307 of 6,683) are in a reported copy. A further 9 rows report members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it. 2 of the 13 are in trees this repository does not ship — vendored, example/demo, project-template, fixture and benchmark code — and are ranked below the shipped groups rather than excluded from them: the duplication there is real and is still counted in this dimension's score. The dimensions that publish a production-file census leave those trees out of theirs, so this count is deliberately drawn over the wider population.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with OAuth2Provider.scala, CookieAuthenticator.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Edited copies of one member (3 members, 27+ corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with FacebookProvider.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Edited copies of one member (3 members, 20+ corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with GitHubProvider.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D5 · Coupling
3 production modules (sbt), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; a dependsOn spread (deps: _*) and a project whose directory a helper computes are not visible there; 0 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 2 of the 3 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, declare types in source no model reads, or have no source directory of their own).
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 16 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
1 outdated direct gem(s), 0 pinning defect(s). 4 declaration(s) graded against rubygems.org, 1 of them against a version resolved in a committed Gemfile.lock. 3 declaration(s) carry a requirement that EXCLUDES the current release; that is a deliberate constraint (a supported-version ceiling or a held-back CI pin) and is counted, not charged. Whether any of these gems is DEPRECATED or YANKED is not graded — rubygems.org publishes no deprecation marker, and a yank removes a version rather than flagging it. Whether any is UNMAINTAINED is not graded either: no registry publishes a maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is a source question, not a registry one. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 39 shipped gem(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from rubygems.org over the 39 gem(s) a consumer installs — this repository's runtime declarations closed transitively over its committed Gemfile.lock. Development-group and `add_development_dependency` gems are excluded: they are not distributed with this repository. 3 of them publish no licence on rubygems.org; that is missing data, not a violation, and none of them is charged. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's gem dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares an sbt build (REDACTED), and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt
6 deducted task-comment markers across 6683 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.9. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What to do
- Resolve the 6 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with IdGenerator.scala (2), OAuth2Provider.scala, LoginApi.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D21 · Naming Consistency
1 naming inconsistencies among 25 declarations measured against a convention their peers follow.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 `callbackURL` spells `URL` where 40 names in the project spell it `Url` finding(s) in Naming Consistency — start with OAuth1Provider.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 2 build units (sbt) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues. semgrep hit a parse error in 19 file(s) — `docs/src/manual/data/featured.yml`, `module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/ConcurProvider.scala`, `module-code/app/securesocial/views/Registration/signUp.scala.html`, `module-code/app/securesocial/views/Registration/startResetPassword.scala.html`, `module-code/app/securesocial/views/Registration/startSignUp.scala.html`, … (+14 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
39 of 39 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is module-code/app/securesocial/core/OAuth2Provider.scala. Counted over 39 of the 76 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 39 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with OAuth2Provider.scala, Registration.scala, SecureSocial.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (39 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
1/3 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 0 platform declaration(s) and 4 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
- An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×3) — docs/src/manual/source/sponsors.html.erb:16, docs/src/manual/source/sponsors.html.erb:31, module-code/app/securesocial/views/provider.scala.html:12
What to do
- Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels
- A fieldset groups related controls but has no <legend> to name the group. Add a <legend> as its first child — or, if the group already has a visible caption beside it (or the fieldset is there only to disable its subtree and carries no group box), point aria-labelledby at that caption's id instead, which names the group without rendering a second one. (×6) — module-code/app/securesocial/views/Registration/resetPasswordPage.scala.html:22, module-code/app/securesocial/views/Registration/signUp.scala.html:21, module-code/app/securesocial/views/Registration/startResetPassword.scala.html:22, …
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure
- An iframe with no title (or an empty one) is announced only as "frame". Add a non-empty title describing its content, or an aria-label. (×2) — docs/src/manual/source/index.html.erb:17, docs/src/manual/source/index.html.erb:19
- Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. — docs/src/manual/source/index.html.erb:74
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×4) — docs/src/manual/source/layouts/guide_layout.erb:2, docs/src/manual/source/layouts/layout.erb:2, module-code/app/securesocial/views/mails/passwordChangedNotice.scala.html:3, …
- The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×2) — module-code/app/securesocial/views/mails/passwordChangedNotice.scala.html:3, module-code/app/securesocial/views/main.scala.html:5
- A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. — module-code/app/securesocial/views/mails/passwordChangedNotice.scala.html:3
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics
- An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. — docs/src/manual/source/_navbar.erb:4
What to do
- Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- The inline foreground/background colours fall below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken/lighten one of them. — docs/src/manual/source/index.html.erb:6
- `.control-group.warning .input-prepend .add-on, .control-group.warning .input-append .add-on` sets color: #c09853 on background-color: #fcf8e3 — 2.5:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×3) — samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1108, samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1108, module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1108
- `.control-group.error .input-prepend .add-on, .control-group.error .input-append .add-on` sets color: #b94a48 on background-color: #f2dede — 3.9:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×3) — samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1137, samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1137, module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1137
- `.control-group.success .input-prepend .add-on, .control-group.success .input-append .add-on` sets color: #468847 on background-color: #dff0d8 — 3.6:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×3) — samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1166, samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1166, module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1166
- `.dropdown-menu li > a:hover, .dropdown-menu .active > a, .dropdown-menu .active > a:hover` sets color: #ffffff on background-color: #0088cc — 3.9:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×3) — samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:2426, samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:2426, module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:2426
- `.alert` sets color: #c09853 on background-color: #fcf8e3 — 2.5:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×3) — samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3128, samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3128, module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3128
- `.alert-danger, .alert-error` sets color: #b94a48 on background-color: #f2dede — 3.9:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×3) — samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3158, samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3158, module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3158
- `.alert-info` sets color: #3a87ad on background-color: #d9edf7 — 3.3:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×3) — samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3164, samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3164, module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3164
- `.nav-list > .active > a, .nav-list > .active > a:hover` sets color: #ffffff on background-color: #0088cc — 3.9:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×3) — samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3236, samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3236, module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3236
- `.nav-pills > .active > a, .nav-pills > .active > a:hover` sets color: #ffffff on background-color: #0088cc — 3.9:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×3) — samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3329, samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3329, module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3329
- `.nav-tabs .open .dropdown-toggle, .nav-pills .open .dropdown-toggle, .nav > li.dropdown.open.active > a:hover` sets color: #ffffff on background-color: #999999 — 2.8:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×3) — samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3416, samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3416, module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3416
- `.pager .disabled a, .pager .disabled a:hover` sets color: #999999 on background-color: #fff — 2.8:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×3) — samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:4104, samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:4104, module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:4104
- `.open .dropdown-toggle` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. (×2) — samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:2345, samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:2345
- `.btn.active` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. (×2) — samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:2640, samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:2640
- `.btn-group.open .dropdown-toggle` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3022
- `.navbar-search .search-query.focused` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3715
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AX10 · Code composition
AX2 · Stateful singletons
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX6 · Interface segregation
- `RuntimeEnvironment` declares 19 abstract members: `routes`, `viewTemplates`, `mailTemplates`, `mailer`, `currentHasher`, `passwordHashers`, `passwordValidator`, `httpService`, `cacheService`, `avatarService`, `providers`, `idGenerator`, `authenticatorService`, `eventListeners`, `userService`, `executionContext`, `configuration`, `messagesApi`, `parsers`. Counted over its ABSTRACT members — a `def` with no body or a `val`/`var` with no initializer, once per signature; concrete members, private and protected members, and members of a companion `object` are not counted, because no implementer is forced to write them. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — module-code/app/securesocial/core/RuntimeEnvironment.scala:21
- `RoutesService` declares 17 abstract members: `loginPageUrl`, `accessDeniedUrl`, `startSignUpUrl`, `handleStartSignUpUrl`, `signUpUrl`, `handleSignUpUrl`, `startResetPasswordUrl`, `handleStartResetPasswordUrl`, `resetPasswordUrl`, `handleResetPasswordUrl`, `passwordChangeUrl`, `handlePasswordChangeUrl`, `authenticationUrl`, `faviconPath`, `jqueryPath`, `bootstrapCssPath`, `customCssPath`. Counted over its ABSTRACT members — a `def` with no body or a `val`/`var` with no initializer, once per signature; concrete members, private and protected members, and members of a companion `object` are not counted, because no implementer is forced to write them. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — module-code/app/securesocial/core/services/RoutesService.scala:26
What to do
- Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
M1 · Documentation (README)
- No README at the repository root — newcomers have no entry point.
What to do
- Add a root README: what the system is, how to build/run it, and a map of the projects.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
P1 · CI/CD gates
- A CI pipeline exists but no test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was found — changes may merge without the suite running.
What to do
- Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`sbt test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.
P10 · Library API & versioning
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add scalafix or scapegoat (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: scalafix or scapegoat — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P6 · Release Hygiene
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
- `execute` is async and calls Await.result — a blocking call inside async code stalls the execution-context thread, and every future or fiber scheduled on it for as long as it runs. — module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/PasswordChange.scala:88
What to do
- Scala: compose the Future or effect (map/flatMap, a for-comprehension) instead of Await.result or unsafeRunSync, and wrap unavoidable blocking calls in blocking { } (Future), IO.blocking or ZIO.attemptBlocking.
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256")`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call. — module-code/app/securesocial/core/services/AvatarService.scala:60
- This repository runs an HTTP server and nothing in its Scala source or committed configuration secures the transport: no HTTPS served (akka/pekko-http `ConnectionContext.httpsServer`/`enableHttps`, an http4s builder's `withTLS`, Jetty's `SslContextFactory`, zio-http's `SSLConfig`, Play's `https.port`), no `Strict-Transport-Security` header, HSTS middleware or Play `RedirectHttpsFilter`, no `X-Forwarded-Proto` read or Play `play.http.forwarded.trustedProxies` for a TLS-terminating proxy — so its traffic may cross the network in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: REDACTED:8 — the `PlayScala` plugin.
- Set: Referrer-Policy, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies. Missing: Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security — the four headers that carry the points of this card's security-headers term (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options), 0.5 each.(−1.0 on this card.) The server: REDACTED:8 — the `PlayScala` plugin.
What to do
- Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (xxhash, murmurhash) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key.
- Secure the server's transport: serve TLS itself (akka/pekko-http `ConnectionContext.httpsServer(sslContext)` with `newServerAt(…).enableHttps(…)`, an http4s server builder's `withTLS(…)`, Play's `https.port`), or run it behind a TLS-terminating proxy and trust it (`X-Forwarded-Proto`; Play `play.http.forwarded.trustedProxies`); send `Strict-Transport-Security` once it is HTTPS-only (http4s `HSTS(…)`, Play `RedirectHttpsFilter`).
- Add Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security beside the headers the Scala server already sets.
X1 · Async correctness
X12 · Unreachable branch
X16 · Unfloored truncation loop
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped
X3 · Exception handling
X5 · Nullable reference types
- No build over this repository's 52 Scala product file(s) passes `-Yexplicit-nulls`, enables WartRemover's `Null` wart or runs Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls`, so every reference type admits null and nothing reports a `null` written into the code or returned from a Java API — the first one to reach a method call is a `NullPointerException`. `Option` by convention is a habit no tool here holds the code to.
What to do
- On Scala 3, add `-Yexplicit-nulls` to `scalacOptions` so `String` and `String | Null` mean different things, and type each Java API's result as nullable where it can return null; on Scala 2 (or as a first step), enable WartRemover's `Null` wart (`wartremoverErrors += Wart.Null`) or Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls = true` so the code holds absence in `Option`. Then pay the assertions down rather than adding to them: each `.nn` is a null the compiler could not rule out — wrap the Java value in `Option(…)` at the boundary, pattern-match on `null` once there, or change the API so the null cannot arrive; an `unsafeNulls` import switches the checking off for everything after it.
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC4 · Keyboard semantics | 2.1.1, 2.4.3 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 74% | Adequate — gated by X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 95% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 29% | Weak — gated by D34, M1, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 63% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 64% | Adequate — gated by D36 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Accessibility | 19% | Critical — gated by AC1, AC4, AC6 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Performance | 85% | Strong | Solid. |
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- X10 Duplicated predicate — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 2 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 62 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named column (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone_number, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, a MongoDB or Cassandra driver, JDBC) imported either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, JDBC, MongoDB, Cassandra, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, JDBC, MongoDB, Cassandra, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
- D10 Test Quality — ~483 lines of test source are present (.scala) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .scala suite was found but not re-run
- D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D19 Documentation Quality — No runnable or published unit to look for an example in, and no multi-project root README to look for a map in; the other documentation kinds are withheld (see the gaps), so documentation quality is not applicable here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only — this repository's production source is .java, .rb, .scala, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.scala), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 1 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 signals for this style, 2 needed — the count is met but a required primary signal is absent): 25 value object(s); 1 domain event(s); its domain events are published by services or handlers — no domain entity raises one
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 9 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P2 Observability — This repository's JVM, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby source (4 module(s), 69 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JVM, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Ruby, Scala and Java were read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Ruby request takes no token: Net::HTTP, Faraday and async-http are stopped from outside the call (Async::Task#stop, Thread#raise, Timeout), not through a parameter; a Scala request takes no token: a Future cannot be cancelled, and cats-effect, ZIO and Monix interrupt the fiber that made the request from outside the call, not through a parameter; a Java request off Android takes no token: it is cancelled through the handle it returns (Future.cancel, Call.cancel, a Disposable), ambiently (io.grpc.Context) or by interrupting its thread, not through a parameter
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Ruby was read, and it logs through none: the standard library's Logger, which Rails.logger is, takes one finished message and no template arguments or fields (as log4net does in C#), so an interpolated message there loses nothing the API could have kept. The console gem (`Console.info`), SemanticLogger, Ougai and dry-logger would be judged.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 8 finding(s)
- <img> without a text alternative docs/src/manual/source/sponsors.html.erb:16
- <img> without a text alternative docs/src/manual/source/sponsors.html.erb:31
- <img> without a text alternative module-code/app/securesocial/views/provider.scala.html:12
- <iframe> without a title docs/src/manual/source/index.html.erb:17
- <iframe> without a title docs/src/manual/source/index.html.erb:19
- <html> without a lang module-code/app/securesocial/views/mails/passwordChangedNotice.scala.html:3
- <html> without a lang module-code/app/securesocial/views/main.scala.html:5
- Document without a <title> module-code/app/securesocial/views/mails/passwordChangedNotice.scala.html:3
Serious — 79 finding(s)
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1137
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:2426
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3158
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3236
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3329
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1137
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:2426
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3158
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3236
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3329
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1137
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:2426
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3158
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3236
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.9:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3329
- <fieldset> without a <legend> module-code/app/securesocial/views/Registration/resetPasswordPage.scala.html:22
- <fieldset> without a <legend> module-code/app/securesocial/views/Registration/signUp.scala.html:21
- <fieldset> without a <legend> module-code/app/securesocial/views/Registration/startResetPassword.scala.html:22
- <fieldset> without a <legend> module-code/app/securesocial/views/Registration/startSignUp.scala.html:20
- <fieldset> without a <legend> module-code/app/securesocial/views/passwordChange.scala.html:31
- <fieldset> without a <legend> module-code/app/securesocial/views/provider.scala.html:19
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1108
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3128
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1108
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3128
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1108
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3128
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3416
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:4104
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3416
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:4104
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3416
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:4104
- Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:2345
- Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:2640
- Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3022
- Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3715
- Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:2345
- Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:2640
- TodoComment module-code/app/securesocial/core/OAuth2Provider.scala:122
- TodoComment module-code/app/securesocial/core/authenticator/IdGenerator.scala:38
- TodoComment module-code/app/securesocial/core/authenticator/IdGenerator.scala:50
- TodoComment module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/LoginApi.scala:78
- TodoComment module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/ProviderController.scala:80
- TodoComment module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/Registration.scala:66
- Page without a main landmark docs/src/manual/source/layouts/guide_layout.erb:2
- Page without a main landmark docs/src/manual/source/layouts/layout.erb:2
- Page without a main landmark module-code/app/securesocial/views/mails/passwordChangedNotice.scala.html:3
- Page without a main landmark module-code/app/securesocial/views/main.scala.html:5
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.6:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1166
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.6:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1166
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.6:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:1166
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.3:1) samples/scala/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3164
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.3:1) samples/java/demo/public/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3164
- Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.3:1) module-code/public/securesocial/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css:3164
- Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) module-code/app/securesocial/core/OAuth2Provider.scala:89
- Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) module-code/app/securesocial/core/authenticator/CookieAuthenticator.scala:150
- Heading level jumps from h2 to h4 docs/src/manual/source/index.html.erb:74
- Anchor without href docs/src/manual/source/_navbar.erb:4
- Low contrast colour pair (2.8:1) docs/src/manual/source/index.html.erb:6
- BaseProviderController.handleAuth (cognitive 31) module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/ProviderController.scala:93
- BaseRegistration.handleSignUp (cognitive 19) module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/Registration.scala:156
- BaseLoginApi.authenticate (cognitive 17) module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/LoginApi.scala:52
- OAuth1Provider.authenticate (cognitive 17) module-code/app/securesocial/core/OAuth1Provider.scala:120
- REDACTED
- Edited copies of one member (3 members, 27+ corresponding lines) module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/FacebookProvider.scala:50
- Edited copies of one member (3 members, 20+ corresponding lines) module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/GitHubProvider.scala:60
- Edited copy of a member (23 corresponding lines) module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/PasswordReset.scala:77
- Edited copy of a member (8 corresponding lines) module-code/app/securesocial/core/authenticator/CookieAuthenticator.scala:135
- Edited copy of a member (5 corresponding lines) module-code/app/securesocial/core/OAuth1Provider.scala:86
- Duplicated block (9–10 lines × 2) module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/LinkedInOAuth2Provider.scala:38
- Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/GoogleProvider.scala:52
- Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/GitHubProvider.scala:62
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/LinkedInOAuth2Provider.scala:48
- Edited copy of a member (14 corresponding lines) samples/java/demo/app/service/InMemoryUserService.java:116
- Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) samples/scala/demo/app/service/InMemoryUserService.scala:39
- No solution README
- Sync-over-async blocking module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/PasswordChange.scala:88
- Weak hash algorithm module-code/app/securesocial/core/services/AvatarService.scala:60
Minor — 55 finding(s)
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/core/OAuth2Provider.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/Registration.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/core/SecureSocial.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/core/services/RoutesService.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/ViewsPlugin.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/core/java/BaseUserService.java:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/ProviderController.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/core/OAuth1Provider.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/ConcurProvider.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/core/authenticator/CookieAuthenticator.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/core/RuntimeEnvironment.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/PasswordChange.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/PasswordReset.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/UsernamePasswordProvider.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/core/authenticator/HttpHeaderAuthenticator.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/core/authenticator/StoreBackedAuthenticator.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/utils/Mailer.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/core/authenticator/Authenticator.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/core/java/Secured.java:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/WeiboProvider.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/LoginApi.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/core/services/UserService.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/core/IdentityProvider.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/LoginPage.scala:1
- Orphaned file module-code/app/securesocial/controllers/MailTokenBasedOperations.scala:1
- Fat interface: RuntimeEnvironment (19 abstract members) module-code/app/securesocial/core/RuntimeEnvironment.scala:21
- Fat interface: RoutesService (17 abstract members) module-code/app/securesocial/core/services/RoutesService.scala:26
- No ADRs found REDACTED:8
- `callbackURL` spells `URL` where 40 names in the project spell it `Url` module-code/app/securesocial/core/OAuth1Provider.scala:38
- Dormant codebase
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- No ADRs
- No architecture diagram/doc
- CI test execution not evidenced
- No SAST
- No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected
- Security headers incomplete
- Duplicated predicate module-code/app/securesocial/core/java/Secured.java:97
- Scala's null is not held to the type system everywhere
Minor — 1 finding(s)
- Outdated: pygments.rb
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-0c4a8371d3b44c2ca52795ca01428016/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-0c4a8371d3b44c2ca52795ca01428016/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt --exclude docs/src/manual/source/javascripts --exclude module-code/public/securesocial/javascripts --exclude samples/java/demo/public/javascripts --exclude samples/scala/demo/public/javascripts . | 0 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . /tmp/codehealth-osv-sbom-16691fc0b84e4058adf65ed035bbcbca | 1 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 1 file(s) — `module-code/app/securesocial/core/providers/ConcurProvider.scala` — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover them at all. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . /tmp/codehealth-osv-sbom-16691fc0b84e4058adf65ed035bbcbca | 0 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |