Executive summary
ivan-borovets/fastapi-clean-example is rated At risk because critical security findings are open. It scores 72 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged. We judged it as a template or a sample, against a lower bar.
Every lens scores high enough to be rated Strong, so no single lens holds the score back. The best first step is adding automated security scanning, worth about 10 points. Fixing the package under a licence on your banned list comes next, worth about 5 points.
Three pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Two known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers, and one weakness in the code could be used by an attacker. Pinning each tool to an exact version, updating the vulnerable packages and fixing the weaknesses the scanner points to would close these risks. The package under a licence on your banned list needs replacing, or clearing with your legal team.
The product code is 3,350 lines, about €8,400 to rebuild.
Every lens already scores high enough to be rated Strong, so no single lens holds the score back.
New since the last survey: 2 findings
- Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/app/core/commands/deactivate_user.py
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Rebuild cost: about €8,400 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €2,800 to €14,000, for 46 to 147 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Low, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×1.1 at a score of 72. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 3,350 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 core.commands.ports.flusher | 2 core.commands.ports.transaction_manager | 3 core.common.authorization.base | 4 core.common.authorization.ports | 5 core.common.entities.types_ | 6 core.common.exceptions | 7 core.common.ports.access_revoker | 8 core.common.ports.identity_provider | 9 core.common.value_objects.base | 10 core.queries.models.user | 11 core.queries.query_support.sorting | 12 main.config.settings | 13 core.common.value_objects.raw_password | 14 core.common.value_objects.username | 15 core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime | 16 core.queries.ports.user_reader | 17 core.common.entities.user | 18 core.common.ports.password_hasher | 19 core.common.ports.utc_timer | 20 outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader | 21 outbound.auth_ctx.model | 22 core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage | 23 core.common.authorization.current_user_service | 24 core.common.authorization.permissions | 25 core.common.services.user | 26 outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor | 27 outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer | 28 core.commands.activate_user | 29 core.commands.create_user | 30 core.commands.deactivate_user | 31 core.commands.grant_admin | 32 core.commands.revoke_admin | 33 core.commands.set_user_password | 34 core.queries.list_users | 35 main.ioc.outbound | 36 outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage | 37 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up | 38 outbound.auth_ctx.service | 39 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password | 40 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 core.commands.ports.flusher | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2 core.commands.ports.transaction_manager | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3 core.common.authorization.base | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4 core.common.authorization.ports | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5 core.common.entities.types_ | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6 core.common.exceptions | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 7 core.common.ports.access_revoker | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8 core.common.ports.identity_provider | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 9 core.common.value_objects.base | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 10 core.queries.models.user | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 11 core.queries.query_support.sorting | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 12 main.config.settings | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 13 core.common.value_objects.raw_password | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 14 core.common.value_objects.username | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 15 core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 16 core.queries.ports.user_reader | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 17 core.common.entities.user | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 18 core.common.ports.password_hasher | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 19 core.common.ports.utc_timer | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20 outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21 outbound.auth_ctx.model | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22 core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 23 core.common.authorization.current_user_service | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 24 core.common.authorization.permissions | 5 | 1 | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 25 core.common.services.user | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 26 outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 27 outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 28 core.commands.activate_user | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 29 core.commands.create_user | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 30 core.commands.deactivate_user | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 31 core.commands.grant_admin | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 32 core.commands.revoke_admin | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 33 core.commands.set_user_password | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 34 core.queries.list_users | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 35 main.ioc.outbound | 6 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 36 outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 37 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 38 outbound.auth_ctx.service | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 39 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 40 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in | 1 | 1 | 1 |
13→9 core.common.value_objects.raw_password uses core.common.value_objects.base✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.value_objects.raw_password uses a type in core.common.value_objects.base.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.value_objects.raw_password.RawPassword→src.app.core.common.value_objects.base.ValueObject
- Direction
- core.common.value_objects.raw_password uses core.common.value_objects.base, so a change to core.common.value_objects.base can break core.common.value_objects.raw_password, while a change to core.common.value_objects.raw_password can't break core.common.value_objects.base.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.value_objects.raw_password uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
14→9 core.common.value_objects.username uses core.common.value_objects.base✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.value_objects.username uses a type in core.common.value_objects.base.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.value_objects.username.Username→src.app.core.common.value_objects.base.ValueObject
- Direction
- core.common.value_objects.username uses core.common.value_objects.base, so a change to core.common.value_objects.base can break core.common.value_objects.username, while a change to core.common.value_objects.username can't break core.common.value_objects.base.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.value_objects.username uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
15→9 core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime uses core.common.value_objects.base✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime uses a type in core.common.value_objects.base.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime.UtcDatetime→src.app.core.common.value_objects.base.ValueObject
- Direction
- core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime uses core.common.value_objects.base, so a change to core.common.value_objects.base can break core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime, while a change to core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime can't break core.common.value_objects.base.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
16→10 core.queries.ports.user_reader uses core.queries.models.user✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.queries.ports.user_reader uses a type in core.queries.models.user.
- The types involved
src.app.core.queries.ports.user_reader.UserReader→src.app.core.queries.models.user.ListUsersQm
- Direction
- core.queries.ports.user_reader uses core.queries.models.user, so a change to core.queries.models.user can break core.queries.ports.user_reader, while a change to core.queries.ports.user_reader can't break core.queries.models.user.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.queries.ports.user_reader uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
16→11 core.queries.ports.user_reader uses core.queries.query_support.sorting✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.queries.ports.user_reader uses a type in core.queries.query_support.sorting.
- The types involved
src.app.core.queries.ports.user_reader.UserReader→src.app.core.queries.query_support.sorting.SortingParams
- Direction
- core.queries.ports.user_reader uses core.queries.query_support.sorting, so a change to core.queries.query_support.sorting can break core.queries.ports.user_reader, while a change to core.queries.ports.user_reader can't break core.queries.query_support.sorting.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.queries.ports.user_reader uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
17→5 core.common.entities.user uses core.common.entities.types_✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.entities.user uses a type in core.common.entities.types_.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.entities.user.User→src.app.core.common.entities.types_.UserRole
- Direction
- core.common.entities.user uses core.common.entities.types_, so a change to core.common.entities.types_ can break core.common.entities.user, while a change to core.common.entities.user can't break core.common.entities.types_.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.entities.user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
17→14 core.common.entities.user uses core.common.value_objects.username✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.entities.user uses a type in core.common.value_objects.username.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.entities.user.User→src.app.core.common.value_objects.username.Username
- Direction
- core.common.entities.user uses core.common.value_objects.username, so a change to core.common.value_objects.username can break core.common.entities.user, while a change to core.common.entities.user can't break core.common.value_objects.username.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.entities.user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
17→15 core.common.entities.user uses core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.entities.user uses a type in core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.entities.user.User→src.app.core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime.UtcDatetime
- Direction
- core.common.entities.user uses core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime, so a change to core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime can break core.common.entities.user, while a change to core.common.entities.user can't break core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.entities.user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
18→13 core.common.ports.password_hasher uses core.common.value_objects.raw_password✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.ports.password_hasher uses a type in core.common.value_objects.raw_password.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.ports.password_hasher.PasswordHasher→src.app.core.common.value_objects.raw_password.RawPassword
- Direction
- core.common.ports.password_hasher uses core.common.value_objects.raw_password, so a change to core.common.value_objects.raw_password can break core.common.ports.password_hasher, while a change to core.common.ports.password_hasher can't break core.common.value_objects.raw_password.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.ports.password_hasher uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
19→15 core.common.ports.utc_timer uses core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.ports.utc_timer uses a type in core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.ports.utc_timer.UtcTimer→src.app.core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime.UtcDatetime
- Direction
- core.common.ports.utc_timer uses core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime, so a change to core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime can break core.common.ports.utc_timer, while a change to core.common.ports.utc_timer can't break core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.ports.utc_timer uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
20→10 outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader uses core.queries.models.user✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader uses a type in core.queries.models.user.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader.SqlaUserReader→src.app.core.queries.models.user.ListUsersQm
- Direction
- outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader uses core.queries.models.user, so a change to core.queries.models.user can break outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader, while a change to outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader can't break core.queries.models.user.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
20→11 outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader uses core.queries.query_support.sorting✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader uses a type in core.queries.query_support.sorting.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader.SqlaUserReader→src.app.core.queries.query_support.sorting.SortingParams
- Direction
- outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader uses core.queries.query_support.sorting, so a change to core.queries.query_support.sorting can break outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader, while a change to outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader can't break core.queries.query_support.sorting.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
20→16 outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader uses core.queries.ports.user_reader✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader uses a type in core.queries.ports.user_reader.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader.SqlaUserReader→src.app.core.queries.ports.user_reader.UserReader
- Direction
- outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader uses core.queries.ports.user_reader, so a change to core.queries.ports.user_reader can break outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader, while a change to outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader can't break core.queries.ports.user_reader.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.adapters.sqla_user_reader uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
21→15 outbound.auth_ctx.model uses core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.model uses a type in core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.model.AuthSession→src.app.core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime.UtcDatetime
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.model uses core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime, so a change to core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime can break outbound.auth_ctx.model, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.model can't break core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.model uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
22→17 core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage uses core.common.entities.user✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage uses a type in core.common.entities.user.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.UserTxStorage→src.app.core.common.entities.user.User
- Direction
- core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage uses core.common.entities.user, so a change to core.common.entities.user can break core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage, while a change to core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage can't break core.common.entities.user.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
23→4 core.common.authorization.current_user_service uses core.common.authorization.ports✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.authorization.current_user_service uses a type in core.common.authorization.ports.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.authorization.current_user_service.CurrentUserService→src.app.core.common.authorization.ports.AuthzUserFinder
- Direction
- core.common.authorization.current_user_service uses core.common.authorization.ports, so a change to core.common.authorization.ports can break core.common.authorization.current_user_service, while a change to core.common.authorization.current_user_service can't break core.common.authorization.ports.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.authorization.current_user_service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
23→7 core.common.authorization.current_user_service uses core.common.ports.access_revoker✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.authorization.current_user_service uses a type in core.common.ports.access_revoker.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.authorization.current_user_service.CurrentUserService→src.app.core.common.ports.access_revoker.AccessRevoker
- Direction
- core.common.authorization.current_user_service uses core.common.ports.access_revoker, so a change to core.common.ports.access_revoker can break core.common.authorization.current_user_service, while a change to core.common.authorization.current_user_service can't break core.common.ports.access_revoker.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.authorization.current_user_service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
23→8 core.common.authorization.current_user_service uses core.common.ports.identity_provider✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.authorization.current_user_service uses a type in core.common.ports.identity_provider.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.authorization.current_user_service.CurrentUserService→src.app.core.common.ports.identity_provider.IdentityProvider
- Direction
- core.common.authorization.current_user_service uses core.common.ports.identity_provider, so a change to core.common.ports.identity_provider can break core.common.authorization.current_user_service, while a change to core.common.authorization.current_user_service can't break core.common.ports.identity_provider.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.authorization.current_user_service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
23→17 core.common.authorization.current_user_service uses core.common.entities.user✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.authorization.current_user_service uses a type in core.common.entities.user.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.authorization.current_user_service.CurrentUserService→src.app.core.common.entities.user.User
- Direction
- core.common.authorization.current_user_service uses core.common.entities.user, so a change to core.common.entities.user can break core.common.authorization.current_user_service, while a change to core.common.authorization.current_user_service can't break core.common.entities.user.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.authorization.current_user_service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
24→3 core.common.authorization.permissions uses core.common.authorization.base✕
- Connections
- 5 pairs of types, where a type in core.common.authorization.permissions uses a type in core.common.authorization.base.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.authorization.permissions.CanManageRole→src.app.core.common.authorization.base.Permissionsrc.app.core.common.authorization.permissions.CanManageSelf→src.app.core.common.authorization.base.Permissionsrc.app.core.common.authorization.permissions.CanManageSubordinate→src.app.core.common.authorization.base.Permissionsrc.app.core.common.authorization.permissions.RoleManagementContext→src.app.core.common.authorization.base.PermissionContextsrc.app.core.common.authorization.permissions.UserManagementContext→src.app.core.common.authorization.base.PermissionContext
- Direction
- core.common.authorization.permissions uses core.common.authorization.base, so a change to core.common.authorization.base can break core.common.authorization.permissions, while a change to core.common.authorization.permissions can't break core.common.authorization.base.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.authorization.permissions uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
24→5 core.common.authorization.permissions uses core.common.entities.types_✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.authorization.permissions uses a type in core.common.entities.types_.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.authorization.permissions.RoleManagementContext→src.app.core.common.entities.types_.UserRole
- Direction
- core.common.authorization.permissions uses core.common.entities.types_, so a change to core.common.entities.types_ can break core.common.authorization.permissions, while a change to core.common.authorization.permissions can't break core.common.entities.types_.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.authorization.permissions uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
24→17 core.common.authorization.permissions uses core.common.entities.user✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in core.common.authorization.permissions uses a type in core.common.entities.user.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.authorization.permissions.RoleManagementContext→src.app.core.common.entities.user.Usersrc.app.core.common.authorization.permissions.UserManagementContext→src.app.core.common.entities.user.User
- Direction
- core.common.authorization.permissions uses core.common.entities.user, so a change to core.common.entities.user can break core.common.authorization.permissions, while a change to core.common.authorization.permissions can't break core.common.entities.user.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.authorization.permissions uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
25→5 core.common.services.user uses core.common.entities.types_✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.services.user uses a type in core.common.entities.types_.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.services.user.UserService→src.app.core.common.entities.types_.UserRole
- Direction
- core.common.services.user uses core.common.entities.types_, so a change to core.common.entities.types_ can break core.common.services.user, while a change to core.common.services.user can't break core.common.entities.types_.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.services.user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
25→13 core.common.services.user uses core.common.value_objects.raw_password✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.services.user uses a type in core.common.value_objects.raw_password.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.services.user.UserService→src.app.core.common.value_objects.raw_password.RawPassword
- Direction
- core.common.services.user uses core.common.value_objects.raw_password, so a change to core.common.value_objects.raw_password can break core.common.services.user, while a change to core.common.services.user can't break core.common.value_objects.raw_password.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.services.user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
25→14 core.common.services.user uses core.common.value_objects.username✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.services.user uses a type in core.common.value_objects.username.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.services.user.UserService→src.app.core.common.value_objects.username.Username
- Direction
- core.common.services.user uses core.common.value_objects.username, so a change to core.common.value_objects.username can break core.common.services.user, while a change to core.common.services.user can't break core.common.value_objects.username.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.services.user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
25→15 core.common.services.user uses core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.services.user uses a type in core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.services.user.UserService→src.app.core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime.UtcDatetime
- Direction
- core.common.services.user uses core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime, so a change to core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime can break core.common.services.user, while a change to core.common.services.user can't break core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.services.user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
25→17 core.common.services.user uses core.common.entities.user✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.services.user uses a type in core.common.entities.user.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.services.user.UserService→src.app.core.common.entities.user.User
- Direction
- core.common.services.user uses core.common.entities.user, so a change to core.common.entities.user can break core.common.services.user, while a change to core.common.services.user can't break core.common.entities.user.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.services.user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
25→18 core.common.services.user uses core.common.ports.password_hasher✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.common.services.user uses a type in core.common.ports.password_hasher.
- The types involved
src.app.core.common.services.user.UserService→src.app.core.common.ports.password_hasher.PasswordHasher
- Direction
- core.common.services.user uses core.common.ports.password_hasher, so a change to core.common.ports.password_hasher can break core.common.services.user, while a change to core.common.services.user can't break core.common.ports.password_hasher.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.common.services.user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
26→21 outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor uses outbound.auth_ctx.model✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor uses a type in outbound.auth_ctx.model.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor.JwtProcessor→src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.model.AuthSession
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor uses outbound.auth_ctx.model, so a change to outbound.auth_ctx.model can break outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor can't break outbound.auth_ctx.model.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
27→15 outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer uses core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer uses a type in core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer.AuthSessionUtcTimer→src.app.core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime.UtcDatetime
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer uses core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime, so a change to core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime can break outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer can't break core.common.value_objects.utc_datetime.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
27→21 outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer uses outbound.auth_ctx.model✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer uses a type in outbound.auth_ctx.model.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer.AuthSessionUtcTimer→src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.model.AuthSession
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer uses outbound.auth_ctx.model, so a change to outbound.auth_ctx.model can break outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer can't break outbound.auth_ctx.model.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
28→2 core.commands.activate_user uses core.commands.ports.transaction_manager✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.activate_user uses a type in core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.activate_user.ActivateUser→src.app.core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.TransactionManager
- Direction
- core.commands.activate_user uses core.commands.ports.transaction_manager, so a change to core.commands.ports.transaction_manager can break core.commands.activate_user, while a change to core.commands.activate_user can't break core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.activate_user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
28→19 core.commands.activate_user uses core.common.ports.utc_timer✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.activate_user uses a type in core.common.ports.utc_timer.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.activate_user.ActivateUser→src.app.core.common.ports.utc_timer.UtcTimer
- Direction
- core.commands.activate_user uses core.common.ports.utc_timer, so a change to core.common.ports.utc_timer can break core.commands.activate_user, while a change to core.commands.activate_user can't break core.common.ports.utc_timer.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.activate_user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
28→22 core.commands.activate_user uses core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.activate_user uses a type in core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.activate_user.ActivateUser→src.app.core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.UserTxStorage
- Direction
- core.commands.activate_user uses core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage, so a change to core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage can break core.commands.activate_user, while a change to core.commands.activate_user can't break core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.activate_user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
28→23 core.commands.activate_user uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.activate_user uses a type in core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.activate_user.ActivateUser→src.app.core.common.authorization.current_user_service.CurrentUserService
- Direction
- core.commands.activate_user uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service, so a change to core.common.authorization.current_user_service can break core.commands.activate_user, while a change to core.commands.activate_user can't break core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.activate_user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
28→25 core.commands.activate_user uses core.common.services.user✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.activate_user uses a type in core.common.services.user.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.activate_user.ActivateUser→src.app.core.common.services.user.UserService
- Direction
- core.commands.activate_user uses core.common.services.user, so a change to core.common.services.user can break core.commands.activate_user, while a change to core.commands.activate_user can't break core.common.services.user.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.activate_user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
29→1 core.commands.create_user uses core.commands.ports.flusher✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.create_user uses a type in core.commands.ports.flusher.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.create_user.CreateUser→src.app.core.commands.ports.flusher.Flusher
- Direction
- core.commands.create_user uses core.commands.ports.flusher, so a change to core.commands.ports.flusher can break core.commands.create_user, while a change to core.commands.create_user can't break core.commands.ports.flusher.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.create_user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
29→2 core.commands.create_user uses core.commands.ports.transaction_manager✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.create_user uses a type in core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.create_user.CreateUser→src.app.core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.TransactionManager
- Direction
- core.commands.create_user uses core.commands.ports.transaction_manager, so a change to core.commands.ports.transaction_manager can break core.commands.create_user, while a change to core.commands.create_user can't break core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.create_user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
29→19 core.commands.create_user uses core.common.ports.utc_timer✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.create_user uses a type in core.common.ports.utc_timer.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.create_user.CreateUser→src.app.core.common.ports.utc_timer.UtcTimer
- Direction
- core.commands.create_user uses core.common.ports.utc_timer, so a change to core.common.ports.utc_timer can break core.commands.create_user, while a change to core.commands.create_user can't break core.common.ports.utc_timer.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.create_user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
29→22 core.commands.create_user uses core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.create_user uses a type in core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.create_user.CreateUser→src.app.core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.UserTxStorage
- Direction
- core.commands.create_user uses core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage, so a change to core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage can break core.commands.create_user, while a change to core.commands.create_user can't break core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.create_user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
29→23 core.commands.create_user uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.create_user uses a type in core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.create_user.CreateUser→src.app.core.common.authorization.current_user_service.CurrentUserService
- Direction
- core.commands.create_user uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service, so a change to core.common.authorization.current_user_service can break core.commands.create_user, while a change to core.commands.create_user can't break core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.create_user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
29→25 core.commands.create_user uses core.common.services.user✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.create_user uses a type in core.common.services.user.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.create_user.CreateUser→src.app.core.common.services.user.UserService
- Direction
- core.commands.create_user uses core.common.services.user, so a change to core.common.services.user can break core.commands.create_user, while a change to core.commands.create_user can't break core.common.services.user.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.create_user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
30→2 core.commands.deactivate_user uses core.commands.ports.transaction_manager✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.deactivate_user uses a type in core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.deactivate_user.DeactivateUser→src.app.core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.TransactionManager
- Direction
- core.commands.deactivate_user uses core.commands.ports.transaction_manager, so a change to core.commands.ports.transaction_manager can break core.commands.deactivate_user, while a change to core.commands.deactivate_user can't break core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.deactivate_user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
30→7 core.commands.deactivate_user uses core.common.ports.access_revoker✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.deactivate_user uses a type in core.common.ports.access_revoker.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.deactivate_user.DeactivateUser→src.app.core.common.ports.access_revoker.AccessRevoker
- Direction
- core.commands.deactivate_user uses core.common.ports.access_revoker, so a change to core.common.ports.access_revoker can break core.commands.deactivate_user, while a change to core.commands.deactivate_user can't break core.common.ports.access_revoker.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.deactivate_user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
30→19 core.commands.deactivate_user uses core.common.ports.utc_timer✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.deactivate_user uses a type in core.common.ports.utc_timer.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.deactivate_user.DeactivateUser→src.app.core.common.ports.utc_timer.UtcTimer
- Direction
- core.commands.deactivate_user uses core.common.ports.utc_timer, so a change to core.common.ports.utc_timer can break core.commands.deactivate_user, while a change to core.commands.deactivate_user can't break core.common.ports.utc_timer.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.deactivate_user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
30→22 core.commands.deactivate_user uses core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.deactivate_user uses a type in core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.deactivate_user.DeactivateUser→src.app.core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.UserTxStorage
- Direction
- core.commands.deactivate_user uses core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage, so a change to core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage can break core.commands.deactivate_user, while a change to core.commands.deactivate_user can't break core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.deactivate_user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
30→23 core.commands.deactivate_user uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.deactivate_user uses a type in core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.deactivate_user.DeactivateUser→src.app.core.common.authorization.current_user_service.CurrentUserService
- Direction
- core.commands.deactivate_user uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service, so a change to core.common.authorization.current_user_service can break core.commands.deactivate_user, while a change to core.commands.deactivate_user can't break core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.deactivate_user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
30→25 core.commands.deactivate_user uses core.common.services.user✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.deactivate_user uses a type in core.common.services.user.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.deactivate_user.DeactivateUser→src.app.core.common.services.user.UserService
- Direction
- core.commands.deactivate_user uses core.common.services.user, so a change to core.common.services.user can break core.commands.deactivate_user, while a change to core.commands.deactivate_user can't break core.common.services.user.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.deactivate_user uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
31→2 core.commands.grant_admin uses core.commands.ports.transaction_manager✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.grant_admin uses a type in core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.grant_admin.GrantAdmin→src.app.core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.TransactionManager
- Direction
- core.commands.grant_admin uses core.commands.ports.transaction_manager, so a change to core.commands.ports.transaction_manager can break core.commands.grant_admin, while a change to core.commands.grant_admin can't break core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.grant_admin uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
31→19 core.commands.grant_admin uses core.common.ports.utc_timer✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.grant_admin uses a type in core.common.ports.utc_timer.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.grant_admin.GrantAdmin→src.app.core.common.ports.utc_timer.UtcTimer
- Direction
- core.commands.grant_admin uses core.common.ports.utc_timer, so a change to core.common.ports.utc_timer can break core.commands.grant_admin, while a change to core.commands.grant_admin can't break core.common.ports.utc_timer.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.grant_admin uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
31→22 core.commands.grant_admin uses core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.grant_admin uses a type in core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.grant_admin.GrantAdmin→src.app.core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.UserTxStorage
- Direction
- core.commands.grant_admin uses core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage, so a change to core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage can break core.commands.grant_admin, while a change to core.commands.grant_admin can't break core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.grant_admin uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
31→23 core.commands.grant_admin uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.grant_admin uses a type in core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.grant_admin.GrantAdmin→src.app.core.common.authorization.current_user_service.CurrentUserService
- Direction
- core.commands.grant_admin uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service, so a change to core.common.authorization.current_user_service can break core.commands.grant_admin, while a change to core.commands.grant_admin can't break core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.grant_admin uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
31→25 core.commands.grant_admin uses core.common.services.user✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.grant_admin uses a type in core.common.services.user.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.grant_admin.GrantAdmin→src.app.core.common.services.user.UserService
- Direction
- core.commands.grant_admin uses core.common.services.user, so a change to core.common.services.user can break core.commands.grant_admin, while a change to core.commands.grant_admin can't break core.common.services.user.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.grant_admin uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
32→2 core.commands.revoke_admin uses core.commands.ports.transaction_manager✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.revoke_admin uses a type in core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.revoke_admin.RevokeAdmin→src.app.core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.TransactionManager
- Direction
- core.commands.revoke_admin uses core.commands.ports.transaction_manager, so a change to core.commands.ports.transaction_manager can break core.commands.revoke_admin, while a change to core.commands.revoke_admin can't break core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.revoke_admin uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
32→19 core.commands.revoke_admin uses core.common.ports.utc_timer✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.revoke_admin uses a type in core.common.ports.utc_timer.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.revoke_admin.RevokeAdmin→src.app.core.common.ports.utc_timer.UtcTimer
- Direction
- core.commands.revoke_admin uses core.common.ports.utc_timer, so a change to core.common.ports.utc_timer can break core.commands.revoke_admin, while a change to core.commands.revoke_admin can't break core.common.ports.utc_timer.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.revoke_admin uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
32→22 core.commands.revoke_admin uses core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.revoke_admin uses a type in core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.revoke_admin.RevokeAdmin→src.app.core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.UserTxStorage
- Direction
- core.commands.revoke_admin uses core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage, so a change to core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage can break core.commands.revoke_admin, while a change to core.commands.revoke_admin can't break core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.revoke_admin uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
32→23 core.commands.revoke_admin uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.revoke_admin uses a type in core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.revoke_admin.RevokeAdmin→src.app.core.common.authorization.current_user_service.CurrentUserService
- Direction
- core.commands.revoke_admin uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service, so a change to core.common.authorization.current_user_service can break core.commands.revoke_admin, while a change to core.commands.revoke_admin can't break core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.revoke_admin uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
32→25 core.commands.revoke_admin uses core.common.services.user✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.revoke_admin uses a type in core.common.services.user.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.revoke_admin.RevokeAdmin→src.app.core.common.services.user.UserService
- Direction
- core.commands.revoke_admin uses core.common.services.user, so a change to core.common.services.user can break core.commands.revoke_admin, while a change to core.commands.revoke_admin can't break core.common.services.user.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.revoke_admin uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
33→2 core.commands.set_user_password uses core.commands.ports.transaction_manager✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.set_user_password uses a type in core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.set_user_password.SetUserPassword→src.app.core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.TransactionManager
- Direction
- core.commands.set_user_password uses core.commands.ports.transaction_manager, so a change to core.commands.ports.transaction_manager can break core.commands.set_user_password, while a change to core.commands.set_user_password can't break core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.set_user_password uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
33→7 core.commands.set_user_password uses core.common.ports.access_revoker✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.set_user_password uses a type in core.common.ports.access_revoker.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.set_user_password.SetUserPassword→src.app.core.common.ports.access_revoker.AccessRevoker
- Direction
- core.commands.set_user_password uses core.common.ports.access_revoker, so a change to core.common.ports.access_revoker can break core.commands.set_user_password, while a change to core.commands.set_user_password can't break core.common.ports.access_revoker.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.set_user_password uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
33→19 core.commands.set_user_password uses core.common.ports.utc_timer✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.set_user_password uses a type in core.common.ports.utc_timer.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.set_user_password.SetUserPassword→src.app.core.common.ports.utc_timer.UtcTimer
- Direction
- core.commands.set_user_password uses core.common.ports.utc_timer, so a change to core.common.ports.utc_timer can break core.commands.set_user_password, while a change to core.commands.set_user_password can't break core.common.ports.utc_timer.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.set_user_password uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
33→22 core.commands.set_user_password uses core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.set_user_password uses a type in core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.set_user_password.SetUserPassword→src.app.core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.UserTxStorage
- Direction
- core.commands.set_user_password uses core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage, so a change to core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage can break core.commands.set_user_password, while a change to core.commands.set_user_password can't break core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.set_user_password uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
33→23 core.commands.set_user_password uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.set_user_password uses a type in core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.set_user_password.SetUserPassword→src.app.core.common.authorization.current_user_service.CurrentUserService
- Direction
- core.commands.set_user_password uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service, so a change to core.common.authorization.current_user_service can break core.commands.set_user_password, while a change to core.commands.set_user_password can't break core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.set_user_password uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
33→25 core.commands.set_user_password uses core.common.services.user✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.commands.set_user_password uses a type in core.common.services.user.
- The types involved
src.app.core.commands.set_user_password.SetUserPassword→src.app.core.common.services.user.UserService
- Direction
- core.commands.set_user_password uses core.common.services.user, so a change to core.common.services.user can break core.commands.set_user_password, while a change to core.commands.set_user_password can't break core.common.services.user.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.commands.set_user_password uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
34→10 core.queries.list_users uses core.queries.models.user✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.queries.list_users uses a type in core.queries.models.user.
- The types involved
src.app.core.queries.list_users.ListUsers→src.app.core.queries.models.user.ListUsersQm
- Direction
- core.queries.list_users uses core.queries.models.user, so a change to core.queries.models.user can break core.queries.list_users, while a change to core.queries.list_users can't break core.queries.models.user.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.queries.list_users uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
34→11 core.queries.list_users uses core.queries.query_support.sorting✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.queries.list_users uses a type in core.queries.query_support.sorting.
- The types involved
src.app.core.queries.list_users.ListUsersRequest→src.app.core.queries.query_support.sorting.SortingOrder
- Direction
- core.queries.list_users uses core.queries.query_support.sorting, so a change to core.queries.query_support.sorting can break core.queries.list_users, while a change to core.queries.list_users can't break core.queries.query_support.sorting.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.queries.list_users uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
34→16 core.queries.list_users uses core.queries.ports.user_reader✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.queries.list_users uses a type in core.queries.ports.user_reader.
- The types involved
src.app.core.queries.list_users.ListUsers→src.app.core.queries.ports.user_reader.UserReader
- Direction
- core.queries.list_users uses core.queries.ports.user_reader, so a change to core.queries.ports.user_reader can break core.queries.list_users, while a change to core.queries.list_users can't break core.queries.ports.user_reader.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.queries.list_users uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
34→23 core.queries.list_users uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in core.queries.list_users uses a type in core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- The types involved
src.app.core.queries.list_users.ListUsers→src.app.core.common.authorization.current_user_service.CurrentUserService
- Direction
- core.queries.list_users uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service, so a change to core.common.authorization.current_user_service can break core.queries.list_users, while a change to core.queries.list_users can't break core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: core.queries.list_users uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
35→12 main.ioc.outbound uses main.config.settings✕
- Connections
- 6 pairs of types, where a type in main.ioc.outbound uses a type in main.config.settings.
- The types involved
src.app.main.ioc.outbound.AuthProvider→src.app.main.config.settings.CookieSettingssrc.app.main.ioc.outbound.AuthProvider→src.app.main.config.settings.JwtSettingssrc.app.main.ioc.outbound.AuthProvider→src.app.main.config.settings.SessionSettingssrc.app.main.ioc.outbound.HasherThreadPoolProvider→src.app.main.config.settings.PasswordHasherSettingssrc.app.main.ioc.outbound.PersistenceSqlaProvider→src.app.main.config.settings.PostgresSettingssrc.app.main.ioc.outbound.PersistenceSqlaProvider→src.app.main.config.settings.SqlaSettings
- Direction
- main.ioc.outbound uses main.config.settings, so a change to main.config.settings can break main.ioc.outbound, while a change to main.ioc.outbound can't break main.config.settings.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: main.ioc.outbound uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
35→26 main.ioc.outbound uses outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in main.ioc.outbound uses a type in outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor.
- The types involved
src.app.main.ioc.outbound.AuthProvider→src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor.JwtProcessor
- Direction
- main.ioc.outbound uses outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor, so a change to outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor can break main.ioc.outbound, while a change to main.ioc.outbound can't break outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: main.ioc.outbound uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
35→27 main.ioc.outbound uses outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in main.ioc.outbound uses a type in outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer.
- The types involved
src.app.main.ioc.outbound.AuthProvider→src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer.AuthSessionUtcTimer
- Direction
- main.ioc.outbound uses outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer, so a change to outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer can break main.ioc.outbound, while a change to main.ioc.outbound can't break outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: main.ioc.outbound uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
36→4 outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage uses core.common.authorization.ports✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage uses a type in core.common.authorization.ports.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage.SqlaUserTxStorage→src.app.core.common.authorization.ports.AuthzUserFinder
- Direction
- outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage uses core.common.authorization.ports, so a change to core.common.authorization.ports can break outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage, while a change to outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage can't break core.common.authorization.ports.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
36→17 outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage uses core.common.entities.user✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage uses a type in core.common.entities.user.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage.SqlaUserTxStorage→src.app.core.common.entities.user.User
- Direction
- outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage uses core.common.entities.user, so a change to core.common.entities.user can break outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage, while a change to outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage can't break core.common.entities.user.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
36→22 outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage uses core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage uses a type in core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage.SqlaUserTxStorage→src.app.core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.UserTxStorage
- Direction
- outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage uses core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage, so a change to core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage can break outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage, while a change to outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage can't break core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.adapters.sqla_user_tx_storage uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
37→1 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses core.commands.ports.flusher✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses a type in core.commands.ports.flusher.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up.SignUp→src.app.core.commands.ports.flusher.Flusher
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses core.commands.ports.flusher, so a change to core.commands.ports.flusher can break outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up can't break core.commands.ports.flusher.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
37→2 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses core.commands.ports.transaction_manager✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses a type in core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up.SignUp→src.app.core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.TransactionManager
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses core.commands.ports.transaction_manager, so a change to core.commands.ports.transaction_manager can break outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up can't break core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
37→19 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses core.common.ports.utc_timer✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses a type in core.common.ports.utc_timer.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up.SignUp→src.app.core.common.ports.utc_timer.UtcTimer
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses core.common.ports.utc_timer, so a change to core.common.ports.utc_timer can break outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up can't break core.common.ports.utc_timer.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
37→22 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses a type in core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up.SignUp→src.app.core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.UserTxStorage
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage, so a change to core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage can break outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up can't break core.commands.ports.user_tx_storage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
37→23 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses a type in core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up.SignUp→src.app.core.common.authorization.current_user_service.CurrentUserService
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service, so a change to core.common.authorization.current_user_service can break outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up can't break core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
37→25 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses core.common.services.user✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses a type in core.common.services.user.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up.SignUp→src.app.core.common.services.user.UserService
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses core.common.services.user, so a change to core.common.services.user can break outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up can't break core.common.services.user.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.sign_up uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
38→26 outbound.auth_ctx.service uses outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.service uses a type in outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.service.AuthService→src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor.JwtProcessor
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.service uses outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor, so a change to outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor can break outbound.auth_ctx.service, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.service can't break outbound.auth_ctx.jwt_processor.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
38→27 outbound.auth_ctx.service uses outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.service uses a type in outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.service.AuthService→src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer.AuthSessionUtcTimer
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.service uses outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer, so a change to outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer can break outbound.auth_ctx.service, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.service can't break outbound.auth_ctx.utc_timer.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
39→2 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses core.commands.ports.transaction_manager✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses a type in core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password.ChangePassword→src.app.core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.TransactionManager
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses core.commands.ports.transaction_manager, so a change to core.commands.ports.transaction_manager can break outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password can't break core.commands.ports.transaction_manager.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
39→19 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses core.common.ports.utc_timer✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses a type in core.common.ports.utc_timer.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password.ChangePassword→src.app.core.common.ports.utc_timer.UtcTimer
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses core.common.ports.utc_timer, so a change to core.common.ports.utc_timer can break outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password can't break core.common.ports.utc_timer.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
39→23 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses a type in core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password.ChangePassword→src.app.core.common.authorization.current_user_service.CurrentUserService
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service, so a change to core.common.authorization.current_user_service can break outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password can't break core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
39→25 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses core.common.services.user✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses a type in core.common.services.user.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password.ChangePassword→src.app.core.common.services.user.UserService
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses core.common.services.user, so a change to core.common.services.user can break outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password can't break core.common.services.user.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
39→38 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses outbound.auth_ctx.service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses a type in outbound.auth_ctx.service.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password.ChangePassword→src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.service.AuthService
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses outbound.auth_ctx.service, so a change to outbound.auth_ctx.service can break outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password can't break outbound.auth_ctx.service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.change_password uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
40→23 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in uses a type in core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in.LogIn→src.app.core.common.authorization.current_user_service.CurrentUserService
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in uses core.common.authorization.current_user_service, so a change to core.common.authorization.current_user_service can break outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in can't break core.common.authorization.current_user_service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
40→25 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in uses core.common.services.user✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in uses a type in core.common.services.user.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in.LogIn→src.app.core.common.services.user.UserService
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in uses core.common.services.user, so a change to core.common.services.user can break outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in can't break core.common.services.user.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
40→38 outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in uses outbound.auth_ctx.service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in uses a type in outbound.auth_ctx.service.
- The types involved
src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in.LogIn→src.app.outbound.auth_ctx.service.AuthService
- Direction
- outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in uses outbound.auth_ctx.service, so a change to outbound.auth_ctx.service can break outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in, while a change to outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in can't break outbound.auth_ctx.service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: outbound.auth_ctx.handlers.log_in uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2025 — Injection | 4 | High / Critical |
| A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration | 3 | Medium |
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 2 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing; Resolve the 1 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance; Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +9.8 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Resolve the 1 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance. | +4.6 pts | Low | License Compliance |
| Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release. | +3.6 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Name the access rules — DRF permission classes, django-guardian or django-rules permissions, a casbin or oso policy, or roles and permissions declared once — and consult them where access is checked (permission_classes, @permission_required, Depends), so the rule set is reviewable and testable on its own. | +2.2 pts | Medium | Access Controls |
| Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. | +0.8 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Resolve the 1 Critical vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. | +0.8 pts | Low | Dependency Vulnerabilities |
| Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. | +0.8 pts | Low | Dependency Vulnerabilities |
| Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite. | +1.1 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 3.0 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.8 | Mixed | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical vulnerability: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Near-clean | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED |
| src/app/core/commands/activate_user.py | 7.4 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Members sharing a duplicated core (4 members, 50+ identical tokens) |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED |
| src/app/core/commands/grant_admin.py | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (28 lines × 2) |
| src/app/outbound/adapters/sqla_transaction_manager.py | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) |
| src/app/core/commands/deactivate_user.py | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) |
| src/app/core/commands/create_user.py | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 54 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 54 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 18 of 25 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT READ here — but this repository measures it: a coverage step in CI (`coverage report`) shows that coverage is collected and tracked in your own CI. The built-in collector has no runner for this ecosystem (.py), so the analyzer could not read the number — a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not an unmeasured repo. Not scored. To have the real number read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (`coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Git history depth insufficient — this repository has 3 commit(s), too few for a reliable trend signal. The clone is complete, so there is no deeper history to fetch: the signal returns as the project accumulates history.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable (1 contributor(s) across 3 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). Concentration needs a team to concentrate: with one contributor there is nobody to spread the knowledge to, so there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's deterministic naming rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. Until then its declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether its names are consistent.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22's deterministic call-shape rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. This says nothing about whether that surface is consistent.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `src/app/core/common/authorization/authorize.py`, `src/app/core/common/authorization/base.py`, `src/app/core/common/authorization/composite.py`, `src/app/core/common/entities/base.py`, `src/app/core/common/sentinels.py`, … (+4 more) produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Too few commits to judge knowledge freshness (3 commit(s) sampled).
- D35 Change Coupling — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Git history depth insufficient — this repository has 3 commit(s), too few for a reliable change-coupling signal. The clone is complete, so there is no deeper history to fetch: the signal returns as the project accumulates history.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection registrations in C# and Spring beans in Java/Kotlin only, and this repository's container is dishka, whose lifetimes are not modelled yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (REDACTED). compose up failed (exit 15 — the compose project is invalid) — error while interpolating services.db_pg.environment.POSTGRES_DB: required variable POSTGRES_DB is missing a value; runtime evidence skipped.
- C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and no C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby or Scala was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and no C#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby or Scala was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala or PHP was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript (Vue and Svelte components included), Java, Rust, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Rust, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and MSBuild project configuration, TypeScript source and its tsconfig files, Java source and its package and module declarations, PHP source and its PHPStan and Psalm configuration, Dart source and its pubspec language version, Ruby source and its Sorbet and Steep configuration, Scala source and its build's explicit-nulls, WartRemover and Scalafix settings, and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded, no TypeScript was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — we run the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
6 duplicated block group(s) detected. One further row reports members as variants of one another; it aggregates block groups already counted above and is not itself counted.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (28 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with activate_user.py, grant_admin.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with deactivate_user.py, create_user.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Members sharing a duplicated core (4 members, 50+ identical tokens) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with activate_user.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 8 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D9 · Test Distribution
217 test methods: 136 unit, 81 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The Python suite contributes 217 test function(s) across 33 file(s) declaring at least one — every `def test…` in a file pytest or unittest would collect, which is those frameworks' own definition of a case; a parametrize table counts once, so this is a floor. Its tier split is read from file names and paths only.
D11 · Test Reliability
0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). Python (repository root, 33 test files): measured (0 flaky).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
3 outdated, 0 yanked pinned Python distributions. Only EXACT pins are graded for currency: a floor or a range already installs the newest release it admits, so reporting one would report this repository for being current. Whether a deliberate upper cap has itself gone stale is a different and weaker question, and is not asked. Whether any distribution is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — PyPI publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Lockfiles are not read (poetry.lock, REDACTED, Pipfile.lock, pdm.lock), so a lock-resolved install is outside this verdict. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
1 of 22 shipped Python distribution(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from PyPI over the distributions a consumer installs — this repository's 6 declared runtime requirement(s) closed transitively over each distribution's published `requires_dist` (16 reached that way). Requirements it states ONLY under an extra, a PEP 735 dependency group, a Poetry dev group or a dev-named requirements file are excluded: pip does not install any of them for a consumer. ★ This repository commits no dependency lockfile that this pass reads, so each licence is the one PyPI publishes for the distribution's CURRENT release rather than for a pinned version. This repository publishes itself under MIT, which is its own choice and is not judged here.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted task-comment markers across 3350 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 1 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 2 build units (Python) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D27 · Navigability
94 % of calls cross a namespace and 12 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low. 3 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 10 file(s) — `scripts/makefile/migration.sh` (line 11, line 12, line 13), `src/app/core/common/authorization/authorize.py` (line 5), `src/app/core/common/authorization/base.py` (line 11), `src/app/core/common/authorization/composite.py` (line 4), `src/app/core/common/entities/base.py` (line 5), … (+5 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 3 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
2 finding(s): 1 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Critical vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D31 · IaC & Container Security
3 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 1 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 6 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX5 · Architecture & structure
C2 · Access Controls
- Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect.
What to do
- Name the access rules — DRF permission classes, django-guardian or django-rules permissions, a casbin or oso policy, or roles and permissions declared once — and consult them where access is checked (permission_classes, @permission_required, Depends), so the rule set is reviewable and testable on its own.
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
M3 · Folder & project structure
P1 · CI/CD gates
P10 · Library API & versioning
P2 · Observability
What to do
- Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (opentelemetry-sdk) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:3
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
P8 · Schema migrations
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
X1 · Async correctness
X12 · Unreachable branch
X13 · Undrained process stream
X14 · Bypassable address classification
X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader
X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document
X19 · Unrestored process-global state
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X22 · Contradicted release guard
X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped
X25 · Inert configuration knob
X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff
X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard
X3 · Exception handling
X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects
X4 · Structured logging
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 100% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 87% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 86% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Readiness | 57% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 81% | Strong | Solid. |
| Performance | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — 1 observation(s) recorded · The CI pipeline publishes no artifact — no package publish, container push or release with files to download. Supply-chain provenance, signing and an SBOM describe a PUBLISHED artifact for the people who obtain it, so there is nothing to attest here; a deployment of the service itself publishes nothing for anyone else to verify. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts publishing artifacts (a package, a container image, or a release with downloadable files). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (an audit-log table or model — a class or table named for it — django-simple-history, django-auditlog, django-reversion, django-pghistory or SQLAlchemy-Continuum recording each change, or an event-sourced store beside one) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
- C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 61 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — No container singleton was found, so there is no shared instance for concurrent requests to race on. No function in this Python code is served by a threaded web framework (a Flask, Bottle or FastAPI route, a Django or Pyramid view), so no module is shared between request threads.
- AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a transaction-script/CRUD architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 15 — the compose project is invalid) — error while interpolating services.db_pg.environment.POSTGRES_DB: required variable POSTGRES_DB is missing a value; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~3324 lines of test source are present (.py) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D16 Bus Factor — single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
- D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency is measured on C# and TypeScript only; Python not measured.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — API consistency is measured on C# only; the exposed Python surface was not measured.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only — this repository's production source is .py, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 9 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — too few commits to judge knowledge freshness
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this Python build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (14 value object(s))
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 1 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HTTP client call or construction in the Python source (service entry point: src/app/outbound/auth_ctx/cookie_manager.py:2 ())
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for a pytest-benchmark or pytest-codspeed dependency with tests taking the `benchmark` fixture, an asv.conf.json with its `time_`/`mem_`/`peakmem_` benchmarks, or a pyperf Runner, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Python was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Python request takes no token: asyncio cancels the task and trio or anyio the scope that made it, from outside the call, and requests, httpx, aiohttp and gRPC take a timeout, not a cancellation
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 7 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Banned license: psycopg
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
Serious — 10 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Duplicated block (28 lines × 2) src/app/core/commands/activate_user.py:50
- Duplicated block (28 lines × 2) src/app/core/commands/grant_admin.py:50
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/app/core/commands/deactivate_user.py:47
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/app/core/commands/create_user.py:58
- REDACTED
- Members sharing a duplicated core (4 members, 50+ identical tokens) src/app/core/commands/activate_user.py:50
- Duplicated block (17 lines × 4) src/app/core/commands/activate_user.py:58
- Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/app/outbound/adapters/sqla_transaction_manager.py:18
Minor — 5 finding(s)
- No named authorization policies
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- No SAST REDACTED:3
- No changelog
Minor — 3 finding(s)
- Outdated: alembic
- Outdated: fastapi
- Outdated: psycopg
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-ec00d263a7d3438e91d2a3d0f5415106/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-ec00d263a7d3438e91d2a3d0f5415106/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 4 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 2 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 3 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 9 file(s) — `src/app/core/common/authorization/authorize.py`, `src/app/core/common/authorization/base.py`, `src/app/core/common/authorization/composite.py`, `src/app/core/common/entities/base.py`, `src/app/core/common/sentinels.py`, … (+4 more) — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 0 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |