Executive summary
hnjaman/complete-microservice-application is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, most of them in the packages it uses. Its score is held back because we found no working pipeline that builds or tests changes to the code and no automated security scanning of the code, its secrets or its dependencies. It scores 40 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged.
Production Readiness, at 25, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first steps are adding an automated build and test pipeline and adding automated security scanning, each worth about 5 points. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 53.
Eighty known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Two passwords or keys are open to anyone who can read the repository, and two weaknesses in the code could be used by an attacker. Updating the vulnerable packages, replacing each exposed password or key and fixing the weaknesses the scanner points to would close these risks. The image with no text description needs a text description.
The product code is 1,300 lines, about €1,200 to rebuild.
If Production Readiness rose from 25 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 40 to about 53.
New since the last survey: 6 findings
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Fixed since the last survey: 16 findings
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Forms & labels · <input> without a programmatic label microservice-ui/src/app/store/discount.component.html
- Forms & labels · <input> without a programmatic label microservice-ui/src/app/store/discount.component.html
- Forms & labels · <input> without a programmatic label microservice-ui/src/app/store/price.component.html
- Forms & labels · <input> without a programmatic label microservice-ui/src/app/store/price.component.html
- Forms & labels · <input> without a programmatic label microservice-ui/src/app/store/product.component.html
- Forms & labels · <input> without a programmatic label microservice-ui/src/app/store/product.component.html
- Forms & labels · <input> without a programmatic label microservice-ui/src/app/store/product.component.html
- Forms & labels · <input> without a programmatic label microservice-ui/src/app/store/product.component.html
Rebuild cost: about €1,200 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €400 to €2,000, for 7 to 21 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.7 at a score of 40. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Very small: 1,300 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 com.hnj.apigateway | 2 com.hnj.apigateway.config | 3 com.hnj.apigateway.config.fallback | 4 com.hnj.offer | 5 com.hnj.offer.configuration | 6 com.hnj.offer.event | 7 com.hnj.offer.model | 8 com.hnj.offer.model.request | 9 com.hnj.product | 10 com.hnj.product.configuration | 11 com.hnj.product.model | 12 com.hnj.product.model.request | 13 com.hnj.serviceregistry | 14 microservice-ui | 15 microservice-ui.src | 16 microservice-ui.src.app.app-routing_module | 17 microservice-ui.src.app.app_component | 18 microservice-ui.src.app.app_module | 19 microservice-ui.src.app.model.model_module | 20 microservice-ui.src.app.model.offer_model | 21 microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_model | 22 microservice-ui.src.app.model.static_datasource | 23 microservice-ui.src.app.rest_service | 24 microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_module | 25 com.hnj.offer.repository | 26 com.hnj.offer.service | 27 com.hnj.product.repository | 28 com.hnj.product.service | 29 microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository | 30 com.hnj.offer.controller | 31 com.hnj.offer.service.impl | 32 com.hnj.product.controller | 33 com.hnj.product.event | 34 com.hnj.product.service.impl | 35 microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 com.hnj.apigateway | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2 com.hnj.apigateway.config | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3 com.hnj.apigateway.config.fallback | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4 com.hnj.offer | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5 com.hnj.offer.configuration | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6 com.hnj.offer.event | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 7 com.hnj.offer.model | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8 com.hnj.offer.model.request | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 9 com.hnj.product | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 10 com.hnj.product.configuration | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 11 com.hnj.product.model | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 12 com.hnj.product.model.request | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 13 com.hnj.serviceregistry | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 14 microservice-ui | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 15 microservice-ui.src | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 16 microservice-ui.src.app.app-routing_module | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 17 microservice-ui.src.app.app_component | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 18 microservice-ui.src.app.app_module | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 19 microservice-ui.src.app.model.model_module | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20 microservice-ui.src.app.model.offer_model | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21 microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_model | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22 microservice-ui.src.app.model.static_datasource | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 23 microservice-ui.src.app.rest_service | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 24 microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_module | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 25 com.hnj.offer.repository | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 26 com.hnj.offer.service | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 27 com.hnj.product.repository | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 28 com.hnj.product.service | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 29 microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 30 com.hnj.offer.controller | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 31 com.hnj.offer.service.impl | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 32 com.hnj.product.controller | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 33 com.hnj.product.event | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 34 com.hnj.product.service.impl | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 35 microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
25→7 com.hnj.offer.repository uses com.hnj.offer.model✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.offer.repository uses a type in com.hnj.offer.model.
- The types involved
com.hnj.offer.repository.OfferRepository→com.hnj.offer.model.Offer
- Direction
- com.hnj.offer.repository uses com.hnj.offer.model, so a change to com.hnj.offer.model can break com.hnj.offer.repository, while a change to com.hnj.offer.repository can't break com.hnj.offer.model.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.offer.repository uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
26→7 com.hnj.offer.service uses com.hnj.offer.model✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.offer.service uses a type in com.hnj.offer.model.
- The types involved
com.hnj.offer.service.OfferService→com.hnj.offer.model.Offer
- Direction
- com.hnj.offer.service uses com.hnj.offer.model, so a change to com.hnj.offer.model can break com.hnj.offer.service, while a change to com.hnj.offer.service can't break com.hnj.offer.model.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.offer.service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
26→8 com.hnj.offer.service uses com.hnj.offer.model.request✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.offer.service uses a type in com.hnj.offer.model.request.
- The types involved
com.hnj.offer.service.OfferService→com.hnj.offer.model.request.OfferRequest
- Direction
- com.hnj.offer.service uses com.hnj.offer.model.request, so a change to com.hnj.offer.model.request can break com.hnj.offer.service, while a change to com.hnj.offer.service can't break com.hnj.offer.model.request.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.offer.service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
27→11 com.hnj.product.repository uses com.hnj.product.model✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.product.repository uses a type in com.hnj.product.model.
- The types involved
com.hnj.product.repository.ProductRepository→com.hnj.product.model.Product
- Direction
- com.hnj.product.repository uses com.hnj.product.model, so a change to com.hnj.product.model can break com.hnj.product.repository, while a change to com.hnj.product.repository can't break com.hnj.product.model.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.product.repository uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
28→11 com.hnj.product.service uses com.hnj.product.model✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.product.service uses a type in com.hnj.product.model.
- The types involved
com.hnj.product.service.ProductService→com.hnj.product.model.Product
- Direction
- com.hnj.product.service uses com.hnj.product.model, so a change to com.hnj.product.model can break com.hnj.product.service, while a change to com.hnj.product.service can't break com.hnj.product.model.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.product.service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
28→12 com.hnj.product.service uses com.hnj.product.model.request✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.product.service uses a type in com.hnj.product.model.request.
- The types involved
com.hnj.product.service.ProductService→com.hnj.product.model.request.ProductRequest
- Direction
- com.hnj.product.service uses com.hnj.product.model.request, so a change to com.hnj.product.model.request can break com.hnj.product.service, while a change to com.hnj.product.service can't break com.hnj.product.model.request.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.product.service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
29→21 microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository uses microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_model✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository uses a type in microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_model.
- The types involved
microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository.ProductRepository→microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_model.Product
- Direction
- microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository uses microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_model, so a change to microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_model can break microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository, while a change to microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository can't break microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_model.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
29→22 microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository uses microservice-ui.src.app.model.static_datasource✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository uses a type in microservice-ui.src.app.model.static_datasource.
- The types involved
microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository.ProductRepository→microservice-ui.src.app.model.static_datasource.StaticDataSource
- Direction
- microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository uses microservice-ui.src.app.model.static_datasource, so a change to microservice-ui.src.app.model.static_datasource can break microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository, while a change to microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository can't break microservice-ui.src.app.model.static_datasource.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
30→7 com.hnj.offer.controller uses com.hnj.offer.model✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.offer.controller uses a type in com.hnj.offer.model.
- The types involved
com.hnj.offer.controller.OfferController→com.hnj.offer.model.Offer
- Direction
- com.hnj.offer.controller uses com.hnj.offer.model, so a change to com.hnj.offer.model can break com.hnj.offer.controller, while a change to com.hnj.offer.controller can't break com.hnj.offer.model.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.offer.controller uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
30→8 com.hnj.offer.controller uses com.hnj.offer.model.request✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.offer.controller uses a type in com.hnj.offer.model.request.
- The types involved
com.hnj.offer.controller.OfferController→com.hnj.offer.model.request.OfferRequest
- Direction
- com.hnj.offer.controller uses com.hnj.offer.model.request, so a change to com.hnj.offer.model.request can break com.hnj.offer.controller, while a change to com.hnj.offer.controller can't break com.hnj.offer.model.request.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.offer.controller uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
30→26 com.hnj.offer.controller uses com.hnj.offer.service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.offer.controller uses a type in com.hnj.offer.service.
- The types involved
com.hnj.offer.controller.OfferController→com.hnj.offer.service.OfferService
- Direction
- com.hnj.offer.controller uses com.hnj.offer.service, so a change to com.hnj.offer.service can break com.hnj.offer.controller, while a change to com.hnj.offer.controller can't break com.hnj.offer.service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.offer.controller uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
31→6 com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses com.hnj.offer.event✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses a type in com.hnj.offer.event.
- The types involved
com.hnj.offer.service.impl.OfferServiceImpl→com.hnj.offer.event.EventDispatcher
- Direction
- com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses com.hnj.offer.event, so a change to com.hnj.offer.event can break com.hnj.offer.service.impl, while a change to com.hnj.offer.service.impl can't break com.hnj.offer.event.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
31→7 com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses com.hnj.offer.model✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses a type in com.hnj.offer.model.
- The types involved
com.hnj.offer.service.impl.OfferServiceImpl→com.hnj.offer.model.Offer
- Direction
- com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses com.hnj.offer.model, so a change to com.hnj.offer.model can break com.hnj.offer.service.impl, while a change to com.hnj.offer.service.impl can't break com.hnj.offer.model.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
31→8 com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses com.hnj.offer.model.request✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses a type in com.hnj.offer.model.request.
- The types involved
com.hnj.offer.service.impl.OfferServiceImpl→com.hnj.offer.model.request.OfferRequest
- Direction
- com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses com.hnj.offer.model.request, so a change to com.hnj.offer.model.request can break com.hnj.offer.service.impl, while a change to com.hnj.offer.service.impl can't break com.hnj.offer.model.request.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
31→25 com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses com.hnj.offer.repository✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses a type in com.hnj.offer.repository.
- The types involved
com.hnj.offer.service.impl.OfferServiceImpl→com.hnj.offer.repository.OfferRepository
- Direction
- com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses com.hnj.offer.repository, so a change to com.hnj.offer.repository can break com.hnj.offer.service.impl, while a change to com.hnj.offer.service.impl can't break com.hnj.offer.repository.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
31→26 com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses com.hnj.offer.service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses a type in com.hnj.offer.service.
- The types involved
com.hnj.offer.service.impl.OfferServiceImpl→com.hnj.offer.service.OfferService
- Direction
- com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses com.hnj.offer.service, so a change to com.hnj.offer.service can break com.hnj.offer.service.impl, while a change to com.hnj.offer.service.impl can't break com.hnj.offer.service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.offer.service.impl uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
32→11 com.hnj.product.controller uses com.hnj.product.model✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.product.controller uses a type in com.hnj.product.model.
- The types involved
com.hnj.product.controller.ProductController→com.hnj.product.model.Product
- Direction
- com.hnj.product.controller uses com.hnj.product.model, so a change to com.hnj.product.model can break com.hnj.product.controller, while a change to com.hnj.product.controller can't break com.hnj.product.model.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.product.controller uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
32→12 com.hnj.product.controller uses com.hnj.product.model.request✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.product.controller uses a type in com.hnj.product.model.request.
- The types involved
com.hnj.product.controller.ProductController→com.hnj.product.model.request.ProductRequest
- Direction
- com.hnj.product.controller uses com.hnj.product.model.request, so a change to com.hnj.product.model.request can break com.hnj.product.controller, while a change to com.hnj.product.controller can't break com.hnj.product.model.request.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.product.controller uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
32→28 com.hnj.product.controller uses com.hnj.product.service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.product.controller uses a type in com.hnj.product.service.
- The types involved
com.hnj.product.controller.ProductController→com.hnj.product.service.ProductService
- Direction
- com.hnj.product.controller uses com.hnj.product.service, so a change to com.hnj.product.service can break com.hnj.product.controller, while a change to com.hnj.product.controller can't break com.hnj.product.service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.product.controller uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
33→28 com.hnj.product.event uses com.hnj.product.service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.product.event uses a type in com.hnj.product.service.
- The types involved
com.hnj.product.event.EventHandler→com.hnj.product.service.ProductService
- Direction
- com.hnj.product.event uses com.hnj.product.service, so a change to com.hnj.product.service can break com.hnj.product.event, while a change to com.hnj.product.event can't break com.hnj.product.service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.product.event uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
34→11 com.hnj.product.service.impl uses com.hnj.product.model✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.product.service.impl uses a type in com.hnj.product.model.
- The types involved
com.hnj.product.service.impl.ProductServiceImpl→com.hnj.product.model.Product
- Direction
- com.hnj.product.service.impl uses com.hnj.product.model, so a change to com.hnj.product.model can break com.hnj.product.service.impl, while a change to com.hnj.product.service.impl can't break com.hnj.product.model.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.product.service.impl uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
34→12 com.hnj.product.service.impl uses com.hnj.product.model.request✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.product.service.impl uses a type in com.hnj.product.model.request.
- The types involved
com.hnj.product.service.impl.ProductServiceImpl→com.hnj.product.model.request.ProductRequest
- Direction
- com.hnj.product.service.impl uses com.hnj.product.model.request, so a change to com.hnj.product.model.request can break com.hnj.product.service.impl, while a change to com.hnj.product.service.impl can't break com.hnj.product.model.request.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.product.service.impl uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
34→27 com.hnj.product.service.impl uses com.hnj.product.repository✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.product.service.impl uses a type in com.hnj.product.repository.
- The types involved
com.hnj.product.service.impl.ProductServiceImpl→com.hnj.product.repository.ProductRepository
- Direction
- com.hnj.product.service.impl uses com.hnj.product.repository, so a change to com.hnj.product.repository can break com.hnj.product.service.impl, while a change to com.hnj.product.service.impl can't break com.hnj.product.repository.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.product.service.impl uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
34→28 com.hnj.product.service.impl uses com.hnj.product.service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.hnj.product.service.impl uses a type in com.hnj.product.service.
- The types involved
com.hnj.product.service.impl.ProductServiceImpl→com.hnj.product.service.ProductService
- Direction
- com.hnj.product.service.impl uses com.hnj.product.service, so a change to com.hnj.product.service can break com.hnj.product.service.impl, while a change to com.hnj.product.service.impl can't break com.hnj.product.service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.hnj.product.service.impl uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
35→20 microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component uses microservice-ui.src.app.model.offer_model✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component uses a type in microservice-ui.src.app.model.offer_model.
- The types involved
microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component.ConfirmationDialog→microservice-ui.src.app.model.offer_model.Offer
- Direction
- microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component uses microservice-ui.src.app.model.offer_model, so a change to microservice-ui.src.app.model.offer_model can break microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component, while a change to microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component can't break microservice-ui.src.app.model.offer_model.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
35→21 microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component uses microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_model✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component uses a type in microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_model.
- The types involved
microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component.ConfirmationDialog→microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_model.Productmicroservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component.PriceDialog→microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_model.Productmicroservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component.ProductDialog→microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_model.Product
- Direction
- microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component uses microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_model, so a change to microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_model can break microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component, while a change to microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component can't break microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_model.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
35→23 microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component uses microservice-ui.src.app.rest_service✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component uses a type in microservice-ui.src.app.rest_service.
- The types involved
microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component.ConfirmationDialog→microservice-ui.src.app.rest_service.RestServicemicroservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component.PriceDialog→microservice-ui.src.app.rest_service.RestServicemicroservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component.ProductDialog→microservice-ui.src.app.rest_service.RestService
- Direction
- microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component uses microservice-ui.src.app.rest_service, so a change to microservice-ui.src.app.rest_service can break microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component, while a change to microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component can't break microservice-ui.src.app.rest_service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
35→29 microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component uses microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component uses a type in microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository.
- The types involved
microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component.StoreComponent→microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository.ProductRepository
- Direction
- microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component uses microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository, so a change to microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository can break microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component, while a change to microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component can't break microservice-ui.src.app.model.product_repository.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: microservice-ui.src.app.store.store_component uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Accessibility
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 118 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 4 | High / Critical |
| A07:2025 — Authentication Failures | 3 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR; Run what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing; Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +4.8 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Run what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +4.8 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +4.1 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video. | +3.9 pts | Medium | Text alternatives |
| Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href. | +3.9 pts | Medium | Keyboard semantics |
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. | +1.5 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Replace Hibernate ddl-auto with Flyway or Liquibase, with `ddl-auto` set to `validate` so the production schema can evolve safely and reproducibly. | +2.5 pts | Medium | Schema migrations |
| Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add @angular-eslint/eslint-plugin-template (a11y rules), then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI. | +2.2 pts | Medium | A11y enforcement |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 4.0 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): High secret: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): High secret: REDACTED |
| microservice-ui/src/app/rest.service.ts | 7.3 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| api-gateway/pom.xml | 7.9 | Mixed | Platform End-of-Life: End-of-life framework: Spring Boot 2 |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 76 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 76 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 163 of 175 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — the JavaScript/TypeScript suite(s) run through a browser-driven runner the coverage collector does not drive — microservice-ui/ (karma) — a gap in the analyzer, not something this repository is missing. Coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo. In the meantime, commit (or publish into the working tree) the lcov/Cobertura report your CI produces and the real number is read on the next scan. You can widen what we reach: optional: commit the lcov/Cobertura report your CI produces, and the real number is read on the next scan.
- D9 Test Distribution — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test distribution NOT SCORED: this repository's production source spans more than one ecosystem, and the test-pyramid census cannot read the .java test suite(s) — so the pyramid was not measured for the repository as a whole. The suites we could count came back with 4 test method(s) (3 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 1 e2e), but that is a shape for one part of the product and we do not publish a partial pyramid as if it were complete. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — test distribution is excluded from the score rather than counted.
- D10 Test Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 4 test(s) behind this row are the ones the JavaScript/TypeScript census could read, and this repository also carries at least 4 test source file(s) (.java) that it cannot: it reads JavaScript/TypeScript test declarations off disk, so a JUnit/pytest-style suite is invisible to it. Skipped tests, zero-assertion tests and the other quality signals on this row are UNMEASURED in that suite — their absence from the counts above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that those tests are sound.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.java, .ts, .js) and this repository declares a JVM test suite (4 builds), but it was not re-run: the analyzer environment could not run it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored — 4 Maven/Gradle manifest(s) were read, stating a version for 7 dependency(ies) and leaving 21 to a parent or an imported BOM, but no build resolved the dependency graph, so the outdated signal was not established. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its JVM dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable (1 contributor(s) across 37 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). Concentration needs a team to concentrate: with one contributor there is nobody to spread the knowledge to, so there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's deterministic naming rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. Until then its declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether its names are consistent.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict. For npm the surface is what a published package.json's entry points (exports, main, module, types) export, followed through the source; an entry that names build output the tree does not commit (dist/, build/) is not followed back to source, because only a tsconfig outDir/rootDir pair states that mapping and a bundler's input lives in executable configuration this engine does not evaluate.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
- D27 Navigability — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites, and all 17 sampled here came from .java files. This repository's .ts source is a material share of its production lines and contributed none, so the score above is a verdict about the part that was read. Not a finding that the unread half navigates well — it is unmeasured.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Too few commits to judge knowledge freshness (37 commit(s) sampled).
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `npm run` found no package.json in the folder where our sandbox ran it. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. (rule: no-root-manifest). The renderer reported: the dev server (`npm run start`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (our sandbox): `npm run` found no package.json in the folder where our sandbox ran it. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. Last output: "npm error code ENOENT / npm error syscall open / npm error path <repo>/package.json / npm error errno -2 / npm error enoent Could not read package.json: Error: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '<repo>/package.json' / npm error enoent This is related to npm not being able to find a file. / npm error enoent / npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: <path>" No runtime evidence was gathered.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DevServer (start). the dev server (`npm run start`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (our sandbox): `npm run` found no package.json in the folder where our sandbox ran it. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. Last output: "npm error code ENOENT / npm error syscall open / npm error path <repo>/package.json / npm error errno -2 / npm error enoent Could not read package.json: Error: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '<repo>/package.json' / npm error enoent This is related to npm not being able to find a file. / npm error enoent / npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: <path>" No runtime evidence was gathered.
- C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
- C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
- C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
- C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Java is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
2 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was authMiddleware.default at 18.
What to do
- Bring the 2 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with authMiddleware.default (cyclomatic 18), exports (cyclomatic 18). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 2 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.7 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cyclomatic Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
2 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was authMiddleware.default at 21.
What to do
- Bring the 2 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with authMiddleware.default (cognitive 21), exports (cognitive 18). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 2 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.5 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cognitive Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected. Measured on part of this repository only: .ts (38% of production source) was not exposed to THIS dimension's token comparison and is not in this count; duplication there is measured by R10 Code Duplication, the frontend lens's card running the same clone algorithm over the JS/TS token stream.
D5 · Coupling
5 production modules (Maven+npm), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; 0 module(s) off the main sequence.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 2 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 4 tests. Measured on the JavaScript/TypeScript suite only — at least 4 test source file(s) (.java) went unread, so its test quality is unmeasured and is not in these counts.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 6 declared JVM dependency artifact(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from the POMs Maven Central publishes, over the coordinates this repository's 4 Maven/Gradle manifest(s) declare with a version resolvable from the manifest itself — the same declaration-site closure this analysis reads for dependency currency. The JVM has no lockfile a checkout is guaranteed to carry, so this is deliberately NOT the transitive closure. 21 further coordinate(s) are declared with no version at the declaration site — inherited from a parent POM, a BOM or an unresolved Gradle version reference — and are NOT graded: this verdict covers what the checkout pins, not the full transitive graph. 2 name a copyleft licence without stating its version (e.g. "GNU Lesser General Public Licence"), which this policy bans only at specific versions; they are reported here and not charged, because guessing the version would either accuse an LGPL-2.1 artifact or clear an LGPL-3.0 one. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's JVM dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares package.json, and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt
2 deducted task-comment markers across 1300 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.9. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with rest.service.ts (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Explicit Debt in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 1 document(s) read across 2 unit(s).
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 5 build units (Maven, npm) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D27 · Navigability
76 % of calls cross a namespace and 59 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated. Measured over the .java source only — this repository's .ts was not sampled for call sites, so this score covers part of the tree, not all of it.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 High interface indirection finding(s) in Navigability. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D28 · Secrets (history)
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 2 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
118 finding(s): 19 critical, 61 high, 28 medium, 10 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 59 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (59). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (59 issue-level).
- Resolve the 18 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (18). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 High vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 1 end-of-life framework(s), read from 4 platform declaration(s) and 15 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 End-of-life framework finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with pom.xml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
- An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. — microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.html:59
What to do
- Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels
AC3 · Page structure
- Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. — microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.html:29
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics
- A positive tabindex forces a manual tab order that fights the DOM and is fragile. Use tabindex="0" (or restructure the DOM). — microservice-ui/src/app/store/price.component.html:17
- An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. — microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.html:4
What to do
- Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (@angular-eslint/eslint-plugin-template (a11y rules)) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 6 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here. — microservice-ui/package.json:32
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add @angular-eslint/eslint-plugin-template (a11y rules), then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 · Captive dependencies
AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
AX2 · Stateful singletons
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX6 · Interface segregation
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 5 of 5 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P2 · Observability
- Only 1/4 runnable modules use logging (modules with no entry point or server are excluded — they are libraries a runnable module hosts). Silent: `api-gateway`, `offer-service`, `service-registry`.
What to do
- Extend structured logging to the remaining runnable modules so everything you run is diagnosable in production.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add spotbugs with find-sec-bugs (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
- `microservice-ui/package.json` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — microservice-ui/package.json:14
What to do
- Run what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P8 · Schema migrations
- Hibernate ddl-auto builds the schema from the model at startup and keeps no migration history, so there is no reviewed, repeatable upgrade path for an existing production database — a renamed column is dropped and re-added rather than migrated. Adopt Flyway or Liquibase, with `ddl-auto` set to `validate`, so every schema change is a versioned file applied the same way in every environment. (×2) — REDACTED:27, REDACTED:25
What to do
- Replace Hibernate ddl-auto with Flyway or Liquibase, with `ddl-auto` set to `validate` so the production schema can evolve safely and reproducibly.
R1 · Type Safety
What to do
- Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication
- microservice-ui/src/app/app.module.ts:60 · microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.module.ts:57 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is a run of DECLARATIONS inside a construct — the members of a type, or the entries of an object or array literal — with no statement anywhere in it. Do not read this as an extract-a-helper row: nothing here executes, so there is no call site, and a call expression cannot stand where a member declaration or a literal's entry was. What repeats is a SHAPE, and which shape decides the move. Where the copies declare the same members, the repetition is a missing common ancestor: give it a base type, an interface both extend, a generic instantiated twice, or — where the copies are a literal's entries rather than a type's members — one shared constant each site spreads or refers to, so the set is written once. Where they declare DIFFERENT members and only the form is shared — a decorator and its options, an annotation, a registration table's keys — the form is prescribed by a framework or a schema rather than copied, and the only collapse available is to generate the declarations from that schema; where you do not own the generator, this is the cost of the framework and there is nothing to extract. Check which of the two it is before acting: these copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why the repetition is reported, but the sentence to act on is not the same in both cases. — microservice-ui/src/app/app.module.ts:60
- microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.ts:48 · microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.ts:63 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.ts:48
What to do
- Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
R11 · Import Boundaries
- microservice-ui/src/polyfills.ts:58 imports zone.js/dist/zone, reaching past a declared dependency's public entry into its build output — that path is the package's toolchain layout, not its API, and a minor version bump can relocate it with no semver signal. Import from the package's documented entry point instead. — microservice-ui/src/polyfills.ts:58
What to do
- Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- exports has cyclomatic complexity 18 and cognitive complexity 18; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — REDACTED:6
R3 · Large Files
R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×14) — microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.ts:1, microservice-ui/src/app/app.module.ts:1, microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.module.ts:1, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 · Dependency Freshness
What to do
- Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 · Tooling
- test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
What to do
- Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code
- Unreachable from the 3 application, 5 tooling and 4 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on `npm run build` — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (3 application, 5 tooling, 4 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make — microservice-ui/src/test.ts
- Nothing in its class reads or assigns this private field (for a constructor parameter property: it is stored and never read), and no string key or test reaches it by name. Remove it, or use it where it was meant to take effect. — microservice-ui/src/app/model/product.repository.ts:10
- This top-level declaration is not exported and its name occurs nowhere else in its module — not called, read, typed against, re-exported or named by a string. Nothing outside the module can reach a non-exported binding, so this is the whole search: remove it, or use it. (×3) — microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.ts:15, microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.ts:16, microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.ts:17
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Declared in microservice-ui/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it. (×3)
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports
X1 · Async correctness
X12 · Unreachable branch
X13 · Undrained process stream
X14 · Bypassable address classification
X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader
X16 · Unfloored truncation loop
X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document
X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness
X19 · Unrestored process-global state
X20 · Mistyped argument guard
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X22 · Contradicted release guard
X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped
X25 · Inert configuration knob
X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff
X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard
X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element
X3 · Exception handling
- An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. — REDACTED:26
What to do
- Swallowed exception (empty catch)
X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects
X4 · Structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types
- 0/3 of this repository's type-checking configuration(s) turn on strict null checking (`"strict": true`, or `"strictNullChecks": true`). A configuration that states neither is counted as OFF, because off is tsc's own default; a solution-style one whose `"files"` is empty and whose `"references"` point at other projects is in neither number, because it checks no source itself. Where it is off, `string` admits `null` and `undefined`: passing a value that is null compiles silently and throws on the first property access.
What to do
- The findings name the configuration each number was taken from and, for the assertions, the files that hold them. Turn null checking on where it is off — `"strict": true` in the base tsconfig that the others extend switches `strictNullChecks` on with the rest of the family — and then resolve the assertions rather than adding to them. A `!` on a value the checker could show to be null is a promise the author cannot check from where they are standing, and each one is a `TypeError: Cannot read properties of null` waiting for the path that makes it true; where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (narrow it with a test, make the property required, drop the `?`).
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC4 · Keyboard semantics | 2.1.1, 2.4.3 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 63% | Adequate — gated by X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 82% | Strong | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 66% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 25% | Critical — gated by R4, P1, P3, P8 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 76% | Checked 3 of 9 | Solid. |
| Accessibility | 37% | Weak — gated by AC1, AC4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not evidenced — 6 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
Not included — 49 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — the dev server (`npm run start`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (our sandbox): `npm run` found no package.json in the folder where our sandbox ran it. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. Last output: "npm error code ENOENT / npm error syscall open / npm error path <repo>/package.json / npm error errno -2 / npm error enoent Could not read package.json: Error: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '<repo>/package.json' / npm error enoent This is related to npm not being able to find a file. / npm error enoent / npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: <path>" No runtime evidence was gathered. This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .java suite was found but not re-run
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Not scored — 4 Maven/Gradle manifest(s) were read, stating a version for 7 dependency(ies) and leaving 21 to a parent or an imported BOM, but no build resolved the dependency graph, so the outdated signal was not established. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
- D16 Bus Factor — single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency is measured on C# and TypeScript only; Java, JavaScript not measured.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .java source were not judged.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — too few commits to judge knowledge freshness
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite
- D9 Test Distribution — Test distribution not scored — polyglot repository, one half's tests are uncountable
- DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 2 domain event(s); its domain events are published by services or handlers — no domain entity raises one; 3 repository port(s) loading or saving an aggregate/entity
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HTTP client call or construction in the JVM, JavaScript/TypeScript source (service entry point: service-registry/src/main/java/com/hnj/serviceregistry/ServiceRegistryApplication.java:7 (@SpringBootApplication))
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report` or the Gradle `jacocoTestReport` task) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `@Benchmark` in a Java, Kotlin or Scala file importing JMH or kotlinx-benchmark, Jetpack Benchmark's `measureRepeated` in a file importing androidx.benchmark, or JMH/kotlinx-benchmark/androidx.benchmark in a pom.xml, Gradle or sbt build, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: this repository declares no async functions, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Java was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Java request off Android takes no token: it is cancelled through the handle it returns (Future.cancel, Call.cancel, a Disposable), ambiently (io.grpc.Context) or by interrupting its thread, not through a parameter
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 85 finding(s)
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- <img> without a text alternative microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.html:59
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Serious — 68 finding(s)
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- No test reaches this file microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.ts:1
- No test reaches this file microservice-ui/src/app/app.module.ts:1
- No test reaches this file microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.module.ts:1
- No test reaches this file microservice-ui/src/app/rest.service.ts:1
- No test reaches this file REDACTED:1
- No test reaches this file microservice-ui/src/app/model/product.repository.ts:1
- No test reaches this file microservice-ui/data.js:1
- No test reaches this file microservice-ui/src/test.ts:1
- No test reaches this file microservice-ui/src/app/model/static.datasource.ts:1
- No test reaches this file microservice-ui/src/main.ts:1
- No test reaches this file microservice-ui/src/app/app-routing.module.ts:1
- No test reaches this file microservice-ui/src/app/model/product.model.ts:1
- No test reaches this file microservice-ui/src/app/model/model.module.ts:1
- No test reaches this file microservice-ui/src/app/model/offer.model.ts:1
- TodoComment microservice-ui/src/app/rest.service.ts:54
- TodoComment microservice-ui/src/app/rest.service.ts:57
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- Schema created by Hibernate ddl-auto (no migration path) REDACTED:27
- Schema created by Hibernate ddl-auto (no migration path) REDACTED:25
- Heading level jumps from h3 to h6 microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.html:29
- Positive tabindex (1) microservice-ui/src/app/store/price.component.html:17
- Anchor without href microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.html:4
- Accessibility enforcement below the top rung microservice-ui/package.json:32
- authMiddleware.default (cyclomatic 18) REDACTED:6
- exports (cyclomatic 18) REDACTED:6
- authMiddleware.default (cognitive 21) REDACTED:6
- exports (cognitive 18) REDACTED:6
- End-of-life framework: Spring Boot 2 api-gateway/pom.xml:1
- No CI pipeline
- Duplicated block (51 lines × 2 locations) microservice-ui/src/app/app.module.ts:60
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 2 locations) microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.ts:48
- Boundary violation [package:third-party-deep-import] microservice-ui/src/polyfills.ts:58
- Complex function exports (cyclomatic 18, cognitive 18) REDACTED:6
- No typecheck script
- Dead file (~20 LoC) microservice-ui/src/test.ts
- Unused dependency '@angular/animations'
- Unused dependency '@angular/cli'
- Unused dependency '@angular/compiler'
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Minor — 22 finding(s)
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- No ADRs found
- High interface indirection
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- Logging is not universal
- No SAST
- No dependency-update automation microservice-ui/package.json:14
- Unused private field 'dataSource' microservice-ui/src/app/model/product.repository.ts:10
- Unused module-local declaration 'PROTOCOL' microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.ts:15
- Unused module-local declaration 'OfferPORT' microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.ts:16
- Unused module-local declaration 'productPort' microservice-ui/src/app/store/store.component.ts:17
- Strict null checking is not enabled everywhere the repository type-checks
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-0e75fd089ede42eb8c2a03f47bfc511e/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-0e75fd089ede42eb8c2a03f47bfc511e/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 4 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 118 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |