Executive summary
hashrocket/tilex falls short of our standard for production, in part because we found no automated security scanning of the code, its secrets or its dependencies. It scores 51 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, and 22 of its 30 critical findings are security problems.
Production Readiness, at 44, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step for the work it takes is fixing the package under a licence on your banned list, worth about 4 points. Adding automated security scanning would lift Production Readiness itself, worth about 5 points. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 56.
Ten known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Ten pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with, and one password or key is open to anyone who can read the repository. Updating the vulnerable packages, pinning each tool to an exact version and replacing the exposed password or key would close these risks. Switching the validation back on would fix the security check on connections or logins switched off. The five labels or groups of fields with no name need connecting to their fields or naming.
The product code is 3,958 lines, about €6,300 to rebuild.
If Production Readiness rose from 44 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 51 to about 56.
New since the last survey: 4 findings
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (15 corresponding lines) lib/tilex/posts.ex
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (4 corresponding lines) lib/tilex/auth/error_handler.ex
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (4 corresponding lines) lib/tilex_web/controllers/post_controller.ex
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Fixed since the last survey: 6 findings
- REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret config/dev.exs
- REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret: signing-key config/dev.exs
- REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret config/test.exs
- REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret: signing-key config/test.exs
- Secrets (history) · High secret: WD-SECRET-0005 REDACTED
- A11y enforcement · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung
Rebuild cost: about €6,300 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €2,100 to €11,000, for 35 to 111 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.7 at a score of 51. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 3,958 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 (global) | 2 Mix.Tasks | 3 Mix.Tasks.Ecto | 4 Mix.Tasks.Tilex | 5 Phoenix.Param | 6 Tilex | 7 Tilex.Auth | 8 Tilex.Blog | 9 Tilex.MCP | 10 Tilex.Notifications | 11 Tilex.Plug | 12 assets.js | 13 assets.js.post_form | 14 assets.js.text_conversion | 15 Tilex.Notifications.Notifiers | 16 TilexWeb | 17 TilexWeb.Api |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (global) | |||||||||||||||||
| 2 Mix.Tasks | |||||||||||||||||
| 3 Mix.Tasks.Ecto | |||||||||||||||||
| 4 Mix.Tasks.Tilex | |||||||||||||||||
| 5 Phoenix.Param | |||||||||||||||||
| 6 Tilex | |||||||||||||||||
| 7 Tilex.Auth | |||||||||||||||||
| 8 Tilex.Blog | |||||||||||||||||
| 9 Tilex.MCP | |||||||||||||||||
| 10 Tilex.Notifications | |||||||||||||||||
| 11 Tilex.Plug | |||||||||||||||||
| 12 assets.js | |||||||||||||||||
| 13 assets.js.post_form | |||||||||||||||||
| 14 assets.js.text_conversion | |||||||||||||||||
| 15 Tilex.Notifications.Notifiers | 3 | ||||||||||||||||
| 16 TilexWeb | 21 | ||||||||||||||||
| 17 TilexWeb.Api | 4 |
15→10 Tilex.Notifications.Notifiers uses Tilex.Notifications✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in Tilex.Notifications.Notifiers uses a type in Tilex.Notifications.
- The types involved
Tilex.Notifications.Notifiers.Slack→Tilex.Notifications.NotifierTilex.Notifications.Notifiers.Twitter→Tilex.Notifications.NotifierTilex.Notifications.Notifiers.Webhook→Tilex.Notifications.Notifier
- Direction
- Tilex.Notifications.Notifiers uses Tilex.Notifications, so a change to Tilex.Notifications can break Tilex.Notifications.Notifiers, while a change to Tilex.Notifications.Notifiers can't break Tilex.Notifications.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Tilex.Notifications.Notifiers uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
16→1 TilexWeb uses (global)✕
- Connections
- 21 pairs of types, where a type in TilexWeb uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
TilexWeb.AuthController→TilexWebTilexWeb.ChannelController→TilexWebTilexWeb.ChannelView→TilexWebTilexWeb.DeveloperController→TilexWebTilexWeb.DeveloperView→TilexWebTilexWeb.ErrorView→TilexWebTilexWeb.FeedController→TilexWebTilexWeb.FeedView→TilexWebTilexWeb.LayoutView→TilexWebTilexWeb.PixelController→TilexWebTilexWeb.PostController→TilexWebTilexWeb.PostView→TilexWebTilexWeb.Router→TilexWebTilexWeb.SharedView→TilexWebTilexWeb.SitemapController→TilexWebTilexWeb.SitemapView→TilexWebTilexWeb.StatsController→TilexWebTilexWeb.StatsView→TilexWebTilexWeb.StructuredDataView→TilexWebTilexWeb.WebManifestController→TilexWebTilexWeb.WebManifestView→TilexWeb
- Direction
- TilexWeb uses (global), so a change to (global) can break TilexWeb, while a change to TilexWeb can't break (global).
- Position
- Below the diagonal: TilexWeb uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
17→1 TilexWeb.Api uses (global)✕
- Connections
- 4 pairs of types, where a type in TilexWeb.Api uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
TilexWeb.Api.DeveloperPostController→TilexWebTilexWeb.Api.DeveloperPostView→TilexWebTilexWeb.Api.PostController→TilexWebTilexWeb.Api.PostView→TilexWeb
- Direction
- TilexWeb.Api uses (global), so a change to (global) can break TilexWeb.Api, while a change to TilexWeb.Api can't break (global).
- Position
- Below the diagonal: TilexWeb.Api uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Accessibility
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 24 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 13 | High / Critical |
| A07:2025 — Authentication Failures | 2 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing; Resolve the 1 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance; Set an explicit timeout on every client — `recv_timeout:` for HTTPoison, `receive_timeout:` for Req and Finch, `Tesla.Middleware.Timeout` (or the adapter's `recv_timeout`) for Tesla, `timeout:` for `:httpc` — and add retries with back-off (`Tesla.Middleware.Retry`, Req's `retry:`) and a breaker (`:fuse`, `ExternalService`) around dependencies that fail.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance. | +4.2 pts | Low | License Compliance |
| Resolve the 1 Floating source dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +2.8 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Resolve the 1 Retired release finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +2.8 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Resolve the 1 Unbounded dependency requirement finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +2.8 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with Procfile. | +2.6 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +5.0 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Set an explicit timeout on every client — `recv_timeout:` for HTTPoison, `receive_timeout:` for Req and Finch, `Tesla.Middleware.Timeout` (or the adapter's `recv_timeout`) for Tesla, `timeout:` for `:httpc` — and add retries with back-off (`Tesla.Middleware.Retry`, Req's `retry:`) and a breaker (`:fuse`, `ExternalService`) around dependencies that fail. | +3.9 pts | Medium | Outbound HTTP resilience |
| Resolve the 1 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with .tool-versions. | +1.2 pts | Low | Platform End-of-Life |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.2 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 0.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Mixed | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: REDACTED |
| .tool-versions | 7.9 | Mixed | Platform End-of-Life: End-of-life runtime: Node.js 19 |
| lib/tilex/posts.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (15 corresponding lines) |
| lib/tilex/auth/error_handler.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (4 corresponding lines) |
| lib/tilex_web/controllers/post_controller.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (4 corresponding lines) |
| lib/tilex_web/controllers/channel_controller.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: channel_controller.ex ↔ post_controller.ex |
| Procfile | 9.5 | Near-clean | ADR Quality: No ADRs found |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 51 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 51 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 84 of 116 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. 5 process module(s) keep their state in something other than a record or struct (a map or a tuple), which this pass does not read as fields, and no other module held state it could measure.
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.exs, .ex) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.exs, .ex) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its Hex package dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. PREREGISTRATION version 20's fallback (adjudication D21-sample3-v3): this rule kind was adjudicated below the 95 % precision gate, so its candidates are counted here and not published, and the score covers only the acronym-spelling and awaitable-suffix rules. The kind returns as rows only after it shows a measured precision; this says nothing about whether these names are consistent.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Subject: 27 markup document(s) — HTML, Razor, JSX, Vue, Svelte or server templates. The Runtime Evidence tier boots an app only via docker-compose, an Aspire AppHost, a Dockerfile, an npm dev script, a web service's own toolchain entry point (cargo, go, dotnet, Python, Spring Boot), or an Android app's own Gradle wrapper (run on an emulator); an Apple or Flutter app needs a host it lacks. None applied, so no live runtime a11y/egress/header evidence was collected. You can widen what we reach: add a docker-compose.yml (or an Aspire AppHost) that brings the app up with its dependencies. We then boot it in an isolated sandbox and gathers real runtime evidence — you change nothing in your pipeline (no CI step, no SDK).
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Elixir is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Elixir is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
- X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, PHP, Dart, Kotlin, Ruby, Scala, Java, Python and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and no named async function in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, nor any Go, PHP or Dart function or Kotlin suspend function, makes a request that can be cancelled (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http; net/http, net.Dial; amphp; Dio; Ktor, OkHttp), so there is nothing to judge, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded, no Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found, and this repository's Elixir is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. X7 measured the part of this repository it reads (C#, Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, Rust, Go, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Ruby, Swift and Dart), and its Elixir source is outside the check's reach, so the card covers only part of the product. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the unread source is free of silent defaults.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected. 1.1 % of the production lines (44 of 3,958) are in a reported copy. A further 3 rows report members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Edited copy of a member (4 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with error_handler.ex, post_controller.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (15 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with posts.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
16 outdated, 1 retired direct Hex dependencies, 2 pinning defect(s). Whether any of these packages is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — hex.pm publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: a Hex app name does not determine the modules it provides (`ecto_sql` provides Ecto.Adapters.SQL), and a large idiomatic class of BEAM dependencies — runtime adapters, codec plugins, protocol implementations and OTP applications the release starts — is correctly declared and never referenced in source, so absence of a reference is not evidence of an unused dependency. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from REDACTED there.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Retired release finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Floating source dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Unbounded dependency requirement finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D13 · REDACTED Scanning
REDACTED scan ran and found no leaked secrets. 4 detection(s) were excluded as holding no minted credential in material that runs: a name, reference or comparison rather than a value, a readable phrase or pattern, a value that declares itself fake, or development, test, example, mock or demo material.
D14 · License Compliance
1 of 70 shipped Hex package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from hex.pm over the packages a consumer installs — this repository's REDACTED closed over the declarations its mix.exs files do not gate behind `only:`. Packages it asks for ONLY under `only: [:dev, :test]` (or any other non-prod environment, such as `:docs`) are excluded: they are not installed by anything that depends on this repository. Each licence is the one hex.pm publishes for the package's current release. A further 1 package(s) the closure reaches resolve from git, a path or a local override and publish no licence this pass can read; they are outside this verdict. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's Hex package dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares package.json, and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
5 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is lib/tilex_web/controllers/post_controller.ex. Counted over 19 of the 111 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted task-comment markers across 3958 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 2 document(s) read across 2 unit(s).
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with Procfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 2 build units (Mix, npm) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D27 · Navigability
21 % of calls cross a namespace and 0 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
D28 · Secrets (history)
1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
13 finding(s): 0 critical, 10 high, 3 medium, 0 low. 10 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 1 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 10 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
24 finding(s): 0 critical, 10 high, 14 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 14 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (13), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 warning-level).
- Resolve the 10 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (10). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
19 of 19 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is .credo.exs. Counted over 19 of the 111 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 19 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with .credo.exs, post_controller.ex, stats.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (19 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: channel_controller.ex↔post_controller.ex 54%
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with channel_controller.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
1 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 4 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with .tool-versions. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC2 · Forms & labels
- This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id. (×5) — lib/tilex_web/templates/developer/edit.html.eex:38, lib/tilex_web/templates/developer/edit.html.eex:44, lib/tilex_web/templates/developer/edit.html.eex:52, …
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure
- A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. (×2) — lib/tilex_web/templates/layout/error.html.heex:2, lib/tilex_web/templates/layout/root.html.heex:2
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — lib/tilex_web/templates/layout/root.html.heex:2
- An empty heading appears in the document outline announced with no text. Give the heading text, or remove it if it's decorative. — lib/tilex_web/templates/post/form.html.eex:49
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics
AC5 · ARIA correctness
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- `ul.post_list li a:before` moves (`transition: right 0.1s`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. (×2) — lib/tilex_web/templates/layout/error.html.heex:809, assets/css/components.css:252
- `.post aside ul a.post__like-link .post__like-heart` moves (`animation: jiggle 2s ease-in`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — assets/css/components.css:196
- `.post aside ul a.post__like-link:not(.liked) .post__like-heart` moves (`animation: heartbeat 0.5s infinite ease-out alternate`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — assets/css/components.css:206
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
C1 · Data Protection
- No encryption usage (Cloak.Ecto encrypted field types, a Cloak vault, Plug.Crypto's message encryptor, :crypto ciphers that encrypt, libsodium boxes) was found, and this repository persists personal data in the model cited here — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore. — lib/tilex/blog/developer.ex:14
What to do
- Encrypt sensitive data at rest (Cloak.Ecto — a Cloak.Ecto.Binary-backed field type for the column — or ash_cloak for Ash) and manage keys in a vault (AWS KMS / Secrets Manager through ex_aws_kms, GCP KMS / REDACTED Manager, Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault). Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
C2 · Access Controls
- Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect.
What to do
- Name the access rules — a Bodyguard.Policy or LetMe policy module, a Canada.Can implementation, or roles and permissions declared once — and consult them where access is checked (Bodyguard.permit!, a plug in the pipeline), so the rule set is reviewable and testable on its own.
M1 · Documentation (README)
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P2 · Observability
What to do
- Add a health-check endpoint (a /health route in your Phoenix router or Plug) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:6
- `assets/package.json` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — assets/package.json:8
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience
- `Req.post!(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. — lib/tilex/notifications/notifiers/twitter.ex:30
- `Req.post(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. — lib/tilex/notifications/notifiers/webhook.ex:16
What to do
- Set an explicit timeout on every client — `recv_timeout:` for HTTPoison, `receive_timeout:` for Req and Finch, `Tesla.Middleware.Timeout` (or the adapter's `recv_timeout`) for Tesla, `timeout:` for `:httpc` — and add retries with back-off (`Tesla.Middleware.Retry`, Req's `retry:`) and a breaker (`:fuse`, `ExternalService`) around dependencies that fail.
R1 · Type Safety
- 0 typed · 9 plain JS — the untyped files are assets/js/app.js, assets/js/google_analytics.js, assets/js/image_uploader.js, assets/js/like.js, assets/js/post_form.js, assets/js/socket.js (+3 more).
What to do
- Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
R10 · Code Duplication
- assets/js/post_form.js:71 · assets/js/post_form.js:170 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 52 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both spans, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — assets/js/post_form.js:71
- assets/js/like.js:17 · assets/js/like.js:34 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — assets/js/like.js:17
What to do
- Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
R3 · Large Files
R5 · Dependency Freshness
R6 · Tooling
- test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
What to do
- Add type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
R9 · Circular Imports
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- `verify: :verify_none` is set on a TLS client, so every peer certificate is accepted — including one an attacker presents. Chain, expiry, revocation and hostname are all skipped, so an attacker on the network path can present any certificate and read or rewrite the traffic — the connection is encrypted to the attacker, not to the intended host. Remove the override so the peer is verified — `verify: :verify_peer` is what `:ssl`, Mint, Finch, Req and hackney use when nothing is set (OTP 26 and later default to it). Give it the trust roots to check against: `cacerts: :public_key.cacerts_get()` (OTP 25+) or the `CAStore` package's `cacertfile: CAStore.file_path()`, with `customize_hostname_check: [match_fun: :public_key.pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun(:https)]` so the hostname is checked too. If the server presents a self-signed or privately-issued certificate, trust THAT issuer rather than every certificate: pass its CA as `cacertfile:`/`cacerts:`, which keeps the chain and hostname checks on. — config/runtime.exs:35
- Set: Referrer-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies. Missing: Content-Security-Policy — the four headers that carry the points of this card's security-headers term (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options), 0.5 each.(−0.5 on this card.) The server: lib/tilex_web/endpoint.ex:2 — `Phoenix.Endpoint`.
What to do
- Stop accepting every TLS certificate: delete `verify: :verify_none` (hackney's `insecure: true`, a `verify_fun` that answers `{:valid, _}`, a `match_fun` that returns `true`) so the chain, hostname and expiry are verified, and trust a self-signed or private server by giving the client its CA (`cacertfile:`, `cacerts:`) — never by switching verification off.
- Add Content-Security-Policy beside the headers the Elixir server already sets.
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC4 · Keyboard semantics | 2.1.1, 2.4.3 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 61% | Adequate — gated by R1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 90% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 53% | Adequate — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 44% | Weak — gated by P3, P7 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 53% | Adequate — gated by C1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Accessibility | 61% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (an audit-log table or schema — a module, Ecto schema or migration table named for it — ExAudit, PaperTrail, AshPaperTrail or Carbonite recording each change, or a Commanded / EventStore event-sourced store beside one) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
- C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 73 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: the BEAM has no dependency-injection container — state lives in processes, and no process is handed an instance whose lifetime another one scopes.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: Elixir processes share no mutable memory — state lives in a process's own mailbox — so there is no shared object to race on. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- D10 Test Quality — ~2735 lines of test source are present (.exs, .ex) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — no .exs test runner
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D21 Naming Consistency — D21 withholds its case and prefix conventions rows: 2 candidate(s) found and not reported.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .ex, .exs source were not judged.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline publishes no artifact — no package publish, container push or release with files to download. Supply-chain provenance, signing and an SBOM describe a PUBLISHED artifact for the people who obtain it, so there is nothing to attest here; a deployment of the service itself publishes nothing for anyone else to verify. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts publishing artifacts (a package, a container image, or a release with downloadable files). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this OTP build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — cohesion (LCOM4) not measured — process state held outside a record or struct
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for Benchee jobs (the entries of a `Benchee.run` job map) or Benchfella `bench "…"` blocks under `use Benchfella` in any `.ex`/`.exs` file, or benchee or benchfella in a mix.exs, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: Elixir has no async/await function colour, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R4 Test Coverage — the JS/TS workspace (9 production file(s)) has no JavaScript/TypeScript test, but it is 10.8% of this repository's production source and the other 89.2% carries 2,735 line(s) of test code this pass cannot read — an incidental frontend's reachability is not the repository's test posture, so it is not scored as one
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X12 Unreachable branch — X12 reached only 11% of this repository's production lines — elixir (3,958 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — X16 reached only 11% of this repository's production lines — elixir (3,958 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Elixir processes share no heap: a value sent to another process arrives as a copy, so no collection is reachable from two processes at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X3 Exception handling — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — Not applicable: this check asks whether the null-typed discipline a language offers is switched on, and how much of that the assertion operator takes back, and in this repository's languages there is no such switch and no such operator. Elixir's `nil` is an atom in a dynamically typed language: `@spec`s are checked by an external analysis that has no nullability operator, so there is no null-typed discipline in the language to adopt. Plain JavaScript carries no type annotations and commits no tsconfig, so it states no null-typed discipline for this check to grade: there is nothing here that switches null checking on or off, and TypeScript (or `// @ts-check`) is how a repository acquires one — advice, not a defect this card measures. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 30 finding(s)
- REDACTED
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- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
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- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- <label> that labels no control lib/tilex_web/templates/developer/edit.html.eex:38
- <label> that labels no control lib/tilex_web/templates/developer/edit.html.eex:44
- <label> that labels no control lib/tilex_web/templates/developer/edit.html.eex:52
- <label> that labels no control lib/tilex_web/templates/stats/developer.html.eex:12
- <label> that labels no control lib/tilex_web/templates/stats/developer.html.eex:13
- Document without a <title> lib/tilex_web/templates/layout/error.html.heex:2
- Document without a <title> lib/tilex_web/templates/layout/root.html.heex:2
- Banned license: anubis_mcp
- REDACTED
- TLS certificate validation disabled config/runtime.exs:35
Serious — 38 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
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- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard lib/tilex_web/templates/layout/error.html.heex:809
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard assets/css/components.css:196
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard assets/css/components.css:206
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard assets/css/components.css:252
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Edited copy of a member (4 corresponding lines) lib/tilex/auth/error_handler.ex:9
- Edited copy of a member (4 corresponding lines) lib/tilex_web/controllers/post_controller.ex:26
- Outbound HTTP without resilience lib/tilex/notifications/notifiers/twitter.ex:30
- Outbound HTTP without resilience lib/tilex/notifications/notifiers/webhook.ex:16
- Page without a main landmark lib/tilex_web/templates/layout/root.html.heex:2
- Empty <h1> heading lib/tilex_web/templates/post/form.html.eex:49
- No data-protection/encryption lib/tilex/blog/developer.ex:14
- Retired release: earmark
- Floating source dependency: oauther
- Unbounded dependency requirement: postgrex
- REDACTED
- Change coupling: channel_controller.ex ↔ post_controller.ex lib/tilex_web/controllers/channel_controller.ex:1
- Edited copy of a member (15 corresponding lines) lib/tilex/posts.ex:12
- End-of-life runtime: Node.js 19 .tool-versions:1
- Type Safety
- Duplicated block with local edits (15 matched lines × 2 locations) assets/js/post_form.js:71
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) assets/js/like.js:17
- No typecheck script
Minor — 32 finding(s)
- Orphaned file .credo.exs:1
- Orphaned file lib/tilex_web/controllers/post_controller.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/tilex/stats.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/tilex/posts.ex:1
- Orphaned file REDACTED:1
- Orphaned file lib/mix/tasks/tilex/hdb.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/tilex_web/router.ex:1
- Orphaned file config/runtime.exs:1
- Orphaned file lib/tilex/blog/post.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/tilex/mcp/new_post.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/tilex/notifications/notifications.ex:1
- Orphaned file mix.exs:1
- Orphaned file lib/tilex_web/views/layout_view.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/tilex/page_views_report.ex:1
- Orphaned file config/dev.exs:1
- Orphaned file lib/tilex_web/views/structured_data_view.ex:1
- Orphaned file config/prod.exs:1
- Orphaned file lib/tilex/blog/post_scrubber.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/tilex_web.ex:1
- No named authorization policies
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
- No ADRs found Procfile:1
- REDACTED
- Orphaned files with no living knowledge
- REDACTED
- No ADRs
- No architecture diagram/doc
- No SAST REDACTED:6
- No dependency-update automation assets/package.json:8
- No release approval gate
- No changelog
- Security headers incomplete
Minor — 16 finding(s)
- Outdated: appsignal_phoenix
- Outdated: credo
- Outdated: ecto_sql
- Outdated: esbuild
- Outdated: floki
- Outdated: guardian
- Outdated: html_sanitize_ex
- Outdated: jason
- Outdated: phoenix_ecto
- Outdated: phoenix_live_dashboard
- Outdated: phoenix_live_reload
- Outdated: plug_cowboy
- Outdated: postgrex
- Outdated: swoosh
- Outdated: telemetry_poller
- Outdated: tidewave
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-3f14ba0caf1f4da7a2da3fa0ed6c6f1d/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 1 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-3f14ba0caf1f4da7a2da3fa0ed6c6f1d/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 13 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 24 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |