Executive summary
gvolpe/trading falls short of our standard for production because 24 files are no longer known to anyone active in the project and the project keeps no record of its design decisions. It scores 54 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, and 39 of its 42 critical findings are security problems.
Maturity, at 50, is the weakest lens by a small margin, and the weakest lens counts most in the score. The best first steps are recording design decisions and having someone learn and document the 24 files no active contributor knows, each worth about 4 points.
Sixteen settings leave the servers or containers unsafe. Ten pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Correcting the unsafe settings and pinning each tool to an exact version would close both risks. Updating the vulnerable packages would fix the six packages with a known security hole, and limiting each secret to its own step would deal with the five secrets exposed to more of the pipeline than needed. The two images with no text description need a text description.
The product code is 4,760 lines, about €7,100 to rebuild.
The weakest lenses score close to each other, so improving any of them moves the score.
Rebuild cost: about €7,100 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €2,400 to €12,000, for 40 to 125 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.8 at a score of 54. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 4,760 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture — module dependency graph
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 trading | 2 trading.Newt | 3 trading.Newtype | 4 trading.client.ui | 5 trading.core | 6 trading.core.http | 7 trading.lib.Consumer | 8 trading.lib.Logger | 9 trading.trace.fsm | 10 web-app.js | 11 trading.core.AppTopic | 12 trading.forecasts | 13 trading.state | 14 trading.trace | 15 trading.trace.Config | 16 trading.domain | 17 trading.client | 18 trading.commands | 19 trading.core.snapshots | 20 trading.lib | 21 trading.state.Prices | 22 trading.state.TradeState | 23 trading.ws | 24 trading.events | 25 trading.lib.Producer | 26 trading.alerts | 27 trading.feed | 28 trading.forecasts.cdc | 29 trading.forecasts.store | 30 trading.processor | 31 trading.snapshots | 32 trading.trace.tracer |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 trading | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2 trading.Newt | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3 trading.Newtype | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4 trading.client.ui | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5 trading.core | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6 trading.core.http | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 7 trading.lib.Consumer | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8 trading.lib.Logger | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 9 trading.trace.fsm | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 10 web-app.js | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 11 trading.core.AppTopic | 10 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 12 trading.forecasts | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 13 trading.state | 9 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 14 trading.trace | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 15 trading.trace.Config | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 16 trading.domain | 21 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 17 trading.client | 3 | 6 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 18 trading.commands | 10 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 19 trading.core.snapshots | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20 trading.lib | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21 trading.state.Prices | 2 | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22 trading.state.TradeState | 4 | 3 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 23 trading.ws | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 24 trading.events | 13 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 25 trading.lib.Producer | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 26 trading.alerts | 1 | 6 | 4 | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 27 trading.feed | 4 | 3 | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 28 trading.forecasts.cdc | 1 | 3 | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 29 trading.forecasts.store | 15 | 3 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 30 trading.processor | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 31 trading.snapshots | 4 | 1 | 2 | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 32 trading.trace.tracer | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
11→5 trading.core.AppTopic uses trading.core✕
- Connections
- 10 pairs of types, where a type in trading.core.AppTopic uses a type in trading.core.
- The types involved
trading.core.AppTopic.Alerts→trading.core.AppTopictrading.core.AppTopic.AuthorEvents→trading.core.AppTopictrading.core.AppTopic.ForecastCommands→trading.core.AppTopictrading.core.AppTopic.ForecastEvents→trading.core.AppTopictrading.core.AppTopic.OutboxEvents→trading.core.AppTopictrading.core.AppTopic.PriceUpdates→trading.core.AppTopictrading.core.AppTopic.SwitchCommands→trading.core.AppTopictrading.core.AppTopic.SwitchEvents→trading.core.AppTopictrading.core.AppTopic.TradingCommands→trading.core.AppTopictrading.core.AppTopic.TradingEvents→trading.core.AppTopic
- Direction
- trading.core.AppTopic uses trading.core, so a change to trading.core can break trading.core.AppTopic, while a change to trading.core.AppTopic can't break trading.core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.core.AppTopic uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
12→7 trading.forecasts uses trading.lib.Consumer✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in trading.forecasts uses a type in trading.lib.Consumer.
- The types involved
trading.forecasts.Engine→trading.lib.Consumer.Msgtrading.forecasts.VotesHandler→trading.lib.Consumer.Msg
- Direction
- trading.forecasts uses trading.lib.Consumer, so a change to trading.lib.Consumer can break trading.forecasts, while a change to trading.forecasts can't break trading.lib.Consumer.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.forecasts uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→16 trading.state uses trading.domain part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 9 pairs of types, where a type in trading.state uses a type in trading.domain.
- The types involved
trading.state.DedupState→trading.domain.Timestamptrading.state.IdRegistry→trading.domain.CommandIdtrading.state.IdRegistry→trading.domain.Timestamptrading.state.Prices→trading.domain.Pricetrading.state.TradeState→trading.domain.Pricetrading.state.TradeState→trading.domain.Quantitytrading.state.TradeState→trading.domain.Symboltrading.state.TradeState→trading.domain.TradeActiontrading.state.TradeState→trading.domain.TradingStatus
- Direction
- trading.state uses trading.domain, so a change to trading.domain can break trading.state, while a change to trading.state can't break trading.domain.
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
14→1 trading.trace uses trading✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in trading.trace uses a type in trading.
- The types involved
trading.trace.CmdKernel→trading.Newttrading.trace.EvtKernel→trading.Newt
- Direction
- trading.trace uses trading, so a change to trading can break trading.trace, while a change to trading.trace can't break trading.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.trace uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
15→1 trading.trace.Config uses trading✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in trading.trace.Config uses a type in trading.
- The types involved
trading.trace.Config.HoneycombApiKey→trading.Newtype
- Direction
- trading.trace.Config uses trading, so a change to trading can break trading.trace.Config, while a change to trading.trace.Config can't break trading.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.trace.Config uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
16→1 trading.domain uses trading✕
- Connections
- 21 pairs of types, where a type in trading.domain uses a type in trading.
- The types involved
trading.domain.AlertId→trading.IdNewtypetrading.domain.AuthorId→trading.IdNewtypetrading.domain.AuthorName→trading.Newtypetrading.domain.CommandId→trading.IdNewtypetrading.domain.CorrelationId→trading.IdNewtypetrading.domain.EventId→trading.IdNewtypetrading.domain.ForecastDescription→trading.Newtypetrading.domain.ForecastId→trading.IdNewtypetrading.domain.ForecastScore→trading.NumNewtypetrading.domain.KeyExpiration→trading.Newtypetrading.domain.OnlineUsers→trading.Newtypetrading.domain.Price→trading.NumNewtypetrading.domain.PulsarURI→trading.Newtypetrading.domain.Quantity→trading.NumNewtypetrading.domain.Reason→trading.Newtypetrading.domain.RedisURI→trading.Newtypetrading.domain.SocketId→trading.IdNewtypetrading.domain.Source→trading.Newtypetrading.domain.Symbol→trading.Newtypetrading.domain.Timestamp→trading.Newtypetrading.domain.Website→trading.Newtype
- Direction
- trading.domain uses trading, so a change to trading can break trading.domain, while a change to trading.domain can't break trading.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.domain uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
16→13 trading.domain uses trading.state✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in trading.domain uses a type in trading.state.
- The types involved
trading.domain.PriceUpdate→trading.state.Prices
- Direction
- trading.domain uses trading.state, so a change to trading.state can break trading.domain, while a change to trading.domain can't break trading.state.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.domain uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
17→1 trading.client uses trading✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in trading.client uses a type in trading.
- The types involved
trading.client.ElemId→trading.Newtypetrading.client.InputText→trading.Newtypetrading.client.WsUrl→trading.Newtype
- Direction
- trading.client uses trading, so a change to trading can break trading.client, while a change to trading.client can't break trading.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.client uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
17→16 trading.client uses trading.domain✕
- Connections
- 6 pairs of types, where a type in trading.client uses a type in trading.domain.
- The types involved
trading.client.Dummy→trading.domain.Alerttrading.client.Dummy→trading.domain.Symboltrading.client.Model→trading.domain.Alerttrading.client.Model→trading.domain.Symboltrading.client.Model→trading.domain.TradingStatustrading.client.TradingSocket→trading.domain.SocketId
- Direction
- trading.client uses trading.domain, so a change to trading.domain can break trading.client, while a change to trading.client can't break trading.domain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.client uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
18→16 trading.commands uses trading.domain✕
- Connections
- 10 pairs of types, where a type in trading.commands uses a type in trading.domain.
- The types involved
trading.commands.ForecastCommand→trading.domain.CommandIdtrading.commands.ForecastCommand→trading.domain.CorrelationIdtrading.commands.ForecastCommand→trading.domain.Timestamptrading.commands.SwitchCommand→trading.domain.CommandIdtrading.commands.SwitchCommand→trading.domain.CorrelationIdtrading.commands.SwitchCommand→trading.domain.Timestamptrading.commands.TradeCommand→trading.domain.CommandIdtrading.commands.TradeCommand→trading.domain.CorrelationIdtrading.commands.TradeCommand→trading.domain.Symboltrading.commands.TradeCommand→trading.domain.Timestamp
- Direction
- trading.commands uses trading.domain, so a change to trading.domain can break trading.commands, while a change to trading.commands can't break trading.domain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.commands uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
19→13 trading.core.snapshots uses trading.state✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in trading.core.snapshots uses a type in trading.state.
- The types involved
trading.core.snapshots.SnapshotWriter→trading.state.TradeState
- Direction
- trading.core.snapshots uses trading.state, so a change to trading.state can break trading.core.snapshots, while a change to trading.core.snapshots can't break trading.state.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.core.snapshots uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
19→16 trading.core.snapshots uses trading.domain✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in trading.core.snapshots uses a type in trading.domain.
- The types involved
trading.core.snapshots.SnapshotWriter→trading.domain.TradingStatus
- Direction
- trading.core.snapshots uses trading.domain, so a change to trading.domain can break trading.core.snapshots, while a change to trading.core.snapshots can't break trading.domain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.core.snapshots uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
20→16 trading.lib uses trading.domain✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in trading.lib uses a type in trading.domain.
- The types involved
trading.lib.Time→trading.domain.Timestamp
- Direction
- trading.lib uses trading.domain, so a change to trading.domain can break trading.lib, while a change to trading.lib can't break trading.domain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.lib uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
21→13 trading.state.Prices uses trading.state✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in trading.state.Prices uses a type in trading.state.
- The types involved
trading.state.Prices.__AtAsk→trading.state.Pricestrading.state.Prices.__AtBid→trading.state.Prices
- Direction
- trading.state.Prices uses trading.state, so a change to trading.state can break trading.state.Prices, while a change to trading.state.Prices can't break trading.state.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.state.Prices uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
21→16 trading.state.Prices uses trading.domain✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in trading.state.Prices uses a type in trading.domain.
- The types involved
trading.state.Prices.__AtAsk→trading.domain.Quantitytrading.state.Prices.__AtBid→trading.domain.Quantity
- Direction
- trading.state.Prices uses trading.domain, so a change to trading.domain can break trading.state.Prices, while a change to trading.state.Prices can't break trading.domain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.state.Prices uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
22→13 trading.state.TradeState uses trading.state✕
- Connections
- 4 pairs of types, where a type in trading.state.TradeState uses a type in trading.state.
- The types involved
trading.state.TradeState.__AskPrices→trading.state.TradeStatetrading.state.TradeState.__BidPrices→trading.state.TradeStatetrading.state.TradeState.__Prices→trading.state.Pricestrading.state.TradeState.__Prices→trading.state.TradeState
- Direction
- trading.state.TradeState uses trading.state, so a change to trading.state can break trading.state.TradeState, while a change to trading.state.TradeState can't break trading.state.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.state.TradeState uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
22→16 trading.state.TradeState uses trading.domain✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in trading.state.TradeState uses a type in trading.domain.
- The types involved
trading.state.TradeState.__AskPrices→trading.domain.Symboltrading.state.TradeState.__BidPrices→trading.domain.Symboltrading.state.TradeState.__Prices→trading.domain.Symbol
- Direction
- trading.state.TradeState uses trading.domain, so a change to trading.domain can break trading.state.TradeState, while a change to trading.state.TradeState can't break trading.domain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.state.TradeState uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
23→16 trading.ws uses trading.domain✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in trading.ws uses a type in trading.domain.
- The types involved
trading.ws.WsConnections→trading.domain.SocketId
- Direction
- trading.ws uses trading.domain, so a change to trading.domain can break trading.ws, while a change to trading.ws can't break trading.domain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.ws uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
24→16 trading.events uses trading.domain✕
- Connections
- 13 pairs of types, where a type in trading.events uses a type in trading.domain.
- The types involved
trading.events.AuthorEvent→trading.domain.CorrelationIdtrading.events.AuthorEvent→trading.domain.EventIdtrading.events.AuthorEvent→trading.domain.Timestamptrading.events.ForecastEvent→trading.domain.CorrelationIdtrading.events.ForecastEvent→trading.domain.EventIdtrading.events.ForecastEvent→trading.domain.ForecastIdtrading.events.ForecastEvent→trading.domain.Timestamptrading.events.SwitchEvent→trading.domain.CorrelationIdtrading.events.SwitchEvent→trading.domain.EventIdtrading.events.SwitchEvent→trading.domain.Timestamptrading.events.TradeEvent→trading.domain.CorrelationIdtrading.events.TradeEvent→trading.domain.EventIdtrading.events.TradeEvent→trading.domain.Timestamp
- Direction
- trading.events uses trading.domain, so a change to trading.domain can break trading.events, while a change to trading.events can't break trading.domain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.events uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
24→18 trading.events uses trading.commands✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in trading.events uses a type in trading.commands.
- The types involved
trading.events.TradeEvent→trading.commands.TradeCommand
- Direction
- trading.events uses trading.commands, so a change to trading.commands can break trading.events, while a change to trading.events can't break trading.commands.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.events uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
25→20 trading.lib.Producer uses trading.lib✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in trading.lib.Producer uses a type in trading.lib.
- The types involved
trading.lib.Producer.Dummy→trading.lib.Producertrading.lib.Producer.Dummy→trading.lib.Txn
- Direction
- trading.lib.Producer uses trading.lib, so a change to trading.lib can break trading.lib.Producer, while a change to trading.lib.Producer can't break trading.lib.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.lib.Producer uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
26→13 trading.alerts uses trading.state✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in trading.alerts uses a type in trading.state.
- The types involved
trading.alerts.Engine→trading.state.TradeState
- Direction
- trading.alerts uses trading.state, so a change to trading.state can break trading.alerts, while a change to trading.alerts can't break trading.state.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.alerts uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
26→16 trading.alerts uses trading.domain✕
- Connections
- 6 pairs of types, where a type in trading.alerts uses a type in trading.domain.
- The types involved
trading.alerts.AlertsConfig→trading.domain.AppIdtrading.alerts.AlertsConfig→trading.domain.RedisURItrading.alerts.Engine→trading.domain.Alerttrading.alerts.Engine→trading.domain.AppIdtrading.alerts.Engine→trading.domain.PriceUpdatetrading.alerts.Main→trading.domain.AppId
- Direction
- trading.alerts uses trading.domain, so a change to trading.domain can break trading.alerts, while a change to trading.alerts can't break trading.domain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.alerts uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
26→20 trading.alerts uses trading.lib✕
- Connections
- 4 pairs of types, where a type in trading.alerts uses a type in trading.lib.
- The types involved
trading.alerts.Engine→trading.lib.Ackertrading.alerts.Engine→trading.lib.FSMtrading.alerts.Engine→trading.lib.Producertrading.alerts.Engine→trading.lib.Txn
- Direction
- trading.alerts uses trading.lib, so a change to trading.lib can break trading.alerts, while a change to trading.alerts can't break trading.lib.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.alerts uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
26→24 trading.alerts uses trading.events✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in trading.alerts uses a type in trading.events.
- The types involved
trading.alerts.Engine→trading.events.SwitchEventtrading.alerts.Engine→trading.events.TradeEvent
- Direction
- trading.alerts uses trading.events, so a change to trading.events can break trading.alerts, while a change to trading.alerts can't break trading.events.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.alerts uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
27→18 trading.feed uses trading.commands✕
- Connections
- 4 pairs of types, where a type in trading.feed uses a type in trading.commands.
- The types involved
trading.feed.Feed→trading.commands.ForecastCommandtrading.feed.Feed→trading.commands.SwitchCommandtrading.feed.Feed→trading.commands.TradeCommandtrading.feed.ForecastFeed→trading.commands.ForecastCommand
- Direction
- trading.feed uses trading.commands, so a change to trading.commands can break trading.feed, while a change to trading.feed can't break trading.commands.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.feed uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
27→20 trading.feed uses trading.lib✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in trading.feed uses a type in trading.lib.
- The types involved
trading.feed.Feed→trading.lib.Producertrading.feed.ForecastFeed→trading.lib.Consumertrading.feed.ForecastFeed→trading.lib.Producer
- Direction
- trading.feed uses trading.lib, so a change to trading.lib can break trading.feed, while a change to trading.feed can't break trading.lib.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.feed uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
27→24 trading.feed uses trading.events✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in trading.feed uses a type in trading.events.
- The types involved
trading.feed.ForecastFeed→trading.events.AuthorEventtrading.feed.ForecastFeed→trading.events.ForecastEvent
- Direction
- trading.feed uses trading.events, so a change to trading.events can break trading.feed, while a change to trading.feed can't break trading.events.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.feed uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
28→7 trading.forecasts.cdc uses trading.lib.Consumer✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in trading.forecasts.cdc uses a type in trading.lib.Consumer.
- The types involved
trading.forecasts.cdc.OutboxHandler→trading.lib.Consumer.Msg
- Direction
- trading.forecasts.cdc uses trading.lib.Consumer, so a change to trading.lib.Consumer can break trading.forecasts.cdc, while a change to trading.forecasts.cdc can't break trading.lib.Consumer.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.forecasts.cdc uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
28→16 trading.forecasts.cdc uses trading.domain✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in trading.forecasts.cdc uses a type in trading.domain.
- The types involved
trading.forecasts.cdc.OutboxEvent→trading.domain.CorrelationIdtrading.forecasts.cdc.OutboxEvent→trading.domain.EventIdtrading.forecasts.cdc.OutboxEvent→trading.domain.Timestamp
- Direction
- trading.forecasts.cdc uses trading.domain, so a change to trading.domain can break trading.forecasts.cdc, while a change to trading.forecasts.cdc can't break trading.domain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.forecasts.cdc uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
28→24 trading.forecasts.cdc uses trading.events✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in trading.forecasts.cdc uses a type in trading.events.
- The types involved
trading.forecasts.cdc.OutboxEvent→trading.events.AuthorEventtrading.forecasts.cdc.OutboxEvent→trading.events.ForecastEvent
- Direction
- trading.forecasts.cdc uses trading.events, so a change to trading.events can break trading.forecasts.cdc, while a change to trading.forecasts.cdc can't break trading.events.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.forecasts.cdc uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
29→16 trading.forecasts.store uses trading.domain✕
- Connections
- 15 pairs of types, where a type in trading.forecasts.store uses a type in trading.domain.
- The types involved
trading.forecasts.store.AuthorStore→trading.domain.Authortrading.forecasts.store.AuthorStore→trading.domain.AuthorIdtrading.forecasts.store.DuplicateEventId→trading.domain.EventIdtrading.forecasts.store.ForecastStore→trading.domain.Forecasttrading.forecasts.store.ForecastStore→trading.domain.ForecastIdtrading.forecasts.store.SQL→trading.domain.Authortrading.forecasts.store.SQL→trading.domain.AuthorIdtrading.forecasts.store.SQL→trading.domain.Forecasttrading.forecasts.store.SQL→trading.domain.ForecastIdtrading.forecasts.store.SQL→trading.domain.VoteResulttrading.forecasts.store.TxAuthorStore→trading.domain.Authortrading.forecasts.store.TxForecastStore→trading.domain.AuthorIdtrading.forecasts.store.TxForecastStore→trading.domain.Forecasttrading.forecasts.store.TxForecastStore→trading.domain.ForecastIdtrading.forecasts.store.TxForecastStore→trading.domain.VoteResult
- Direction
- trading.forecasts.store uses trading.domain, so a change to trading.domain can break trading.forecasts.store, while a change to trading.forecasts.store can't break trading.domain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.forecasts.store uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
29→24 trading.forecasts.store uses trading.events✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in trading.forecasts.store uses a type in trading.events.
- The types involved
trading.forecasts.store.SQL→trading.events.ForecastEventtrading.forecasts.store.TxAuthorStore→trading.events.AuthorEventtrading.forecasts.store.TxForecastStore→trading.events.ForecastEvent
- Direction
- trading.forecasts.store uses trading.events, so a change to trading.events can break trading.forecasts.store, while a change to trading.forecasts.store can't break trading.events.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.forecasts.store uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
30→13 trading.processor uses trading.state✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in trading.processor uses a type in trading.state.
- The types involved
trading.processor.Engine→trading.state.TradeState
- Direction
- trading.processor uses trading.state, so a change to trading.state can break trading.processor, while a change to trading.processor can't break trading.state.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.processor uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
30→16 trading.processor uses trading.domain✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in trading.processor uses a type in trading.domain.
- The types involved
trading.processor.Main→trading.domain.AppIdtrading.processor.ProcessorConfig→trading.domain.AppId
- Direction
- trading.processor uses trading.domain, so a change to trading.domain can break trading.processor, while a change to trading.processor can't break trading.domain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.processor uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
30→18 trading.processor uses trading.commands✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in trading.processor uses a type in trading.commands.
- The types involved
trading.processor.Engine→trading.commands.SwitchCommandtrading.processor.Engine→trading.commands.TradeCommand
- Direction
- trading.processor uses trading.commands, so a change to trading.commands can break trading.processor, while a change to trading.processor can't break trading.commands.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.processor uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
30→20 trading.processor uses trading.lib✕
- Connections
- 4 pairs of types, where a type in trading.processor uses a type in trading.lib.
- The types involved
trading.processor.Engine→trading.lib.Ackertrading.processor.Engine→trading.lib.FSMtrading.processor.Engine→trading.lib.Producertrading.processor.Engine→trading.lib.Txn
- Direction
- trading.processor uses trading.lib, so a change to trading.lib can break trading.processor, while a change to trading.processor can't break trading.lib.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.processor uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
30→24 trading.processor uses trading.events✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in trading.processor uses a type in trading.events.
- The types involved
trading.processor.Engine→trading.events.SwitchEventtrading.processor.Engine→trading.events.TradeEvent
- Direction
- trading.processor uses trading.events, so a change to trading.events can break trading.processor, while a change to trading.processor can't break trading.events.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.processor uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
31→16 trading.snapshots uses trading.domain✕
- Connections
- 4 pairs of types, where a type in trading.snapshots uses a type in trading.domain.
- The types involved
trading.snapshots.Main→trading.domain.AppIdtrading.snapshots.SnapshotsConfig→trading.domain.AppIdtrading.snapshots.SnapshotsConfig→trading.domain.KeyExpirationtrading.snapshots.SnapshotsConfig→trading.domain.RedisURI
- Direction
- trading.snapshots uses trading.domain, so a change to trading.domain can break trading.snapshots, while a change to trading.snapshots can't break trading.domain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.snapshots uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
31→19 trading.snapshots uses trading.core.snapshots✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in trading.snapshots uses a type in trading.core.snapshots.
- The types involved
trading.snapshots.Engine→trading.core.snapshots.SnapshotWriter
- Direction
- trading.snapshots uses trading.core.snapshots, so a change to trading.core.snapshots can break trading.snapshots, while a change to trading.snapshots can't break trading.core.snapshots.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.snapshots uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
31→20 trading.snapshots uses trading.lib✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in trading.snapshots uses a type in trading.lib.
- The types involved
trading.snapshots.Engine→trading.lib.Ackertrading.snapshots.Engine→trading.lib.FSM
- Direction
- trading.snapshots uses trading.lib, so a change to trading.lib can break trading.snapshots, while a change to trading.snapshots can't break trading.lib.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.snapshots uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
31→24 trading.snapshots uses trading.events✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in trading.snapshots uses a type in trading.events.
- The types involved
trading.snapshots.Engine→trading.events.SwitchEventtrading.snapshots.Engine→trading.events.TradeEvent
- Direction
- trading.snapshots uses trading.events, so a change to trading.events can break trading.snapshots, while a change to trading.snapshots can't break trading.events.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.snapshots uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
32→14 trading.trace.tracer uses trading.trace✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in trading.trace.tracer uses a type in trading.trace.
- The types involved
trading.trace.tracer.TradingTracer→trading.trace.CmdKerneltrading.trace.tracer.TradingTracer→trading.trace.EvtKernel
- Direction
- trading.trace.tracer uses trading.trace, so a change to trading.trace can break trading.trace.tracer, while a change to trading.trace.tracer can't break trading.trace.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.trace.tracer uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
32→16 trading.trace.tracer uses trading.domain✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in trading.trace.tracer uses a type in trading.domain.
- The types involved
trading.trace.tracer.TradingTracer→trading.domain.Alert
- Direction
- trading.trace.tracer uses trading.domain, so a change to trading.domain can break trading.trace.tracer, while a change to trading.trace.tracer can't break trading.domain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.trace.tracer uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
32→18 trading.trace.tracer uses trading.commands✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in trading.trace.tracer uses a type in trading.commands.
- The types involved
trading.trace.tracer.ForecastingTracer→trading.commands.ForecastCommandtrading.trace.tracer.TradingTracer→trading.commands.TradeCommand
- Direction
- trading.trace.tracer uses trading.commands, so a change to trading.commands can break trading.trace.tracer, while a change to trading.trace.tracer can't break trading.commands.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.trace.tracer uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
32→24 trading.trace.tracer uses trading.events✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in trading.trace.tracer uses a type in trading.events.
- The types involved
trading.trace.tracer.ForecastingTracer→trading.events.AuthorEventtrading.trace.tracer.ForecastingTracer→trading.events.ForecastEventtrading.trace.tracer.TradingTracer→trading.events.TradeEvent
- Direction
- trading.trace.tracer uses trading.events, so a change to trading.events can break trading.trace.tracer, while a change to trading.trace.tracer can't break trading.events.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: trading.trace.tracer uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Domain Modelling
At a glance — Accessibility
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration | 250 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 27 | High / Critical |
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 21 | High / Critical |
| A07:2025 — Authentication Failures | 2 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality; Resolve the 24 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with Main.scala (6), Engine.scala (2), build.sbt; Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. | +3.8 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Resolve the 24 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with Main.scala (6), Engine.scala (2), build.sbt. | +3.8 pts | Medium | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2). | +1.6 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +3.1 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +0.9 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Secure the server's transport: serve TLS itself (akka/pekko-http `ConnectionContext.httpsServer(sslContext)` with `newServerAt(…).enableHttps(…)`, an http4s server builder's `withTLS(…)`, Play's `https.port`), or run it behind a TLS-terminating proxy and trust it (`X-Forwarded-Proto`; Play `play.http.forwarded.trustedProxies`); send `Strict-Transport-Security` once it is HTTPS-only (http4s `HSTS(…)`, Play `RedirectHttpsFilter`). | +1.7 pts | Medium | Web-Security Posture |
| Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape. | +1.4 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Resolve the 8 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. | +0.7 pts | Low | Kernel & Syscall Confinement |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.4 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.3 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.6 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.6 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.6 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.6 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.6 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.6 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.6 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.6 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.5 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 3.1 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 3.3 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 3.7 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.8 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 75 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 75 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 349 of 374 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.scala) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`addSbtPlugin("org.scoverage" % "sbt-scoverage" % "<version>")` in `project/plugins.sbt`, then `sbt clean coverage test coverageReport`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (`addSbtPlugin("org.scoverage" % "sbt-scoverage" % "<version>")` in `project/plugins.sbt`, then `sbt clean coverage test coverageReport`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (6 contributor(s) across 856 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 88% of the history; the other 5 hold 2.4% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
- D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's deterministic naming rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. Until then its declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether its names are consistent.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict. For npm the surface is what a published package.json's entry points (exports, main, module, types) export, followed through the source; an entry that names build output the tree does not commit (dist/, build/) is not followed back to source, because only a tsconfig outDir/rootDir pair states that mapping and a bundler's input lives in executable configuration this engine does not evaluate.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
- D27 Navigability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `modules/domain/shared/src/main/scala/trading/commands/ForecastCommand.scala`, `modules/domain/shared/src/main/scala/trading/commands/SwitchCommand.scala`, `modules/domain/shared/src/main/scala/trading/commands/TradeCommand.scala`, `modules/domain/shared/src/main/scala/trading/domain/Alert.scala`, `modules/domain/shared/src/main/scala/trading/domain/AlertType.scala`, … (+25 more) produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection singletons in C#, Spring/JSR-330/CDI singletons in Java and Kotlin, module state in Python request handlers, handler state in Go and Swift, Play controllers, Cask routes, Scalatra servlets, Finatra controllers, Akka/Pekko HTTP routes and JSR-330 singletons in Scala, Rails, Sinatra, Grape, Roda and Hanami handlers and Rack apps in Ruby, and module state in F# request handlers (Giraffe, Saturn, Falco, Oxpecker and Suave handlers and ASP.NET Core controllers) only, and this repository's product is written in Scala (http4s), which was left unread, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (REDACTED). compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — redis Error context canceled pulsar Error context canceled forecasts Error context canceled tracing Error context canceled ws-server Error context canceled grafana Error context canceled Error response from daemon: pull access denied for trading-snapshots, repository does not exist or may require 'docker login': denied: requested access to the resource is denied; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: forecasts Error context canceled grafana Error context canceled pulsar Error context canceled redis Error context canceled tracing Error context canceled snapshots Error context canceled ws-server Error context canceled Error response from daemon: pull access denied for trading-processor, repository does not exist or may require 'docker login': denied: requested access to the resource is denied; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped.
- C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
- C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
- DM8 Value-object opportunities — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check finds primitive parameters that travel together through several signatures of the domain (a missing value object). Its deterministic rule has not yet shown 95 % precision on adjudicated rows, so the clumps it finds are counted here and not published as findings, and the card carries no score. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- DM9 Scattered domain decisions — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The frontend declares that it computes whether a construction is produced or passed, yet 1 of 41 constructions arrived without the answer. Arm two skipped them; it did not clear them.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — we run the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
7 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Main.resources at 55.
What to do
- Bring the 7 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with Main.resources (cognitive 55), Main.resources (cognitive 55), Main.resources (cognitive 45). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 7 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 6.9 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
2 duplicated block group(s) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with Config.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (6–7 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with ForecastingTracer.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D5 · Coupling
12 production modules (sbt), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; a dependsOn spread (deps: _*) and a project whose directory a helper computes are not visible there; 2 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 11 of the 12 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, declare types in source no model reads, or have no source directory of their own).
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D9 · Test Distribution
28 test methods: 28 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The Scala suite contributes 28 test case(s) across 13 file(s) in a test source set declaring at least one — every `test("…")`, `it("…")`, `property("…")` and `"…" in {…}` registration and every JUnit `@Test`, which is how munit, ScalaTest, utest, ZIO Test and specs2 declare a case; a case registered under a computed name is not counted, so this is a floor. Its tier split is INFERRED from paths and file names, except sbt's src/it source set, which the build declares.
D11 · Test Reliability
0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). Scala (repository root, 18 test files): measured (0 flaky).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
9 outdated direct sbt declarations. 14 of 15 direct declarations were graded against Maven Central (1 not published there, which is what a private Nexus or Artifactory artifact looks like, 0 declaring a version range rather than an exact version). An sbt declaration names an EXACT version, so the remedy is an edit to the build file — there is no lockfile refresh that would move it. Test-, Provided- and it-scoped declarations are excluded, because a consumer of this project never receives them. A version held in a Scala val is read only when the val is one string literal: sbt is a program rather than a manifest, and evaluating a computed version would invent the measurement rather than take it. Whether any artifact is DEPRECATED or ABANDONED is not graded and cannot be — Maven Central publishes no such marker, and release age does not stand in for one: the most widely depended-upon libraries are routinely the stalest, being finished rather than abandoned. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question.
What to do
- Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D13 · Secret Scanning
1 secret(s) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 14 declared sbt dependency artifact(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from the POMs Maven Central publishes, over the production coordinates this repository's 2 sbt build file(s) (build.sbt and project/*.scala) declare with a literal version, directly or through a string-literal val — `%%` resolved to the Scala binary suffix Central publishes under, test-scoped declarations excluded — the same declaration-site closure this analysis reads for dependency currency. sbt has no lockfile a checkout carries, so this is deliberately NOT the transitive closure. A further 1 coordinate(s) are not published to Maven Central — another repository (Google's Maven hosts androidx), a SNAPSHOT, or a private artifact — so their licences are not readable from here and they are outside this verdict.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted task-comment markers across 4760 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 1 document(s) read across 2 unit(s).
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 2 build units (npm, sbt) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
27 finding(s): 0 critical, 15 high, 12 medium, 0 low. 10 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 10 file(s) — `REDACTED`, `REDACTED`, `modules/domain/shared/src/main/scala/trading/commands/TradeCommand.scala`, `modules/domain/shared/src/main/scala/trading/state/TradeState.scala`, `modules/ws-client/index.html` (line 19), … (+5 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 10 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
8 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 2 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 6 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
D31 · IaC & Container Security
250 finding(s): 0 critical, 16 high, 186 medium, 48 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 186 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (22), REDACTED (22), REDACTED (22). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (186 warning-level).
- Resolve the 16 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (6), REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 issue-level).
- Resolve the 48 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (6), REDACTED (6), REDACTED (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (48 recommendation-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
24 of 24 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is build.sbt. Counted over 24 of the 122 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 24 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with Main.scala (6), Engine.scala (2), build.sbt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (24 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 5 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D40 · Network Egress Confinement
1/2 network-egress controls present (network policy, egress restriction).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No egress restriction finding(s) in Network Egress Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement
0/8 workload(s) run every container under a seccomp profile; 0/8 declare an AppArmor/SELinux profile.
What to do
- Resolve the 8 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 recommendation-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
1 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with build.sbt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
- An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×2) — modules/ws-client/index.html:19, web-app/index.html:21
What to do
- Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels
AC3 · Page structure
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×2) — modules/ws-client/index.html:2, web-app/index.html:2
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (an accessibility check that can read your UI — no component framework was detected and your pages are rendered by server-side templates, which neither the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins nor the HTML-template linters can parse; run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, or assert the accessibility invariants over that rendered HTML in the test suite you already have) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start by running that check over your rendered pages in CI. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 2 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here. — modules/ws-client/package.json:11
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add an accessibility check that can read your UI — no component framework was detected and your pages are rendered by server-side templates, which neither the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins nor the HTML-template linters can parse; run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, or assert the accessibility invariants over that rendered HTML in the test suite you already have, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX6 · Interface segregation
AX8 · Test isolation
DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
- `PriceUpdate` (domain) — a transport codec (circe/derevo/spray/…) is derived directly on the domain entity — the type knows its own wire representation. Invert the dependency: keep the domain core free of framework/transport types (derive codecs on a boundary DTO; express infra behind a domain-owned port). — modules/domain/shared/src/main/scala/trading/domain/PriceUpdate.scala:9
What to do
- Invert domain→infrastructure dependencies: declare interfaces in the domain, implement them in infrastructure (Dependency Inversion).
DM9 · Scattered domain decisions
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something. (×3) — modules/domain/jvm/src/test/scala/trading/ws/WsCodecSuite.scala:81, modules/domain/jvm/src/test/scala/trading/ws/WsCodecSuite.scala:88, modules/it/src/test/scala/trading/it/RedisSuite.scala:32
- A bare `// scalastyle:off`, `// scalafix:off` or `@nowarn` (or Wartremover's `warts.All`) switches every rule or warning off — hidden debt. Suppress the specific rule on the specific line, with a justification, instead. (×2) — modules/feed/src/main/scala/trading/feed/Feed.scala:54, modules/lib/src/main/scala/trading/lib/orphan.scala:26
What to do
- Clear the softer debt: re-enable or delete `ignore`d and `pending` tests, decide whether each empty method or UnsupportedOperationException is deliberate (and say so in a comment), and replace a bare `// scalastyle:off` or `@nowarn` with targeted, justified suppressions.
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 1 of 1 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P2 · Observability
What to do
- Add a health-check endpoint (@godaddy/terminus or a /health route) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- `modules/ws-client/package.json` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — modules/ws-client/package.json:11
What to do
- Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency but is not wired into CI — run it as a required step on push/PR (e.g. `composer phpstan` / `mix sobelow` / `bundle exec brakeman` / the spotbugs Gradle task / `sbt scalafixAll --check` / `golangci-lint run` / `rebar3 lint`) so a regression fails the build instead of relying on someone running it locally.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup
What to do
- Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
- No persistence guard on critical data stores — use Docker named volumes (or your orchestrator's persistent-volume equivalent) so the data store can't be wiped by a container recreate (or, in cloud, set purge-protection / soft-delete / prevent_destroy).
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
P8 · Schema migrations
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- This repository runs an HTTP server and nothing in its Scala source or committed configuration secures the transport: no HTTPS served (akka/pekko-http `ConnectionContext.httpsServer`/`enableHttps`, an http4s builder's `withTLS`, Jetty's `SslContextFactory`, zio-http's `SSLConfig`, Play's `https.port`), no `Strict-Transport-Security` header, HSTS middleware or Play `RedirectHttpsFilter`, no `X-Forwarded-Proto` read or Play `play.http.forwarded.trustedProxies` for a TLS-terminating proxy — so its traffic may cross the network in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: modules/core/src/main/scala/trading/core/http/Ember.scala:9 — `EmberServerBuilder`.
- None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is set on a response this repository's Scala server sends — defense in depth, even when a proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: modules/core/src/main/scala/trading/core/http/Ember.scala:9 — `EmberServerBuilder`.
What to do
- Secure the server's transport: serve TLS itself (akka/pekko-http `ConnectionContext.httpsServer(sslContext)` with `newServerAt(…).enableHttps(…)`, an http4s server builder's `withTLS(…)`, Play's `https.port`), or run it behind a TLS-terminating proxy and trust it (`X-Forwarded-Proto`; Play `play.http.forwarded.trustedProxies`); send `Strict-Transport-Security` once it is HTTPS-only (http4s `HSTS(…)`, Play `RedirectHttpsFilter`).
- Set security response headers on what the server sends — keep Play's `SecurityHeadersFilter` enabled, wrap akka/pekko-http routes in `respondWithHeaders(RawHeader("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff"), …)`, or add an http4s middleware that sets `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Content-Type-Options` and a frame policy on every response.
X1 · Async correctness
X12 · Unreachable branch
X13 · Undrained process stream
X14 · Bypassable address classification
X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader
X16 · Unfloored truncation loop
X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document
X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness
X19 · Unrestored process-global state
X20 · Mistyped argument guard
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X22 · Contradicted release guard
X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped
X25 · Inert configuration knob
X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff
X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard
X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element
X3 · Exception handling
X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects
X5 · Nullable reference types
- No build over this repository's 97 Scala product file(s) passes `-Yexplicit-nulls`, enables WartRemover's `Null` wart or runs Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls`, so every reference type admits null and nothing reports a `null` written into the code or returned from a Java API — the first one to reach a method call is a `NullPointerException`. `Option` by convention is a habit no tool here holds the code to.
What to do
- On Scala 3, add `-Yexplicit-nulls` to `scalacOptions` so `String` and `String | Null` mean different things, and type each Java API's result as nullable where it can return null; on Scala 2 (or as a first step), enable WartRemover's `Null` wart (`wartremoverErrors += Wart.Null`) or Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls = true` so the code holds absence in `Option`. Then pay the assertions down rather than adding to them: each `.nn` is a null the compiler could not rule out — wrap the Java value in `Option(…)` at the boundary, pattern-match on `null` once there, or change the API so the null cannot arrive; an `unsafeNulls` import switches the checking off for everything after it.
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 74% | Adequate — gated by X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 97% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 50% | Weak — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 56% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 52% | Adequate — gated by D29, D31, D36 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 88% | Strong | Solid. |
| Accessibility | 53% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Performance | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Not included — 56 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No styled element found in the parsed markup — AC6 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's Scala imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 18 — an image could not be pulled) — redis Error context canceled pulsar Error context canceled forecasts Error context canceled tracing Error context canceled ws-server Error context canceled grafana Error context canceled Error response from daemon: pull access denied for trading-snapshots, repository does not exist or may require 'docker login': denied: requested access to the resource is denied; the earlier `compose pull` step reported: forecasts Error context canceled grafana Error context canceled pulsar Error context canceled redis Error context canceled tracing Error context canceled snapshots Error context canceled ws-server Error context canceled Error response from daemon: pull access denied for trading-processor, repository does not exist or may require 'docker login': denied: requested access to the resource is denied; the runtime sandbox reaches registries only through the in-fence pull-through mirror, so an image the mirror does not carry cannot be fetched — this is a limit of our sandbox, not of your stack; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named column (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone_number, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, a MongoDB or Cassandra driver, JDBC) imported either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, JDBC, MongoDB, Cassandra, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, JDBC, MongoDB, Cassandra, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
- D10 Test Quality — ~1535 lines of test source are present (.scala) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency is measured on C# and TypeScript only; JavaScript, Scala not measured.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .scala source were not judged.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.scala), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 30 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured: of the 152 type(s) found, none both holds instance state and has two or more methods whose shared use of it could be read (113 with fewer than two methods, 39 stateless), so LCOM4 is undefined for every type in this repository. Not scored — the metric does not apply here, and this is not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — no aggregates detected — aggregate-boundary check not applicable
- DM10 One transaction, one aggregate — no repository writes detected — no operation to judge against the one-aggregate rule
- DM11 Constructible invalid state — no entities detected — construction-time invariants not assessable
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model — no data-bearing entities detected — rich-vs-anemic model not assessable
- DM5 Encapsulated state — no domain entities found — DM5 grades how entities protect their state, and this repository declares none
- DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
- DM8 Value-object opportunities — not scored — the deterministic rule found 0 candidate clump(s); its rows are withheld until it has a measured precision of 95 % (a sample of fewer than 10 rows cannot show one)
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JVM, JavaScript/TypeScript source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`addSbtPlugin("org.scoverage" % "sbt-scoverage" % "<version>")` in `project/plugins.sbt`, then `sbt clean coverage test coverageReport`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Scala was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Scala request takes no token: a Future cannot be cancelled, and cats-effect, ZIO and Monix interrupt the fiber that made the request from outside the call, not through a parameter
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Scala was read, and it logs through none that an interpolated message defeats: scala-logging takes an `s"…"` message apart into SLF4J's pattern and arguments at compile time, and log4s, grizzled-slf4j, Play's Logger, Akka's LoggingAdapter, sbt's Logger and Spark's Logging take one finished message (as log4net does in C#). Calls made straight through SLF4J (`org.slf4j.Logger`) would be judged.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 42 finding(s)
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- <img> without a text alternative modules/ws-client/index.html:19
- <img> without a text alternative web-app/index.html:21
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- Domain depends on infrastructure: PriceUpdate modules/domain/shared/src/main/scala/trading/domain/PriceUpdate.scala:9
Serious — 224 finding(s)
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- Page without a main landmark modules/ws-client/index.html:2
- Page without a main landmark web-app/index.html:2
- Main.resources (cognitive 55) modules/forecasts/src/main/scala/trading/forecasts/Main.scala:55
- Main.resources (cognitive 55) modules/tracing/src/main/scala/trading/trace/Main.scala:63
- Main.resources (cognitive 36) modules/feed/src/main/scala/trading/feed/Main.scala:53
- Main.resources (cognitive 36) modules/snapshots/src/main/scala/trading/snapshots/Main.scala:61
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- Off the main sequence: domain
- Off the main sequence: core
- Accessibility enforcement below the top rung modules/ws-client/package.json:11
- Main.resources (cognitive 45) modules/alerts/src/main/scala/trading/alerts/Main.scala:77
- Main.resources (cognitive 28) modules/processor/src/main/scala/trading/processor/Main.scala:64
- Engine.fsm (cognitive 16) modules/alerts/src/main/scala/trading/alerts/Engine.scala:18
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- Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) modules/forecasts/src/main/scala/trading/forecasts/Config.scala:18
- Duplicated block (6–7 lines × 2) modules/tracing/src/main/scala/trading/trace/tracer/ForecastingTracer.scala:44
- End-of-life runtime: Scala 3.5 build.sbt:1
Minor — 99 finding(s)
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- Orphaned file build.sbt:1
- Orphaned file modules/x-demo/src/main/scala/demo/tracer/TraceApp.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/lib/src/main/scala/trading/lib/Consumer.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/alerts/src/main/scala/trading/alerts/Engine.scala:1
- Orphaned file project/Dependencies.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/ws-client/src/main/scala/trading/client/View.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/alerts/src/main/scala/trading/alerts/Main.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/domain/shared/src/main/scala/trading/state/TradeState.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/forecasts/src/main/scala/trading/forecasts/store/SQL.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/lib/src/main/scala/trading/lib/Producer.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/tracing/src/main/scala/trading/trace/Main.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/forecasts/src/main/scala/trading/forecasts/Main.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/ws-server/src/main/scala/trading/ws/Handler.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/x-demo/src/main/scala/demo/PulsarCDC.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/snapshots/src/main/scala/trading/snapshots/Main.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/tracing/src/main/scala/trading/trace/fsm/trading.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/processor/src/main/scala/trading/processor/Main.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/lib/src/main/scala/trading/lib/ext.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/core/src/main/scala/trading/core/TradeEngine.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/ws-client/src/main/scala/trading/client/Model.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/forecasts/src/main/scala/trading/forecasts/Engine.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/feed/src/main/scala/trading/feed/Feed.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/tracing/src/main/scala/trading/trace/tracer/ForecastingTracer.scala:1
- Orphaned file modules/feed/src/main/scala/trading/feed/Main.scala:1
- No seccomp profile REDACTED:2
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- Disabled test modules/domain/jvm/src/test/scala/trading/ws/WsCodecSuite.scala:81
- Disabled test modules/domain/jvm/src/test/scala/trading/ws/WsCodecSuite.scala:88
- Disabled test modules/it/src/test/scala/trading/it/RedisSuite.scala:32
- Blanket warning suppression modules/feed/src/main/scala/trading/feed/Feed.scala:54
- Blanket warning suppression modules/lib/src/main/scala/trading/lib/orphan.scala:26
- No ADRs found
- Dormant codebase
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- No egress restriction
- No ADRs
- No architecture diagram/doc
- No dependency-update automation modules/ws-client/package.json:11
- No changelog
- No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected
- No security response headers detected
- Scala's null is not held to the type system everywhere
Minor — 9 finding(s)
- Outdated: com.github.fd4s:fs2-kafka_3
- Outdated: dev.profunktor:redis4cats-effects_3
- Outdated: dev.scalafreaks:odin-core_3
- Outdated: org.flywaydb:flyway-core
- Outdated: org.scalacheck:scalacheck_3
- Outdated: org.tpolecat:natchez-core_3
- Outdated: org.tpolecat:natchez-honeycomb_3
- Outdated: org.tpolecat:natchez-http4s_3
- Outdated: org.typelevel:log4cats-noop_3
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-4aabd12292054df2aea936a5c5eb7716/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-4aabd12292054df2aea936a5c5eb7716/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 27 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 8 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 250 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 30 file(s) — `modules/domain/shared/src/main/scala/trading/commands/ForecastCommand.scala`, `modules/domain/shared/src/main/scala/trading/commands/SwitchCommand.scala`, `modules/domain/shared/src/main/scala/trading/commands/TradeCommand.scala`, `modules/domain/shared/src/main/scala/trading/domain/Alert.scala`, `modules/domain/shared/src/main/scala/trading/domain/AlertType.scala`, … (+25 more) — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover them at all. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |