Executive summary
google/zx falls short of our standard for production because we found no logging, tracing or health checks in the code. It scores 60 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, and one of its two critical findings is a security problem in its servers and containers.
Production Readiness, at 48, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step for the work it takes is recording design decisions, worth about 4 points. Adding a diagnostic log would lift Production Readiness itself, worth about 7 points. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 68.
One setting leaves the servers or containers unsafe. Correcting the unsafe settings would close this risk. The use of a package that isn't listed needs adding to the project's list of dependencies.
The product code is 4,026 lines, about €9,800 to rebuild.
If Production Readiness rose from 48 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 60 to about 68.
New since the last survey: 5 findings
- Code Coverage · Coverage not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite
- Cancellation propagation · Async function without AbortSignal: kill src/core.ts
- Exception handling · Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/core.ts
- Exception handling · Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/core.ts
- Exception handling · Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/core.ts
Fixed since the last survey: 91 findings
- Secrets (history) · High secret: WD-SECRET-0005 package-lock.json
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/jsr-publish.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/jsr-publish.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/jsr-publish.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/jsr-publish.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/jsr-publish.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/jsr-publish.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag REDACTED
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/test.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/zizmor.yml
- Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium: watchdog-regexp-from-parameter-ts scripts/build-js.mjs
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file scripts/build-js.mjs
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file scripts/npm-audit.js
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file scripts/build-dts.mjs
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file scripts/build-pkgjson-lite.mjs
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file scripts/build-versions.mjs
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file scripts/build-size-limit.mjs
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file scripts/build-tests.mjs
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file scripts/build-pkgjson-main.mjs
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file scripts/build-clean.mjs
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file scripts/deno.polyfill.js
- Test Coverage · No test reaches this file scripts/import-meta-url.polyfill.js
- Exception handling · Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/core.ts
- Exception handling · Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/core.ts
- Exception handling · Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/core.ts
Rebuild cost: about €9,800 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €3,300 to €16,000, for 54 to 172 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.8 at a score of 60. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 4,026 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 scripts | 2 src.error | 3 src.util | 4 src.vendor-extra | 5 src.core | 6 (global) | 7 src |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 scripts | |||||||
| 2 src.error | |||||||
| 3 src.util | |||||||
| 4 src.vendor-extra | |||||||
| 5 src.core | 2 | ||||||
| 6 (global) | 1 | ||||||
| 7 src | 2 | 1 | 1 |
5→3 src.core uses src.util✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in src.core uses a type in src.util.
- The types involved
src.core.Options→src.util.Durationsrc.core.ProcessPromise→src.util.Duration
- Direction
- src.core uses src.util, so a change to src.util can break src.core, while a change to src.core can't break src.util.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.core uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
6→5 (global) uses src.core✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in (global) uses a type in src.core.
- The types involved
index→src.core.ProcessPromise
- Direction
- (global) uses src.core, so a change to src.core can break (global), while a change to (global) can't break src.core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: (global) uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
7→3 src uses src.util✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in src uses a type in src.util.
- The types involved
src.goods→src.util.Durationsrc.util→src.util.Duration
- Direction
- src uses src.util, so a change to src.util can break src, while a change to src can't break src.util.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
7→4 src uses src.vendor-extra✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src uses a type in src.vendor-extra.
- The types involved
src.goods→src.vendor-extra.ParsedArgs
- Direction
- src uses src.vendor-extra, so a change to src.vendor-extra can break src, while a change to src can't break src.vendor-extra.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
7→5 src uses src.core✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src uses a type in src.core.
- The types involved
src.core→src.core.Options
- Direction
- src uses src.core, so a change to src.core can break src, while a change to src can't break src.core.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 4 | Medium |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 2 | Medium |
| A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration | 2 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Write a diagnostic trail the user can hand back with a bug report: a log file under the platform's per-user data directory, switchable with a `--verbose`/`--debug` flag. Start with the error paths that emit nothing — a discarded error is the failure the user cannot describe and you cannot reproduce; Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with package.json; Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with package.json. | +4.0 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Write a diagnostic trail the user can hand back with a bug report: a log file under the platform's per-user data directory, switchable with a `--verbose`/`--debug` flag. Start with the error paths that emit nothing — a discarded error is the failure the user cannot describe and you cannot reproduce. | +6.9 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +3.2 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Resolve the 7 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with cli.test.js (5), bun.test.js, build-jsr.test.js. | +1.6 pts | Low | Test Quality |
| Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release. | +2.2 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. | +1.0 pts | Low | Bus Factor |
| Thread an AbortSignal through async functions that make requests, so the work stops when its caller gives up. | +1.5 pts | Medium | Cancellation propagation |
| Resolve the 1 finding(s) in Type Safety. | +1.3 pts | Medium | Type Safety |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 4.6 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| test/cli.test.js | 7.1 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions: promise resolved |
| src/core.ts | 7.2 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: ProcessPromise._pipe (cyclomatic 17) |
| package.json | 7.4 | Mixed | Platform End-of-Life: End-of-life runtime: Node.js 12 |
| src/log.ts | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: log.formatCmd (cyclomatic 20) |
| test/core.test.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Test Quality: Skipped test: handles multiline literals |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Mixed | Supply-chain Provenance & Signing: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Mixed | Supply-chain Provenance & Signing: REDACTED |
| src/cli.ts | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| src/globals.ts | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| test/smoke/bun.test.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Test Quality: No assertions: stdio: inherit |
| test/it/build-jsr.test.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Test Quality: No assertions: publish --dry-run` |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 59 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 59 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 50 of 63 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.ts, .js, .cjs, .mjs) and its test script runs a plain-node harness, which the reliability runner re-ran on its own: `node ./test/all.test.js` in the repository root exited cleanly on 0 of 3 runs; `node ./test/extra.test.js` in the repository root exited cleanly on 3 of 3 runs. The harness executes every test file inside its own process and starts none of them as a separate `node` process, so each run yields a single pass/fail for the whole suite — too coarse to tell which test is flaky. Not scored — this is a limit of what a one-process harness reports, not a finding about this repository.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored — 3 production npm declaration(s) across 3 package.json (1 of them the product) were read for PINNING discipline (0 defect(s) reported), but the outdated/deprecated signal needs registry.npmjs.org, and no committed lockfile here resolves to the concrete versions that question is asked about, so this dimension's own question is only partly answered. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
- D14 License Compliance — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored — this repository's committed lockfile was read and it resolves no production dependency: everything it installs is declared under `devDependencies`, or is a workspace-internal package with no registry release behind it. Licences are resolved from registry.npmjs.org, because an npm checkout does not contain its dependencies' licences. NOT a finding that this repository's licences are compliant: this dimension asserts nothing about its licensing in either direction.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22's deterministic call-shape rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. This says nothing about whether that surface is consistent.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `src/core.ts`, `src/goods.ts` produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via REDACTED (REDACTED). docker build failed (exit 1) — -------------------- 6 | COPY ../package.json /zx/package.json 7 | COPY ../LICENSE /zx/LICENSE 8 | >>> COPY ../README.md /zx/README.md 9 | 10 | ENTRYPOINT ["node", "/zx/build/cli.js"] -------------------- ERROR: failed to solve: failed to compute cache key: failed to calculate checksum of ref 62bfd350-6be9-499d-bbc7-2f8a408e79ec::21hxgxe6pjwxki2qep2bi7d5c: "/README.md": not found; runtime evidence skipped.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. 19 JavaScript/TypeScript file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source, disabled certificate validation, obsolete TLS versions, plaintext password storage and session cookies set without HttpOnly, Secure or SameSite, and none was found. The server controls this dimension also scores were not assessed, so no score is given.
- X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value is measured as redundancy only: a comment that repeats its code's words is found, but a paraphrase in other words, a vague comment, or one the code contradicts is not, and whether a comment is valuable is not claimed. Comments in other scripts or languages, and outside C#, are not judged.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
3 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was log.formatCmd at 20.
What to do
- Bring the 3 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with log.formatCmd (cyclomatic 20), ProcessPromise._pipe (cyclomatic 17), md.transformMarkdown (cyclomatic 16). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 3 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.5 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
3 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was log.formatCmd at 31.
What to do
- Bring the 3 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with log.formatCmd (cognitive 31), md.transformMarkdown (cognitive 30), ProcessPromise._pipe (cognitive 18). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 3 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.0 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
D3 · God Classes
2 god class(es) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with core.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with core.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 1 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D10 · Test Quality
1 skipped, 7 zero-assertion, 1 synchronised by a fixed sleep, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 285 tests.
What to do
- Resolve the 7 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with cli.test.js (5), bun.test.js, build-jsr.test.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Skipped test finding(s) in Test Quality — start with core.test.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Fixed-sleep synchronisation finding(s) in Test Quality — start with core.test.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
2 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/core.ts. Counted over 9 of the 17 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D17 · Explicit Debt
2 deducted task-comment markers across 2727 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 9.9. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with cli.ts, globals.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 19 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with package.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D24 · Comment Value
0 of 31 judged comments only repeat the code they sit on (0.0 %). 8 comment(s) in another language or script were not judged.
D27 · Navigability
16 % of calls cross a namespace and 4 % go through an interface, but 43 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 0 low. semgrep hit a parse error in 2 file(s) — `src/core.ts` (lines 184–188, lines 253–254), `src/goods.ts` (lines 125–126) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 3 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable dependencies in any ecosystem this repository declares.
D31 · IaC & Container Security
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 9 of the 17 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
3/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy
A vulnerability-disclosure policy (.github/SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
1 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with package.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX6 · Interface segregation
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something. — test/core.test.js:159
What to do
- Clear the softer debt: re-enable or delete skipped tests, decide whether each empty function is a deliberate no-op (and say so in a comment), and replace blanket `eslint-disable` / `@ts-nocheck` with targeted, justified suppressions.
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P10 · Library API & versioning
P2 · Observability
- No logging or diagnostics emission found. This repository ships a binary its users launch rather than a service you operate, so there is no operator to page — but when a run fails on a user's machine, neither they nor you have anything to read.
What to do
- Write a diagnostic trail the user can hand back with a bug report: a log file under the platform's per-user data directory, switchable with a `--verbose`/`--debug` flag. Start with the error paths that emit nothing — a discarded error is the failure the user cannot describe and you cannot reproduce.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- `package.json` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — package.json:112
What to do
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
R1 · Type Safety
- 25 typed · 32 plain JS — the untyped files are scripts/build-clean.mjs, scripts/build-dts.mjs, scripts/build-js.mjs, scripts/build-jsr.mjs, scripts/build-pkgjson-lite.mjs, scripts/build-pkgjson-main.mjs (+26 more).
R10 · Code Duplication
- scripts/build-pkgjson-lite.mjs:21 · scripts/build-pkgjson-main.mjs:20 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 102 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — scripts/build-pkgjson-lite.mjs:21
- scripts/build-tests.mjs:30 · scripts/build-versions.mjs:21 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 54 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — scripts/build-tests.mjs:30
What to do
- Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- transformMarkdown has cyclomatic complexity 15 and cognitive complexity 33; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — REDACTED:18
- formatCmd has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 17; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/log.ts:153
- readScript has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 15; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/cli.ts:204
- main has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 12; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/cli.ts:103
- kill has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 12; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/core.ts:1057
R3 · Large Files
- src/core.ts has 970 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module. — src/core.ts:1
What to do
- Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. — src/globals-jsr.ts:1
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 · Dependency Freshness
R6 · Tooling
R7 · Dead Code
- Unreachable from the 30 application, 12 tooling and 38 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on `npm run build` — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (30 application, 12 tooling, 38 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make (×3) — scripts/deno.polyfill.js, src/globals-jsr.ts, scripts/import-meta-url.polyfill.js
- Nothing in its class reads or assigns this private field (for a constructor parameter property: it is stored and never read), and no string key or test reaches it by name. Remove it, or use it where it was meant to take effect. — src/core.ts:814
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. — scripts/build-clean.mjs:18
- Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it. (×3)
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports
X1 · Async correctness
X12 · Unreachable branch
X16 · Unfloored truncation loop
X19 · Unrestored process-global state
X2 · Cancellation propagation
- Only 0/2 async functions that make a cancellable request (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http) accept an AbortSignal or pass one on, so a request keeps running after whatever wanted it has given up — a page navigated away from, an unmounted component, a timed-out job. Take a `signal` (or an options object that carries one) and hand it to the request; where nothing could ever cancel the call, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against how the function is used.
- `readScriptFromHttp` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — src/cli.ts:251
- `kill` holds an AbortSignal but calls `cp.exec(…)` without it, so its caller's cancellation never reaches that call and it runs to its end after whatever wanted it has given up. Hand the signal on: `cp.exec(…, { signal })`. — src/core.ts:1057
What to do
- Thread an AbortSignal through async functions that make requests, so the work stops when its caller gives up.
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element
X3 · Exception handling
- An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. (×4) — src/cli.ts:201, src/core.ts:1025, src/core.ts:1079, …
What to do
- Swallowed exception (empty catch)
X5 · Nullable reference types
- ~7.5 `!` null assertions per 1k TypeScript source lines — 23 assertion(s) across the 3061 source line(s) of the 18 TypeScript file(s) read, which is the only code the operator asserts anything in (a `!` in a `.js` file is not this operator and was not counted, and one in a file whose null checking is off silences nothing). Densest: src/core.ts (20), src/goods.ts (2), src/cli.ts (1). Each one tells the compiler to trust the author about null, suppressing the very diagnostic `strictNullChecks` exists to produce. Many are correct: each is a claim the checker could not verify, and it is wrong only where the value can in fact be missing, so review the densest places first.
What to do
- The findings name the configuration each number was taken from and, for the assertions, the files that hold them. Turn null checking on where it is off — `"strict": true` in the base tsconfig that the others extend switches `strictNullChecks` on with the rest of the family — and then resolve the assertions rather than adding to them. A `!` on a value the checker could show to be null is a promise the author cannot check from where they are standing, and each one is a `TypeError: Cannot read properties of null` waiting for the path that makes it true; where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (narrow it with a test, make the property required, drop the `?`).
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 61% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Architecture | 99% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 64% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 48% | Weak — gated by P2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 87% | Strong | Solid. |
| Performance | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 69 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (2 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (2 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (2 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (2 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (2 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (2 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's TypeScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — docker build failed (exit 1) — -------------------- 6 | COPY ../package.json /zx/package.json 7 | COPY ../LICENSE /zx/LICENSE 8 | >>> COPY ../README.md /zx/README.md 9 | 10 | ENTRYPOINT ["node", "/zx/build/cli.js"] -------------------- ERROR: failed to solve: failed to compute cache key: failed to calculate checksum of ref 62bfd350-6be9-499d-bbc7-2f8a408e79ec::21hxgxe6pjwxki2qep2bi7d5c: "/README.md": not found; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect. If it does persist personal data (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the controls belong to wherever that data is stored.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — this repository stands up no server (no Express, Fastify, Koa, Hono, NestJS or similar app, no Next.js/SvelteKit/Nuxt server route, no edge function), creates no Supabase tables and talks to no hosted backend. Access control is therefore N/A here — a browser application or library is authorized by the server it calls, not by itself; a client-side route guard hides a page and authorizes nothing. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the limit belongs wherever that data is stored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the rights are served wherever that data is stored.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not scored — the plain-node test harness runs every file in one process
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Not scored — 3 production npm declaration(s) across 3 package.json (1 of them the product) were read for PINNING discipline (0 defect(s) reported), but the outdated/deprecated signal needs registry.npmjs.org, and no committed lockfile here resolves to the concrete versions that question is asked about, so this dimension's own question is only partly answered. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
- D14 License Compliance — npm licences not graded — this repository's lockfile resolves no production dependency
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (453 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
- D22 Internal API Consistency — API consistency is measured on C# only; the exposed TypeScript surface was not measured.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (3875 LoC, 28 module-visible types across 3 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 2 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
- D4 Code Duplication — This repository's production source (.mts, .ts) is not read by D4's token comparison, which compares .NET source: duplication in it is measured by R10 Code Duplication, the frontend lens's card running the same clone algorithm over the JS/TS token stream. Not scored here — read the R10 card for this repository's duplication.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this npm build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — the own c8/nyc coverage script suite in the repository root ran and not one test passed (throw new ERR_UNKNOWN_FILE_EXTENSION(ext, filepath);), so the coverage would describe the failed run, not the code. Coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. The named suite step is one the repository's maintainers can perform; once it passes, the real number is measured on the next scan.
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JavaScript/TypeScript source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: 19 JavaScript/TypeScript file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source, disabled TLS certificate validation, obsolete TLS versions, passwords stored or checked as plaintext and session cookies set without HttpOnly, Secure or SameSite, and none was found. That half of the dimension is clean, but it is not scored on its own: a C# repository with the same clean reading is scored on its server controls as well, or is N/A for having no web surface, and neither can be decided here. Of the server controls, two are read where the source shows them: every session or sign-in cookie the code sets is read for HttpOnly, Secure and SameSite at the line that sets it (a raw `Set-Cookie` header, Express, Fastify, Hono, Koa, Next.js, `cookie.serialize`, express-session and cookie-session), and every Node listener for HTTPS enforcement. HSTS, security response headers and input validation are NOT assessed for JavaScript/TypeScript: each is scored as an absence, an absence is only reportable over the production HTTP server, and in this ecosystem the file that opens the port is build output or a framework launcher rather than a file in the source tree. Their absence here is not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — Not applicable: this check looks for a loop whose body adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is walking, invalidating the enumerator it holds, and in this repository's languages that cannot happen. JavaScript and TypeScript have no iterator that a change can invalidate: an `Array` is walked by index against its live length, and a `Map` or `Set` by the ECMAScript specification's live entry list, so a body that adds to, removes from or empties what it walks raises nothing — every loop form (`for…of`, `for…in`, `forEach`, `map`, `filter`, `reduce`, `entries()`) on every built-in collection (`Array`, `Map`, `Set`, plain objects, `URLSearchParams`, `Headers`, `FormData`) runs to completion. Such a loop can still skip an element or never end, which is a different defect and not the one this check asks about. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 2 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- Unlisted import 'fast-glob' scripts/build-clean.mjs:18
Serious — 49 finding(s)
- No assertions: promise resolved test/cli.test.js:48
- No assertions: require() is working in ESM test/cli.test.js:338
- No assertions: __filename & __dirname are defined test/cli.test.js:342
- No assertions: markdown scripts are working test/cli.test.js:346
- No assertions: executes a script from $PATH test/cli.test.js:378
- No assertions: stdio: inherit test/smoke/bun.test.js:31
- No assertions: publish --dry-run` test/it/build-jsr.test.js:49
- Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/cli.ts:201
- Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/core.ts:1025
- Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/core.ts:1079
- Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/core.ts:1086
- TodoComment src/cli.ts:169
- TodoComment src/globals.ts:18
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Dead file (~16 LoC) scripts/deno.polyfill.js
- Dead file (~16 LoC) src/globals-jsr.ts
- Async function without AbortSignal: readScriptFromHttp src/cli.ts:251
- Async function without AbortSignal: kill src/core.ts:1057
- log.formatCmd (cyclomatic 20) src/log.ts:153
- ProcessPromise._pipe (cyclomatic 17) src/core.ts:640
- md.transformMarkdown (cyclomatic 16) REDACTED:18
- Skipped test: handles multiline literals test/core.test.js:159
- Fixed-sleep synchronisation: just works test/core.test.js:1061
- log.formatCmd (cognitive 31) src/log.ts:153
- md.transformMarkdown (cognitive 30) REDACTED:18
- ProcessPromise._pipe (cognitive 18) src/core.ts:640
- FileTooLong: src/core.ts src/core.ts
- TooManyMethods: ProcessPromise src/core.ts:257
- REDACTED
- End-of-life runtime: Node.js 12 package.json:67
- Coverage not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite
- No structured logging
- Type Safety
- Duplicated block with local edits (11 matched lines × 2 locations) scripts/build-pkgjson-lite.mjs:21
- Duplicated block with local edits (6 matched lines × 2 locations) scripts/build-tests.mjs:30
- Complex function transformMarkdown (cyclomatic 15, cognitive 33) REDACTED:18
- Complex function formatCmd (cyclomatic 13, cognitive 17) src/log.ts:153
- Complex function readScript (cyclomatic 13, cognitive 15) src/cli.ts:204
- Complex function main (cyclomatic 13, cognitive 12) src/cli.ts:103
- Complex function kill (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 12) src/core.ts:1057
- src/core.ts: 970 lines of code src/core.ts:1
- No test reaches this file src/globals-jsr.ts:1
- Dead file (~5 LoC) scripts/import-meta-url.polyfill.js
- Unused dependency '@size-limit/file'
- Unused dependency '@webpod/ingrid'
- Unused dependency 'lefthook'
Minor — 11 finding(s)
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
- No ADRs found package.json:51
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Disabled test test/core.test.js:159
- No ADRs
- No dependency-update automation package.json:112
- No changelog
- Unused private field 'writable' src/core.ts:814
- Not all async functions that make a request accept an AbortSignal
- Null assertions (`!`) override strict null checking
Minor — 1 finding(s)
- doc comments repeat the names src/deps.ts:21
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-1446b53d127046c7b2a657953f4f3f78/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-1446b53d127046c7b2a657953f4f3f78/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 2 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 2 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 2 file(s) — `src/core.ts`, `src/goods.ts` — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |