Executive summary
fly-apps/live_beats falls short of our standard for production because two passwords or keys sit in the current code and we found no working pipeline that builds or tests changes to the code. It scores 40 out of 100 and is rated Weak, and 15 of its 16 critical findings are security problems.
Production Readiness, at 30, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is replacing the two exposed passwords or keys and switching the old ones off, worth about 8 points. Putting upper bounds on the open-ended dependency requirements comes next, worth about 5 points. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 47.
Nine known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Three settings leave the servers or containers unsafe, and two passwords or keys are open to anyone who can read the repository. Updating the vulnerable packages, correcting the unsafe settings and replacing each exposed password or key would close these risks. Loading the key from a secret store instead of the code would fix the encryption key written into the code. The page or frame without a title needs a descriptive title.
The product code is 4,995 lines, about €4,800 to rebuild.
If Production Readiness rose from 30 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 40 to about 47.
New since the last survey: 6 findings
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (10 corresponding lines) lib/live_beats_web/components/core_components.ex
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines) lib/live_beats/github.ex
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Data Protection · No data-protection/encryption lib/live_beats/accounts/identity.ex
Fixed since the last survey: 2 findings
- Data Protection · No data-protection/encryption lib/live_beats/accounts/user.ex
- A11y enforcement · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung
Rebuild cost: about €4,800 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €1,600 to €8,000, for 27 to 85 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.7 at a score of 40. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 4,995 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 (global) | 2 LiveBeats | 3 LiveBeats.Accounts | 4 LiveBeats.Accounts.Events | 5 LiveBeats.MediaLibrary | 6 LiveBeats.MediaLibrary.Events | 7 assets.js | 8 LiveBeatsWeb | 9 LiveBeatsWeb.Presence | 10 LiveBeatsWeb.ProfileLive |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (global) | ||||||||||
| 2 LiveBeats | ||||||||||
| 3 LiveBeats.Accounts | ||||||||||
| 4 LiveBeats.Accounts.Events | ||||||||||
| 5 LiveBeats.MediaLibrary | ||||||||||
| 6 LiveBeats.MediaLibrary.Events | ||||||||||
| 7 assets.js | ||||||||||
| 8 LiveBeatsWeb | 13 | |||||||||
| 9 LiveBeatsWeb.Presence | 1 | |||||||||
| 10 LiveBeatsWeb.ProfileLive | 3 |
8→1 LiveBeatsWeb uses (global)✕
- Connections
- 13 pairs of types, where a type in LiveBeatsWeb uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
LiveBeatsWeb.CoreComponents→LiveBeatsWebLiveBeatsWeb.ErrorHTML→LiveBeatsWebLiveBeatsWeb.FileController→LiveBeatsWebLiveBeatsWeb.Layouts→LiveBeatsWebLiveBeatsWeb.OAuthCallbackController→LiveBeatsWebLiveBeatsWeb.PlayerLive→LiveBeatsWebLiveBeatsWeb.Presence→LiveBeatsWebLiveBeatsWeb.ProfileLive→LiveBeatsWebLiveBeatsWeb.RedirectController→LiveBeatsWebLiveBeatsWeb.Router→LiveBeatsWebLiveBeatsWeb.SettingsLive→LiveBeatsWebLiveBeatsWeb.SignInLive→LiveBeatsWebLiveBeatsWeb.UserAuth→LiveBeatsWeb
- Direction
- LiveBeatsWeb uses (global), so a change to (global) can break LiveBeatsWeb, while a change to LiveBeatsWeb can't break (global).
- Position
- Below the diagonal: LiveBeatsWeb uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
9→1 LiveBeatsWeb.Presence uses (global)✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in LiveBeatsWeb.Presence uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
LiveBeatsWeb.Presence.BadgeComponent→LiveBeatsWeb
- Direction
- LiveBeatsWeb.Presence uses (global), so a change to (global) can break LiveBeatsWeb.Presence, while a change to LiveBeatsWeb.Presence can't break (global).
- Position
- Below the diagonal: LiveBeatsWeb.Presence uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
10→1 LiveBeatsWeb.ProfileLive uses (global)✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in LiveBeatsWeb.ProfileLive uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
LiveBeatsWeb.ProfileLive.SongEntryComponent→LiveBeatsWebLiveBeatsWeb.ProfileLive.SongRowComponent→LiveBeatsWebLiveBeatsWeb.ProfileLive.UploadFormComponent→LiveBeatsWeb
- Direction
- LiveBeatsWeb.ProfileLive uses (global), so a change to (global) can break LiveBeatsWeb.ProfileLive, while a change to LiveBeatsWeb.ProfileLive can't break (global).
- Position
- Below the diagonal: LiveBeatsWeb.ProfileLive uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Accessibility
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 16 | High / Critical |
| A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration | 5 | High / Critical |
| A07:2025 — Authentication Failures | 2 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2); Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR; Resolve the 3 Unbounded dependency requirement finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2). | +8.2 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Resolve the 3 Unbounded dependency requirement finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +4.9 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Resolve the 1 Documentation finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. | +4.3 pts | Low | Documentation Quality |
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with fly.toml. | +4.3 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Resolve the 2 Floating source dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +3.8 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +5.3 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Resolve the 23 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with media_library.ex, profile_live.ex, mp3_stat.ex. | +4.0 pts | Medium | Knowledge Freshness |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +2.7 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.2 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.0 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.8 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED |
| lib/live_beats_web/components/core_components.ex | 6.3 | Mixed | God Classes: FileTooLong: components/core_components.ex |
| test/live_beats_web/live/profile_live_test.exs | 7.3 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| test/live_beats_web/live/settings_live_test.exs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| lib/live_beats_web/controllers/file_controller.ex | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| lib/live_beats/media_library.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: TooManyFunctions: MediaLibrary |
| lib/live_beats/github.ex | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines) |
| README.md | 9.5 | Near-clean | Documentation Quality: Documentation: no build, run or usage example |
| fly.toml | 9.5 | Near-clean | ADR Quality: No ADRs found |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 41 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 41 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 65 of 97 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. 1 process module(s) keep their state in something other than a record or struct (a map or a tuple), which this pass does not read as fields, and no other module held state it could measure.
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.exs, .ex) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.exs, .ex) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. All 24 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness). Counted over 24 of the 58 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's deterministic naming rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. Until then its declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether its names are consistent.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via REDACTED (REDACTED). docker build failed (exit 1) — 74 | >>> && apt-get clean && rm -f /var/lib/apt/lists/*_* 75 | -------------------- ERROR: failed to solve: process "/bin/sh -c apt-get update -y && apt-get install -y libstdc++6 openssl libncurses5 locales curl ffmpeg s3fs && apt-get clean && rm -f /var/lib/apt/lists/*_*" did not complete successfully: exit code: 100; runtime evidence skipped.
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Elixir is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Elixir is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, PHP, Dart, Kotlin, Ruby, Scala, Java, Python and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and no named async function in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, nor any Go, PHP or Dart function or Kotlin suspend function, makes a request that can be cancelled (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http; net/http, net.Dial; amphp; Dio; Ktor, OkHttp), so there is nothing to judge, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded, no Java, Rust, Erlang, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found, and this repository's Elixir is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X3 Exception handling — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover most of the languages this repository's product is written in. What it read is kept, but it is too small a share to grade the product by. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. X7 measured the part of this repository it reads (C#, Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, Rust, Go, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Ruby, Swift and Dart), and its Elixir source is outside the check's reach, so the card covers only part of the product. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the unread source is free of silent defaults.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
D3 · God Classes
2 over-large unit(s) detected — types, modules or files that carry too much.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 TooManyFunctions finding(s) in God Classes — start with media_library.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with core_components.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected. A further 2 rows report members as variants of one another; they aggregate block groups already counted above and are not themselves counted.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (10 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with core_components.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with github.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
16 outdated, 0 retired direct Hex dependencies, 5 pinning defect(s). Whether any of these packages is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — hex.pm publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: a Hex app name does not determine the modules it provides (`ecto_sql` provides Ecto.Adapters.SQL), and a large idiomatic class of BEAM dependencies — runtime adapters, codec plugins, protocol implementations and OTP applications the release starts — is correctly declared and never referenced in source, so absence of a reference is not evidence of an unused dependency. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from REDACTED there.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Unbounded dependency requirement finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Floating source dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
D13 · Secret Scanning
2 secret(s) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 46 shipped Hex package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from hex.pm over the packages a consumer installs — this repository's REDACTED closed over the declarations its mix.exs files do not gate behind `only:`. Packages it asks for ONLY under `only: [:dev, :test]` (or any other non-prod environment, such as `:docs`) are excluded: they are not installed by anything that depends on this repository. Each licence is the one hex.pm publishes for the package's current release. A further 2 package(s) the closure reaches resolve from git, a path or a local override and publish no licence this pass can read; they are outside this verdict.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt
4 deducted task-comment markers across 4995 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.9. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What to do
- Resolve the 4 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with profile_live_test.exs (2), settings_live_test.exs, file_controller.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
D19 · Documentation Quality
0 of 1 documentation facets pass in full; short on: F2 example. 1 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Documentation finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with fly.toml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D27 · Navigability
23 % of calls cross a namespace and 0 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
16 finding(s): 0 critical, 9 high, 7 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 9 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
- Resolve the 7 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
D31 · IaC & Container Security
5 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 2 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
24 of 24 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is lib/live_beats_web/components/core_components.ex. Counted over 24 of the 58 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 23 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with media_library.ex, profile_live.ex, mp3_stat.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (23 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Most significant orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with core_components.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: core_components.ex↔layouts.ex 50%
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with core_components.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
AC2 · Forms & labels
AC3 · Page structure
- A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. — lib/live_beats_web/components/layouts/root.html.heex:2
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — lib/live_beats_web/components/layouts/root.html.heex:2
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics
- This <div aria-modal="true"> is a modal dialog, but nothing moves focus into it when it opens and nothing keeps focus inside it while it is open, so a keyboard or screen-reader user keeps acting on the content behind it (WCAG 2.4.3). Use a native <dialog> opened with showModal(), a dialog component that traps focus, or move focus to the dialog on open, trap Tab inside it (or make the page behind inert) and return focus to the control that opened it on close. — lib/live_beats_web/components/layouts/live.html.heex:1
What to do
- Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- `.fade-in-scale` moves (`animation: 0.2s ease-in 0s normal forwards 1 fade-in-scale-keys`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — assets/css/app.css:8
- `.fade-out-scale` moves (`animation: 0.2s ease-out 0s normal forwards 1 fade-out-scale-keys`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — assets/css/app.css:12
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
C1 · Data Protection
- No encryption usage (Cloak.Ecto encrypted field types, a Cloak vault, Plug.Crypto's message encryptor, :crypto ciphers that encrypt, libsodium boxes) was found, and this repository persists personal data in the model cited here — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore. — lib/live_beats/accounts/identity.ex:14
What to do
- Encrypt sensitive data at rest (Cloak.Ecto — a Cloak.Ecto.Binary-backed field type for the column — or ash_cloak for Ash) and manage keys in a vault (AWS KMS / Secrets Manager through ex_aws_kms, GCP KMS / Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault). Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
- Enforce HTTPS (force_ssl: [hsts: true] on the Phoenix endpoint, or plug Plug.SSL, or an https: listener) so data in transit is always encrypted.
C2 · Access Controls
- Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect.
What to do
- Name the access rules — a Bodyguard.Policy or LetMe policy module, a Canada.Can implementation, or roles and permissions declared once — and consult them where access is checked (Bodyguard.permit!, a plug in the pipeline), so the rule set is reviewable and testable on its own.
C4 · Data Retention
- A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: an expiry limit — a declared maximum age / TTL after which the data is no longer kept, a documented retention period / data-expiry.
What to do
- Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P2 · Observability
What to do
- Add a health-check endpoint (a /health route in your Phoenix router or Plug) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
What to do
- Run what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- `secret_key_base` is the secret key and is a compile-time constant, so the secret this operation depends on is published with the source. A key that ships with the source is not secret: every contributor, fork, mirror and released binary carries it, so anyone holding the repository can decrypt what any installation encrypted, and there is no way to invalidate what was already protected because every deployment built from this source shares the value. Where the constant is a password salt the consequence differs but is no smaller — one global salt means precomputation amortises across every installation, which is the property salting exists to destroy. Read the value from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager at startup and FAIL FAST when it is absent, so a missing key stops the process instead of silently falling back to a shared default; treat the committed value as disclosed and rotate it rather than only deleting the line. For a salt, generate a fresh random one per password and store it alongside the hash. — REDACTED:18
- This repository runs an HTTP server and nothing in its Elixir source or production configuration secures the transport: no HTTPS served (an endpoint's `https: [...]`, `scheme: :https`, `Plug.Cowboy.https`, SiteEncrypt), no `force_ssl:` or `plug Plug.SSL` redirecting to HTTPS and sending HSTS, no `strict-transport-security` header, no `rewrite_on: [:x_forwarded_proto]` or `x-forwarded-proto` read for a TLS-terminating proxy — so its traffic may cross the network in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: lib/live_beats_web/endpoint.ex:2 — `Phoenix.Endpoint`.
- Set: Referrer-Policy, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies. Missing: Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security — the four headers that carry the points of this card's security-headers term (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options), 0.5 each.(−1.0 on this card.) The server: lib/live_beats_web/endpoint.ex:2 — `Phoenix.Endpoint`.
What to do
- Load cryptographic key and salt material from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager rather than fixing it in the source, and fail fast at startup when it is absent — a default that silently works is the one that reaches production. Rotate anything already committed: it must be treated as disclosed. Salts should be generated per password and stored with the hash, never shared across installations.
- Secure the server's transport: set `force_ssl: [rewrite_on: [:x_forwarded_proto], hsts: true]` on the endpoint in `config/prod.exs` (Plug.SSL redirects to HTTPS and sends `Strict-Transport-Security`; `rewrite_on` trusts the TLS-terminating proxy in front of it), or serve TLS itself with the endpoint's `https: [port: 443, cipher_suite: :strong, keyfile: …, certfile: …]`.
- Add Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security beside the headers the Elixir server already sets.
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC4 · Keyboard semantics | 2.1.1, 2.4.3 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 97% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Architecture | 94% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 41% | Weak — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 30% | Weak — gated by D13, P1, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 39% | Weak — gated by C1, S1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Accessibility | 49% | Weak — gated by AC4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not evidenced — 3 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (an audit-log table or schema — a module, Ecto schema or migration table named for it — ExAudit, PaperTrail, AshPaperTrail or Carbonite recording each change, or a Commanded / EventStore event-sourced store beside one) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 72 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: the BEAM has no dependency-injection container — state lives in processes, and no process is handed an instance whose lifetime another one scopes.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: Elixir processes share no mutable memory — state lives in a process's own mailbox — so there is no shared object to race on. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — docker build failed (exit 1) — 74 | >>> && apt-get clean && rm -f /var/lib/apt/lists/*_* 75 | -------------------- ERROR: failed to solve: process "/bin/sh -c apt-get update -y && apt-get install -y libstdc++6 openssl libncurses5 locales curl ffmpeg s3fs && apt-get clean && rm -f /var/lib/apt/lists/*_*" did not complete successfully: exit code: 100; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- D10 Test Quality — ~669 lines of test source are present (.exs, .ex) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — no .exs test runner
- D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency is measured on C# and TypeScript only; Elixir, JavaScript not measured.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .ex, .exs source were not judged.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (4811 LoC, 52 module-visible types across 11 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this OTP build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — cohesion (LCOM4) not measured — process state held outside a record or struct
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 6 value object(s); 5 domain event(s); its domain events are published by services or handlers — no domain entity raises one
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (2 Elixir aggregate(s) emitting domain events (%Event{} from execute/2))
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 1 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HTTP client call or construction in the Elixir, JavaScript/TypeScript source (service entry point: lib/live_beats_web.ex:85 (use Phoenix.Router))
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for Benchee jobs (the entries of a `Benchee.run` job map) or Benchfella `bench "…"` blocks under `use Benchfella` in any `.ex`/`.exs` file, or benchee or benchfella in a mix.exs, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: Elixir has no async/await function colour, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
- X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X12 Unreachable branch — X12 reached only 7% of this repository's production lines — elixir (4,995 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — X16 reached only 7% of this repository's production lines — elixir (4,995 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — X21 reached only 7% of this repository's production lines — elixir (4,995 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Elixir processes share no heap: a value sent to another process arrives as a copy, so no collection is reachable from two processes at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X3 Exception handling — X3 reached only 7% of this repository's production lines — elixir (4,995 lines) was left unread. Not scored: a score over a minority of the product would be published as the whole of it.
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — Not applicable: this check asks whether the null-typed discipline a language offers is switched on, and how much of that the assertion operator takes back, and in this repository's languages there is no such switch and no such operator. Elixir's `nil` is an atom in a dynamically typed language: `@spec`s are checked by an external analysis that has no nullability operator, so there is no null-typed discipline in the language to adopt. Plain JavaScript carries no type annotations and commits no tsconfig, so it states no null-typed discipline for this check to grade: there is nothing here that switches null checking on or off, and TypeScript (or `// @ts-check`) is how a repository acquires one — advice, not a defect this card measures. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 16 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Document without a <title> lib/live_beats_web/components/layouts/root.html.heex:2
- Cryptographic key material is a compile-time constant REDACTED:18
Serious — 29 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- TodoComment test/live_beats_web/live/profile_live_test.exs:67
- TodoComment test/live_beats_web/live/profile_live_test.exs:72
- TodoComment test/live_beats_web/live/settings_live_test.exs:15
- TodoComment lib/live_beats_web/controllers/file_controller.ex:95
- Unbounded dependency requirement: dns_cluster
- Unbounded dependency requirement: postgrex
- Unbounded dependency requirement: exla
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard assets/css/app.css:8
- Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard assets/css/app.css:12
- Floating source dependency: phoenix_live_view
- Floating source dependency: bumblebee
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Page without a main landmark lib/live_beats_web/components/layouts/root.html.heex:2
- Modal dialog does not manage focus lib/live_beats_web/components/layouts/live.html.heex:1
- No data-protection/encryption lib/live_beats/accounts/identity.ex:14
- TooManyFunctions: MediaLibrary lib/live_beats/media_library.ex:1
- FileTooLong: components/core_components.ex lib/live_beats_web/components/core_components.ex
- Change coupling: core_components.ex ↔ layouts.ex lib/live_beats_web/components/core_components.ex:1
- Edited copy of a member (10 corresponding lines) lib/live_beats_web/components/core_components.ex:271
- Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines) lib/live_beats/github.ex:40
- No CI pipeline
Minor — 36 finding(s)
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats/media_library.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats_web/live/profile_live.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats/mp3_stat.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats_web/live/player_live.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats_web/live/profile_live/upload_form_component.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats_web/channels/presence.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats_web/live/settings_live.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats_web/controllers/user_auth.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats/accounts.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats_web/live/profile_live/song_entry_component.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats/github.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats_web/components/layouts.ex:1
- Orphaned file config/runtime.exs:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats/media_library/song.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats_web/controllers/file_controller.ex:1
- Orphaned file config/dev.exs:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats_web.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats/accounts/user.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats_web/live/nav.ex:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats_web/live/profile_live/song_row_component.ex:1
- Orphaned file mix.exs:1
- Orphaned file lib/live_beats/application.ex:1
- No named authorization policies
- Partial data-retention evidence
- Documentation: no build, run or usage example README.md:1
- No ADRs found fly.toml:1
- Dormant codebase
- Most significant orphaned file lib/live_beats_web/components/core_components.ex:1
- No ADRs
- No architecture diagram/doc
- No SAST
- No release approval gate
- No changelog
- No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected
- Security headers incomplete
Minor — 16 finding(s)
- Outdated: dns_cluster
- Outdated: ecto_sql
- Outdated: esbuild
- Outdated: exla
- Outdated: finch
- Outdated: floki
- Outdated: jason
- Outdated: mint
- Outdated: phoenix_ecto
- Outdated: phoenix_live_dashboard
- Outdated: phoenix_live_reload
- Outdated: plug_cowboy
- Outdated: postgrex
- Outdated: req
- Outdated: swoosh
- Outdated: telemetry_poller
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-e821d95d37fd4da084dd6339febfdf79/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-e821d95d37fd4da084dd6339febfdf79/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 0 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 16 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 5 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 0 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |