Public report of festinalli/BankMore-Challenge, published 8 November 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.11.2). Assert signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey → Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 8 November 2026, 14:35 UTC · Survey ID cd_ade123bac3754a8784f42405d77af532

festinalli/BankMore-Challenge

Measured 8 November 2026, 14:35 UTC, at code version e041c5d

Code coverage is not measured: JavaScript/TypeScript suite (CouldNotMeasureNoCollector).

Supply-chain provenance & signing is not measured: Supply-chain provenance is not scored (this pipeline releases no artifact), but its build steps or GitHub Actions workflows have integrity defects, or nothing watches its dependency set for published advisories.

CAI score 43out of 100 Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
Up 1 since the last survey

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

A small codebase: 12,242 lines of product code in 16 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.2 person-years · Weakest lens: Security and Compliance, 33

Findings by how serious they are

72 critical 162 serious 91 minor

11 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, we either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard we look for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Assert small markCanine Code Analyzer
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Canine Code Analyzer engine 1.0.0
Measured
8 November 2026, 14:35 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds the Canine Code Analyzer. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today the Canine Code Analyzer is the only one that does.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. We work it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸

98of 98 dimensions measured by tools.
280of 325 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 45 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
98dimensions across 9 lenses, read from 12,242 lines of product code in 16 projects.
Chapters

Executive summary

festinalli/BankMore-Challenge falls short of our standard for production, in part because 29 of the dependencies have a known vulnerability. It scores 43 out of 100 and is rated Weak, and 63 of its 72 critical findings are security problems.

Security and Compliance, at 33, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is replacing the ten exposed passwords or keys and switching the old ones off, worth about 6 points. Hashing passwords properly would lift Security and Compliance itself, worth about 5 points. Raising Security and Compliance to 70 would lift the score to about 51.

Thirty-three known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Twelve settings leave the servers or containers unsafe, and ten passwords or keys in the code and one in the code's history are open to anyone who can read the repository. Updating the vulnerable packages, correcting the unsafe settings and replacing each exposed password or key would close these risks. Pinning each tool to an exact version would fix the six pipeline tools referenced by a changeable name, and hashing passwords with a password-hashing function such as Argon2, bcrypt or PBKDF2 would deal with the place where passwords are scrambled with a fast general-purpose hash. The five errors that are caught and ignored need handling or logging instead of being ignored.

The product code is 12,242 lines, about €28,000 to rebuild.

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Security and Compliance 33 · counts for 45%Production Readiness 37 · counts for 25%Accessibility 45 · counts for 14%Code Health 74 · counts for 8%Architecture 79 · counts for 4%Maturity 84 · counts for 2%Performance 85 · counts for 1%Domain Modelling 98 · counts for 1%Event-Driven 100 · counts for 0%

If Security and Compliance rose from 33 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 43 to about 51.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Business logic 25%Supporting code 44%Tests 31%
New since the last survey: 17 findings

These 17 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 22 October 2026.

We compare every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 7 findings

These 7 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 22 October 2026, and are gone from this one.

  • Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
  • Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Program.cs
  • Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Program.cs
  • Schema migrations · Schema created by SQLAlchemy create_all() (no migration path) investigation/bankmore_intelligence/db.py
  • Ambient inputs in the domain · Domain type reads the wall clock: EndToEndId src/BankMore.Pix.Domain/EndToEndId.cs
Rebuild cost: about €28,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild€9,100 to €46,000, for 152 to 486 hours of work, about 0.2 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problemVery high, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.7 at a score of 43. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeSmall: 12,242 lines of product code
Comment linesThe estimate prices 11,386 lines. Comment lines count towards the size of 12,242 lines but aren't priced as work.
What it is notNot a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one.

How the estimate is made: We price the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Resolve the 10 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2).
Raises the score by about 6 points · Medium effort · Secret Scanning
2
Store passwords with a salted KDF — `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.PasswordHasher<T>`, `Rfc2898DeriveBytes` (PBKDF2), or BCrypt/Argon2 — and compare with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals`.
(A fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim, is not password storage.) Start in `src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Services/PasswordHasher.cs:97`.
Raises the score by about 5 points · Medium effort · Web-Security Posture
3
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Raises the score by about 5 points · Medium effort · Data Protection

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €28,000 to build again, about 0.2 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Security and Compliance, at 33 (Weak). Security and Compliance is about how well the product is protected, and how it handles personal data. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Security and Compliance also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Security and Compliance grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Security and Compliance actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Resolve the 10 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 6 points for medium effort, because it clears the 10 Secret Scanning findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

arch BacenSim BacenSim ContaCorrente.Api ContaCorrente.Api ctx:ContaCorrente ContaCorrente Application · Domain · Infrastructure ContaCorrente.Api->ctx:ContaCorrente Pix.Api Pix.Api ctx:Pix Pix Application · Domain · Infrastructure Pix.Api->ctx:Pix Tarifas.Worker Tarifas.Worker Transferencia.Api Transferencia.Api ctx:Transferencia Transferencia Application · Domain · Infrastructure Transferencia.Api->ctx:Transferencia

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

71 modules, with 28 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 31 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →1 (global)2 BankMore.BacenSim.Dict3 BankMore.BacenSim.Iso200224 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api.Middleware5 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Models6 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Services7 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain.Entities8 BankMore.Pix.Api.Services9 BankMore.Pix.Domain10 BankMore.Tarifas.Worker.Services11 BankMore.Transferencia.Api.Middleware12 BankMore.Transferencia.Domain13 BankMore.Transferencia.Domain.Enums14 frontend.src15 frontend.src.app.app16 frontend.src.app.core.core_module17 frontend.src.app.core.services18 frontend.src.app.core.services.auth_service19 jev.bankmore_jev.client20 jev.bankmore_jev.policy21 jev.bankmore_jev.state22 ml.registro23 BankMore.BacenSim.Spi24 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain.Interfaces25 BankMore.Pix.Application26 BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure27 BankMore.Tarifas.Worker.Handlers28 BankMore.Transferencia.Api.Controllers29 BankMore.Transferencia.Api.Services30 BankMore.Transferencia.Application.Handlers31 BankMore.Transferencia.Infrastructure32 frontend.src.app.core.guards.auth_guard33 frontend.src.app.core.interceptors.jwt_interceptor34 jev.bankmore_jev35 ml36 ml.portao37 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Handlers38 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Infrastructure.Repositories39 BankMore.Pix.Api.Controllers40 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api.Controllers
1 (global)
2 BankMore.BacenSim.Dict
3 BankMore.BacenSim.Iso20022
4 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api.Middleware
5 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Models
6 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Services
7 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain.Entities
8 BankMore.Pix.Api.Services
9 BankMore.Pix.Domain
10 BankMore.Tarifas.Worker.Services
11 BankMore.Transferencia.Api.Middleware
12 BankMore.Transferencia.Domain
13 BankMore.Transferencia.Domain.Enums
14 frontend.src
15 frontend.src.app.app
16 frontend.src.app.core.core_module
17 frontend.src.app.core.services
18 frontend.src.app.core.services.auth_service
19 jev.bankmore_jev.client
20 jev.bankmore_jev.policy
21 jev.bankmore_jev.state
22 ml.registro
23 BankMore.BacenSim.Spi11
24 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain.Interfaces4
25 BankMore.Pix.Application25
26 BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure15
27 BankMore.Tarifas.Worker.Handlers2
28 BankMore.Transferencia.Api.Controllers11
29 BankMore.Transferencia.Api.Services2
30 BankMore.Transferencia.Application.Handlers11
31 BankMore.Transferencia.Infrastructure3
32 frontend.src.app.core.guards.auth_guard1
33 frontend.src.app.core.interceptors.jwt_interceptor1
34 jev.bankmore_jev423
35 ml2
36 ml.portao1
37 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Handlers2225
38 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Infrastructure.Repositories51
39 BankMore.Pix.Api.Controllers51
40 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api.Controllers2
Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself
1 (global)2 BankMore.BacenSim.Dict3 BankMore.BacenSim.Iso200224 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api.Middleware5 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Models6 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Services7 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain.Entities8 BankMore.Pix.Api.Services9 BankMore.Pix.Domain10 BankMore.Tarifas.Worker.Services11 BankMore.Transferencia.Api.Middleware12 BankMore.Transferencia.Domain13 BankMore.Transferencia.Domain.Enums14 frontend.src15 frontend.src.app.app16 frontend.src.app.core.core_module17 frontend.src.app.core.services18 frontend.src.app.core.services.auth_service19 jev.bankmore_jev.client20 jev.bankmore_jev.policy21 jev.bankmore_jev.state22 ml.registro23 BankMore.BacenSim.Spi24 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain.Interfaces25 BankMore.Pix.Application26 BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure27 BankMore.Tarifas.Worker.Handlers28 BankMore.Transferencia.Api.Controllers29 BankMore.Transferencia.Api.Services30 BankMore.Transferencia.Application.Handlers31 BankMore.Transferencia.Infrastructure32 frontend.src.app.core.guards.auth_guard33 frontend.src.app.core.interceptors.jwt_interceptor34 jev.bankmore_jev35 ml36 ml.portao37 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Handlers38 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Infrastructure.Repositories39 BankMore.Pix.Api.Controllers40 BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api.Controllers(global)1BankMore.BacenSim.Dict2BankMore.BacenSim.Iso200223BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api.Middleware4BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Models5BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Services6BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain.Entities7BankMore.Pix.Api.Services8BankMore.Pix.Domain9BankMore.Tarifas.Worker.Services10BankMore.Transferencia.Api.Middleware11BankMore.Transferencia.Domain12BankMore.Transferencia.Domain.Enums13frontend.src14frontend.src.app.app15frontend.src.app.core.core_module16frontend.src.app.core.services17frontend.src.app.core.services.auth_service18jev.bankmore_jev.client19jev.bankmore_jev.policy20jev.bankmore_jev.state21ml.registro22BankMore.BacenSim.Spi23BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain.Interfaces24BankMore.Pix.Application25BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure26BankMore.Tarifas.Worker.Handlers27BankMore.Transferencia.Api.Controllers28BankMore.Transferencia.Api.Services29BankMore.Transferencia.Application.Handlers30BankMore.Transferencia.Infrastructure31frontend.src.app.core.guards.auth_guard32frontend.src.app.core.interceptors.jwt_interceptor33jev.bankmore_jev34ml35ml.portao36BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Handlers37BankMore.ContaCorrente.Infrastructure.Repositories38BankMore.Pix.Api.Controllers39BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api.Controllers40114251521121131142321222551512+31 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 74% · Strong ·

At a glance — Architecture · 79% · Strong ·

At a glance — Maturity · 84% · Strong ·

At a glance — Readiness · 37% · Weak · gated by D13, R4, P3 ·

At a glance — Security · 33% · Weak · gated by D31, C1, S1 ·

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 98% · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Accessibility · 45% · Weak · gated by AC4, AC6 ·

At a glance — Performance · 85% · Strong ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures43High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration43High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection19High / Critical
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures12High / Critical

Roadmap

Top priorities: Resolve the 10 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2); Store passwords with a salted KDF — `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.PasswordHasher<T>`, `Rfc2898DeriveBytes` (PBKDF2), or BCrypt/Argon2 — and compare with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals`. (A fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim, is not password storage.) Start in `src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Services/PasswordHasher.cs:97`; Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 10 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2).+6.5 ptsMediumSecret Scanning
Store passwords with a salted KDF — `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.PasswordHasher<T>`, `Rfc2898DeriveBytes` (PBKDF2), or BCrypt/Argon2 — and compare with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals`. (A fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim, is not password storage.) Start in `src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Services/PasswordHasher.cs:97`.+5.3 ptsMediumWeb-Security Posture
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.+4.8 ptsMediumData Protection
Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests.csproj, BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure.Tests.csproj.+2.3 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 2 Outdated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED, BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests.csproj.+2.3 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 29 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (27), REDACTED (2).+3.8 ptsMediumDependency Vulnerabilities
Resolve the 1 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with UnitTest1.cs.+1.7 ptsLowTest Quality
Resolve the 9 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (7), REDACTED (2).+1.6 ptsLowDependency Vulnerabilities

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 59 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 3% slop · 72% mixed · 25% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED0.0SlopSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED0.0SlopSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED4.0MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED4.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED4.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED4.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED4.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED4.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED4.3MixedExplicit Debt: EmptyCatchBlock
REDACTED4.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED5.3MixedDependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED5.8MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain/Entities/ContaCorrente.cs6.0MixedExplicit Debt: Dead code: Inativar
src/BankMore.Transferencia.Api/Services/OutboxRelayHostedService.cs6.1MixedExplicit Debt: EmptyCatchBlock

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 72

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 162

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 91

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 11

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 98 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.

Every figure here is one of two kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10.

What we checked — 98 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D7D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D17D19D26D28D29D30D31D34D35D39D43D44AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX7AX8AX9C1C2C4DM12ED1ED2ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5PF3R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9S1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X2X20X21X22X23X24X25X26X27X28X29X3X30X32X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 280 of 325 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a1bb95-a732-75c6-b8d8-7f97913726c3.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D10 Test Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 18 test(s) behind this row are the ones the C# collector could read, and this repository also carries at least 19 test source file(s) (.py, .ts) that it cannot: it parses C# syntax and matches C# test attributes, so a vitest/jest/JUnit/pytest-style suite is invisible to it. Skipped tests, zero-assertion tests and the other quality signals on this row are UNMEASURED in that suite — their absence from the counts above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that those tests are sound.
  • D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), but the licence verdict published here was taken over its NuGet package dependencies. Nothing was read about its Python dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
  • D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its NuGet package dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
  • D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable (1 contributor(s) across 69 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). Concentration needs a team to concentrate: with one contributor there is nobody to spread the knowledge to, so there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
  • D17 Explicit Debt — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 6 deducted marker(s) and the 1.1/KLoC density on this row were taken over this repository's .NET projects ALONE: .py (4,628 lines, 38% of production source), .ts (2,117 lines, 17% of production source) went unread, because every marker collector on this path is reached through a C# workspace. D17's marker collectors need a compiler we do not have for that language, so none of its nine marker kinds were read there. The debt in that source is UNMEASURED — its absence from the score above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that the code carries none.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This kind did not reach the 95 % precision gate in three adjudicated runs (docs/plans/deterministic-engine/adjudication/D19-sample3-v3.md), so by the pre-registered fallback it publishes no row until a re-measurement shows it does. The candidates are counted here, not reported as findings, and the score does not include them.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This kind did not reach the 95 % precision gate in three adjudicated runs (docs/plans/deterministic-engine/adjudication/D19-sample3-v3.md), so by the pre-registered fallback it publishes no row until a re-measurement shows it does. The candidates are counted here, not reported as findings, and the score does not include them.
  • D20 ADR Quality — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. The ADR lexicon (adr-lexicon-1) covers de, en, it, nl. A record identified as another language, or whose language could not be identified (fewer than 25 words of prose, or no clear winner), is never read with English rules: its missing-section, status, consequence-cost and same-question rules abstain, and only the structural rules (title, single option, dangling link, enforcement field) run.
  • D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's deterministic naming rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. Until then its declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether its names are consistent.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The loaded project set declares no packable project and no `.Contracts` project, so there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
  • D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D24 compares a comment's words with the identifiers, literals and constructs of the code it annotates, using English function-word and rationale lexicons. Comments in another script or language were left unread rather than counted as clean.
  • D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
  • D27 Navigability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `REDACTED`, `src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Handlers/EfetuarMovimentacaoHandler.cs`, `src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Handlers/ObterExtratoQuery.cs`, `src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Handlers/ObterSaldoHandler.cs`, `src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Services/RecorrenciaScheduler.cs`, … (+7 more) produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (REDACTED). compose up failed (exit 15 — the compose project is invalid) — error while interpolating services.intelligence-integration-test.environment.INTELLIGENCE_IDENTITIES: required variable INTELLIGENCE_IDENTITIES is missing a value: Configure identidades; runtime evidence skipped.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 reads a prose claim (a path, a setting, a variable, a route, a version, a project, an install, a bare project name in a command) only in text identified as English: the cues that tell a claim from an absence, the past, a plan or an example are an English lexicon, and on other text they would let a false claim through. Links, image targets, fenced commands with an explicit path or a package-manager script, and env-fence variables are checked in every language. 'und' is text the identifier could not name (too short, mixed script, no function words).
  • M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
  • P10 Library API & versioning — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Library API & versioning could not be assessed in this run — the check did not complete, so it is not scored. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository. Engine failure: ArgumentException: SyntaxTree is not part of the compilation (Parameter 'syntaxTree').
  • P11 BDD / executable specs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. BDD / executable specs could not be assessed in this run — the check did not complete, so it is not scored. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository. Engine failure: ArgumentException: SyntaxTree is not part of the compilation (Parameter 'syntaxTree').
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Outbound HTTP resilience could not be assessed in this run — the check did not complete, so it is not scored. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository. Engine failure: ArgumentException: SyntaxTree is not part of the compilation (Parameter 'syntaxTree').
  • P8 Schema migrations — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Schema migrations could not be assessed in this run — the check did not complete, so it is not scored. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository. Engine failure: ArgumentException: SyntaxTree is not part of the compilation (Parameter 'syntaxTree').

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — we run the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned REDACTED, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is read from the handler body and one hop below: a mutation is flagged only on structural double-apply evidence (a fresh-identity insert, an accumulation, a growing list, an unkeyed POST/send/charge), so a duplicate effect through a home-grown gateway two hops down, or an insert keyed on the message with no unique constraint, is not flagged but counted as not classified; a guard enforced by a database constraint or a broker's exactly-once delivery is invisible either way. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was top-level statements at 30.

top-level statements (cyclomatic 30)src/BankMore.BacenSim/Program.cs:22
check_kafka.main (cyclomatic 16)investigation/scripts/check_kafka.py:36
demo._imprimir (cyclomatic 16)jev/bankmore_jev/demo.py:241
policy._avaliar_contexto (cyclomatic 16)jev/bankmore_jev/policy.py:67

What to do

  1. Bring the 4 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with top-level statements (cyclomatic 30), check_kafka.main (cyclomatic 16), demo._imprimir (cyclomatic 16). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.0 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

11 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was top-level statements at 39.

top-level statements (cognitive 39)src/BankMore.BacenSim/Program.cs:22
demo._imprimir (cognitive 24)jev/bankmore_jev/demo.py:241
fraud_detector.main (cognitive 23)pyflink/fraud_detector.py:187
OutboxRelayHostedService.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 21)src/BankMore.Transferencia.Api/Services/OutboxRelayHostedService.cs:52
check_kafka.main (cognitive 19)investigation/scripts/check_kafka.py:36

+ 6 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Bring the 1 body over 30 down to 30 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with top-level statements (cognitive 39). — Refactoring it lifts Cognitive Complexity from 8.1 to about 8.4/10.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: PixRepositorysrc/BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure/PixRepository.cs
MethodTooLong: TarifaConsumer.Handlesrc/BankMore.Tarifas.Worker/Handlers/TarifaConsumer.cs:29

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with PixRepository.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 MethodTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with TarifaConsumer.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.3 / 10Stronggated by 11 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

11 duplicated block group(s) detected. Measured on part of this repository only: .ts (17% of production source) was not exposed to THIS dimension's token comparison and is not in this count; duplication there is measured by R10 Code Duplication, the frontend lens's card running the same clone algorithm over the JS/TS token stream.

Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×3src/BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure/PixRepository.cs:137
Duplicated block (7–33 lines × 2)src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain/Entities/ContaCorrente.cs:19
Duplicated block (27 lines × 2)REDACTED:35
Duplicated block (25–28 lines × 2)REDACTED:64
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)REDACTED:115

+ 4 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with PixRepository.cs, REDACTED, fraud_detector.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (7–33 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with ContaCorrente.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (27 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling9.0 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

16 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Layer violation: Application → Infrastructuresrc/BankMore.Pix.Application/BankMore.Pix.Application.csproj:9
Off the main sequence: BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain · ×2src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain.csproj:1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Layer violation finding(s) in Coupling — start with BankMore.Pix.Application.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling — start with BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain.csproj, BankMore.Transferencia.Domain.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 27 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D7 · Architectural Integrity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.

Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

All 23 mechanizable ADR(s) are enforced: 23 by analyzers, 0 by tests. Cycles found: 0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

146 test methods: 146 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The JavaScript/TypeScript suite contributes 2 `it`/`test` case(s) across 1 test file(s) declaring at least one beside 18 .NET test method(s); its tier split is read from package names and paths only. The Python suite contributes 126 test function(s) across 13 file(s) declaring at least one — every `def test…` in a file pytest or unittest would collect, which is those frameworks' own definition of a case; a parametrize table counts once, so this is a floor. Its tier split is read from file names and paths only.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality8.3 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 1 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 18 tests. Measured on the C# suite only — at least 19 test source file(s) (.py, .ts) went unread, so its test quality is unmeasured and is not in these counts.

No assertions (empty test): Test1tests/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests/UnitTest1.cs:5
Mock framework: Moq

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with UnitTest1.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 3 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky); JavaScript/TypeScript (vitest via `npm ci --ignore-scripts` in frontend/ (0 tests)): measured (0 flaky); Python (repository root, 13 test files): measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, not deprecated, and not bloated. Known vulnerabilities are D30's.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (capped-linear for deprecation, prerelease and outdated) per KLoC. Known-vulnerable packages are D30's and are not charged here (rubric-2026.11.2). Exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

27 outdated, 1 vulnerable, 1 deprecated packages. Those are the NuGet packages; this repository's npm dependencies were read too — 7 outdated of 9 package(s) across 1 lockfile(s).

Deprecated: xunit · ×2tests/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests.csproj:17
Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore · ×2REDACTED:8
Outdated: Confluent.Kafka · ×25
Outdated (npm): @angular/common · ×7

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests.csproj, BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure.Tests.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Outdated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED, BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
  3. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

8 secret(s) detected.

REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 10 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 246 packages use a banned license. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 29 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 184 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's NuGet package dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry) and package.json, and the licences of those dependency graphs were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt7.9 / 10Adequategated by 5 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 deducted debt markers + 11 dead symbols across 5435 LoC in the .NET projects (1.1/KLoC) → score 7.9. Measured on the .NET source only: .py, .ts (55% of production source) was not read, and carries at least 0 uncounted task marker(s) in 0 file(s).

EmptyCatchBlock · ×5REDACTED:140
Dead code: ObterDescricaoExtrato · ×11src/BankMore.Transferencia.Domain/Enum/TipoTransferencia.cs:37
TodoCommentREDACTED:10

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 EmptyCatchBlock finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with REDACTED (2), FraudeClient.cs (2), OutboxRelayHostedService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 11 Dead code finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with IContaCorrenteRepository.cs (4), ContaCorrente.cs (2), TipoTransferencia.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Every README, docs/ document and root guide parsed by its markup and measured in Unicode letters. Published: a runnable or packaged .NET project whose README (or a document it links, or a root guide) shows no example, and a root README naming none of three or more projects. Overview, licence, boilerplate, wall-of-text, empty-section and XML-doc rows are measured and withheld (counted in gaps) after adjudication. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 of 2 documentation facets pass in full. 10 document(s) read across 16 unit(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 16 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)9.0 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

19 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 11 medium, 2 low. 6 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 12 file(s) — `REDACTED` (lines 12–13, line 67), `src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Handlers/EfetuarMovimentacaoHandler.cs` (lines 14–16, line 57), `src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Handlers/ObterExtratoQuery.cs` (lines 13–15, line 49), `src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Handlers/ObterSaldoHandler.cs` (lines 19–20, line 52), `src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Services/RecorrenciaScheduler.cs` (lines 18–20, lines 21–22), … (+7 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. In 12 of those file(s) — `REDACTED`, `src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Handlers/EfetuarMovimentacaoHandler.cs`, `src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Handlers/ObterExtratoQuery.cs`, `src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Handlers/ObterSaldoHandler.cs`, `src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Services/RecorrenciaScheduler.cs`, … (+7 more) — the break is a C# primary constructor, which semgrep's grammar cannot parse and which hides the type from every rule scoped to it; those files were re-scanned from a shadow copy with the constructor's parameter list blanked (line and column preserving), which restores the type to the rules, and 0 additional row(s) came from that pass. Only the header's own parameter list is unread in them.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 6 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  3. No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 6 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): every row is a match against a vulnerability database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

43 finding(s): 4 critical, 29 high, 9 medium, 1 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 29 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (27), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (29 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 9 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (7), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 4 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security3.1 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

43 finding(s): 0 critical, 12 high, 28 medium, 3 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 28 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (13), REDACTED (10), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (28 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 12 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (7), REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 3 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 44 of the 66 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 of 312 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

IL efficiency: 4 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetsrc/BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure/PixRepository.cs:122

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Reported apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): the malicious-package feed is a database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 16 platform declaration(s) and 20 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC2 · Forms & labels7.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

  • This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id. — frontend/src/app/features/transferencia/transferencia.component.ts:39

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no element the repo's own CSS styles `cursor: pointer` without giving it any of the three, no unfocusable element whose only binding is a mouse enter/leave pair or a double-click, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

Coverage: Population: elements that pose a keyboard-semantics question, in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) — a non-natively-interactive element carrying a click handler, a double-click or hover enter/leave binding, a pointer-only gesture on a tabindex="0" element, or `cursor: pointer` from the repo's own CSS; an href-less or placeholder-href (#, javascript:) anchor; and any element with a positive tabindex. Natively interactive elements used correctly (<button>, <a href>, form controls) are NOT in the population — there is nothing to judge — so a page of nothing but correct controls gives AC4 nothing to measure. Keyboard reachability is judged from the markup, never from a rendered page. ★ An interactive element declared in a tagged-template (html`…`) or hyperscript frontend is NOT in this population — no producer reads either — so an empty population is reported as an analyzer gap, never as "this repository has no interactive elements".

  • An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. — frontend/src/app/features/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:81

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

Coverage: Population: elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) that carry a role or an aria-* attribute; roles and token values are checked against the ARIA enums exhaustively within that set. An expression-valued (dynamic) role or aria-* value is skipped rather than guessed, and markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety3.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

  • `.btn-primary` sets color: white on background-color: #007bff — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — frontend/src/app/shared/components/button/button.component.ts:28
  • `.btn-primary` sets color: white on background-color: #667eea — 3.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×2) — frontend/src/app/features/register/register.component.ts:88, frontend/src/app/features/login/login.component.ts:71
  • `.empty` sets color: #64748b on background-color: #1e293b — 3.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — frontend/src/app/features/ops/fraude.component.ts:142
  • `.empty` sets color: #9ca3af on background-color: white — 2.5:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×2) — frontend/src/app/features/extrato/extrato.component.ts:113, frontend/src/app/features/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:191
  • `.card` moves (`transition: transform 0.15s`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — frontend/src/app/features/ops/fraude.component.ts:146

What to do

  • Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

Coverage: Population: the repository's own tooling configuration — lint config, test and CI files — NOT the markup. It is read for a configured accessibility checker and an automated accessibility assertion (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse, or a native-toolkit equivalent), and it credits an INVOCATION, never a mention: a licence filename, an import comment or a doc reference earns no rung. Enforcement configured entirely outside the repository leaves no evidence here and cannot be credited.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (@angular-eslint/eslint-plugin-template (a11y rules)) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 12 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here. — frontend/package.json:35

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add @angular-eslint/eslint-plugin-template (a11y rules), then assert with vitest-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction6.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

  • `BankMore.Pix.Application` is a Application project but references `BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one. — src/BankMore.Pix.Application/BankMore.Pix.Application.csproj:9
  • This Application file depends on the Infrastructure project `BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure`: it names `BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure`, `Pacs008Builder`. The inward dependency rule is broken here. It is named again on line 79. Depend on an abstraction the inner layer owns, implemented in the outer one. — src/BankMore.Pix.Application/MedHandlers.cs:2
  • This Application file depends on the Infrastructure project `BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure`: it names `BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure`, `Pacs008Builder`. The inward dependency rule is broken here. It is named again on line 110. Depend on an abstraction the inner layer owns, implemented in the outer one. — src/BankMore.Pix.Application/PixLiquidacaoService.cs:2

What to do

  • Keep dependencies pointing inward: domain/application define interfaces, infrastructure/web implement them (Dependency Inversion).
AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

  • `IPixRepository` declares 26 members: `ObterChaveLocal`, `SalvarChave`, `ListarChavesPorConta`, `SalvarPagamento`, `AtualizarPagamento`, `ObterPagamento`, `ObterPagamentoPorE2e`, `ContarPagamentosRecentes`, `LiquidarMovimentos`, `EstornarMovimentos`, `SalvarQrCode`, `ObterQrCodePorTxid`, `AtualizarStatusQrCode`, `SalvarDevolucao`, `AtualizarDevolucao`, `ObterDevolucao`, `SalvarConsentimento`, `AtualizarConsentimento`, `ObterConsentimento`, `ListarConsentimentosVencidos`, `SalvarNfcToken`, `ObterNfcToken`, `AtualizarNfcToken`, `ObterIdContaPorCpf`, `ObterNomePorCpf`, `ObterCpfPorIdConta`. Counted as the author wrote them — a property is ONE member and its get/set accessors are not counted separately, and an event counts once. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — src/BankMore.Pix.Domain/Interfaces.cs:4

What to do

  • Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
AX7 · Slice cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.

Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C1 · Data Protection1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
  • Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.
C2 · Access Controls7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.
  • This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable. (×16) — REDACTED:10, src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Controllers/PixController.cs:27, src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Controllers/PixController.cs:35, …

What to do

  • Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.
C4 · Data Retention7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).

Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.

  • A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob).

What to do

  • Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain types receive the time and randomness their rules depend on, rather than reading the process clock or a global random source directly — an ambient read makes the rule it feeds untestable at the instant that matters and lets two reads inside one operation disagree.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated, C#/VB only): domain-layer types scanned for ambient reads — DateTime/DateTimeOffset.Now/UtcNow/Today, Random.Shared, new Random(), Stopwatch.GetTimestamp — resolved against the semantic model, with a comment/string-stripped token fallback only where resolution fails. Body reads are scored; field/property initialisers are surfaced unscored. Apply/When folds excluded (ES1 owns them). Deterministic, symbol-resolved.

  • `EndToEndId` reads `DateTimeOffset.UtcNow` inside `Gerar`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`. — src/BankMore.Pix.Domain/EndToEndId.cs:23
  • `EndToEndId` reads `DateTimeOffset.UtcNow` inside `GerarDevolucao`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`. — src/BankMore.Pix.Domain/EndToEndId.cs:30

What to do

  • Pass the instant into the domain method that needs it, or inject `TimeProvider` (BCL, .NET 8+) and read it there — then a test can choose the moment a rule is evaluated at.
ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED2 · Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

ED4 · Outbox / dual-write10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED5 · Idempotency10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers and message or event consumers) are idempotent, so an at-least-once redelivery or a client retry does not apply the effect twice.

Method: Roslyn (any mutation, ungated): each persistent write of a command handler or message/event consumer is idempotent when a guard is visible (an exists/dedup read that gates an exit, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox used in a condition or store call, versioned or fixed-value write, dedup envelope or pipeline), at risk only on positive double-apply evidence (a fresh-identity insert, an accumulation on a loaded and saved object, a growing member list, an unkeyed POST/SMTP send/Stripe charge), and otherwise not classified. Deterministic, no model; not scored when more than half are not classified. Advisory.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. Every mutation is classified exhaustively and deterministically: guarded, at risk on positive evidence, or not classified; the score is over the classified ones and is withheld when they are fewer than half.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 14 of 14 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Grow the ADR log (currently 24) — reach 50 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the project's current-state documentation describes the code that exists.

Method: Every current-state document's checkable claims looked up in the tree (links, versions, and artefact counts an order of magnitude off), plus two README checks: an advertised infrastructure product with no footprint, and a module the CHANGELOG records as removed. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 2956 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:9
  • `REDACTED` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — REDACTED:8

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

What to do

  • Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from each language's code model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

  • `main` is async and calls subprocess.check_output — a blocking call inside async code stalls the event loop — every other task on it waits for as long as it runs. — investigation/scripts/check_live_mcp.py:52

What to do

  • Python: await the async equivalent (asyncio.sleep, an async HTTP client such as httpx.AsyncClient or aiohttp, asyncio.create_subprocess_exec), or move the blocking call off the loop with `await asyncio.to_thread(...)`; never call asyncio.run inside a coroutine — await the coroutine.
R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

R10 · Code Duplication8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.

Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Deterministic.

  • 8 duplicated blocks under frontend/src/app/features/ have copies in at least two of the sibling directories dashboard, extrato, login, register, transferencia — 7 of them are reported below, and 1 is counted here but not reported individually: those copies match on shape but no longer clear R10's bar for an individually reported row — either they kept neither their own names nor their values, or what was copied is too small to stand on its own (it reports near-exact duplication only, and only of substantial extent). What this row states is the concentration, which the detector measured over all 8 and which does not depend on how exactly each block's copies still match. That concentration is one structural fact, not 8 local ones: the siblings replicate behaviour none of them owns, which is the shape of a missing shared module — a common library every sibling imports — rather than 8 separate extractions. Check first whether the siblings are deliberately standalone deliverables (scaffold templates, demo apps that must stay copy-pasteable); where they are, the duplication is the design and the per-block rows are the ones to act on. — frontend/src/app/features/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:196
  • frontend/src/app/features/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:196 · frontend/src/app/features/extrato/extrato.component.ts:117 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 265 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — frontend/src/app/features/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:196
  • frontend/src/app/features/register/register.component.ts:123 · frontend/src/app/features/transferencia/transferencia.component.ts:182 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — frontend/src/app/features/register/register.component.ts:123
  • frontend/src/app/features/login/login.component.ts:79 · frontend/src/app/features/register/register.component.ts:94 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is a run of DECLARATIONS inside a construct — the members of a type, or the entries of an object or array literal — with no statement anywhere in it. Do not read this as an extract-a-helper row: nothing here executes, so there is no call site, and a call expression cannot stand where a member declaration or a literal's entry was. What repeats is a SHAPE, and which shape decides the move. Where the copies declare the same members, the repetition is a missing common ancestor: give it a base type, an interface both extend, a generic instantiated twice, or — where the copies are a literal's entries rather than a type's members — one shared constant each site spreads or refers to, so the set is written once. Where they declare DIFFERENT members and only the form is shared — a decorator and its options, an annotation, a registration table's keys — the form is prescribed by a framework or a schema rather than copied, and the only collapse available is to generate the declarations from that schema; where you do not own the generator, this is the cost of the framework and there is nothing to extract. Check which of the two it is before acting: these copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why the repetition is reported, but the sentence to act on is not the same in both cases. — frontend/src/app/features/login/login.component.ts:79
  • frontend/src/app/features/extrato/extrato.component.ts:167 · frontend/src/app/features/transferencia/transferencia.component.ts:235 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — frontend/src/app/features/extrato/extrato.component.ts:167
  • frontend/src/app/features/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:275 · frontend/src/app/features/extrato/extrato.component.ts:177 · frontend/src/app/features/extrato/extrato.component.ts:191 — the 3 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — frontend/src/app/features/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:275
  • frontend/src/app/features/login/login.component.ts:94 · frontend/src/app/features/register/register.component.ts:132 · frontend/src/app/features/transferencia/transferencia.component.ts:191 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — frontend/src/app/features/login/login.component.ts:94
  • frontend/src/app/features/register/register.component.ts:138 · frontend/src/app/features/transferencia/transferencia.component.ts:197 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — frontend/src/app/features/register/register.component.ts:138

What to do

  • Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • pedir has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 14; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — frontend/src/app/features/ops/jev.component.ts:275
R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

R4 · Test Coverage0.5 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×21) — frontend/src/app/features/ops/jev.component.ts:1, frontend/src/app/features/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:1, frontend/src/app/features/transferencia/transferencia.component.ts:1, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 · Dependency Freshness8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30, which answers dependency vulnerabilities for every ecosystem). Deterministic.

What to do

  • Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 · Tooling6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✓ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.

What to do

  • Add eslint as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 1 application, 1 tooling and 1 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on `npm run build` — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 1 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (frontend/src/app/shared/shared.module.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it (×4) — frontend/src/app/shared/components/input/input.component.ts, frontend/src/app/shared/components/button/button.component.ts, frontend/src/app/shared/pipes/date-br.pipe.ts, …
  • no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 1 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make (×2) — frontend/src/app/core/core.module.ts, frontend/src/app/shared/shared.module.ts

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

  • `SHA256.HashData(…)` puts the password `password` through SHA256, a fast general-purpose digest, so a stolen hash is guessed at billions of candidates a second whether or not it is salted — no key-derivation function (PBKDF2/scrypt/Argon2/bcrypt) stands between the password and the stored value. — src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Services/PasswordHasher.cs:97
  • `Iterations` fixes PBKDF2 at 100,000 iterations. A key-derivation function's only defence is the cost of ONE guess, and that cost is this number — the algorithm choice does not set it. Current OWASP guidance is 1,300,000 PBKDF2 iterations with HMAC-SHA1, 600,000 with SHA-256 and 210,000 with SHA-512; scrypt at N=2^17, r=8, p=1 (or an equivalent N·r·p product); Argon2id at 19 MiB of memory and 2 iterations (or an equivalent row); bcrypt at a work factor of at least 10. This figure divides the attacker's work by a factor of tens or hundreds against the same stolen hash, on hardware they already own. Where what is derived is short or low-entropy — a PIN, a numeric parental code, a four-character token — the whole keyspace falls in the time this parameter buys, and no salt or constant-time comparison changes that. Raise the count to the current published figure for the PRF you use, measure it on the slowest hardware that must run it (a target of roughly 100 ms per derivation is the usual budget), and read the value from configuration so a deployment can raise it again without a rebuild. Where the derived value must interoperate with a format someone else fixed, the count cannot move — derive a SEPARATE value for anything you own rather than inheriting the external format's price. — src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Services/PasswordHasher.cs:28
  • `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — src/BankMore.Transferencia.Api/Program.cs:57
  • `ValidateAudience`, `ValidateIssuer` are all set to `false`, which means a token minted for a DIFFERENT relying party is accepted here. Any other service that trusts the same issuer can have its tokens replayed against this one, which is precisely what the `Audience` value exists to prevent. — src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api/Program.cs:72
  • None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves. (×4) — src/BankMore.BacenSim/Program.cs:22, src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api/Program.cs:13, src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Program.cs:19, …
  • No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it. (×4) — src/BankMore.BacenSim/Program.cs:22, src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api/Program.cs:13, src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Program.cs:19, …

What to do

  • Store passwords with a salted KDF — `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.PasswordHasher<T>`, `Rfc2898DeriveBytes` (PBKDF2), or BCrypt/Argon2 — and compare with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals`. (A fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim, is not password storage.) Start in `src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Services/PasswordHasher.cs:97`.
  • Raise the cost parameter to current guidance — PBKDF2 at 1,300,000 (HMAC-SHA1), 600,000 (SHA-256) or 210,000 (SHA-512) iterations; scrypt at N=2^17, r=8, p=1; bcrypt at a work factor of 10 or more — or move to a memory-hard KDF (Argon2id, scrypt) where the platform offers one. Read the parameter from configuration and tune it to roughly 100 ms per derivation on the slowest hardware that must run it, so the price can be raised again without shipping new code.
  • Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
  • Re-enable token validation — `ValidateAudience` is set to `false`. If it was switched off because the expected value was wrong or absent, supply that value instead (`ValidAudiences`/`ValidIssuers`, or `IssuerSigningKeys`/`IssuerSigningKeyResolver` for the signature) rather than skipping the check: a disabled check accepts every token, not just the one that was failing.
  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy first, then Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options and a frame policy) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X2 · Cancellation propagation9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 89/99 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×7) — src/BankMore.Transferencia.Api/Controllers/TransferenciaController.cs:16, REDACTED:19, REDACTED:24, …
  • No CancellationToken parameter, and the token `ctx.RequestAborted` carries reaches none of the calls here that take one — this work can't be stopped early once started. Pass `ctx.RequestAborted` on, or take a CancellationToken. (×2) — src/BankMore.Transferencia.Api/Middleware/ExceptionMiddleware.cs:32, src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api/Middleware/ExceptionMiddleware.cs:65
  • 1 async method(s) await work their caller's cancellation cannot reach: a CancellationToken they hold (a parameter, or the one a framework-fixed signature carries) is never passed on, or the call is handed CancellationToken.None, default or an already-cancelled token. Forward the caller's token to that call.
  • Its signature is fixed by the framework, and the token it carries (`context.ConsumerContext.WorkerStopped`) reaches none of the calls here that take one — so an aborted request or a stopping host still waits for that work. Pass `context.ConsumerContext.WorkerStopped` to them. — src/BankMore.Tarifas.Worker/Handlers/TarifaConsumer.cs:29

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X20 · Mistyped argument guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `ArgumentNullException` tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back. Also whether a `finally` that gives the primitive back unconditionally can run in a state where the method does not hold it: after a timed wait whose result was discarded, after an acquire inside the `try` that can fail, after the body already released it, or never, because a `return` left between the acquire and the `try`.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `foreach` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is enumerating invalidates the enumerator it is holding, so the next `MoveNext` throws `InvalidOperationException` and the remaining items are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X3 · Exception handling5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

  • An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. (×5) — src/BankMore.Transferencia.Api/Services/OutboxRelayHostedService.cs:91, REDACTED:140, REDACTED:183, …

What to do

  • Swallowed exception (empty catch)
X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X32 · Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a plugin lookup names the type it means — searching every assembly loaded into the process for a candidate whose SIMPLE name equals a string supplied at runtime, and taking the first one found, is decided by assembly LOAD ORDER rather than by this source, so the same name can resolve to a different type on the next run.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every invocation of `First`/`FirstOrDefault`/`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` whose OWN expression subtree contains both a `GetAssemblies()` call and a `GetTypes()`/`GetExportedTypes()` call — a single-element pick out of every type loaded into the process. A nested selector in the same chain sees no `GetAssemblies()` in its own subtree and is outside the population, so one lookup counts once however many links its chain has. A finding additionally needs both remaining halves: the selector must be `First`/`FirstOrDefault` (`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` reports the ambiguity rather than resolving it, and is counted and never reported), and the chain must carry an `==` comparison of `<lambda parameter>.Name` against something that is not a literal. The receiver must be a plain identifier bound by one of the chain’s own lambdas, which places `assembly.GetName().Name == "X"` outside the rule by construction. One exemption: a `.Name` test joined by `&&` to a `FullName`/`AssemblyQualifiedName` test on the same identifier is spared; joined by `||` it is not. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~0.2 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 7 suppression(s) across the 31179 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 12 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (22%; ≈24% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 43 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 43 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.1.1, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health74%StrongSolid.
Architecture79%StrongSolid.
Maturity84%StrongSolid.
Readiness37%Weak — gated by D13, R4, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security33%Weak — gated by D31, C1, S1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling98%ExemplarySolid.
Event-Driven100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Accessibility45%Weak — gated by AC4, AC6Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance85%StrongSolid.
Unscored — 3 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X10 Duplicated predicate — 6 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — 6 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 3 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
Not included — 33 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 15 — the compose project is invalid) — error while interpolating services.intelligence-integration-test.environment.INTELLIGENCE_IDENTITIES: required variable INTELLIGENCE_IDENTITIES is missing a value: Configure identidades; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a C#/VB .NET solution, but this repository's production source is mostly .py, .ts, which the C#/VB workspace does not load — the projects that loaded are an immaterial minority, so solution shape was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D20 ADR Quality — 23 ADR(s) are written in a language our ADR lexicon does not cover, or are too short to tell (pt); their sections and statuses were not judged.
  • D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency is measured on C# and TypeScript only; Python not measured.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — small single-context codebase (5,435 production LoC in the .NET projects) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — 254 of 254 comment blocks were not judged (254 in a language other than English): redundancy is judged by word overlap with the code's identifiers, which cannot be measured across languages.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — None of 0 binding record(s) states a rule in checkable form (a backticked element with a prohibition, or an `adr-rules` block), so conformance cannot be read from the code. Write the rule as an `adr-rules` block (`forbid:` a symbol, a package or a dependency) to make it checkable.
  • D27 Navigability — D27 reads resolved call sites in the languages it reads only — this repository's production source is .py, .ts, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 12 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the .NET half measured 28.6%; the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — frontend/ runs vitest but declares no coverage provider, so the suite can run and still produce no lcov — add `@vitest/coverage-v8` (or `@vitest/coverage-istanbul`) as a devDependency. This repository's production source spans both ecosystems, and no partial figure is published as if it were the whole: coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. The named suite step is one the repository's maintainers can perform; once it passes, the real number is measured on the next scan. Alternatively, commit the lcov/Cobertura report your CI produces and it is read without a re-run.
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 15 value object(s); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
  • ED3 Event naming — no domain or integration events detected — event-naming check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • P10 Library API & versioning — Library API & versioning could not be assessed in this run — the check did not complete, so it is not scored. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P11 BDD / executable specs — BDD / executable specs could not be assessed in this run — the check did not complete, so it is not scored. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — Outbound HTTP resilience could not be assessed in this run — the check did not complete, so it is not scored. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P8 Schema migrations — Schema migrations could not be assessed in this run — the check did not complete, so it is not scored. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 72 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×29
  • REDACTED
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  • + 4 more in this group — see findings.md.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×12
  • REDACTED
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D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×10
  • REDACTED
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
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D17 · Explicit Debt · EmptyCatchBlock · ×5
  • EmptyCatchBlock REDACTED:140 — empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
  • EmptyCatchBlock REDACTED:183 — empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
  • EmptyCatchBlock src/BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure/FraudeClient.cs:63 — empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
  • EmptyCatchBlock src/BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure/FraudeClient.cs:64 — empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
  • EmptyCatchBlock src/BankMore.Transferencia.Api/Services/OutboxRelayHostedService.cs:91 — empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×4
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
AC2 · Forms & labels · <label> that labels no control · ×1
  • <label> that labels no control frontend/src/app/features/transferencia/transferencia.component.ts:39 — This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
AX4 · Dependency direction · Dependency-rule violation · ×1
  • Dependency-rule violation: BankMore.Pix.Application (Application) → BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) src/BankMore.Pix.Application/BankMore.Pix.Application.csproj:9 — `BankMore.Pix.Application` is a Application project but references `BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
D10 · Test Quality · No assertions (empty test) · ×1
  • No assertions (empty test): Test1 tests/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests/UnitTest1.cs:5 — Test method has an empty body — it asserts nothing and exercises no code.
D28 · Secrets (history) · High secret · ×1
  • REDACTED
D5 · Coupling · Layer violation · ×1
  • Layer violation: Application → Infrastructure src/BankMore.Pix.Application/BankMore.Pix.Application.csproj:9 — BankMore.Pix.Application (Application) references BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) — dependencies must point inward (Web → Application → Domain; Infrastructure implements inner interfaces, nothing depends outward on it).
S1 · Web-Security Posture · Password hashing without a KDF · ×1
  • Password hashing without a KDF src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Services/PasswordHasher.cs:97 — `SHA256.HashData(…)` puts the password `password` through SHA256, a fast general-purpose digest, so a stolen hash is guessed at billions of candidates a second whether or not it is salted — no key-derivation function (PBKDF2/scrypt/Argon2/bcrypt) stands between the password and the stored value.
Serious — 162 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×28
  • REDACTED
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  • + 3 more in this group — see findings.md.
R4 · Test Coverage · No test reaches this file · ×21
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/features/ops/jev.component.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/features/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/features/transferencia/transferencia.component.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/features/ops/fraude.component.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/features/extrato/extrato.component.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/core/services/auth.service.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/features/register/register.component.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/features/ops/investigation.component.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/features/login/login.component.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/shared/components/input/input.component.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/shared/components/button/button.component.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/core/services/conta.service.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/core/interceptors/jwt.interceptor.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/app.routes.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/core/services/transferencia.service.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/core/core.module.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/shared/pipes/date-br.pipe.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/shared/shared.module.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/core/guards/auth.guard.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/app/shared/pipes/currency-brl.pipe.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
  • No test reaches this file frontend/src/main.ts:1 — No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one.
D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×11
  • Dead code: ObterDescricaoExtrato src/BankMore.Transferencia.Domain/Enum/TipoTransferencia.cs:37 — Method ObterDescricaoExtrato — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including BankMore.Transferencia.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: ObterPorId src/BankMore.Transferencia.Domain/ITransferenciaRepository.cs:20 — Method ObterPorId — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including BankMore.Transferencia.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: SaltSize src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Services/PasswordHasher.cs:30 — Field SaltSize — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: Inativar src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain/Entities/ContaCorrente.cs:87 — Method Inativar — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: Reativar src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain/Entities/ContaCorrente.cs:95 — Method Reativar — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: ObterPorNumero src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain/Interfaces/IContaCorrenteRepository.cs:9 — Method ObterPorNumero — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: ObterPorId src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain/Interfaces/IContaCorrenteRepository.cs:10 — Method ObterPorId — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: Inativar src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain/Interfaces/IContaCorrenteRepository.cs:12 — Method Inativar — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: ObterTarifas src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain/Interfaces/IContaCorrenteRepository.cs:16 — Method ObterTarifas — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: BuildPacs008 src/BankMore.BacenSim/Iso20022/Iso20022Messages.cs:27 — Method BuildPacs008 — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including BankMore.BacenSim, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
  • Dead code: ObterPagamentoPorE2e src/BankMore.Pix.Domain/Interfaces.cs:15 — Method ObterPagamentoPorE2e — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including BankMore.Pix.Domain, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×9
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X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken · ×9
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Transferir src/BankMore.Transferencia.Api/Controllers/TransferenciaController.cs:16 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Respond src/BankMore.Transferencia.Api/Middleware/ExceptionMiddleware.cs:32 — No CancellationToken parameter, and the token `ctx.RequestAborted` carries reaches none of the calls here that take one — this work can't be stopped early once started. Pass `ctx.RequestAborted` on, or take a CancellationToken.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Cadastrar REDACTED:19 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Login REDACTED:24 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: ObterSaldo REDACTED:34 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: ObterExtrato REDACTED:39 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Movimentar REDACTED:47 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Respond src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api/Middleware/ExceptionMiddleware.cs:65 — No CancellationToken parameter, and the token `ctx.RequestAborted` carries reaches none of the calls here that take one — this work can't be stopped early once started. Pass `ctx.RequestAborted` on, or take a CancellationToken.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: RegistrarSaldoInicial src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Handlers/CadastrarContaHandler.cs:110 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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X3 · Exception handling · Swallowed exception (empty catch) · ×5
  • Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/BankMore.Transferencia.Api/Services/OutboxRelayHostedService.cs:91 — An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
  • Swallowed exception (empty catch) REDACTED:140 — An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
  • Swallowed exception (empty catch) REDACTED:183 — An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
  • Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure/FraudeClient.cs:63 — An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
  • Swallowed exception (empty catch) src/BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure/FraudeClient.cs:64 — An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×3
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure/PixRepository.cs:137 — src/BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure/PixRepository.cs:137-143 | src/BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure/PixRepository.cs:158-165 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure/PixRepository.cs:137` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) REDACTED:105 — REDACTED:105-111 | REDACTED:120-126 — before extracting anything, compare `REDACTED` and `REDACTED` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 88 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) pyflink/fraud_detector.py:148 — pyflink/fraud_detector.py:148-154 | REDACTED:224-230 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~26 LoC) · ×3
  • Dead file (~26 LoC) frontend/src/app/core/core.module.ts — no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 1 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
  • Dead file (~26 LoC) frontend/src/app/shared/pipes/date-br.pipe.ts — no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 1 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (frontend/src/app/shared/shared.module.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
  • Dead file (~26 LoC) frontend/src/app/shared/shared.module.ts — no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 1 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.7 · ×2
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.7:1) frontend/src/app/features/register/register.component.ts:88 — `.btn-primary` sets color: white on background-color: #667eea — 3.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.7:1) frontend/src/app/features/login/login.component.ts:71 — `.btn-primary` sets color: white on background-color: #667eea — 3.7:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5 · ×2
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) frontend/src/app/features/extrato/extrato.component.ts:113 — `.empty` sets color: #9ca3af on background-color: white — 2.5:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.5:1) frontend/src/app/features/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:191 — `.empty` sets color: #9ca3af on background-color: white — 2.5:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AX4 · Dependency direction · Dependency-rule violation · ×2
  • Dependency-rule violation: BankMore.Pix.Application (Application) → BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) src/BankMore.Pix.Application/MedHandlers.cs:2 — This Application file depends on the Infrastructure project `BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure`: it names `BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure`, `Pacs008Builder`. The inward dependency rule is broken here. It is named again on line 79. Depend on an abstraction the inner layer owns, implemented in the outer one.
  • Dependency-rule violation: BankMore.Pix.Application (Application) → BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) src/BankMore.Pix.Application/PixLiquidacaoService.cs:2 — This Application file depends on the Infrastructure project `BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure`: it names `BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure`, `Pacs008Builder`. The inward dependency rule is broken here. It is named again on line 110. Depend on an abstraction the inner layer owns, implemented in the outer one.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×2
  • Deprecated: xunit tests/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests.csproj:17 — xunit 2.8.0 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; that is the next major line under a new package id, so the move is a breaking rename rather than a version bump — budget for API changes in the code that uses it, not only the reference swap.
  • Deprecated: xunit tests/BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure.Tests/BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure.Tests.csproj:14 — xunit 2.8.0 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; that is the next major line under a new package id, so the move is a breaking rename rather than a version bump — budget for API changes in the code that uses it, not only the reference swap.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×2
  • Off the main sequence: BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain.csproj:1 — BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain: abstractness 0.20, instability 0.00, distance 0.80 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: BankMore.Transferencia.Domain src/BankMore.Transferencia.Domain/BankMore.Transferencia.Domain.csproj:1 — BankMore.Transferencia.Domain: abstractness 0.25, instability 0.00, distance 0.75 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain · Domain type reads the wall clock · ×2
  • Domain type reads the wall clock: EndToEndId src/BankMore.Pix.Domain/EndToEndId.cs:23 — `EndToEndId` reads `DateTimeOffset.UtcNow` inside `Gerar`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`.
  • Domain type reads the wall clock: EndToEndId src/BankMore.Pix.Domain/EndToEndId.cs:30 — `EndToEndId` reads `DateTimeOffset.UtcNow` inside `GerarDevolucao`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics · Anchor without href · ×1
  • Anchor without href frontend/src/app/features/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:81 — An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.0 · ×1
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (4.0:1) frontend/src/app/shared/components/button/button.component.ts:28 — `.btn-primary` sets color: white on background-color: #007bff — 4.0:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.1 · ×1
  • Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.1:1) frontend/src/app/features/ops/fraude.component.ts:142 — `.empty` sets color: #64748b on background-color: #1e293b — 3.1:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard · ×1
  • Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard frontend/src/app/features/ops/fraude.component.ts:146 — `.card` moves (`transition: transform 0.15s`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
AC7 · A11y enforcement · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung · ×1
  • Accessibility enforcement below the top rung frontend/package.json:35 — No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (@angular-eslint/eslint-plugin-template (a11y rules)) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 12 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · top-level statements (cyclomatic 30) · ×1
  • top-level statements (cyclomatic 30) src/BankMore.BacenSim/Program.cs:22 — top-level statements has cyclomatic complexity 30 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 8 of the 30 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 8 function items inside it that branch (a function literal at line 104, a function literal at line 221, a function literal at line 246, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · check_kafka.main (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • check_kafka.main (cyclomatic 16) investigation/scripts/check_kafka.py:36 — check_kafka.main has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · demo._imprimir (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • demo._imprimir (cyclomatic 16) jev/bankmore_jev/demo.py:241 — demo._imprimir has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · policy._avaliar_contexto (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • policy._avaliar_contexto (cyclomatic 16) jev/bankmore_jev/policy.py:67 — policy._avaliar_contexto has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×1
  • TodoComment REDACTED:10 — // Exige JWT em TODO endpoint da classe — exceto os marcados. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · top-level statements (cognitive 39) · ×1
  • top-level statements (cognitive 39) src/BankMore.BacenSim/Program.cs:22 — top-level statements has cognitive complexity 39 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 9 of the 39 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 8 function items inside it that branch (a function literal at line 104, a function literal at line 130, a function literal at line 221, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · demo._imprimir (cognitive 24) · ×1
  • demo._imprimir (cognitive 24) jev/bankmore_jev/demo.py:241 — demo._imprimir has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: ternaries 7 (13 pts), if/else 4 (6 pts), loops 3, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · fraud_detector.main (cognitive 23) · ×1
  • fraud_detector.main (cognitive 23) pyflink/fraud_detector.py:187 — fraud_detector.main has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (15 pts), boolean chains 5, error handling 1 (2 pts), loops 1 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · OutboxRelayHostedService.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 21) · ×1
  • OutboxRelayHostedService.ExecuteAsync (cognitive 21) src/BankMore.Transferencia.Api/Services/OutboxRelayHostedService.cs:52 — OutboxRelayHostedService.ExecuteAsync has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · check_kafka.main (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • check_kafka.main (cognitive 19) investigation/scripts/check_kafka.py:36 — check_kafka.main has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (9 pts), boolean chains 5, error handling 2 (3 pts), loops 2 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · FraudDecider.process_element (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • FraudDecider.process_element (cognitive 19) REDACTED:232 — FraudDecider.process_element has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (12 pts), boolean chains 5, ternaries 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · demo.avaliar_pix (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • demo.avaliar_pix (cognitive 18) jev/bankmore_jev/demo.py:185 — demo.avaliar_pix has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (8 pts), ternaries 5 (6 pts), error handling 2 (4 pts) (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · demo.resumo (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • demo.resumo (cognitive 18) jev/bankmore_jev/demo.py:280 — demo.resumo has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12 (15 pts), ternaries 1 (2 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · CpfValidator.IsValid (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • CpfValidator.IsValid (cognitive 17) src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Services/CpfValidator.cs:10 — CpfValidator.IsValid has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · policy._avaliar_contexto (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • policy._avaliar_contexto (cognitive 17) jev/bankmore_jev/policy.py:67 — policy._avaliar_contexto has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (11 pts), boolean chains 4, ternaries 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 2). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · rag.search (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • rag.search (cognitive 16) investigation/bankmore_intelligence/rag.py:101 — rag.search has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (12 pts), boolean chains 2, loops 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
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D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×1
  • TooManyMethods: PixRepository src/BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure/PixRepository.cs — TooManyMethods — 201 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 35 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 5 over it, 1.17× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
D3 · God Classes · MethodTooLong · ×1
  • MethodTooLong: TarifaConsumer.Handle src/BankMore.Tarifas.Worker/Handlers/TarifaConsumer.cs:29 — MethodTooLong — Handle runs 102 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 2 over it, 1.02× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7–33 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (7–33 lines × 2) src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain/Entities/ContaCorrente.cs:19 — src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Domain/Entities/ContaCorrente.cs:19-51 | src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Infrastructure/Repositories/ContaCorrenteRepository.cs:208-214 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (27 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (27 lines × 2) REDACTED:35 — REDACTED:35-61 | REDACTED:42-68 — before extracting anything, compare `REDACTED` and `REDACTED` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 88 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (25–28 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (25–28 lines × 2) REDACTED:64 — REDACTED:64-88 | REDACTED:76-103 — before extracting anything, compare `REDACTED` and `REDACTED` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 88 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) REDACTED:115 — REDACTED:115-130 | REDACTED:134-149 — before extracting anything, compare `REDACTED` and `REDACTED` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 88 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) REDACTED:92 — REDACTED:92-101 | REDACTED:107-116 — before extracting anything, compare `REDACTED` and `REDACTED` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 88 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 3) src/BankMore.Tarifas.Worker/Handlers/RejeicaoConsumer.cs:60 — src/BankMore.Tarifas.Worker/Handlers/RejeicaoConsumer.cs:60-64 | src/BankMore.Tarifas.Worker/Handlers/TarifaConsumer.cs:225-229 | src/BankMore.Transferencia.Application/Handlers/EfetuarTransferenciaHandler.cs:25-29 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) src/BankMore.Tarifas.Worker/Handlers/RejeicaoConsumer.cs:60 — src/BankMore.Tarifas.Worker/Handlers/RejeicaoConsumer.cs:60-65 | src/BankMore.Transferencia.Application/Handlers/EfetuarTransferenciaHandler.cs:25-30 | src/BankMore.Transferencia.Domain/Transferencia.cs:5-10 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (47 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (47 lines × 2) src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api/Program.cs:21 — src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api/Program.cs:21-86 | src/BankMore.Transferencia.Api/Program.cs:22-68 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api/Program.cs:21` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the .NET half measured 28.6%; the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — frontend/ runs vitest but declares no coverage provider, so the suite can run and still produce no lcov — add `@vitest/coverage-v8` (or `@vitest/coverage-istanbul`) as a devDependency. This repository's production source spans both ecosystems, and no partial figure is published as if it were the whole: coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. The named suite step is one the repository's maintainers can perform; once it passes, the real number is measured on the next scan. Alternatively, commit the lcov/Cobertura report your CI produces and it is read without a re-run.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene · Sync-over-async blocking · ×1
  • Sync-over-async blocking investigation/scripts/check_live_mcp.py:52 — `main` is async and calls subprocess.check_output — a blocking call inside async code stalls the event loop — every other task on it waits for as long as it runs.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplication concentrated across 5 sibling directories (8 clone groups) · ×1
  • Duplication concentrated across 5 sibling directories (8 clone groups) frontend/src/app/features/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:196 — 8 duplicated blocks under frontend/src/app/features/ have copies in at least two of the sibling directories dashboard, extrato, login, register, transferencia — 7 of them are reported below, and 1 is counted here but not reported individually: those copies match on shape but no longer clear R10's bar for an individually reported row — either they kept neither their own names nor their values, or what was copied is too small to stand on its own (it reports near-exact duplication only, and only of substantial extent). What this row states is the concentration, which the detector measured over all 8 and which does not depend on how exactly each block's copies still match. That concentration is one structural fact, not 8 local ones: the siblings replicate behaviour none of them owns, which is the shape of a missing shared module — a common library every sibling imports — rather than 8 separate extractions. Check first whether the siblings are deliberately standalone deliverables (scaffold templates, demo apps that must stay copy-pasteable); where they are, the duplication is the design and the per-block rows are the ones to act on.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block with local edits (35 matched lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block with local edits (35 matched lines × 2 locations) frontend/src/app/features/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:196 — frontend/src/app/features/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:196 · frontend/src/app/features/extrato/extrato.component.ts:117 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 265 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) frontend/src/app/features/register/register.component.ts:123 — frontend/src/app/features/register/register.component.ts:123 · frontend/src/app/features/transferencia/transferencia.component.ts:182 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) frontend/src/app/features/login/login.component.ts:79 — frontend/src/app/features/login/login.component.ts:79 · frontend/src/app/features/register/register.component.ts:94 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is a run of DECLARATIONS inside a construct — the members of a type, or the entries of an object or array literal — with no statement anywhere in it. Do not read this as an extract-a-helper row: nothing here executes, so there is no call site, and a call expression cannot stand where a member declaration or a literal's entry was. What repeats is a SHAPE, and which shape decides the move. Where the copies declare the same members, the repetition is a missing common ancestor: give it a base type, an interface both extend, a generic instantiated twice, or — where the copies are a literal's entries rather than a type's members — one shared constant each site spreads or refers to, so the set is written once. Where they declare DIFFERENT members and only the form is shared — a decorator and its options, an annotation, a registration table's keys — the form is prescribed by a framework or a schema rather than copied, and the only collapse available is to generate the declarations from that schema; where you do not own the generator, this is the cost of the framework and there is nothing to extract. Check which of the two it is before acting: these copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why the repetition is reported, but the sentence to act on is not the same in both cases.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2 locations) frontend/src/app/features/extrato/extrato.component.ts:167 — frontend/src/app/features/extrato/extrato.component.ts:167 · frontend/src/app/features/transferencia/transferencia.component.ts:235 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 3 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 3 locations) frontend/src/app/features/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:275 — frontend/src/app/features/dashboard/dashboard.component.ts:275 · frontend/src/app/features/extrato/extrato.component.ts:177 · frontend/src/app/features/extrato/extrato.component.ts:191 — the 3 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 3 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 3 locations) frontend/src/app/features/login/login.component.ts:94 — frontend/src/app/features/login/login.component.ts:94 · frontend/src/app/features/register/register.component.ts:132 · frontend/src/app/features/transferencia/transferencia.component.ts:191 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2 locations) frontend/src/app/features/register/register.component.ts:138 — frontend/src/app/features/register/register.component.ts:138 · frontend/src/app/features/transferencia/transferencia.component.ts:197 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Complex function pedir (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 14) · ×1
  • Complex function pedir (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 14) frontend/src/app/features/ops/jev.component.ts:275 — pedir has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 14; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
R6 · Tooling · No lint script · ×1
  • No lint script — test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✓ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~107 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~107 LoC) frontend/src/app/shared/components/input/input.component.ts — no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 1 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (frontend/src/app/shared/shared.module.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~71 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~71 LoC) frontend/src/app/shared/components/button/button.component.ts — no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 1 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (frontend/src/app/shared/shared.module.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~18 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~18 LoC) frontend/src/app/shared/pipes/currency-brl.pipe.ts — no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 1 test roots considered), but 1 in-repo import(s) from 1 other file(s) do name it (frontend/src/app/shared/shared.module.ts) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
S1 · Web-Security Posture · Password key derivation is priced too cheaply · ×1
  • Password key derivation is priced too cheaply src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Services/PasswordHasher.cs:28 — `Iterations` fixes PBKDF2 at 100,000 iterations. A key-derivation function's only defence is the cost of ONE guess, and that cost is this number — the algorithm choice does not set it. Current OWASP guidance is 1,300,000 PBKDF2 iterations with HMAC-SHA1, 600,000 with SHA-256 and 210,000 with SHA-512; scrypt at N=2^17, r=8, p=1 (or an equivalent N·r·p product); Argon2id at 19 MiB of memory and 2 iterations (or an equivalent row); bcrypt at a work factor of at least 10. This figure divides the attacker's work by a factor of tens or hundreds against the same stolen hash, on hardware they already own. Where what is derived is short or low-entropy — a PIN, a numeric parental code, a four-character token — the whole keyspace falls in the time this parameter buys, and no salt or constant-time comparison changes that. Raise the count to the current published figure for the PRF you use, measure it on the slowest hardware that must run it (a target of roughly 100 ms per derivation is the usual budget), and read the value from configuration so a deployment can raise it again without a rebuild. Where the derived value must interoperate with a format someone else fixed, the count cannot move — derive a SEPARATE value for anything you own rather than inheriting the external format's price.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · Token validation disabled · ×1
  • Token validation disabled src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api/Program.cs:72 — `ValidateAudience`, `ValidateIssuer` are all set to `false`, which means a token minted for a DIFFERENT relying party is accepted here. Any other service that trusts the same issuer can have its tokens replayed against this one, which is precisely what the `Audience` value exists to prevent.
SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene · NuGet dependencies are not locked · ×1
  • NuGet dependencies are not locked — No packages.lock.json and no central package management — restores aren't reproducible or pinned (SSDF PW.4.4). Enable <RestorePackagesWithLockFile>true</RestorePackagesWithLockFile> (commit the lockfile) or adopt Directory.Packages.props. Advisory — never scored.
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async method drops its ambient CancellationToken · ×1
  • Async method drops its ambient CancellationToken: Handle src/BankMore.Tarifas.Worker/Handlers/TarifaConsumer.cs:29 — Its signature is fixed by the framework, and the token it carries (`context.ConsumerContext.WorkerStopped`) reaches none of the calls here that take one — so an aborted request or a stopping host still waits for that work. Pass `context.ConsumerContext.WorkerStopped` to them.
Minor — 58 finding(s)
C2 · Access Controls · No named authorization policies · ×17
  • No named authorization policies — Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies REDACTED:10 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Controllers/PixController.cs:27 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Controllers/PixController.cs:35 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Controllers/PixController.cs:46 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Controllers/PixController.cs:54 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Controllers/PixController.cs:67 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Controllers/PixController.cs:75 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Controllers/PixController.cs:83 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Controllers/PixController.cs:92 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Controllers/PixController.cs:99 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Controllers/PixController.cs:107 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Controllers/PixController.cs:117 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Controllers/PixController.cs:124 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Controllers/PixController.cs:132 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Controllers/PixController.cs:140 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies src/BankMore.Transferencia.Api/Controllers/TransferenciaController.cs:12 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
X10 · Duplicated predicate · Duplicated predicate · ×6
  • Duplicated predicate REDACTED:96 — `clause is not KeyInfoX509Data x509 || x509.Certificates is null` appears character-identically in 2 files — REDACTED, REDACTED. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate frontend/src/app/features/register/register.component.ts:129 — `c && c.invalid && (c.touched || c.dirty)` appears character-identically in 2 files — frontend/src/app/features/register/register.component.ts, frontend/src/app/features/transferencia/transferencia.component.ts. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate REDACTED:119 — `ku.KeyUsages.HasFlag(X509KeyUsageFlags.NonRepudiation) || ku.KeyUsages.HasFlag(X509KeyUsageFlags.DigitalSignature)` appears character-identically in 2 files — REDACTED, REDACTED. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate jev/bankmore_jev/api.py:313 — `env.get("TYPESAFE_MODEL") or DEFAULT_MODEL` appears character-identically in 2 files — jev/bankmore_jev/api.py, jev/bankmore_jev/demo.py. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate REDACTED:74 — `sigNodes.Count == 0 || sigNodes[0] is not XmlElement sigEl` appears character-identically in 2 files — REDACTED, REDACTED. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate src/BankMore.Tarifas.Worker/Handlers/PixLiquidadoConsumer.cs:64 — `string.IsNullOrEmpty(cpf) || cpf.Length < 4` appears character-identically in 2 files — src/BankMore.Tarifas.Worker/Handlers/PixLiquidadoConsumer.cs, src/BankMore.Tarifas.Worker/Handlers/TarifaConsumer.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×5
  • No security response headers detected — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No security response headers detected src/BankMore.BacenSim/Program.cs:22 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api/Program.cs:13 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Program.cs:19 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
  • No security response headers detected src/BankMore.Transferencia.Api/Program.cs:13 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected · ×5
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected — No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected src/BankMore.BacenSim/Program.cs:22 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api/Program.cs:13 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Program.cs:19 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
  • No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected src/BankMore.Transferencia.Api/Program.cs:13 — This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
X7 · Silent fallback defaults · Silent fallback default in catch · ×5
  • Silent fallback default in catch REDACTED:71 — `Verificar` swallows every exception into `return false;` — a data error becomes a silent behavior change with no trail. Log the failure or let validation throw.
  • Silent fallback default in catch src/BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure/FraudeClient.cs:51 — `Avaliar` swallows every exception into `return null;` — a data error becomes a silent behavior change with no trail. Log the failure or let validation throw.
  • Silent fallback default in catch REDACTED:83 — `Verificar` swallows every exception into `return false;` — a data error becomes a silent behavior change with no trail. Log the failure or let validation throw.
  • Silent fallback default in catch REDACTED:425 — `_extract_key` (in `build_pipeline`) swallows every exception into `return ''` — a data error becomes a silent behavior change with no trail. Log the failure or let it raise. If that constant is the correct answer rather than a stand-in for a value that could not be read, say so in a comment on the handler or in the docstring, and the row stops firing.
  • Silent fallback default in catch REDACTED:453 — `predicate` (in `_valor_alto_filter`) swallows every exception into `return False` — a data error becomes a silent behavior change with no trail. Log the failure or let it raise. If that constant is the correct answer rather than a stand-in for a value that could not be read, say so in a comment on the handler or in the docstring, and the row stops firing.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×3
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×2
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore REDACTED:8 — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 6.5.0 → 10.3.1 available (referenced by BankMore.Transferencia.Api).
  • Outdated: coverlet.collector tests/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests.csproj:22 — coverlet.collector 6.0.2 → 10.1.0 available (referenced by BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests).
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
AX6 · Interface segregation · Fat interface · ×1
  • Fat interface: IPixRepository (26 members) src/BankMore.Pix.Domain/Interfaces.cs:4 — `IPixRepository` declares 26 members: `ObterChaveLocal`, `SalvarChave`, `ListarChavesPorConta`, `SalvarPagamento`, `AtualizarPagamento`, `ObterPagamento`, `ObterPagamentoPorE2e`, `ContarPagamentosRecentes`, `LiquidarMovimentos`, `EstornarMovimentos`, `SalvarQrCode`, `ObterQrCodePorTxid`, `AtualizarStatusQrCode`, `SalvarDevolucao`, `AtualizarDevolucao`, `ObterDevolucao`, `SalvarConsentimento`, `AtualizarConsentimento`, `ObterConsentimento`, `ListarConsentimentosVencidos`, `SalvarNfcToken`, `ObterNfcToken`, `AtualizarNfcToken`, `ObterIdContaPorCpf`, `ObterNomePorCpf`, `ObterCpfPorIdConta`. Counted as the author wrote them — a property is ONE member and its get/set accessors are not counted separately, and an event counts once. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces.
C4 · Data Retention · Partial data-retention evidence · ×1
  • Partial data-retention evidence — A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob).
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • REDACTED
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D39 · IL Efficiency · IL efficiency · ×1
  • IL efficiency: 4 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget src/BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure/PixRepository.cs:122 — 4 of 312 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure.PixRepository.MapBack @ src/BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure/PixRepository.cs:122, 694 IL instructions; that pulled this dimension to 9.7/10. These bodies are far past the JIT's inline budget, so splitting them does not make them inlinable — what moves the number is emitting less: collapsing LINQ chains and closures on hot paths, and interpolation built eagerly where it is only sometimes used.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1
  • No SAST REDACTED:9 — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 2956 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · No dependency-update automation · ×1
  • No dependency-update automation REDACTED:8 — `REDACTED` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · OIDC metadata fetched over HTTP · ×1
  • OIDC metadata fetched over HTTP src/BankMore.Transferencia.Api/Program.cs:57 — `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path.
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Not all async methods take a CancellationToken · ×1
  • Not all async methods take a CancellationToken — Only 89/99 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Some async methods drop the CancellationToken they accept · ×1
  • Some async methods drop the CancellationToken they accept — 1 async method(s) await work their caller's cancellation cannot reach: a CancellationToken they hold (a parameter, or the one a framework-fixed signature carries) is never passed on, or the call is handed CancellationToken.None, default or an already-cancelled token. Forward the caller's token to that call.
X5 · Nullable reference types · Null-forgiving operator (`!`) suppressions reduce the NRT score · ×1
  • Null-forgiving operator (`!`) suppressions reduce the NRT score — ~0.2 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 7 suppression(s) across the 31179 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
X7 · Silent fallback defaults · Silent fallback default on configuration miss · ×1
  • Silent fallback default on configuration miss REDACTED:90 — `GenerateToken` reads `_configuration["Jwt:Key"]` — a missing or misspelt key silently becomes `DefaultJwtSecret`, with no log or throw. Validate the options at startup (or log the miss); if that value is the specified default, document it on the member and the row stops firing.
Minor — 33 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×25
  • Outdated: Confluent.Kafka — Confluent.Kafka 2.4.0 → 2.16.0 available (referenced by BankMore.Transferencia.Api).
  • Outdated: Confluent.SchemaRegistry — Confluent.SchemaRegistry 2.4.0 → 2.16.0 available (referenced by BankMore.Transferencia.Api).
  • Outdated: Confluent.SchemaRegistry.Serdes.Avro — Confluent.SchemaRegistry.Serdes.Avro 2.4.0 → 2.16.0 available (referenced by BankMore.Transferencia.Api).
  • Outdated: MediatR — MediatR 12.2.0 → 14.3.0 available (referenced by BankMore.Transferencia.Api).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 8.0.0 → 10.0.14 available (referenced by BankMore.Transferencia.Api).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens — Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens 8.15.0 → 8.23.0 available (referenced by BankMore.Transferencia.Api).
  • Outdated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 8.15.0 → 8.23.0 available (referenced by BankMore.Transferencia.Api).
  • Outdated: Dapper — Dapper 2.1.66 → 2.1.89 available (referenced by BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api).
  • Outdated: Npgsql — Npgsql 8.0.3 → 10.0.3 available (referenced by BankMore.ContaCorrente.Api).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions 8.0.0 → 10.0.14 available (referenced by BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application).
  • Outdated: Newtonsoft.Json — Newtonsoft.Json 13.0.3 → 13.0.4 available (referenced by BankMore.Transferencia.Application).
  • Outdated: KafkaFlow — KafkaFlow 4.1.0 → 4.2.0 available (referenced by BankMore.Tarifas.Worker).
  • Outdated: KafkaFlow.LogHandler.Console — KafkaFlow.LogHandler.Console 4.1.0 → 4.2.0 available (referenced by BankMore.Tarifas.Worker).
  • Outdated: KafkaFlow.Microsoft.DependencyInjection — KafkaFlow.Microsoft.DependencyInjection 4.1.0 → 4.2.0 available (referenced by BankMore.Tarifas.Worker).
  • Outdated: KafkaFlow.Serializer.NewtonsoftJson — KafkaFlow.Serializer.NewtonsoftJson 4.1.0 → 4.2.0 available (referenced by BankMore.Tarifas.Worker).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration 8.0.0 → 10.0.14 available (referenced by BankMore.Tarifas.Worker).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection — Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection 8.0.0 → 10.0.14 available (referenced by BankMore.Tarifas.Worker).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting — Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting 8.0.0 → 10.0.14 available (referenced by BankMore.Tarifas.Worker).
  • Outdated: StackExchange.Redis — StackExchange.Redis 2.7.33 → 3.4.31 available (referenced by BankMore.Tarifas.Worker).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 17.9.0 → 18.11.0 available (referenced by BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests).
  • Outdated: Moq — Moq 4.20.70 → 4.21.0 available (referenced by BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests).
  • Outdated: xunit — xunit 2.8.0 → 2.9.3 available (referenced by BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests).
  • Outdated: xunit.runner.visualstudio — xunit.runner.visualstudio 2.8.0 → 4.0.1 available (referenced by BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests).
  • Outdated: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml — REDACTED → 10.0.14 available (referenced by BankMore.BacenSim).
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions 8.0.0 → 10.0.14 available (referenced by BankMore.Pix.Infrastructure).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated (npm) · ×7
  • Outdated (npm): @angular/common — @angular/common 21.1.4 → 22.2.5 available.
  • Outdated (npm): @angular/compiler — @angular/compiler 21.1.4 → 22.2.5 available.
  • Outdated (npm): @angular/core — @angular/core 21.1.4 → 22.2.5 available.
  • Outdated (npm): @angular/forms — @angular/forms 21.1.4 → 22.2.5 available.
  • Outdated (npm): @angular/platform-browser — @angular/platform-browser 21.1.4 → 22.2.5 available.
  • Outdated (npm): @angular/router — @angular/router 21.1.4 → 22.2.5 available.
  • Outdated (npm): tslib — tslib 2.8.1 → 2.9.1 available.
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×1
  • Mock framework: Moq — BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application.Tests references Moq.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-f70be42d06d447a3a0e88213d52254d7/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-f70be42d06d447a3a0e88213d52254d7/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt .19artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet list BankMoreSolution.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json43artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .43artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 12 file(s) — `REDACTED`, `src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Handlers/EfetuarMovimentacaoHandler.cs`, `src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Handlers/ObterExtratoQuery.cs`, `src/BankMore.ContaCorrente.Application/Handlers/ObterSaldoHandler.cs`, `src/BankMore.Pix.Api/Services/RecorrenciaScheduler.cs`, … (+7 more) — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json

Run 01a1bb95-a732-75c6-b8d8-7f97913726c3 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md