Executive summary
ever-co/ever-api-starter-kit is rated At risk because critical security findings are open. Its score is held back in part because five passwords or keys sit in the current code. It scores 40 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged. We judged it as a template or a sample, against a lower bar.
Production Readiness, at 20, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is replacing the five exposed passwords or keys and switching the old ones off, worth about 18 points. Making the tests check their results comes next, worth about 7 points. Raising Production Readiness to 52 would lift the score to about 51.
Sixty-five known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Forty-five pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with, and twenty-eight secrets can leak from the build pipeline. Updating the vulnerable packages, pinning each tool to an exact version and limiting each secret to its own step would close these risks. The 24 unsafe settings in infrastructure or container files need changing to safe values. The five passwords or keys in the code need replacing, with the old ones switched off. The loop of files that import each other needs breaking.
The product code is 1,601 lines, about €1,400 to rebuild. The check for the health of its packages couldn't finish, so that result is missing, not a clean pass.
If Production Readiness rose from 20 to 52, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 40 to about 51.
New since the last survey: 20 findings
- Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- IaC & Container Security · REDACTED
Fixed since the last survey: 20 findings
- Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium: watchdog-eol-action-major-in-workflow REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC: REDACTED REDACTED
- IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC: REDACTED REDACTED
Rebuild cost: about €1,400 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €460 to €2,300, for 8 to 25 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.7 at a score of 40. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Very small: 1,601 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 (global) | 2 generated.sdk.ever-api-sdk | 3 src | 4 src.app_module | 5 src.config | 6 src.config.config | 7 src.config.database | 8 src.core.crud.tenant-aware-crud_service | 9 src.core.dto.base_dto | 10 src.core.entities.base_entity | 11 src.core.enums.auth-method_enum | 12 src.core.interfaces.tenant_interface | 13 src.modules.auth.auth_guard | 14 src.modules.auth.auth_module | 15 src.modules.employee | 16 src.modules.employee.employee_module | 17 src.modules.seeds | 18 src.modules.seeds.seed_module | 19 src.sagas.app_saga | 20 src.schema_module | 21 src.schema_service | 22 src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface | 23 src.entity.tenant_entity | 24 src.modules.employee.dto.employee_dto | 25 src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity | 26 src.entity.organization_entity | 27 src.entity.tenantApiKey_entity | 28 src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity | 29 src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service | 30 src.modules.auth.auth_middleware | 31 src.modules.employee.employee_entity | 32 src.modules.employee.employee_service | 33 src.modules.employee.resolvers.employee_resolver | 34 src.modules.employee.employee_controller | 35 src.modules.seeds.seed_service | 36 src.app_service | 37 src.app_controller |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (global) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2 generated.sdk.ever-api-sdk | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3 src | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4 src.app_module | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5 src.config | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6 src.config.config | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 7 src.config.database | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8 src.core.crud.tenant-aware-crud_service | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 9 src.core.dto.base_dto | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 10 src.core.entities.base_entity | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 11 src.core.enums.auth-method_enum | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 12 src.core.interfaces.tenant_interface | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 13 src.modules.auth.auth_guard | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 14 src.modules.auth.auth_module | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 15 src.modules.employee | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 16 src.modules.employee.employee_module | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 17 src.modules.seeds | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 18 src.modules.seeds.seed_module | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 19 src.sagas.app_saga | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20 src.schema_module | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21 src.schema_service | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22 src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 23 src.entity.tenant_entity | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 24 src.modules.employee.dto.employee_dto | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 25 src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 26 src.entity.organization_entity | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 27 src.entity.tenantApiKey_entity | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 28 src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 29 src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 30 src.modules.auth.auth_middleware | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 31 src.modules.employee.employee_entity | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 32 src.modules.employee.employee_service | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 33 src.modules.employee.resolvers.employee_resolver | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 34 src.modules.employee.employee_controller | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 35 src.modules.seeds.seed_service | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 36 src.app_service | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 37 src.app_controller | 1 |
22→11 src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface uses src.core.enums.auth-method_enum✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface uses a type in src.core.enums.auth-method_enum.
- The types involved
src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface.CustomRequest→src.core.enums.auth-method_enum.AuthMethod
- Direction
- src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface uses src.core.enums.auth-method_enum, so a change to src.core.enums.auth-method_enum can break src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface, while a change to src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface can't break src.core.enums.auth-method_enum.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
22→12 src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface uses src.core.interfaces.tenant_interface✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface uses a type in src.core.interfaces.tenant_interface.
- The types involved
src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface.CustomRequest→src.core.interfaces.tenant_interface.ITenant
- Direction
- src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface uses src.core.interfaces.tenant_interface, so a change to src.core.interfaces.tenant_interface can break src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface, while a change to src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface can't break src.core.interfaces.tenant_interface.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
23→10 src.entity.tenant_entity uses src.core.entities.base_entity✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.entity.tenant_entity uses a type in src.core.entities.base_entity.
- The types involved
src.entity.tenant_entity.Tenant→src.core.entities.base_entity.Base
- Direction
- src.entity.tenant_entity uses src.core.entities.base_entity, so a change to src.core.entities.base_entity can break src.entity.tenant_entity, while a change to src.entity.tenant_entity can't break src.core.entities.base_entity.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.entity.tenant_entity uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
24→9 src.modules.employee.dto.employee_dto uses src.core.dto.base_dto✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.modules.employee.dto.employee_dto uses a type in src.core.dto.base_dto.
- The types involved
src.modules.employee.dto.employee_dto.EmployeeDTO→src.core.dto.base_dto.IBaseDTO
- Direction
- src.modules.employee.dto.employee_dto uses src.core.dto.base_dto, so a change to src.core.dto.base_dto can break src.modules.employee.dto.employee_dto, while a change to src.modules.employee.dto.employee_dto can't break src.core.dto.base_dto.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.modules.employee.dto.employee_dto uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
25→10 src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity uses src.core.entities.base_entity✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity uses a type in src.core.entities.base_entity.
- The types involved
src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity.TenantBaseEntity→src.core.entities.base_entity.Base
- Direction
- src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity uses src.core.entities.base_entity, so a change to src.core.entities.base_entity can break src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity, while a change to src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity can't break src.core.entities.base_entity.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
25→23 src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity uses src.entity.tenant_entity✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity uses a type in src.entity.tenant_entity.
- The types involved
src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity.TenantBaseEntity→src.entity.tenant_entity.Tenant
- Direction
- src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity uses src.entity.tenant_entity, so a change to src.entity.tenant_entity can break src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity, while a change to src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity can't break src.entity.tenant_entity.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
26→25 src.entity.organization_entity uses src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.entity.organization_entity uses a type in src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity.
- The types involved
src.entity.organization_entity.Organization→src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity.TenantBaseEntity
- Direction
- src.entity.organization_entity uses src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity, so a change to src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity can break src.entity.organization_entity, while a change to src.entity.organization_entity can't break src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.entity.organization_entity uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
27→25 src.entity.tenantApiKey_entity uses src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.entity.tenantApiKey_entity uses a type in src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity.
- The types involved
src.entity.tenantApiKey_entity.TenantApiKey→src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity.TenantBaseEntity
- Direction
- src.entity.tenantApiKey_entity uses src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity, so a change to src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity can break src.entity.tenantApiKey_entity, while a change to src.entity.tenantApiKey_entity can't break src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.entity.tenantApiKey_entity uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
28→25 src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity uses src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity uses a type in src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity.
- The types involved
src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity.TenantOrganizationBaseEntity→src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity.TenantBaseEntity
- Direction
- src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity uses src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity, so a change to src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity can break src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity, while a change to src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity can't break src.core.entities.tenant-base_entity.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
28→26 src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity uses src.entity.organization_entity✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity uses a type in src.entity.organization_entity.
- The types involved
src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity.TenantOrganizationBaseEntity→src.entity.organization_entity.Organization
- Direction
- src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity uses src.entity.organization_entity, so a change to src.entity.organization_entity can break src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity, while a change to src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity can't break src.entity.organization_entity.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
29→8 src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service uses src.core.crud.tenant-aware-crud_service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service uses a type in src.core.crud.tenant-aware-crud_service.
- The types involved
src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service.TenantApiKeyService→src.core.crud.tenant-aware-crud_service.TenantAwareCrudService
- Direction
- src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service uses src.core.crud.tenant-aware-crud_service, so a change to src.core.crud.tenant-aware-crud_service can break src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service, while a change to src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service can't break src.core.crud.tenant-aware-crud_service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
29→27 src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service uses src.entity.tenantApiKey_entity✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service uses a type in src.entity.tenantApiKey_entity.
- The types involved
src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service.TenantApiKeyService→src.entity.tenantApiKey_entity.TenantApiKey
- Direction
- src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service uses src.entity.tenantApiKey_entity, so a change to src.entity.tenantApiKey_entity can break src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service, while a change to src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service can't break src.entity.tenantApiKey_entity.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
30→22 src.modules.auth.auth_middleware uses src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.modules.auth.auth_middleware uses a type in src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface.
- The types involved
src.modules.auth.auth_middleware.AuthMiddleware→src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface.CustomRequest
- Direction
- src.modules.auth.auth_middleware uses src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface, so a change to src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface can break src.modules.auth.auth_middleware, while a change to src.modules.auth.auth_middleware can't break src.core.interfaces.custom-request_interface.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.modules.auth.auth_middleware uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
30→29 src.modules.auth.auth_middleware uses src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.modules.auth.auth_middleware uses a type in src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service.
- The types involved
src.modules.auth.auth_middleware.AuthMiddleware→src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service.TenantApiKeyService
- Direction
- src.modules.auth.auth_middleware uses src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service, so a change to src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service can break src.modules.auth.auth_middleware, while a change to src.modules.auth.auth_middleware can't break src.modules.auth.tenant-api-key_service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.modules.auth.auth_middleware uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
31→28 src.modules.employee.employee_entity uses src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.modules.employee.employee_entity uses a type in src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity.
- The types involved
src.modules.employee.employee_entity.Employee→src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity.TenantOrganizationBaseEntity
- Direction
- src.modules.employee.employee_entity uses src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity, so a change to src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity can break src.modules.employee.employee_entity, while a change to src.modules.employee.employee_entity can't break src.core.entities.tenant-organization-base_entity.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.modules.employee.employee_entity uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
32→31 src.modules.employee.employee_service uses src.modules.employee.employee_entity✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.modules.employee.employee_service uses a type in src.modules.employee.employee_entity.
- The types involved
src.modules.employee.employee_service.EmployeeService→src.modules.employee.employee_entity.Employee
- Direction
- src.modules.employee.employee_service uses src.modules.employee.employee_entity, so a change to src.modules.employee.employee_entity can break src.modules.employee.employee_service, while a change to src.modules.employee.employee_service can't break src.modules.employee.employee_entity.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.modules.employee.employee_service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
33→31 src.modules.employee.resolvers.employee_resolver uses src.modules.employee.employee_entity✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.modules.employee.resolvers.employee_resolver uses a type in src.modules.employee.employee_entity.
- The types involved
src.modules.employee.resolvers.employee_resolver.EmployeeResolver→src.modules.employee.employee_entity.Employee
- Direction
- src.modules.employee.resolvers.employee_resolver uses src.modules.employee.employee_entity, so a change to src.modules.employee.employee_entity can break src.modules.employee.resolvers.employee_resolver, while a change to src.modules.employee.resolvers.employee_resolver can't break src.modules.employee.employee_entity.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.modules.employee.resolvers.employee_resolver uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
34→32 src.modules.employee.employee_controller uses src.modules.employee.employee_service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.modules.employee.employee_controller uses a type in src.modules.employee.employee_service.
- The types involved
src.modules.employee.employee_controller.EmployeeController→src.modules.employee.employee_service.EmployeeService
- Direction
- src.modules.employee.employee_controller uses src.modules.employee.employee_service, so a change to src.modules.employee.employee_service can break src.modules.employee.employee_controller, while a change to src.modules.employee.employee_controller can't break src.modules.employee.employee_service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.modules.employee.employee_controller uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
35→6 src.modules.seeds.seed_service uses src.config.config✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.modules.seeds.seed_service uses a type in src.config.config.
- The types involved
src.modules.seeds.seed_service.SeedDataService→src.config.config.ConfigurationService
- Direction
- src.modules.seeds.seed_service uses src.config.config, so a change to src.config.config can break src.modules.seeds.seed_service, while a change to src.modules.seeds.seed_service can't break src.config.config.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.modules.seeds.seed_service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
35→7 src.modules.seeds.seed_service uses src.config.database✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.modules.seeds.seed_service uses a type in src.config.database.
- The types involved
src.modules.seeds.seed_service.SeedDataService→src.config.database.TypeOrmConfigService
- Direction
- src.modules.seeds.seed_service uses src.config.database, so a change to src.config.database can break src.modules.seeds.seed_service, while a change to src.modules.seeds.seed_service can't break src.config.database.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.modules.seeds.seed_service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
35→32 src.modules.seeds.seed_service uses src.modules.employee.employee_service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.modules.seeds.seed_service uses a type in src.modules.employee.employee_service.
- The types involved
src.modules.seeds.seed_service.SeedDataService→src.modules.employee.employee_service.EmployeeService
- Direction
- src.modules.seeds.seed_service uses src.modules.employee.employee_service, so a change to src.modules.employee.employee_service can break src.modules.seeds.seed_service, while a change to src.modules.seeds.seed_service can't break src.modules.employee.employee_service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.modules.seeds.seed_service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
36→6 src.app_service uses src.config.config✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.app_service uses a type in src.config.config.
- The types involved
src.app_service.AppService→src.config.config.ConfigurationService
- Direction
- src.app_service uses src.config.config, so a change to src.config.config can break src.app_service, while a change to src.app_service can't break src.config.config.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.app_service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
36→35 src.app_service uses src.modules.seeds.seed_service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.app_service uses a type in src.modules.seeds.seed_service.
- The types involved
src.app_service.AppService→src.modules.seeds.seed_service.SeedDataService
- Direction
- src.app_service uses src.modules.seeds.seed_service, so a change to src.modules.seeds.seed_service can break src.app_service, while a change to src.app_service can't break src.modules.seeds.seed_service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.app_service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
37→36 src.app_controller uses src.app_service✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.app_controller uses a type in src.app_service.
- The types involved
src.app_controller.AppController→src.app_service.AppService
- Direction
- src.app_controller uses src.app_service, so a change to src.app_service can break src.app_controller, while a change to src.app_controller can't break src.app_service.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.app_controller uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Domain Modelling
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 118 | High / Critical |
| A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration | 94 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 90 | High / Critical |
| A07:2025 — Authentication Failures | 5 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2), REDACTED; Improve Test Distribution — currently 3.5/10; Encrypt sensitive data at rest (AES-256-GCM through node:crypto createCipheriv, or a column-encryption layer such as typeorm-encrypted / prisma-field-encryption / MongoDB CSFLE) and manage keys in a vault (AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, GCP KMS, HashiCorp Vault). Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2), REDACTED. | +17.7 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Resolve the 1 Assertions commented out finding(s) in Test Quality — start with app.controller.spec.ts. | +7.2 pts | Low | Test Quality |
| Improve Test Distribution — currently 3.5/10. | +10.7 pts | Medium | Test Distribution |
| Encrypt sensitive data at rest (AES-256-GCM through node:crypto createCipheriv, or a column-encryption layer such as typeorm-encrypted / prisma-field-encryption / MongoDB CSFLE) and manage keys in a vault (AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, GCP KMS, HashiCorp Vault). Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.). | +8.8 pts | Medium | Data Protection |
| Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. | +3.5 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
| Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies. | +3.5 pts | Medium | Dependency Hygiene |
| The findings name the configuration each number was taken from and, for the assertions, the files that hold them. Turn null checking on where it is off — `"strict": true` in the base tsconfig that the others extend switches `strictNullChecks` on with the rest of the family — and then resolve the assertions rather than adding to them. A `!` on a value the checker could show to be null is a promise the author cannot check from where they are standing, and each one is a `TypeError: Cannot read properties of null` waiting for the path that makes it true; where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (narrow it with a test, make the property required, drop the `?`). | +2.3 pts | Medium | Nullable reference types |
| Resolve the 1 No network policy finding(s) in Network Egress Confinement. | +1.1 pts | Low | Network Egress Confinement |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: Critical IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 0.2 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 0.2 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 0.2 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 0.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 0.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 0.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.6 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.5 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.5 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.5 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 3.7 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 4.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| src/config/database.ts | 6.0 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 70 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 70 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 356 of 369 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — the dependency install for the repository root failed in the analyzer sandbox (yarn install v1.22.22), so the suite never ran. Coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo. In the meantime, commit (or publish into the working tree) the lcov/Cobertura report your CI produces and the real number is read on the next scan. You can widen what we reach: optional: commit the lcov/Cobertura report your CI produces, and the real number is read on the next scan.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test reliability NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript suite could not be re-run in the analyzer sandbox — the dependency install for the repository root failed in the analyzer sandbox (yarn install v1.22.22), so the suite never ran. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — it is excluded from the score.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test reliability for the jest suite in the repository root was NOT MEASURED: the dependency install for the repository root failed in the analyzer sandbox (yarn install v1.22.22), so the suite never ran. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repository, and the suite is excluded from the measurement rather than counted against it.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This repository's dependency manifests WERE read and their pinning discipline assessed; what went unanswered is the currency half, because registry.npmjs.org — the registry that answers it — was asked and did not reply (registry returned 429). This is OUR side and it is an ENVIRONMENT fault, not a missing collector: the collector exists and ran. An HTTP 403 here is what this scan's egress allowlist returns for a host that is not on it, so the remedy is to add registry.npmjs.org to the allowlist and re-run — not to build anything.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (4 contributor(s) across 93 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 88% of the history; the other 3 hold 4% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. This repository's source is written only in languages whose packages are published through a manifest, and no manifest in the tree makes a publication act: either there is no package manifest of any ecosystem (no package.json, pyproject.toml, setup.py, gemspec, Cargo.toml, pom.xml, build.gradle, composer.json, pubspec.yaml or mix.exs), or every one present declares in its package manager's own terms that it is not published (an npm package marked "private": true, a Cargo package with publish = false, a pubspec with publish_to: none, a Composer "project", a Poetry project with package-mode = false, or the "Private :: Do Not Upload" classifier). With no publication act there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (REDACTED). compose up failed (exit 15 — the compose project is invalid) — validating REDACTED: services.api.links must be a list; runtime evidence skipped.
- DM9 Scattered domain decisions — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Arm two tells a construction that PRODUCES a measurement from one that merely passes it along, and this repository's frontend does not compute that fact. A measurement built independently in two places would not appear above.
- P1 CI/CD gates — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — so either the gate runs tests through a step this pass could not recognise, or "test" is incidental here (a path, "latest", a reporter). Which of the two it is cannot be settled from this dimension's evidence; the coverage dimensions report whether a suite exists at all. You can widen what we reach: name the test runner explicitly in the pipeline step (your stack's test command, or a job named for the suite) so the gate is unambiguous to a reader and to this pass.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. 46 JavaScript/TypeScript file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source, disabled certificate validation, obsolete TLS versions, plaintext password storage and session cookies set without HttpOnly, Secure or SameSite, and none was found. The server controls this dimension also scores were not assessed, so no score is given.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, PHP, Dart, Kotlin, Ruby, Scala, Java, Python and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and no named async function in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, nor any Go, PHP or Dart function or Kotlin suspend function, makes a request that can be cancelled (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http; net/http, net.Dial; amphp; Dio; Ktor, OkHttp), so there is nothing to judge, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value is measured as redundancy only: a comment that repeats its code's words is found, but a paraphrase in other words, a vague comment, or one the code contradicts is not, and whether a comment is valuable is not claimed. Comments in other scripts or languages, and outside C#, are not judged.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was TypeOrmConfigService.createTypeOrmOptions at 16.
What to do
- Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with TypeOrmConfigService.createTypeOrmOptions (cyclomatic 16). — Refactoring it lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.9 to about 10.0/10.
- Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was TypeOrmConfigService.createTypeOrmOptions at 18.
What to do
- Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with TypeOrmConfigService.createTypeOrmOptions (cognitive 18). — Refactoring it lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.7 to about 10.0/10.
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 3 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D9 · Test Distribution
2 test methods: 1 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 1 e2e. The JavaScript/TypeScript suite contributes 2 `it`/`test` case(s) across 2 test file(s) declaring at least one; its tier split is read from package names and paths only.
What to do
- Improve Test Distribution — currently 3.5/10. — 2 test methods: 1 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 1 e2e. The JavaScript/TypeScript suite contributes 2 `it`/`test` case(s) across 2 test file(s) declaring at least one; its tier split is read from package names and paths only.
D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 1 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 2 tests.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Assertions commented out finding(s) in Test Quality — start with app.controller.spec.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce Test Quality in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D13 · Secret Scanning
3 secret(s) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 5 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
- Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt
4 deducted task-comment markers across 1577 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.8. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What to do
- Resolve the 4 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with schema.module.ts (2), app.module.ts, database.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
- Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 3 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D24 · Comment Value
1 of 36 judged comments only repeat the code they sit on (2.8 %).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with auth.guard.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 1 build units (npm) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
90 finding(s): 0 critical, 77 high, 13 medium, 0 low. 45 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `REDACTED` (lines 50–52) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 3 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
What to do
- Resolve the 22 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (4), REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (22 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 45 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (45 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
102 finding(s): 10 critical, 55 high, 31 medium, 6 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 54 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (54). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (54 issue-level).
- Resolve the 10 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (10). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D31 · IaC & Container Security
94 finding(s): 12 critical, 12 high, 36 medium, 34 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 36 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (9), REDACTED (9), REDACTED (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (36 warning-level).
- Resolve the 12 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (12). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level).
- Resolve the 12 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 3 of the 46 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
D40 · Network Egress Confinement
0/2 network-egress controls present (network policy, egress restriction).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No network policy finding(s) in Network Egress Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement
0/6 workload(s) run every container under a seccomp profile; 0/6 declare an AppArmor/SELinux profile.
What to do
- Resolve the 6 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 recommendation-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 0 platform declaration(s) and 52 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
C1 · Data Protection
- No encryption usage (node:crypto createCipheriv, Web Crypto subtle.encrypt, crypto-js AES, tweetnacl/libsodium secretbox, a column-encryption layer such as typeorm-encrypted, prisma-field-encryption or mongoose-field-encryption, or MongoDB client-side field-level encryption) was found, and this repository persists personal data in the model cited here — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore. — src/modules/employee/employee.entity.ts:14
What to do
- Encrypt sensitive data at rest (AES-256-GCM through node:crypto createCipheriv, or a column-encryption layer such as typeorm-encrypted / prisma-field-encryption / MongoDB CSFLE) and manage keys in a vault (AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, GCP KMS, HashiCorp Vault). Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
- Enforce HTTPS (serve through https.createServer / NestJS httpsOptions, or redirect plain HTTP with express-sslify behind your TLS terminator) so data in transit is always encrypted.
C2 · Access Controls
- Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect. — REDACTED:30
What to do
- Name the access rules — roles/permissions declared once (a @Roles/@Permissions decorator with its guard, a CASL ability, a casbin model, or Supabase CREATE POLICY) and consulted where access is checked, so the rule set is reviewable and testable on its own.
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
DM9 · Scattered domain decisions
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- `handleError` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. — src/modules/seeds/seed.service.ts:161
What to do
- Remove the dead code that still moves this score: delete dead if(false) branches and either do the real async work or drop the async keyword from fake-async functions.
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
M3 · Folder & project structure
P1 · CI/CD gates
What to do
- Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack, and gate merges on it.
P2 · Observability
- `src/app.controller.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 7 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/app.controller.ts:7
- `src/app.module.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 22 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/app.module.ts:22
- `src/app.module.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 23 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/app.module.ts:23
- `src/app.service.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 13 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/app.service.ts:13
- `src/app.service.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 21 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/app.service.ts:21
- `src/schema.module.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 18 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/schema.module.ts:18
- `src/schema.module.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 19 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/schema.module.ts:19
- `src/schema.service.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 7 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/schema.service.ts:7
- `src/schema.service.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 11 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/schema.service.ts:11
- `src/schema.service.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 15 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/schema.service.ts:15
- `REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 68 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:68
- `REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 69 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:69
- `src/modules/auth/tenant-api-key.service.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 34 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/modules/auth/tenant-api-key.service.ts:34
- `src/config/database.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 21 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/config/database.ts:21
- `src/config/database.ts` reports through `console.*` at line 43 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — src/config/database.ts:43
What to do
- Route service-code `console.*` output through the module's structured logger (with named fields), so delivery outcomes and failures reach the log pipeline with a level.
- Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (@opentelemetry/sdk-node) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- `package.json` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — package.json:57
What to do
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- The pipeline declares a deployment environment, but whether required reviewers / protection rules are attached to it lives in repository settings we cannot read — confirm the gate is enforced before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup
- A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
- Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
P8 · Schema migrations
- TypeORM synchronize: true builds the schema from the model at startup and keeps no migration history, so there is no reviewed, repeatable upgrade path for an existing production database — a renamed column is dropped and re-added rather than migrated. Adopt TypeORM migrations (`typeorm migration:generate` + `migrationsRun`), so every schema change is a versioned file applied the same way in every environment. — src/config/database.ts:85
What to do
- Replace TypeORM synchronize: true with TypeORM migrations (`typeorm migration:generate` + `migrationsRun`) so the production schema can evolve safely and reproducibly.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
R1 · Type Safety
What to do
- Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication
- src/modules/seeds/seed.service.ts:22 · src/modules/seeds/seed.service.ts:41 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 87 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both spans, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — src/modules/seeds/seed.service.ts:22
- src/core/entities/tenant-base.entity.ts:6 · src/core/entities/tenant-organization-base.entity.ts:6 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the SHAPE of this repetition could not be determined. It is not a run of declarations, a listing, a declaration header, a type body or a slice through a construct — and it was not measured as a run of executable statements either, so this row cannot tell you whether a function can stand where these lines are. Read the two spans before acting, because the move is opposite in the two cases. Where they are statements, the ordinary answer holds: give the shared part one home and call it from each site. Where they turn out to be declarations, a literal's entries, or the cases of an enumeration, there is no call site to call anything from, and collapsing them would delete what each copy pins — a shared base type, a generated set, or one exported constant each site refers to is the move instead, and sometimes the honest answer is that there is nothing to extract at all. Reported because the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is true whichever of those they are. — src/core/entities/tenant-base.entity.ts:6
- src/modules/seeds/seed.ts:5 · src/modules/seeds/seed.update.ts:5 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — src/modules/seeds/seed.ts:5
- src/config/database.ts:55 · src/orm-config.ts:11 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — src/config/database.ts:55
- src/main.ts:9 · src/swagger.ts:6 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — src/main.ts:9
- src/app.module.ts:17 · src/schema.module.ts:13 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — src/app.module.ts:17
What to do
- Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- createTypeOrmOptions has cyclomatic complexity 16 and cognitive complexity 30; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/config/database.ts:16
R3 · Large Files
What to do
- Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×10) — src/schema.module.ts:1, src/orm-config.ts:1, src/index.ts:1, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling
- test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
What to do
- Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code
- Nothing in its class reads or assigns this private field (for a constructor parameter property: it is stored and never read), and no string key or test reaches it by name. Remove it, or use it where it was meant to take effect. — src/app.controller.ts:6
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it. (×3)
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports
- src/core/entities/tenant-base.entity.ts → src/entity/index.ts → src/entity/organization.entity.ts → src/core/entities/tenant-base.entity.ts (one verified cycle inside a mutually-dependent group of 4 files) — src/core/entities/tenant-base.entity.ts:4
What to do
- Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
X1 · Async correctness
X12 · Unreachable branch
X13 · Undrained process stream
X14 · Bypassable address classification
X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader
X16 · Unfloored truncation loop
X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document
X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness
X19 · Unrestored process-global state
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X22 · Contradicted release guard
X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped
X25 · Inert configuration knob
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard
X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element
X3 · Exception handling
X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects
X5 · Nullable reference types
- 0/3 of this repository's type-checking configuration(s) turn on strict null checking (`"strict": true`, or `"strictNullChecks": true`). A configuration that states neither is counted as OFF, because off is tsc's own default; a solution-style one whose `"files"` is empty and whose `"references"` point at other projects is in neither number, because it checks no source itself. Where it is off, `string` admits `null` and `undefined`: passing a value that is null compiles silently and throws on the first property access.
What to do
- The findings name the configuration each number was taken from and, for the assertions, the files that hold them. Turn null checking on where it is off — `"strict": true` in the base tsconfig that the others extend switches `strictNullChecks` on with the rest of the family — and then resolve the assertions rather than adding to them. A `!` on a value the checker could show to be null is a promise the author cannot check from where they are standing, and each one is a `TypeError: Cannot read properties of null` waiting for the path that makes it true; where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (narrow it with a test, make the property required, drop the `?`).
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 67% | Adequate — gated by X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 91% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 86% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Readiness | 20% | Weak — gated by D9, D13, R8, P5, P8 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 32% | Weak — gated by D29, D31, D36, C1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Performance | 100% | Exemplary | Solid. |
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — 54 observation(s) recorded · Dependency currency not established — registry.npmjs.org did not answer
Not evidenced — 3 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (an audit-log table or model, an ORM write hook that records changes — a TypeORM/MikroORM subscriber, a Sequelize or Mongoose hook, Prisma middleware — or a change-history plugin such as mongoose-history or sequelize-paper-trail) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
- C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
Not included — 65 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: NestJS makes a provider that injects a request-scoped one request-scoped itself (scope bubbles up the injection chain), and gives every consumer its own transient instance by contract.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — no exported interface declares behaviour
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 15 — the compose project is invalid) — validating REDACTED: services.api.links must be a list; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite did not run
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's 497 shipped npm package(s) were resolved from its committed lockfile, but registry.npmjs.org could not be asked for the licence of 43 of them (registry returned 429), and a licence verdict over part of a dependency graph is not a licence verdict. Nothing is asserted about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
- D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (162 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D4 Code Duplication — This repository's production source (.ts) is not read by D4's token comparison, which compares .NET source: duplication in it is measured by R10 Code Duplication, the frontend lens's card running the same clone algorithm over the JS/TS token stream. Not scored here — read the R10 card for this repository's duplication.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
- D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this npm build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
- DM10 One transaction, one aggregate — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
- DM5 Encapsulated state — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
- DM7 Repository granularity — not applicable: no DDD domain layer was detected (no aggregate, entity or value-object structure), so there is no domain model for this card to grade
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 3 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks. 6 claim(s) of kinds M4 does not check were not checked (command argument 6); M4 checks only links and versions and artefact counts.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HTTP client call or construction in the JavaScript/TypeScript source (service entry point: src/index.ts:24 (express()))
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `jest --coverage --coverageReporters=lcovonly`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D30 (Dependency Vulnerabilities), which answers every ecosystem
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: 46 JavaScript/TypeScript file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source, disabled TLS certificate validation, obsolete TLS versions, passwords stored or checked as plaintext and session cookies set without HttpOnly, Secure or SameSite, and none was found. That half of the dimension is clean, but it is not scored on its own: a C# repository with the same clean reading is scored on its server controls as well, or is N/A for having no web surface, and neither can be decided here. Of the server controls, two are read where the source shows them: every session or sign-in cookie the code sets is read for HttpOnly, Secure and SameSite at the line that sets it (a raw `Set-Cookie` header, Express, Fastify, Hono, Koa, Next.js, `cookie.serialize`, express-session and cookie-session), and every Node listener for HTTPS enforcement. HSTS, security response headers and input validation are NOT assessed for JavaScript/TypeScript: each is scored as an absence, an absence is only reportable over the production HTTP server, and in this ecosystem the file that opens the port is build output or a framework launcher rather than a file in the source tree. Their absence here is not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — Not applicable: this check looks for a loop whose body adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is walking, invalidating the enumerator it holds, and in this repository's languages that cannot happen. JavaScript and TypeScript have no iterator that a change can invalidate: an `Array` is walked by index against its live length, and a `Map` or `Set` by the ECMAScript specification's live entry list, so a body that adds to, removes from or empties what it walks raises nothing — every loop form (`for…of`, `for…in`, `forEach`, `map`, `filter`, `reduce`, `entries()`) on every built-in collection (`Array`, `Map`, `Set`, plain objects, `URLSearchParams`, `Headers`, `FormData`) runs to completion. Such a loop can still skip an element or never end, which is a different defect and not the one this check asks about. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 173 finding(s)
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- Assertions commented out: should return "Hello World!" src/app.controller.spec.ts:18
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- Import cycle (3 files) src/core/entities/tenant-base.entity.ts:4
Serious — 123 finding(s)
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- No test reaches this file src/schema.module.ts:1
- No test reaches this file src/orm-config.ts:1
- No test reaches this file src/index.ts:1
- No test reaches this file src/main.ts:1
- No test reaches this file src/modules/seeds/seed.module.ts:1
- No test reaches this file src/swagger.ts:1
- No test reaches this file src/modules/seeds/seed.ts:1
- No test reaches this file src/modules/seeds/seed.update.ts:1
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- Duplicated block (9 lines × 2 locations) src/config/database.ts:55
- Duplicated block (9 lines × 2 locations) src/main.ts:9
- No data-protection/encryption src/modules/employee/employee.entity.ts:14
- TypeOrmConfigService.createTypeOrmOptions (cyclomatic 16) src/config/database.ts:16
- TypeOrmConfigService.createTypeOrmOptions (cognitive 18) src/config/database.ts:16
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- Schema created by TypeORM synchronize: true (no migration path) src/config/database.ts:85
- Duplicated block with local edits (15 matched lines × 2 locations) src/modules/seeds/seed.service.ts:22
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 2 locations) src/core/entities/tenant-base.entity.ts:6
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) src/modules/seeds/seed.ts:5
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2 locations) src/app.module.ts:17
- Complex function createTypeOrmOptions (cyclomatic 16, cognitive 30) src/config/database.ts:16
- No typecheck script
- Unused dependency '@apollo/gateway'
- Unused dependency '@apollo/server'
- Unused dependency '@apollo/subgraph'
Minor — 72 finding(s)
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- Console output used as the logging channel src/app.controller.ts:7
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- Console output used as the logging channel src/app.service.ts:13
- Console output used as the logging channel src/app.service.ts:21
- Console output used as the logging channel src/schema.module.ts:18
- Console output used as the logging channel src/schema.module.ts:19
- Console output used as the logging channel src/schema.service.ts:7
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- Console output used as the logging channel src/modules/auth/tenant-api-key.service.ts:34
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- No network policy
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- Unused private field 'appService' src/app.controller.ts:6
- Strict null checking is not enabled everywhere the repository type-checks
Minor — 1 finding(s)
- doc comments repeat the names generated/sdk/ever-api-sdk.ts:292
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-eb3ea030e5ea4410a7713a53837284f8/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-eb3ea030e5ea4410a7713a53837284f8/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt --exclude generated/schemas . | 90 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 102 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 94 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |