Public report of dart-lang/http, published 5 November 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.11.2). Assert signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey → Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 5 November 2026, 22:00 UTC · Survey ID cd_1949236f3da44aff96d62a0188a58bb4

dart-lang/http

Measured 5 November 2026, 22:00 UTC, at code version 6582177

Knowledge freshness is not measured: Freshness signal contradicted by repo activity.

CAI score 53out of 100 Adequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
Up 2 since the last survey

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

A medium codebase: 20,851 lines of product code in 13 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.3 person-years · Weakest lens: Security and Compliance, 32

Findings by how serious they are

1 critical 119 serious 23 minor

12 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, we either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard we look for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Assert small markCanine Code Analyzer
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Canine Code Analyzer engine 1.0.0
Measured
5 November 2026, 22:00 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds the Canine Code Analyzer. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today the Canine Code Analyzer is the only one that does.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. We work it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸

62of 62 dimensions measured by tools.
132of 143 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 11 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
62dimensions across 6 lenses, read from 20,851 lines of product code in 13 projects.
Chapters

Executive summary

dart-lang/http falls short of our standard for a template or a sample, in part because we found no access checks on the code's endpoints or handlers. It scores 53 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, and its one critical finding is a security problem in the build pipeline.

Security and Compliance, at 32, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is adding access checks, worth about 15 points. Replacing the weak hashes comes next, worth about 8 points. Raising Security and Compliance to 66 would lift the score to about 68.

One secret can leak from the build pipeline. Limiting the secret to its own step would close this risk.

The product code is 20,851 lines, about €38,000 to rebuild.

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Security and Compliance 32 · counts for 46%Production Readiness 61 · counts for 25%Maturity 75 · counts for 14%Performance 79 · counts for 8%Code Health 92 · counts for 4%Architecture 95 · counts for 2%

If Security and Compliance rose from 32 to 66, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 53 to about 68.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Product code 53%Tests 47%
New since the last survey: 5 findings

These 5 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 21 October 2026.

  • Cyclomatic Complexity · Connection._handleFrameImpl (cyclomatic 16) pkgs/http2/lib/src/connection.dart
  • Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot: pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_client.dart pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_client.dart
  • Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Repeated repair: pkgs/http2/lib/src/flowcontrol/connection_queues.dart pkgs/http2/lib/src/flowcontrol/connection_queues.dart
  • Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Repeated repair: pkgs/http2/lib/src/sync_errors.dart pkgs/http2/lib/src/sync_errors.dart
  • Access Controls · No authorization pkgs/http_multi_server/lib/http_multi_server.dart

We compare every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 3 findings

These 3 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 21 October 2026, and are gone from this one.

  • Explicit Debt · TodoComment pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart
  • Change Coupling · Change coupling: decoder.dart ↔ media_type.dart pkgs/http_parser/lib/src/chunked_coding/decoder.dart
  • Access Controls · No authorization pkgs/http2/lib/multiprotocol_server.dart
Rebuild cost: about €38,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild€13,000 to €64,000, for 212 to 673 hours of work, about 0.3 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problemStandard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.7 at a score of 53. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeMedium: 20,851 lines of product code
What it is notNot a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one.

How the estimate is made: We price the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do.
Raises the score by about 15 points · Medium effort · Access Controls
2
Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (xxhash, murmurhash) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key.
Raises the score by about 8 points · Medium effort · Web-Security Posture
3
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.
Raises the score by about 3 points · Low effort · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €38,000 to build again, about 0.3 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Security and Compliance, at 32 (Weak). Security and Compliance is about how well the product is protected, and how it handles personal data. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Security and Compliance also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Security and Compliance grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Security and Compliance actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 15 points for medium effort. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways, which only happens where the projects form a dependency cycle. A graph without cycles has none.

arch cronet_http cronet_http cupertino_http cupertino_http http http http2 http2 http_multi_server http_multi_server http_parser http_parser http_profile http_profile ok_http (Gradle) ok_http (Gradle) ok_http (pub) ok_http (pub) web_socket web_socket web_socket_channel web_socket_channel

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

5 modules, with 3 dependencies between them. One loop runs through 2 of the modules, marked above the diagonal.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →1 io.flutter.plugins.cronet_http.UrlRequestCallbackProxy2 pkgs.flutter_http_example.web3 io.flutter.plugins.cronet_http4 repository.src5 repository
1 io.flutter.plugins.cronet_http.UrlRequestCallbackProxy
2 pkgs.flutter_http_example.web
3 io.flutter.plugins.cronet_http1
4 repository.src14
5 repository21
Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself
1 io.flutter.plugins.cronet_http.UrlRequestCallbackProxy2 pkgs.flutter_http_example.web3 io.flutter.plugins.cronet_http4 repository.src5 repositoryio.flutter.plugins.cronet_http.UrlRequestCallbackProxy1pkgs.flutter_http_example.web2io.flutter.plugins.cronet_http3repository.src4repository511421

At a glance — Code Health · 92% · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Architecture · 95% · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Maturity · 75% · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Readiness · 61% · Adequate · gated by P3 ·

At a glance — Security · 32% · Weak · gated by D36, C2 ·

At a glance — Performance · 79% · Exemplary ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures3Medium
A05:2025 — Injection1High / Critical

Roadmap

Top priorities: Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do; Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (xxhash, murmurhash) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key; Prune the dead entries from your analyzer's `exclude:` list — each one names a path that is not in the repository, so the list no longer describes what is actually being skipped.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do.+15.0 ptsMediumAccess Controls
Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (xxhash, murmurhash) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key.+8.2 ptsMediumWeb-Security Posture
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+2.9 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+2.9 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+2.9 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED.+2.3 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)
Prune the dead entries from your analyzer's `exclude:` list — each one names a path that is not in the repository, so the list no longer describes what is actually being skipped.+3.5 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Extend structured logging to the remaining runnable modules so everything you run is diagnosable in production.+2.5 ptsMediumObservability

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 45 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 0% slop · 2% mixed · 98% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_api.dart5.5MixedGod Classes: FileTooLong: src/cupertino_api.dart
pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart6.0Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/cronet_client.dart6.0Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
pkgs/http2/lib/src/hpack/hpack.dart6.0Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
pkgs/http2/lib/src/connection.dart6.0Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
pkgs/http2/lib/src/flowcontrol/stream_queues.dart6.0Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
pkgs/http2/lib/src/settings/settings.dart6.0Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
pkgs/http/lib/src/browser_client.dart6.0Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
pkgs/http2/lib/src/flowcontrol/connection_queues.dart6.4Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
pkgs/http2/test/client_conformance_test.dart6.5Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
pkgs/http/lib/src/io_client.dart6.7Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
pkgs/http/lib/src/request.dart6.7Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
pkgs/web_socket_channel/lib/adapter_web_socket_channel.dart7.0Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2)
pkgs/ok_http/lib/src/jni/bindings.dart7.1Near-cleanCohesion (LCOM4): Low cohesion: _$ExecutorService (LCOM4 13)
pkgs/http2/lib/src/frames/frame_reader.dart7.2Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: FrameReader.startDecoding (cyclomatic 17)
REDACTED7.2Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
pkgs/http2/lib/src/frames/frame_writer.dart7.3Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
pkgs/http/lib/src/base_request.dart7.3Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_client.dart7.4Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: CupertinoClient.send (cyclomatic 28)
pkgs/http2/lib/src/http2_client.dart7.8Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: Http2Client._sendOverHttp2 (cyclomatic 20)

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 1

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 119

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 23

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 12

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 62 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.

Every figure here is one of two kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10.

What we checked — 62 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D13D14D15D16D17D19D26D28D29D35D36D44AX1AX10AX3AX4AX8AX9C2GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P10P2P3P6PF2PF3S1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X2X20X21X22X23X25X26X27X28X29X3X30X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 132 of 143 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a1adb9-f652-7e87-8167-8f4fe7d991b7.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.dart) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `flutter test --coverage` (or `dart test --coverage=coverage` then `dart run coverage:format_coverage --lcov`)) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `flutter test --coverage` (or `dart test --coverage=coverage` then `dart run coverage:format_coverage --lcov`)) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
  • D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.dart) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored — 8 Maven/Gradle manifest(s) were read, stating a version for 6 dependency(ies) and leaving 0 to a parent or an imported BOM, but no build resolved the dependency graph, so the outdated signal was not established. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
  • D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares a Dart pubspec.yaml, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its JVM dependencies. Nothing was read about its Dart dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
  • D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's deterministic naming rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. Until then its declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether its names are consistent.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (pkgs/web_socket_channel/pubspec.yaml), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
  • D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. File-level freshness contradicts repo activity: 61 commits in the last 90 days, yet 44 of 83 significant files carry no living knowledge. Those two readings cannot both be true, so the per-file recency signal is treated as unreliable here and freshness is not scored for this run.
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Subject: a native UI project (pkgs/ok_http/android/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml). The Runtime Evidence tier boots an app only via docker-compose, an Aspire AppHost, a Dockerfile, an npm dev script, a web service's own toolchain entry point (cargo, go, dotnet, Python, Spring Boot), or an Android app's own Gradle wrapper (run on an emulator); an Apple or Flutter app needs a host it lacks. None applied, so no live runtime a11y/egress/header evidence was collected. You can widen what we reach: add a docker-compose.yml (or an Aspire AppHost) that brings the app up with its dependencies. We then boot it in an isolated sandbox and gathers real runtime evidence — you change nothing in your pipeline (no CI step, no SDK).
  • P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
  • X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Scala, Ruby and Python source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Scala, Ruby or Python was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.

Repo exclusion declarations: 10 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

11 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was StreamHandler._changeState at 47. A further 1 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being CupertinoClient._findReasonPhrase at 41 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.

StreamHandler._changeState (cyclomatic 47)pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:1096
CronetEngine.build (cyclomatic 35)pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/cronet_client.dart:214
StreamHandler._processStreamFrameInternal (cyclomatic 29)pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:656
CupertinoClient.send (cyclomatic 28)pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_client.dart:282
HPackDecoder.decodeWithLimit (cyclomatic 20)pkgs/http2/lib/src/hpack/hpack.dart:85

+ 6 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Bring the 2 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with StreamHandler._changeState (cyclomatic 47), CronetEngine.build (cyclomatic 35). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 2 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 7.9 to about 8.4/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 30; a cleaner split scores higher.
  2. Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

18 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was CronetEngine.build at 90.

CronetEngine.build (cognitive 90)pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/cronet_client.dart:214
StreamHandler._processStreamFrameInternal (cognitive 52)pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:656
StreamHandler._changeState (cognitive 44)pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:1096
CupertinoClient.send (cognitive 43)pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_client.dart:282
HPackDecoder.decodeWithLimit (cognitive 36)pkgs/http2/lib/src/hpack/hpack.dart:85

+ 13 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Bring the 1 body over 60 down to 60 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with CronetEngine.build (cognitive 90). — Refactoring it lifts Cognitive Complexity from 6.7 to about 7.1/10.
  2. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

8 god class(es) detected.

MethodTooLong: CupertinoClient.send · ×3pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_client.dart:282
FileTooLong: src/cupertino_api.dart · ×2pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_api.dart
TooManyMethods: StreamHandler · ×2pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:127
ClassTooLong: StreamHandlerpkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:127

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 MethodTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with cupertino_client.dart, ok_http_client.dart, frame_reader.dart. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with cupertino_api.dart, stream_handler.dart. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with stream_handler.dart, cupertino_api.dart. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  4. Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.9 / 10Stronggated by 6 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

6 duplicated block group(s) detected. 2 of the 6 are in trees this repository does not ship — vendored, example/demo, project-template, fixture and benchmark code — and are ranked below the shipped groups rather than excluded from them: the duplication there is real and is still counted in this dimension's score. The dimensions that publish a production-file census leave those trees out of theirs, so this count is deliberately drawn over the wider population.

Duplicated block (19 lines × 2)pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:186
Duplicated block (8–9 lines × 2)pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_web_socket.dart:271
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2)pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/cronet_client.dart:759
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2)pkgs/web_socket_channel/lib/adapter_web_socket_channel.dart:143
Duplicated block (25 lines × 2)pkgs/cronet_http/example/lib/main.dart:60

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with stream_handler.dart. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (8–9 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with cupertino_web_socket.dart. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with cronet_client.dart. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

11 production modules (Gradle+pub), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; edges a convention plugin adds from buildSrc or build-logic are not visible there; 0 module(s) off the main sequence.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

15 of 91 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: URLSessionConfiguration (LCOM4 31) · ×15pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_api.dart:758

What to do

  1. Resolve the 15 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with bindings.dart (5), cupertino_api.dart (2), http_profile_response_data.dart (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Cohesion (LCOM4) in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 test methods: 3 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 1 declared JVM dependency artifact(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from the POMs Maven Central publishes, over the coordinates this repository's 8 Maven/Gradle manifest(s) declare with a version resolvable from the manifest itself — the same declaration-site closure this analysis reads for dependency currency. The JVM has no lockfile a checkout is guaranteed to carry, so this is deliberately NOT the transitive closure. A further 3 coordinate(s) are not published to Maven Central — another repository (Google's Maven hosts androidx), a SNAPSHOT, or a private artifact — so their licences are not readable from here and they are outside this verdict. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's JVM dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares a Dart pubspec.yaml, and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots9.8 / 10Stronggated by 6 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Top hotspots: pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart (8×29=232); pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/cronet_client.dart (4×35=140); pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_client.dart (3×28=84) Repeated repair below the complexity floor: pkgs/http2/lib/src/flowcontrol/connection_queues.dart (4 of 4 changes were fixes); pkgs/http2/lib/src/sync_errors.dart (3 of 3 changes were fixes)

Hotspot: pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart · ×4pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:656
Repeated repair: pkgs/http2/lib/src/flowcontrol/connection_queues.dart · ×2pkgs/http2/lib/src/flowcontrol/connection_queues.dart:101

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with stream_handler.dart, cronet_client.dart, cupertino_client.dart. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Repeated repair finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with connection_queues.dart, sync_errors.dart. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D16 · Bus Factor7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

19 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_client.dart. Counted over 83 of the 182 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 · ×2
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Further sole-owners (lower concentration) finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.6 / 10Stronggated by 50 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

50 deducted task-comment markers across 20851 LoC (0.2/KLoC) → score 9.6. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

TodoComment · ×50pkgs/web_socket_channel/test/html_test.dart:175

What to do

  1. Resolve the 50 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with connection_queues.dart (8), client_conformance_test.dart (5), connection.dart (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (50 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Every README, docs/ document and root guide parsed by its markup and measured in Unicode letters. Published: a runnable or packaged .NET project whose README (or a document it links, or a root guide) shows no example, and a root README naming none of three or more projects. Overview, licence, boilerplate, wall-of-text, empty-section and XML-doc rows are measured and withheld (counted in gaps) after adjudication. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 18 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 13 build units (Gradle, pub) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)8.4 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 5 platform declaration(s) and 6 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition8.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C2 · Access Controls0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • This repository serves requests — an HTTP server (HttpServer.bind) (pkgs/http_multi_server/lib/http_multi_server.dart:103) — and no route guard, auth-gate middleware, global guard or imperative check that refuses a caller (401/403, an Unauthorized/Forbidden error) was found: its endpoints may be unprotected. — pkgs/http_multi_server/lib/http_multi_server.dart:103

What to do

  • Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue in this repository's Dart: methods whose whole body still throws UnimplementedError or a "not implemented" error, and placeholder text (lorem ipsum, changeme/replace_me…) left in strings of non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords, in this repository's Dart: methods that only throw UnimplementedError or a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant or do nothing, dead `if (false)` branches, and skeleton classes most of whose methods are holes.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something. (×5) — pkgs/cronet_http/example/integration_test/cronet_engine_test.dart:137, pkgs/cronet_http/example/integration_test/cronet_engine_test.dart:148, pkgs/cupertino_http/test/url_session_delegate_test.dart:415, …

What to do

  • Clear the softer debt: re-enable or delete tests marked `skip:`, decide whether each empty method or UnsupportedError is deliberate (and say so in a comment), and replace `// ignore_for_file: type=lint` with targeted, justified ignores.
M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 8 of 8 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the project's current-state documentation describes the code that exists.

Method: Every current-state document's checkable claims looked up in the tree (links, versions, and artefact counts an order of magnitude off), plus two README checks: an advertised infrastructure product with no footprint, and a module the CHANGELOG records as removed. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P10 · Library API & versioning6.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries; off .NET, a library is the ecosystem's publication act (an npm package that is not private and names an entry point, a PyPI distribution with a build system, a Rust library crate, a Maven/Gradle module that publishes, a Go module with no package main, a gemspec, a Composer library, a SwiftPM library product, a pub.dev or Hex package), its surface is the share of types the language's code model records as public (Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, Go, Dart; not measured where the model records no type visibility or, as in TypeScript, only module-level export), and its version is read from the manifest, a semver CHANGELOG, release tooling or semver git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • 728/813 types (90%) declared in the published library are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — keep implementation types off the surface and expose only the intended API.

What to do

  • Keep implementation types off the public surface (Dart: a `_` name, or keep it under `lib/src/` unexported; Kotlin: `internal`; Swift: leave it `internal` (the default) instead of `public`) so internals can change without breaking consumers.
P2 · Observability4.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 1/8 runnable modules use logging (modules with no entry point or server are excluded — they are libraries a runnable module hosts). Silent: `pkgs/cupertino_http/ios_test`, `pkgs/cupertino_http/ios_test/ios`, `pkgs/flutter_http_example`, `pkgs/flutter_http_example/ios`, `pkgs/flutter_http_example/macos` and 2 more.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging to the remaining runnable modules so everything you run is diagnosable in production.
P3 · Security & performance tooling3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • `pkgs/cronet_http/analysis_options.yaml` excludes `lib/src/messages.dart`, `pigeons/messages.dart` from analysis, and no such path is in the repository. These entries are dead configuration: they silence nothing today, and each one is a name the analyzer will silently start honouring the moment a directory of that name appears — so the file's exclusion list is wider than anything anybody decided. Delete the entries that no longer name anything, and keep the ones that do. — pkgs/cronet_http/analysis_options.yaml:1
  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 77330 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — .github/workflows/cronet.yml:14
  • `.github/dependabot.yml` schedules updates, but no `package-ecosystem` entry covers `gradle`, which this tree depends on — so those dependencies get no update pull requests and no advisory pressure, however complete the dep-scan credit looks. Add the missing entry to the `updates:` list. — .github/dependabot.yml:5

What to do

  • Prune the dead entries from your analyzer's `exclude:` list — each one names a path that is not in the repository, so the list no longer describes what is actually being skipped.
  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Dependabot is configured but does not watch `gradle` — add that `package-ecosystem` entry to .github/dependabot.yml so those dependencies get the same automatic update and advisory pressure as the ones it already covers.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

PF2 · Allocation hygiene6.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — in .NET Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit; off .NET, with comments and strings blanked, Go's sync.Pool, preallocated slices/maps, Grow, strconv.Append* and buf[:0] reuse; the JVM's NIO buffer views, MemorySegment, primitive collections, pools and literal presizes (plus Kotlin primitive arrays and value classes, Scala AnyVal and @specialized); Swift's reserveCapacity, ContiguousArray, withUnsafe* access and ~Copyable. Activated off .NET on the same floor (400 lines, and benchmarks or 8 uses); Rust and garbage-collected scripting languages are not applicable. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

  • Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 12 use(s) across 19,164 production line(s) (~0.6/1k). More of the idioms below on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
  • Dart: on hot paths, hold numbers in dart:typed_data lists (Int32List, Float64List …) instead of boxed List<int>/List<double>, read through views (sublistView, buffer.asInt32List, asByteData) instead of copying, make lists that never grow growable: false, compute in the SIMD types (Float32x4List …), and build bytes with BytesBuilder(copy: false).
  • Kotlin: on hot paths, use primitive arrays (IntArray, LongArray …) and @JvmInline value classes instead of boxed values, primitive collections (androidx.collection, fastutil) instead of boxed ones, and presize collections and StringBuilders.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from each language's code model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

S1 · Web-Security Posture4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Read from this repository's Dart source: cryptographic hygiene (weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source) and outbound TLS certificate validation — facts about code that hold whether or not it serves anything itself. The TLS protocol version is not read: `dart:io` leaves the protocol floor to the platform's TLS library and has no switch that admits an obsolete version. This repository serves HTTP itself (pkgs/http_multi_server/lib/http_multi_server.dart:103 — `HttpServer.bind(`), so its Dart source was also read for the server controls: TLS served or HSTS set, security response headers, cookie flags and inbound validation — each credited where its Dart spelling appears in production source, not proven on every route.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

  • MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`sha256.convert(…)` from `package:crypto`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call. — pkgs/web_socket_channel/lib/src/channel.dart:91
  • None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is set on a response this repository's Dart server sends — defense in depth, even when a proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: pkgs/http_multi_server/lib/http_multi_server.dart:103 — `HttpServer.bind(`.
  • No handler of this repository's Dart server answers 400, 413 or 422 (`Response.badRequest`, `HttpStatus.badRequest`, `statusCode = 400`) and no validation package (luthor, acanthis, ez_validator, json_schema, …) is imported — nothing shows inbound requests being checked, and refused, before a handler acts on them. A check that answers its failure with 200 and an error body is not seen. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: pkgs/http_multi_server/lib/http_multi_server.dart:103 — `HttpServer.bind(`.

What to do

  • Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (xxhash, murmurhash) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key.
  • Set security response headers on what the server sends — `response.headers.set('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff')` in a `dart:io` handler, or a shelf middleware that adds `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Content-Type-Options` and a frame policy to every `Response`.
  • Validate what the server reads from a request — path, query, headers, body size and shape — and answer what fails with 400 (413 for an oversized body) before a handler acts on it, so a client and a proxy can tell a refusal from a success.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness4.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

  • `_CompleterSink` carries a disposal duty — it declares its own release — and it creates `_controller` itself (line 125, `StreamController`), which makes that instance its own. Nothing in the class releases it — no `_controller.close()`, no tear-off of it, on any path — nothing elsewhere in the library releases it through another instance, and it is never handed on as a value (passed positionally, returned, stored, collected), so no other owner can be ending it. Passing it as a named argument does not: a widget or animation never disposes a controller it was given. On what was read, `StreamController` outlives the object that made it — its listeners, and through them this object and everything it references, stay reachable, and a ticker, timer or subscription keeps calling into a disposed object. Release it where the duty is discharged: `_controller.close();` in `dispose()` before `super.dispose()`. — pkgs/web_socket_channel/lib/src/sink_completer.dart:125
  • `MultiProtocolHttpServer` carries a disposal duty — it declares its own release — and it creates `_http2Controller` itself (line 27, `StreamController`), which makes that instance its own. Nothing in the class releases it — no `_http2Controller.close()`, no tear-off of it, on any path — nothing elsewhere in the library releases it through another instance, and it is never handed on as a value (passed positionally, returned, stored, collected), so no other owner can be ending it. Passing it as a named argument does not: a widget or animation never disposes a controller it was given. On what was read, `StreamController` outlives the object that made it — its listeners, and through them this object and everything it references, stay reachable, and a ticker, timer or subscription keeps calling into a disposed object. Release it where the duty is discharged: `_http2Controller.close();` in `dispose()` before `super.dispose()`. — pkgs/http2/lib/multiprotocol_server.dart:27

What to do

  • Each finding names the value and the span that decides who owns it — the `new` that created it, or the constructor parameter that handed it over. Confirm ownership from that span, then make the disposal match it: release what this type created, leave what it was injected with to whoever created THAT, and drop a finalizer whose type holds nothing unmanaged to release.
X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X2 · Cancellation propagation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether functions that make a cancellable request accept or pass on a CancelToken (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

X20 · Mistyped argument guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `NullPointerException` (Java, Kotlin, Scala), `ArgumentError.notNull` (Dart) or `ArgumentNullException` (F#'s `nullArg`) tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back. Also whether a `finally` that gives the primitive back unconditionally can run in a state where the method does not hold it: after a timed wait whose result was discarded, after an acquire inside the `try` that can fail, after the body already released it, or never, because a `return` left between the acquire and the `try`.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `for … in` loop leaves the `List`, `Map` or `Set` it is walking alone — Dart's collection iterators check that the collection has not changed since the loop began, so a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is walking (or the map whose `keys`, `values` or `entries` it walks) makes the next step throw `ConcurrentModificationError` and the remaining elements are never seen. Whether a `for (x in c)` or `c.forEach { … }` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a `mutableListOf`/`ArrayList`, `mutableMapOf`/`HashMap` or `mutableSetOf`/`HashSet` is a `java.util` collection on the JVM and is walked by its own fail-fast iterator, so a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is walking makes the next step throw `ConcurrentModificationException` and the remaining elements are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X5 · Nullable reference types9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether Dart's sound null safety is on and is not undermined by null assertions — a package whose `environment: sdk:` lower bound is 2.12 or above is null safe, so `String` cannot hold null and `String?` must be checked before use, and each postfix `!` is a run-time `Null check operator used on a null value` the author has told the analyzer cannot happen.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health92%ExemplarySolid.
Architecture95%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity75%ExemplarySolid.
Readiness61%Adequate — gated by P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security32%Weak — gated by D36, C2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance79%ExemplarySolid.
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

  • X10 Duplicated predicate — 5 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 2 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 55 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (17 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (17 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (17 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (17 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (17 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (17 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — Frontend below the scale floor (17 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — No container singleton was found, so there is no shared instance for concurrent requests to race on. No class in this Kotlin code is a Spring, JSR-330 or CDI singleton bean. No Swift request handler (a Vapor, Hummingbird, Kitura, Swifter or Perfect route handler, as a method or a registered closure) is declared, so no state is shared between request threads. Dart isolates share no mutable memory, so no two requests write one object at the same instant.
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Drift table, an Isar, ObjectBox, Floor or Hive entity, or a Serverpod table model — and no database or data-store client (sqflite, Drift, Isar, Hive, Realm, Firestore, Supabase, postgres, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Drift table, an ObjectBox/Floor @Entity, an Isar @collection, a Hive @HiveType or a Serverpod table model — and no database or data-store client (sqflite, Firestore, Supabase, postgres, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Drift table, an ObjectBox/Floor @Entity, an Isar @collection, a Hive @HiveType or a Serverpod table model — and no database or data-store client (sqflite, Firestore, Supabase, postgres, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Drift table, an ObjectBox/Floor @Entity, an Isar @collection, a Hive @HiveType or a Serverpod table model — and no database or data-store client (sqflite, Firestore, Supabase, postgres, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~18633 lines of test source are present (.dart) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — no .dart test runner
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Not scored — 8 Maven/Gradle manifest(s) were read, stating a version for 6 dependency(ies) and leaving 0 to a parent or an imported BOM, but no build resolved the dependency graph, so the outdated signal was not established. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
  • D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency is measured on C# and TypeScript only; Dart, Kotlin, Swift, html not measured.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only — this repository's production source is .dart, .kt, .swift, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.dart), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Dart pubspec.yaml — not scanned yet).
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — knowledge concentrated in recent work — freshness signal contradicted by repo activity
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Dart pubspec.yaml — not scanned yet).
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and this analysis resolves a call's owner only where the receiver's type is written down in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
  • ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, which this analysis does not build from source alone for this language. Reported as guidance rather than measured
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HTTP client call or construction in the Dart, JVM source (service entry point: pkgs/http_multi_server/lib/http_multi_server.dart:103 (HttpServer.bind())
  • P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `flutter test --coverage` (or `dart test --coverage=coverage` then `dart run coverage:format_coverage --lcov`)) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for classes extending benchmark_harness's `BenchmarkBase`, `AsyncBenchmarkBase` or `PerfBenchmarkBase` (directly or through a base of your own), `benchmark(…)` calls under the pub `benchmark` package, Flutter's `benchmarkWidgets`, `watchPerformance` or `traceAction` in a test importing flutter_test, integration_test or flutter_driver, or benchmark_harness, benchmark or web_benchmarks in a pubspec.yaml, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
  • X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Dart was read, and it logs through none: package:logging, package:logger, talker and dart:developer take one finished message and no template arguments or fields (as log4net does in C#), so an interpolated message there loses nothing the API could have kept. Sentry's structured logs (`Sentry.logger`) would be judged.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 1 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
Serious — 119 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×50
  • TodoComment pkgs/web_socket_channel/test/html_test.dart:175 — // TODO(nweiz): Make this channel use a port number that's guaranteed to be — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/web_socket/test/fake_web_socket_test.dart:21 — // TODO(https://github.com/dart-lang/test/issues/2576): Throw
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/test/client_conformance_test.dart:238 — // TODO: Implement request body streaming support in Http2Client. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/test/client_conformance_test.dart:244 — // TODO: Re-enable once request abort support is implemented in Http2Client. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/test/client_conformance_test.dart:259 — // TODO: Implement redirect-following support in Http2Client. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/test/client_conformance_test.dart:268 — // TODO: Support running client conformance tests in isolates. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/test/client_conformance_test.dart:276 — // TODO: Implement request abort support in Http2Client. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/test/server_test.dart:537 — // TODO: Do we want to get an error in this case? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/test/src/flowcontrol/connection_queues_test.dart:151 — // TODO: Write tests for adding HeadersFrame/PushPromiseFrame. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/test/src/flowcontrol/stream_queues_test.dart:162 — // TODO: Add tests for Headers/HeadersPush messages. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/lib/src/connection.dart:240 — // TODO: The [error] can contain sensitive information we now expose via — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/lib/src/connection.dart:378 — // TODO: There is probably more we need to wait for. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/lib/src/connection.dart:412 — // TODO: Can this even happen and if so, how should we propagate this — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/lib/src/connection.dart:622 — // TODO: When do we complete here? — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:131 — // TODO: Handle stream/connection queue errors & forward to connection object. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:522 — // TODO: We should wait for us to send the headers frame before doing this — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:685 — // TODO: Consider splitting this method into client/server handling. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:769 — // TODO: When implementing priorities for HTTP/2 streams, these frames — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/lib/src/settings/settings.dart:171 — // TODO: Have a timeout: When ACK doesn't get back in a reasonable time — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/lib/src/settings/settings.dart:208 — // TODO: Propagate this signal to the HPackContext. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/lib/src/ping/ping_handler.dart:13 — // TODO: We currently write unconditionally to the [FrameWriter]: we might want — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/lib/src/hpack/hpack.dart:219 — // TODO: Currently we encode all headers: — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/lib/src/hpack/hpack.dart:224 — // TODO: Once we start encoding via dynamic table we need to let the other — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/lib/src/hpack/hpack.dart:256 — // TODO: Support huffman encoding. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment pkgs/http2/lib/src/frames/frame_writer.dart:7 — // TODO: No support for writing padded information. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • + 25 more in this group — see findings.md.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×15
  • Low cohesion: URLSessionConfiguration (LCOM4 31) pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_api.dart:758 — URLSessionConfiguration's methods fall into 31 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 31 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
  • Low cohesion: _$ExecutorService (LCOM4 13) pkgs/ok_http/lib/src/jni/bindings.dart:9539 — _$ExecutorService's methods fall into 13 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 13 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
  • Low cohesion: Request (LCOM4 9) pkgs/http/lib/src/request.dart:15 — Request's methods fall into 9 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 9 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
  • Low cohesion: HttpProfileResponseData (LCOM4 8) pkgs/http_profile/lib/src/http_profile_response_data.dart:56 — HttpProfileResponseData's methods fall into 8 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 8 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
  • Low cohesion: _$Call (LCOM4 8) pkgs/ok_http/lib/src/jni/bindings.dart:7060 — _$Call's methods fall into 8 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 8 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
  • Low cohesion: _$UrlRequestCallbackProxy$UrlRequestCallbackInterface (LCOM4 6) pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/jni/jni_bindings.dart:482 — _$UrlRequestCallbackProxy$UrlRequestCallbackInterface's methods fall into 6 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 6 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
  • Low cohesion: URLSession (LCOM4 6) pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_api.dart:1518 — URLSession's methods fall into 6 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 6 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
  • Low cohesion: _$WebSocket (LCOM4 6) pkgs/ok_http/lib/src/jni/bindings.dart:11466 — _$WebSocket's methods fall into 6 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 6 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
  • Low cohesion: _$X509KeyManager (LCOM4 6) pkgs/ok_http/lib/src/jni/bindings.dart:20060 — _$X509KeyManager's methods fall into 6 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 6 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
  • Low cohesion: AdapterWebSocketChannel (LCOM4 5) pkgs/web_socket_channel/lib/adapter_web_socket_channel.dart:15 — AdapterWebSocketChannel's methods fall into 5 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 5 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
  • Low cohesion: HttpProfileRequestData (LCOM4 5) pkgs/http_profile/lib/src/http_profile_request_data.dart:47 — HttpProfileRequestData's methods fall into 5 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 5 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
  • Low cohesion: _$WebSocketListenerProxy$WebSocketListener (LCOM4 5) pkgs/ok_http/lib/src/jni/bindings.dart:11876 — _$WebSocketListenerProxy$WebSocketListener's methods fall into 5 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 5 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
  • Low cohesion: HtmlWebSocketChannel (LCOM4 4) pkgs/web_socket_channel/lib/html.dart:16 — HtmlWebSocketChannel's methods fall into 4 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 4 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
  • Low cohesion: Http2StreamImpl (LCOM4 4) pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:35 — Http2StreamImpl's methods fall into 4 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 4 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
  • Low cohesion: HttpProfileRedirectData (LCOM4 4) pkgs/http_profile/lib/src/http_profile_response_data.dart:7 — HttpProfileRedirectData's methods fall into 4 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 4 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot · ×4
  • Hotspot: pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:656 — pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart changed 8 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 29 in StreamHandler._processStreamFrameInternal at line 656. 8 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-08-07..2026-11-05, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-07 13:04:35 -08:00' --until='2026-11-05 13:04:35 -08:00' --full-history --no-merges -- pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Hotspot: pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/cronet_client.dart pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/cronet_client.dart:214 — pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/cronet_client.dart changed 4 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 35 in CronetEngine.build at line 214. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, and the other 3 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-08-07..2026-11-05, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-07 13:04:35 -08:00' --until='2026-11-05 13:04:35 -08:00' --full-history --no-merges -- pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/cronet_client.dart`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Hotspot: pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_client.dart pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_client.dart:282 — pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_client.dart changed 3 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 28 in CupertinoClient.send at line 282. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-08-07..2026-11-05, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-07 13:04:35 -08:00' --until='2026-11-05 13:04:35 -08:00' --full-history --no-merges -- pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_client.dart`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Hotspot: pkgs/http2/lib/src/connection.dart pkgs/http2/lib/src/connection.dart:419 — pkgs/http2/lib/src/connection.dart changed 4 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 16 in Connection._handleFrameImpl at line 419. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits, and the other 2 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-08-07..2026-11-05, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-07 13:04:35 -08:00' --until='2026-11-05 13:04:35 -08:00' --full-history --no-merges -- pkgs/http2/lib/src/connection.dart`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
D3 · God Classes · MethodTooLong · ×3
  • MethodTooLong: CupertinoClient.send pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_client.dart:282 — MethodTooLong — send runs 178 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 78 over it, 1.78× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
  • MethodTooLong: OkHttpClient.send pkgs/ok_http/lib/src/ok_http_client.dart:331 — MethodTooLong — send runs 128 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 28 over it, 1.28× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
  • MethodTooLong: FrameReader._readFrame pkgs/http2/lib/src/frames/frame_reader.dart:195 — MethodTooLong — _readFrame runs 114 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 14 over it, 1.14× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Repeated repair · ×2
  • Repeated repair: pkgs/http2/lib/src/flowcontrol/connection_queues.dart pkgs/http2/lib/src/flowcontrol/connection_queues.dart:101 — pkgs/http2/lib/src/flowcontrol/connection_queues.dart changed 4 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 10 (its worst body is ConnectionMessageQueueOut._peekSendableMessage at line 101), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(http2): do not head-of-line block HEADERS, RST_STREAM and GOAWAY behind window-exhausted DATA (#2013)”; “fix(http2): never write RST_STREAM ahead of the stream's still-queued HEADERS (#2008)”; “fix(http2): preserve the complete response on RST_STREAM(NO_ERROR) (#2012)”; “fix(http2): replenish connection receive window when stream closes with unconsumed data (#2005)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-08-07..2026-11-05, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-07 13:04:35 -08:00' --until='2026-11-05 13:04:35 -08:00' --full-history --no-merges -- pkgs/http2/lib/src/flowcontrol/connection_queues.dart`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: pkgs/http2/lib/src/sync_errors.dart pkgs/http2/lib/src/sync_errors.dart:12 — pkgs/http2/lib/src/sync_errors.dart changed 3 times in last 90 days and 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 1 (its worst body is ProtocolException.toString at line 12), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(http2): make StreamException a StreamTransportException and forward ALPN errors to onError (#2009)”; “fix(http2): bound peer-controlled streams and headers (#1958)”; “fix(http2): reject requests that exceed `SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS` (#1965)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-08-07..2026-11-05, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-07 13:04:35 -08:00' --until='2026-11-05 13:04:35 -08:00' --full-history --no-merges -- pkgs/http2/lib/src/sync_errors.dart`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×2
  • FileTooLong: src/cupertino_api.dart pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_api.dart — FileTooLong — 843 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 343 over it, 1.69× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: streams/stream_handler.dart pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart — FileTooLong — 674 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 90% of them inside a single declaration: StreamHandler (132-1184). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 174 over it, 1.35× the bar. Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×2
  • TooManyMethods: StreamHandler pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:127 — TooManyMethods — 50 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 20 over it, 1.67× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
  • TooManyMethods: URLSessionConfiguration pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_api.dart:758 — TooManyMethods — 37 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 7 over it, 1.23× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness · Owned disposable field is never released · ×2
  • Owned disposable field is never released pkgs/web_socket_channel/lib/src/sink_completer.dart:125 — `_CompleterSink` carries a disposal duty — it declares its own release — and it creates `_controller` itself (line 125, `StreamController`), which makes that instance its own. Nothing in the class releases it — no `_controller.close()`, no tear-off of it, on any path — nothing elsewhere in the library releases it through another instance, and it is never handed on as a value (passed positionally, returned, stored, collected), so no other owner can be ending it. Passing it as a named argument does not: a widget or animation never disposes a controller it was given. On what was read, `StreamController` outlives the object that made it — its listeners, and through them this object and everything it references, stay reachable, and a ticker, timer or subscription keeps calling into a disposed object. Release it where the duty is discharged: `_controller.close();` in `dispose()` before `super.dispose()`.
  • Owned disposable field is never released pkgs/http2/lib/multiprotocol_server.dart:27 — `MultiProtocolHttpServer` carries a disposal duty — it declares its own release — and it creates `_http2Controller` itself (line 27, `StreamController`), which makes that instance its own. Nothing in the class releases it — no `_http2Controller.close()`, no tear-off of it, on any path — nothing elsewhere in the library releases it through another instance, and it is never handed on as a value (passed positionally, returned, stored, collected), so no other owner can be ending it. Passing it as a named argument does not: a widget or animation never disposes a controller it was given. On what was read, `StreamController` outlives the object that made it — its listeners, and through them this object and everything it references, stay reachable, and a ticker, timer or subscription keeps calling into a disposed object. Release it where the duty is discharged: `_http2Controller.close();` in `dispose()` before `super.dispose()`.
C2 · Access Controls · No authorization · ×1
  • No authorization pkgs/http_multi_server/lib/http_multi_server.dart:103 — This repository serves requests — an HTTP server (HttpServer.bind) (pkgs/http_multi_server/lib/http_multi_server.dart:103) — and no route guard, auth-gate middleware, global guard or imperative check that refuses a caller (401/403, an Unauthorized/Forbidden error) was found: its endpoints may be unprotected.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · StreamHandler._changeState (cyclomatic 47) · ×1
  • StreamHandler._changeState (cyclomatic 47) pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:1096 — StreamHandler._changeState has cyclomatic complexity 47 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart holds 2 of the 11 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 46 of the 96 points over it (48%), 2.3× the next-largest file (pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/cronet_client.dart at 20). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · CronetEngine.build (cyclomatic 35) · ×1
  • CronetEngine.build (cyclomatic 35) pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/cronet_client.dart:214 — CronetEngine.build has cyclomatic complexity 35 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · StreamHandler._processStreamFrameInternal (cyclomatic 29) · ×1
  • StreamHandler._processStreamFrameInternal (cyclomatic 29) pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:656 — StreamHandler._processStreamFrameInternal has cyclomatic complexity 29 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart holds 2 of the 11 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 46 of the 96 points over it (48%), 2.3× the next-largest file (pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/cronet_client.dart at 20). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · CupertinoClient.send (cyclomatic 28) · ×1
  • CupertinoClient.send (cyclomatic 28) pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_client.dart:282 — CupertinoClient.send has cyclomatic complexity 28 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This is NOT this file's highest cyclomatic complexity: CupertinoClient._findReasonPhrase (cyclomatic 41) is higher and carries no row of its own — it was excluded as a flat dispatcher (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), which this dimension does not treat as a refactor obligation. It is named here so the ranking you see in this file is not mistaken for the whole of it; the excluded method is counted neither in this dimension's figures nor in its score.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · HPackDecoder.decodeWithLimit (cyclomatic 20) · ×1
  • HPackDecoder.decodeWithLimit (cyclomatic 20) pkgs/http2/lib/src/hpack/hpack.dart:85 — HPackDecoder.decodeWithLimit has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Http2Client._sendOverHttp2 (cyclomatic 20) · ×1
  • Http2Client._sendOverHttp2 (cyclomatic 20) pkgs/http2/lib/src/http2_client.dart:169 — Http2Client._sendOverHttp2 has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · FrameReader.startDecoding (cyclomatic 17) · ×1
  • FrameReader.startDecoding (cyclomatic 17) pkgs/http2/lib/src/frames/frame_reader.dart:32 — FrameReader.startDecoding has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · FrameReader._readFrame (cyclomatic 17) · ×1
  • FrameReader._readFrame (cyclomatic 17) pkgs/http2/lib/src/frames/frame_reader.dart:195 — FrameReader._readFrame has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Connection._handleFrameImpl (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • Connection._handleFrameImpl (cyclomatic 16) pkgs/http2/lib/src/connection.dart:419 — Connection._handleFrameImpl has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Connection._validateSettings (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • Connection._validateSettings (cyclomatic 16) pkgs/http2/lib/src/connection.dart:515 — Connection._validateSettings has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · _Sink._decode (cyclomatic 16) · ×1
  • _Sink._decode (cyclomatic 16) pkgs/http_parser/lib/src/chunked_coding/decoder.dart:81 — _Sink._decode has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · CronetEngine.build (cognitive 90) · ×1
  • CronetEngine.build (cognitive 90) pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/cronet_client.dart:214 — CronetEngine.build has cognitive complexity 90 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 23 (77 pts), boolean chains 9, loops 1 (3 pts), error handling 1 (nesting depth added 56). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · StreamHandler._processStreamFrameInternal (cognitive 52) · ×1
  • StreamHandler._processStreamFrameInternal (cognitive 52) pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:656 — StreamHandler._processStreamFrameInternal has cognitive complexity 52 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 30 (47 pts), boolean chains 3, ternaries 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 18). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · StreamHandler._changeState (cognitive 44) · ×1
  • StreamHandler._changeState (cognitive 44) pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:1096 — StreamHandler._changeState has cognitive complexity 44 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 32, if/else 7 (11 pts), match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · CupertinoClient.send (cognitive 43) · ×1
  • CupertinoClient.send (cognitive 43) pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_client.dart:282 — CupertinoClient.send has cognitive complexity 43 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 22 (31 pts), ternaries 4 (7 pts), boolean chains 3, error handling 2 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · HPackDecoder.decodeWithLimit (cognitive 36) · ×1
  • HPackDecoder.decodeWithLimit (cognitive 36) pkgs/http2/lib/src/hpack/hpack.dart:85 — HPackDecoder.decodeWithLimit has cognitive complexity 36 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19 (28 pts), loops 2 (4 pts), boolean chains 2, error handling 2 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Http2Client._sendOverHttp2 (cognitive 31) · ×1
  • Http2Client._sendOverHttp2 (cognitive 31) pkgs/http2/lib/src/http2_client.dart:169 — Http2Client._sendOverHttp2 has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14 (24 pts), loops 2 (3 pts), ternaries 3, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · FrameReader.startDecoding (cognitive 30) · ×1
  • FrameReader.startDecoding (cognitive 30) pkgs/http2/lib/src/frames/frame_reader.dart:32 — FrameReader.startDecoding has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13 (24 pts), loops 1 (2 pts), match/switch 1 (2 pts), boolean chains 1, error handling 1 (nesting depth added 13). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · StreamMessageQueueIn._tryDispatch (cognitive 27) · ×1
  • StreamMessageQueueIn._tryDispatch (cognitive 27) pkgs/http2/lib/src/flowcontrol/stream_queues.dart:304 — StreamMessageQueueIn._tryDispatch has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (23 pts), boolean chains 3, loops 1 (nesting depth added 13). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · IOClient.send (cognitive 26) · ×1
  • IOClient.send (cognitive 26) pkgs/http/lib/src/io_client.dart:103 — IOClient.send has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (20 pts), ternaries 2 (4 pts), error handling 2 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SettingsHandler._modifySettings (cognitive 25) · ×1
  • SettingsHandler._modifySettings (cognitive 25) pkgs/http2/lib/src/settings/settings.dart:181 — SettingsHandler._modifySettings has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (21 pts), match/switch 1 (2 pts), boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · RetryClient.send (cognitive 22) · ×1
  • RetryClient.send (cognitive 22) pkgs/http/lib/retry.dart:118 — RetryClient.send has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 5 (12 pts), error handling 3 (7 pts), boolean chains 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · HuffmanDecoder.decode (cognitive 21) · ×1
  • HuffmanDecoder.decode (cognitive 21) pkgs/http2/lib/src/hpack/huffman.dart:36 — HuffmanDecoder.decode has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (16 pts), loops 3 (5 pts) (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Connection._handleFrameImpl (cognitive 19) · ×1
  • Connection._handleFrameImpl (cognitive 19) pkgs/http2/lib/src/connection.dart:419 — Connection._handleFrameImpl has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15 (17 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 2). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · _Sink._decode (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • _Sink._decode (cognitive 18) pkgs/http_parser/lib/src/chunked_coding/decoder.dart:81 — _Sink._decode has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 5 (12 pts), ternaries 1 (3 pts), match/switch 1 (2 pts), loops 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BrowserClient.send (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • BrowserClient.send (cognitive 17) pkgs/http/lib/src/browser_client.dart:131 — BrowserClient.send has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 4 (7 pts), ternaries 3 (6 pts), loops 1 (2 pts), boolean chains 1, error handling 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · StreamMessageQueueOut._trySendData (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • StreamMessageQueueOut._trySendData (cognitive 17) pkgs/http2/lib/src/flowcontrol/stream_queues.dart:99 — StreamMessageQueueOut._trySendData has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (14 pts), boolean chains 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · OkHttpClient.OkHttpClient (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • OkHttpClient.OkHttpClient (cognitive 16) pkgs/ok_http/lib/src/ok_http_client.dart:227 — OkHttpClient.OkHttpClient has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (11 pts), boolean chains 5 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BrowserWebSocket.connect (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • BrowserWebSocket.connect (cognitive 16) pkgs/web_socket/lib/src/browser_web_socket.dart:21 — BrowserWebSocket.connect has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12 (13 pts), boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 1). To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
D3 · God Classes · ClassTooLong · ×1
  • ClassTooLong: StreamHandler pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:127 — ClassTooLong — 605 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 50 methods. The bar is 400 significant lines; this is 205 over it, 1.51× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:186 — pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:186-204 | pkgs/http2/lib/src/streams/stream_handler.dart:214-232 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8–9 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (8–9 lines × 2) pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_web_socket.dart:271 — pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_web_socket.dart:271-279 | pkgs/ok_http/lib/src/ok_http_web_socket.dart:170-177 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/cronet_client.dart:759 — pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/cronet_client.dart:759-763 | pkgs/ok_http/lib/src/ok_http_client.dart:315-319 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) pkgs/web_socket_channel/lib/adapter_web_socket_channel.dart:143 — pkgs/web_socket_channel/lib/adapter_web_socket_channel.dart:143-148 | pkgs/web_socket_channel/lib/html.dart:175-180 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (25 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (25 lines × 2) pkgs/cronet_http/example/lib/main.dart:60 — pkgs/cronet_http/example/lib/main.dart:60-84 | pkgs/ok_http/example/lib/main.dart:55-79 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) pkgs/cronet_http/example/lib/main.dart:86 — pkgs/cronet_http/example/lib/main.dart:86-97 | pkgs/ok_http/example/lib/main.dart:81-92 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · Analyzer excludes 2 path(s) that do not exist · ×1
  • Analyzer excludes 2 path(s) that do not exist pkgs/cronet_http/analysis_options.yaml:1 — `pkgs/cronet_http/analysis_options.yaml` excludes `lib/src/messages.dart`, `pigeons/messages.dart` from analysis, and no such path is in the repository. These entries are dead configuration: they silence nothing today, and each one is a name the analyzer will silently start honouring the moment a directory of that name appears — so the file's exclusion list is wider than anything anybody decided. Delete the entries that no longer name anything, and keep the ones that do.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · Weak hash algorithm · ×1
  • Weak hash algorithm pkgs/web_socket_channel/lib/src/channel.dart:91 — MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`sha256.convert(…)` from `package:crypto`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call.
Minor — 23 finding(s)
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Disabled test · ×5
  • Disabled test pkgs/cronet_http/example/integration_test/cronet_engine_test.dart:137 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
  • Disabled test pkgs/cronet_http/example/integration_test/cronet_engine_test.dart:148 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
  • Disabled test pkgs/cupertino_http/test/url_session_delegate_test.dart:415 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
  • Disabled test pkgs/http/test/html/client_test.dart:30 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
  • Disabled test pkgs/http/test/html/streamed_request_test.dart:39 — A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something.
X10 · Duplicated predicate · Duplicated predicate · ×5
  • Duplicated predicate pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_web_socket.dart:88 — `!url.isScheme('ws') && !url.isScheme('wss')` appears character-identically in 4 files — pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_web_socket.dart, pkgs/ok_http/lib/src/ok_http_web_socket.dart, pkgs/web_socket/lib/src/browser_web_socket.dart, pkgs/web_socket/lib/src/io_web_socket.dart. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_web_socket.dart:277 — `code != null && code != 1000 && !(code >= 3000 && code <= 4999)` appears character-identically in 3 files — pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_web_socket.dart, pkgs/ok_http/lib/src/ok_http_web_socket.dart, pkgs/web_socket/lib/src/utils.dart. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate pkgs/web_socket/lib/src/browser_web_socket.dart:76 — `eventData.typeofEquals('object') && (eventData as JSObject).instanceOfString('ArrayBuffer')` appears character-identically in 2 files — pkgs/web_socket/lib/src/browser_web_socket.dart, pkgs/web_socket_channel/lib/html.dart. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/cronet_client.dart:791 — `profile != null && request.contentLength != null` appears character-identically in 2 files — pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/cronet_client.dart, pkgs/ok_http/lib/src/ok_http_client.dart. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
  • Duplicated predicate pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_web_socket.dart:283 — `reason != null && utf8.encode(reason).length > 123` appears character-identically in 3 files — pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_web_socket.dart, pkgs/ok_http/lib/src/ok_http_web_socket.dart, pkgs/web_socket/lib/src/utils.dart. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×2
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 6 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_client.dart, pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/src/cupertino_web_socket.dart, pkgs/http_client_conformance_tests/lib/src/response_headers_tests.dart, pkgs/http/lib/src/client.dart, pkgs/http/lib/src/base_response.dart, pkgs/cupertino_http/lib/cupertino_http.dart. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #2 — If anonymized user #2 becomes unavailable, 3 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: pkgs/http2/lib/src/flowcontrol/connection_queues.dart, pkgs/http2/lib/src/flowcontrol/stream_queues.dart, pkgs/http2/lib/multiprotocol_server.dart. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D16 · Bus Factor · Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
  • Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 7 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (19 single-owned of 83 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated, example/demo and scaffolding-template trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 83 of the 182 production source files in this repository met that bar). They are anonymized user #3 (2 file(s)), anonymized user #4 (2 file(s)), anonymized user #5 (2 file(s)), anonymized user #6 (1 file(s)), anonymized user #7 (1 file(s)), anonymized user #8 (1 file(s)) (+1 more) — spread or document their files in the same way, at lower priority than the named off-boarding risks above. The files folded here: pkgs/http2/lib/src/settings/settings.dart, pkgs/http2/lib/src/flowcontrol/window_handler.dart, pkgs/http_parser/lib/src/chunked_coding/decoder.dart, pkgs/http_parser/lib/src/media_type.dart, pkgs/http_client_conformance_tests/lib/src/bodyless_request_server.dart, pkgs/http_client_conformance_tests/lib/src/bodyless_request_tests.dart, pkgs/http_multi_server/lib/http_multi_server.dart, pkgs/http_profile/lib/src/http_profile_request_data.dart (+2 more).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1
  • No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
P10 · Library API & versioning · Large public API surface · ×1
  • Large public API surface — 728/813 types (90%) declared in the published library are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — keep implementation types off the surface and expose only the intended API.
P2 · Observability · Logging is not universal · ×1
  • Logging is not universal — Only 1/8 runnable modules use logging (modules with no entry point or server are excluded — they are libraries a runnable module hosts). Silent: `pkgs/cupertino_http/ios_test`, `pkgs/cupertino_http/ios_test/ios`, `pkgs/flutter_http_example`, `pkgs/flutter_http_example/ios`, `pkgs/flutter_http_example/macos` and 2 more.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1
  • No SAST .github/workflows/cronet.yml:14 — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add the Dart analyzer's security lints plus `semgrep --config=auto` as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 77330 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · Dependabot does not watch gradle · ×1
  • Dependabot does not watch gradle .github/dependabot.yml:5 — `.github/dependabot.yml` schedules updates, but no `package-ecosystem` entry covers `gradle`, which this tree depends on — so those dependencies get no update pull requests and no advisory pressure, however complete the dep-scan credit looks. Add the missing entry to the `updates:` list.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×1
  • No security response headers detected — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is set on a response this repository's Dart server sends — defense in depth, even when a proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: pkgs/http_multi_server/lib/http_multi_server.dart:103 — `HttpServer.bind(`.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No inbound request validation detected · ×1
  • No inbound request validation detected — No handler of this repository's Dart server answers 400, 413 or 422 (`Response.badRequest`, `HttpStatus.badRequest`, `statusCode = 400`) and no validation package (luthor, acanthis, ez_validator, json_schema, …) is imported — nothing shows inbound requests being checked, and refused, before a handler acts on them. A check that answers its failure with 200 and an error body is not seen. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: pkgs/http_multi_server/lib/http_multi_server.dart:103 — `HttpServer.bind(`.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-c9623e7f8f28403cb736d3ca58c42e00/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .2artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-c9623e7f8f28403cb736d3ca58c42e00/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt --exclude pkgs/cronet_http/lib/src/jni --exclude pkgs/ok_http/lib/src/jni .1artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (dependency manifest found, not scanned for vulnerabilities here)—none (dependency manifest found, not scanned for vulnerabilities here): not applicable — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Dart pubspec.yaml — not scanned yet).0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciesnone (dependency manifest found, not scanned for vulnerabilities here)—none (dependency manifest found, not scanned for vulnerabilities here): not applicable — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Dart pubspec.yaml — not scanned yet).0—

Run 01a1adb9-f652-7e87-8167-8f4fe7d991b7 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md