Executive summary
catdad/canvas-confetti falls short of our standard for production because we found no logging, tracing or health checks in the code and no automated security scanning of the code, its secrets or its dependencies. It scores 43 out of 100 and is rated Weak, and four of its five critical findings are security problems in the build pipeline and in its automatic dependency updates.
Production Readiness, at 35, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is having someone learn and document the file no active contributor knows, worth about 4 points. Adopting a logging library would lift Production Readiness itself, also worth about 4. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 49.
Three pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. One automatic update takes new releases before a bad one can be spotted, and one part of the code is no longer understood by anyone working on it. Having someone learn the forgotten files, pinning each tool to an exact version and setting a waiting period for automatic updates would close these risks.
The product code is 1,315 lines, about €2,000 to rebuild.
If Production Readiness rose from 35 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 43 to about 49.
New since the last survey: 3 findings
- Cyclomatic Complexity · confetti.confettiCannon.fire (cyclomatic 22) src/confetti.js
- Cyclomatic Complexity · confettiCannon::fire (cyclomatic 16) src/confetti.js
- Cognitive Complexity · confetti.confettiCannon.fire (cognitive 23) src/confetti.js
Fixed since the last survey: 2 findings
- Cyclomatic Complexity · confetti.confettiCannon::fire (cyclomatic 16) src/confetti.js
- A11y enforcement · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung
Rebuild cost: about €2,000 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €660 to €3,300, for 11 to 35 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.7 at a score of 43. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Very small: 1,315 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Accessibility
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 6 | Medium |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 4 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Adopt pino (or winston) and log at meaningful points in the services you run; Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing; Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with confetti.js.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with confetti.js. | +4.1 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Adopt pino (or winston) and log at meaningful points in the services you run. | +4.2 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +4.2 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Resolve the 3 Fixed-sleep synchronisation finding(s) in Test Quality — start with index.test.js (3). | +2.1 pts | Low | Test Quality |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +3.3 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video. | +3.0 pts | Medium | Text alternatives |
| Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1. | +3.0 pts | Medium | Visual & motion safety |
| Resolve the 2 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with index.test.js (2). | +1.4 pts | Low | Test Quality |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| src/confetti.js | 7.1 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: confetti.confettiCannon.fire (cyclomatic 22) |
| test/index.test.js | 7.1 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions: [custom canvas] resizes the custom canvas when the window resizes |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 41 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.7, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 41 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 25 of 38 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D4 Code Duplication — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. The language model for this repository listed its production source (.html) but exposed no token stream for any of it, so nothing reached the token comparison.
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — the JavaScript/TypeScript suite(s) run through a browser-driven runner the coverage collector does not drive — the repository root (puppeteer) — a gap in the analyzer, not something this repository is missing. Coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.js) and the reliability runner does support this ecosystem — it drives jest, vitest, mocha and egg-bin — but every JavaScript/TypeScript test package this repository declares runs its suite in a real browser, which the re-runner has no way to launch. the root package declares `puppeteer` and its `scripts.test` is `cd test && ava --verbose --serial`. So flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's browser-driven test support, not a missing .js runner and not a finding about this repository.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. This repository's 1 package.json manifest(s) WERE read and their pinning discipline assessed; what went unanswered is the currency half, because answering it needs a lockfile resolved to CONCRETE versions and this repository commits none — a package.json states version RANGES, and a range names no particular release to be behind. So registry.npmjs.org was never asked, and there was nothing here for it to grade. This is a true statement about the repository and NOT a gap on our side: no lockfile reader we could write would find anything here to read, so there is no capability behind this row to build.
- D14 License Compliance — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored — this repository declares package.json manifests but commits no lockfile this pass can resolve (npm, pnpm, yarn and bun each write a different one, and `bun.lockb` is a binary format with no published shape), so the set of packages it actually ships is not resolvable from the checkout: its declarations carry version RANGES, and grading whichever release happens to be newest today would be a verdict about a dependency graph this repository has not pinned. Commit the lock and this dimension grades its production dependencies against registry.npmjs.org. NOT a finding that this repository's licences are compliant: this dimension asserts nothing about its licensing in either direction.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (20 contributor(s) across 662 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 96% of the history; the other 19 hold 0.2% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
- D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's naming rules read C# through Roslyn and every other language through its sidecar model; these languages are left out (PHP's reading is its own change, a Roslyn-loaded VB or F# project has no population builder yet). Their declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether their names are consistent.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22's deterministic call-shape rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. This says nothing about whether that surface is consistent.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) (npm) WERE scanned and every vulnerability they reported is included in this result; osv was not, so this dimension's score covers less than the dependency surface this repository declares, and nothing here is evidence that osv is free of known-vulnerable dependencies. osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. This is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass. osv-scanner documents exit 128 as "no package sources found" — but this scan only invoked it because the tree declares a source it supports (`pom.xml` and the resolved lockfiles among them), so the tool's report and this repository disagree. Check that those sources are reachable from the directory the scan ran in before concluding anything is missing. If this tree really does commit only range-pinned manifests, commit the lockfile your package manager produces — but only where your ecosystem HAS one and commits it: Maven has none at all (osv-scanner reads `pom.xml` directly) and Gradle writes one only under opt-in dependency locking, while a published Composer package and a published Dart library both deliberately exclude theirs. In those three, generate one in CI before the scan instead — a resolved dependency list or an SBOM fed to the scanner.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) (npm) WERE scanned and every vulnerability they reported is included in this result; osv was not, so this dimension's score covers less than the dependency surface this repository declares, and nothing here is evidence that osv is free of known-vulnerable dependencies. osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. This is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass. osv-scanner documents exit 128 as "no package sources found" — but this scan only invoked it because the tree declares a source it supports (`pom.xml` and the resolved lockfiles among them), so the tool's report and this repository disagree. Check that those sources are reachable from the directory the scan ran in before concluding anything is missing. If this tree really does commit only range-pinned manifests, commit the lockfile your package manager produces — but only where your ecosystem HAS one and commits it: Maven has none at all (osv-scanner reads `pom.xml` directly) and Gradle writes one only under opt-in dependency locking, while a published Composer package and a published Dart library both deliberately exclude theirs. In those three, generate one in CI before the scan instead — a resolved dependency list or an SBOM fed to the scanner.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This dimension reads a project's own statement about the platform it runs on: a TargetFramework in a .NET project file, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain file or Cargo.toml rust-version, a .go-version, .java-version, .ruby-version, .tool-versions or .sdkmanrc, a go.mod go directive, a Maven or Gradle Java level or toolchain, a Gemfile's ruby directive, a mix.exs elixir requirement, a rebar.config minimum_otp_vsn, a pubspec.yaml SDK constraint, a build.sbt scalaVersion, or a framework major pinned by a dependency constraint. This repository carries none of them, so nothing about its platform was established. That is a gap in this analyzer's coverage, NOT a finding that the platform is supported — a language whose runtime is declared elsewhere (Package.swift, a Dockerfile) is simply not read here yet.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. The package `send` is declared in package.json but was not installed in our sandbox, so the dependency install did not complete here. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. (rule: dependency-not-installed). The renderer reported: the dev server (`npm run dev`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (our sandbox): the package `send` is declared in package.json but was not installed in our sandbox, so the dependency install did not complete here. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. Last output: "at TracingChannel.traceSync (node:diagnostics_channel:322:14) / at wrapModuleLoad (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:217:24) / at Module.require (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:1335:12) / at require (node:internal/modules/helpers:136:16) / at Object.<anonymous> (<repo>/build/serve.js:3:14) / at Module._compile (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:1562:14) / at Object..js (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:1699:10) / at Module.load (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:1313:32) { / code: 'MODULE_NOT_FOUND', / requireStack: [ / '<repo>/build/serve.js' / ] / } / Node.js v22.13.0" No runtime evidence was gathered.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DevServer (dev). the dev server (`npm run dev`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (our sandbox): the package `send` is declared in package.json but was not installed in our sandbox, so the dependency install did not complete here. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. Last output: "at TracingChannel.traceSync (node:diagnostics_channel:322:14) / at wrapModuleLoad (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:217:24) / at Module.require (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:1335:12) / at require (node:internal/modules/helpers:136:16) / at Object.<anonymous> (<repo>/build/serve.js:3:14) / at Module._compile (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:1562:14) / at Object..js (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:1699:10) / at Module.load (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:1313:32) { / code: 'MODULE_NOT_FOUND', / requireStack: [ / '<repo>/build/serve.js' / ] / } / Node.js v22.13.0" No runtime evidence was gathered.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and none applies: this repository publishes a library and deploys nothing (no container, IaC or deployment manifest), so it holds no runtime state of its own. Any data-access dependency it declares is the store it is a CLIENT for, not one it operates. The DR control belongs to whoever runs that data.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, PHP, Dart, Kotlin, Ruby, Scala, Java, Python and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and no named async function in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, nor any Go, PHP or Dart function or Kotlin suspend function, makes a request that can be cancelled (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http; net/http, net.Dial; amphp; Dio; Ktor, OkHttp), so there is nothing to judge, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value is measured as redundancy only: a comment that repeats its code's words is found, but a paraphrase in other words, a vague comment, or one the code contradicts is not, and whether a comment is valuable is not claimed. Comments in other scripts or languages, and outside C#, are not judged.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
2 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was confetti.confettiCannon.fire at 22.
What to do
- Bring the 2 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with confetti.confettiCannon.fire (cyclomatic 22), confettiCannon::fire (cyclomatic 16). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 2 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.4 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
2 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was confettiCannon at 35.
What to do
- Bring the 2 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with confettiCannon (cognitive 35), confetti.confettiCannon.fire (cognitive 23). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 2 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 8.8 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
D3 · God Classes
2 over-large unit(s) detected — types, modules or files that carry too much.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with confetti.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with confetti.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 2 zero-assertion, 3 synchronised by a fixed sleep, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 40 tests.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Fixed-sleep synchronisation finding(s) in Test Quality — start with index.test.js (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with index.test.js (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 1 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D24 · Comment Value
0 of 44 judged comments only repeat the code they sit on (0.0 %). 2 comment(s) in another language or script were not judged.
D27 · Navigability
0 % of calls cross a namespace and 0 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low. 3 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 3 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable dependencies in the 1 ecosystem(s) that were scanned (npm). Partial dependency scan: 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) were scanned (npm), and the findings above are real and complete for them. osv was not scanned (osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned), so this is not the whole dependency surface and the result is reported at reduced confidence.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
1 of 1 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/confetti.js.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with confetti.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No known-vulnerable dependencies in the 1 ecosystem(s) that were scanned (npm). Partial dependency scan: 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) were scanned (npm), and the findings above are real and complete for them. osv was not scanned (osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned), so this is not the whole dependency surface and the result is reported at reduced confidence.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
- A <canvas> with no aria-label/title and no inner fallback content can't be described by assistive tech. Add a name or fallback content. — index.html:589
What to do
- Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels
AC3 · Page structure
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — index.html:2
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC5 · ARIA correctness
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- `.theme` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — index.html:99
- `.run` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — index.html:172
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
P1 · CI/CD gates
- A CI pipeline exists but no build step was matched — changes may merge without the build ever running. A build step may be invoked directly as a command, or declared as a task that a runner named in the pipeline resolves.
What to do
- Add an explicit build step to your CI pipeline — your stack's own build command, or, if the pipeline delegates to a task runner, a build task that runner executes in CI — so every change is built before merge.
P10 · Library API & versioning
P2 · Observability
- No logging call was found in the 3 JavaScript/TypeScript production file(s) this check read across 1 module(s). Each was searched for its ecosystem's logging libraries (JavaScript/TypeScript: pino, winston, bunyan, log4js, loglevel, consola, the NestJS Logger) and for a call on a receiver named `log`/`logger` (or ending in `Logger`/`_logger`) with a level verb. It cannot see logging through a repo-local wrapper named otherwise, or in source it did not read — this is 'no logging found by this walk', not a verdict that nothing here logs. If it is right, production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt pino (or winston) and log at meaningful points in the services you run.
- Add a health-check endpoint (@godaddy/terminus or a /health route) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:5
- `package.json` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — package.json:29
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
R10 · Code Duplication
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- `https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/ace/1.3.0/ace.js` is executed by this page with no Subresource Integrity. Whoever can answer that request — the CDN, anyone who compromises it, anyone on the network path — runs arbitrary script in this page's origin, with its session. 2 such include(s) across the repository's markup. — index.html:317
- `http(…).listen(…)` serves plain HTTP on a network address, and nothing in its package enforces HTTPS: no TLS served (`https.createServer`, Fastify `https`, Nest `httpsOptions`), no redirect of plain requests to `https://`, no `Strict-Transport-Security` (helmet sends it by default), and no TLS-terminating proxy configuration committed beside it — so a browser may talk to it in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.) — build/serve.js:28
What to do
- Pin third-party scripts and verify them: name an exact version in the URL and add an `integrity="sha384-…"` hash alongside `crossorigin="anonymous"` (both are required — an integrity hash on a cross-origin script without `crossorigin` is not evaluated, it blocks the script). Where the vendor ships a continuously-updated loader and publishes no stable hash (tag managers, analytics, chat widgets), Subresource Integrity is not available: constrain it instead with a `Content-Security-Policy` that names the exact origins allowed to execute, and drop the script from the pages that do not need it. Where the page is shipped inside a package that others host, prefer vendoring the asset and serving it from the app’s own origin, so no consumer inherits a third-party dependency they did not choose.
- Enforce HTTPS on each listed server: serve TLS itself, or redirect plain requests to `https://` and send `Strict-Transport-Security` (`helmet()` does by default) behind the TLS-terminating proxy — and commit that proxy's configuration beside the service. A server only this machine reaches should bind `127.0.0.1`.
X12 · Unreachable branch
X16 · Unfloored truncation loop
X3 · Exception handling
X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 96% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Architecture | 69% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Maturity | 43% | Weak — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 35% | Weak — gated by P2, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 61% | Adequate — gated by D36 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Accessibility | 41% | Weak — gated by AC1, AC6 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 76 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — the dev server (`npm run dev`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (our sandbox): the package `send` is declared in package.json but was not installed in our sandbox, so the dependency install did not complete here. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. Last output: "at TracingChannel.traceSync (node:diagnostics_channel:322:14) / at wrapModuleLoad (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:217:24) / at Module.require (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:1335:12) / at require (node:internal/modules/helpers:136:16) / at Object.<anonymous> (<repo>/build/serve.js:3:14) / at Module._compile (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:1562:14) / at Object..js (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:1699:10) / at Module.load (node:internal/modules/cjs/loader:1313:32) { / code: 'MODULE_NOT_FOUND', / requireStack: [ / '<repo>/build/serve.js' / ] / } / Node.js v22.13.0" No runtime evidence was gathered. This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect. If it does persist personal data (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the controls belong to wherever that data is stored.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — this repository stands up no server (no Express, Fastify, Koa, Hono, NestJS or similar app, no Next.js/SvelteKit/Nuxt server route, no edge function), creates no Supabase tables and talks to no hosted backend. Access control is therefore N/A here — a browser application or library is authorized by the server it calls, not by itself; a client-side route guard hides a page and authorizes nothing. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the limit belongs wherever that data is stored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the rights are served wherever that data is stored.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — no browser-driven test runner (puppeteer)
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency currency not established — this repository commits no lockfile to resolve
- D14 License Compliance — npm licences not graded — this npm repository commits no lockfile this pass can resolve
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency does not read html yet; not measured.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — API consistency is measured on C# only; the exposed JavaScript surface was not measured.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (822 LoC, 5 module-visible types across 3 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D4 Code Duplication — Duplication not measured — .html not exposed to the token comparison
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life — Platform end-of-life not assessed — this repository declares no platform this pass reads
- D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this npm build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 1 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks. 1 claim(s) of kinds M4 does not check were not checked (install 1); M4 checks only links and versions and artefact counts.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HTTP client call or construction in the JavaScript/TypeScript source (service entry point: build/serve.js:9 (http.createServer())
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: this repository declares no async functions, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
- X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — Not applicable: this check looks for a loop whose body adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is walking, invalidating the enumerator it holds, and in this repository's languages that cannot happen. JavaScript and TypeScript have no iterator that a change can invalidate: an `Array` is walked by index against its live length, and a `Map` or `Set` by the ECMAScript specification's live entry list, so a body that adds to, removes from or empties what it walks raises nothing — every loop form (`for…of`, `for…in`, `forEach`, `map`, `filter`, `reduce`, `entries()`) on every built-in collection (`Array`, `Map`, `Set`, plain objects, `URLSearchParams`, `Headers`, `FormData`) runs to completion. Such a loop can still skip an element or never end, which is a different defect and not the one this check asks about. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — Not applicable: this check asks whether the null-typed discipline a language offers is switched on, and how much of that the assertion operator takes back, and in this repository's languages there is no such switch and no such operator. Plain JavaScript carries no type annotations and commits no tsconfig, so it states no null-typed discipline for this check to grade: there is nothing here that switches null checking on or off, and TypeScript (or `// @ts-check`) is how a repository acquires one — advice, not a defect this card measures. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 5 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Orphaned knowledge src/confetti.js:1
Serious — 20 finding(s)
- Fixed-sleep synchronisation: [custom canvas] calling `reset` method clears all existing confetti but more can be launched after test/index.test.js:1127
- Fixed-sleep synchronisation: [browserify] works using the browserify bundle test/index.test.js:1156
- Fixed-sleep synchronisation: [minified] works using the terser minified and compressed code test/index.test.js:1180
- Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement index.html:99
- Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement index.html:172
- No assertions: [custom canvas] resizes the custom canvas when the window resizes test/index.test.js:945
- No assertions: [custom canvas] resizes the custom canvas when the window resizes and a worker is used test/index.test.js:951
- <canvas> without a text alternative index.html:589
- Page without a main landmark index.html:2
- confetti.confettiCannon.fire (cyclomatic 22) src/confetti.js:610
- confettiCannon::fire (cyclomatic 16) src/confetti.js:610
- confettiCannon (cognitive 35) src/confetti.js:546
- confetti.confettiCannon.fire (cognitive 23) src/confetti.js:610
- FileTooLong: src/confetti.js src/confetti.js
- FunctionTooLong: confetti.confettiCannon src/confetti.js:546
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- No structured logging
- Third-party script without Subresource Integrity index.html:317
- JavaScript dependencies are not locked package.json:29
Minor — 12 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- No ADRs
- No architecture diagram/doc
- CI build step not evidenced
- No SAST REDACTED:5
- No dependency-update automation package.json:29
- No release approval gate
- No changelog
- No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected build/serve.js:28
Minor — 1 finding(s)
- Dependency hygiene PARTLY measured — npm pinning read, dependency currency not (no committed lockfile, so no resolved version to grade)
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-a284bcd2aef74b86b5bf385f8cf0958d/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-a284bcd2aef74b86b5bf385f8cf0958d/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 4 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 0 | — |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |