Executive summary
cablehead/http-nu is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, most of them in the build pipeline. Its score is held back because we found no access checks on the code's endpoints or handlers and two of the dependencies have a known vulnerability. It scores 57 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged. We judged it as a preview release, against a lower bar.
Security and Compliance, at 33, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is adding access checks, worth about 15 points. Adding the security headers comes next, worth about 4 points. Raising Security and Compliance to 68 would lift the score to about 71.
Eleven pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Five known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers, and three secrets can leak from the build pipeline. Pinning each tool to an exact version, updating the vulnerable packages and limiting each secret to its own step would close these risks. Passing outside input through environment variables would fix the pipeline step that puts outside input straight into a shell command.
The product code is 7,359 lines, about €11,000 to rebuild.
If Security and Compliance rose from 33 to 68, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 57 to about 71.
New since the last survey: 9 findings
- Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot: src/logging.rs src/logging.rs
- Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot: src/handler.rs src/handler.rs
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Fixed since the last survey: 2 findings
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability: RUSTSEC-2026-0346 REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability: RUSTSEC-2026-0367 REDACTED
Rebuild cost: about €11,000 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €3,600 to €18,000, for 61 to 193 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.8 at a score of 57. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 7,359 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 bus | 2 compression | 3 listener | 4 listener.win_uds_compat | 5 request | 6 response | 7 stdlib | 8 logging | 9 store | 10 engine | 11 handler | 12 worker | 13 main | 14 commands |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 bus | ||||||||||||||
| 2 compression | ||||||||||||||
| 3 listener | ||||||||||||||
| 4 listener.win_uds_compat | ||||||||||||||
| 5 request | ||||||||||||||
| 6 response | ||||||||||||||
| 7 stdlib | ||||||||||||||
| 8 logging | 2 | |||||||||||||
| 9 store | 2 | |||||||||||||
| 10 engine | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||
| 11 handler | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||
| 12 worker | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||
| 13 main | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | ||||||||||
| 14 commands | 2 | 3 | 14 |
8→5 logging uses request✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in logging uses a type in request.
- The types involved
http_nu.logging.RequestData→http_nu.request.Requesthttp_nu.logging.logging$module→http_nu.request.Request
- Direction
- logging uses request, so a change to request can break logging, while a change to logging can't break request.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: logging uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
9→10 store uses engine part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in store uses a type in engine.
- The types involved
http_nu.store.Store→http_nu.engine.Enginehttp_nu.store.store$module→http_nu.engine.Engine
- Direction
- store uses engine, so a change to engine can break store, while a change to store can't break engine.
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
10→1 engine uses bus✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in engine uses a type in bus.
- The types involved
http_nu.engine.Engine→http_nu.bus.Bus
- Direction
- engine uses bus, so a change to bus can break engine, while a change to engine can't break bus.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: engine uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
10→9 engine uses store✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in engine uses a type in store.
- The types involved
http_nu.engine.Engine→http_nu.store.Store
- Direction
- engine uses store, so a change to store can break engine, while a change to engine can't break store.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: engine uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
11→5 handler uses request✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in handler uses a type in request.
- The types involved
http_nu.handler.handler$module→http_nu.request.Request
- Direction
- handler uses request, so a change to request can break handler, while a change to handler can't break request.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: handler uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
11→8 handler uses logging✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in handler uses a type in logging.
- The types involved
http_nu.handler.handler$module→http_nu.logging.RequestGuard
- Direction
- handler uses logging, so a change to logging can break handler, while a change to handler can't break logging.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: handler uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
11→10 handler uses engine✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in handler uses a type in engine.
- The types involved
http_nu.handler.handler$module→http_nu.engine.Engine
- Direction
- handler uses engine, so a change to engine can break handler, while a change to handler can't break engine.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: handler uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
12→5 worker uses request✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in worker uses a type in request.
- The types involved
http_nu.worker.worker$module→http_nu.request.Request
- Direction
- worker uses request, so a change to request can break worker, while a change to worker can't break request.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: worker uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
12→10 worker uses engine✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in worker uses a type in engine.
- The types involved
http_nu.worker.worker$module→http_nu.engine.Engine
- Direction
- worker uses engine, so a change to engine can break worker, while a change to worker can't break engine.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: worker uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→8 main uses logging✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in main uses a type in logging.
- The types involved
http_nu.main.main$module→http_nu.logging.StartupOptions
- Direction
- main uses logging, so a change to logging can break main, while a change to main can't break logging.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: main uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→9 main uses store✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in main uses a type in store.
- The types involved
http_nu.main.main$module→http_nu.store.Store
- Direction
- main uses store, so a change to store can break main, while a change to main can't break store.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: main uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→10 main uses engine✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in main uses a type in engine.
- The types involved
http_nu.main.main$module→http_nu.engine.Enginehttp_nu.main.main$module→http_nu.engine.HttpNuOptions
- Direction
- main uses engine, so a change to engine can break main, while a change to main can't break engine.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: main uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→11 main uses handler✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in main uses a type in handler.
- The types involved
http_nu.main.main$module→http_nu.handler.AppConfig
- Direction
- main uses handler, so a change to handler can break main, while a change to main can't break handler.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: main uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
14→1 commands uses bus✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in commands uses a type in bus.
- The types involved
http_nu.commands.BusPubCommand→http_nu.bus.Bushttp_nu.commands.BusSubCommand→http_nu.bus.Bus
- Direction
- commands uses bus, so a change to bus can break commands, while a change to commands can't break bus.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: commands uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
14→9 commands uses store✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in commands uses a type in store.
- The types involved
http_nu.commands.MjCommand→http_nu.store.Storehttp_nu.commands.MjCompileCommand→http_nu.store.Storehttp_nu.commands.commands$module→http_nu.store.Store
- Direction
- commands uses store, so a change to store can break commands, while a change to commands can't break store.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: commands uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
14→13 commands uses main✕
- Connections
- 14 pairs of types, where a type in commands uses a type in main.
- The types involved
http_nu.commands.BusPubCommand→http_nu.main.Commandhttp_nu.commands.BusSubCommand→http_nu.main.Commandhttp_nu.commands.HighlightCommand→http_nu.main.Commandhttp_nu.commands.HighlightLangCommand→http_nu.main.Commandhttp_nu.commands.HighlightThemeCommand→http_nu.main.Commandhttp_nu.commands.MdCommand→http_nu.main.Commandhttp_nu.commands.MjCommand→http_nu.main.Commandhttp_nu.commands.MjCompileCommand→http_nu.main.Commandhttp_nu.commands.MjRenderCommand→http_nu.main.Commandhttp_nu.commands.PrintCommand→http_nu.main.Commandhttp_nu.commands.ReverseProxyCommand→http_nu.main.Commandhttp_nu.commands.RunNuCommand→http_nu.main.Commandhttp_nu.commands.StaticCommand→http_nu.main.Commandhttp_nu.commands.ToSse→http_nu.main.Command
- Direction
- commands uses main, so a change to main can break commands, while a change to commands can't break main.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: commands uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Event Sourcing
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 46 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 23 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do; Set security response headers on what the server sends — actix-web's `DefaultHeaders::new().add((header::X_CONTENT_TYPE_OPTIONS, "nosniff"))`, tower-http's `SetResponseHeaderLayer::overriding(…)` on an axum router, or keep Rocket's default `Shield` — with `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Content-Type-Options` and a frame policy on every response; Trigger your SAST workflow on pull requests — a scan that only runs on a cron reports history, it does not gate.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do. | +14.7 pts | Medium | Access Controls |
| Set security response headers on what the server sends — actix-web's `DefaultHeaders::new().add((header::X_CONTENT_TYPE_OPTIONS, "nosniff"))`, tower-http's `SetResponseHeaderLayer::overriding(…)` on an axum router, or keep Rocket's default `Shield` — with `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Content-Type-Options` and a frame policy on every response. | +4.4 pts | Medium | Web-Security Posture |
| Trigger your SAST workflow on pull requests — a scan that only runs on a cron reports history, it does not gate. | +3.1 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. | +1.5 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3). | +1.5 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
| Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. | +1.5 pts | Low | Dependency Vulnerabilities |
| Resolve the 3 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED. | +1.5 pts | Low | Dependency Vulnerabilities |
| Resolve the 14 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (11), REDACTED (3). | +2.7 pts | Medium | Dependency Vulnerabilities |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.2 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.6 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 3.0 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 4.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 6.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED |
| src/commands.rs | 7.0 | Near-clean | Cyclomatic Complexity: ReverseProxyCommand::run (cyclomatic 24) |
| src/logging.rs | 7.0 | Near-clean | Cyclomatic Complexity: http_nu::logging::run_human_handler (cyclomatic 34) |
| src/main.rs | 7.0 | Near-clean | Cyclomatic Complexity: http_nu::main (cyclomatic 25) |
| src/handler.rs | 7.1 | Near-clean | Cyclomatic Complexity: http_nu::handler::handle_inner (cyclomatic 34) |
| src/worker.rs | 7.4 | Near-clean | Cyclomatic Complexity: http_nu::worker::spawn_eval_thread::inner (cyclomatic 24) |
| src/compression.rs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: BrotliStream::poll_next (cognitive 24) |
| src/engine.rs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (28–30 lines × 2) |
| src/listener.rs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) |
| docs/adr/0002-html-escaping-strategy.md | 9.0 | Near-clean | Architectural Integrity: Classify ADR enforcement: HTML Escaping Strategy |
| docs/adr/0001-explicit-append-html-dsl.md | 9.5 | Near-clean | Architectural Integrity: Classify ADR enforcement: Explicit Append in HTML DSL |
| docs/adr/0003-html-dsl-design.md | 9.5 | Near-clean | Architectural Integrity: Classify ADR enforcement: HTML DSL Design |
| docs/adr/0004-custom-event-system.md | 9.5 | Near-clean | Architectural Integrity: Classify ADR enforcement: Custom Event System |
| docs/adr/0005-md-highlight-escaping.md | 9.5 | Near-clean | Architectural Integrity: Classify ADR enforcement: Markdown and Highlight Escaping |
| docs/issues/0000-flaky-parse-error-test.md | 9.5 | Near-clean | Architectural Integrity: Classify ADR enforcement: Flaky test_parse_error_ansi_formatting Test |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 52 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 52 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 122 of 160 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.rs) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo install cargo-llvm-cov`, then `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo install cargo-llvm-cov`, then `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.rs) and this repository declares a Cargo test suite (repository root, 11 test files), but it was not re-run: its build outgrew the 6 GB scratch ceiling (6.256 GB measured) and was stopped; its suite was not run. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (2 contributor(s) across 605 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 100% of the history; the other 1 hold 0% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's deterministic naming rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. Until then its declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether its names are consistent.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22's deterministic call-shape rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. This says nothing about whether that surface is consistent.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
- D27 Navigability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `src/stdlib/datastar/datastar-rocket@1.0.4.js` produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and no C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby or Scala was found, and this repository's Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and no C#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby or Scala was found, and this repository's Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
- X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala or PHP was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or PHP was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java, TypeScript/JavaScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin or PHP was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Scala, Ruby and Python source only, and no C# was loaded, and the 2 JavaScript/TypeScript file(s) found looked minified or bundled, which this check does not read, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Erlang, Python, Dart and Ruby source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Erlang, Python, Dart or Ruby was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X3 Exception handling — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and PHP, Java, Kotlin, Python, Ruby, Scala, Dart, Swift, Erlang, Go and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and no C# was loaded and no PHP, Java, Kotlin, Python, Ruby, Scala, Dart, Swift, Erlang, Go, JavaScript or TypeScript was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and MSBuild project configuration, TypeScript source and its tsconfig files, Java source and its package and module declarations, PHP source and its PHPStan and Psalm configuration, Dart source and its pubspec language version, Ruby source and its Sorbet and Steep configuration, Scala source and its build's explicit-nulls, WartRemover and Scalafix settings, and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded, no TypeScript was found, and this repository's Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (REDACTED, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
8 function(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was http_nu::handler::handle_inner at 34.
What to do
- Bring the 8 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with http_nu::handler::handle_inner (cyclomatic 34), http_nu::logging::run_human_handler (cyclomatic 34), http_nu::main (cyclomatic 25). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 8 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 8.1 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
- Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
14 function(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was http_nu::handler::handle_inner at 78.
What to do
- Bring the 14 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with http_nu::handler::handle_inner (cognitive 78), ReverseProxyCommand::run (cognitive 64), http_nu::logging::run_human_handler (cognitive 45). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 14 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 4.4 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D3 · God Classes
10 over-large unit(s) detected — types, modules or files that carry too much.
What to do
- Resolve the 6 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with handler.rs (2), logging.rs (2), main.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with commands.rs, logging.rs, main.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 MethodTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with commands.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D4 · Code Duplication
10 duplicated block group(s) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (28–30 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with engine.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with commands.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with commands.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 9 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D7 · Architectural Integrity
No mechanizable ADR was identified, so enforcement is not measured. Dependency cycles not checked (no project-reference graph; where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there).
What to do
- Resolve the 7 Classify ADR enforcement finding(s) in Architectural Integrity — start with 0001-explicit-append-html-dsl.md, 0002-html-escaping-strategy.md, 0003-html-dsl-design.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 recommendation-level).
- Enforce Architectural Integrity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D9 · Test Distribution
186 test methods: 95 unit, 91 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The Rust suite contributes 186 `#[test]` function(s) across 11 file(s) declaring at least one; its unit/integration split is Cargo's own — 2 of those file(s) are integration-test targets under a crate's tests/ directory, and the rest are #[test] functions compiled into the crate they test.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
27 outdated, 0 yanked direct Cargo dependencies. Only DIRECT edges are graded: a transitive crate cannot be moved past what its parent's requirement admits, so reporting one would be advice its owner cannot take. A newer release is reported only where this repository's OWN requirement already admits it, so the remedy is `cargo update` and never a manifest edit — which means a release outside the declared range is deliberately NOT charged, because a written-down constraint is a decision rather than a defect. Note that a bare requirement is a CARET, and for a 0.x crate its ceiling is the minor. Whether any crate is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — crates.io publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from REDACTED there.
What to do
- Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 893 shipped crate(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from crates.io over the crates a consumer compiles — this repository's REDACTED closed over its manifests' `[dependencies]` and `[build-dependencies]`. Crates it asks for ONLY under `[dev-dependencies]` are excluded: they are not compiled by anything that depends on this repository. This repository publishes itself under MIT, which is its own choice and is not judged here.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
Top hotspots: src/logging.rs (4×34=136); src/handler.rs (3×34=102); src/main.rs (4×25=100)
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with logging.rs, handler.rs, main.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted task-comment markers across 7359 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 6 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D20 · ADR Quality
1 of 7 evaluated ADRs have a defect readable from the log itself (a missing or empty section, no title, a single option, consequences with no cost, no status, a missing enforcement field, a status the log contradicts, a dangling link, an unlinked second decision on one question, a date that is no calendar day). How well each record argues its case is not measured.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 ADR has no Decision and Consequences section finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0002-html-escaping-strategy.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 1 build units (Cargo) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
23 finding(s): 0 critical, 15 high, 8 medium, 0 low. 11 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 2 file(s) — `src/main.rs` (line 578, line 580), `src/stdlib/datastar/datastar-rocket@1.0.4.js` (line 9) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 1 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 11 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
39 finding(s): 2 critical, 3 high, 33 medium, 1 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 14 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (11), REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 15 of the 17 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 2 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
AX2 · Stateful singletons
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX8 · Test isolation
AX9 · CQS / query purity
C2 · Access Controls
- This repository serves requests — a server (.serve_connection_with_upgrades) (src/main.rs:418) — and no route guard, auth-gate middleware, global guard or imperative check that refuses a caller (401/403, an Unauthorized/Forbidden error) was found: its endpoints may be unprotected. — src/main.rs:418
What to do
- Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do.
ES1 · Fold determinism
ES2 · Immutable events
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a README to the 1 of 1 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation
What to do
- Grow the ADR log (currently 7) — reach 8 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P10 · Library API & versioning
- 38/48 types (79%) declared in the published library are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — keep implementation types off the surface and expose only the intended API.
What to do
- Keep implementation types off the public surface (Rust: `pub(crate)`, or keep the module private) so internals can change without breaking consumers.
P2 · Observability
What to do
- Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (opentelemetry with tracing-opentelemetry) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- `REDACTED` run(s) a static-analysis scan, but no workflow that runs one is triggered by a pull request (or a merge queue, or an unfiltered push) — the scan fires on a schedule or a manual dispatch only. A vulnerable change therefore merges clean and is reported on the next scheduled run, by which time it is on the default branch and the only remedy is a follow-up fix. Add the pull-request trigger to the workflow that runs the scan so the finding arrives before the merge rather than after it.
- `examples/2048/test/package.json` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — examples/2048/test/package.json:6
What to do
- Trigger your SAST workflow on pull requests — a scan that only runs on a cron reports history, it does not gate.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is set on a response this repository's Rust server sends — defense in depth, even when a proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: `.serve_connection_with_upgrades(` (src/main.rs:418).
- No handler of this repository's Rust server answers 400, 413 or 422 (`StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST`, `HttpResponse::BadRequest()`, `Status::BadRequest`, tonic `Status::invalid_argument`), and nothing declares validation — no `validator`/`garde` derive, no body limit (`DefaultBodyLimit::max`, `RequestBodyLimitLayer`, `JsonConfig::default().limit(…)`, Rocket `Limits`) — nothing shows inbound requests being checked, and refused, before a handler acts on them. A check that answers its failure with 200 and an error body is not seen. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: `.serve_connection_with_upgrades(` (src/main.rs:418).
What to do
- Set security response headers on what the server sends — actix-web's `DefaultHeaders::new().add((header::X_CONTENT_TYPE_OPTIONS, "nosniff"))`, tower-http's `SetResponseHeaderLayer::overriding(…)` on an axum router, or keep Rocket's default `Shield` — with `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Content-Type-Options` and a frame policy on every response.
- Validate what the server reads from a request — path, query, headers, body size and shape — and answer what fails with 400 (413 for an oversized body) before a handler acts on it: derive `validator::Validate` (or `garde::Validate`) on the request types and reject with `StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST`, and cap bodies with `DefaultBodyLimit::max`/`RequestBodyLimitLayer` or actix's `JsonConfig::default().limit(…)`.
X1 · Async correctness
X14 · Bypassable address classification
X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard
X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element
X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 88% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 97% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 85% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Readiness | 61% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 33% | Weak — gated by D29, D36, C2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Event Sourcing | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Performance | 100% | Exemplary | Solid. |
Unscored — 3 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 65 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; Rust with no dependency-injection crate has no container to hand one lifetime's instance to another — every value is owned by the code that builds it, and the borrow checker rejects a longer-lived value keeping a borrow of a shorter-lived one.
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — This repository has nothing the runtime tiers could boot or serve — no markup, no UI framework or web-server dependency, no UI component source, no native UI project and no API definition — nothing here is a surface to boot — so runtime a11y/egress/header evidence has no subject here. Not applicable: this is neither a gap in the scan nor a finding about your code.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in a Diesel schema, a SeaORM entity, a Diesel or sqlx row struct, or a SQL CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store crate (sqlx, Diesel, SeaORM, rusqlite, tokio-postgres, MongoDB, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in a Diesel schema, a SeaORM entity, a Diesel or sqlx row struct, or a SQL CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store crate (sqlx, Diesel, SeaORM, rusqlite, tokio-postgres, MongoDB, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in a Diesel schema, a SeaORM entity, a Diesel or sqlx row struct, or a SQL CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store crate (sqlx, Diesel, SeaORM, rusqlite, tokio-postgres, MongoDB, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in a Diesel schema, a SeaORM entity, a Diesel or sqlx row struct, or a SQL CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store crate (sqlx, Diesel, SeaORM, rusqlite, tokio-postgres, MongoDB, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
- D10 Test Quality — ~3349 lines of test source are present (.rs) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .rs suite was found but not re-run
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency is measured on C# and TypeScript only; JavaScript, Python, Rust not measured.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — API consistency is measured on C# only; the exposed Rust surface was not measured.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .py, .rs source were not judged.
- D25 ADR Conformance — None of 0 binding record(s) states a rule in checkable form (a backticked element with a prohibition, or an `adr-rules` block), so conformance cannot be read from the code. Write the rule as an `adr-rules` block (`forbid:` a symbol, a package or a dependency) to make it checkable.
- D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.rs), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 1 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this Cargo build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 1 value object(s); 1 domain event(s); its domain events are published by services or handlers — no domain entity raises one
- ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and a call made through an inferred or generic receiver has no resolvable owner in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JavaScript/TypeScript, Rust source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo install cargo-llvm-cov`, then `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `#[bench]`, criterion's `bench_function`/`bench_with_input`, `#[divan::bench]` or `#[library_benchmark]` in any `.rs` file, or criterion, divan, iai or a `[[bench]]` target in a Cargo.toml, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X12 Unreachable branch — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X13 Undrained process stream — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Rust was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Rust request takes no token: a future is cancelled by dropping it, from outside the call (select!, a timeout, an aborted task), and reqwest, hyper and tonic take none
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Rust's compiler refuses the unsynchronised version: a collection shared between a callback's thread and the waiting body must be `Sync`, which a `Vec`, `VecDeque` or `HashMap` is only behind a `Mutex`/`RwLock`, so the race this check looks for cannot be written in safe Rust. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Rust was read, and it logs through none: the `log` crate's macros take one finished message (as log4net does in C#; its `kv` values are an opt-in its backends mostly drop), `println!`/`eprintln!` are not loggers, or it makes no log call outside its tests and examples at all. Calls through `tracing` (`tracing::info!`, or `info!` imported from it) would be judged.
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 20 finding(s)
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Serious — 91 finding(s)
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- http_nu::handler::handle_inner (cognitive 78) src/handler.rs:70
- http_nu::logging::run_human_handler (cognitive 45) src/logging.rs:545
- http_nu::handler::build_normal_response (cognitive 41) src/handler.rs:418
- http_nu::worker::spawn_eval_thread::inner (cognitive 40) src/worker.rs:73
- http_nu::file_source (cognitive 39) src/main.rs:186
- http_nu::serve (cognitive 37) src/main.rs:332
- http_nu::main (cognitive 31) src/main.rs:545
- http_nu::stdin_source (cognitive 28) src/main.rs:281
- http_nu::commands::event_to_string (cognitive 23) src/commands.rs:329
- http_nu::logging::run_jsonl_handler (cognitive 19) src/logging.rs:242
- http_nu::handler::handle_inner (cyclomatic 34) src/handler.rs:70
- http_nu::logging::run_human_handler (cyclomatic 34) src/logging.rs:545
- http_nu::main (cyclomatic 25) src/main.rs:545
- http_nu::worker::spawn_eval_thread::inner (cyclomatic 24) src/worker.rs:73
- http_nu::handler::build_normal_response (cyclomatic 20) src/handler.rs:418
- http_nu::logging::run_jsonl_handler (cyclomatic 20) src/logging.rs:242
- http_nu::serve (cyclomatic 17) src/main.rs:332
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- FunctionTooLong: http_nu::handler::handle_inner src/handler.rs:70
- FunctionTooLong: http_nu::main src/main.rs:545
- FunctionTooLong: http_nu::worker::spawn_eval_thread src/worker.rs:62
- FunctionTooLong: http_nu::logging::run_human_handler src/logging.rs:545
- FunctionTooLong: http_nu::logging::run_jsonl_handler src/logging.rs:242
- FunctionTooLong: http_nu::handler::build_normal_response src/handler.rs:418
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- Hotspot: src/logging.rs src/logging.rs:545
- Hotspot: src/handler.rs src/handler.rs:70
- Hotspot: src/main.rs src/main.rs:545
- FileTooLong: src/commands.rs src/commands.rs
- FileTooLong: src/logging.rs src/logging.rs
- FileTooLong: src/main.rs src/main.rs
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- No authorization src/main.rs:418
- ReverseProxyCommand::run (cyclomatic 24) src/commands.rs:464
- ReverseProxyCommand::run (cognitive 64) src/commands.rs:464
- BrotliStream::poll_next (cognitive 24) src/compression.rs:118
- MdCommand::run (cognitive 22) src/commands.rs:1371
- MjCompileCommand::run (cognitive 19) src/commands.rs:863
- MethodTooLong: MjCommand.run src/commands.rs:656
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- Duplicated block (28–30 lines × 2) src/engine.rs:169
- Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) src/commands.rs:185
- Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) src/commands.rs:721
- Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/main.rs:702
- Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/commands.rs:668
- Duplicated block (12–13 lines × 2) src/commands.rs:784
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/listener.rs:231
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/commands.rs:685
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/commands.rs:1665
- Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/logging.rs:507
- SAST runs, but gates no merge
- JavaScript dependencies are not locked examples/2048/test/package.json:6
Minor — 22 finding(s)
- Classify ADR enforcement: Explicit Append in HTML DSL docs/adr/0001-explicit-append-html-dsl.md
- Classify ADR enforcement: HTML Escaping Strategy docs/adr/0002-html-escaping-strategy.md
- Classify ADR enforcement: HTML DSL Design docs/adr/0003-html-dsl-design.md
- Classify ADR enforcement: Custom Event System docs/adr/0004-custom-event-system.md
- Classify ADR enforcement: Markdown and Highlight Escaping docs/adr/0005-md-highlight-escaping.md
- Classify ADR enforcement: Flaky test_parse_error_ansi_formatting Test docs/issues/0000-flaky-parse-error-test.md
- Classify ADR enforcement: Markdown javascript: URL Injection docs/issues/0001-markdown-javascript-urls.md
- Hand-rolled JSON/XML parsing via regex src/stdlib/datastar/datastar-rocket@1.0.4.js:9
- Hand-rolled JSON/XML parsing via regex src/stdlib/datastar/datastar@1.0.4.js:9
- ADR has no Decision and Consequences section docs/adr/0002-html-escaping-strategy.md:4
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- Large public API surface
- No dependency-update automation examples/2048/test/package.json:6
- No release approval gate
- No security response headers detected
- No inbound request validation detected
- Silent fallback default on Err src/response.rs:92
Minor — 27 finding(s)
- Outdated: arc-swap
- Outdated: clap
- Outdated: ctrlc
- Outdated: headers
- Outdated: http-body-util
- Outdated: hyper
- Outdated: hyper-util
- Outdated: nu-cli
- Outdated: nu-cmd-extra
- Outdated: nu-cmd-lang
- Outdated: nu-cmd-plugin
- Outdated: nu-command
- Outdated: nu-engine
- Outdated: nu-parser
- Outdated: nu-plugin
- Outdated: nu-plugin-engine
- Outdated: nu-protocol
- Outdated: nu-std
- Outdated: nu-utils
- Outdated: rustls
- Outdated: serde_json
- Outdated: tokio
- Outdated: tokio-rustls
- Outdated: tokio-stream
- Outdated: tokio-util
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-6fc664987fa34ec8a2eb63638b74ec80/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-6fc664987fa34ec8a2eb63638b74ec80/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 23 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 39 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 1 file(s) — `src/stdlib/datastar/datastar-rocket@1.0.4.js` — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |