Public report of blackcandy-org/blackcandy, published 14 November 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of
findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known
vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive reportMeasured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.11.4). Assert signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey →
Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 14 November 2026, 03:59 UTC · Survey ID cd_fd0306f2f4174b0b9e6a9647e8391076
blackcandy-org/blackcandy
Measured 14 November 2026, 03:57 UTC, at code version 2e4b98b
CAI scoreAt riskNo change since the last survey
The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.
A small codebase: 3,578 lines of product code in 2 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: under 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Production Readiness, 30
Findings by how serious they are
69 critical99 serious17 minor
8 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, we either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard we look for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.
This survey was produced by
Canine Code Analyzer
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Canine Code Analyzer engine 1.0.0
Measured
14 November 2026, 03:57 UTC
A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number
together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee
the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds the Canine Code Analyzer. It is open to any tool that
implements it, and today the Canine Code Analyzer is the only one that does.
A critical security finding is open, such as a library with a known critical vulnerability or a password or key found in the code. The score itself is unchanged, but its band shows At risk until the finding is fixed. See the Security and Compliance lens.
The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. We work it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸
66of 66 dimensions measured by tools.
158of 185 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 27 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
66dimensions across 8 lenses, read from 3,578 lines of product code in 2 projects.
blackcandy-org/blackcandy is rated At risk because critical security findings are open. It scores 37 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged. We judged it as a template or a sample, against a lower bar.
Production Readiness, at 30, is the weakest lens by a small margin, and the weakest lens counts most in the score. The best first steps are adding tests for the code no test reaches and adding a test runner and linting to the front end's build, each worth about 3 points.
Twenty pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Fifteen known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers, and fifteen weaknesses in the code could be used by an attacker. Pinning each tool to an exact version, updating the vulnerable packages and fixing the weaknesses the scanner points to would close these risks. Limiting each secret to its own step would fix the seven secrets exposed to more of the pipeline than needed, and the two passwords or keys in the code's history need replacing, with the old ones switched off. The two pages that don't say their language need their language set.
The product code is 3,578 lines, about €6,200 to rebuild.
A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.
How the score is built: what each lens counts forThe lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
We compare every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.
Fixed since the last survey: 5 findings
These 5 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 25 October 2026, and are gone from this one.
Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
A11y enforcement · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung
Rebuild cost: about €6,200 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild
€2,000 to €10,000, for 34 to 108 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem
Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor
×0.7 at a score of 37. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size
Small: 3,578 lines of product code
What it is not
Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one.
How the estimate is made: We price the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.
Top priorities
The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.
1
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Raises the score by about 3 points · Medium effort · Test Coverage
2
Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) and eslint and type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Raises the score by about 3 points · Medium effort · Tooling
3
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Raises the score by about 2 points · Medium effort · Text alternatives
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.
Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €6,200 to build again, under 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 30 (Weak). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 3 points for medium effort. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.
48 modules, with 14 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.
The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 8 more are left out to keep it readable.
Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
CurrentPlaylist.Songs uses (global), so a change to (global) can break CurrentPlaylist.Songs, while a change to CurrentPlaylist.Songs can't break (global).
Position
Below the diagonal: CurrentPlaylist.Songs uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2025 — Injection
51
High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures
34
High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration
4
High / Critical
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures
3
High / Critical
Roadmap
Top priorities: Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry); Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) and eslint and type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI; Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) and eslint and type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Set `open_timeout` and `read_timeout` explicitly on every client (Net::HTTP, Faraday `request: { timeout: }`, HTTParty `timeout:`), add Faraday's `:retry` middleware (faraday-retry) or `retriable`, and a breaker (`circuitbox`, `stoplight`) around dependencies that fail.
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
Code Duplication: Near-duplicate member pair (39 shared lines)
REDACTED
7.2
Near-clean
Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED
7.2
Near-clean
Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED
7.2
Near-clean
Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED
7.2
Near-clean
Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED
7.2
Near-clean
Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
How the grades work
Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this
survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.
Critical — 69
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a
missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here
tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 99
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades
the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to
carry for two years either.
Minor — 17
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions.
Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 8
Something this survey could not settle
from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no
positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves
nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean
result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither
rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each
one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 66 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
Every figure here is one of two kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10.
What we checked — 66 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 158 of 185 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT READ here — but this repository measures it: a coverage step in CI (`coverallsapp/github-action`) shows that coverage is collected and tracked in your own CI. The built-in collector has no runner for this ecosystem (.rb), so the analyzer could not read the number — a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not an unmeasured repo. Not scored.
D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.rb) and this repository declares a Ruby test suite (minitest: repository root, 68 test files), but it was not re-run: no test result was produced. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its gem dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (8 contributor(s) across 1056 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 98% of the history; the other 7 hold 0.3% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. PREREGISTRATION version 20's fallback (adjudication D21-sample3-v3): this rule kind was adjudicated below the 95 % precision gate, so its candidates are counted here and not published, and the score covers only the acronym-spelling and awaitable-suffix rules. The kind returns as rows only after it shows a measured precision; this says nothing about whether these names are consistent.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. This repository's source is written only in languages whose packages are published through a manifest, and no manifest in the tree makes a publication act: either there is no package manifest of any ecosystem (no package.json, pyproject.toml, setup.py, gemspec, Cargo.toml, pom.xml, build.gradle, composer.json, pubspec.yaml or mix.exs), or every one present declares in its package manager's own terms that it is not published (an npm package marked "private": true, a Cargo package with publish = false, a pubspec with publish_to: none, a Composer "project", a Poetry project with package-mode = false, or the "Private :: Do Not Upload" classifier). With no publication act there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
D26 Project Cohesion — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `(repository root)` (4804 LoC, 180 module-visible types across 29 directories) is over its size bounds, and whether one unit is a coherent whole or a grab-bag is read from its type references: the parts of it that reach the rest only through its shared core. Those are read over the C#/VB code model, which this unit's source did not supply. Its size alone is no verdict on its cohesion, so none is published.
C1 Data Protection — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
C2 Access Controls — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This check's reader does not cover every language in this repository. The score describes the part it read, which is most of the product; the rest is a gap in this analyzer's language reach.
M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with ClientDetection.need_transcode? (cognitive 16). — Refactoring it lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.9 to about 10.0/10.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: How much of the production code is copy-pasted: the share of production lines inside a reported copy (every copy of a duplicated block or of an edited member, each line once), 10 at none and 0 at a quarter of the lines.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), scored on the share of production lines inside a reported copy (each line once; 10 at none, 0 at a quarter). Deterministic.
5 duplicated block group(s) detected. 4.1 % of the production lines (146 of 3,578) are in a reported copy. A further 4 rows report members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it.
Near-duplicate member pair (39 shared lines)db/migrate/20241018134323_drop_solid_queue_tables.rb:3
Edited copy of a member (14 corresponding lines)db/migrate/20240115051640_migrate_images_from_albums.rb:3
Edited copy of a member (6 corresponding lines)REDACTED:46
Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines)REDACTED:28
+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with 20241018134323_drop_solid_queue_tables.rb (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Near-duplicate member pair (39 shared lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with 20241018134323_drop_solid_queue_tables.rb. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (14 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with 20240115051640_migrate_images_from_albums.rb. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
2 production modules (npm+RubyGems), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations, and main-sequence distance (abstractness) is not computed for these modules yet.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, not deprecated, and not bloated. Known vulnerabilities are D30's.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (capped-linear for deprecation, prerelease and outdated) per KLoC. Known-vulnerable packages are D30's and are not charged here (rubric-2026.11.2). Exhaustive.
3 outdated direct gem(s), 0 pinning defect(s). 39 declaration(s) graded against rubygems.org, 19 of them against a version resolved in a committed REDACTED. 19 declaration(s) carry a requirement that EXCLUDES the current release; that is a deliberate constraint (a supported-version ceiling or a held-back CI pin) and is counted, not charged. Whether any of these gems is DEPRECATED or YANKED is not graded — rubygems.org publishes no deprecation marker, and a yank removes a version rather than flagging it. Whether any is UNMAINTAINED is not graded either: no registry publishes a maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is a source question, not a registry one. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.
Outdated: puma · ×3
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
0 of 103 shipped gem(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from rubygems.org over the 103 gem(s) a consumer installs — this repository's runtime declarations closed transitively over its committed REDACTED. Development-group and `add_development_dependency` gems are excluded: they are not distributed with this repository. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's gem dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares package.json, and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
0 deducted task-comment markers across 3578 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Every README, docs/ document and root guide parsed by its markup and measured in Unicode letters. Published: a runnable or packaged .NET project whose README (or a document it links, or a root guide) shows no example, and a root README naming none of three or more projects. Overview, licence, boilerplate, wall-of-text, empty-section and XML-doc rows are measured and withheld (counted in gaps) after adjudication. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
Resolve the 2 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
51 finding(s): 0 critical, 42 high, 9 medium, 0 low. 20 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `config/database.yml` — so no absence of findings in them is evidence of anything, and nothing in them was analysed. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 1 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
+ 5 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 13 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 issue-level).
Resolve the 6 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 20 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.
Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no REDACTED is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): every row is a match against a vulnerability database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.
Resolve the 14 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (8), REDACTED (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level).
Resolve the 8 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (6), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Resolve the 1 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 13 of the 151 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.
Resolve the 2 Boundary-crossing change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, player_controller.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Change-coupling hub finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with development.rb. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Reported apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.
Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): the malicious-package feed is a database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.
What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.
Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 45 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
Coverage: Population: image/media elements — img, area, input[type=image], svg, video, object, embed, canvas — across the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and dynamic-attribute elements are skipped. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is NOT read by any producer, so it contributes no element to this population; where such a frontend is present the card discloses it as an analyzer gap rather than scoring around it.
An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. — app/views/shared/_player.html.erb:8
What to do
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels6.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. — app/views/shared/_player.html.erb:71
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×2) — app/views/layouts/base.html.erb:2, app/views/layouts/mailer.html.erb:2
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×2) — app/views/layouts/base.html.erb:2, app/views/layouts/mailer.html.erb:2
user-scalable=no/0 or a maximum-scale below 2 stops low-vision users zooming to 200%. Remove the zoom restriction from the viewport meta. — app/views/layouts/base.html.erb:5
A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. — app/views/layouts/mailer.html.erb:2
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no element the repo's own CSS styles `cursor: pointer` without giving it any of the three, no unfocusable element whose only binding is a mouse enter/leave pair or a double-click, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
Coverage: Population: elements that pose a keyboard-semantics question, in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) — a non-natively-interactive element carrying a click handler, a double-click or hover enter/leave binding, a pointer-only gesture on a tabindex="0" element, or `cursor: pointer` from the repo's own CSS; an href-less or placeholder-href (#, javascript:) anchor; and any element with a positive tabindex. Natively interactive elements used correctly (<button>, <a href>, form controls) are NOT in the population — there is nothing to judge — so a page of nothing but correct controls gives AC4 nothing to measure. Keyboard reachability is judged from the markup, never from a rendered page. ★ An interactive element declared in a tagged-template (html`…`) or hyperscript frontend is NOT in this population — no producer reads either — so an empty population is reported as an analyzer gap, never as "this repository has no interactive elements".
An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×2) — app/views/shared/_player.html.erb:15, app/views/shared/_player.html.erb:18
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Coverage: Population: elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) that carry a role or an aria-* attribute; roles and token values are checked against the ARIA enums exhaustively within that set. An expression-valued (dynamic) role or aria-* value is skipped rather than guessed, and markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
`.c-input-group input:focus` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — app/assets/stylesheets/components/input.css:24
`.c-player__volume` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — app/assets/stylesheets/components/player.css:94
`.o-animation-fadeInUp` moves (`animation-name: fadeInUp`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — app/assets/stylesheets/objects/animations.css:31
`.o-animation-fadeOutDown` moves (`animation-name: fadeOutDown`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — app/assets/stylesheets/objects/animations.css:36
`.o-animation-spin` moves (`animation: spin 0.9s linear infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — app/assets/stylesheets/objects/animations.css:41
`.o-marquee__content` moves (`animation: marquee-scroll 8s linear infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — app/assets/stylesheets/objects/marquee.css:10
`.c-card__image__actions` moves (`transition: opacity 0.15s ease, transform 0.15s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — app/assets/stylesheets/components/card.css:43
`.c-dialog` moves (`transition: opacity 0.2s ease, transform 0.2s ease, overlay 0.2s ease allow-discrete, display 0.2s ease allow-discrete`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — app/assets/stylesheets/components/dialog.css:13
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
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C1 · Data Protection4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
What to do
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (AWS KMS / Secrets Manager, GCP KMS / Secret Manager, HashiCorp Vault — kms_encrypted or vault-rails, not only the master key beside credentials.yml.enc) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (encrypts, lockbox) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
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C2 · Access Controls7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect.
What to do
Name the access rules — Pundit or Action Policy classes (a PostPolicy), a CanCanCan Ability, or rolify roles — and consult them where access is checked (authorize @record, load_and_authorize_resource, authorize!), so the rule set is reviewable and testable on its own.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (ActiveRecord/Sequel/ROM) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
`User` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository). — app/models/user.rb:3
What to do
Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + mapper; leave the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository).
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue in this repository's Ruby: methods whose whole body still raises NotImplementedError where nothing overrides them, or a "not implemented" error, and placeholder text (lorem ipsum, changeme/replace_me…) left in strings of non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords, in this repository's Ruby: methods that only raise NotImplementedError or a "not implemented" error where nothing overrides them, methods that take inputs and return a constant or do nothing, dead `if false` branches, and skeleton classes most of whose methods are holes.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository and its projects have a README, and whether it is substantive.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository is organised deliberately: production code and tests are set apart in a way its ecosystem or the repository itself declares.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the project's current-state documentation describes the code that exists.
Method: Every current-state document's checkable claims looked up in the tree (links, versions, and artefact counts an order of magnitude off), plus two README checks: an advertised infrastructure product with no footprint, and a module the CHANGELOG records as removed. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
`package.json` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — package.json:4
What to do
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.
What to do
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.
Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.
`HTTParty` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. — app/models/integrations/service.rb:6
What to do
Set `open_timeout` and `read_timeout` explicitly on every client (Net::HTTP, Faraday `request: { timeout: }`, HTTParty `timeout:`), add Faraday's `:retry` middleware (faraday-retry) or `retriable`, and a breaker (`circuitbox`, `stoplight`) around dependencies that fail.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether database schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than being auto-created from the model at startup.
Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage; off .NET, a file scan of dependency manifests, migration histories (Flyway, Liquibase, Alembic, Django, Rails, Prisma, TypeORM, Knex/Sequelize, golang-migrate, goose, Laravel, Doctrine, Diesel/sqlx) and schema auto-create in production source or config. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from each language's code model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
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R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
0 typed · 30 plain JS — the untyped files are app/javascript/application.js, app/javascript/controllers/application.js, app/javascript/controllers/bridge/account_controller.js, app/javascript/controllers/bridge/album_controller.js, app/javascript/controllers/bridge/flash_controller.js, app/javascript/controllers/bridge/playlist_controller.js (+24 more).
What to do
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
React / JS · Code Health — The share of the scored frontend lines inside a near-exact copy-pasted block of substantial extent (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386; each line once, 10 at none and 0 at a quarter of the lines, as D4): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.
Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Scored on the share of the scored frontend lines inside a reported copy, on the same curve as D4. Deterministic.
app/javascript/controllers/bridge/album_controller.js:5 · app/javascript/controllers/bridge/playlist_controller.js:5 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — app/javascript/controllers/bridge/album_controller.js:5
What to do
Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
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R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
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R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
0% of 29 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph — 'production' here is the RESIDUE: every source file left once tests, tooling, generated output, config, declarations and declaration-only modules, fixture corpora, type fixtures, behaviour-free data modules, re-export barrels, registration/constant data modules and service workers are set aside, so the percentage is taken over a smaller denominator than the workspace's file count
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30, which answers dependency vulnerabilities for every ecosystem). Deterministic.
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R6 · Tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
test ✗ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
What to do
Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) and eslint and type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
Unreachable from the 6 application, 1 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on `npm run build` — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make (×23) — app/javascript/controllers/player_controller.js, app/javascript/controllers/playlist_sortable_controller.js, app/javascript/controllers/media_session_controller.js, …
no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 13 in-repo import(s) from 13 other file(s) do name it (app/javascript/controllers/bridge/album_controller.js, app/javascript/controllers/bridge/playlist_controller.js, app/javascript/controllers/bridge/songs_controller.js and 10 more) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — app/javascript/controllers/mixins/event_handler.js
no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (app/javascript/controllers/current_playlist_songs_controller.js, app/javascript/controllers/songs_controller.js) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it — app/javascript/controllers/mixins/playing_song_indicator.js
What to do
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Other · Security — Read from this repository's Ruby source: cryptographic hygiene (weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source) and outbound TLS (certificate validation, protocol version) — facts about code that hold whether or not it serves anything itself. The server controls — HTTPS enforcement, HSTS, cookie flags, input validation — are NOT assessed for Ruby: this reading covers the code's own cryptography and the TLS connections it opens as a client, and a Rails, Rack or Sinatra application's transport, header and validation settings are not modelled. Their absence here is not a finding about this repository.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.
MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`Digest::SHA256` or `OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA256")`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call. (×2) — REDACTED:7, REDACTED:37
What to do
Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (xxhash, murmurhash) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key. This repository constructs a collision-broken hash (MD5/SHA1) at 2 sites, not one: `REDACTED:7` (Digest::MD5.hexdigest), `REDACTED:37` (Digest::MD5.base64digest). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether async functions that make a cancellable request accept or pass on an AbortSignal (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.
Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
`rescue` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter. (×3) — app/models/media.rb:62, REDACTED:75, REDACTED:44
An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. — app/javascript/controllers/media_session_controller.js:19
Other · Code Health — Whether Ruby's type checker checks nil and is not undermined by assertions — a file Sorbet reads at `# typed: true` or above, or a Steep target `check`s under its default or strict diagnostics, is one where a method call on a `T.nilable(String)` / `String?` is an error, and each `T.must`, `#: as !nil` or `# steep:ignore NoMethod` is the author telling the checker a value cannot be nil.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
This repository commits no Sorbet configuration (`sorbet/config`) and no `Steepfile`, so nothing type-checks its 150 Ruby product file(s): a nilable value reaches a method call silently and raises `NoMethodError: undefined method … for nil` the first time it is nil. A `# typed:` sigil does nothing without a `sorbet/config` beside the code; a Steep run configured only on a command line is not something this check can read.
What to do
Adopt a checker and raise it file by file: with Sorbet, `srb init` (or `bundle exec tapioca init`) commits `sorbet/config`, then move each file's sigil from `# typed: false` to `# typed: true` and on to `strict` as its methods get `sig`s — `spoom bump` does the moving; with Steep, write RBS signatures and `check` the product directories in the `Steepfile` under `D::Ruby.default` or `strict`, not `lenient`. Then pay down the assertions rather than adding to them: each `T.must` is a nil the checker could not rule out — narrow it (`return unless x`, `x&.`, `if (y = x)`), make the attribute non-nilable and set it in `initialize`, or change the method so the nil cannot arrive.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Unscored — 4 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.
AXH1 Runtime security headers — 7 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXI1 Runtime container hardening — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility (rendered) — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
P12 CI test-gate honesty — 1 observation(s) recorded · Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (an audit-log table or model, a change-history gem on the models — paper_trail's has_paper_trail, audited, Logidze's has_logidze, public_activity's tracked — or an ActiveRecord callback or Sequel hook that records each change) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 58 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's Ruby imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — no class or module declares an abstract method
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXA1 Runtime unauthenticated reachability — This run crawled public routes only — it had no logged-in session, so there is no authenticated surface to compare anonymous access against and nothing was measured. This is a statement about this run, not about your application: nothing here says access control is missing, and nothing here says it is present.
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXS1 Runtime exposed surface — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
D10 Test Quality — ~3647 lines of test source are present (.rb) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .rb suite was found but not re-run
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
D21 Naming Consistency — D21 withholds its case and prefix conventions rows: 1 candidate(s) found and not reported.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Aggregate roots were found in only one source directory (models), which is a layered codebase, not two contexts. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .rb source were not judged.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — D26 could not read how the parts of this repository's one build unit reference each other, so its cohesion was not measured. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `x.report(…)` entries in a `Benchmark.ips`/`bm`/`bmbm`/`benchmark`/`memory` block, `benchmark:` entries in a benchmark-driver YAML under a bench* directory, rspec-benchmark `perform_*` expectations where the gem is installed, or benchmark-ips, benchmark-memory, rspec-benchmark or benchmark-driver in a Gemfile or gemspec, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Ruby was read, and it logs through none: the standard library's Logger, which Rails.logger is, takes one finished message and no template arguments or fields (as log4net does in C#), so an interpolated message there loses nothing the API could have kept. The console gem (`Console.info`), SemanticLogger, Ougai and dry-logger would be judged.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
<html> without a lang app/views/layouts/base.html.erb:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang app/views/layouts/mailer.html.erb:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
Boundary-crossing change coupling: REDACTED ↔ artist.rb REDACTED:1— `REDACTED` (context controllers) and `app/models/artist.rb` (context models) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 64% of the time (7 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 7 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `2cae6836` Automatically fetch cover image from discogs in background job of med…; `512c5c79` Move Filterable concern and Sortable concern to Model; `a51a0e69` Consolidate Album and Artist image logic into concern — run `git show` on any of them.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: REDACTED ↔ album.rb REDACTED:1— `REDACTED` (context controllers) and `app/models/album.rb` (context models) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 50% of the time (7 of the 14 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 7 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `2cae6836` Automatically fetch cover image from discogs in background job of med…; `512c5c79` Move Filterable concern and Sortable concern to Model; `a51a0e69` Consolidate Album and Artist image logic into concern — run `git show` on any of them.
AC1 · Text alternatives· <img> without a text alternative · ×1
<img> without a text alternative app/views/shared/_player.html.erb:8— An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative.
AC2 · Forms & labels· <input> without a programmatic label · ×1
<input> without a programmatic label app/views/shared/_player.html.erb:71— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
Viewport restricts zoom app/views/layouts/base.html.erb:5— user-scalable=no/0 or a maximum-scale below 2 stops low-vision users zooming to 200%. Remove the zoom restriction from the viewport meta.
AC3 · Page structure· Document without a <title> · ×1
Document without a <title> app/views/layouts/mailer.html.erb:2— A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>.
Domain fused to persistence infrastructure: User app/models/user.rb:3— `User` is a domain concept fused to persistence ON ITS OWN DECLARATION (Rails ActiveRecord — `ApplicationRecord`) — the domain entity IS the ActiveRecord row (active-record), and it carries domain behaviour on the persistence type. A schema/persistence change ripples straight into the domain. Keep the ORM/table mapping on a boundary data-model + a mapper, and the domain entity framework-free (map row↔domain through a repository).
AXH1 · Runtime security headers· Runtime security header not set · ×7
Runtime security header not set: content-security-policy — The live app's responses did not include content-security-policy (restricts the sources a page may load — mitigates XSS/injection). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: cross-origin-embedder-policy — The live app's responses did not include cross-origin-embedder-policy (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: require-corp)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: cross-origin-opener-policy — The live app's responses did not include cross-origin-opener-policy (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: same-origin)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: cross-origin-resource-policy — The live app's responses did not include cross-origin-resource-policy (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: same-origin)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: permissions-policy — The live app's responses did not include permissions-policy (restricts powerful browser features (camera, geolocation, …)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: strict-transport-security — The live app's responses did not include strict-transport-security (forces HTTPS on subsequent requests — mitigates downgrade/MITM). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: x-dns-prefetch-control — The live app's responses did not include x-dns-prefetch-control (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: off)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety· Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard · ×6
Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard app/assets/stylesheets/objects/animations.css:31— `.o-animation-fadeInUp` moves (`animation-name: fadeInUp`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard app/assets/stylesheets/objects/animations.css:36— `.o-animation-fadeOutDown` moves (`animation-name: fadeOutDown`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard app/assets/stylesheets/objects/animations.css:41— `.o-animation-spin` moves (`animation: spin 0.9s linear infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard app/assets/stylesheets/objects/marquee.css:10— `.o-marquee__content` moves (`animation: marquee-scroll 8s linear infinite`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard app/assets/stylesheets/components/card.css:43— `.c-card__image__actions` moves (`transition: opacity 0.15s ease, transform 0.15s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard app/assets/stylesheets/components/dialog.css:13— `.c-dialog` moves (`transition: opacity 0.2s ease, transform 0.2s ease, overlay 0.2s ease allow-discrete, display 0.2s ease allow-discrete`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
Change coupling: REDACTED ↔ REDACTED REDACTED:1— `REDACTED` and `REDACTED` change together 80% of the time (20 of the 25 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 20 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `9b5013c7` adjust dialog implementation (#495); `2cae6836` Automatically fetch cover image from discogs in background job of med…; `42916934` Bring back Active Storage — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: REDACTED ↔ REDACTED app/controllers/settings_controller.rb:1— `app/controllers/settings_controller.rb` and `REDACTED` change together 64% of the time (7 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 7 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `1e693be3` feat: enhance API responses for playlists, songs, and users; `5efa5fb0` Add demo mode; `2efc6fb8` Add black candy config to set app config easily — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: player_controller.js ↔ player.js app/javascript/controllers/player_controller.js:1— `app/javascript/controllers/player_controller.js` and `app/javascript/player.js` change together 62% of the time (23 of the 37 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 23 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `bbde07ea` feat: add simple volume slider; `d01c3cb2` Handle playing ended; `42c0a165` Fix some strange issues in player — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: production.rb ↔ test.rb config/environments/production.rb:1— `config/environments/production.rb` and `config/environments/test.rb` change together 58% of the time (7 of the 12 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 7 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `fa8a4644` feat: upgrade Rails to 8.0; `b2cfa725` Replace litecache with solid_cache; `e604c8bf` Move image data to Active Storage — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: REDACTED ↔ REDACTED REDACTED:1— `REDACTED` and `REDACTED` change together 50% of the time (7 of the 14 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 7 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `9b5013c7` adjust dialog implementation (#495); `ef970eb9` Use value object to refactor sort option; `8e9d1465` Fix #279, unify all dialog views under dialog route path — run `git show` on any of them.
Dead file (~7 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/element_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~7 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/form_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~7 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/theme_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) app/models/media.rb:62— `rescue` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) REDACTED:75— `rescue` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) REDACTED:44— `rescue` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
AC3 · Page structure· Page without a main landmark · ×2
Page without a main landmark app/views/layouts/base.html.erb:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark app/views/layouts/mailer.html.erb:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics· Anchor without href · ×2
Anchor without href app/views/shared/_player.html.erb:15— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href app/views/shared/_player.html.erb:18— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety· Focus outline removed in CSS without a · ×2
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/components/input.css:24— `.c-input-group input:focus` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement app/assets/stylesheets/components/player.css:94— `.c-player__volume` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) db/migrate/20241018134323_drop_solid_queue_tables.rb:67— db/migrate/20241018134323_drop_solid_queue_tables.rb:67-73 | db/queue_schema.rb:69-75 — before extracting anything, compare `db/migrate/20241018134323_drop_solid_queue_tables.rb` and `db/queue_schema.rb` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 39 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) db/migrate/20241018134323_drop_solid_queue_tables.rb:77— db/migrate/20241018134323_drop_solid_queue_tables.rb:77-83 | db/queue_schema.rb:104-110 — before extracting anything, compare `db/migrate/20241018134323_drop_solid_queue_tables.rb` and `db/queue_schema.rb` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 39 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Dead file (~59 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/mini_player_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~59 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/songs_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~33 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/bridge/album_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~33 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/bridge/playlist_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~10 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/bridge/flash_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~10 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/bridge/theme_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Weak hash algorithm REDACTED:7— MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`Digest::SHA256` or `OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA256")`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call.
Weak hash algorithm REDACTED:37— MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`Digest::SHA256` or `OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA256")`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call.
AXI1 · Runtime container hardening· Container process runs as root · ×1
Container process runs as root: wd-runtime-app — 'wd-runtime-app' (wd-runtime-app:scan) runs as uid 0 — no user was specified, or one resolving to root was. Observed on the running container, which is the only place the answer is settled: an image's own USER, a base image's inherited one and a compose override are all invisible to a REDACTED reader. Advisory evidence for CRA Annex I (2)(b).
AXR1 · Runtime accessibility (rendered)· WCAG 1.4.4 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface · ×1
WCAG 1.4.4 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface — axe-core rule(s) meta-viewport failed on: meta[name="viewport"]. Runtime evidence (advisory — not scored); fix and re-scan to verify it clears.
AXR1 · Runtime accessibility (rendered)· WCAG 3.1.1 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface · ×1
WCAG 3.1.1 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface — axe-core rule(s) html-has-lang failed on: html. Runtime evidence (advisory — not scored); fix and re-scan to verify it clears.
ClientDetection.need_transcode? (cognitive 16) app/controllers/concerns/client_detection.rb:10— ClientDetection.need_transcode? has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (9 pts), boolean chains 6, ternaries 1 (nesting depth added 3). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Change-coupling hub: development.rb → application.rb, production.rb, test.rb config/environments/development.rb— `config/environments/development.rb` changes together with 3 other files — `config/application.rb`, `config/environments/production.rb`, `config/environments/test.rb` — none of which declares a dependency on it: one file is the hub of 3 separate couplings, not 3 unrelated pairs. Read the hub first: if the others each duplicate a part of what it does, the shared concern belongs in ONE unit and extracting it clears every edge at once; if the hub is a registry, dispatcher or barrel that must name each of them, the coupling is structural and the question is whether that list can be discovered instead of enumerated. Fixing the hub is one change; breaking the couplings one pair at a time is 3.
Near-duplicate member pair (39 shared lines) db/migrate/20241018134323_drop_solid_queue_tables.rb:3— db/migrate/20241018134323_drop_solid_queue_tables.rb:3-94 | db/queue_schema.rb:1-129 — These two members are variants of one another: 39 of their lines are already reported as duplicated blocks below, spread through both bodies rather than gathered into one. Read them as a single construct written twice. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared pipeline into one implementation the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (sync against async, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Extracting the individual blocks below is not the same fix: it leaves the two bodies in place and the next edit still has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (14 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (14 corresponding lines) db/migrate/20240115051640_migrate_images_from_albums.rb:3— db/migrate/20240115051640_migrate_images_from_albums.rb:3-16 | db/migrate/20240115122443_migrate_images_from_artists.rb:3-16 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 14 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (6 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (6 corresponding lines) REDACTED:46— REDACTED:46-51 | REDACTED:30-35 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 6 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) REDACTED:28— REDACTED:28-36 | REDACTED:24-32 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 9 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) db/migrate/20241018134323_drop_solid_queue_tables.rb:30— db/migrate/20241018134323_drop_solid_queue_tables.rb:30-45 | db/queue_schema.rb:30-45 — before extracting anything, compare `db/migrate/20241018134323_drop_solid_queue_tables.rb` and `db/queue_schema.rb` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 39 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) db/migrate/20241018134323_drop_solid_queue_tables.rb:86— db/migrate/20241018134323_drop_solid_queue_tables.rb:86-94 | db/queue_schema.rb:113-121 — before extracting anything, compare `db/migrate/20241018134323_drop_solid_queue_tables.rb` and `db/queue_schema.rb` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 39 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) REDACTED:9— REDACTED:9-19 | REDACTED:8-18 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
Low cohesion: SessionsController (LCOM4 4) REDACTED:3— SessionsController's methods fall into 4 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 4 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
P12 · CI test-gate honesty· Coverage collected but not gated · ×1
Coverage collected but not gated — CI collects a coverage report but no step enforces a minimum — coverage could halve and CI stays green. Add a step that fails the build when coverage drops below a floor (your coverage tool's minimum-threshold flag, or a coverage-gate action) so the number guards something. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: this repository's CI files AND its coverage configuration — the well-known coverage and test-runner config files, read at the repository root and inside workspace package directories two levels down, so a floor declared beside the tests rather than in the pipeline is credited — matched against the threshold settings this check knows by name. A floor set in your coverage service's web UI rather than in a committed file, or under a setting whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
Outbound HTTP without resilience app/models/integrations/service.rb:6— `HTTParty` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
Duplicated block (23 lines × 2 locations) app/javascript/controllers/bridge/album_controller.js:5— app/javascript/controllers/bridge/album_controller.js:5 · app/javascript/controllers/bridge/playlist_controller.js:5 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it.
Test Coverage — 0% of 29 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph — 'production' here is the RESIDUE: every source file left once tests, tooling, generated output, config, declarations and declaration-only modules, fixture corpora, type fixtures, behaviour-free data modules, re-export barrels, registration/constant data modules and service workers are set aside, so the percentage is taken over a smaller denominator than the workspace's file count
R6 · Tooling· No test, lint or typecheck script · ×1
No test, lint or typecheck script — test ✗ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
Dead file (~280 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/player_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~132 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/playlist_sortable_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~116 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/media_session_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~109 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/lyrics_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~71 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/current_playlist_songs_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~54 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/mixins/event_handler.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 13 in-repo import(s) from 13 other file(s) do name it (app/javascript/controllers/bridge/album_controller.js, app/javascript/controllers/bridge/playlist_controller.js, app/javascript/controllers/bridge/songs_controller.js and 10 more) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~48 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/mixins/playing_song_indicator.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), but 2 in-repo import(s) from 2 other file(s) do name it (app/javascript/controllers/current_playlist_songs_controller.js, app/javascript/controllers/songs_controller.js) — every one of those referrers is itself unreachable, so this file is dead only as a member of that cluster: if any referrer is in fact alive, this row falls with it
Dead file (~47 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/bridge/songs_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~41 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/dialog_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~29 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/search_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~25 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/cover_image_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~24 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/flash_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~21 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/dropdown_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~20 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/bridge/account_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~17 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/bridge/search_controller.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~9 LoC) app/javascript/controllers/application.js— no import path from any entry point (6 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Swallowed exception (empty catch) app/javascript/controllers/media_session_controller.js:19— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
C2 · Access Controls· No named authorization policies · ×1
No named authorization policies — Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
No dependency-update automation package.json:4— `package.json` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`.
No release approval gate — The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.
No changelog — No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
X5 · Nullable reference types· Ruby's type checker does not check nil everywhere · ×1
Ruby's type checker does not check nil everywhere — This repository commits no Sorbet configuration (`sorbet/config`) and no `Steepfile`, so nothing type-checks its 150 Ruby product file(s): a nilable value reaches a method call silently and raises `NoMethodError: undefined method … for nil` the first time it is nil. A `# typed:` sigil does nothing without a `sorbet/config` beside the code; a Steep run configured only on a command line is not something this check can read.
Outdated: puma — `puma` is resolved to 8.0.2 in the committed REDACTED but 8.0.3 is the current release on rubygems.org, and it already satisfies the `"~> 8.0.0"` requirement declared in Gemfile — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update puma` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: rails — `rails` is resolved to 8.1.3 in the committed REDACTED but 8.1.4.1 is the current release on rubygems.org, and it already satisfies the `"~> 8.1.0"` requirement declared in Gemfile — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update rails` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Outdated: thruster — `thruster` is resolved to 0.1.20 in the committed REDACTED but 0.1.27 is the current release on rubygems.org, and it already satisfies the `"~> 0.1.14"` requirement declared in Gemfile — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. This build is therefore missing every fix published since, including any security fix. Run `bundle update thruster` and commit the updated REDACTED.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
Run 01a1d834-4942-71b4-9d34-2fb31a0c6394 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 69 · Warnings: 99 · Recommendations: 14 · Info: 3 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by the Canine Code Analyzer: deterministic code-health analysis. 14-11-2026 @ 03:57 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.