Executive summary
auth0/node-jsonwebtoken falls short of our standard for production because two files are no longer known to anyone active in the project and we found no recorded design decisions and no architecture document or diagram. It scores 53 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, and its one critical finding is a security problem in the build pipeline.
Maturity, at 43, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first steps are having someone learn and document the two files no active contributor knows and recording design decisions, each worth about 9 points. Raising Maturity to 70 would lift the score to about 61.
One secret can leak from the build pipeline. Limiting the secret to its own step would close this risk.
The product code is 577 lines, too few for a meaningful rebuild estimate.
If Maturity rose from 43 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 53 to about 61.
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
At a glance β Code Health
At a glance β Architecture
At a glance β Maturity
At a glance β Readiness
At a glance β Security
Security & Compliance β OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 β Software Supply Chain Failures | 4 | Medium |
| A05:2025 β Injection | 1 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Resolve the 2 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness β start with sign.js, verify.js; Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them; Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 2 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness β start with sign.js, verify.js. | +9.1 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +6.7 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +8.8 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first β no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up. | +3.8 pts | Medium | Type Safety |
| Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite. | +3.2 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Bring the 4 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity β start with verify.default (cyclomatic 78), exports (cyclomatic 78), sign.default (cyclomatic 55). | +4.0 pts | High | Cyclomatic Complexity |
| Bring the 4 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cognitive Complexity β start with exports (cognitive 104), verify.default (cognitive 99), exports (cognitive 71). | +3.5 pts | High | Cognitive Complexity |
| Swallowed exception (empty catch) | +1.7 pts | Medium | Exception handling |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| verify.js | 7.1 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: verify.default (cyclomatic 78) |
| sign.js | 7.2 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: sign.default (cyclomatic 55) |
| lib/validateAsymmetricKey.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cognitive Complexity: validateAsymmetricKey.default (cognitive 24) |
| test/async_sign.tests.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Test Quality: Skipped test: should work with none algorithm where secret is falsy |
| test/validateAsymmetricKey.tests.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions: should pass the validation if no key has been provided |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Mixed | Supply-chain Provenance & Signing: REDACTED |
| test/rsa-public-key.tests.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Test Quality: No assertions: should work for RS algorithms when modulus length is less than 2048 when allowInsecureKeySizes is true |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere β not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository β a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores β or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment β run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 45 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked β 45 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line β never an absolute scratch path. Here, 30 of 42 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals β a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score β and this report, byte for byte β is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | β deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | β deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | β deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | β deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | β deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 Β· 0.31.0 | β deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 Β· 0.69.3 | β deterministic |
Run transparency β what happened this run
- D12 Dependency Hygiene β not measured this run β This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. This repository's 1 package.json manifest(s) WERE read and their pinning discipline assessed; what went unanswered is the currency half, because answering it needs a lockfile resolved to CONCRETE versions and this repository commits none β a package.json states version RANGES, and a range names no particular release to be behind. So registry.npmjs.org was never asked, and there was nothing here for it to grade. This is a true statement about the repository and NOT a gap on our side: no lockfile reader we could write would find anything here to read, so there is no capability behind this row to build.
- D14 License Compliance β not measured this run β We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side β a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored β this repository declares package.json manifests but commits no lockfile this pass can resolve (npm, pnpm, yarn and bun each write a different one, and `bun.lockb` is a binary format with no published shape), so the set of packages it actually ships is not resolvable from the checkout: its declarations carry version RANGES, and grading whichever release happens to be newest today would be a verdict about a dependency graph this repository has not pinned. Commit the lock and this dimension grades its production dependencies against registry.npmjs.org. NOT a finding that this repository's licences are compliant: this dimension asserts nothing about its licensing in either direction.
- D16 Bus Factor β not measured this run β This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. All 2 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains β nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness). Counted over 2 of the 12 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
- D22 Internal API Consistency β not measured this run β We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side β a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (package.json), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises β so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker β not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict. For npm the surface is what a published package.json's entry points (exports, main, module, types) export, followed through the source; an entry that names build output the tree does not commit (dist/, build/) is not followed back to source, because only a tsconfig outDir/rootDir pair states that mapping and a bundler's input lives in executable configuration this engine does not evaluate.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities β measured, with a gap in what it reached β This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) (npm) WERE scanned and every vulnerability they reported is included in this result; osv was not, so this dimension's score covers less than the dependency surface this repository declares, and nothing here is evidence that osv is free of known-vulnerable dependencies. osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. This is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass. osv-scanner documents exit 128 as "no package sources found" β but this scan only invoked it because the tree declares a source it supports (`pom.xml` and the resolved lockfiles among them), so the tool's report and this repository disagree. Check that those sources are reachable from the directory the scan ran in before concluding anything is missing. If this tree really does commit only range-pinned manifests, commit the lockfile your package manager produces β but only where your ecosystem HAS one and commits it: Maven has none at all (osv-scanner reads `pom.xml` directly) and Gradle writes one only under opt-in dependency locking, while a published Composer package and a published Dart library both deliberately exclude theirs. In those three, generate one in CI before the scan instead β a resolved dependency list or an SBOM fed to the scanner.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies β measured, with a gap in what it reached β This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) (npm) WERE scanned and every vulnerability they reported is included in this result; osv was not, so this dimension's score covers less than the dependency surface this repository declares, and nothing here is evidence that osv is free of known-vulnerable dependencies. osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. This is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass. osv-scanner documents exit 128 as "no package sources found" β but this scan only invoked it because the tree declares a source it supports (`pom.xml` and the resolved lockfiles among them), so the tool's report and this repository disagree. Check that those sources are reachable from the directory the scan ran in before concluding anything is missing. If this tree really does commit only range-pinned manifests, commit the lockfile your package manager produces β but only where your ecosystem HAS one and commits it: Maven has none at all (osv-scanner reads `pom.xml` directly) and Gradle writes one only under opt-in dependency locking, while a published Composer package and a published Dart library both deliberately exclude theirs. In those three, generate one in CI before the scan instead β a resolved dependency list or an SBOM fed to the scanner.
- P5 DR & Backup β not measured this run β This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found β and none applies: this repository publishes a library and deploys nothing (no container, IaC or deployment manifest), so it holds no runtime state of its own. Any data-access dependency it declares is the store it is a CLIENT for, not one it operates. The DR control belongs to whoever runs that data.
- S1 Web-Security Posture β not measured this run β We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side β a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. 12 JavaScript/TypeScript file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source, disabled certificate validation, obsolete TLS versions, plaintext password storage and session cookies set without HttpOnly, Secure or SameSite, and none was found. The server controls this dimension also scores were not assessed, so no score is given.
- X2 Cancellation propagation β not measured this run β We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side β a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, PHP, Dart, Kotlin, Ruby, Scala, Java, Python and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and no named async function in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, nor any Go, PHP or Dart function or Kotlin suspend function, makes a request that can be cancelled (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http; net/http, net.Dial; amphp; Dio; Ktor, OkHttp), so there is nothing to judge, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach β not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X4 Structured logging β not measured this run β We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side β a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach β not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap β a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically β it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type β a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module β one class/IIFE β earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity β an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization β so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED β its repetition is the tool's, not the team's β so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside our isolated image β the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural β it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers β we run the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree β a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history β a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value is measured as redundancy only: a comment that repeats its code's words is found, but a paraphrase in other words, a vague comment, or one the code contradicts is not, and whether a comment is valuable is not claimed. Comments in other scripts or languages, and outside C#, are not judged.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural β it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns β a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) β it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases β a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension β code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS β files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen β a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen β a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics β a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see β only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) β controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 Β· Cyclomatic Complexity
4 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was verify.default at 78.
What to do
- Bring the 4 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity β start with verify.default (cyclomatic 78), exports (cyclomatic 78), sign.default (cyclomatic 55). β This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing β the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 0.0 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
D2 Β· Cognitive Complexity
6 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was exports at 104.
What to do
- Bring the 4 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cognitive Complexity β start with exports (cognitive 104), verify.default (cognitive 99), exports (cognitive 71). β This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing β the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 0.0 to about 7.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 30; a cleaner split scores higher.
D3 Β· God Classes
1 over-large unit(s) detected β types, modules or files that carry too much.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes β start with verify.js. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D4 Β· Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected. 0.0 % of the production lines (0 of 577) are in a reported copy.
D8 Β· Code Coverage
Line coverage 96.9%. Measured from the JavaScript/TypeScript suite (mocha + nyc via `npm install --ignore-scripts` (no lockfile) in the repository root).
D10 Β· Test Quality
1 skipped, 4 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 253 tests.
What to do
- Resolve the 4 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality β start with validateAsymmetricKey.tests.js (2), async_sign.tests.js, rsa-public-key.tests.js. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Skipped test finding(s) in Test Quality β start with async_sign.tests.js. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D11 Β· Test Reliability
0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). JavaScript/TypeScript (mocha via `npm install --ignore-scripts` (no lockfile) in the repository root (511 tests)): measured (0 flaky).
D13 Β· Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D15 Β· Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D19 Β· Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 1 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D24 Β· Comment Value
0 of 30 judged comments only repeat the code they sit on (0.0 %). 5 comment(s) in another language or script were not judged.
D27 Β· Navigability
11 % of calls cross a namespace and 0 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located β so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small β navigation cost is tolerated.
D28 Β· Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 Β· Static Analysis (SAST)
1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 2 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) β start with REDACTED. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D30 Β· Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable dependencies in the 1 ecosystem(s) that were scanned (npm). Partial dependency scan: 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) were scanned (npm), and the findings above are real and complete for them. osv was not scanned (osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned), so this is not the whole dependency surface and the result is reported at reduced confidence.
D34 Β· Knowledge Freshness
2 of 2 significant source file(s) are orphaned β their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is sign.js. Counted over 2 of the 12 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness β start with sign.js, verify.js. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 Β· Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 Β· Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
3/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing β start with REDACTED. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing β start with REDACTED. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. β One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D43 Β· Malicious Dependencies
No known-vulnerable dependencies in the 1 ecosystem(s) that were scanned (npm). Partial dependency scan: 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) were scanned (npm), and the findings above are real and complete for them. osv was not scanned (osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned), so this is not the whole dependency surface and the result is reported at reduced confidence.
D44 Β· Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 0 platform declaration(s) and 10 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF β a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 Β· Code composition
AX3 Β· Project dependency cycles
AX4 Β· Dependency direction
GD1 Β· Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 Β· Incompleteness & stubs
- A test is skipped/ignored β coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something. β test/async_sign.tests.js:47
What to do
- Clear the softer debt: re-enable or delete skipped tests, decide whether each empty function is a deliberate no-op (and say so in a comment), and replace blanket `eslint-disable` / `@ts-nocheck` with targeted, justified suppressions.
M1 Β· Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 Β· Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found β no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape β no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is β¦" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document β not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 Β· Folder & project structure
P1 Β· CI/CD gates
- A CI pipeline exists but no build step was matched β changes may merge without the build ever running. A build step may be invoked directly as a command, or declared as a task that a runner named in the pipeline resolves.
What to do
- Add an explicit build step to your CI pipeline β your stack's own build command, or, if the pipeline delegates to a task runner, a build task that runner executes in CI β so every change is built before merge.
P10 Β· Library API & versioning
P3 Β· Security & performance tooling
- `REDACTED` run(s) a static-analysis scan, but no workflow that runs one is triggered by a pull request (or a merge queue, or an unfiltered push) β the scan fires on a schedule or a manual dispatch only. A vulnerable change therefore merges clean and is reported on the next scheduled run, by which time it is on the default branch and the only remedy is a follow-up fix. Add the pull-request trigger to the workflow that runs the scan so the finding arrives before the merge rather than after it.
- `package.json` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices β including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. β package.json:40
What to do
- Trigger your SAST workflow on pull requests β a scan that only runs on a cron reports history, it does not gate.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 Β· Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 Β· Release Hygiene
R1 Β· Type Safety
- 0 typed · 46 plain JS β the untyped files are decode.js, index.js, lib/JsonWebTokenError.js, lib/NotBeforeError.js, lib/TokenExpiredError.js, lib/asymmetricKeyDetailsSupported.js (+40 more).
What to do
- Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first β no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
R10 Β· Code Duplication
R2 Β· Cyclomatic Complexity
- (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 57 and cognitive complexity 78; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side β extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. β verify.js:101
- exports has cyclomatic complexity 49 and cognitive complexity 64; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side β extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. β sign.js:86
- exports has cyclomatic complexity 20 and cognitive complexity 22; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side β extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. β verify.js:21
- exports has cyclomatic complexity 15 and cognitive complexity 24; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side β extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. β lib/validateAsymmetricKey.js:16
R3 Β· Large Files
R4 Β· Test Coverage
R6 Β· Tooling
- test β · lint β · typecheck β β read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. β therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline β a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A β means the wiring is DECLARED β a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
What to do
- Add type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 Β· Dead Code
R8 Β· Dependency Hygiene
- Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members β no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it. (×2)
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 Β· Circular Imports
X12 Β· Unreachable branch
X21 Β· Side-effecting pattern guard
X3 Β· Exception handling
- An empty catch block silently discards the error β failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. β decode.js:16
What to do
- Swallowed exception (empty catch)
Reference β by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 54% | Adequate β gated by D1, D2, R1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 69% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Maturity | 43% | Weak β gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 63% | Adequate β gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 90% | Strong | Strongest area. |
Unscored β 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene β 1 observation(s) recorded Β· Advisory β this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced β 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P5 DR & Backup β not evidenced β repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included β 81 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives β No web markup found β accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels β No web markup found β accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure β No web markup found β accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics β No web markup found β accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness β No web markup found β accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety β No web markup found β accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies β Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own β nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes β so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons β Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure β not assessed β architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation β not applicable β JavaScript has no interface declaration, so there is no declared member list whose width this check could measure
- AX7 Slice cohesion β not applicable β not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation β no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity β no CQRS query handlers detected β query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked β no reproducible boot β This repository has nothing the runtime tiers could boot or serve β no markup, no UI framework or web-server dependency, no UI component source, no native UI project and no API definition β nothing here is a surface to boot β so runtime a11y/egress/header evidence has no subject here. Not applicable: this is neither a gap in the scan nor a finding about your code.
- C1 Data Protection β No personal data detected in a persisted data model β no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, β¦) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model β and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect. If it does persist personal data (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the controls belong to wherever that data is stored.
- C2 Access Controls β No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source β this repository stands up no server (no Express, Fastify, Koa, Hono, NestJS or similar app, no Next.js/SvelteKit/Nuxt server route, no edge function), creates no Supabase tables and talks to no hosted backend. Access control is therefore N/A here β a browser application or library is authorized by the server it calls, not by itself; a client-side route guard hides a page and authorizes nothing. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail β No personal data detected in a persisted data model β no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, β¦) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model β and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention β No personal data detected in a persisted data model β no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, β¦) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model β and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the limit belongs wherever that data is stored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights β No personal data detected in a persisted data model β no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, β¦) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model β and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the rights are served wherever that data is stored.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene β Dependency currency not established β this repository commits no lockfile to resolve
- D14 License Compliance β npm licences not graded β this npm repository commits no lockfile this pass can resolve
- D16 Bus Factor β dormant codebase β no living knowledge left to concentrate
- D17 Explicit Debt β explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language β this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored β this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape β D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality β N/A β ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D21 Naming Consistency β N/A β too few peers to establish a naming convention (55 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
- D22 Internal API Consistency β The exposed public-API surface could not be collected β no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling β No bounded-context organisation was detected either β neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (β₯2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it β e.g. `architecture:` β `contexts:` β `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D25 ADR Conformance β no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion β This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (577 LoC, 8 module-visible types across 2 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
- D31 IaC & Container Security β No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) β No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks β nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy β No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement β No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement β No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement β No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling β Not applicable β this npm build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) β No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D7 Architectural Integrity β no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read β so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- DM1 Domain Modelling β not scored β this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven β not scored β this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency β no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected β idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing β not scored β this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- M4 Documentation accuracy β Not applicable: the 1 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks. 1 claim(s) of kinds M4 does not check were not checked (install 1); M4 checks only links and versions and artefact counts.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty β Reported, not scored β and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P2 Observability β This repository's JavaScript/TypeScript source (1 module(s), 12 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service β it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience β not applicable β no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JavaScript/TypeScript source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations β no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage β coverage data present for 12 file(s), but no domain-layer files were identified: no covered file's path contains any of the markers this check keys on (/domain/, /aggregates/, /valueobjects/, /domainmodel/, .domain/, /entities/), which are matched case-insensitively anywhere in the path. With no domain partition there is nothing to compare the web/controller layer against β if this repository keeps its business rules under a folder named none of those, that naming is what the check cannot see, not the domain logic.
- PF1 Benchmark discipline β Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene β Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene β Not applicable: this repository declares no async functions, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
- R11 Import Boundaries β No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout β boundary rules not applicable.
- R5 Dependency Freshness β no package-lock.json β dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D30 (Dependency Vulnerabilities), which answers every ecosystem
- S1 Web-Security Posture β Not assessed: 12 JavaScript/TypeScript file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source, disabled TLS certificate validation, obsolete TLS versions, passwords stored or checked as plaintext and session cookies set without HttpOnly, Secure or SameSite, and none was found. That half of the dimension is clean, but it is not scored on its own: a C# repository with the same clean reading is scored on its server controls as well, or is N/A for having no web surface, and neither can be decided here. Of the server controls, two are read where the source shows them: every session or sign-in cookie the code sets is read for HttpOnly, Secure and SameSite at the line that sets it (a raw `Set-Cookie` header, Express, Fastify, Hono, Koa, Next.js, `cookie.serialize`, express-session and cookie-session), and every Node listener for HTTPS enforcement. HSTS, security response headers and input validation are NOT assessed for JavaScript/TypeScript: each is scored as an absence, an absence is only reportable over the production HTTP server, and in this ecosystem the file that opens the port is build output or a framework launcher rather than a file in the source tree. Their absence here is not a finding about this repository.
- X1 Async correctness β not applicable β the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X10 Duplicated predicate β Advisory β this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X13 Undrained process stream β not applicable β the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification β not applicable β the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader β not applicable β the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop β not applicable β the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document β not applicable β the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness β not applicable β the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state β not applicable β the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation β not analysed β these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard β This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception β .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X22 Contradicted release guard β not applicable β the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation β not applicable β the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped β not applicable β the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X25 Inert configuration knob β not applicable β the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff β Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated β Not applicable: this check looks for a loop whose body adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is walking, invalidating the enumerator it holds, and in this repository's languages that cannot happen. JavaScript and TypeScript have no iterator that a change can invalidate: an `Array` is walked by index against its live length, and a `Map` or `Set` by the ECMAScript specification's live entry list, so a body that adds to, removes from or empties what it walks raises nothing β every loop form (`forβ¦of`, `forβ¦in`, `forEach`, `map`, `filter`, `reduce`, `entries()`) on every built-in collection (`Array`, `Map`, `Set`, plain objects, `URLSearchParams`, `Headers`, `FormData`) runs to completion. Such a loop can still skip an element or never end, which is a different defect and not the one this check asks about. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard β not applicable β the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element β not applicable β the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects β not applicable β the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly β This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging β not analysed β these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types β Not applicable: this check asks whether the null-typed discipline a language offers is switched on, and how much of that the assertion operator takes back, and in this repository's languages there is no such switch and no such operator. Plain JavaScript carries no type annotations and commits no tsconfig, so it states no null-typed discipline for this check to grade: there is nothing here that switches null checking on or off, and TypeScript (or `// @ts-check`) is how a repository acquires one β advice, not a defect this card measures. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing β Advisory β this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults β Advisory β this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand β Advisory β this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A β Findings (grouped)
Critical β 1 finding(s)
- REDACTED
Serious β 29 finding(s)
- No assertions: should work for RS algorithms when modulus length is less than 2048 when allowInsecureKeySizes is true test/async_sign.tests.js:72
- No assertions: should work for RS algorithms when modulus length is less than 2048 when allowInsecureKeySizes is true test/rsa-public-key.tests.js:28
- No assertions: should pass the validation if no key has been provided test/validateAsymmetricKey.tests.js:49
- No assertions: should pass the validation if no algorithm has been provided test/validateAsymmetricKey.tests.js:54
- verify.default (cyclomatic 78) verify.js:21
- exports (cyclomatic 78) verify.js:21
- sign.default (cyclomatic 55) sign.js:86
- exports (cyclomatic 55) sign.js:86
- Skipped test: should work with none algorithm where secret is falsy test/async_sign.tests.js:47
- exports (cognitive 104) verify.js:21
- verify.default (cognitive 99) verify.js:21
- exports (cognitive 71) sign.js:86
- sign.default (cognitive 68) sign.js:86
- validateAsymmetricKey.default (cognitive 24) lib/validateAsymmetricKey.js:16
- exports (cognitive 24) lib/validateAsymmetricKey.js:16
- FunctionTooLong: verify.default verify.js:21
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- SAST runs, but gates no merge
- Type Safety
- Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 57, cognitive 78) verify.js:101
- Complex function exports (cyclomatic 49, cognitive 64) sign.js:86
- Complex function exports (cyclomatic 20, cognitive 22) verify.js:21
- Complex function exports (cyclomatic 15, cognitive 24) lib/validateAsymmetricKey.js:16
- No typecheck script
- Unused dependency 'conventional-changelog-conventionalcommits'
- Unused dependency 'nsp'
- JavaScript dependencies are not locked package.json:40
- Swallowed exception (empty catch) decode.js:16
Minor β 10 finding(s)
- Orphaned file sign.js:1
- Orphaned file verify.js:1
- Orphaned files with no living knowledge
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Disabled test test/async_sign.tests.js:47
- No ADRs
- No architecture diagram/doc
- CI build step not evidenced
- No dependency-update automation package.json:40
Minor β 2 finding(s)
- Dependency hygiene PARTLY measured β npm pinning read, dependency currency not (no committed lockfile, so no resolved version to grade)
- doc comments repeat the names test/test-utils.js:54
Appendix B β Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 Β· Secrets (history) | gitleaks | β | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-a2ece0b2a8a54a79b2ff7f15087651f7/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 Β· Secrets (history) | gitleaks | β | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-a2ece0b2a8a54a79b2ff7f15087651f7/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 Β· Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | β | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 1 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 Β· Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | β | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 0 | β |
| D30 Β· Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | β | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 Β· IaC & Container Security | trivy | β | trivy: not applicable β No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | β |
| D32 Β· Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | β | semgrep: not applicable β No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks β nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | β |
| D37 Β· Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | β | disclosure: not applicable β No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | β |
| D40 Β· Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | β | runtime-hardening: not applicable β No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | β |
| D41 Β· Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | β | runtime-hardening: not applicable β No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | β |
| D42 Β· Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | β | runtime-hardening: not applicable β No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | β |
| D43 Β· Malicious Dependencies | osv-scanner | β | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 0 | β |
| D43 Β· Malicious Dependencies | trivy | β | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |