Public report of astral-sh/ty, published 17 November 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.11.4). Assert signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey β†’ Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 17 November 2026, 01:31 UTC Β· Survey ID cd_3307ef8693664324ac9cffa343805cb8

astral-sh/ty

Measured 17 November 2026, 01:31 UTC, at code version 6d46032

CAI score 56.9out of 100 Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
Up 4.0 since the last survey

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

A very small codebase: 1,398 lines of product code in 3 projects, tests not counted Β· Estimated rebuild effort: under 0.1 person-years Β· Weakest lens: Production Readiness, 43.2

Findings by how serious they are

13 critical 5 serious 4 minor

13 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, we either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard we look for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Assert small markCanine Code Analyzer
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Canine Code Analyzer engine 1.0.0
Measured
17 November 2026, 01:31 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds the Canine Code Analyzer. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today the Canine Code Analyzer is the only one that does.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. We work it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology β–Έ

37of 37 dimensions measured by tools.
16of 22 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 6 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
37dimensions across 5 lenses, read from 1,398 lines of product code in 3 projects.
Chapters

Executive summary

astral-sh/ty falls short of our standard for a preview release because its Testing dimensions are rated Critical, and the project has no automated tests. It scores 56.9 out of 100, which alone would earn Adequate, but it is rated Weak: a rating can't sit more than one step above its weakest group.

Production Readiness, at 43.2, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step for the work it takes is adding a diagnostic log, worth about 8.5 points. Adding automated tests comes next, worth about 13.7 points. Raising Production Readiness to 62 would lift the score to about 65.5.

Eight secrets can leak from the build pipeline. Two settings leave the servers or containers unsafe, and one pipeline tool is referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Limiting each secret to its own step, correcting the unsafe settings and pinning the tool to an exact version would close these risks. Correcting the flagged pipeline settings would fix the weakness in the build pipeline's configuration.

The product code is 1,398 lines, about €1,400 to rebuild.

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Production Readiness 43.2 Β· counts for 47%Maturity 60.7 Β· counts for 26%Architecture 69.0 Β· counts for 14%Security and Compliance 80.7 Β· counts for 8%Code Health 100.0 Β· counts for 4%

If Production Readiness rose from 43.2 to 62, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 56.9 to about 65.5.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Product code 100%
Fixed since the last survey: 4 findings

These 4 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 5 November 2026, and are gone from this one.

  • Cyclomatic Complexity Β· build_ty_pgo.profile_language_server (cyclomatic 17) scripts/build_ty_pgo.py
  • Cognitive Complexity Β· build_ty_pgo.profile_language_server (cognitive 19) scripts/build_ty_pgo.py
  • Cognitive Complexity Β· build_ty_pgo.ecosystem_python_files (cognitive 18) scripts/build_ty_pgo.py
  • God Classes Β· FileTooLong: scripts/build_ty_pgo.py scripts/build_ty_pgo.py
Rebuild cost: about €1,400 Β· Estimate
Cost to rebuild€480 to €2,400, for 8 to 25 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problemStandard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.8 at a score of 57. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeVery small: 1,398 lines of product code
What it is notNot a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one.

How the estimate is made: We price the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Write a diagnostic trail the user can hand back with a bug report: a log file under the platform's per-user data directory, switchable with a `--verbose`/`--debug` flag.
Start with the error paths that emit nothing β€” a discarded error is the failure the user cannot describe and you cannot reproduce.
Raises the score by about 8.5 points Β· Medium effort Β· Observability
2
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
Raises the score by about 13.7 points Β· High effort Β· Code Coverage
3
Record your significant design decisions.
Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
Raises the score by about 4.0 points Β· Medium effort Β· Architecture documentation

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

If you do one thing first Β· First action
Write a diagnostic trail the user can hand back with a bug report: a log file under the platform's per-user data directory, switchable with a `--verbose`/`--debug` flag. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 8.5 points for medium effort. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

6 modules, with 2 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses β†’1 docs.js2 python.ty3 python.ty._find_ty4 scripts.build_ty_pgo5 scripts.update_schemastore6 scripts
1 docs.js
2 python.ty
3 python.ty._find_ty
4 scripts.build_ty_pgo
5 scripts.update_schemastore
6 scripts12
Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself
1 docs.js2 python.ty3 python.ty._find_ty4 scripts.build_ty_pgo5 scripts.update_schemastore6 scriptsdocs.js1python.ty2python.ty._find_ty3scripts.build_ty_pgo4scripts.update_schemastore5scripts612

At a glance β€” Code Health Β· 100.0 Β· Exemplary Β·

At a glance β€” Architecture Β· 69.0 Β· Strong Β·

At a glance β€” Maturity Β· 60.7 Β· Adequate Β· gated by M2 Β·

At a glance β€” Readiness Β· 43.2 Β· Adequate Β· gated by D8, P2 Β·

At a glance β€” Security Β· 80.7 Β· Adequate Β· gated by D29 Β·

Security & Compliance β€” OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A05:2025 β€” Injection10High / Critical
A02:2025 β€” Security Misconfiguration4High / Critical
A03:2025 β€” Software Supply Chain Failures3Medium

Roadmap

Top priorities: Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage; Write a diagnostic trail the user can hand back with a bug report: a log file under the platform's per-user data directory, switchable with a `--verbose`/`--debug` flag. Start with the error paths that emit nothing β€” a discarded error is the failure the user cannot describe and you cannot reproduce; Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.

Ranked by impact Γ· effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Write a diagnostic trail the user can hand back with a bug report: a log file under the platform's per-user data directory, switchable with a `--verbose`/`--debug` flag. Start with the error paths that emit nothing β€” a discarded error is the failure the user cannot describe and you cannot reproduce.+8.5 ptsMediumObservability
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.+13.7 ptsHighCode Coverage
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.+4.0 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Resolve the 1 Scattered collaborators finding(s) in Navigability.+1.7 ptsLowNavigability
Resolve the 8 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) β€” start with REDACTED (8).+0.6 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)
Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.+1.2 ptsMediumDocumentation (README)
Reconcile the README with reality: docs/python-version.md names Python 3.7, but pyproject.toml:4 requires `requires-python = ">=3.8"`: the package does not install on Python 3.7.+0.7 ptsMediumDocumentation accuracy
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) β€” start with REDACTED.+0.2 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 β€” a quality signature. Of 5 files carrying findings, judged against the Preview bar: 20% slop Β· 20% mixed Β· 60% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED2.7SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED7.9Near-cleanSupply-chain Provenance & Signing: REDACTED

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it β€” and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical β€” 13

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious β€” 5

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere β€” not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor β€” 4

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved β€” 13

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository β€” a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores β€” or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

This survey is a deep, periodic assessment β€” run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 37 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.

Every figure here is one of two kinds, and we label which: βœ“ Measured β€” a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled β€” an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): βœ“ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; β—‹ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean β€” a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence β€” absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10.

What we checked β€” 37 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D8D13D15D16D17D19D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D36D37D43D44AX10AX3AX4M1M2M3M4P1P10P2P3P4P6X12X3

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality β€” in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report β€” three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line β€” never an absolute scratch path. Here, 16 of 22 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals β€” a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score β€” and this report, byte for byte β€” is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) β€” re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0βœ“ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0βœ“ deterministic
Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0βœ“ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400βœ“ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400βœ“ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 Β· 0.31.0βœ“ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 Β· 0.69.3 Β· 3.2.533βœ“ deterministic

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a1e721-5319-7c9e-b8cd-81657c78bfaa.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension β€” tool, version, invocation and retained raw output β€” is in Appendix B β€” Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency β€” what happened this run

What ran differently this time β€” a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D12 Dependency Hygiene β€” not measured this run β€” We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side β€” a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β€” and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored β€” 0 shipped Python distribution(s) were read, but the outdated signal needs pypi.org, and the index lookup answered not published for every exact pin asked about (0 lookup(s)), so this dimension's own question is only partly answered. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
  • D14 License Compliance β€” not measured this run β€” We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side β€” a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β€” and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored β€” this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry)), which this pass does not parse yet β€” so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D19 Documentation Quality β€” measured, with a gap in what it reached β€” We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side β€” a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β€” so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency β€” not measured this run β€” We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side β€” a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β€” and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (pyproject.toml), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises β€” so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker β€” not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict. For npm the surface is what a published package.json's entry points (exports, main, module, types) export, followed through the source; an entry that names build output the tree does not commit (dist/, build/) is not followed back to source, because only a tsconfig outDir/rootDir pair states that mapping and a bundler's input lives in executable configuration this engine does not evaluate.
  • D24 Comment Value β€” not measured this run β€” We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side β€” a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β€” and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness β€” not measured this run β€” We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side β€” a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β€” and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. A file the REDACTED copies (`ruff/Cargo.lock`) is not in the build context; the repository declares git submodules, and a submodule our checkout did not fetch would explain it. (rule: missing-build-input). The renderer reported: docker build failed (exit 1) β€” 44 | >>> COPY ruff/Cargo.lock Cargo.lock 45 | COPY dist-workspace.toml ../dist-workspace.toml 46 | RUN cargo zigbuild --bin ty --target $(cat rust_target.txt) --release -------------------- ERROR: failed to solve: failed to compute cache key: failed to calculate checksum of ref e7ae7cc1-cbd9-4ed8-98dd-bf3e0216b471::es5u3y40pc2eloxqt37nmsqv4: "/ruff/Cargo.lock": not found; likely cause (not identified): a file the REDACTED copies (`ruff/Cargo.lock`) is not in the build context; the repository declares git submodules, and a submodule our checkout did not fetch would explain it; runtime evidence skipped.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility β€” not measured this run β€” We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side β€” a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β€” and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via REDACTED (REDACTED). docker build failed (exit 1) β€” 44 | >>> COPY ruff/Cargo.lock Cargo.lock 45 | COPY dist-workspace.toml ../dist-workspace.toml 46 | RUN cargo zigbuild --bin ty --target $(cat rust_target.txt) --release -------------------- ERROR: failed to solve: failed to compute cache key: failed to calculate checksum of ref e7ae7cc1-cbd9-4ed8-98dd-bf3e0216b471::es5u3y40pc2eloxqt37nmsqv4: "/ruff/Cargo.lock": not found; likely cause (not identified): a file the REDACTED copies (`ruff/Cargo.lock`) is not in the build context; the repository declares git submodules, and a submodule our checkout did not fetch would explain it; runtime evidence skipped.
  • C1 Data Protection β€” not measured this run β€” We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side β€” a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β€” and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach β€” not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code β€” not measured this run β€” We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side β€” a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β€” and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Java source only, and this repository's Python is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach β€” not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs β€” not measured this run β€” We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side β€” a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β€” and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and this repository's Python is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach β€” not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy β€” measured, with a gap in what it reached β€” We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side β€” a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β€” so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
  • P3 Security & performance tooling β€” measured, with a gap in what it reached β€” We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side β€” a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β€” so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. `.github/renovate.json5` is not valid JSON ('r' is invalid after a value. Expected either ',', '}', or ']'. LineNumber: 13 | BytePositionInLine: 65.). Each was counted as dependency-update automation without being read, so whether it actually schedules updates is unverified: if it does not, the dep-scan credit on this card is not earned.
  • P5 DR & Backup β€” not measured this run β€” This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found β€” and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture β€” not measured this run β€” We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side β€” a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β€” and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach β€” not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
  • X4 Structured logging β€” not measured this run β€” We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side β€” a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β€” and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust, Go, Swift, Erlang, F# and Visual Basic source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach β€” not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X5 Nullable reference types β€” not measured this run β€” We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side β€” a collector, parser or image we have not built yet β€” and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and MSBuild project configuration, TypeScript source and its tsconfig files, Java source and its package and module declarations, PHP source and its PHPStan and Psalm configuration, Dart source and its pubspec language version, Ruby source and its Sorbet and Steep configuration, Scala source and its build's explicit-nulls, WartRemover and Scalafix settings, Kotlin source, and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, no TypeScript was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach β€” not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.

Repo exclusion declarations: 3 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored β€” auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap β€” a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see β€” the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically β€” it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type β€” a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module β€” one class/IIFE β€” earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity β€” an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization β€” so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED β€” its repetition is the tool's, not the team's β€” so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies β€” runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside our isolated image β€” the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree β€” a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history β€” a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension β€” pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual β€” undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded β€” it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural β€” it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns β€” a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) β€” it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases β€” a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules β€” it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension β€” code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS β€” files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen β€” a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen β€” a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics β€” a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see β€” only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) β€” controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

Dimensions

D1 Β· Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is β€” methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 Β· Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 Β· God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 Β· Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the production code is copy-pasted: the share of production lines inside a reported copy (every copy of a duplicated block or of an edited member, each line once), 10 at none and 0 at a quarter of the lines.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), scored on the share of production lines inside a reported copy (each line once; 10 at none, 0 at a quarter). Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected. 0.0 % of the production lines (0 of 1,398) are in a reported copy.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 Β· Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type β€” the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Prevented

3 production modules (source-import), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). No manifest declares this repository's modules, so the modules are its top-level source directories and the edges the imports between them; 0 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 2 of the 3 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, declare types in source no model reads, or have no source directory of their own).

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D8 Β· Code Coverage0.0 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from the analyzer's own run of the suite, computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. A coverage report found in the repository is never read. When the suite can't be built/run in-image, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable β€” never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 0.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Verified

No automated tests β€” no test code was found in this repository.

No automated tests

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 Β· Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D15 Β· Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex β€” the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 Β· Bus Factor10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author. Counted over 5 of the 8 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md.

D17 Β· Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code β€” TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Prevented

0 deducted task-comment markers across 1398 LoC (0.0/KLoC) β†’ score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.

D19 Β· Documentation Quality10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Every README, docs/ document and root guide parsed by its markup and measured in Unicode letters. Published: a runnable or packaged .NET project whose README (or a document it links, or a root guide) shows no example, and a root README naming none of three or more projects. Overview, licence, boilerplate, wall-of-text, empty-section and XML-doc rows are measured and withheld (counted in gaps) after adjudication. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 21 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D27 Β· Navigability6.3 / 10Adequateβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call β€” low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≀400 methods) β€” not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 6.3 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

100 % of calls cross a namespace and 0 % go through an interface, but 25 % of collaborators are co-located β€” so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small β€” navigation cost is tolerated.

Scattered collaborators

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Scattered collaborators finding(s) in Navigability. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D28 Β· Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed β€” scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout β€” the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands β€” merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side β€” unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 Β· Static Analysis (SAST)1.8 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings β€” likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files β€” exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 1.8 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

10 finding(s): 0 critical, 10 high, 0 medium, 0 low. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) β€” `docs/.overrides/main.html` (lines 1–4, line 6, line 8, …) β€” so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 3 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 8 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) β€” start with REDACTED (8). β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) β€” start with REDACTED. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) β€” start with REDACTED. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 Β· Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares β€” Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): every row is a match against a vulnerability database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable dependencies in any ecosystem this repository declares.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md.

D31 Β· IaC & Container Security9.1 / 10Adequategated by 2 critical findingsβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 9.1 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 2 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security β€” start with REDACTED (2). β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security β€” start with REDACTED (2). β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 Β· Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned β€” last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge β€” recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 5 of the 8 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 Β· Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together β€” pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only β€” tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file β‰₯10 revisions, β‰₯5 shared commits, β‰₯50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only β€” test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair β€” a command and the reference page that restates it β€” is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 Β· Supply-chain Provenance & Signing7.5 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity β€” generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals β€” generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions β€” scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 7.5 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

3/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing β€” start with REDACTED. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. β€” One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md Β· top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D37 Β· Vulnerability-disclosure Policy10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact β†’ 10; present without a contact β†’ 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.

D43 Β· Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable β€” a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Reported apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it β€” a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): the malicious-package feed is a database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

D44 Β· Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON β€” the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates β€” no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged β€” `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on β€” and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads β€” never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented β†’ Verified β†’ Prevented Β· effective 10.0 / 10 Β· rule-coverage 100% Β· ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 3 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF β€” a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

βœ“ On the Gold path β€” maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS Β· M = Maturity Β· P = Readiness.

AX10 Β· Code composition10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Architecture β€” How the codebase splits by code ROLE β€” domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER β€” domain, then infrastructure, then application β€” so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone β€” no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence β€” and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention β€” a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX3 Β· Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Architecture β€” Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 Β· Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Other Β· Architecture β€” Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) β€” the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

M1 Β· Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Maturity Β· Maturity β€” Whether the repository and its projects have a README, and whether it is substantive.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 Β· Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Weakβœ“ Tool-verified

Maturity Β· Maturity β€” Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found β€” no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 Β· Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Maturity Β· Maturity β€” Whether the repository is organised deliberately: production code and tests are set apart in a way its ecosystem or the repository itself declares.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 Β· Documentation accuracy8.0 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Maturity Β· Maturity β€” Whether the project's current-state documentation describes the code that exists.

Method: Every current-state document's checkable claims looked up in the tree (links, versions, and artefact counts an order of magnitude off), plus two README checks: an advertised infrastructure product with no footprint, and a module the CHANGELOG records as removed. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.

  • docs/python-version.md names Python 3.7, but pyproject.toml:4 requires `requires-python = ">=3.8"`: the package does not install on Python 3.7. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. β€” docs/python-version.md:49

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: docs/python-version.md names Python 3.7, but pyproject.toml:4 requires `requires-python = ">=3.8"`: the package does not install on Python 3.7.
P1 Β· CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

Readiness Β· Readiness β€” Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P10 Β· Library API & versioning10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

Readiness Β· Readiness β€” For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries; off .NET, a library is the ecosystem's publication act (an npm package that is not private and names an entry point, a PyPI distribution with a build system, a Rust library crate, a Maven/Gradle module that publishes, a Go module with no package main, a gemspec, a Composer library, a SwiftPM library product, a pub.dev or Hex package), its surface is the share of types the language's code model records as public (Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, Go, Dart; not measured where the model records no type visibility or, as in TypeScript, only module-level export), and its version is read from the manifest, a semver CHANGELOG, release tooling or semver git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 Β· Observability0.0 / 10Criticalβœ“ Tool-verified

Readiness Β· Readiness β€” Whether the code is diagnosable in production β€” structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No logging or diagnostics emission found. This repository ships a binary its users launch rather than a service you operate, so there is no operator to page β€” but when a run fails on a user's machine, neither they nor you have anything to read.

What to do

  • Write a diagnostic trail the user can hand back with a bug report: a log file under the platform's per-user data directory, switchable with a `--verbose`/`--debug` flag. Start with the error paths that emit nothing β€” a discarded error is the failure the user cannot describe and you cannot reproduce.
P3 Β· Security & performance tooling7.0 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Readiness Β· Readiness β€” Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step β€” in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 Β· Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strongβœ“ Tool-verified

Readiness Β· Readiness β€” Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) β€” from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P6 Β· Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplaryβœ“ Tool-verified

Readiness Β· Readiness β€” Whether releases are traceable β€” a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

X12 Β· Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

Other Β· Code Health β€” Whether any branch is dead by construction β€” a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X3 Β· Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplaryβ—‹ Nothing flagged

Other Β· Code Health β€” Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

Reference β€” by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health100.0ExemplaryStrongest area.
Architecture69.0StrongSolid.
Maturity60.7Adequate β€” gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β€” resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness43.2Adequate β€” gated by D8, P2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β€” resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security80.7Adequate β€” gated by D29Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor β€” resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not evidenced β€” 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase β€” the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • P5 DR & Backup β€” not evidenced β€” repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included β€” 79 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives β€” No web markup found β€” accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels β€” No web markup found β€” accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure β€” No web markup found β€” accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics β€” No web markup found β€” accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness β€” No web markup found β€” accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety β€” No web markup found β€” accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies β€” Not applicable: this repository's Python imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own β€” nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes β€” so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
  • AX2 Stateful singletons β€” No container singleton was found, so there is no shared instance for concurrent requests to race on. No function in this Python code is served by a threaded web framework (a Flask, Bottle or FastAPI route, a Django or Pyramid view), so no module is shared between request threads. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
  • AX5 Architecture & structure β€” not assessed β€” architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation β€” no interface, protocol or abstract type declares an operation an implementer must write
  • AX7 Slice cohesion β€” not applicable β€” not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation β€” no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity β€” no CQRS query handlers detected β€” query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness β€” Advisory β€” this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility β€” docker build failed (exit 1) β€” 44 | >>> COPY ruff/Cargo.lock Cargo.lock 45 | COPY dist-workspace.toml ../dist-workspace.toml 46 | RUN cargo zigbuild --bin ty --target $(cat rust_target.txt) --release -------------------- ERROR: failed to solve: failed to compute cache key: failed to calculate checksum of ref e7ae7cc1-cbd9-4ed8-98dd-bf3e0216b471::es5u3y40pc2eloxqt37nmsqv4: "/ruff/Cargo.lock": not found; likely cause (not identified): a file the REDACTED copies (`ruff/Cargo.lock`) is not in the build context; the repository declares git submodules, and a submodule our checkout did not fetch would explain it; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
  • C1 Data Protection β€” Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository β€” because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls β€” No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source β€” this repository registers no route and starts no server another machine can reach (no Flask/FastAPI/Starlette route, Django urlpatterns or class-based view, Tornado handler). Access control is therefore N/A here β€” a library or command-line tool is authorized by the application that serves it, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail β€” No personal data detected in a persisted data model β€” no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in a Django, SQLAlchemy, SQLModel, Peewee, Tortoise or MongoEngine model, a migration or a SQL schema β€” and no database or data-store client (Django ORM, SQLAlchemy, psycopg, PyMongo, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
  • C4 Data Retention β€” No personal data detected in a persisted data model β€” no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential on a Django, SQLAlchemy, SQLModel, Peewee, Tortoise or mongoengine model, in a migration or in a SQL schema β€” and no database or data-store client (django.db, sqlalchemy, psycopg2, pymongo, sqlite3, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights β€” No personal data detected in a persisted data model β€” no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential on a Django, SQLAlchemy, SQLModel, Peewee, Tortoise or mongoengine model, in a migration or in a SQL schema β€” and no database or data-store client (django.db, sqlalchemy, psycopg2, pymongo, sqlite3, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
  • D10 Test Quality β€” No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
  • D11 Test Reliability β€” No test suite was found to re-run, so reliability couldn't be assessed. Two searches produced that zero and both came back empty: the classifier that reads the loaded workspace recognised no suite it could run, and a walk of the source on disk β€” which covers the JS/TS `*.test.*` and `*.spec.*` conventions and probes for a Pester suite β€” found no test source in any other ecosystem either. Neither search reaches a suite that is missing from the loaded workspace and carries no name either walk recognises, so this is 'no suite found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene β€” Not scored β€” 0 shipped Python distribution(s) were read, but the outdated signal needs pypi.org, and the index lookup answered not published for every exact pin asked about (0 lookup(s)), so this dimension's own question is only partly answered. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
  • D14 License Compliance β€” Package manifest not parsed for licence data β€” analyzer language-coverage gap
  • D18 Solution Shape β€” D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D20 ADR Quality β€” N/A β€” ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D21 Naming Consistency β€” N/A β€” too few peers to establish a naming convention (96 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
  • D22 Internal API Consistency β€” The exposed public-API surface could not be collected β€” no C#/VB projects loaded.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling β€” No bounded-context organisation was detected either β€” neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (β‰₯2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it β€” e.g. `architecture:` β†’ `contexts:` β†’ `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value β€” D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .py source were not judged.
  • D25 ADR Conformance β€” no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion β€” This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (1475 LoC, 12 module-visible types across 3 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) β€” No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks β€” nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement β€” No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement β€” No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement β€” No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) β€” Cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured: of the 8 type(s) found, none both holds instance state and has two or more methods whose shared use of it could be read (3 with fewer than two methods, 5 stateless), so LCOM4 is undefined for every type in this repository. Not scored β€” the metric does not apply here, and this is not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity β€” no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read β€” so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM1 Domain Modelling β€” not scored β€” this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (2 value object(s))
  • ED1 Event-Driven β€” not scored β€” this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency β€” no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected β€” idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing β€” not scored β€” this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code β€” no source files were read β€” this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Java, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs β€” not analysed β€” these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty β€” Reported, not scored β€” and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience β€” not applicable β€” no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JavaScript/TypeScript, Python source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
  • P8 Schema migrations β€” no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage β€” coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here β€” Test coverage (D8) says why
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline β€” Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for a pytest-benchmark or pytest-codspeed dependency with tests taking the `benchmark` fixture, an asv.conf.json with its `time_`/`mem_`/`peakmem_` benchmarks, or a pyperf Runner, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene β€” Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene β€” Not applicable: this repository declares no async functions, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture β€” Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository β€” because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • X1 Async correctness β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X10 Duplicated predicate β€” Advisory β€” this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X13 Undrained process stream β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X14 Bypassable address classification β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X16 Unfloored truncation loop β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X18 Disposal-pattern correctness β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X19 Unrestored process-global state β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X2 Cancellation propagation β€” no C# was loaded; this repository's Python was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller β€” a Python request takes no token: asyncio cancels the task and trio or anyio the scope that made it, from outside the call, and requests, httpx, aiohttp and gRPC take a timeout, not a cancellation
  • X20 Mistyped argument guard β€” This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception β€” .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X21 Side-effecting pattern guard β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X22 Contradicted release guard β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X25 Inert configuration knob β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X27 Collection changed while being enumerated β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects β€” not applicable β€” the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
  • X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly β€” This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X4 Structured logging β€” not analysed β€” these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types β€” not analysed β€” these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing β€” Advisory β€” this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults β€” Advisory β€” this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand β€” Advisory β€” this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A β€” Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical β€” 13 finding(s)
D29 Β· Static Analysis (SAST) Β· REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D31 Β· IaC & Container Security Β· High IaC Β· Γ—2
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D29 Β· Static Analysis (SAST) Β· REDACTED Β· Γ—1
  • REDACTED
D29 Β· Static Analysis (SAST) Β· REDACTED Β· Γ—1
  • REDACTED
D8 Β· Code Coverage Β· No automated tests Β· Γ—1
  • No automated tests β€” No automated tests β€” no test code was found in this repository. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely. Start with the code you change most often: add a suite in a framework a runner can collect (pytest or unittest), and run it in CI so the gap cannot reopen.
Serious β€” 5 finding(s)
D31 Β· IaC & Container Security Β· Medium IaC Β· Γ—2
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D36 Β· Supply-chain Provenance & Signing Β· REDACTED Β· Γ—1
  • REDACTED
D36 Β· Supply-chain Provenance & Signing Β· REDACTED Β· Γ—1
  • REDACTED
P2 Β· Observability Β· No structured logging Β· Γ—1
  • No structured logging β€” No logging or diagnostics emission found. This repository ships a binary its users launch rather than a service you operate, so there is no operator to page β€” but when a run fails on a user's machine, neither they nor you have anything to read.
Minor β€” 4 finding(s)
D27 Β· Navigability Β· Scattered collaborators Β· Γ—1
  • Scattered collaborators β€” 100 % of calls cross a namespace and only 25 % of collaborators are co-located β€” group each feature's code into a vertical slice so a call's collaborators sit together.
D36 Β· Supply-chain Provenance & Signing Β· REDACTED Β· Γ—1
  • REDACTED
M2 Β· Architecture documentation Β· No ADRs Β· Γ—1
  • No ADRs β€” No Architecture Decision Records found β€” no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
M4 Β· Documentation accuracy Β· README/code drift Β· Γ—1
  • README/code drift docs/python-version.md:49 β€” docs/python-version.md names Python 3.7, but pyproject.toml:4 requires `requires-python = ">=3.8"`: the package does not install on Python 3.7. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.

Appendix B β€” Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension β€” the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative β€” never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json β€” kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 Β· Secrets (history)gitleaksβ€”gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=0 --max-count=200" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-80dadf7acf8f468b8f2d51870fb818b0/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 Β· Secrets (history)gitleaksβ€”gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=200 --max-count=578" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-80dadf7acf8f468b8f2d51870fb818b0/history-1.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history-1.json
D28 Β· Secrets (history)gitleaksβ€”gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-80dadf7acf8f468b8f2d51870fb818b0/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 Β· Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepβ€”semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt .10artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 Β· Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerβ€”osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm .0artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D31 Β· IaC & Container Securitytrivyβ€”trivy config --format json --quiet .4artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 Β· Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepβ€”semgrep: not applicable β€” No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks β€” nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.0β€”
D40 Β· Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningβ€”runtime-hardening: not applicable β€” No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0β€”
D41 Β· Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningβ€”runtime-hardening: not applicable β€” No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0β€”
D42 Β· Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningβ€”runtime-hardening: not applicable β€” No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0β€”
D43 Β· Malicious Dependenciesosv-scannerβ€”osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm .0artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 01a1e721-5319-7c9e-b8cd-81657c78bfaa Β· every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric β€” drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md