Executive summary
andersonkrs/malheatmap is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, most of them in the build pipeline. It scores 59.7 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged.
Code Health, at 55.6, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step for the work it takes is recording design decisions, worth about 2.0 points. Adding type checking would lift Code Health itself, worth about 3.2 points. Raising Code Health to 70 would lift the score to about 62.6.
Seventeen pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Ten known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers, and three settings leave the servers or containers unsafe. Pinning each tool to an exact version, updating the vulnerable packages and correcting the unsafe settings would close these risks. Limiting each secret to its own step would fix the two secrets exposed to more of the pipeline than needed, and setting a waiting period for automatic updates would deal with the automatic dependency update that takes a new release at once. The three buttons or links with no name need a name, even when they only show an icon.
The product code is 2,582 lines, about €4,100 to rebuild.
If Code Health rose from 55.6 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 59.7 to about 62.6.
Rebuild cost: about €4,100 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €1,300 to €6,800, for 22 to 71 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.8 at a score of 60. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 2,582 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 ApplicationCable | 2 CalendarComponent | 3 CrawlingLogEntry | 4 HttpClient | 5 MAL.Errors | 6 MAL.Parsers | 7 MalHeatmap | 8 Notification | 9 SolidQueue | 10 Turbo | 11 Turbo.Streams | 12 User.ActivitiesGenerator | 13 User.Calendars | 14 User.MALSyncable | 15 User.MALSyncable.ScrapedData | 16 app.javascript | 17 app.javascript.controllers.clipboard_controller | 18 app.javascript.controllers.notification_controller | 19 app.javascript.controllers.tracker_controller | 20 MAL | 21 User | 22 (global) | 23 Images | 24 Purgeable | 25 User.CalendarImages | 26 User.Deactivatable | 27 User.Geolocatable | 28 User.Incinerable |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 ApplicationCable | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2 CalendarComponent | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3 CrawlingLogEntry | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4 HttpClient | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5 MAL.Errors | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6 MAL.Parsers | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 7 MalHeatmap | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8 Notification | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 9 SolidQueue | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 10 Turbo | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 11 Turbo.Streams | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 12 User.ActivitiesGenerator | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 13 User.Calendars | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 14 User.MALSyncable | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 15 User.MALSyncable.ScrapedData | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 16 app.javascript | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 17 app.javascript.controllers.clipboard_controller | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 18 app.javascript.controllers.notification_controller | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 19 app.javascript.controllers.tracker_controller | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20 MAL | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21 User | 2 | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22 (global) | 1 | 1 | 8 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 23 Images | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 24 Purgeable | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 25 User.CalendarImages | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 26 User.Deactivatable | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 27 User.Geolocatable | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 28 User.Incinerable | 1 |
20→22 MAL uses (global) part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in MAL uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
MAL.ApiClient→ApplicationClient
- Direction
- MAL uses (global), so a change to (global) can break MAL, while a change to MAL can't break (global).
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
21→12 User uses User.ActivitiesGenerator✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in User uses a type in User.ActivitiesGenerator.
- The types involved
User.ActivitiesGenerator→User.ActivitiesGenerator.ProcessedActivitiesUser.ActivitiesGenerator→User.ActivitiesGenerator.ProcessedEntries
- Direction
- User uses User.ActivitiesGenerator, so a change to User.ActivitiesGenerator can break User, while a change to User can't break User.ActivitiesGenerator.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: User uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
21→22 User uses (global) part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in User uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
User.PeriodicMALSyncJob→ApplicationJobUser.SchedulePeriodicMALSyncJob→ApplicationJob
- Direction
- User uses (global), so a change to (global) can break User, while a change to User can't break (global).
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
22→4 (global) uses HttpClient✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in (global) uses a type in HttpClient.
- The types involved
HttpClient→HttpClient.RequestProxy
- Direction
- (global) uses HttpClient, so a change to HttpClient can break (global), while a change to (global) can't break HttpClient.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: (global) uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
22→20 (global) uses MAL✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in (global) uses a type in MAL.
- The types involved
ActivityComponent→MAL.URLS
- Direction
- (global) uses MAL, so a change to MAL can break (global), while a change to (global) can't break MAL.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: (global) uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
22→21 (global) uses User✕
- Connections
- 8 pairs of types, where a type in (global) uses a type in User.
- The types involved
User→User.AuthenticatableUser→User.CalendarImageableUser→User.CalendarsUser→User.DeactivatableUser→User.GeolocatableUser→User.IncinerableUser→User.MALSyncableUser→User.Mergeable
- Direction
- (global) uses User, so a change to User can break (global), while a change to (global) can't break User.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: (global) uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
23→22 Images uses (global)✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in Images uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
Images.CalendarsController→ApplicationControllerImages.CalendarsController→UserScoped
- Direction
- Images uses (global), so a change to (global) can break Images, while a change to Images can't break (global).
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Images uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
24→22 Purgeable uses (global)✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in Purgeable uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
Purgeable.PurgeDueLaterJob→ApplicationJob
- Direction
- Purgeable uses (global), so a change to (global) can break Purgeable, while a change to Purgeable can't break (global).
- Position
- Below the diagonal: Purgeable uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
25→22 User.CalendarImages uses (global)✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in User.CalendarImages uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
User.CalendarImages.GenerateJob→ApplicationJob
- Direction
- User.CalendarImages uses (global), so a change to (global) can break User.CalendarImages, while a change to User.CalendarImages can't break (global).
- Position
- Below the diagonal: User.CalendarImages uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
26→22 User.Deactivatable uses (global)✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in User.Deactivatable uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
User.Deactivatable.DeactivationJob→ApplicationJob
- Direction
- User.Deactivatable uses (global), so a change to (global) can break User.Deactivatable, while a change to User.Deactivatable can't break (global).
- Position
- Below the diagonal: User.Deactivatable uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
27→22 User.Geolocatable uses (global)✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in User.Geolocatable uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
User.Geolocatable.FetchGeolocationJob→ApplicationJob
- Direction
- User.Geolocatable uses (global), so a change to (global) can break User.Geolocatable, while a change to User.Geolocatable can't break (global).
- Position
- Below the diagonal: User.Geolocatable uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
28→22 User.Incinerable uses (global)✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in User.Incinerable uses a type in (global).
- The types involved
User.Incinerable.IncinerationJob→ApplicationJob
- Direction
- User.Incinerable uses (global), so a change to (global) can break User.Incinerable, while a change to User.Incinerable can't break (global).
- Position
- Below the diagonal: User.Incinerable uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Domain Modelling
At a glance — Accessibility
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 25 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 22 | High / Critical |
| A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration | 5 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up; Adopt a checker and raise it file by file: with Sorbet, `srb init` (or `bundle exec tapioca init`) commits `sorbet/config`, then move each file's sigil from `# typed: false` to `# typed: true` and on to `strict` as its methods get `sig`s — `spoom bump` does the moving; with Steep, write RBS signatures and `check` the product directories in the `Steepfile` under `D::Ruby.default` or `strict`, not `lenient`. Then pay down the assertions rather than adding to them: each `T.must` is a nil the checker could not rule out — narrow it (`return unless x`, `x&.`, `if (y = x)`), make the attribute non-nilable and set it in `initialize`, or change the method so the nil cannot arrive; Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with Procfile.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with Procfile. | +2.0 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up. | +3.2 pts | Medium | Type Safety |
| Adopt a checker and raise it file by file: with Sorbet, `srb init` (or `bundle exec tapioca init`) commits `sorbet/config`, then move each file's sigil from `# typed: false` to `# typed: true` and on to `strict` as its methods get `sig`s — `spoom bump` does the moving; with Steep, write RBS signatures and `check` the product directories in the `Steepfile` under `D::Ruby.default` or `strict`, not `lenient`. Then pay down the assertions rather than adding to them: each `T.must` is a nil the checker could not rule out — narrow it (`return unless x`, `x&.`, `if (y = x)`), make the attribute non-nilable and set it in `initialize`, or change the method so the nil cannot arrive. | +2.9 pts | Medium | Nullable reference types |
| Resolve the 9 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (9). | +1.2 pts | Low | Dependency Vulnerabilities |
| Resolve the 8 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (8). | +1.1 pts | Low | Dependency Vulnerabilities |
| Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (AWS KMS / Secrets Manager, GCP KMS / Secret Manager, HashiCorp Vault — kms_encrypted or vault-rails, not only the master key beside credentials.yml.enc) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (encrypts, lockbox) — partial coverage still leaves gaps. | +2.0 pts | Medium | Data Protection |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +1.7 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). | +0.8 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.3 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.8 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: REDACTED |
| Procfile | 9.5 | Near-clean | ADR Quality: No ADRs found |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 54 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 54 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 72 of 107 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.rb) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.rb) and this repository declares a Ruby test suite (minitest: repository root, 22 test files), but it was not re-run: no test result was produced. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable (1 contributor(s) across 1115 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). Concentration needs a team to concentrate: with one contributor there is nobody to spread the knowledge to, so there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. This repository's source is written only in languages whose packages are published through a manifest, and no manifest in the tree makes a publication act: either there is no package manifest of any ecosystem (no package.json, pyproject.toml, setup.py, gemspec, Cargo.toml, pom.xml, build.gradle, composer.json, pubspec.yaml or mix.exs), or every one present declares in its package manager's own terms that it is not published (an npm package marked "private": true, a Cargo package with publish = false, a pubspec with publish_to: none, a Composer "project", a Poetry project with package-mode = false, or the "Private :: Do Not Upload" classifier). With no publication act there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (REDACTED). compose up failed (exit 1 — a container did not start, exited, or never became healthy) — time="2026-11-17T20:34:22Z" level=warning msg="The \"RAILS_MASTER_KEY\" variable is not set. Defaulting to a blank string." time="2026-11-17T20:34:22Z" level=warning msg="The \"REDIS_URL\" variable is not set. Defaulting to a blank string." network coolify declared as external, but could not be found; runtime evidence skipped.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected. 0.0 % of the production lines (0 of 2,582) are in a reported copy.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 11 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
27 outdated direct gem(s), 0 pinning defect(s). 38 declaration(s) graded against rubygems.org, 36 of them against a version resolved in a committed REDACTED. 2 declaration(s) carry a requirement that EXCLUDES the current release; that is a deliberate constraint (a supported-version ceiling or a held-back CI pin) and is counted, not charged. Whether any of these gems is DEPRECATED or YANKED is not graded — rubygems.org publishes no deprecation marker, and a yank removes a version rather than flagging it. Whether any is UNMAINTAINED is not graded either: no registry publishes a maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is a source question, not a registry one. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 138 shipped gem(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from rubygems.org over the 138 gem(s) a consumer installs — this repository's runtime declarations closed transitively over its committed REDACTED. Development-group and `add_development_dependency` gems are excluded: they are not distributed with this repository.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted task-comment markers across 2582 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with Procfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
22 finding(s): 0 critical, 21 high, 1 medium, 0 low. 17 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `config/storage.yml` — so no absence of findings in them is evidence of anything, and nothing in them was analysed. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 17 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (17 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
20 finding(s): 1 critical, 9 high, 8 medium, 2 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 9 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
- Resolve the 8 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D31 · IaC & Container Security
5 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 2 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 11 of the 121 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 38 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
AC2 · Forms & labels
- A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label. — app/components/calendar_component.html.erb:21
- A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one). (×2) — app/components/notification/component.html.erb:2, app/views/users/_bb_code.html.erb:20
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×2) — app/views/layouts/application.html.erb:2, app/views/users/signature.html.erb:1
- The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). — app/views/users/signature.html.erb:1
- A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. — app/views/users/signature.html.erb:1
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC5 · ARIA correctness
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
AX10 · Code composition
AX2 · Stateful singletons
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
C1 · Data Protection
What to do
- Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (AWS KMS / Secrets Manager, GCP KMS / Secret Manager, HashiCorp Vault — kms_encrypted or vault-rails, not only the master key beside credentials.yml.enc) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (encrypts, lockbox) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
C2 · Access Controls
- Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect.
What to do
- Name the access rules — Pundit or Action Policy classes (a PostPolicy), a CanCanCan Ability, or rolify roles — and consult them where access is checked (authorize @record, load_and_authorize_resource, authorize!), so the rule set is reviewable and testable on its own.
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something. (×5) — test/controllers/users_controller_test.rb:19, test/controllers/users_controller_test.rb:53, test/controllers/users_controller_test.rb:78, …
What to do
- Clear the softer debt: re-enable or delete `xit`/`skip`ped tests, decide whether each empty method or NotImplementedError refusal is deliberate (and say so in a comment), and replace `# rubocop:disable all` with targeted, justified disables.
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure
P1 · CI/CD gates
P2 · Observability
P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever reaches the release trigger goes to production unreviewed, so a mistaken merge or tag is live before anyone can stop it. — REDACTED:140
What to do
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P8 · Schema migrations
- This repository versions its schema (Rails migrations), but ActiveRecord::Schema.define at runtime here builds or alters the schema from the model as well, outside that history — the two paths can disagree about the shape, and a change made this way is never a reviewed migration. Turn it off and let Rails migrations own the schema. (×3) — db/cache_schema.rb:13, db/ops_schema.rb:13, db/queue_schema.rb:13
What to do
- Turn off ActiveRecord::Schema.define at runtime in production and let the versioned migrations own the schema.
R1 · Type Safety
- 0 typed · 7 plain JS — the untyped files are app/javascript/analytics.js, app/javascript/application.js, app/javascript/controllers/application.js, app/javascript/controllers/clipboard_controller.js, app/javascript/controllers/index.js, app/javascript/controllers/notification_controller.js (+1 more).
What to do
- Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
R10 · Code Duplication
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
R3 · Large Files
R7 · Dead Code
- Unreachable from the 6 application, 0 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. This repository declares no build, type-check or test script, so nothing here would fail on a wrong deletion — confirm by hand that nothing loads each file (including by a path built at runtime) before removing it. An undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (6 application, 0 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make — app/javascript/analytics.js
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R9 · Circular Imports
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- MD5/SHA1 is computed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ (`Digest::SHA256` or `OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA256")`) for content integrity, or a KDF (bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, an avatar URL, an ETag), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as xxhash or murmurhash says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. Where a protocol this code does not own fixes the digest (a k-anonymity range query, a legacy signature format), the protocol decides; say so beside the call. — REDACTED:9
- `https://kit.fontawesome.com/210bca511f.js` is executed by this page with no Subresource Integrity. Whoever can answer that request — the CDN, anyone who compromises it, anyone on the network path — runs arbitrary script in this page's origin, with its session. The URL also names no version, so it resolves to whatever that origin serves at fetch time — the executed bytes can change with nobody touching this repository. 2 such include(s) across the repository's markup. — app/views/layouts/application.html.erb:39
What to do
- Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (xxhash, murmurhash) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key.
- Pin third-party scripts and verify them: name an exact version in the URL and add an `integrity="sha384-…"` hash alongside `crossorigin="anonymous"` (both are required — an integrity hash on a cross-origin script without `crossorigin` is not evaluated, it blocks the script). Where the vendor ships a continuously-updated loader and publishes no stable hash (tag managers, analytics, chat widgets), Subresource Integrity is not available: constrain it instead with a `Content-Security-Policy` that names the exact origins allowed to execute, and drop the script from the pages that do not need it. Where the page is shipped inside a package that others host, prefer vendoring the asset and serving it from the app’s own origin, so no consumer inherits a third-party dependency they did not choose.
X12 · Unreachable branch
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation
- `debug` at line 53 is called with an argument built by `body &. pretty_inspect` (line 53), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Ruby evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: no `debug?` test, no debug flag, no block the logger calls only when the level is on. — lib/http_client/request_proxy.rb:53
What to do
- In Ruby, hand the logger a block it calls only when the level is on (`logger.debug { "args: #{args.join(' ')}" }` — Logger, ActiveSupport, SemanticLogger and console all take one), or put the line behind `if logger.debug?`. Interpolating the value into the message is not the fix: Ruby builds the string, and every `map`, `join` or `to_json` inside its `#{…}`, before the call is entered.
X3 · Exception handling
X5 · Nullable reference types
- This repository commits no Sorbet configuration (`sorbet/config`) and no `Steepfile`, so nothing type-checks its 120 Ruby product file(s): a nilable value reaches a method call silently and raises `NoMethodError: undefined method … for nil` the first time it is nil. A `# typed:` sigil does nothing without a `sorbet/config` beside the code; a Steep run configured only on a command line is not something this check can read.
What to do
- Adopt a checker and raise it file by file: with Sorbet, `srb init` (or `bundle exec tapioca init`) commits `sorbet/config`, then move each file's sigil from `# typed: false` to `# typed: true` and on to `strict` as its methods get `sig`s — `spoom bump` does the moving; with Steep, write RBS signatures and `check` the product directories in the `Steepfile` under `D::Ruby.default` or `strict`, not `lenient`. Then pay down the assertions rather than adding to them: each `T.must` is a nil the checker could not rule out — narrow it (`return unless x`, `x&.`, `if (y = x)`), make the attribute non-nilable and set it in `initialize`, or change the method so the nil cannot arrive.
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 55.6 | Adequate — gated by R1, X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 88.7 | Strong | Solid. |
| Maturity | 61.7 | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 66.4 | Adequate — gated by P8 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 57.5 | Adequate — gated by D36 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 100.0 | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Accessibility | 71.9 | Strong | Solid. |
Unscored — 2 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- X10 Duplicated predicate — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 5 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (an audit-log table or model, a change-history gem on the models — paper_trail's has_paper_trail, audited, Logidze's has_logidze, public_activity's tracked — or an ActiveRecord callback or Sequel hook that records each change) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
- C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
Not included — 67 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's Ruby imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — no class or module declares an abstract method
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 1 — a container did not start, exited, or never became healthy) — time="2026-11-17T20:34:22Z" level=warning msg="The \"RAILS_MASTER_KEY\" variable is not set. Defaulting to a blank string." time="2026-11-17T20:34:22Z" level=warning msg="The \"REDIS_URL\" variable is not set. Defaulting to a blank string." network coolify declared as external, but could not be found; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- D10 Test Quality — ~1209 lines of test source are present (.rb) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .rb suite was found but not re-run
- D16 Bus Factor — single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D19 Documentation Quality — No runnable or published unit to look for an example in, and no multi-project root README to look for a map in; the other documentation kinds are withheld (see the gaps), so documentation quality is not applicable here.
- D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (481 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Aggregate roots were found in only one source directory (models), which is a layered codebase, not two contexts. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .rb source were not judged.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (2654 LoC, 144 module-visible types across 30 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
- D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this RubyGems build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 1 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HTTP client call or construction in the JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby source (service entry point: lib/solid_queue/helper.rb:5 (Rails.application))
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `x.report(…)` entries in a `Benchmark.ips`/`bm`/`bmbm`/`benchmark`/`memory` block, `benchmark:` entries in a benchmark-driver YAML under a bench* directory, rspec-benchmark `perform_*` expectations where the gem is installed, or benchmark-ips, benchmark-memory, rspec-benchmark or benchmark-driver in a Gemfile or gemspec, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: Ruby has no async/await function colour, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R4 Test Coverage — the JS/TS workspace (7 production file(s)) has no JavaScript/TypeScript test, but it is 2.71% of this repository's production source and the other 97.29% carries 1,209 line(s) of test code this pass cannot read — an incidental frontend's reachability is not the repository's test posture, so it is not scored as one
- R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D30 (Dependency Vulnerabilities), which answers every ecosystem
- R6 Tooling — no package.json in the repository — test/lint/typecheck wiring is read from package.json scripts (corroborated against CI), so this project's own toolchain isn't measured here
- R8 Dependency Hygiene — Not measured — no package.json declares any dependency, so there is nothing to check imports against (imports may resolve through a host runtime rather than node).
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Ruby was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Ruby request takes no token: Net::HTTP, Faraday and async-http are stopped from outside the call (Async::Task#stop, Thread#raise, Timeout), not through a parameter
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Ruby was read, and it logs through none: the standard library's Logger, which Rails.logger is, takes one finished message and no template arguments or fields (as log4net does in C#), so an interpolated message there loses nothing the API could have kept. The console gem (`Console.info`), SemanticLogger, Ougai and dry-logger would be judged.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 39 finding(s)
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- REDACTED
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- REDACTED
- <button> with no accessible text app/components/notification/component.html.erb:2
- <button> with no accessible text app/views/users/_bb_code.html.erb:20
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Link with no accessible name app/components/calendar_component.html.erb:21
- <html> without a lang app/views/users/signature.html.erb:1
- Document without a <title> app/views/users/signature.html.erb:1
- REDACTED
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Serious — 22 finding(s)
- REDACTED
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- Schema created by ActiveRecord::Schema.define at runtime outside the migrations db/cache_schema.rb:13
- Schema created by ActiveRecord::Schema.define at runtime outside the migrations db/ops_schema.rb:13
- Schema created by ActiveRecord::Schema.define at runtime outside the migrations db/queue_schema.rb:13
- Page without a main landmark app/views/layouts/application.html.erb:2
- Page without a main landmark app/views/users/signature.html.erb:1
- REDACTED
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- Type Safety
- Dead file (~3 LoC) app/javascript/analytics.js
- Weak hash algorithm REDACTED:9
- Third-party script without Subresource Integrity app/views/layouts/application.html.erb:39
Minor — 19 finding(s)
- Disabled test test/controllers/users_controller_test.rb:19
- Disabled test test/controllers/users_controller_test.rb:53
- Disabled test test/controllers/users_controller_test.rb:78
- Disabled test test/controllers/users_controller_test.rb:93
- Disabled test test/controllers/users_controller_test.rb:106
- REDACTED
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- Duplicated predicate config/initializers/balzer.rb:2
- Duplicated predicate config/initializers/balzer.rb:1
- No named authorization policies
- No ADRs found Procfile:1
- REDACTED
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- No ADRs
- No release approval gate REDACTED:140
- Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted lib/http_client/request_proxy.rb:53
- Ruby's type checker does not check nil everywhere
- Silent fallback default on parse failure lib/mal/user_crawler.rb:93
Minor — 27 finding(s)
- Outdated: blazer
- Outdated: bootsnap
- Outdated: brakeman
- Outdated: cuprite
- Outdated: debug
- Outdated: ferrum
- Outdated: geocoder
- Outdated: gettext
- Outdated: gettext_i18n_rails
- Outdated: image_processing
- Outdated: lograge
- Outdated: mechanize
- Outdated: mocha
- Outdated: propshaft
- Outdated: puma
- Outdated: rails
- Outdated: redis
- Outdated: requestjs-rails
- Outdated: rubocop-rails-omakase
- Outdated: solid_errors
- Outdated: solid_queue
- Outdated: thruster
- Outdated: vcr
- Outdated: view_component
- Outdated: web-console
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=0 --max-count=200" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-84b131cf64654013889b4e7e09f781fa/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=200 --max-count=800" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-84b131cf64654013889b4e7e09f781fa/history-1.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history-1.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=1000 --max-count=115" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-84b131cf64654013889b4e7e09f781fa/history-2.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history-2.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-84b131cf64654013889b4e7e09f781fa/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt --exclude vendor/assets . | 22 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 20 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 5 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 0 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |