Executive summary
aframevr/aframe is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, most of them in the packages it uses. Its score is held back because we found no automated security scanning of the code, its secrets or its dependencies. It scores 70 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged.
Production Readiness, at 58, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is recording design decisions, worth about 8 points. Adding automated security scanning would lift Production Readiness itself, also worth about 8. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 74.
Forty known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Six pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Updating the vulnerable packages and pinning each tool to an exact version would close both risks. The three tests that check nothing need to check the result they produce.
The product code is 5,046 lines, about €7,800 to rebuild.
If Production Readiness rose from 58 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 70 to about 74.
New since the last survey: 1 finding
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Fixed since the last survey: 2 findings
- Secrets (history) · Secret: generic-api-key examples/_uploader/index.html
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
Rebuild cost: about €7,800 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €2,600 to €13,000, for 43 to 137 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×1.0 at a score of 70. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 5,046 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 scripts | 2 scripts.docs-primitives | 3 src | 4 src.components | 5 src.components.scene | 6 src.core | 7 src.core.a-cubemap | 8 src.core.a-node | 9 src.core.scene | 10 src.extras.primitives | 11 src.shaders | 12 src.systems | 13 src.utils | 14 src.core.a-assets | 15 src.core.a-entity | 16 src.core.a-mixin | 17 src.core.scene.a-scene | 18 src.extras.primitives.primitives |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 scripts | ||||||||||||||||||
| 2 scripts.docs-primitives | ||||||||||||||||||
| 3 src | ||||||||||||||||||
| 4 src.components | ||||||||||||||||||
| 5 src.components.scene | ||||||||||||||||||
| 6 src.core | ||||||||||||||||||
| 7 src.core.a-cubemap | ||||||||||||||||||
| 8 src.core.a-node | ||||||||||||||||||
| 9 src.core.scene | ||||||||||||||||||
| 10 src.extras.primitives | ||||||||||||||||||
| 11 src.shaders | ||||||||||||||||||
| 12 src.systems | ||||||||||||||||||
| 13 src.utils | ||||||||||||||||||
| 14 src.core.a-assets | 2 | |||||||||||||||||
| 15 src.core.a-entity | 1 | |||||||||||||||||
| 16 src.core.a-mixin | 1 | |||||||||||||||||
| 17 src.core.scene.a-scene | 1 | |||||||||||||||||
| 18 src.extras.primitives.primitives | 1 |
14→8 src.core.a-assets uses src.core.a-node✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in src.core.a-assets uses a type in src.core.a-node.
- The types involved
src.core.a-assets.AAssetItem→src.core.a-node.ANodesrc.core.a-assets.AAssets→src.core.a-node.ANode
- Direction
- src.core.a-assets uses src.core.a-node, so a change to src.core.a-node can break src.core.a-assets, while a change to src.core.a-assets can't break src.core.a-node.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.core.a-assets uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
15→8 src.core.a-entity uses src.core.a-node✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.core.a-entity uses a type in src.core.a-node.
- The types involved
src.core.a-entity.AEntity→src.core.a-node.ANode
- Direction
- src.core.a-entity uses src.core.a-node, so a change to src.core.a-node can break src.core.a-entity, while a change to src.core.a-entity can't break src.core.a-node.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.core.a-entity uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
16→8 src.core.a-mixin uses src.core.a-node✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.core.a-mixin uses a type in src.core.a-node.
- The types involved
src.core.a-mixin.AMixin→src.core.a-node.ANode
- Direction
- src.core.a-mixin uses src.core.a-node, so a change to src.core.a-node can break src.core.a-mixin, while a change to src.core.a-mixin can't break src.core.a-node.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.core.a-mixin uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
17→15 src.core.scene.a-scene uses src.core.a-entity✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.core.scene.a-scene uses a type in src.core.a-entity.
- The types involved
src.core.scene.a-scene.AScene→src.core.a-entity.AEntity
- Direction
- src.core.scene.a-scene uses src.core.a-entity, so a change to src.core.a-entity can break src.core.scene.a-scene, while a change to src.core.scene.a-scene can't break src.core.a-entity.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.core.scene.a-scene uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
18→15 src.extras.primitives.primitives uses src.core.a-entity✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in src.extras.primitives.primitives uses a type in src.core.a-entity.
- The types involved
src.extras.primitives.primitives.primitiveClass→src.core.a-entity.AEntity
- Direction
- src.extras.primitives.primitives uses src.core.a-entity, so a change to src.core.a-entity can break src.extras.primitives.primitives, while a change to src.extras.primitives.primitives can't break src.core.a-entity.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: src.extras.primitives.primitives uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 62 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 7 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing; Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with REDACTED; Resolve the 3 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with a-scene.test.js (2), cursor.test.js.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with REDACTED. | +7.5 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Resolve the 3 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with a-scene.test.js (2), cursor.test.js. | +6.8 pts | Low | Test Quality |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +7.6 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +6.0 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Resolve the 22 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (22). | +5.6 pts | Medium | Dependency Hygiene |
| Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it. | +4.0 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Resolve the 38 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with cursor.test.js (9), a-node.test.js (6), a-assets.test.js (4). | +2.6 pts | Medium | Test Quality |
| Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite. | +2.1 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED |
| tests/core/scene/a-scene.test.js | 4.4 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions (empty test): emits enter-vr |
| REDACTED | 4.5 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| tests/components/cursor.test.js | 5.0 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions (empty test): emits click event on intersectedEl when fuse and mouse cursor enabled |
| REDACTED | 6.2 | Mixed | Dependency Hygiene: Deprecated: eslint |
| tests/core/a-node.test.js | 7.1 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions: can emit event |
| tests/core/a-assets.test.js | 7.1 | Mixed | Test Quality: Skipped test: calls load when timing out |
| tests/components/animation.test.js | 7.4 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions: emits animationbegin event |
| tests/components/raycaster.test.js | 7.4 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions: emits intersectioncleared when disabled |
| tests/utils/throttle.test.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Test Quality: Skipped test: does not fire callback on ticks too soon |
| tests/core/a-entity.test.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Test Quality: Skipped test: can update component property with asymmetrical property type |
| tests/components/sound.test.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Test Quality: Skipped test: can change volume |
| tests/components/oculus-go-controls.test.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions: if we get buttondown for button |
| tests/components/vive-controls.test.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions: emits |
| tests/components/vive-focus-controls.test.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions: if we get buttondown for button |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED |
| tests/csp/no-unsafe-eval.test.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Test Quality: No assertions: loading the A-Frame bundle does not require unsafe-eval |
| tests/components/geometry.test.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Test Quality: No assertions: allows empty geometry |
| tests/components/look-controls.test.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Test Quality: No assertions: enables grab cursor on canvas |
| tests/components/scene/fog.test.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Test Quality: No assertions: can remove and add linear fog |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 31 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 31 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 149 of 156 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D4 Code Duplication — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. The language model for this repository listed its production source (.html) but exposed no token stream for any of it, so nothing reached the token comparison.
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — the JavaScript/TypeScript suite(s) run through a browser-driven runner the coverage collector does not drive — the repository root (karma) — a gap in the analyzer, not something this repository is missing. Coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — a Codecov configuration (codecov.yml, target 70%) and a coverage step in CI (`codecov/codecov-action`) shows coverage is measured in your own CI.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.js) and the reliability runner does support this ecosystem — it drives jest, vitest, mocha and egg-bin — but every JavaScript/TypeScript test package this repository declares runs its suite in a real browser, which the re-runner has no way to launch. the root package declares `karma` and its `scripts.test` is `karma start ./tests/karma.conf.js`. So flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's browser-driven test support, not a missing .js runner and not a finding about this repository.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. All 4 production source file(s) in this repository were read, and every one is under the ~2,400-byte (~100-line) size floor this dimension measures over (or declares itself generated), so there is no significant file to judge and knowledge concentration is not applicable. This is the size of the repository's files, not a file the engine failed to read.
- D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's naming rules read C# through Roslyn and every other language through its sidecar model; these languages are left out (PHP's reading is its own change, a Roslyn-loaded VB or F# project has no population builder yet). Their declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether their names are consistent.
- D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. PREREGISTRATION version 20's fallback (adjudication D21-sample3-v3): this rule kind was adjudicated below the 95 % precision gate, so its candidates are counted here and not published, and the score covers only the acronym-spelling and awaitable-suffix rules. The kind returns as rows only after it shows a measured precision; this says nothing about whether these names are consistent.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (REDACTED), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict. For npm the surface is what a published REDACTED's entry points (exports, main, module, types) export, followed through the source; an entry that names build output the tree does not commit (dist/, build/) is not followed back to source, because only a tsconfig outDir/rootDir pair states that mapping and a bundler's input lives in executable configuration this engine does not evaluate.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. All 4 production source file(s) in this repository were read, and every one is under the ~2,400-byte (~100-line) size floor this dimension measures over (or declares itself generated), so there is no significant file to judge and knowledge freshness is not applicable. This is the size of the repository's files, not a file the engine failed to read.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. The dev server kept running but no port it opened served a page in the time allowed. (rule: no-answer). The renderer reported: the dev server (`npm run dev`) kept running but served no page within 2 minutes. Likely cause (not identified): the dev server kept running but no port it opened served a page in the time allowed. Last output: "data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg xmlns=%27.. 813 bytes [built] [code generated] / data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg xmlns=%27.. 985 bytes [built] [code generated] / data:image/svg+xml,%3C%3Fxml versio.. 6.6 KiB [built] [code generated] / + 2 modules / modules by path ./vendor/ 10.7 KiB / ./vendor/DeviceOrientationControls.js 2.59 KiB [built] [code generated] / ./vendor/wakelock/wakelock.js 4.43 KiB [built] [code generated] / ./vendor/wakelock/util.js 3.66 KiB [built] [code generated] / ./REDACTED 3.05 KiB [built] [code generated] / webpack 5.95.0 compiled successfully in 8176 ms" No runtime evidence was gathered.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DevServer (dev). the dev server (`npm run dev`) kept running but served no page within 2 minutes. Likely cause (not identified): the dev server kept running but no port it opened served a page in the time allowed. Last output: "data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg xmlns=%27.. 813 bytes [built] [code generated] / data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg xmlns=%27.. 985 bytes [built] [code generated] / data:image/svg+xml,%3C%3Fxml versio.. 6.6 KiB [built] [code generated] / + 2 modules / modules by path ./vendor/ 10.7 KiB / ./vendor/DeviceOrientationControls.js 2.59 KiB [built] [code generated] / ./vendor/wakelock/wakelock.js 4.43 KiB [built] [code generated] / ./vendor/wakelock/util.js 3.66 KiB [built] [code generated] / ./REDACTED 3.05 KiB [built] [code generated] / webpack 5.95.0 compiled successfully in 8176 ms" No runtime evidence was gathered.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and none applies: this repository publishes a library and deploys nothing (no container, IaC or deployment manifest), so it holds no runtime state of its own. Any data-access dependency it declares is the store it is a CLIENT for, not one it operates. The DR control belongs to whoever runs that data.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, PHP, Dart, Kotlin, Ruby, Scala, Java, Python and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and no named async function in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, nor any Go, PHP or Dart function or Kotlin suspend function, makes a request that can be cancelled (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch, got, undici, node:http; net/http, net.Dial; amphp; Dio; Ktor, OkHttp), so there is nothing to judge, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 4 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D10 · Test Quality
7 skipped, 41 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 1172 tests.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with a-scene.test.js (2), cursor.test.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 38 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with cursor.test.js (9), a-node.test.js (6), a-assets.test.js (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (38 warning-level).
- Resolve the 7 Skipped test finding(s) in Test Quality — start with throttle.test.js (2), sound.test.js (2), a-assets.test.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
5 outdated direct production npm dependency(ies) of 8 graded, 0 pinning defect(s), across 1 REDACTED (1 of them the product) and 1 committed lockfile(s). Development dependencies are deliberately not graded for currency: that grade is about what SHIPS. 3 direct dependency(ies) — production, development or optional — are marked DEPRECATED by their publisher (the registry's per-version mark, or the lockfile's copy of it when the registry could not be asked); deprecated transitive packages are listed but not charged. Whether any is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — the registry publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: that is a source question, and the frontend dependency lens (R8) answers it in this same run. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.
What to do
- Resolve the 22 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (22). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (22 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 3 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 38 shipped npm package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from registry.npmjs.org over the 38 package(s) this repository's committed lockfile installs for a consumer — its 8 production, optional and peer dependency(ies), across 1 product REDACTED manifest(s), and everything those install in turn. Its 40 `devDependencies` declaration(s), and every package only they reach, are excluded: a consumer installs none of them. ★ Each licence is the one the registry publishes for the package's CURRENT release rather than for the pinned version, which is the same caveat the Hex and RubyGems arms carry. This repository publishes itself under MIT, which is its own choice and is not judged here.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 2 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D27 · Navigability
27 % of calls cross a namespace and 0 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
7 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 1 medium, 0 low. 6 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `examples/showcase/wikipedia/indexMobile.html` — so no absence of findings in them is evidence of anything, and nothing in them was analysed. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 6 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
62 finding(s): 6 critical, 34 high, 16 medium, 6 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 33 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (33). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (33 issue-level).
- Resolve the 5 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Critical vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 8 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P10 · Library API & versioning
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 2 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:8
- `REDACTED` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — REDACTED:46
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- `http://localhost:8080/dist/aframe-master.js` is executed by this page with no Subresource Integrity. Whoever can answer that request — the CDN, anyone who compromises it, anyone on the network path — runs arbitrary script in this page's origin, with its session. The URL also names no version, so it resolves to whatever that origin serves at fetch time — the executed bytes can change with nobody touching this repository. — scripts/docs-primitives/index.html:5
What to do
- Pin third-party scripts and verify them: name an exact version in the URL and add an `integrity="sha384-…"` hash alongside `crossorigin="anonymous"` (both are required — an integrity hash on a cross-origin script without `crossorigin` is not evaluated, it blocks the script). Where the vendor ships a continuously-updated loader and publishes no stable hash (tag managers, analytics, chat widgets), Subresource Integrity is not available: constrain it instead with a `Content-Security-Policy` that names the exact origins allowed to execute, and drop the script from the pages that do not need it. Where the page is shipped inside a package that others host, prefer vendoring the asset and serving it from the app’s own origin, so no consumer inherits a third-party dependency they did not choose.
X12 · Unreachable branch
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 100% | Checked 1 of 4 | Strongest area. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 66% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 58% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 88% | Strong | Solid. |
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- X10 Duplicated predicate — 3 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 85 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (4 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (4 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (4 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (4 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (4 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (4 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — the dev server (`npm run dev`) kept running but served no page within 2 minutes. Likely cause (not identified): the dev server kept running but no port it opened served a page in the time allowed. Last output: "data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg xmlns=%27.. 813 bytes [built] [code generated] / data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg xmlns=%27.. 985 bytes [built] [code generated] / data:image/svg+xml,%3C%3Fxml versio.. 6.6 KiB [built] [code generated] / + 2 modules / modules by path ./vendor/ 10.7 KiB / ./vendor/DeviceOrientationControls.js 2.59 KiB [built] [code generated] / ./vendor/wakelock/wakelock.js 4.43 KiB [built] [code generated] / ./vendor/wakelock/util.js 3.66 KiB [built] [code generated] / ./REDACTED 3.05 KiB [built] [code generated] / webpack 5.95.0 compiled successfully in 8176 ms" No runtime evidence was gathered. This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect. If it does persist personal data (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the controls belong to wherever that data is stored.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — this repository stands up no server (no Express, Fastify, Koa, Hono, NestJS or similar app, no Next.js/SvelteKit/Nuxt server route, no edge function), creates no Supabase tables and talks to no hosted backend. Access control is therefore N/A here — a browser application or library is authorized by the server it calls, not by itself; a client-side route guard hides a page and authorizes nothing. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the limit belongs wherever that data is stored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the rights are served wherever that data is stored.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — cyclomatic complexity does not apply: all 373 method(s) the analysis read sit in demonstration, test, vendored or generated trees, so this repository has no authored production method to measure. Not scored.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — no browser-driven test runner (karma)
- D16 Bus Factor — every production source file is under the ~100-line size floor — too little code for knowledge concentration to be judged
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — cognitive complexity does not apply: all 373 method(s) the analysis read sit in demonstration, test, vendored or generated trees, so this repository has no authored production method to measure. Not scored.
- D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency does not read html yet; not measured.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — Too few judgeable comments (0 of at least 30); comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (4730 LoC, 72 module-visible types across 20 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — every production source file is under the ~100-line size floor — too little code for knowledge freshness to be judged
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline publishes no artifact — no package publish, container push or release with files to download. Supply-chain provenance, signing and an SBOM describe a PUBLISHED artifact for the people who obtain it, so there is nothing to attest here; a deployment of the service itself publishes nothing for anyone else to verify. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts publishing artifacts (a package, a container image, or a release with downloadable files). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D4 Code Duplication — Duplication not measured — .html not exposed to the token comparison
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this npm build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — reported, not scored — this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript declares no class method or module-scope function, and this score is a density of unfinished work per function, which has no denominator here. The file-level signals below were still collected and are shown in full
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
- P2 Observability — This repository's JavaScript/TypeScript source (1 module(s), 1 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JavaScript/TypeScript source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a REDACTED, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: this repository declares no async functions, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — Not applicable: this check looks for a loop whose body adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is walking, invalidating the enumerator it holds, and in this repository's languages that cannot happen. JavaScript and TypeScript have no iterator that a change can invalidate: an `Array` is walked by index against its live length, and a `Map` or `Set` by the ECMAScript specification's live entry list, so a body that adds to, removes from or empties what it walks raises nothing — every loop form (`for…of`, `for…in`, `forEach`, `map`, `filter`, `reduce`, `entries()`) on every built-in collection (`Array`, `Map`, `Set`, plain objects, `URLSearchParams`, `Headers`, `FormData`) runs to completion. Such a loop can still skip an element or never end, which is a different defect and not the one this check asks about. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X3 Exception handling — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — Not applicable: this check asks whether the null-typed discipline a language offers is switched on, and how much of that the assertion operator takes back, and in this repository's languages there is no such switch and no such operator. Plain JavaScript carries no type annotations and commits no tsconfig, so it states no null-typed discipline for this check to grade: there is nothing here that switches null checking on or off, and TypeScript (or `// @ts-check`) is how a repository acquires one — advice, not a defect this card measures. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 49 finding(s)
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- No assertions (empty test): emits enter-vr tests/core/scene/a-scene.test.js:192
- No assertions (empty test): emits exit-vr tests/core/scene/a-scene.test.js:312
- No assertions (empty test): emits click event on intersectedEl when fuse and mouse cursor enabled tests/components/cursor.test.js:163
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Serious — 66 finding(s)
- No assertions: loading the A-Frame bundle does not require unsafe-eval tests/csp/no-unsafe-eval.test.js:31
- No assertions: loads if no assets tests/core/a-assets.test.js:17
- No assertions: waits for images to load tests/core/a-assets.test.js:57
- No assertions: does not wait for media element without preload attribute tests/core/a-assets.test.js:119
- No assertions: does not wait for random element tests/core/a-assets.test.js:135
- No assertions: handles detaching with with uninitialized components tests/core/a-entity.test.js:628
- No assertions: can emit event tests/core/a-node.test.js:9
- No assertions: bubbles tests/core/a-node.test.js:52
- No assertions: can load when empty tests/core/a-node.test.js:96
- No assertions: can load with a child node tests/core/a-node.test.js:114
- No assertions: can load with a callback tests/core/a-node.test.js:125
- No assertions: does not wait for non-nodes to load tests/core/a-node.test.js:131
- No assertions: calls component pause handlers tests/core/scene/a-scene.test.js:652
- No assertions: calls component remove handlers tests/core/scene/a-scene.test.js:664
- No assertions: emits animationbegin event tests/components/animation.test.js:566
- No assertions: emits animationcomplete event tests/components/animation.test.js:571
- No assertions: emits animationcomplete event twice tests/components/animation.test.js:580
- No assertions: emits mousedown event on el tests/components/cursor.test.js:92
- No assertions: emits mousedown event on intersectedEl tests/components/cursor.test.js:101
- No assertions: emits mouseup event on el tests/components/cursor.test.js:120
- No assertions: emits mouseup event on intersectedEl tests/components/cursor.test.js:130
- No assertions: emits click event on el tests/components/cursor.test.js:141
- No assertions: emits click event on intersectedEl tests/components/cursor.test.js:152
- No assertions: emits a mouseleave event on the prevIntersectedEl tests/components/cursor.test.js:278
- No assertions: emits event on intersectedEl on fuse click tests/components/cursor.test.js:324
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- Skipped test: does not fire callback on ticks too soon tests/utils/throttle.test.js:40
- Skipped test: fires only one callback on multiply late ticks tests/utils/throttle.test.js:70
- Skipped test: calls load when timing out tests/core/a-assets.test.js:149
- Skipped test: can update component property with asymmetrical property type tests/core/a-entity.test.js:416
- Skipped test: cancels request animation frame tests/core/scene/a-scene.test.js:638
- Skipped test: can change volume tests/components/sound.test.js:63
- Skipped test: preloading audio tag tests/components/sound.test.js:336
- Deprecated: eslint REDACTED:65
- Deprecated: glob REDACTED:70
- Deprecated: sinon REDACTED:87
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- Third-party script without Subresource Integrity scripts/docs-primitives/index.html:5
Minor — 36 finding(s)
- Deprecated: @humanwhocodes/config-array REDACTED:590
- Deprecated: @humanwhocodes/object-schema REDACTED:620
- Deprecated: abab REDACTED:1457
- Deprecated: boom REDACTED:2172
- Deprecated: content-type-parser REDACTED:2870
- Deprecated: cryptiles REDACTED:2957
- Deprecated: har-validator REDACTED:5916
- Deprecated: hawk REDACTED:6059
- Deprecated: hoek REDACTED:6086
- Deprecated: inflight REDACTED:6451
- Deprecated: glob REDACTED:7814
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- Deprecated: lodash.get REDACTED:8088
- Deprecated: openport REDACTED:9310
- Deprecated: request REDACTED:10518
- Deprecated: rimraf REDACTED:10690
- Deprecated: glob REDACTED:10707
- Deprecated: glob REDACTED:11419
- Deprecated: sntp REDACTED:11631
- Deprecated: eslint REDACTED:12130
- Deprecated: glob REDACTED:13242
- Deprecated: uuid REDACTED:13784
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- Duplicated predicate src/core/a-assets.js:32
- Duplicated predicate src/components/logitech-mx-ink-controls.js:160
- Duplicated predicate src/components/logitech-mx-ink-controls.js:126
- No ADRs found REDACTED:15
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- No dependency-update automation REDACTED:46
Minor — 5 finding(s)
- Outdated (npm): debug
- Outdated (npm): deep-assign
- Outdated (npm): stats-gl
- Outdated (npm): three
- Outdated (npm): three-bmfont-text
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-a8cd02a228bc4084a0444474f2e33c5e/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 20 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-a8cd02a228bc4084a0444474f2e33c5e/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 12 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt --exclude docs --exclude scripts --exclude src --exclude tests/components --exclude tests/core --exclude tests/csp --exclude tests/extras --exclude tests/node --exclude tests/shaders --exclude tests/systems --exclude tests/utils --exclude vendor . | 7 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 62 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |