Public report of VirtusLab/orca, published 7 November 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of
findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known
vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive reportMeasured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.11.2). Assert signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey →
Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 7 November 2026, 08:23 UTC · Survey ID cd_4f0f1465d28d46f7a10b304768834466
VirtusLab/orca
Measured 7 November 2026, 08:23 UTC, at code version 026c41d
CAI scoreAdequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
Up 1 since the last survey
The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.
A medium codebase: 34,354 lines of product code in 9 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.6 person-years · Weakest lens: Production Readiness, 55
Findings by how serious they are
19 critical52 serious60 minor
12 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, we either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard we look for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.
This survey was produced by
Canine Code Analyzer
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Canine Code Analyzer engine 1.0.0
Measured
7 November 2026, 08:23 UTC
A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number
together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee
the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds the Canine Code Analyzer. It is open to any tool that
implements it, and today the Canine Code Analyzer is the only one that does.
The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. We work it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸
63of 63 dimensions measured by tools.
121of 131 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 10 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
63dimensions across 6 lenses, read from 34,354 lines of product code in 9 projects.
VirtusLab/orca falls short of our standard for a preview release because we found no automated security scanning of the code, its secrets or its dependencies. It scores 62 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, and 18 of its 19 critical findings are security problems in the build pipeline.
Production Readiness, at 55, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is adding automated security scanning, worth about 4 points. Declaring which values may be missing comes next, worth about 3 points. Raising Production Readiness to 62 would lift the score to about 64.
Sixteen pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. One pipeline step runs a download nobody checks, and one secret can leak from the build pipeline. Pinning each tool to an exact version, checking the download against a checksum and limiting the secret to its own step would close these risks. The set of files in separate parts that keep changing together needs that dependency made explicit.
The product code is 34,354 lines, about €90,000 to rebuild. The check for the health of its packages couldn't finish, so that result is missing, not a clean pass.
A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.
How the score is built: what each lens counts forThe lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
If Production Readiness rose from 55 to 62, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 62 to about 64.
Code composition: what the lines of code are
Product code 43%Tests 57%
Rebuild cost: about €90,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild
€30,000 to €150,000, for 497 to 1,576 hours of work, about 0.6 person-years for 1 to 2 engineers
Difficulty of the problem
Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor
×0.9 at a score of 62. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size
Medium: 34,354 lines of product code
What it is not
Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one.
How the estimate is made: We price the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.
Top priorities
The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.
1
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: scalafix or scapegoat — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
On Scala 3, add `-Yexplicit-nulls` to `scalacOptions` so `String` and `String | Null` mean different things, and type each Java API's result as nullable where it can return null; on Scala 2 (or as a first step), enable WartRemover's `Null` wart (`wartremoverErrors += Wart.Null`) or Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls = true` so the code holds absence in `Option`.
Then pay the assertions down rather than adding to them: each `.nn` is a null the compiler could not rule out — wrap the Java value in `Option(…)` at the boundary, pattern-match on `null` once there, or change the API so the null cannot arrive; an `unsafeNulls` import switches the checking off for everything after it.
Secure the server's transport: serve TLS itself (akka/pekko-http `ConnectionContext.httpsServer(sslContext)` with `newServerAt(…).enableHttps(…)`, an http4s server builder's `withTLS(…)`, Play's `https.port`), or run it behind a TLS-terminating proxy and trust it (`X-Forwarded-Proto`; Play `play.http.forwarded.trustedProxies`); send `Strict-Transport-Security` once it is HTTPS-only (http4s `HSTS(…)`, Play `RedirectHttpsFilter`).
Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.
Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €90,000 to build again, about 0.6 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 55 (Adequate). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: scalafix or scapegoat — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 4 points for medium effort. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways, which only happens where the projects form a dependency cycle. A graph without cycles has none.
At a glance — Code Health · 57% · Adequate · gated by X5 ·
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2025 — Injection
19
High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures
5
Medium
Roadmap
Top priorities: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: scalafix or scapegoat — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing; On Scala 3, add `-Yexplicit-nulls` to `scalacOptions` so `String` and `String | Null` mean different things, and type each Java API's result as nullable where it can return null; on Scala 2 (or as a first step), enable WartRemover's `Null` wart (`wartremoverErrors += Wart.Null`) or Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls = true` so the code holds absence in `Option`. Then pay the assertions down rather than adding to them: each `.nn` is a null the compiler could not rule out — wrap the Java value in `Option(…)` at the boundary, pattern-match on `null` once there, or change the API so the null cannot arrive; an `unsafeNulls` import switches the checking off for everything after it; Secure the server's transport: serve TLS itself (akka/pekko-http `ConnectionContext.httpsServer(sslContext)` with `newServerAt(…).enableHttps(…)`, an http4s server builder's `withTLS(…)`, Play's `https.port`), or run it behind a TLS-terminating proxy and trust it (`X-Forwarded-Proto`; Play `play.http.forwarded.trustedProxies`); send `Strict-Transport-Security` once it is HTTPS-only (http4s `HSTS(…)`, Play `RedirectHttpsFilter`).
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: scalafix or scapegoat — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
On Scala 3, add `-Yexplicit-nulls` to `scalacOptions` so `String` and `String | Null` mean different things, and type each Java API's result as nullable where it can return null; on Scala 2 (or as a first step), enable WartRemover's `Null` wart (`wartremoverErrors += Wart.Null`) or Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls = true` so the code holds absence in `Option`. Then pay the assertions down rather than adding to them: each `.nn` is a null the compiler could not rule out — wrap the Java value in `Option(…)` at the boundary, pattern-match on `null` once there, or change the API so the null cannot arrive; an `unsafeNulls` import switches the checking off for everything after it.
Secure the server's transport: serve TLS itself (akka/pekko-http `ConnectionContext.httpsServer(sslContext)` with `newServerAt(…).enableHttps(…)`, an http4s server builder's `withTLS(…)`, Play's `https.port`), or run it behind a TLS-terminating proxy and trust it (`X-Forwarded-Proto`; Play `play.http.forwarded.trustedProxies`); send `Strict-Transport-Security` once it is HTTPS-only (http4s `HSTS(…)`, Play `RedirectHttpsFilter`).
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Architectural Integrity: Classify ADR enforcement: 0001. Implement Orca in direct-style Scala 3 on Ox
adr/0002-context-function-flow-dsl.md
9.0
Near-clean
Architectural Integrity: Classify ADR enforcement: 0002. Flow scripts use a context-function DSL with an ambient FlowContext
adr/0003-pluggable-llm-backends.md
9.0
Near-clean
Architectural Integrity: Classify ADR enforcement: 0003. LLM backends are pluggable behind an `AgentBackend[B <: Backend]` trait
adr/0004-module-layout.md
9.0
Near-clean
Architectural Integrity: Classify ADR enforcement: 0004. Split the codebase into `tools / flow / backend / runner` modules
adr/0005-flow-dsl-reshape.md
9.0
Near-clean
Architectural Integrity: Classify ADR enforcement: 0005. Reshape the flow DSL so `import orca.{*, given}` is the whole ceremony
How the grades work
Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this
survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.
Critical — 19
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a
missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here
tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 52
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades
the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to
carry for two years either.
Minor — 60
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions.
Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 12
Something this survey could not settle
from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no
positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves
nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean
result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither
rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each
one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 63 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
Every figure here is one of two kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10.
What we checked — 63 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 121 of 131 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.scala) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`addSbtPlugin("org.scoverage" % "sbt-scoverage" % "<version>")` in `project/plugins.sbt`, then `sbt clean coverage test coverageReport`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (`addSbtPlugin("org.scoverage" % "sbt-scoverage" % "<version>")` in `project/plugins.sbt`, then `sbt clean coverage test coverageReport`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.scala) and this repository declares an sbt build (repository root, 283 test files), but it was not re-run: the analyzer environment could not run it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This repository's dependency manifests WERE read and their pinning discipline assessed; what went unanswered is the currency half, because repo1.maven.org — the registry that answers it — was asked and did not reply (HTTP 429 Too Many Requests from http://172.31.7.1:8790/maven/com/lihaoyi/fansi_3/maven-metadata.xml). This is OUR side and it is an ENVIRONMENT fault, not a missing collector: the collector exists and ran. An HTTP 403 here is what this scan's egress allowlist returns for a host that is not on it, so the remedy is to add repo1.maven.org to the allowlist and re-run — not to build anything.
D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (5 contributor(s) across 748 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 99% of the history; the other 4 hold 0.2% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's deterministic naming rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. Until then its declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether its names are consistent.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository publishes a package — a Claude Code plugin, declared by skills/orca/.claude-plugin/plugin.json — so it DOES have an intentionally-exposed surface: the commands, skills, agents and hooks the plugin contributes to its host, which consumers reach by name. D22 collects code-API surfaces (type and member signatures) only, and has no collector for a plugin's contribution surface, so the consistency of that surface was not judged. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault — no change to the scan image can close it.
D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
D25 ADR Conformance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The code index reads C#, Razor, TypeScript, JavaScript and Vue. A rule whose scope holds production code in another language is not called honoured, because its uses could sit in that code.
D27 Navigability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `claude/src/main/scala/orca/backend/claude/ClaudeArgs.scala`, `claude/src/main/scala/orca/backend/claude/ClaudeBackend.scala`, `claude/src/main/scala/orca/backend/claude/ClaudeDecoder.scala`, `claude/src/main/scala/orca/backend/claude/streamjson/ContentBlock.scala`, `claude/src/main/scala/orca/backend/claude/streamjson/InboundMessage.scala`, … (+138 more) produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
D44 Platform End-of-Life — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This dimension reads a project's own statement about the platform it runs on: a TargetFramework in a .NET project file, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain file or Cargo.toml rust-version, a .go-version, .java-version, .ruby-version, .tool-versions or .sdkmanrc, a go.mod go directive, a Maven or Gradle Java level or toolchain, a Gemfile's ruby directive, a mix.exs elixir requirement, a rebar.config minimum_otp_vsn, a pubspec.yaml SDK constraint, a build.sbt scalaVersion, or a framework major pinned by a dependency constraint. This repository carries none of them, so nothing about its platform was established. That is a gap in this analyzer's coverage, NOT a finding that the platform is supported — a language whose runtime is declared elsewhere (Package.swift, a Dockerfile) is simply not read here yet.
AX2 Stateful singletons — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection singletons in C#, Spring/JSR-330/CDI singletons in Java and Kotlin, module state in Python request handlers, handler state in Go and Swift, Play controllers, Cask routes, Scalatra servlets, Finatra controllers, Akka/Pekko HTTP routes and JSR-330 singletons in Scala, Rails, Sinatra, Grape, Roda and Hanami handlers and Rack apps in Ruby, and module state in F# request handlers (Giraffe, Saturn, Falco, Oxpecker and Suave handlers and ASP.NET Core controllers) only, and this repository's product is written in Scala (Tapir), which was left unread, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
D25 ADR Conformance: ADR conformance checks only decisions stated in a checkable form (a ruled-out element, package or dependency, an adr-rules block, a declared delivery status): a decision written only as prose is unverifiable, and decisions never written down are not checked.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was OpencodeDecoder.translate at 18. A further 2 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being TerminalEventRenderer.render at 22 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score. 2 files carry no cyclomatic complexity row at all for this reason — every one of their over-threshold methods was excluded, so the exclusion is disclosed nowhere in the file itself: runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/terminal/TerminalEventRenderer.scala (TerminalEventRenderer.render at 22), runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/LoggingListener.scala (LoggingListener.onEvent at 20). They are named here because the per-file figures other dimensions report are taken BEFORE this exclusion, so such a file can show a high maximum complexity elsewhere in this report and nothing here, with nothing to reconcile the two.
Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with OpencodeDecoder.translate (cyclomatic 18). — Refactoring it lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.7 to about 10.0/10.
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Bring the 2 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with ResponseParser.matchingCloseBrace (cognitive 18), ToolInputSummary.topLevelFieldNames (cognitive 17). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 2 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.7 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D3 · God Classes9.3 / 10Stronggated by 7 serious findings✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 4 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with OsGitTool.scala, OrcaDir.scala, Agent.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with FlowLifecycle.scala, GitHubTool.scala, OsGitTool.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
D5 · Coupling9.1 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
9 production modules (sbt), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; a dependsOn spread (deps: _*) and a project whose directory a helper computes are not visible there; 1 module(s) off the main sequence.
Off the main sequence: tools
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Resolve the 1 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with OsProcCliRunner.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cohesion (LCOM4) in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.
Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.
No mechanizable ADR was identified, so enforcement is not measured. Dependency cycles not checked (no project-reference graph; where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there).
Classify ADR enforcement: 0001. Implement Orca in direct-style Scala 3 on Ox · ×25adr/0001-direct-style-scala-on-ox.md
What to do
Resolve the 25 Classify ADR enforcement finding(s) in Architectural Integrity — start with 0001-direct-style-scala-on-ox.md, 0002-context-function-flow-dsl.md, 0003-pluggable-llm-backends.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (25 recommendation-level).
Enforce Architectural Integrity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
2570 test methods: 2540 unit, 30 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The Rust suite contributes 2 `#[test]` function(s) across 1 file(s) declaring at least one; its unit/integration split is Cargo's own — 0 of those file(s) are integration-test targets under a crate's tests/ directory, and the rest are #[test] functions compiled into the crate they test. The Scala suite contributes 2568 test case(s) across 238 file(s) in a test source set declaring at least one — every `test("…")`, `it("…")`, `property("…")` and `"…" in {…}` registration and every JUnit `@Test`, which is how munit, ScalaTest, utest, ZIO Test and specs2 declare a case; a case registered under a computed name is not counted, so this is a floor. Its tier split is INFERRED from paths and file names, except sbt's src/it source set, which the build declares.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Resolve the 3 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with TerminalEventRenderer.scala, LoggingListener.scala, OpencodeDecoder.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
1 deducted task-comment markers across 34354 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
Resolve the 1 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with FlowAuthoring.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Every README, docs/ document and root guide parsed by its markup and measured in Unicode letters. Published: a runnable or packaged .NET project whose README (or a document it links, or a root guide) shows no example, and a root README naming none of three or more projects. Overview, licence, boilerplate, wall-of-text, empty-section and XML-doc rows are measured and withheld (counted in gaps) after adjudication. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 100 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D20 · ADR Quality8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Every ADR read by its section structure: nine located rules (a missing Decision, Context or Consequences section, a stale status, two records deciding the same question, a dangling supersede link, a number-only title, a single option, no named cost, no status where the log uses one, no enforcement field where the log adopted one), each a fixed deduction from 10; the score is the mean over evaluated records. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.
11 of 25 evaluated ADRs have a defect readable from the log itself (a missing or empty section, no title, a single option, consequences with no cost, no status, a missing enforcement field, a status the log contradicts, a dangling link, an unlinked second decision on one question, a date that is no calendar day). How well each record argues its case is not measured.
ADR has no Context section · ×5adr/0001-direct-style-scala-on-ox.md:1detected by adr-integrity
ADR declares no status · ×4adr/0010-prompts-and-helpers-convention.md:1detected by adr-integrity
ADR superseded but its status says otherwise · ×2adr/0019-project-stack-settings.md:3detected by adr-integrity
What to do
Resolve the 5 ADR has no Context section finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0001-direct-style-scala-on-ox.md, 0002-context-function-flow-dsl.md, 0003-pluggable-llm-backends.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 4 ADR declares no status finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0010-prompts-and-helpers-convention.md, 0011-reviewer-roster.md, 0012-mcp-host-bridge.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 2 ADR superseded but its status says otherwise finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0019-project-stack-settings.md, 0021-orca-shell.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the code actually follows the decisions recorded in the project's ADRs.
Method: Each binding ADR read for checkable forms: a backticked element its Decision section rules out, a ruled-out package the manifests declare, a forbidden module dependency, an opt-in adr-rules block, and a declared delivery status the code does not yet carry. A prose decision with no checkable form is unverifiable, neither a finding nor a pass. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.
0 of 1 checkable records are broken by the code or by their own declared delivery (1 of 20 binding records state a rule in checkable form or declare their delivery; prose decisions are unverifiable).
1 of 1 build units (sbt) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
Projects may be oversized for their cohesion
What to do
Resolve the 1 Projects may be oversized for their cohesion finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
19 finding(s): 0 critical, 18 high, 1 medium, 0 low. 16 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 114 file(s) — `claude/src/main/scala/orca/backend/claude/ClaudeArgs.scala`, `claude/src/main/scala/orca/backend/claude/ClaudeBackend.scala`, `claude/src/main/scala/orca/backend/claude/ClaudeDecoder.scala`, `claude/src/main/scala/orca/backend/claude/streamjson/ContentBlock.scala`, `claude/src/main/scala/orca/backend/claude/streamjson/InboundMessage.scala`, … (+109 more) — so no absence of findings in them is evidence of anything, and nothing in them was analysed. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 16 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (16 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.
Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): every row is a match against a vulnerability database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 183 of the 347 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.
Resolve the 1 Boundary-crossing change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with ClaudeBackend.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with FsTool.scala (2), CostTracker.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Reported apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.
Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): the malicious-package feed is a database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.
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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue in this repository's Scala: methods whose whole body is still `???` or a "not implemented" throw where nothing overrides them, and placeholder text (lorem ipsum, changeme/replace_me…) left in strings of non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords, in this repository's Scala: methods whose body is `???` or only throws a "not implemented" error, methods that take inputs and return a constant or do nothing, dead `if (false)` branches, and skeleton classes most of whose methods are holes.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the project's current-state documentation describes the code that exists.
Method: Every current-state document's checkable claims looked up in the tree (links, versions, and artefact counts an order of magnitude off), plus two README checks: an advertised infrastructure product with no footprint, and a module the CHANGELOG records as removed. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add scalafix or scapegoat (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 4339 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:7
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: scalafix or scapegoat — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.
What to do
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from each language's code model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
Other · Security — Read from this repository's Scala source and the Java beside it: cryptographic hygiene (weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source) and outbound TLS (certificate validation, protocol version) — facts about code that hold whether or not it serves anything itself. This repository serves HTTP itself (tools/src/main/scala/orca/backend/mcp/McpHost.scala:14 — `NettySyncServer`), so its Scala source was also read for the server controls: TLS served or HSTS set, security response headers, cookie flags and inbound validation — each credited where its Scala spelling appears in production source, not proven on every route. A Play application is credited the security headers Play's default `SecurityHeadersFilter` sends unless its build or configuration switches that filter off, and its cookies the HttpOnly flag Play sets by default.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.
This repository runs an HTTP server and nothing in its Scala source or committed configuration secures the transport: no HTTPS served (akka/pekko-http `ConnectionContext.httpsServer`/`enableHttps`, an http4s builder's `withTLS`, Jetty's `SslContextFactory`, zio-http's `SSLConfig`, Play's `https.port`), no `Strict-Transport-Security` header, HSTS middleware or Play `RedirectHttpsFilter`, no `X-Forwarded-Proto` read or Play `play.http.forwarded.trustedProxies` for a TLS-terminating proxy — so its traffic may cross the network in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: tools/src/main/scala/orca/backend/mcp/McpHost.scala:14 — `NettySyncServer`.
None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is set on a response this repository's Scala server sends — defense in depth, even when a proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: tools/src/main/scala/orca/backend/mcp/McpHost.scala:14 — `NettySyncServer`.
What to do
Secure the server's transport: serve TLS itself (akka/pekko-http `ConnectionContext.httpsServer(sslContext)` with `newServerAt(…).enableHttps(…)`, an http4s server builder's `withTLS(…)`, Play's `https.port`), or run it behind a TLS-terminating proxy and trust it (`X-Forwarded-Proto`; Play `play.http.forwarded.trustedProxies`); send `Strict-Transport-Security` once it is HTTPS-only (http4s `HSTS(…)`, Play `RedirectHttpsFilter`).
Set security response headers on what the server sends — keep Play's `SecurityHeadersFilter` enabled, wrap akka/pekko-http routes in `respondWithHeaders(RawHeader("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff"), …)`, or add an http4s middleware that sets `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Content-Type-Options` and a frame policy on every response.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `NullPointerException` (Java, Kotlin, Scala), `ArgumentError.notNull` (Dart) or `ArgumentNullException` (F#'s `nullArg`) tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back. Also whether a `finally` that gives the primitive back unconditionally can run in a state where the method does not hold it: after a timed wait whose result was discarded, after an acquire inside the `try` that can fail, after the body already released it, or never, because a `return` left between the acquire and the `try`.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.
Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
`debug` at line 30 is called with an argument built by `args.mkString("…")` (line 30), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Scala evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: the logger takes a built `String` (SLF4J, Akka/Pekko `LoggingAdapter`, `context.log`), and there is no `isDebugEnabled`/`isTraceEnabled` test and no debug flag. — tools/src/main/scala/orca/subprocess/OsProcCliRunner.scala:30
`debug` at line 40 is called with an argument built by `args.mkString("…")` (line 40), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Scala evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: the logger takes a built `String` (SLF4J, Akka/Pekko `LoggingAdapter`, `context.log`), and there is no `isDebugEnabled`/`isTraceEnabled` test and no debug flag. — tools/src/main/scala/orca/subprocess/OsProcCliRunner.scala:40
What to do
In Scala, put the construction behind the logger's own check (`if (log.isDebugEnabled)`), or log through a logger that takes the message by name or by macro and so builds it only when the level is on — scala-logging's `LazyLogging`/`StrictLogging` (`logger.debug(s"rows: ${rows.mkString(", ")}")` expands to that check), log4s or log4cats. Interpolating into an `s"…"` is not the fix on SLF4J or Akka's `LoggingAdapter`: their `debug` takes a `String`, so the interpolation and every `mkString` inside it run before the call is entered.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.
Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.
Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.
Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a `for` loop leaves the `dict`, `set` or `deque` it is walking alone — CPython's iterators over those check that the collection has not changed size since the loop began, so a body that removes from (or empties) the very collection the loop is walking makes the next step raise `RuntimeError: dictionary changed size during iteration` and the remaining items are never seen. Whether a `for` comprehension or `foreach` leaves the mutable collection it is walking alone — an `ArrayBuffer` or `ListBuffer` counts its changes and its iterator checks the count, an `ArrayDeque` (and `mutable.Queue`/`mutable.Stack`) is walked by index up to its starting length, and a `java.util` collection walked through `asScala` is fail-fast, so a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is walking makes a later step throw `ConcurrentModificationException` (`IndexOutOfBoundsException` for a deque) and the remaining elements are never seen.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
`case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter. (×24) — tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/OsGitTool.scala:235, tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/OsGitTool.scala:696, tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/Worktrees.scala:220, …
An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. (×4) — tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/OsGitTool.scala:650, runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/terminal/TerminalActor.scala:60, opencode/src/main/scala/orca/backend/opencode/OpencodeDecoder.scala:71, …
`case scala.util.control.NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter. (×2) — shell/src/main/scala/orca/shell/menu/ResumeDetector.scala:58, shell/src/main/scala/orca/shell/menu/ResumeDetector.scala:108
What to do
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded)
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X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.
`warn` at line 278 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.warn("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix. — tools/src/main/scala/orca/agents/Agent.scala:278
`warn` at line 352 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.warn("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix. — runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/FlowLifecycle.scala:352
`debug` at line 865 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.debug("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix. — runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/FlowLifecycle.scala:865
`debug` at line 123 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.debug("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix. — pi/src/main/scala/orca/backend/pi/PiSessionStore.scala:123
`warn` at line 126 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.warn("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix. — pi/src/main/scala/orca/backend/pi/PiSessionStore.scala:126
`warn` at line 134 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.warn("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix. — pi/src/main/scala/orca/backend/pi/PiSessionStore.scala:134
`warn` at line 86 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.warn("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix. — flow/src/main/scala/orca/runlog/RunEventLog.scala:86
`warn` at line 292 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.warn("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix. — flow/src/main/scala/orca/runlog/RunEventLog.scala:292
`warn` at line 305 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.warn("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix. — flow/src/main/scala/orca/runlog/RunEventLog.scala:305
Other · Code Health — Whether Scala's null is held to the type system and not undermined by assertions — a file compiled with `-Yexplicit-nulls` is one where `String` excludes null and `String | Null` admits it, a file under WartRemover's `Null` wart or Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls` is one whose code cannot write `null` and must say `Option`, and each `.nn`, `import scala.language.unsafeNulls` or null-lint suppression is the author overruling that.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
No build over this repository's 340 Scala product file(s) passes `-Yexplicit-nulls`, enables WartRemover's `Null` wart or runs Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls`, so every reference type admits null and nothing reports a `null` written into the code or returned from a Java API — the first one to reach a method call is a `NullPointerException`. `Option` by convention is a habit no tool here holds the code to.
What to do
On Scala 3, add `-Yexplicit-nulls` to `scalacOptions` so `String` and `String | Null` mean different things, and type each Java API's result as nullable where it can return null; on Scala 2 (or as a first step), enable WartRemover's `Null` wart (`wartremoverErrors += Wart.Null`) or Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls = true` so the code holds absence in `Option`. Then pay the assertions down rather than adding to them: each `.nn` is a null the compiler could not rule out — wrap the Java value in `Option(…)` at the boundary, pattern-match on `null` once there, or change the API so the null cannot arrive; an `unsafeNulls` import switches the checking off for everything after it.
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Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — 4 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 53 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's Scala imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's TypeScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
AX2 Stateful singletons — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — This repository has nothing the runtime tiers could boot or serve — no markup, no UI framework or web-server dependency, no UI component source, no native UI project and no API definition — nothing here is a surface to boot — so runtime a11y/egress/header evidence has no subject here. Not applicable: this is neither a gap in the scan nor a finding about your code.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named column (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone_number, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, a MongoDB or Cassandra driver, JDBC) imported either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, JDBC, MongoDB, Cassandra, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, JDBC, MongoDB, Cassandra, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
D10 Test Quality — ~45921 lines of test source are present (.scala) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .scala suite was found but not re-run
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency currency not established — repo1.maven.org did not answer
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's 13 pinned sbt dependency coordinate(s) were read from its 5 sbt build file(s), but Maven Central could not be asked for the licence of 12 of them (HTTP 429 Too Many Requests from http://172.31.7.1:8790/maven/com/github/plokhotnyuk/jsoniter-scala/jsoniter-scala-core_3/2.38.17/jsoniter-scala-core_3-2.38.17.pom), and a licence verdict over part of a dependency graph is not a licence verdict. Nothing is asserted about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency is measured on C# and TypeScript only; Scala not measured.
D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only; comments in this repository's .py, .scala source were not judged.
D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.scala), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 143 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D44 Platform End-of-Life — Platform end-of-life not assessed — this repository declares no platform this pass reads
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 signals for this style, 2 needed — the count is met but a required primary signal is absent): 250 value object(s); 42 domain event(s); its domain events are published by services or handlers — no domain entity raises one
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JVM, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`addSbtPlugin("org.scoverage" % "sbt-scoverage" % "<version>")` in `project/plugins.sbt`, then `sbt clean coverage test coverageReport`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `@Benchmark` in a Java, Kotlin or Scala file importing JMH or kotlinx-benchmark, Jetpack Benchmark's `measureRepeated` in a file importing androidx.benchmark, or JMH/kotlinx-benchmark/androidx.benchmark in a pom.xml, Gradle or sbt build, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Scala and Python were read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Scala request takes no token: a Future cannot be cancelled, and cats-effect, ZIO and Monix interrupt the fiber that made the request from outside the call, not through a parameter; a Python request takes no token: asyncio cancels the task and trio or anyio the scope that made it, from outside the call, and requests, httpx, aiohttp and gRPC take a timeout, not a cancellation
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: ClaudeBackend.scala ↔ CodexBackend.scala claude/src/main/scala/orca/backend/claude/ClaudeBackend.scala:1— `claude/src/main/scala/orca/backend/claude/ClaudeBackend.scala` (context claude) and `codex/src/main/scala/orca/backend/codex/CodexBackend.scala` (context codex) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 54% of the time (14 of the 26 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 14 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `ad841ca0` Make the turn-entry gate a template method on AgentBackend (#131) (at that commit the files were still `claude/src/main/scala/orca/tools/claude/ClaudeBackend.scala` and `codex/src/main/scala/orca/tools/codex/CodexBackend.scala`); `4370119e` Make the autonomous auto-deny reason approval-mode aware (#123) (at that commit the files were still `claude/src/main/scala/orca/tools/claude/ClaudeBackend.scala` and `codex/src/main/scala/orca/tools/codex/CodexBackend.scala`); `ae606b51` Derive each backend's argv flags and enforcement cell from one match … (at that commit the files were still `claude/src/main/scala/orca/tools/claude/ClaudeBackend.scala` and `codex/src/main/scala/orca/tools/codex/CodexBackend.scala`) — run `git show` on any of them.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/OsGitTool.scala:235— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/OsGitTool.scala:696— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/Worktrees.scala:220— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) tools/src/main/scala/orca/subprocess/TtyProbe.scala:39— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) tools/src/main/scala/orca/backend/EnvCookieSweep.scala:97— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) tools/src/main/scala/orca/backend/SessionSupport.scala:227— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) shell/src/main/scala/orca/shell/menu/ResumeDetector.scala:58— `case scala.util.control.NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) shell/src/main/scala/orca/shell/menu/ResumeDetector.scala:108— `case scala.util.control.NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) shell/src/main/scala/orca/shell/create/FlowAuthoring.scala:281— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) shell/src/main/scala/orca/shell/create/FlowCommit.scala:51— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) shell/src/main/scala/orca/shell/actions/SessionAction.scala:59— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) shell/src/main/scala/orca/shell/actions/SessionAction.scala:119— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/SetupPreflight.scala:203— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) pi/src/main/scala/orca/backend/pi/PiSessionStore.scala:62— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) pi/src/main/scala/orca/backend/pi/PiSessionStore.scala:89— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) pi/src/main/scala/orca/backend/pi/PiSessionStore.scala:96— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) pi/src/main/scala/orca/backend/pi/rpc/InboundEvent.scala:130— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) pi/src/main/scala/orca/backend/pi/rpc/InboundEvent.scala:133— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) pi/src/main/scala/orca/backend/pi/rpc/InboundEvent.scala:141— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) opencode/src/main/scala/orca/backend/opencode/JavaNetOpencodeHttp.scala:76— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) opencode/src/main/scala/orca/backend/opencode/JavaNetOpencodeHttp.scala:124— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) opencode/src/main/scala/orca/backend/opencode/OpencodeBackend.scala:91— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) flow/src/main/scala/orca/stage.scala:148— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) flow/src/main/scala/orca/stage.scala:242— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) flow/src/main/scala/orca/runlog/RunPruning.scala:106— `case NonFatal(_)` takes every exception and records none of it — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch and only the substituted value survives. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, narrow the catch to the exception this call can actually raise, or say in a comment on the catch why the failure genuinely cannot matter.
TooManyMethods: OsGitTool tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/OsGitTool.scala:22— TooManyMethods — 62 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 32 over it, 2.07× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: OrcaDir tools/src/main/scala/orca/OrcaDir.scala:18— TooManyMethods — 33 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 3 over it, 1.10× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Agent tools/src/main/scala/orca/agents/Agent.scala:41— TooManyMethods — 33 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 3 over it, 1.10× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: OsGitHubTool tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/GitHubTool.scala:311— TooManyMethods — 32 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 2 over it, 1.07× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/OsGitTool.scala:650— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/terminal/TerminalActor.scala:60— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) opencode/src/main/scala/orca/backend/opencode/OpencodeDecoder.scala:71— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) flow/src/main/scala/orca/runlog/RunPruning.scala:110— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Hotspot: runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/terminal/TerminalEventRenderer.scala runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/terminal/TerminalEventRenderer.scala:37— runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/terminal/TerminalEventRenderer.scala changed 19 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 22 in TerminalEventRenderer.render at line 37. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-07-23..2026-10-21, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-23 23:30:13 -05:00' --until='2026-10-21 23:30:13 -05:00' --full-history --no-merges -- runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/terminal/TerminalEventRenderer.scala`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/LoggingListener.scala runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/LoggingListener.scala:20— runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/LoggingListener.scala changed 20 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 20 in LoggingListener.onEvent at line 20. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, and the other 19 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-07-23..2026-10-21, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-23 23:30:13 -05:00' --until='2026-10-21 23:30:13 -05:00' --full-history --no-merges -- runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/LoggingListener.scala`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: opencode/src/main/scala/orca/backend/opencode/OpencodeDecoder.scala opencode/src/main/scala/orca/backend/opencode/OpencodeDecoder.scala:92— opencode/src/main/scala/orca/backend/opencode/OpencodeDecoder.scala changed 7 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 18 in OpencodeDecoder.translate at line 92. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-07-23..2026-10-21, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-23 23:30:13 -05:00' --until='2026-10-21 23:30:13 -05:00' --full-history --no-merges -- opencode/src/main/scala/orca/backend/opencode/OpencodeDecoder.scala`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
FileTooLong: runner/FlowLifecycle.scala runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/FlowLifecycle.scala— FileTooLong — 581 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 81 over it, 1.16× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: tools/GitHubTool.scala tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/GitHubTool.scala— FileTooLong — 525 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 25 over it, 1.05× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: tools/OsGitTool.scala tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/OsGitTool.scala— FileTooLong — 508 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 8 over it, 1.02× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
Change coupling: FsTool.scala ↔ GitHubTool.scala tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/FsTool.scala:1— `tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/FsTool.scala` and `tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/GitHubTool.scala` change together 80% of the time (8 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 8 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `2c6b3653` Check at runtime that WorkspaceWrite stays on its thread (#233); `e592f5cb` Tighten concrete-impl visibility to private[orca]; `13d12ab7` Fold orca.tools.{fs,git,github} into orca.tools — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: FsTool.scala ↔ GitTool.scala tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/FsTool.scala:1— `tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/FsTool.scala` and `tools/src/main/scala/orca/tools/GitTool.scala` change together 80% of the time (8 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 8 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `2c6b3653` Check at runtime that WorkspaceWrite stays on its thread (#233); `e592f5cb` Tighten concrete-impl visibility to private[orca]; `13d12ab7` Fold orca.tools.{fs,git,github} into orca.tools — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: CostTracker.scala ↔ Pricing.scala flow/src/main/scala/orca/events/CostTracker.scala:1— `flow/src/main/scala/orca/events/CostTracker.scala` and `flow/src/main/scala/orca/events/Pricing.scala` change together 55% of the time (6 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 6 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `269b2d68` Name the role agents so the cost summary answers what planning cost (…; `d4225e34` Don't let a reported cost of zero hide the estimate (#124); `e4131a53` Mark a partial cost total, and narrow the cost-pipeline contracts (#120) — run `git show` on any of them.
OpencodeDecoder.translate (cyclomatic 18) opencode/src/main/scala/orca/backend/opencode/OpencodeDecoder.scala:92— OpencodeDecoder.translate has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
TodoComment shell/src/main/scala/orca/shell/create/FlowAuthoring.scala:547— // TODO: implement the flow — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
ResponseParser.matchingCloseBrace (cognitive 18) tools/src/main/scala/orca/agents/ResponseParser.scala:114— ResponseParser.matchingCloseBrace has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (13 pts), match/switch 2 (5 pts) (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ToolInputSummary.topLevelFieldNames (cognitive 17) runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/terminal/ToolInputSummary.scala:192— ToolInputSummary.topLevelFieldNames has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (10 pts), match/switch 2 (5 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Off the main sequence: tools — tools: abstractness 0.11, instability 0.00, distance 0.89 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 7 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Low cohesion: OsPipedSubProcess (LCOM4 4) tools/src/main/scala/orca/subprocess/OsProcCliRunner.scala:59— OsPipedSubProcess's methods fall into 4 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 4 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0001. Implement Orca in direct-style Scala 3 on Ox adr/0001-direct-style-scala-on-ox.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0002. Flow scripts use a context-function DSL with an ambient FlowContext adr/0002-context-function-flow-dsl.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0003. LLM backends are pluggable behind an `AgentBackend[B <: Backend]` trait adr/0003-pluggable-llm-backends.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0004. Split the codebase into `tools / flow / backend / runner` modules adr/0004-module-layout.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0005. Reshape the flow DSL so `import orca.{*, given}` is the whole ceremony adr/0005-flow-dsl-reshape.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0006. Drive Claude Code via stream-json instead of TTY handoff adr/0006-stream-json-conversation-driver.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0007. Drive Codex via `codex exec --json` stdio JSONL adr/0007-codex-exec-jsonl-driver.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0008. Terminal output: event log + status bar adr/0008-terminal-output-design.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0009. Announce typeclass for friendly summaries of structured outputs adr/0009-announce-typeclass.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: ADR 0010: Prompts and helper-function convention adr/0010-prompts-and-helpers-convention.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: ADR 0011: Reviewer roster and aspects adr/0011-reviewer-roster.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: ADR 0012: MCP host bridge for mid-session user input adr/0012-mcp-host-bridge.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0013-persistent-plans adr/0013-persistent-plans.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0014. OpenCode server driver adr/0014-opencode-server-driver.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0015. Drive Gemini CLI via `gemini --output-format stream-json` stdio JSONL adr/0015-gemini-stream-json-driver.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0016. `ToolSet` capability axis and planner read-only network access adr/0016-toolset-capability-axis-and-planner-network.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0017. Configurable OpenCode serve launcher adr/0017-opencode-configurable-launcher.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0018. Stage-bound flow runtime: resumable stages, capabilities, progress log adr/0018-stage-bound-flow-runtime.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0019. Per-project stack settings with auto-discovery adr/0019-project-stack-settings.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0020. Configurable role agents adr/0020-configurable-role-agents.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0021. Orca Shell adr/0021-orca-shell.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0022. Review rework adr/0022-review-rework.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0023. Reviewer discovery adr/0023-reviewer-discovery.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0024. Formatting runs inside the review loop, committed with the stage adr/0024-format-gate-placement.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Classify ADR enforcement: 0025. One event log per run for cached state adr/0025-run-event-log.md— This record carries no `enforcement:` field, so nothing says whether the decision is checked by anything or is upheld by convention alone — and an unclassified record is counted as UNENFORCED in this dimension's score, which is the same bucket as a rule known to have no check behind it. If this is a mechanizable rule, add an analyzer/test (or `enforcement: analyzer|test`); if it's a design decision, mark `enforcement: not-applicable` so it isn't counted as unenforced.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging tools/src/main/scala/orca/agents/Agent.scala:278— `warn` at line 278 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.warn("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/FlowLifecycle.scala:352— `warn` at line 352 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.warn("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging runner/src/main/scala/orca/runner/FlowLifecycle.scala:865— `debug` at line 865 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.debug("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging pi/src/main/scala/orca/backend/pi/PiSessionStore.scala:123— `debug` at line 123 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.debug("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging pi/src/main/scala/orca/backend/pi/PiSessionStore.scala:126— `warn` at line 126 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.warn("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging pi/src/main/scala/orca/backend/pi/PiSessionStore.scala:134— `warn` at line 134 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.warn("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging flow/src/main/scala/orca/runlog/RunEventLog.scala:86— `warn` at line 86 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.warn("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging flow/src/main/scala/orca/runlog/RunEventLog.scala:292— `warn` at line 292 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.warn("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging flow/src/main/scala/orca/runlog/RunEventLog.scala:305— `warn` at line 305 is handed an interpolated string as its message through SLF4J, so the logger receives one finished string — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, every occurrence reads as a different message, and the string is built even when the level is filtered out. Pass a constant pattern and the values beside it instead: `log.warn("Order {} moved to {}", orderId, status)`, which keeps the pattern and its arguments apart on the event for a structured encoder (logstash-logback-encoder, OpenTelemetry), or `log.atInfo().addKeyValue("order_id", orderId).log("order moved")` with SLF4J 2's fluent API. scala-logging's `LazyLogging` logger takes an `s"…"` message apart into that pattern at compile time, so switching to it is also a fix.
D20 · ADR Quality· ADR has no Context section · ×5
ADR has no Context section adr/0001-direct-style-scala-on-ox.md:1— adr/0001-direct-style-scala-on-ox.md has no Context section (a heading such as `## Context`, or the MADR equivalent). A decision record states the context that forced it, the decision and its consequences, so a reader can tell later whether it still holds.
ADR has no Context section adr/0002-context-function-flow-dsl.md:1— adr/0002-context-function-flow-dsl.md has no Context section (a heading such as `## Context`, or the MADR equivalent). A decision record states the context that forced it, the decision and its consequences, so a reader can tell later whether it still holds.
ADR has no Context section adr/0003-pluggable-llm-backends.md:1— adr/0003-pluggable-llm-backends.md has no Context section (a heading such as `## Context`, or the MADR equivalent). A decision record states the context that forced it, the decision and its consequences, so a reader can tell later whether it still holds.
ADR has no Context section adr/0004-module-layout.md:1— adr/0004-module-layout.md has no Context section (a heading such as `## Context`, or the MADR equivalent). A decision record states the context that forced it, the decision and its consequences, so a reader can tell later whether it still holds.
ADR has no Context section adr/0005-flow-dsl-reshape.md:1— adr/0005-flow-dsl-reshape.md has no Context section (a heading such as `## Context`, or the MADR equivalent). A decision record states the context that forced it, the decision and its consequences, so a reader can tell later whether it still holds.
ADR declares no status adr/0010-prompts-and-helpers-convention.md:1— `adr/0010-prompts-and-helpers-convention.md` declares no status, while 21 of the 24 other records in `adr` do, so a reader cannot tell whether this decision is in force. Add a `Status:` line.
ADR declares no status adr/0011-reviewer-roster.md:1— `adr/0011-reviewer-roster.md` declares no status, while 21 of the 24 other records in `adr` do, so a reader cannot tell whether this decision is in force. Add a `Status:` line.
ADR declares no status adr/0012-mcp-host-bridge.md:1— `adr/0012-mcp-host-bridge.md` declares no status, while 21 of the 24 other records in `adr` do, so a reader cannot tell whether this decision is in force. Add a `Status:` line.
ADR declares no status adr/0013-persistent-plans.md:1— `adr/0013-persistent-plans.md` declares no status, while 21 of the 24 other records in `adr` do, so a reader cannot tell whether this decision is in force. Add a `Status:` line.
Silent fallback default in catch flow/src/main/scala/orca/runlog/RunPruning.scala:106— `listed` swallows every exception into `Nil` — a data error becomes a silent behavior change with no trail. Log the failure or let it propagate. If that constant is the correct answer rather than a stand-in for a value that could not be read, say so in a comment in the catch case or in the Scaladoc, and the row stops firing.
Silent fallback default in catch opencode/src/main/scala/orca/backend/opencode/JavaNetOpencodeHttp.scala:76— `getStatus` swallows every exception into `0` — a data error becomes a silent behavior change with no trail. Log the failure or let it propagate. If that constant is the correct answer rather than a stand-in for a value that could not be read, say so in a comment in the catch case or in the Scaladoc, and the row stops firing.
Silent fallback default in catch shell/src/main/scala/orca/shell/WorktreeScan.scala:80— `lastAttemptAt` swallows every exception into `0L` — a data error becomes a silent behavior change with no trail. Log the failure or let it propagate. If that constant is the correct answer rather than a stand-in for a value that could not be read, say so in a comment in the catch case or in the Scaladoc, and the row stops firing.
Silent fallback default in catch shell/src/main/scala/orca/shell/menu/ResumeDetector.scala:108— `logsIn` swallows every exception into `Nil` — a data error becomes a silent behavior change with no trail. Log the failure or let it propagate. If that constant is the correct answer rather than a stand-in for a value that could not be read, say so in a comment in the catch case or in the Scaladoc, and the row stops firing.
D20 · ADR Quality· ADR superseded but its status says otherwise · ×2
ADR superseded but its status says otherwise adr/0019-project-stack-settings.md:3— adr/0019-project-stack-settings.md:3 says "Accepted · Date: 2026-07-14", but adr/0020-configurable-role-agents.md supersedes it. Two records now claim the same ground; mark this one "Superseded by" its successor.
ADR superseded but its status says otherwise adr/0021-orca-shell.md:3— adr/0021-orca-shell.md:3 says "Proposed · Date: 2026-07-18", but adr/0025-run-event-log.md supersedes it. Two records now claim the same ground; mark this one "Superseded by" its successor.
X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation· Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted · ×2
Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted tools/src/main/scala/orca/subprocess/OsProcCliRunner.scala:30— `debug` at line 30 is called with an argument built by `args.mkString("…")` (line 30), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Scala evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: the logger takes a built `String` (SLF4J, Akka/Pekko `LoggingAdapter`, `context.log`), and there is no `isDebugEnabled`/`isTraceEnabled` test and no debug flag.
Diagnostic log message is built whether or not it is wanted tools/src/main/scala/orca/subprocess/OsProcCliRunner.scala:40— `debug` at line 40 is called with an argument built by `args.mkString("…")` (line 40), whose cost grows with the collection it walks. Scala evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE entering the method, so that join/projection runs in full every time this line is reached — and then the level check inside the logger discards the string it produced, because debug is a level a shipped configuration normally leaves off. Nothing here decides beforehand whether the message is wanted: the logger takes a built `String` (SLF4J, Akka/Pekko `LoggingAdapter`, `context.log`), and there is no `isDebugEnabled`/`isTraceEnabled` test and no debug flag.
D26 · Project Cohesion· Projects may be oversized for their cohesion · ×1
Projects may be oversized for their cohesion — 1 of 1 project(s) overshoot their size bounds, lowering Project Cohesion to 0.0/10. The most over is `(repository root)` (34281 LoC, 287 module-visible types across 28 directories). Review these for cohesion — draw the boundary inside the module first (group each responsibility into its own package or directory and keep the cross-boundary members non-public), since splitting a published package moves types between packages and breaks consumers.
No SAST REDACTED:7— No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add scalafix or scapegoat (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 4339 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
No release approval gate — The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.
No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected — This repository runs an HTTP server and nothing in its Scala source or committed configuration secures the transport: no HTTPS served (akka/pekko-http `ConnectionContext.httpsServer`/`enableHttps`, an http4s builder's `withTLS`, Jetty's `SslContextFactory`, zio-http's `SSLConfig`, Play's `https.port`), no `Strict-Transport-Security` header, HSTS middleware or Play `RedirectHttpsFilter`, no `X-Forwarded-Proto` read or Play `play.http.forwarded.trustedProxies` for a TLS-terminating proxy — so its traffic may cross the network in clear text. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: tools/src/main/scala/orca/backend/mcp/McpHost.scala:14 — `NettySyncServer`.
No security response headers detected — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is set on a response this repository's Scala server sends — defense in depth, even when a proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: tools/src/main/scala/orca/backend/mcp/McpHost.scala:14 — `NettySyncServer`.
X5 · Nullable reference types· Scala's null is not held to the type system everywhere · ×1
Scala's null is not held to the type system everywhere — No build over this repository's 340 Scala product file(s) passes `-Yexplicit-nulls`, enables WartRemover's `Null` wart or runs Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls`, so every reference type admits null and nothing reports a `null` written into the code or returned from a Java API — the first one to reach a method call is a `NullPointerException`. `Option` by convention is a habit no tool here holds the code to.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 143 file(s) — `claude/src/main/scala/orca/backend/claude/ClaudeArgs.scala`, `claude/src/main/scala/orca/backend/claude/ClaudeBackend.scala`, `claude/src/main/scala/orca/backend/claude/ClaudeDecoder.scala`, `claude/src/main/scala/orca/backend/claude/streamjson/ContentBlock.scala`, `claude/src/main/scala/orca/backend/claude/streamjson/InboundMessage.scala`, … (+138 more) — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover them at all.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
Run 01a1b51a-e545-7bf9-9421-25a76c8fb2f6 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 19 · Warnings: 52 · Recommendations: 60 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by the Canine Code Analyzer: deterministic code-health analysis. 07-11-2026 @ 08:23 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.