Public report of VinoStudio/auth_service, published 8 November 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.11.2). Assert signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey → Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 8 November 2026, 00:23 UTC · Survey ID cd_266a833519344a5d934d222add76aceb

VinoStudio/auth_service

Measured 8 November 2026, 00:23 UTC, at code version ba912fd

CAI score 55out of 100 At risk Up 1 since the last survey

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

A small codebase: 11,393 lines of product code in 2 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Production Readiness, 33

Findings by how serious they are

19 critical 93 serious 10 minor

20 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, we either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard we look for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Assert small markCanine Code Analyzer
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Canine Code Analyzer engine 1.0.0
Measured
8 November 2026, 00:23 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds the Canine Code Analyzer. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today the Canine Code Analyzer is the only one that does.

A critical security finding is open, such as a library with a known critical vulnerability or a password or key found in the code. The score itself is unchanged, but its band shows At risk until the finding is fixed. See the Security and Compliance lens.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. We work it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸

66of 66 dimensions measured by tools.
114of 122 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 8 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
66dimensions across 7 lenses, read from 11,393 lines of product code in 2 projects.
Chapters

Executive summary

VinoStudio/auth_service is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, most of them in the packages it uses. Its score is held back because two passwords or keys sit in the current code and we found no working pipeline that builds or tests changes to the code. It scores 55 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged.

Production Readiness, at 33, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is replacing the two exposed passwords or keys and switching the old ones off, worth about 18 points. Adding an automated build and test pipeline comes next, worth about 7 points. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 71.

Sixteen known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Two passwords or keys are open to anyone who can read the repository, and one setting leaves the servers or containers unsafe. Updating the vulnerable packages, replacing each exposed password or key and correcting the unsafe settings would close these risks.

The product code is 11,393 lines, about €18,000 to rebuild.

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Production Readiness 33 · counts for 46%Domain Modelling 67 · counts for 25%Architecture 75 · counts for 14%Security and Compliance 77 · counts for 8%Maturity 79 · counts for 4%Code Health 100 · counts for 2%Performance 100 · counts for 1%

If Production Readiness rose from 33 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 55 to about 71.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Product code 88%Tests 12%
New since the last survey: 2 findings

These 2 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 21 October 2026.

We compare every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 36 findings

These 36 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 21 October 2026, and are gone from this one.

  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type Permission (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/base/repository/permission_repo.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type Role (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/base/repository/role_repo.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type Role (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/base/repository/role_repo.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type Session (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/base/repository/session_repo.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type User (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/base/repository/user_reader.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type User (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/base/repository/user_reader.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type User (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/base/repository/user_reader.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type User (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/base/repository/user_reader.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type User (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/base/repository/user_reader.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type User (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/base/repository/user_writer.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type User (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/base/repository/user_writer.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type User (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type Role (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type Permission (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type Session (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type OAuthAccount (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type User (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type User (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type Role (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type Role (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type Session (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type OAuthAccount (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type OAuthAccount (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/repositories/oauth/oauth_repo.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type OAuthAccount (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/repositories/oauth/oauth_repo.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type Permission (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/repositories/permission/permission_repo.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type Role (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/repositories/role/role_repo.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type Role (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/repositories/role/role_repo.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type Session (domain → infrastructure) src/infrastructure/repositories/session/session_repo.py
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type User (domain → infrastructure) REDACTED
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type User (domain → infrastructure) REDACTED
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type User (domain → infrastructure) REDACTED
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type User (domain → infrastructure) REDACTED
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type User (domain → infrastructure) REDACTED
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type User (domain → infrastructure) REDACTED
  • Boundary Type-Coupling · Cross-context type User (domain → infrastructure) REDACTED
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
Rebuild cost: about €18,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild€5,800 to €29,000, for 97 to 308 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problemHigh, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.8 at a score of 55. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeSmall: 11,393 lines of product code
What it is notNot a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one.

How the estimate is made: We price the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2).
Raises the score by about 18 points · Low effort · Secret Scanning
2
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Raises the score by about 7 points · Medium effort · CI/CD gates
3
Run what this repository's stack ships: bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Raises the score by about 7 points · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €18,000 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 33 (Weak). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.
One cause behind 11 Domain Modelling findings · Common cause
11 findings in the Domain Modelling lens come from the same cause. The code models the business as objects, such as an order or a customer, and each object should guard its own rules: an order, for example, should refuse to be shipped before it has been paid. Here the objects don't do that. Other code can change an object's data directly, so it can put an order into a state the rules forbid. Some objects only hold data, while the rules that should keep that data valid sit elsewhere in the code. Because all of these findings have the same cause, fixing it once, in the business objects themselves, deals with them together.
Based on: Encapsulated state (5 findings) · Rich vs anemic model (6 findings)
What to do: Give each business object the methods that enforce its rules, such as a method for shipping an order that first checks it has been paid, and let only those methods change its data. Give each kind of identifier a type of its own, so an order number can't be used where a customer number belongs.
If you do one thing first · First action
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 18 points for low effort, because it clears the 2 Secret Scanning findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

191 modules, with 499 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 151 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →1 application.base.commands.base2 application.base.commands.command_handler3 application.base.interface.request4 application.base.queries.base5 application.base.queries.query_handler6 domain.permission.entity.permission7 infrastructure.base.uow8 infrastructure.repositories.token.redis_repo9 application.base.security.jwt_manager10 application.base.session.session_manager11 domain.role.entity.role12 application.cqrs.user.commands.logout_user13 domain.user.entity.user14 application.base.security.jwt_user15 application.cqrs.user.commands.register_oauth_user16 application.cqrs.user.commands.register_user17 infrastructure.base.repository.user_reader18 infrastructure.repositories.converters19 application.cqrs.user.commands.change_user_email20 application.cqrs.user.commands.login_user21 application.cqrs.user.commands.oauth_login_user22 application.cqrs.user.commands.reset_user_password23 application.services.rbac.rbac_manager24 application.services.security.jwt_manager25 application.services.security.oauth_manager26 application.services.security.security_user27 application.cqrs.permission.commands.create_permission28 application.cqrs.permission.commands.delete_permission29 application.cqrs.role.commands.assign_role_to_user30 application.cqrs.role.commands.create_role31 application.cqrs.role.commands.delete_role32 application.cqrs.role.commands.remove_role_permissions33 application.cqrs.role.commands.remove_user_role34 application.cqrs.role.commands.update_role_description35 application.cqrs.role.commands.update_role_permissions36 application.cqrs.role.commands.update_role_security_lvl37 application.cqrs.user.commands.add_oauth_account_request38 application.cqrs.user.commands.add_oauth_account_to_current_user39 application.cqrs.user.commands.deactivate_oauth_account40 application.cqrs.cqrs_di_setup
1 application.base.commands.base
2 application.base.commands.command_handler
3 application.base.interface.request
4 application.base.queries.base
5 application.base.queries.query_handler
6 domain.permission.entity.permission
7 infrastructure.base.uow
8 infrastructure.repositories.token.redis_repo
9 application.base.security.jwt_manager1
10 application.base.session.session_manager1
11 domain.role.entity.role1
12 application.cqrs.user.commands.logout_user111111
13 domain.user.entity.user1
14 application.base.security.jwt_user1
15 application.cqrs.user.commands.register_oauth_user1111
16 application.cqrs.user.commands.register_user1111
17 infrastructure.base.repository.user_reader1
18 infrastructure.repositories.converters122
19 application.cqrs.user.commands.change_user_email111111
20 application.cqrs.user.commands.login_user111111
21 application.cqrs.user.commands.oauth_login_user111111
22 application.cqrs.user.commands.reset_user_password111111
23 application.services.rbac.rbac_manager1111
24 application.services.security.jwt_manager1111
25 application.services.security.oauth_manager1
26 application.services.security.security_user11
27 application.cqrs.permission.commands.create_permission11111111
28 application.cqrs.permission.commands.delete_permission1111111
29 application.cqrs.role.commands.assign_role_to_user1111111111
30 application.cqrs.role.commands.create_role11111111
31 application.cqrs.role.commands.delete_role1111111
32 application.cqrs.role.commands.remove_role_permissions11111111
33 application.cqrs.role.commands.remove_user_role1111111111
34 application.cqrs.role.commands.update_role_description11111111
35 application.cqrs.role.commands.update_role_permissions11111111
36 application.cqrs.role.commands.update_role_security_lvl11111111
37 application.cqrs.user.commands.add_oauth_account_request1111111
38 application.cqrs.user.commands.add_oauth_account_to_current_user1111111
39 application.cqrs.user.commands.deactivate_oauth_account1111111
40 application.cqrs.cqrs_di_setup11111111111111111111
Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself
1 application.base.commands.base2 application.base.commands.command_handler3 application.base.interface.request4 application.base.queries.base5 application.base.queries.query_handler6 domain.permission.entity.permission7 infrastructure.base.uow8 infrastructure.repositories.token.redis_repo9 application.base.security.jwt_manager10 application.base.session.session_manager11 domain.role.entity.role12 application.cqrs.user.commands.logout_user13 domain.user.entity.user14 application.base.security.jwt_user15 application.cqrs.user.commands.register_oauth_user16 application.cqrs.user.commands.register_user17 infrastructure.base.repository.user_reader18 infrastructure.repositories.converters19 application.cqrs.user.commands.change_user_email20 application.cqrs.user.commands.login_user21 application.cqrs.user.commands.oauth_login_user22 application.cqrs.user.commands.reset_user_password23 application.services.rbac.rbac_manager24 application.services.security.jwt_manager25 application.services.security.oauth_manager26 application.services.security.security_user27 application.cqrs.permission.commands.create_permission28 application.cqrs.permission.commands.delete_permission29 application.cqrs.role.commands.assign_role_to_user30 application.cqrs.role.commands.create_role31 application.cqrs.role.commands.delete_role32 application.cqrs.role.commands.remove_role_permissions33 application.cqrs.role.commands.remove_user_role34 application.cqrs.role.commands.update_role_description35 application.cqrs.role.commands.update_role_permissions36 application.cqrs.role.commands.update_role_security_lvl37 application.cqrs.user.commands.add_oauth_account_request38 application.cqrs.user.commands.add_oauth_account_to_current_user39 application.cqrs.user.commands.deactivate_oauth_account40 application.cqrs.cqrs_di_setupapplication.base.commands.base1application.base.commands.command_handler2application.base.interface.request3application.base.queries.base4application.base.queries.query_handler5domain.permission.entity.permission6infrastructure.base.uow7infrastructure.repositories.token.redis_repo8application.base.security.jwt_manager9application.base.session.session_manager10domain.role.entity.role11application.cqrs.user.commands.logout_user12domain.user.entity.user13application.base.security.jwt_user14application.cqrs.user.commands.register_oauth_user15application.cqrs.user.commands.register_user16infrastructure.base.repository.user_reader17infrastructure.repositories.converters18application.cqrs.user.commands.change_user_email19application.cqrs.user.commands.login_user20application.cqrs.user.commands.oauth_login_user21application.cqrs.user.commands.reset_user_password22application.services.rbac.rbac_manager23application.services.security.jwt_manager24application.services.security.oauth_manager25application.services.security.security_user26application.cqrs.permission.commands.create_permission27application.cqrs.permission.commands.delete_permission28application.cqrs.role.commands.assign_role_to_user29application.cqrs.role.commands.create_role30application.cqrs.role.commands.delete_role31application.cqrs.role.commands.remove_role_permissions32application.cqrs.role.commands.remove_user_role33application.cqrs.role.commands.update_role_description34application.cqrs.role.commands.update_role_permissions35application.cqrs.role.commands.update_role_security_lvl36application.cqrs.user.commands.add_oauth_account_request37application.cqrs.user.commands.add_oauth_account_to_current_user38application.cqrs.user.commands.deactivate_oauth_account39application.cqrs.cqrs_di_setup401111111111111111111112211111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111+151 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 100% · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Architecture · 75% · Adequate · gated by D26 ·

At a glance — Maturity · 79% · Strong ·

At a glance — Readiness · 33% · Weak · gated by D13, P1, P3 ·

At a glance — Security · 77% · Strong ·

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 67% · Adequate · gated by DM5 ·

At a glance — Performance · 100% · Exemplary ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures21High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration7High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection6Medium
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures2High / Critical

Roadmap

Top priorities: Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2); Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR; Run what this repository's stack ships: bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2).+18.1 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.+6.8 ptsMediumCI/CD gates
Run what this repository's stack ships: bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+6.8 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Make entity setters private/init-only and hand collections out as IReadOnlyList/IReadOnlyCollection over a private backing field; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).+2.8 ptsMediumEncapsulated state
Resolve the 1 Projects may be oversized for their cohesion finding(s) in Project Cohesion.+1.3 ptsLowProject Cohesion
Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.+2.1 ptsMediumRich vs anemic model
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.+2.0 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.+2.0 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 13 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 15% slop · 39% mixed · 46% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED0.3SlopDependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED2.4SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED5.8MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED6.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED6.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py7.1MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (18–20 lines × 2)
src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)
src/application/cqrs/user/commands/register_oauth_user.py8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (18 lines × 2)
src/application/services/tasks/email_templates.py8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)
src/application/exceptions/oauth.py8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (19 lines × 2)
src/infrastructure/repositories/role/role_repo.py8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (7 lines × 2)
REDACTED9.3Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Low: REDACTED
REDACTED9.3Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Low: REDACTED

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 19

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 93

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 10

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 20

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 66 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.

Every figure here is one of two kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10.

What we checked — 66 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D6D9D13D14D15D17D19D23D26D27D28D29D30D31D35D43D44AX10AX3AX4AX5C2C3DM1DM10DM11DM12DM2DM3DM4DM5DM6DM9M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6P7P8PF3X1X12X13X14X15X17X19X21X22X23X24X25X26X27X28X3X30X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 114 of 122 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a1b88a-166a-7978-ab8a-69ace390f33f.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.py) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (`coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
  • D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.py) and this repository declares a Python test suite (repository root, 5 test files), but it was not re-run: no test result was produced. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. This repository's 5 shipped Python distribution(s) across 1 manifest(s) WERE read; what went unanswered is the currency half, because it grades an EXACT pin against the newest release and every declaration here is a floor or a range — which installs the newest release it admits and so cannot be behind one. So pypi.org was never asked. This is a true statement about the repository, and the healthy one, NOT a gap on our side: no reader we could write would find a currency question here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Git history depth insufficient — this repository has 22 commit(s), too few for a reliable trend signal. The clone is complete, so there is no deeper history to fetch: the signal returns as the project accumulates history.
  • D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Too few commits for a meaningful bus factor (22 commit(s) sampled, fewer than the 50 this dimension needs before a bus factor means anything).
  • D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This kind did not reach the 95 % precision gate in three adjudicated runs (docs/plans/deterministic-engine/adjudication/D19-sample3-v3.md), so by the pre-registered fallback it publishes no row until a re-measurement shows it does. The candidates are counted here, not reported as findings, and the score does not include them.
  • D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's deterministic naming rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. Until then its declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether its names are consistent.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (pyproject.toml), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This kind measured 0/40 valid on a seeded held-out sample of its rows on 98 C# repositories (docs/plans/deterministic-engine/adjudication/P5c-D23-units.md, "Version 1 ON MAIN"): the noise rows were dependencies on layer folders, shared cores and grouping folders read as contexts. By the pre-registered fallback (PREREGISTRATION v37) it publishes no row until version 4 passes its gate. The candidates are counted here, not reported as findings, and the score does not include them.
  • D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Too few commits to judge knowledge freshness (22 commit(s) sampled).
  • D35 Change Coupling — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Git history depth insufficient — this repository has 22 commit(s), too few for a reliable change-coupling signal. The clone is complete, so there is no deeper history to fetch: the signal returns as the project accumulates history.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection registrations in C# and Spring beans in Java/Kotlin only, and this repository's container is dishka, whose lifetimes are not modelled yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via REDACTED (REDACTED). docker build failed (exit 1) — 24 | -------------------- ERROR: failed to solve: process "/bin/sh -c apt update -y && apt install -y python3-dev gcc musl-dev && pip install --upgrade pip && pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.dev.txt && apt-get clean && useradd -r celery_user && chown -R celery_user:celery_user /app" did not complete successfully: exit code: 100; runtime evidence skipped.
  • C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
  • DM8 Value-object opportunities — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check finds primitive parameters that travel together through several signatures of the domain (a missing value object). Its deterministic rule has not yet shown 95 % precision on adjudicated rows, so the clumps it finds are counted here and not published as findings, and the card carries no score. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • DM9 Scattered domain decisions — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Arm two tells a construction that PRODUCES a measurement from one that merely passes it along, and this repository's frontend does not compute that fact. A measurement built independently in two places would not appear above.
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and no C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby or Scala was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and no C#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby or Scala was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
  • X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala or PHP was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript (Vue and Svelte components included), Java, Rust, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Rust, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and MSBuild project configuration, TypeScript source and its tsconfig files, Java source and its package and module declarations, PHP source and its PHPStan and Psalm configuration, Dart source and its pubspec language version, Ruby source and its Sorbet and Steep configuration, Scala source and its build's explicit-nulls, WartRemover and Scalafix settings, and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded, no TypeScript was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling: Boundary leakage is detected from type references across detected contexts — leaks that flow through primitives, serialization or shared infrastructure may not surface as a typed reference.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.6 / 10Stronggated by 12 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

12 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×2src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:42
Duplicated block (18–20 lines × 2)src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:129
Duplicated block (18–19 lines × 2)src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:105
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2)src/application/cqrs/user/commands/register_oauth_user.py:59
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py:64

+ 6 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with 20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (18–20 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with 20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (18–19 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with 20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Duplication in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 1 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

40 test methods: 40 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The Python suite contributes 40 test function(s) across 4 file(s) declaring at least one — every `def test…` in a file pytest or unittest would collect, which is those frameworks' own definition of a case; a parametrize table counts once, so this is a floor. Its tier split is read from file names and paths only.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 secret(s) detected.

REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Secret Scanning in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 38 shipped Python distribution(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from PyPI over the distributions a consumer installs — this repository's 5 declared runtime requirement(s) closed transitively over each distribution's published `requires_dist` (33 reached that way). Requirements it states ONLY under an extra, a PEP 735 dependency group, a Poetry dev group or a dev-named requirements file are excluded: pip does not install any of them for a consumer. ★ This repository commits no dependency lockfile that this pass reads, so each licence is the one PyPI publishes for the distribution's CURRENT release rather than for a pinned version. 2 of them publish no licence on PyPI this pass can read; that is missing data, not a violation, and none of them is charged.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Stronggated by 55 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window. Repeated repair below the complexity floor: src/presentation/api/v1/auth/auth_router.py (8 of 10 changes were fixes); src/application/cqrs/cqrs_di_setup.py (7 of 12 changes were fixes); src/settings/config.py (7 of 10 changes were fixes)

Repeated repair: src/presentation/api/v1/auth/auth_router.py · ×55src/presentation/api/v1/auth/auth_router.py:103

What to do

  1. Resolve the 55 Repeated repair finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with user.py (3), role.py (2), session_manager.py (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (55 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 deducted task-comment markers across 11393 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Every README, docs/ document and root guide parsed by its markup and measured in Unicode letters. Published: a runnable or packaged .NET project whose README (or a document it links, or a root guide) shows no example, and a root README naming none of three or more projects. Overview, licence, boilerplate, wall-of-text, empty-section and XML-doc rows are measured and withheld (counted in gaps) after adjudication. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 1 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether domain types (IDs, enums, value objects) leak across bounded-context boundaries.

Method: Cross-context domain-type leakage via Roslyn structural classification (strongly-typed IDs / value objects) over every public surface. Exhaustive, deterministic, type-level aggregate-boundary check.

Coverage: Bounded contexts derived from NAMESPACE prefix (or graph-inferred where available); cross-boundary domain-type leakage then checked exhaustively over every public member of every type.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

35 domain type(s) cross context boundaries across 2 contexts; they are measured and withheld (not published, not scored). Contexts: domain, infrastructure.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d23_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 2 build units (Python) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

Projects may be oversized for their cohesion

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Projects may be oversized for their cohesion finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D27 · Navigability8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

80 % of calls cross a namespace and 5 % go through an interface, but 65 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

What to do

  1. Improve Navigability — currently 8.4/10. — 80 % of calls cross a namespace and 5 % go through an interface, but 65 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 4 medium, 2 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): every row is a match against a vulnerability database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

21 finding(s): 4 critical, 12 high, 5 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 11 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (11). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Critical vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.1 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 5 medium, 1 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 5 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Reported apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): the malicious-package feed is a database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 5 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX10 · Code composition5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

C2 · Access Controls7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect.

What to do

  • Name the access rules — DRF permission classes, django-guardian or django-rules permissions, a casbin or oso policy, or roles and permissions declared once — and consult them where access is checked (permission_classes, @permission_required, Depends), so the rule set is reviewable and testable on its own.
C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

  • An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: a write-side hook every change flows through (HistoricalRecords, auditlog.register, reversion.register, pghistory.track, SQLAlchemy-Continuum, a post_save / after_update listener recording each change, or an event-sourced store), per-model coverage (a change-history registration on each model that needs a who-changed-what trail, or an event-sourced aggregate).

What to do

  • Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: HistoricalRecords or auditlog.register on the models that need a who-changed-what trail, or a post_save / after_update listener writing each sensitive change to an audit-log table, with the acting user and time on every entry.
DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

DM10 · One transaction, one aggregate10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether a single operation mutates more than one aggregate root. An aggregate is a consistency boundary, so saving two together fuses them into one — the second's invariants come to depend on the first's transaction, and the pair can no longer be separated. Reads of other aggregates are not counted.

Method: Neutral body surface (DDD-gated): every method body scanned for repository WRITE calls (Add/Update/Save/Remove/Delete/Insert/Store and their async forms), keyed on the ARGUMENT type rather than the repository type — three `IRepository<T>` writes collapse to one repository but are three distinct aggregates. Reads (Get/Find/Load/Query) are excluded, so loading another aggregate for context never counts. Score is offending methods over methods that write at all. Deterministic.

DM11 · Constructible invalid state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether an aggregate can be constructed in a state its own rules forbid — a public constructor that takes a raw primitive, stores it, and validates nothing, with no factory beside it. A constructor taking only value objects is not counted: each parameter has already validated itself.

Method: Neutral surface (DDD-gated): each non-abstract entity/aggregate checked for a PUBLIC constructor taking at least one RAW PRIMITIVE parameter whose body contains no guard token (throw / Guard. / Ensure. / ArgumentException / CheckRule / an XException.ThrowIf* helper). C#: a static factory beside a public constructor does not exempt it, and a public parameterless constructor followed by public raw-primitive setters that refuse nothing is charged when the type also declares a validating way in (a guarded constructor or a guarding static method returning the type); TypeScript: a static Create/Of/From/New factory exempts the type. A constructor taking only value objects is never charged -- measured: 64 of 87 unguarded public constructors on the C# corpus take value objects only, so ignoring parameter types would be 73% false positives. One finding per entity. Deterministic.

DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain types receive the time and randomness their rules depend on, rather than reading the process clock or a global random source directly — an ambient read makes the rule it feeds untestable at the instant that matters and lets two reads inside one operation disagree.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated, C#/VB only): domain-layer types scanned for ambient reads — DateTime/DateTimeOffset.Now/UtcNow/Today, Random.Shared, new Random(), Stopwatch.GetTimestamp — resolved against the semantic model, with a comment/string-stripped token fallback only where resolution fails. Body reads are scored; field/property initialisers are surfaced unscored. Apply/When folds excluded (ES1 owns them). Deterministic, symbol-resolved.

DM2 · Strongly-typed ids10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. An id wrapper is recognised by VALUE SEMANTICS, not by being a struct — a record struct, a record class (`record ApartmentId(Guid Value)`) or a class declared by a typed-id base (`class MemberId : TypedIdValueBase`) all count, while a plain mutable class (reference equality) and a verb-phrase query record (`GetCustomerById`) do not. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

DM3 · Integration-event coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether cross-context integration events stay loosely coupled — no producer-owned enums/domain types leaking to consumers. Shared-kernel/contracts types are allowed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): integration-event properties scanned for producer-domain type/enum leaks versus primitives and shared-kernel types. Deterministic, hard fact.

DM4 · Rich vs anemic model5.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

  • `Permission` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — src/domain/permission/entity/permission.py:8
  • `OAuthAccount` is an aggregate/entity with 6 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — src/infrastructure/db/models/oauth_provider.py:8
  • `Permission` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — src/infrastructure/db/models/permission.py:28
  • `Role` is an aggregate/entity with 6 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — src/infrastructure/db/models/role.py:28
  • `UserSession` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — src/infrastructure/db/models/session.py:10
  • `User` is an aggregate/entity with 10 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — src/infrastructure/db/models/user.py:19

What to do

  • Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
DM5 · Encapsulated state1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state — private/init-only setters, and collections handed out as read-only views rather than the mutable backing collection — instead of exposing writable state that bypasses invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entities scanned for publicly writable state — public setters, and (C#/VB) own mutable collections handed out through an auto-property, a public field or a bare-field expression getter, where a computed/copying getter is never charged. One finding per entity; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

  • `OAuthAccount` exposes publicly writable state (user_id, provider, provider_user_id, provider_email, is_active). — src/domain/oauth_account/entity/oauth_account.py:8
  • `Permission` exposes publicly writable state (permission_name). — src/domain/permission/entity/permission.py:8
  • `Role` exposes publicly writable state (name, description, security_level). — src/domain/role/entity/role.py:9
  • `Session` exposes publicly writable state (user_id, user_agent, device_info, device_id, last_activity, is_active). — src/domain/session/entity/session.py:9
  • `User` exposes publicly writable state (id, username, email, password, jwt_data, deleted_at, and 1 more). — src/domain/user/entity/user.py:19

What to do

  • Make entity setters private/init-only and hand collections out as IReadOnlyList/IReadOnlyCollection over a private backing field; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

DM9 · Scattered domain decisions10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether one domain rule is decided — or one measurement produced — in more than one place, rather than living on the type that owns it.

Method: Neutral body surface plus Roslyn (DDD-gated), two arms. DECISION (Roslyn only): a predicate over a domain type's members judged in two or more types, where none of those decisions live on the owning type — operands of comparisons and relational property patterns only, so a member merely passed as an argument is not judged. DERIVATION: a plain all-numeric carrier of ≥2 members, with no base type and exactly one constructor, CONSTRUCTED as the result of a method (returned or assigned, never inline as an argument) in two or more types other than its own — the same measurement produced twice, which centralising the judgement does not fix. DERIVATION runs on every language whose frontend declares the produced-or-passed fact per construction (Roslyn and the Java sidecar today); a target with only the derivation arm carries an engine gap naming the decision arm as not assessed, and a frontend that declares nothing keeps the dimension not measured rather than clean. Single-member rules, test code and generated code are out of population for both. Advisory.

M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the project's current-state documentation describes the code that exists.

Method: Every current-state document's checkable claims looked up in the tree (links, versions, and artefact counts an order of magnitude off), plus two README checks: an advertised infrastructure product with no footprint, and a module the CHANGELOG records as removed. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.

P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

  • Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

What to do

  • Run what this repository's stack ships: bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

  • Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.

P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether database schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than being auto-created from the model at startup.

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage; off .NET, a file scan of dependency manifests, migration histories (Flyway, Liquibase, Alembic, Django, Rails, Prisma, TypeORM, Knex/Sequelize, golang-migrate, goose, Laravel, Doctrine, Diesel/sqlx) and schema auto-create in production source or config. Exhaustive, deterministic.

PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from each language's code model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back. Also whether a `finally` that gives the primitive back unconditionally can run in a state where the method does not hold it: after a timed wait whose result was discarded, after an acquire inside the `try` that can fail, after the body already released it, or never, because a `return` left between the acquire and the `try`.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `for` loop leaves the `dict`, `set` or `deque` it is walking alone — CPython's iterators over those check that the collection has not changed size since the loop began, so a body that removes from (or empties) the very collection the loop is walking makes the next step raise `RuntimeError: dictionary changed size during iteration` and the remaining items are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health100%ExemplarySolid.
Architecture75%Adequate — gated by D26Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity79%StrongSolid.
Readiness33%Weak — gated by D13, P1, P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security77%StrongSolid.
Domain Modelling67%Adequate — gated by DM5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Not evidenced — 3 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 61 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — No container singleton was found, so there is no shared instance for concurrent requests to race on. No function in this Python code is served by a threaded web framework (a Flask, Bottle or FastAPI route, a Django or Pyramid view), so no module is shared between request threads.
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • AXR1 Runtime accessibility — docker build failed (exit 1) — 24 | -------------------- ERROR: failed to solve: process "/bin/sh -c apt update -y && apt install -y python3-dev gcc musl-dev && pip install --upgrade pip && pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.dev.txt && apt-get clean && useradd -r celery_user && chown -R celery_user:celery_user /app" did not complete successfully: exit code: 100; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~1579 lines of test source are present (.py) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .py suite was found but not re-run
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency currency not established — no declaration carries an exact pin to grade
  • D16 Bus Factor — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency is measured on C# and TypeScript only; Python not measured.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
  • D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only — this repository's production source is .py, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — too few commits to judge knowledge freshness
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this Python build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
  • DM8 Value-object opportunities — not scored — the deterministic rule found 0 candidate clump(s); its rows are withheld until it has a measured precision of 95 % (a sample of fewer than 10 rows cannot show one)
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (1 integration event(s))
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
  • P2 Observability — This repository's Python source (2 module(s), 299 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for a pytest-benchmark or pytest-codspeed dependency with tests taking the `benchmark` fixture, an asv.conf.json with its `time_`/`mem_`/`peakmem_` benchmarks, or a pyperf Runner, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Python was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Python request takes no token: asyncio cancels the task and trio or anyio the scope that made it, from outside the call, and requests, httpx, aiohttp and gRPC take a timeout, not a cancellation
  • X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 19 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×11
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×3
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×2
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical vulnerability · ×1
  • REDACTED
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×1
  • REDACTED
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1
  • REDACTED
Serious — 93 finding(s)
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Repeated repair · ×55
  • Repeated repair: src/presentation/api/v1/auth/auth_router.py src/presentation/api/v1/auth/auth_router.py:103 — src/presentation/api/v1/auth/auth_router.py changed 10 times in last 90 days and 8 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 1 (its worst body is AuthController.register at line 103), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: prevent dataclass from overriding BaseEntity hash methods”; “Documentation update: CQRS schema fix, Service's descritption, Mermaid schemas for Presentation layer explanation.”; “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added new queries for current user. Added documentation for currently existing services. Found and Fixed some bugs.”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/presentation/api/v1/auth/auth_router.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/application/cqrs/cqrs_di_setup.py src/application/cqrs/cqrs_di_setup.py:106 — src/application/cqrs/cqrs_di_setup.py changed 12 times in last 90 days and 7 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 1 (its worst body is MediatorProvider.get_command_mediator at line 106), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added new queries for current user. Added documentation for currently existing services. Found and Fixed some bugs.”; “Added OAuth Github support. New commands and queries for permissions. New query for role. Little fixes.”; “Rebuild OAuth system in progress. Added new model schema OAuth Account to connect with Our User. Added domain model with new Repository. Some new methods in UserReader. Rebuilded OAuthManager, but not tested yet. New command for register OAuth users. Some fixes...”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/application/cqrs/cqrs_di_setup.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/settings/config.py src/settings/config.py:21 — src/settings/config.py changed 10 times in last 90 days and 7 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 1 (its worst body is OAuthProvider.get_auth_url at line 21), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: prevent dataclass from overriding BaseEntity hash methods”; “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added OAuth Github support. New commands and queries for permissions. New query for role. Little fixes.”; “Rebuild OAuth system in progress. Added new model schema OAuth Account to connect with Our User. Added domain model with new Repository. Some new methods in UserReader. Rebuilded OAuthManager, but not tested yet. New command for register OAuth users. Some fixes...”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/settings/config.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/presentation/api/main.py src/presentation/api/main.py:23 — src/presentation/api/main.py changed 8 times in last 90 days and 6 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 1 (its worst body is main.create_app at line 23), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: prevent dataclass from overriding BaseEntity hash methods”; “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added new queries for current user. Added documentation for currently existing services. Found and Fixed some bugs.”; “Added OAuth Github support. New commands and queries for permissions. New query for role. Little fixes.”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/presentation/api/main.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/domain/user/entity/user.py src/domain/user/entity/user.py:51 — src/domain/user/entity/user.py changed 7 times in last 90 days and 6 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 4 (its worst body is User._set_jwt_user_data at line 51), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: prevent dataclass from overriding BaseEntity hash methods”; “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Rebuild OAuth system in progress. Added new model schema OAuth Account to connect with Our User. Added domain model with new Repository. Some new methods in UserReader. Rebuilded OAuthManager, but not tested yet. New command for register OAuth users. Some fixes...”; “Added OAuth support. Added password reset to auth with email notification. Some fixes.”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/domain/user/entity/user.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/application/services/security/jwt_di_setup.py src/application/services/security/jwt_di_setup.py:26 — src/application/services/security/jwt_di_setup.py changed 7 times in last 90 days and 6 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 1 (its worst body is JWTProvider.get_jwt_encoder at line 26), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added OAuth Github support. New commands and queries for permissions. New query for role. Little fixes.”; “Rebuild OAuth system in progress. Added new model schema OAuth Account to connect with Our User. Added domain model with new Repository. Some new methods in UserReader. Rebuilded OAuthManager, but not tested yet. New command for register OAuth users. Some fixes...”; “Added OAuth support. Added password reset to auth with email notification. Some fixes.”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/application/services/security/jwt_di_setup.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: REDACTED REDACTED:39 — REDACTED changed 8 times in last 90 days and 5 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 3 (its worst body is UserReader.get_active_user_by_id at line 39), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Rebuild OAuth system in progress. Added new model schema OAuth Account to connect with Our User. Added domain model with new Repository. Some new methods in UserReader. Rebuilded OAuthManager, but not tested yet. New command for register OAuth users. Some fixes...”; “Added OAuth support. Added password reset to auth with email notification. Some fixes.”; “fix”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- REDACTED`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/application/dependency_injector/di.py src/application/dependency_injector/di.py:65 — src/application/dependency_injector/di.py changed 7 times in last 90 days and 5 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 1 (its worst body is SchedulerProvider.get_scheduler_provider at line 65), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added OAuth Github support. New commands and queries for permissions. New query for role. Little fixes.”; “Rebuild OAuth system in progress. Added new model schema OAuth Account to connect with Our User. Added domain model with new Repository. Some new methods in UserReader. Rebuilded OAuthManager, but not tested yet. New command for register OAuth users. Some fixes...”; “fix”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/application/dependency_injector/di.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/presentation/api/lifespan.py src/presentation/api/lifespan.py:23 — src/presentation/api/lifespan.py changed 6 times in last 90 days and 5 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 1 (its worst body is lifespan.init_message_broker at line 23), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: prevent dataclass from overriding BaseEntity hash methods”; “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added OAuth support. Added password reset to auth with email notification. Some fixes.”; “fix”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/presentation/api/lifespan.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/application/services/security/jwt_manager.py src/application/services/security/jwt_manager.py:101 — src/application/services/security/jwt_manager.py changed 6 times in last 90 days and 5 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 8 (its worst body is JWTManager.validate_token at line 101), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added new queries for current user. Added documentation for currently existing services. Found and Fixed some bugs.”; “Added OAuth support. Added password reset to auth with email notification. Some fixes.”; “Added grafana with alloy, loki and prometheus for metrics. Added role interactions with some fix issues.”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/application/services/security/jwt_manager.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/infrastructure/repositories/session/session_repo.py src/infrastructure/repositories/session/session_repo.py:33 — src/infrastructure/repositories/session/session_repo.py changed 6 times in last 90 days and 5 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 2 (its worst body is SessionRepository.get_session_by_id at line 33), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added new queries for current user. Added documentation for currently existing services. Found and Fixed some bugs.”; “Rebuild OAuth system in progress. Added new model schema OAuth Account to connect with Our User. Added domain model with new Repository. Some new methods in UserReader. Rebuilded OAuthManager, but not tested yet. New command for register OAuth users. Some fixes...”; “Added OAuth support. Added password reset to auth with email notification. Some fixes.”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/infrastructure/repositories/session/session_repo.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/domain/permission/values/permission_name.py src/domain/permission/values/permission_name.py:14 — src/domain/permission/values/permission_name.py changed 5 times in last 90 days and 5 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 2 (its worst body is PermissionName._validate at line 14), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: prevent dataclass from overriding BaseEntity hash methods”; “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added new queries for current user. Added documentation for currently existing services. Found and Fixed some bugs.”; “Added OAuth Github support. New commands and queries for permissions. New query for role. Little fixes.”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/domain/permission/values/permission_name.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/application/services/rbac/rbac_manager.py src/application/services/rbac/rbac_manager.py:444 — src/application/services/rbac/rbac_manager.py changed 6 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 5 (its worst body is RBACManager._validate_role_name at line 444), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added new queries for current user. Added documentation for currently existing services. Found and Fixed some bugs.”; “Added grafana with alloy, loki and prometheus for metrics. Added role interactions with some fix issues.”; “fix”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/application/services/rbac/rbac_manager.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/application/services/security/oauth_manager.py src/application/services/security/oauth_manager.py:614 — src/application/services/security/oauth_manager.py changed 6 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 7 (its worst body is OAuthManager._parse_generic_user_info at line 614), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added new queries for current user. Added documentation for currently existing services. Found and Fixed some bugs.”; “Added OAuth Github support. New commands and queries for permissions. New query for role. Little fixes.”; “Rebuild OAuth system in progress. Added new model schema OAuth Account to connect with Our User. Added domain model with new Repository. Some new methods in UserReader. Rebuilded OAuthManager, but not tested yet. New command for register OAuth users. Some fixes...”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/application/services/security/oauth_manager.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/presentation/api/v1/auth/request/user.py src/presentation/api/v1/auth/request/user.py:26 — src/presentation/api/v1/auth/request/user.py changed 6 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 4 (its worst body is UserCreate.validate_names at line 26), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added new queries for current user. Added documentation for currently existing services. Found and Fixed some bugs.”; “Added OAuth support. Added password reset to auth with email notification. Some fixes.”; “Fixed some docker container issues, added external network for kafka. Added some inrernal and external events. Some fixes on kafka consumer impl. Now, app can produce some events to kafka, but still some issues to read them. TBD ->”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/presentation/api/v1/auth/request/user.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/domain/role/entity/role.py src/domain/role/entity/role.py:16 — src/domain/role/entity/role.py changed 5 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 1 (its worst body is Role.permission at line 16), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: prevent dataclass from overriding BaseEntity hash methods”; “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Rebuild OAuth system in progress. Added new model schema OAuth Account to connect with Our User. Added domain model with new Repository. Some new methods in UserReader. Rebuilded OAuthManager, but not tested yet. New command for register OAuth users. Some fixes...”; “fix”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/domain/role/entity/role.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: REDACTED REDACTED:130 — REDACTED changed 5 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 8 (its worst body is NotificationManager.send_notification at line 130), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “Documentation update: CQRS schema fix, Service's descritption, Mermaid schemas for Presentation layer explanation.”; “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added new queries for current user. Added documentation for currently existing services. Found and Fixed some bugs.”; “Added OAuth support. Added password reset to auth with email notification. Some fixes.”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- REDACTED`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/application/exceptions/jwt.py src/application/exceptions/jwt.py:23 — src/application/exceptions/jwt.py changed 5 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 1 (its worst body is AccessRejectedException.message at line 23), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Rebuild OAuth system in progress. Added new model schema OAuth Account to connect with Our User. Added domain model with new Repository. Some new methods in UserReader. Rebuilded OAuthManager, but not tested yet. New command for register OAuth users. Some fixes...”; “Added grafana with alloy, loki and prometheus for metrics. Added role interactions with some fix issues.”; “fix”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/application/exceptions/jwt.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/application/exceptions/rbac.py src/application/exceptions/rbac.py:22 — src/application/exceptions/rbac.py changed 5 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 1 (its worst body is RoleAlreadyExistsException.message at line 22), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added new queries for current user. Added documentation for currently existing services. Found and Fixed some bugs.”; “Added grafana with alloy, loki and prometheus for metrics. Added role interactions with some fix issues.”; “fix”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/application/exceptions/rbac.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/application/services/session/session_manager.py src/application/services/session/session_manager.py:29 — src/application/services/session/session_manager.py changed 5 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 2 (its worst body is SessionManager.get_or_create_session at line 29), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added new queries for current user. Added documentation for currently existing services. Found and Fixed some bugs.”; “Added OAuth support. Added password reset to auth with email notification. Some fixes.”; “fix”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/application/services/session/session_manager.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/infrastructure/repositories/role/role_repo.py src/infrastructure/repositories/role/role_repo.py:42 — src/infrastructure/repositories/role/role_repo.py changed 5 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 2 (its worst body is RoleRepository.get_role_by_id at line 42), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added OAuth Github support. New commands and queries for permissions. New query for role. Little fixes.”; “fix”; “Fixed some docker container issues, added external network for kafka. Added some inrernal and external events. Some fixes on kafka consumer impl. Now, app can produce some events to kafka, but still some issues to read them. TBD ->”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/infrastructure/repositories/role/role_repo.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/infrastructure/repositories/token/redis_repo.py src/infrastructure/repositories/token/redis_repo.py:16 — src/infrastructure/repositories/token/redis_repo.py changed 5 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 2 (its worst body is RedisRepository.set at line 16), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added OAuth support. Added password reset to auth with email notification. Some fixes.”; “Added grafana with alloy, loki and prometheus for metrics. Added role interactions with some fix issues.”; “Fixed some docker container issues, added external network for kafka. Added some inrernal and external events. Some fixes on kafka consumer impl. Now, app can produce some events to kafka, but still some issues to read them. TBD ->”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/infrastructure/repositories/token/redis_repo.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/presentation/api/v1/roles/rbac_router.py src/presentation/api/v1/roles/rbac_router.py:232 — src/presentation/api/v1/roles/rbac_router.py changed 5 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 4 (its worst body is RoleController.partial_update_role at line 232), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added OAuth Github support. New commands and queries for permissions. New query for role. Little fixes.”; “Added grafana with alloy, loki and prometheus for metrics. Added role interactions with some fix issues.”; “fix”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/presentation/api/v1/roles/rbac_router.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/application/base/security/jwt_payload.py src/application/base/security/jwt_payload.py:18 — src/application/base/security/jwt_payload.py changed 4 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 1 (its worst body is BaseJWTPayloadGenerator.generate at line 18), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: prevent dataclass from overriding BaseEntity hash methods”; “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Added new queries for current user. Added documentation for currently existing services. Found and Fixed some bugs.”; “Fixed some docker container issues, added external network for kafka. Added some inrernal and external events. Some fixes on kafka consumer impl. Now, app can produce some events to kafka, but still some issues to read them. TBD ->”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/application/base/security/jwt_payload.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • Repeated repair: src/domain/session/entity/session.py src/domain/session/entity/session.py:21 — src/domain/session/entity/session.py changed 4 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 2 (its worst body is Session.terminate at line 21), UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix: prevent dataclass from overriding BaseEntity hash methods”; “Added ruff support. Naming fixes. Type fixes. Domain changes: ValueObject revorked, Entity changes. Application: now decorator authorization_required in helpers.py. Added README.md, but not finished.”; “Rebuild OAuth system in progress. Added new model schema OAuth Account to connect with Our User. Added domain model with new Repository. Some new methods in UserReader. Rebuilded OAuthManager, but not tested yet. New command for register OAuth users. Some fixes...”; “Fixed some docker container issues, added external network for kafka. Added some inrernal and external events. Some fixes on kafka consumer impl. Now, app can produce some events to kafka, but still some issues to read them. TBD ->”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2025-02-14..2025-05-15, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2025-02-14 17:08:48 +03:00' --until='2025-05-15 17:08:48 +03:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/domain/session/entity/session.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
  • + 30 more in this group — see findings.md.
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model · Anemic entity · ×6
  • Anemic entity: Permission src/domain/permission/entity/permission.py:8 — `Permission` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
  • Anemic entity: OAuthAccount src/infrastructure/db/models/oauth_provider.py:8 — `OAuthAccount` is an aggregate/entity with 6 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
  • Anemic entity: Permission src/infrastructure/db/models/permission.py:28 — `Permission` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
  • Anemic entity: Role src/infrastructure/db/models/role.py:28 — `Role` is an aggregate/entity with 6 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
  • Anemic entity: UserSession src/infrastructure/db/models/session.py:10 — `UserSession` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
  • Anemic entity: User src/infrastructure/db/models/user.py:19 — `User` is an aggregate/entity with 10 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×5
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×5
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
DM5 · Encapsulated state · Mutable entity · ×5
  • Mutable entity: OAuthAccount src/domain/oauth_account/entity/oauth_account.py:8 — `OAuthAccount` exposes publicly writable state (user_id, provider, provider_user_id, provider_email, is_active).
  • Mutable entity: Permission src/domain/permission/entity/permission.py:8 — `Permission` exposes publicly writable state (permission_name).
  • Mutable entity: Role src/domain/role/entity/role.py:9 — `Role` exposes publicly writable state (name, description, security_level).
  • Mutable entity: Session src/domain/session/entity/session.py:9 — `Session` exposes publicly writable state (user_id, user_agent, device_info, device_id, last_activity, is_active).
  • Mutable entity: User src/domain/user/entity/user.py:19 — `User` exposes publicly writable state (id, username, email, password, jwt_data, deleted_at, and 1 more).
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:42 — src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:42-46 | src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:66-70 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:42` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. ★ These copies have DRIFTED, and that is worth reading before extracting anything: just before the matched lines, `src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:65` calls `UniqueConstraint`, `f` and `src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:41` does not — after which the two agree again for 4 more lines. One of those two behaviours is the intended one and the other is what a copy-paste left behind, so decide which BEFORE unifying them: extracting the shared part will silently settle it, and if the copy that skips the call is the wrong one, that bug is already live.
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:98 — src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:98-102 | src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:166-170 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:98` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (18–20 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (18–20 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:129 — src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:129-148 | src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:151-168 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:129` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (18–19 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (18–19 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:105 — src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:105-122 | src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:178-196 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:178` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/application/cqrs/user/commands/register_oauth_user.py:59 — src/application/cqrs/user/commands/register_oauth_user.py:59-76 | src/application/cqrs/user/commands/register_user.py:65-82 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. The `return` at the foot of the matched lines is the enclosing body's own terminal exit, not an early one: it moves with them unchanged, and each site calls the extracted unit from the position that `return` occupied — no decision has to be handed back and re-acted on. ★ These copies have DRIFTED, and that is worth reading before extracting anything: just before the matched lines, `src/application/cqrs/user/commands/register_oauth_user.py:57` calls `create_oauth_account` and `src/application/cqrs/user/commands/register_user.py:64` does not — after which the two agree again for 2 more lines. One of those two behaviours is the intended one and the other is what a copy-paste left behind, so decide which BEFORE unifying them: extracting the shared part will silently settle it, and if the copy that skips the call is the wrong one, that bug is already live.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py:64 — src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py:64-79 | src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py:87-102 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. ★ These copies have DRIFTED, and that is worth reading before extracting anything: just after the matched lines, `src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py:81` calls `add_role` and `src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py:104` does not — after which the two agree again for 2 more lines. One of those two behaviours is the intended one and the other is what a copy-paste left behind, so decide which BEFORE unifying them: extracting the shared part will silently settle it, and if the copy that skips the call is the wrong one, that bug is already live.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/application/services/tasks/email_templates.py:188 — src/application/services/tasks/email_templates.py:188-201 | src/application/services/tasks/email_templates.py:209-222 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12–13 lines × 5) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12–13 lines × 5) src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:29 — src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:29-40 | src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:51-63 | src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:82-93 | src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:106-117 | src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:180-191 — all 5 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:51` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. ★ These copies have DRIFTED, and that is worth reading before extracting anything: just before the matched lines, `src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:105` calls `Column`, `Boolean` and `src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:28` does not — after which the two agree again for 2 more lines. One of those two behaviours is the intended one and the other is what a copy-paste left behind, so decide which BEFORE unifying them: extracting the shared part will silently settle it, and if the copy that skips the call is the wrong one, that bug is already live.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10–11 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (10–11 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py:204 — src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py:204-214 | src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py:241-250 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/infrastructure/repositories/converters.py:204` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7–9 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (7–9 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:28 — src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:28-36 | src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:172-178 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/infrastructure/db/migrations/versions/20250515-154426_a5a0703734e0_database_initialization.py:28` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) src/application/exceptions/oauth.py:12 — src/application/exceptions/oauth.py:12-30 | src/infrastructure/exceptions/repository.py:17-80 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/infrastructure/repositories/role/role_repo.py:25 — src/infrastructure/repositories/role/role_repo.py:25-33 | REDACTED:19-25 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
P1 · CI/CD gates · No CI pipeline · ×1
  • No CI pipeline — No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
Minor — 9 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
C2 · Access Controls · No named authorization policies · ×1
  • No named authorization policies — Authorization IS enforced here (by route guards, auth middleware or checks that refuse a caller) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is a NAMED rule set: who may do what is encoded inline where it is checked, so the rules can't be listed, reviewed or tested apart from the code that applies them. Recommendation, not a defect.
C3 · Audit Trail · Partial audit-trail evidence · ×1
  • Partial audit-trail evidence — An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: a write-side hook every change flows through (HistoricalRecords, auditlog.register, reversion.register, pghistory.track, SQLAlchemy-Continuum, a post_save / after_update listener recording each change, or an event-sourced store), per-model coverage (a change-history registration on each model that needs a who-changed-what trail, or an event-sourced aggregate).
D26 · Project Cohesion · Projects may be oversized for their cohesion · ×1
  • Projects may be oversized for their cohesion — 1 of 2 project(s) overshoot their size bounds, lowering Project Cohesion to 0.0/10. The most over is `(repository root)` (10827 LoC, 330 module-visible types across 75 directories). Review these for cohesion — draw the boundary inside the module first (group each responsibility into its own package or directory and keep the cross-boundary members non-public), since splitting a published package moves types between packages and breaks consumers.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1
  • REDACTED
M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1
  • No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1
  • No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
P6 · Release Hygiene · No changelog · ×1
  • No changelog — No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
Minor — 1 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene PARTLY measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene PARTLY measured — Python dependencies read, no exact pin to grade for currency — This repository's Python dependencies were read: 5 shipped distribution(s) across 1 manifest(s) (3 development or optional declaration(s) excluded, because a consumer does not install them). Whether any of them is behind its current release is the dependency-CURRENCY question, and no declaration here carries an EXACT pin to ask it about — every one is a floor or a range, which installs the newest release it admits and therefore cannot be behind one. That is a healthy declaration style, NOT a defect and NOT a gap in this analyzer; there is simply no currency question to answer. This is NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy. Lockfiles are deliberately not read (poetry.lock, REDACTED, Pipfile.lock, pdm.lock): the four disagree about dev/optional membership, and misreading one would charge a test-only package a consumer never receives. Known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D30.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-6672f604de4747bd9e327c5f6d1540d0/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-6672f604de4747bd9e327c5f6d1540d0/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt .6artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm .21artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .7artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.0—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenance—provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm .0artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 01a1b88a-166a-7978-ab8a-69ace390f33f · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md