Public report of SasanLabs/VulnerableApp, published 17 November 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of
findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known
vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive reportMeasured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.11.4). Assert signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey →
Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 17 November 2026, 17:03 UTC · Survey ID cd_c99a86b172e04496978f90727f5c0a08
SasanLabs/VulnerableApp
Measured 17 November 2026, 17:02 UTC, at code version f2444bd
First survey, so nothing to compare with yet
CAI scoreWeak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.
A small codebase: 18,481 lines of product code in 1 project, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.2 person-years · Weakest lens: Accessibility, 36.5
Findings by how serious they are
108 critical298 serious34 minor
11 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, we either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard we look for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.
This survey was produced by
Canine Code Analyzer
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Canine Code Analyzer engine 1.0.0
Measured
17 November 2026, 17:02 UTC
A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number
together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee
the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds the Canine Code Analyzer. It is open to any tool that
implements it, and today the Canine Code Analyzer is the only one that does.
The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. We work it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸
70of 70 dimensions measured by tools.
405of 440 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 35 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
70dimensions across 7 lenses, read from 18,481 lines of product code in 1 project.
SasanLabs/VulnerableApp falls short of our standard for production because it has controls that only work with a mouse and images with no text description. It scores 41.7 out of 100 and is rated Weak, and 88 of its 108 critical findings are security problems.
Accessibility, at 36.5, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is making the controls keyboard-usable, worth about 3.0 points. Adding text alternatives comes next, worth about 2.7 points. Raising Accessibility to 70 would lift the score to about 45.8.
Thirty-nine pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Fifteen settings leave the servers or containers unsafe, and thirteen passwords or keys in the code and seven in the code's history are open to anyone who can read the repository. Pinning each tool to an exact version, correcting the unsafe settings and replacing each exposed password or key would close these risks. Limiting each secret to its own step would fix the six secrets exposed to more of the pipeline than needed, and the three pipeline steps that install packages without pinning their versions need the packages they install pinned to exact versions. The 15 form fields without a label need a label.
The product code is 18,481 lines, about €27,000 to rebuild.
A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.
How the score is built: what each lens counts forThe lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
If Accessibility rose from 36.5 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 41.7 to about 45.8.
Code composition: what the lines of code are
Product code 58%Tests 42%
Rebuild cost: about €27,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild
€9,100 to €46,000, for 152 to 482 hours of work, about 0.2 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem
Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor
×0.7 at a score of 42. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size
Small: 18,481 lines of product code
What it is not
Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one.
How the estimate is made: We price the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.
Top priorities
The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.
1
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Raises the score by about 3.0 points · Medium effort · Keyboard semantics
2
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Raises the score by about 2.7 points · Medium effort · Text alternatives
3
Resolve the 13 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (8), REDACTED (2), REDACTED.
Raises the score by about 2.5 points · Medium effort · REDACTED Scanning
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.
Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €27,000 to build again, about 0.2 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Accessibility, at 36.5 (Weak). Accessibility is about whether the interface is built so that everyone can use it, including people who can't see the screen or can't use a mouse. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Accessibility also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Accessibility grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Accessibility actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 3.0 points for medium effort. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.
95 modules, with 46 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.
The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 55 more are left out to keep it readable.
Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
sasanlabs.configuration uses sasanlabs.internal.utility, so a change to sasanlabs.internal.utility can break sasanlabs.configuration, while a change to sasanlabs.configuration can't break sasanlabs.internal.utility.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.configuration uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.internal.utility.annotations uses sasanlabs.internal.utility, so a change to sasanlabs.internal.utility can break sasanlabs.internal.utility.annotations, while a change to sasanlabs.internal.utility.annotations can't break sasanlabs.internal.utility.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.internal.utility.annotations uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.internal.utility.annotations uses sasanlabs.vulnerability.types, so a change to sasanlabs.vulnerability.types can break sasanlabs.internal.utility.annotations, while a change to sasanlabs.internal.utility.annotations can't break sasanlabs.vulnerability.types.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.internal.utility.annotations uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.exception uses sasanlabs.internal.utility, so a change to sasanlabs.internal.utility can break sasanlabs.service.exception, while a change to sasanlabs.service.exception can't break sasanlabs.internal.utility.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.exception uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.authentication uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.authentication, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.authentication can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.authentication uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cachePoisoning uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cachePoisoning, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cachePoisoning can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cachePoisoning uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.clickjacking uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.clickjacking, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.clickjacking can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.clickjacking uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.commandInjection uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.commandInjection, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.commandInjection can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.commandInjection uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.deserialization uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.deserialization, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.deserialization can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.deserialization uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.fileupload uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.fileupload, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.fileupload can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.fileupload uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.idor uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.idor, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.idor can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.idor uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt.keys, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt.keys can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt.keys.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.ldapInjection uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.ldapInjection, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.ldapInjection can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.ldapInjection uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.pathTraversal uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.pathTraversal, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.pathTraversal can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.pathTraversal uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.sessionManagement uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.sessionManagement, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.sessionManagement can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.sessionManagement uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.ssrf uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.ssrf, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.ssrf can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.ssrf uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe.dao uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe.dao, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe.dao can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe.dao uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.beans uses sasanlabs.internal.utility, so a change to sasanlabs.internal.utility can break sasanlabs.beans, while a change to sasanlabs.beans can't break sasanlabs.internal.utility.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.beans uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.beans uses sasanlabs.vulnerability.types, so a change to sasanlabs.vulnerability.types can break sasanlabs.beans, while a change to sasanlabs.beans can't break sasanlabs.vulnerability.types.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.beans uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.beans uses sasanlabs.internal.utility.annotations, so a change to sasanlabs.internal.utility.annotations can break sasanlabs.beans, while a change to sasanlabs.beans can't break sasanlabs.internal.utility.annotations.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.beans uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.controller.exception uses sasanlabs.internal.utility, so a change to sasanlabs.internal.utility can break sasanlabs.controller.exception, while a change to sasanlabs.controller.exception can't break sasanlabs.internal.utility.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.controller.exception uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.controller.exception uses sasanlabs.service.exception, so a change to sasanlabs.service.exception can break sasanlabs.controller.exception, while a change to sasanlabs.controller.exception can't break sasanlabs.service.exception.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.controller.exception uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.email uses sasanlabs.configuration, so a change to sasanlabs.configuration can break sasanlabs.service.email, while a change to sasanlabs.service.email can't break sasanlabs.configuration.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.email uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cryptographicFailures.repo uses sasanlabs.configuration, so a change to sasanlabs.configuration can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cryptographicFailures.repo, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cryptographicFailures.repo can't break sasanlabs.configuration.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cryptographicFailures.repo uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt.impl uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt.impl, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt.impl can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.jwt.impl uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe.dao, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe.dao can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe.dao.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.xxe uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service uses sasanlabs.beans, so a change to sasanlabs.beans can break sasanlabs.service, while a change to sasanlabs.service can't break sasanlabs.beans.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cryptographicFailures uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cryptographicFailures, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cryptographicFailures can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cryptographicFailures uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
1 pair of types, where a type in sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cryptographicFailures uses a type in sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cryptographicFailures.repo.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cryptographicFailures uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cryptographicFailures.repo, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cryptographicFailures.repo can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cryptographicFailures, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cryptographicFailures can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cryptographicFailures.repo.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.cryptographicFailures uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.otp uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.otp, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.otp can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.otp uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.otp uses sasanlabs.configuration, so a change to sasanlabs.configuration can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.otp, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.otp can't break sasanlabs.configuration.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.otp uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.otp uses sasanlabs.service.email, so a change to sasanlabs.service.email can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.otp, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.otp can't break sasanlabs.service.email.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.otp uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.passwordReset uses sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean, so a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.passwordReset, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.passwordReset can't break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.bean.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.passwordReset uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.passwordReset uses sasanlabs.configuration, so a change to sasanlabs.configuration can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.passwordReset, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.passwordReset can't break sasanlabs.configuration.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.passwordReset uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.passwordReset uses sasanlabs.service.email, so a change to sasanlabs.service.email can break sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.passwordReset, while a change to sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.passwordReset can't break sasanlabs.service.email.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.vulnerability.passwordReset uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.controller uses sasanlabs.beans, so a change to sasanlabs.beans can break sasanlabs.controller, while a change to sasanlabs.controller can't break sasanlabs.beans.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.controller uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.controller uses sasanlabs.service.email, so a change to sasanlabs.service.email can break sasanlabs.controller, while a change to sasanlabs.controller can't break sasanlabs.service.email.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.controller uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.controller uses sasanlabs.service, so a change to sasanlabs.service can break sasanlabs.controller, while a change to sasanlabs.controller can't break sasanlabs.service.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.controller uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.impl uses sasanlabs.internal.utility, so a change to sasanlabs.internal.utility can break sasanlabs.service.impl, while a change to sasanlabs.service.impl can't break sasanlabs.internal.utility.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.impl uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.impl uses sasanlabs.configuration, so a change to sasanlabs.configuration can break sasanlabs.service.impl, while a change to sasanlabs.service.impl can't break sasanlabs.configuration.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.impl uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.impl uses sasanlabs.internal.utility.annotations, so a change to sasanlabs.internal.utility.annotations can break sasanlabs.service.impl, while a change to sasanlabs.service.impl can't break sasanlabs.internal.utility.annotations.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.impl uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.impl uses sasanlabs.beans, so a change to sasanlabs.beans can break sasanlabs.service.impl, while a change to sasanlabs.service.impl can't break sasanlabs.beans.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.impl uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
sasanlabs.service.impl uses sasanlabs.service, so a change to sasanlabs.service can break sasanlabs.service.impl, while a change to sasanlabs.service.impl can't break sasanlabs.service.
Position
Below the diagonal: sasanlabs.service.impl uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health · 39.5 · Weak · gated by R1, R10, X5 ·
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2025 — Injection
94
High / Critical
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures
24
High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration
23
High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures
13
Medium
Roadmap
Top priorities: Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href; Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video; Resolve the 13 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (8), REDACTED (2), REDACTED.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 77 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 13% slop · 69% mixed · 18% near-clean.
File
Score
Band
Worst signal
REDACTED
1.3
Slop
IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED
1.4
Slop
Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED
1.6
Slop
Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED
1.6
Slop
IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED
2.3
Slop
Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED
2.7
Slop
Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED
2.7
Slop
Secrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED
3.7
Slop
Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED
3.7
Slop
Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED
3.7
Slop
IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED
4.0
Mixed
Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED
4.0
Mixed
Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED
4.0
Mixed
Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED
4.1
Mixed
IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED
4.3
Mixed
Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED
4.4
Mixed
REDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED
4.4
Mixed
REDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED
4.4
Mixed
REDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED
4.6
Mixed
REDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED
4.6
Mixed
Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
How the grades work
Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this
survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.
Critical — 108
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a
missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here
tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 298
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades
the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to
carry for two years either.
Minor — 34
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions.
Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 11
Something this survey could not settle
from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no
positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves
nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean
result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither
rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each
one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 70 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
Every figure here is one of two kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10.
What we checked — 70 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 405 of 440 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: this repository's production source spans .py, .java, and our analyzer cannot run the .java test suite(s) — so no coverage was collected for the repository as a whole. The Python half did build and run, and its own line coverage came back at 77.4% — but that is a figure for one half of the product, and we do not publish a partial one as if it were complete. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero.
D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares a Gradle build (build.gradle/build.gradle.kts), but the licence verdict published here was taken over its gem dependencies. Nothing was read about its Gradle dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (106 contributor(s) across 1890 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 86% of the history; the other 105 hold 0.1% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict. For npm the surface is what a published package.json's entry points (exports, main, module, types) export, followed through the source; an entry that names build output the tree does not commit (dist/, build/) is not followed back to source, because only a tsconfig outDir/rootDir pair states that mapping and a bundler's input lives in executable configuration this engine does not evaluate.
D24 Comment Value — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each source language's comment syntax, and the code a comment annotates in it, needs its own proof before D24 judges it. Until then those comments are left unread, not counted as clean.
D26 Project Cohesion — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `(repository root)` (21669 LoC, 216 module-visible types across 105 directories) is over its size bounds, and whether one unit is a coherent whole or a grab-bag is read from its type references: the parts of it that reach the rest only through its shared core. Those are read over the C#/VB code model, which this unit's source did not supply. Its size alone is no verdict on its cohesion, so none is published.
C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
ED5 Idempotency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check decides whether a handler's mutation is safe to re-run by recognising its persistence writes (a database save, a repository write, an event publish) and its guards. Those markers are .NET member names, so in this repository's language a write such as `repository.save(order)` is not recognised and a same-named call on an unrelated library type could be. The handlers were found; their idempotency was neither confirmed nor ruled out.
M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
P8 Schema migrations — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. The schema may be created by a runner, a deploy script or a config file outside what this check reads, so an absence here is our blind spot rather than a missing migration strategy. The card abstains instead of scoring. You can widen what we reach: if the schema is created and evolved by a tool this check does not name, naming it lets us teach the detector to read it.
S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — we run the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming consistency compares each name with the convention its structural peers follow in this repository: it cannot tell whether a consistently used name is a good one, and languages other than C# and TypeScript are not measured.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value is measured as redundancy only: a comment that repeats its code's words is found, but a paraphrase in other words, a vague comment, or one the code contradicts is not, and whether a comment is valuable is not claimed. Comments in other scripts or languages, and outside C#, are not judged.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
Bring the 4 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with SastBenchmarkStrategy.compare (cyclomatic 20), PasswordReset.setResult (cyclomatic 18), SecurePasswordReset.setResult (cyclomatic 18). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.2 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Bring the 8 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with SastBenchmarkStrategy.compare (cognitive 30), DastBenchmarkStrategy.compare (cognitive 23), setResult (cognitive 22). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 8 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 8.4 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.0 / 10Stronggated by 7 serious findings✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 4 ClassTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with REDACTED, UnrestrictedFileUpload.java, CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with REDACTED, UnrestrictedFileUpload.java, CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D4 · Code Duplication4.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How much of the production code is copy-pasted: the share of production lines inside a reported copy (every copy of a duplicated block or of an edited member, each line once), 10 at none and 0 at a quarter of the lines.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), scored on the share of production lines inside a reported copy (each line once; 10 at none, 0 at a quarter). Deterministic.
30 duplicated block group(s) detected. 13.3 % of the production lines (2,466 of 18,481) are in a reported copy. A further 40 rows report members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it.
Edited copy of a member (16 corresponding lines) · ×2src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/commandInjection/CommandInjection.java:248
Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) · ×2src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:283
Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) · ×2src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/bean/JWTUtils.java:146
Edited copies of one member (3 members, 10+ corresponding lines) · ×2REDACTED:76
Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines) · ×2src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/email/EmailServiceImpl.java:35
+ 57 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 2 Edited copy of a member (16 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with CommandInjection.java, LibBasedJWTGenerator.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java, PathTraversalVulnerability.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with REDACTED, UnrestrictedFileUpload.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Resolve the 3 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with JWTValidator.java, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D10 · Test Quality9.7 / 10Stronggated by 15 serious findings✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
0 skipped, 15 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 711 tests.
No assertions: blankToolField_returns400 · ×15src/test/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/controller/BenchmarkControllerTest.java:125
What to do
Resolve the 15 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with BenchmarkControllerTest.java (6), VulnerableAppRestControllerTest.java (4), VulnerableAppRestControllerHtmlSitemapTest.java (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.
Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, not deprecated, and not bloated. Known vulnerabilities are D30's.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (capped-linear for deprecation, prerelease and outdated) per KLoC. Known-vulnerable packages are D30's and are not charged here (rubric-2026.11.2). Exhaustive.
0 outdated direct gem(s), 1 pinning defect(s). 2 declaration(s) graded against rubygems.org, none of them against a committed Gemfile.lock — this repository commits none, which a published gem correctly does not, so currency is read off the declared requirements: a declaration that does not cap below the current release resolves to it on `bundle install`. Whether any of these gems is DEPRECATED or YANKED is not graded — rubygems.org publishes no deprecation marker, and a yank removes a version rather than flagging it. Whether any is UNMAINTAINED is not graded either: no registry publishes a maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is a source question, not a registry one. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.
No Gemfile.lock committed by an application
What to do
Resolve the 1 No Gemfile.lock committed by an application finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 13 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED (8), REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
0 of 2 shipped gem(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from rubygems.org over the 2 runtime gem(s) this repository declares. It commits no Gemfile.lock to close that set over, so the verdict covers the declarations rather than the whole resolved graph. Development-group and `add_development_dependency` gems are excluded: they are not distributed with this repository. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's gem dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares a Gradle build (build.gradle/build.gradle.kts), and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Resolve the 1 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with SastBenchmarkStrategy.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
2 deducted task-comment markers across 18481 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
Resolve the 2 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with JWTValidator.java, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Every README, docs/ document and root guide parsed by its markup and measured in Unicode letters. Published: a runnable or packaged .NET project whose README (or a document it links, or a root guide) shows no example, and a root README naming none of three or more projects. Overview, licence, boilerplate, wall-of-text, empty-section and XML-doc rows are measured and withheld (counted in gaps) after adjudication. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 25 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.
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D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Every ADR read by its section structure: nine located rules (a missing Decision, Context or Consequences section, a stale status, two records deciding the same question, a dangling supersede link, a number-only title, a single option, no named cost, no status where the log uses one, no enforcement field where the log adopted one), each a fixed deduction from 10; the score is the mean over evaluated records. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with build.gradle. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Seven vocabulary-free rules (N1-N7) mine each naming convention from the repository and flag a name that breaks a convention its structural peers in the same unit follow; production C# and TypeScript, each its own population. Deterministic, no model, no sample. Advisory.
5 naming inconsistencies among 87 declarations measured against a convention their peers follow.
`createJWTHmacAlgoToJavaAlgoMapping` spells `Hmac` where 14 names in the project spell it `HMAC`src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/bean/JWTUtils.java:97
`getOtpHash` spells `Otp` where 21 names in the project spell it `OTP`src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPEntity.java:35
`setOtpHash` spells `Otp` where 21 names in the project spell it `OTP`src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPEntity.java:63
`getCweID` spells `ID` where 53 names in the project spell it `Id`src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/vulnerability/types/VulnerabilityType.java:93
`getWascID` spells `ID` where 53 names in the project spell it `Id`src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/vulnerability/types/VulnerabilityType.java:97
What to do
Resolve the 1 `createJWTHmacAlgoToJavaAlgoMapping` spells `Hmac` where 14 names in the… finding(s) in Naming Consistency — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 `getOtpHash` spells `Otp` where 21 names in the project spell it `OTP` finding(s) in Naming Consistency — start with OTPEntity.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 `setOtpHash` spells `Otp` where 21 names in the project spell it `OTP` finding(s) in Naming Consistency — start with OTPEntity.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Every inline C# comment compared word by word with the identifiers, literals and constructs of the code it annotates (taken from the syntax); a comment whose words that code already contains is redundant, as are closing-brace labels and generator template text. Comments giving a reason or a reference are kept; other scripts and languages are not judged. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
40 % of calls cross a namespace and 13 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.
10 finding(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
Resolve the 6 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
94 finding(s): 0 critical, 53 high, 38 medium, 3 low. 39 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `gradlew` (line 72, line 177) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 3 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
+ 11 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 6 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 39 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (39 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.
Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): every row is a match against a vulnerability database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.
No known-vulnerable dependencies in any ecosystem this repository declares. No known-vulnerable gem among the 2 declared gem(s) osv.dev was asked about. This repository commits no Gemfile.lock — which a published gem correctly does not — so osv-scanner had no resolved graph to read, and the question was put to osv.dev instead over the releases `bundle install` resolves this repository's 2 declared requirement(s) to. The verdict therefore covers the DIRECT declarations at their resolved releases, not the transitive graph a lock would close over.
Resolve the 15 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (7), REDACTED (4), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 issue-level).
Resolve the 8 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
8 of 69 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementVulnerability.java. Counted over 69 of the 160 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
Resolve the 8 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with SessionManagementVulnerability.java, SessionManagementService.java, PasswordHashingUtils.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.
Resolve the 5 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with JWTValidator.java, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Change-coupling hub finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with IJWTValidator.java, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
+ 6 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Reported apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.
Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): the malicious-package feed is a database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious. No known-vulnerable gem among the 2 declared gem(s) osv.dev was asked about. This repository commits no Gemfile.lock — which a published gem correctly does not — so osv-scanner had no resolved graph to read, and the question was put to osv.dev instead over the releases `bundle install` resolves this repository's 2 declared requirement(s) to. The verdict therefore covers the DIRECT declarations at their resolved releases, not the transitive graph a lock would close over.
What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.
Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 1 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 10 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
End-of-life framework: Spring Boot 2build.gradle:1
What to do
Resolve the 1 End-of-life framework finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with build.gradle. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives2.3 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
Coverage: Population: image/media elements — img, area, input[type=image], svg, video, object, embed, canvas — across the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and dynamic-attribute elements are skipped. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is NOT read by any producer, so it contributes no element to this population; where such a frontend is present the card discloses it as an analyzer gap rather than scoring around it.
An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×3) — src/main/resources/static/templates/ErrorBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:18, src/main/resources/static/templates/UnionBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:17, src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:165
What to do
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×15) — src/main/resources/static/templates/BlindSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.html:4, src/main/resources/static/templates/CommandInjection/LEVEL_1/CI_Level1.html:6, src/main/resources/static/templates/ErrorBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.html:4, …
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC3 · Page structure4.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×3) — src/main/resources/static/index.html:2, src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.html:2, src/main/resources/static/phishing/fake-login.html:2
Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×20) — src/main/resources/static/phishing/fake-login.html:18, src/main/resources/static/templates/AuthenticationVulnerability/LEVEL_1/Auth.html:7, src/main/resources/static/templates/AuthenticationVulnerability/LEVEL_8/Auth.html:7, …
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no element the repo's own CSS styles `cursor: pointer` without giving it any of the three, no unfocusable element whose only binding is a mouse enter/leave pair or a double-click, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
Coverage: Population: elements that pose a keyboard-semantics question, in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) — a non-natively-interactive element carrying a click handler, a double-click or hover enter/leave binding, a pointer-only gesture on a tabindex="0" element, or `cursor: pointer` from the repo's own CSS; an href-less or placeholder-href (#, javascript:) anchor; and any element with a positive tabindex. Natively interactive elements used correctly (<button>, <a href>, form controls) are NOT in the population — there is nothing to judge — so a page of nothing but correct controls gives AC4 nothing to measure. Keyboard reachability is judged from the markup, never from a rendered page. ★ An interactive element declared in a tagged-template (html`…`) or hyperscript frontend is NOT in this population — no producer reads either — so an empty population is reported as an analyzer gap, never as "this repository has no interactive elements".
The repo's own CSS styles .cj-overlay-wrapper with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. — src/main/resources/static/templates/ClickjackingVulnerability/LEVEL_4/ClickjackingVulnerability.html:18
An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×5) — src/main/resources/static/templates/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection/LEVEL_12/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.html:14, src/main/resources/static/templates/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection/LEVEL_12/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.html:33, src/main/resources/static/templates/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection/LEVEL_12/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.html:36, …
The repo's own CSS styles .master-item with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. — src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:425
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Coverage: Population: elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) that carry a role or an aria-* attribute; roles and token values are checked against the ARIA enums exhaustively within that set. An expression-valued (dynamic) role or aria-* value is skipped rather than guessed, and markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
`.pr-shell button` sets color: #fff on background-color: #e07020 — 3.2:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/Common/PasswordReset.css:75
`#requestOtpBtn, #validateOtpBtn` sets color: #fff on background-color: #e07020 — 3.2:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — src/main/resources/static/templates/OTPVulnerability/LEVEL_1/OTP.css:106
`.btn-redirect-continue` sets color: #ffffff on background-color: #e07020 — 3.2:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — src/main/resources/static/templates/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection/LEVEL_10/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.css:81
`#ClickjackingVulnerability .cj-fake-btn` sets color: #fff on background-color: #ff9800 — 2.2:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — src/main/resources/static/templates/ClickjackingVulnerability/LEVEL_4/ClickjackingVulnerability.css:133
`#ClickjackingVulnerability .cj-blocked-msg` sets color: #e65100 on background-color: #fff3e0 — 3.5:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — src/main/resources/static/templates/ClickjackingVulnerability/LEVEL_1/ClickjackingVulnerability.css:82
`#loginBtn` sets color: #fff on background-color: #e07020 — 3.2:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×3) — src/main/resources/static/templates/AuthenticationVulnerability/LEVEL_8/Auth.css:95, src/main/resources/static/templates/AuthenticationVulnerability/LEVEL_1/Auth.css:95, src/main/resources/static/phishing/fake-login.css:85
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue in this repository's Java: methods whose whole body only throws a "not implemented" or bare unsupported-operation exception, or returns a default value (or nothing) under a TODO/FIXME marker, and placeholder text (lorem ipsum, changeme/replace_me…) left in strings of non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords, in this repository's Java: methods that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant or do nothing, dead `if (false)` branches, and skeleton classes most of whose methods are holes.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository and its projects have a README, and whether it is substantive.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository is organised deliberately: production code and tests are set apart in a way its ecosystem or the repository itself declares.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the project's current-state documentation describes the code that exists.
Method: Every current-state document's checkable claims looked up in the tree (links, versions, and artefact counts an order of magnitude off), plus two README checks: an advertised infrastructure product with no footprint, and a module the CHANGELOG records as removed. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.
benchmarks/w3af/README.md links to `w3af-results.json`, but `benchmarks/w3af/w3af-results.json` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — benchmarks/w3af/README.md:11
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: benchmarks/w3af/README.md links to `w3af-results.json`, but `benchmarks/w3af/w3af-results.json` does not exist.
Add a health-check endpoint (Spring Boot Actuator's /actuator/health, or a /health route) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
`REDACTED`, `REDACTED`, `REDACTED` run(s) a static-analysis scan, but no workflow that runs one is triggered by a pull request (or a merge queue, or an unfiltered push) — the scan fires on a schedule or a manual dispatch only. A vulnerable change therefore merges clean and is reported on the next scheduled run, by which time it is on the default branch and the only remedy is a follow-up fix. Add the pull-request trigger to the workflow that runs the scan so the finding arrives before the merge rather than after it.
`build.gradle` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — build.gradle:120
What to do
Trigger your SAST workflow on pull requests — a scan that only runs on a cron reports history, it does not gate.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.
Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI; off .NET, the same ladder over Go testing.B, Rust criterion/#[bench]/divan, JMH/kotlinx-benchmark, pytest-benchmark/asv/pyperf, tinybench/mitata/vitest bench/benchmark.js and Swift package-benchmark — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
0 typed · 53 plain JS — the untyped files are src/main/resources/sampleVulnerability/staticResources/LEVEL_1/SampleVulnerability.js, src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.js, src/main/resources/static/phishing/fake-login.js, src/main/resources/static/templates/AuthenticationVulnerability/LEVEL_1/Auth.js, src/main/resources/static/templates/AuthenticationVulnerability/LEVEL_8/Auth.js, src/main/resources/static/templates/BlindSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js (+47 more).
What to do
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
React / JS · Code Health — The share of the scored frontend lines inside a near-exact copy-pasted block of substantial extent (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386; each line once, 10 at none and 0 at a quarter of the lines, as D4): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.
Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Scored on the share of the scored frontend lines inside a reported copy, on the same curve as D4. Deterministic.
6 duplicated blocks under src/main/resources/static/templates/ have copies in at least two of the sibling directories BlindSQLInjectionVulnerability, CommandInjection, ErrorBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability, IDORVulnerability, LDAPInjectionVulnerability, PathTraversal (+4 more sibling(s) not listed) — 5 of them are reported below, and 1 is counted here but not reported individually: those copies match on shape but no longer clear R10's bar for an individually reported row — either they kept neither their own names nor their values, or what was copied is too small to stand on its own (it reports near-exact duplication only, and only of substantial extent). What this row states is the concentration, which the detector measured over all 6 and which does not depend on how exactly each block's copies still match. That concentration is one structural fact, not 6 local ones: the siblings replicate behaviour none of them owns, which is the shape of a missing shared module — a common library every sibling imports — rather than 6 separate extractions. Check first whether the siblings are deliberately standalone deliverables (scaffold templates, demo apps that must stay copy-pasteable); where they are, the duplication is the design and the per-block rows are the ones to act on. — src/main/resources/static/templates/BlindSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:1
src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/Common/PasswordReset.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/LEVEL_9/SecurePasswordReset.js:1 — these 2 files are line-for-line copies of one another — 93 lines are identical, in the same order, in every one of them — so this is one fact about the file set, not a block to extract. An edit made to one file and not the others changes behaviour silently, which is the failure a wholesale copy guarantees. Pick one file as the single source and derive the others from it (re-export it, spread it into the local overrides each variant genuinely needs, or generate the copies at build time) — the few lines that differ between the files are exactly the part each variant should still own. Check first whether the copies are deliberately standalone deliverables (a translation file seeded from its sibling and waiting to be translated); where they are, the duplication is the design, and the honest move is to mark the seeded file as untranslated rather than to let it pass as done. — src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/Common/PasswordReset.js:1
src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_1/IDOR.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_2/IDOR.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_3/IDOR.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_4/IDOR.js:1 · +1 more site(s) not listed — these 5 files are line-for-line copies of one another — 61 lines are identical, in the same order, in every one of them — so this is one fact about the file set, not a block to extract. An edit made to one file and not the others changes behaviour silently, which is the failure a wholesale copy guarantees. Pick one file as the single source and derive the others from it (re-export it, spread it into the local overrides each variant genuinely needs, or generate the copies at build time) — the few lines that differ between the files are exactly the part each variant should still own. Check first whether the copies are deliberately standalone deliverables (a translation file seeded from its sibling and waiting to be translated); where they are, the duplication is the design, and the honest move is to mark the seeded file as untranslated rather than to let it pass as done. — src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_1/IDOR.js:1
src/main/resources/static/templates/AuthenticationVulnerability/LEVEL_1/Auth.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/AuthenticationVulnerability/LEVEL_8/Auth.js:1 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — src/main/resources/static/templates/AuthenticationVulnerability/LEVEL_1/Auth.js:1
src/main/resources/static/templates/ClickjackingVulnerability/LEVEL_1/ClickjackingVulnerability.js:16 · src/main/resources/static/templates/ClickjackingVulnerability/LEVEL_4/ClickjackingVulnerability.js:9 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 311 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — src/main/resources/static/templates/ClickjackingVulnerability/LEVEL_1/ClickjackingVulnerability.js:16
src/main/resources/static/templates/InsecureDeserialization/LEVEL_1/InsecureDeserialization.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/InsecureDeserialization/LEVEL_4/InsecureDeserialization.js:1 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — src/main/resources/static/templates/InsecureDeserialization/LEVEL_1/InsecureDeserialization.js:1
src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/Common/SessionManagement.js:5 · src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SessionManagement.js:1 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 295 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/Common/SessionManagement.js:5
REDACTED:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_2/JWT_Level2.js:1 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — REDACTED:1
src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SessionManagement.js:44 · src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/LEVEL_6/SecureSessionManagement.js:29 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SessionManagement.js:44
src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_4/CachePoisoning.js:10 · src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_5/CachePoisoning.js:11 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 105 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_4/CachePoisoning.js:10
src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_1/CachePoisoning.js:8 · src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_2/CachePoisoning.js:8 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_1/CachePoisoning.js:8
src/main/resources/static/templates/InsecureDeserialization/LEVEL_1/InsecureDeserialization.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/InsecureDeserialization/LEVEL_2/InsecureDeserialization.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/InsecureDeserialization/LEVEL_4/InsecureDeserialization.js:1 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. There is one copy in each of 3 separate files rather than several in one place, so check first whether these are sibling modules that each declare their own version of one shape — one per entity, per provider, per language. Where they are, no single extracted module collapses them: each module still has to be written, and what recurs is the TEMPLATE. The moves that do collapse a template are to generate these modules from the set they enumerate, or to replace the repeated construction with one factory each site calls with its own values — and where the set is the point, each module pinning one distinct thing, the repetition IS the enumeration and there is nothing to delete. — src/main/resources/static/templates/InsecureDeserialization/LEVEL_1/InsecureDeserialization.js:1
src/main/resources/static/templates/BlindSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/ErrorBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:1 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — src/main/resources/static/templates/BlindSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:1
src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_1/JWT_Level1.js:15 · REDACTED:14 · src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_2/JWT_Level2.js:14 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_1/JWT_Level1.js:15
REDACTED:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_2/JWT_Level2.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_7/JWT_Level.js:1 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. There is one copy in each of 3 separate files rather than several in one place, so check first whether these are sibling modules that each declare their own version of one shape — one per entity, per provider, per language. Where they are, no single extracted module collapses them: each module still has to be written, and what recurs is the TEMPLATE. The moves that do collapse a template are to generate these modules from the set they enumerate, or to replace the repeated construction with one factory each site calls with its own values — and where the set is the point, each module pinning one distinct thing, the repetition IS the enumeration and there is nothing to delete. — REDACTED:1
src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/Common/SessionManagement.js:64 · src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SessionManagement.js:61 · src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/LEVEL_6/SecureSessionManagement.js:46 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/Common/SessionManagement.js:64
src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSInImgTagAttribute/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSWithNullBytesImgTagAttribute/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:1 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSInImgTagAttribute/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:1
src/main/resources/sampleVulnerability/staticResources/LEVEL_1/SampleVulnerability.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/SampleVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SampleVulnerability.js:1 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — src/main/resources/sampleVulnerability/staticResources/LEVEL_1/SampleVulnerability.js:1
src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.js:33 · src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/Common/PasswordReset.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/LEVEL_9/SecurePasswordReset.js:1 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. There is one copy in each of 3 separate files rather than several in one place, so check first whether these are sibling modules that each declare their own version of one shape — one per entity, per provider, per language. Where they are, no single extracted module collapses them: each module still has to be written, and what recurs is the TEMPLATE. The moves that do collapse a template are to generate these modules from the set they enumerate, or to replace the repeated construction with one factory each site calls with its own values — and where the set is the point, each module pinning one distinct thing, the repetition IS the enumeration and there is nothing to delete. — src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.js:33
src/main/resources/static/templates/BlindSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/CommandInjection/LEVEL_1/CI_Level1.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/ErrorBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/PathTraversal/LEVEL_1/PathTraversal.js:1 · +1 more site(s) not listed — the 5 copies are spread across 5 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. There is one copy in each of 5 separate files rather than several in one place, so check first whether these are sibling modules that each declare their own version of one shape — one per entity, per provider, per language. Where they are, no single extracted module collapses them: each module still has to be written, and what recurs is the TEMPLATE. The moves that do collapse a template are to generate these modules from the set they enumerate, or to replace the repeated construction with one factory each site calls with its own values — and where the set is the point, each module pinning one distinct thing, the repetition IS the enumeration and there is nothing to delete. — src/main/resources/static/templates/BlindSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:1
src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSInImgTagAttribute/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSWithHtmlTagInjection/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSWithNullBytesImgTagAttribute/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:1 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. There is one copy in each of 3 separate files rather than several in one place, so check first whether these are sibling modules that each declare their own version of one shape — one per entity, per provider, per language. Where they are, no single extracted module collapses them: each module still has to be written, and what recurs is the TEMPLATE. The moves that do collapse a template are to generate these modules from the set they enumerate, or to replace the repeated construction with one factory each site calls with its own values — and where the set is the point, each module pinning one distinct thing, the repetition IS the enumeration and there is nothing to delete. — src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSInImgTagAttribute/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:1
src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_1/CachePoisoning.js:11 · src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_2/CachePoisoning.js:11 · src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_3/CachePoisoning.js:17 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_1/CachePoisoning.js:11
src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:682 · src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:699 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:682
src/main/resources/static/templates/OTPVulnerability/LEVEL_1/OTP.js:35 · src/main/resources/static/templates/OTPVulnerability/LEVEL_1/OTP.js:67 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/main/resources/static/templates/OTPVulnerability/LEVEL_1/OTP.js:35
src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:695 · src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:704 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:695
src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.js:100 · src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/Common/PasswordReset.js:50 · src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/LEVEL_9/SecurePasswordReset.js:50 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. There is one copy in each of 3 separate files rather than several in one place, so check first whether these are sibling modules that each declare their own version of one shape — one per entity, per provider, per language. Where they are, no single extracted module collapses them: each module still has to be written, and what recurs is the TEMPLATE. The moves that do collapse a template are to generate these modules from the set they enumerate, or to replace the repeated construction with one factory each site calls with its own values — and where the set is the point, each module pinning one distinct thing, the repetition IS the enumeration and there is nothing to delete. — src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.js:100
src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.js:74 · src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.js:127 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 52 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both spans, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.js:74
src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_1/IDOR.js:70 · src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_2/IDOR.js:70 · src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_3/IDOR.js:70 · src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_4/IDOR.js:70 · +2 more site(s) not listed — the 6 copies are spread across 6 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_1/IDOR.js:70
What to do
Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
setResult has cyclomatic complexity 16 and cognitive complexity 18; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. (×2) — src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/Common/PasswordReset.js:41, src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/LEVEL_9/SecurePasswordReset.js:41
setResult has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 10; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.js:93
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R3 · Large Files9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js has 642 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module. — src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:1
What to do
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped3.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.
Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
`data.content` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. (×10) — src/main/resources/sampleVulnerability/staticResources/LEVEL_1/SampleVulnerability.js:22, src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/Common/CachePoisoningCommon.js:60, src/main/resources/static/templates/ClickjackingVulnerability/LEVEL_4/ClickjackingVulnerability.js:48, …
`cookies` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — src/main/resources/static/templates/ClickjackingVulnerability/LEVEL_4/ClickjackingVulnerability.js:43
`data.carInformation.imagePath` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the start of a URL attribute, where it chooses the scheme through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. HTML encoding does not help here — a `javascript:` URL contains nothing it changes; allow only http(s) or a relative path. — src/main/resources/static/templates/ErrorBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:18
`"JWT: "+data.content+" is not valid. Please try again"` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. (×3) — src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_1/JWT_Level1.js:26, REDACTED:25, src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_2/JWT_Level2.js:25
`message.replace(/\n/g,"<br>")` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — src/main/resources/static/templates/LDAPInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/LDAP.js:3
`post.content` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — src/main/resources/static/templates/PersistentXSSInHTMLTagVulnerability/LEVEL_1/PersistentXSS.js:17
`data` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. (×5) — src/main/resources/static/templates/PersistentXSSInHTMLTagVulnerability/LEVEL_1/PersistentXSS.js:22, src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSInImgTagAttribute/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:16, src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSWithHtmlTagInjection/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:15, …
`data.imagePath` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the start of a URL attribute, where it chooses the scheme through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. HTML encoding does not help here — a `javascript:` URL contains nothing it changes; allow only http(s) or a relative path. — src/main/resources/static/templates/UnionBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:17
`data.isValid?"File uploaded at location:"+data.content:data.content` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — src/main/resources/static/templates/UnrestrictedFileUpload/LEVEL_1/FileUpload.js:14
`bookName` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — src/main/resources/static/templates/XXEVulnerability/LEVEL_1/XXE.js:18
`author` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — src/main/resources/static/templates/XXEVulnerability/LEVEL_1/XXE.js:22
`isbn` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — src/main/resources/static/templates/XXEVulnerability/LEVEL_1/XXE.js:26
`publisher` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — src/main/resources/static/templates/XXEVulnerability/LEVEL_1/XXE.js:30
`otherComments` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — src/main/resources/static/templates/XXEVulnerability/LEVEL_1/XXE.js:34
`vulnerableAppEndPointData[id]["Description"]` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. (×3) — src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:114, src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:244, src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:250
`responseText` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:136
What to do
Each finding names the expression, the attribute it lands in and the line. Confirm the value's origin from the read this analyzer traced, then escape it at the sink or validate it against the shape the attribute accepts before interpolating.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether an enhanced `for` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is iterating invalidates the fail-fast iterator it is holding, so the next `next()` throws `ConcurrentModificationException` and the remaining elements are never seen.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether Java packages are null-marked and not undermined by heavy nullness suppression — a package under `@NullMarked` (or `@NonNullApi`, `@ParametersAreNonnullByDefault`, `@NonNullByDefault`, or a NullAway/Checker Framework configuration naming it) makes an unannotated reference exclude null, and `@SuppressWarnings("NullAway")`, `("nullness")`, `("null")` and `castToNonNull(…)` are what silence it.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
0/46 of this repository's Java package directories are under a non-null default: a `package-info.java` declaring `@NullMarked` (JSpecify) or `@NonNullApi`, `@ParametersAreNonnullByDefault`, `@NonNullByDefault`, `@DefaultQualifier(NonNull.class)`; a `module-info.java` declaring `@NullMarked`; every type in it `@NullMarked`; or a build that runs NullAway with the package in `AnnotatedPackages`, or the Checker Framework's `NullnessChecker`. Elsewhere every reference admits null and no checker warns on the dereference that throws a `NullPointerException`.
What to do
Declare the default where Java declares it: `@NullMarked` (org.jspecify.annotations) in each package's `package-info.java`, or once in `module-info.java`, and run NullAway (Error Prone) or the Checker Framework so the declaration is enforced. Then annotate the real exceptions `@Nullable` and resolve the suppressions rather than adding to them: a `@SuppressWarnings("NullAway")` or `castToNonNull(x)` on a value the checker could show to be null is a `NullPointerException` waiting for the path that makes it true — where the value genuinely cannot be null, say something the checker can see instead (a null check, `Objects.requireNonNull`, a non-null field initialised in the constructor).
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). A further 2 got runtime (rendered axe-core) evidence this scan: 1.4.12, 2.4.4. The other 38 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Unscored — 6 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.
AXH1 Runtime security headers — 10 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXI1 Runtime container hardening — 3 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility (rendered) — 5 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
P12 CI test-gate honesty — 2 observation(s) recorded · Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
X10 Duplicated predicate — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 3 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
Not included — 53 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXA1 Runtime unauthenticated reachability — This run crawled public routes only — it had no logged-in session, so there is no authenticated surface to compare anonymous access against and nothing was measured. This is a statement about this run, not about your application: nothing here says access control is missing, and nothing here says it is present.
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXP1 Runtime third-party data flows — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXS1 Runtime exposed surface — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — D26 could not read how the parts of this repository's one build unit reference each other, so its cohesion was not measured. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this Gradle build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — polyglot repository, one half has no runner
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (9 repository port(s) loading or saving an aggregate/entity)
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (1 event handler(s))
ED5 Idempotency — Not assessed, and this one is on us: 1 command handler(s) or message consumer(s) were found here, but this check does not yet recognise persistence writes in this repository's language. Idempotency was neither confirmed nor ruled out — this is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (an Axon event-sourcing framework (@Aggregate/@CommandHandler/@EventSourcingHandler annotations))
P8 Schema migrations — Hibernate is declared, but the schema-migration mechanism could not be identified. Our limit, not a verdict on this repository.
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present for 6 file(s), but no domain-layer files were identified: no covered file's path contains any of the markers this check keys on (/domain/, /aggregates/, /valueobjects/, /domainmodel/, .domain/, /entities/), which are matched case-insensitively anywhere in the path. With no domain partition there is nothing to compare the web/controller layer against — if this repository keeps its business rules under a folder named none of those, that naming is what the check cannot see, not the domain logic.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: this repository declares no async functions, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R4 Test Coverage — the JS/TS workspace (53 production file(s)) has no JavaScript/TypeScript test, but it is 14.71% of this repository's production source and the other 85.29% carries 13,635 line(s) of test code this pass cannot read — an incidental frontend's reachability is not the repository's test posture, so it is not scored as one
R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D30 (Dependency Vulnerabilities), which answers every ecosystem
R6 Tooling — no package.json in the repository — test/lint/typecheck wiring is read from package.json scripts (corroborated against CI), so this project's own toolchain isn't measured here
R8 Dependency Hygiene — Not measured — no package.json declares any dependency, so there is nothing to check imports against (imports may resolve through a host runtime rather than node).
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Java was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Java request off Android takes no token: it is cancelled through the handle it returns (Future.cancel, Call.cancel, a Disposable), ambiently (io.grpc.Context) or by interrupting its thread, not through a parameter
X20 Mistyped argument guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
AC2 · Forms & labels· <input> without a programmatic label · ×8
<input> without a programmatic label src/main/resources/static/templates/CommandInjection/LEVEL_1/CI_Level1.html:6— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<input> without a programmatic label src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_1/JWT_Level1.html:9— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<input> without a programmatic label src/main/resources/static/templates/UnrestrictedFileUpload/LEVEL_1/FileUpload.html:5— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<input> without a programmatic label src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSWithHtmlTagInjection/LEVEL_1/XSS.html:4— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<input> without a programmatic label src/main/resources/static/templates/XXEVulnerability/LEVEL_1/XXE.html:7— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<input> without a programmatic label src/main/resources/static/templates/XXEVulnerability/LEVEL_1/XXE.html:10— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<input> without a programmatic label src/main/resources/static/templates/XXEVulnerability/LEVEL_1/XXE.html:13— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<input> without a programmatic label src/main/resources/static/templates/XXEVulnerability/LEVEL_1/XXE.html:16— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
AC2 · Forms & labels· <select> without a programmatic label · ×5
<select> without a programmatic label src/main/resources/static/templates/BlindSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.html:4— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<select> without a programmatic label src/main/resources/static/templates/ErrorBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.html:4— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<select> without a programmatic label src/main/resources/static/templates/PathTraversal/LEVEL_1/PathTraversal.html:4— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<select> without a programmatic label src/main/resources/static/templates/UnionBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.html:4— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<select> without a programmatic label src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSWithHtmlTagInjection/LEVEL_1/XSS.html:5— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
AC1 · Text alternatives· <img> without a text alternative · ×3
<img> without a text alternative src/main/resources/static/templates/ErrorBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:18— An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative.
<img> without a text alternative src/main/resources/static/templates/UnionBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:17— An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative.
<img> without a text alternative src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:165— An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative.
AC2 · Forms & labels· <textarea> without a programmatic label · ×2
<textarea> without a programmatic label src/main/resources/static/templates/PersistentXSSInHTMLTagVulnerability/LEVEL_1/PersistentXSS.html:6— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<textarea> without a programmatic label src/main/resources/static/templates/XXEVulnerability/LEVEL_1/XXE.html:19— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics· Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable · ×2
Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable src/main/resources/static/templates/ClickjackingVulnerability/LEVEL_4/ClickjackingVulnerability.html:18— The repo's own CSS styles .cj-overlay-wrapper with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
Clickable element isn't keyboard-operable src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:425— The repo's own CSS styles .master-item with `cursor: pointer`, so this <div> is a control — but it has no role, no tabindex="0" and no key handler, so it can only be reached with a mouse. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler.
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped· Untrusted text written into markup unescaped · ×33
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/sampleVulnerability/staticResources/LEVEL_1/SampleVulnerability.js:22— `data.content` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/Common/CachePoisoningCommon.js:60— `data.content` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/ClickjackingVulnerability/LEVEL_4/ClickjackingVulnerability.js:43— `cookies` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/ClickjackingVulnerability/LEVEL_4/ClickjackingVulnerability.js:48— `data.content` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/CommandInjection/LEVEL_1/CI_Level1.js:14— `data.content` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/CryptographicFailures/LEVEL_1/CryptographicFailures.js:8— `data.content` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/CryptographicFailures/LEVEL_1/CryptographicFailures.js:44— `data.content` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/CryptographicFailures/LEVEL_1/CryptographicFailures.js:47— `data.content` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/ErrorBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:18— `data.carInformation.imagePath` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the start of a URL attribute, where it chooses the scheme through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. HTML encoding does not help here — a `javascript:` URL contains nothing it changes; allow only http(s) or a relative path.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_1/JWT_Level1.js:26— `"JWT: "+data.content+" is not valid. Please try again"` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped REDACTED:25— `"JWT: "+data.content+" is not valid. Please try again"` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped REDACTED:30— `data.content` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_2/JWT_Level2.js:25— `"JWT: "+data.content+" is not valid. Please try again"` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_2/JWT_Level2.js:30— `data.content` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/LDAPInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/LDAP.js:3— `message.replace(/\n/g,"<br>")` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/PersistentXSSInHTMLTagVulnerability/LEVEL_1/PersistentXSS.js:17— `post.content` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/PersistentXSSInHTMLTagVulnerability/LEVEL_1/PersistentXSS.js:22— `data` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/SampleVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SampleVulnerability.js:22— `data.content` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/UnionBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:17— `data.imagePath` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the start of a URL attribute, where it chooses the scheme through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. HTML encoding does not help here — a `javascript:` URL contains nothing it changes; allow only http(s) or a relative path.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/UnrestrictedFileUpload/LEVEL_1/FileUpload.js:14— `data.isValid?"File uploaded at location:"+data.content:data.content` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSInImgTagAttribute/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:16— `data` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSWithHtmlTagInjection/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:15— `data` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSWithNullBytesImgTagAttribute/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:14— `data` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/XXEVulnerability/LEVEL_1/XXE.js:18— `bookName` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped src/main/resources/static/templates/XXEVulnerability/LEVEL_1/XXE.js:22— `author` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
+ 8 more in this group — see findings.md.
AC3 · Page structure· Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 · ×20
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/phishing/fake-login.html:18— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/AuthenticationVulnerability/LEVEL_1/Auth.html:7— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/AuthenticationVulnerability/LEVEL_8/Auth.html:7— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_1/CachePoisoning.html:9— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_2/CachePoisoning.html:9— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_3/CachePoisoning.html:9— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_4/CachePoisoning.html:9— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_5/CachePoisoning.html:9— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_1/IDOR.html:7— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_2/IDOR.html:7— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_3/IDOR.html:7— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_4/IDOR.html:7— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_5/IDOR.html:7— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/LDAPInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/LDAP.html:7— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/OTPVulnerability/LEVEL_1/OTP.html:7— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/Common/PasswordReset.html:6— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/LEVEL_9/SecurePasswordReset.html:6— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/Common/SessionManagement.html:6— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SessionManagement.html:6— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h3 to h5 src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/LEVEL_6/SecureSessionManagement.html:6— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
No assertions: blankToolField_returns400 src/test/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/controller/BenchmarkControllerTest.java:125— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: detectedItems_areSerializedWhenPresentAndOmittedOtherwise src/test/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/controller/BenchmarkControllerTest.java:72— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: malformedJson_returns400 src/test/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/controller/BenchmarkControllerTest.java:149— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: missingFindingsField_returns400 src/test/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/controller/BenchmarkControllerTest.java:138— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: missingToolField_returns400 src/test/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/controller/BenchmarkControllerTest.java:111— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: writerFailure_returns500WithResultAndPersistenceError src/test/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/controller/BenchmarkControllerTest.java:158— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: sitemapIsServedAsUtf8Html src/test/java/org/sasanlabs/controller/VulnerableAppRestControllerHtmlSitemapTest.java:55— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: sitemapOnlyAnswersGet src/test/java/org/sasanlabs/controller/VulnerableAppRestControllerHtmlSitemapTest.java:189— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: dastEndpoint_isMapped_andCarriesNoDeprecationMarker src/test/java/org/sasanlabs/controller/VulnerableAppRestControllerTest.java:163— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: deprecationLink_pointsAtTheHostThatWasActuallyCalled src/test/java/org/sasanlabs/controller/VulnerableAppRestControllerTest.java:124— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: sastEndpoint_isMapped_andReturnsEveryRowTheProviderHolds src/test/java/org/sasanlabs/controller/VulnerableAppRestControllerTest.java:212— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: sastEndpoint_serialisesTheAgreedFieldNames src/test/java/org/sasanlabs/controller/VulnerableAppRestControllerTest.java:230— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: afterHandshake_doesNothing src/test/java/org/sasanlabs/internal/utility/websocket/VulnerableAppWebSocketHandshakeInterceptorTest.java:78— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: fetchFile_literalDotDotSegmentInTheUrl_neverReachesTheController src/test/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/fileupload/PreflightControllerTest.java:106— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
No assertions: testFetchFile_Success src/test/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/fileupload/PreflightControllerTest.java:44— This method's body runs code, and no assertion was recognised in it. Recognised: JUnit's assertion methods (assertEquals, assertTrue, assertInstanceOf, assertThrows, assertThrowsExactly, assertTimeoutPreemptively, assertAll and the rest of JUnit 5's list), assertThat (AssertJ, Hamcrest, Truth), fail, Mockito's verify and the `assert` statement, in the test body and in helper methods of the test's own class or an in-repository base class, followed three calls deep. Verification through a helper on another object or in another class, through a custom matcher library, or through a harness that fails by throwing under some other name is not visible to this check and is not counted here. Read it as 'no assertion this check knows how to see', and if that is right, add one.
AXH1 · Runtime security headers· Runtime security header not set · ×10
Runtime security header not set: content-security-policy — The live app's responses did not include content-security-policy (restricts the sources a page may load — mitigates XSS/injection). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: cross-origin-embedder-policy — The live app's responses did not include cross-origin-embedder-policy (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: require-corp)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: cross-origin-opener-policy — The live app's responses did not include cross-origin-opener-policy (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: same-origin)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: cross-origin-resource-policy — The live app's responses did not include cross-origin-resource-policy (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: same-origin)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: permissions-policy — The live app's responses did not include permissions-policy (restricts powerful browser features (camera, geolocation, …)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: referrer-policy — The live app's responses did not include referrer-policy (limits referrer leakage to third parties). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: strict-transport-security — The live app's responses did not include strict-transport-security (forces HTTPS on subsequent requests — mitigates downgrade/MITM). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: x-dns-prefetch-control — The live app's responses did not include x-dns-prefetch-control (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: off)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: x-frame-options — The live app's responses did not include x-frame-options (blocks clickjacking via framing (or use CSP frame-ancestors)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: x-permitted-cross-domain-policies — The live app's responses did not include x-permitted-cross-domain-policies (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: none)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.2:1) src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/Common/PasswordReset.css:75— `.pr-shell button` sets color: #fff on background-color: #e07020 — 3.2:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.2:1) src/main/resources/static/templates/OTPVulnerability/LEVEL_1/OTP.css:106— `#requestOtpBtn, #validateOtpBtn` sets color: #fff on background-color: #e07020 — 3.2:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.2:1) src/main/resources/static/templates/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection/LEVEL_10/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.css:81— `.btn-redirect-continue` sets color: #ffffff on background-color: #e07020 — 3.2:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.2:1) src/main/resources/static/templates/AuthenticationVulnerability/LEVEL_8/Auth.css:95— `#loginBtn` sets color: #fff on background-color: #e07020 — 3.2:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.2:1) src/main/resources/static/templates/AuthenticationVulnerability/LEVEL_1/Auth.css:95— `#loginBtn` sets color: #fff on background-color: #e07020 — 3.2:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.2:1) src/main/resources/static/phishing/fake-login.css:85— `#loginBtn` sets color: #fff on background-color: #e07020 — 3.2:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics· Anchor without href · ×5
Anchor without href src/main/resources/static/templates/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection/LEVEL_12/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.html:14— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href src/main/resources/static/templates/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection/LEVEL_12/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.html:33— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href src/main/resources/static/templates/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection/LEVEL_12/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.html:36— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href src/main/resources/static/templates/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection/LEVEL_12/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.html:39— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href src/main/resources/static/templates/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection/LEVEL_12/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.html:42— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Change coupling: JWTValidator.java ↔ LibBasedJWTGenerator.java src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java:1— `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java` and `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/LibBasedJWTGenerator.java` change together 91% of the time (10 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 10 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `426a18b6` feat: add two secure JWT levels that read the token from the Authoriz…; `928713cd` Adding Basic SQL Injection; `07b890fe` Making UI Ajax Driven and also adding Master-Inner-master-Detail Ui — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: REDACTED ↔ REDACTED REDACTED:1— `REDACTED` and `REDACTED` change together 77% of the time (17 of the 22 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 17 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `443c5f44` feat: add Challenge mode to Error-Based and Union-Based SQL Injection…; `8a308f88` Added @Profile("public"/"unsafe") to all vulnerability controllers (#…; `a4b44ace` Revert "feat: added @Profile("public") to infra-safe vulnerability co… — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: REDACTED ↔ REDACTED REDACTED:1— `REDACTED` and `REDACTED` change together 68% of the time (15 of the 22 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 15 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `8a308f88` Added @Profile("public"/"unsafe") to all vulnerability controllers (#…; `a4b44ace` Revert "feat: added @Profile("public") to infra-safe vulnerability co…; `bcbc6bb3` feat: added @Profile("public") to infra-safe vulnerability controller… — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: ScannerResponseBean.java ↔ VulnerableAppRequestMapping.java src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/beans/ScannerResponseBean.java:1— `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/beans/ScannerResponseBean.java` and `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/internal/utility/annotations/VulnerableAppRequestMapping.java` change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 6 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `5a5c72e1` fix: Clean up documentation and simplify configuration and benchmark …; `14533235` #335 Removing deprecated fields (#337); `a9473735` Adding Deprecated Annotation on unused fields — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: IJWTTokenGenerator.java ↔ REDACTED src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/IJWTTokenGenerator.java:1— `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/IJWTTokenGenerator.java` and `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/bean/JWTUtils.java` change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 6 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `426a18b6` feat: add two secure JWT levels that read the token from the Authoriz…; `928713cd` Adding Basic SQL Injection; `8d0c973e` Fixing some code (at that commit the file was still `REDACTED`) — run `git show` on any of them.
ClassTooLong: JWTVulnerability REDACTED:57— ClassTooLong — 1053 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 24 methods. The bar is 400 significant lines; this is 653 over it, 2.63× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
ClassTooLong: UnrestrictedFileUpload src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/fileupload/UnrestrictedFileUpload.java:45— ClassTooLong — 509 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 20 methods. The bar is 400 significant lines; this is 109 over it, 1.27× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
ClassTooLong: CryptographicFailuresVulnerability src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:35— ClassTooLong — 509 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 12 methods. The bar is 400 significant lines; this is 109 over it, 1.27× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
ClassTooLong: PathTraversalVulnerability src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:43— ClassTooLong — 455 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 16 methods. The bar is 400 significant lines; this is 55 over it, 1.14× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
AC3 · Page structure· Page without a main landmark · ×3
Page without a main landmark src/main/resources/static/index.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark src/main/resources/static/phishing/fake-login.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
AXI1 · Runtime container hardening· Container process runs as root · ×3
Container process runs as root: .-VulnerableApp-base-1 — '.-VulnerableApp-base-1' (sasanlabs/owasp-vulnerableapp:unreleased) runs as uid 0 — no user was specified, or one resolving to root was. Observed on the running container, which is the only place the answer is settled: an image's own USER, a base image's inherited one and a compose override are all invisible to a Dockerfile reader. Advisory evidence for CRA Annex I (2)(b).
Container process runs as root: .-VulnerableApp-facade-1 — '.-VulnerableApp-facade-1' (sasanlabs/owasp-vulnerableapp-facade:latest) runs as uid 0 — no user was specified, or one resolving to root was. Observed on the running container, which is the only place the answer is settled: an image's own USER, a base image's inherited one and a compose override are all invisible to a Dockerfile reader. Advisory evidence for CRA Annex I (2)(b).
Container process runs as root: .-mailpit-1 — '.-mailpit-1' (axllent/mailpit:v1.30.1) runs as uid 0 — no user was specified, or one resolving to root was. Observed on the running container, which is the only place the answer is settled: an image's own USER, a base image's inherited one and a compose override are all invisible to a Dockerfile reader. Advisory evidence for CRA Annex I (2)(b).
FileTooLong: REDACTED REDACTED— FileTooLong — 1094 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 96% of them inside a single declaration: JWTVulnerability (57-1304). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 594 over it, 2.19× the bar. Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
FileTooLong: fileupload/UnrestrictedFileUpload.java src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/fileupload/UnrestrictedFileUpload.java— FileTooLong — 544 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 94% of them inside a single declaration: UnrestrictedFileUpload (45-681). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 44 over it, 1.09× the bar. Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
FileTooLong: cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java— FileTooLong — 528 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), about 96% of them inside a single declaration: CryptographicFailuresVulnerability (35-671). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 28 over it, 1.06× the bar. Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
Low cohesion: JWTValidator (LCOM4 5) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java:37— JWTValidator's methods fall into 5 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 5 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
Low cohesion: UnionBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability (LCOM4 5) REDACTED:41— UnionBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability's methods fall into 5 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 5 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
Low cohesion: XSSInImgTagAttribute (LCOM4 5) REDACTED:30— XSSInImgTagAttribute's methods fall into 5 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 5 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
TodoComment src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java:130— // TODO adding EC and OCTET for now not needed so not writing that. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/bean/JWTUtils.java:45— // TODO need to make it better. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
setResult (cognitive 22) src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/Common/PasswordReset.js:41— setResult has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (9 pts), ternaries 5 (7 pts), boolean chains 4, loops 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 5). Of this number, 18 points are the body's own statements and 4 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
setResult (cognitive 22) src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/LEVEL_9/SecurePasswordReset.js:41— setResult has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (9 pts), ternaries 5 (7 pts), boolean chains 4, loops 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 5). Of this number, 18 points are the body's own statements and 4 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Change-coupling hub: IJWTValidator.java → IJWTTokenGenerator.java, REDACTED, LibBasedJWTGenerator.java src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/IJWTValidator.java— `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/IJWTValidator.java` changes together with 3 other files — `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/IJWTTokenGenerator.java`, `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/bean/JWTUtils.java`, `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/LibBasedJWTGenerator.java` — none of which declares a dependency on it: one file is the hub of 3 separate couplings, not 3 unrelated pairs. Read the hub first: if the others each duplicate a part of what it does, the shared concern belongs in ONE unit and extracting it clears every edge at once; if the hub is a registry, dispatcher or barrel that must name each of them, the coupling is structural and the question is whether that list can be discovered instead of enumerated. Fixing the hub is one change; breaking the couplings one pair at a time is 3.
Change-coupling hub: REDACTED → JWTValidator.java, LibBasedJWTGenerator.java, REDACTED, REDACTED REDACTED— `REDACTED` changes together with 4 other files — `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java`, `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/LibBasedJWTGenerator.java`, `REDACTED`, `REDACTED` — none of which declares a dependency on it: one file is the hub of 4 separate couplings, not 4 unrelated pairs. Read the hub first: if the others each duplicate a part of what it does, the shared concern belongs in ONE unit and extracting it clears every edge at once; if the hub is a registry, dispatcher or barrel that must name each of them, the coupling is structural and the question is whether that list can be discovered instead of enumerated. Fixing the hub is one change; breaking the couplings one pair at a time is 4.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (16 corresponding lines) · ×2
Edited copy of a member (16 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/commandInjection/CommandInjection.java:248— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/commandInjection/CommandInjection.java:248-263 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/commandInjection/CommandInjection.java:284-299 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 16 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
Edited copy of a member (16 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/LibBasedJWTGenerator.java:96— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/LibBasedJWTGenerator.java:96-111 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/LibBasedJWTGenerator.java:115-130 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 16 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) · ×2
Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:283— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:283-291 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:313-329 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 9 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
Edited copy of a member (9 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:186— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:186-194 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:214-222 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 9 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) · ×2
Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/bean/JWTUtils.java:146— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/bean/JWTUtils.java:146-157 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/bean/JWTUtils.java:169-180 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 12 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
Edited copy of a member (12 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/fileupload/UnrestrictedFileUpload.java:413— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/fileupload/UnrestrictedFileUpload.java:413-426 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/fileupload/UnrestrictedFileUpload.java:613-624 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 12 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copies of one member (3 members, 10+ corresponding lines) · ×2
Edited copies of one member (3 members, 10+ corresponding lines) REDACTED:76— REDACTED:76-87 | REDACTED:142-151 | REDACTED:172-181 — These 3 members are one piece of code written 3 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 10 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 3 times and the copies will drift further apart.
Edited copies of one member (3 members, 10+ corresponding lines) REDACTED:59— REDACTED:59-68 | REDACTED:75-84 | REDACTED:91-100 — These 3 members are one piece of code written 3 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 10 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 3 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines) · ×2
Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/email/EmailServiceImpl.java:35— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/email/EmailServiceImpl.java:35-47 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/email/EmailServiceImpl.java:50-63 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 13 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/xss/persistent/PersistentXSSInHTMLTagVulnerability.java:195— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/xss/persistent/PersistentXSSInHTMLTagVulnerability.java:195-207 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/xss/persistent/PersistentXSSInHTMLTagVulnerability.java:227-240 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 13 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/impl/EndPointsInformationProvider.java:95— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/impl/EndPointsInformationProvider.java:95-103 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/impl/EndPointsInformationProvider.java:280-288 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/impl/EndPointsInformationProvider.java:95` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it and carries on into the declaration that follows — the window is the tail of one member plus the head of the next, so no call can be substituted for those exact lines, and the smallest declaration that contains all of them is the type they sit in. The repeated unit is the member each site sits in: where those members' bodies are the same, move one whole member to the shared location and have the others delegate to it; where the copies are a run of near-identical overloads or wrappers that differ only in their signatures, the repetition IS the run — a one-line delegation has no helper inside it to lift — so generate the run from the set it enumerates, or accept it and keep each member's own documentation with it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:329— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:329-337 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:352-360 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementService.java:110— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementService.java:110-117 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementService.java:134-141 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementService.java:110` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/deserialization/InsecureDeserializationCookieController.java:131— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/deserialization/InsecureDeserializationCookieController.java:131-138 | REDACTED:121-128 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/deserialization/InsecureDeserializationCookieController.java:131` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it and carries on into the declaration that follows — the window is the tail of one member plus the head of the next, so no call can be substituted for those exact lines, and the smallest declaration that contains all of them is the type they sit in. The repeated unit is the member each site sits in: where those members' bodies are the same, move one whole member to the shared location and have the others delegate to it; where the copies are a run of near-identical overloads or wrappers that differ only in their signatures, the repetition IS the run — a one-line delegation has no helper inside it to lift — so generate the run from the set it enumerates, or accept it and keep each member's own documentation with it.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/impl/EndPointsInformationProvider.java:70— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/impl/EndPointsInformationProvider.java:70-75 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/impl/EndPointsInformationProvider.java:256-261 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/impl/EndPointsInformationProvider.java:70` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) REDACTED:534— REDACTED:534-539 | REDACTED:548-553 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `REDACTED:534` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (29 lines × 2 locations) REDACTED:1— REDACTED:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_2/JWT_Level2.js:1 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another.
Duplicated block (29 lines × 2 locations) src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SessionManagement.js:44— src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SessionManagement.js:44 · src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/LEVEL_6/SecureSessionManagement.js:29 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 3 locations) REDACTED:1— REDACTED:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_2/JWT_Level2.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_7/JWT_Level.js:1 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. There is one copy in each of 3 separate files rather than several in one place, so check first whether these are sibling modules that each declare their own version of one shape — one per entity, per provider, per language. Where they are, no single extracted module collapses them: each module still has to be written, and what recurs is the TEMPLATE. The moves that do collapse a template are to generate these modules from the set they enumerate, or to replace the repeated construction with one factory each site calls with its own values — and where the set is the point, each module pinning one distinct thing, the repetition IS the enumeration and there is nothing to delete.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 3 locations) src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/Common/SessionManagement.js:64— src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/Common/SessionManagement.js:64 · src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SessionManagement.js:61 · src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/LEVEL_6/SecureSessionManagement.js:46 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3 locations) src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.js:33— src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.js:33 · src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/Common/PasswordReset.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/LEVEL_9/SecurePasswordReset.js:1 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. There is one copy in each of 3 separate files rather than several in one place, so check first whether these are sibling modules that each declare their own version of one shape — one per entity, per provider, per language. Where they are, no single extracted module collapses them: each module still has to be written, and what recurs is the TEMPLATE. The moves that do collapse a template are to generate these modules from the set they enumerate, or to replace the repeated construction with one factory each site calls with its own values — and where the set is the point, each module pinning one distinct thing, the repetition IS the enumeration and there is nothing to delete.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3 locations) src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSInImgTagAttribute/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:1— src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSInImgTagAttribute/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSWithHtmlTagInjection/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSWithNullBytesImgTagAttribute/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:1 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. There is one copy in each of 3 separate files rather than several in one place, so check first whether these are sibling modules that each declare their own version of one shape — one per entity, per provider, per language. Where they are, no single extracted module collapses them: each module still has to be written, and what recurs is the TEMPLATE. The moves that do collapse a template are to generate these modules from the set they enumerate, or to replace the repeated construction with one factory each site calls with its own values — and where the set is the point, each module pinning one distinct thing, the repetition IS the enumeration and there is nothing to delete.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2 locations) src/main/resources/static/templates/OTPVulnerability/LEVEL_1/OTP.js:35— src/main/resources/static/templates/OTPVulnerability/LEVEL_1/OTP.js:35 · src/main/resources/static/templates/OTPVulnerability/LEVEL_1/OTP.js:67 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2 locations) src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:695— src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:695 · src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:704 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Complex function setResult (cyclomatic 16, cognitive 18) src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/Common/PasswordReset.js:41— setResult has cyclomatic complexity 16 and cognitive complexity 18; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function setResult (cyclomatic 16, cognitive 18) src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/LEVEL_9/SecurePasswordReset.js:41— setResult has cyclomatic complexity 16 and cognitive complexity 18; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.2:1) src/main/resources/static/templates/ClickjackingVulnerability/LEVEL_4/ClickjackingVulnerability.css:133— `#ClickjackingVulnerability .cj-fake-btn` sets color: #fff on background-color: #ff9800 — 2.2:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
Low contrast colour pair in CSS (3.5:1) src/main/resources/static/templates/ClickjackingVulnerability/LEVEL_1/ClickjackingVulnerability.css:82— `#ClickjackingVulnerability .cj-blocked-msg` sets color: #e65100 on background-color: #fff3e0 — 3.5:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AXR1 · Runtime accessibility (rendered)· WCAG 1.1.1 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface · ×1
WCAG 1.1.1 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface — axe-core rule(s) image-alt, role-img-alt failed on: .rs-icon-home, .rs-nav-item-content[role="button"] > .rs-icon-github. Runtime evidence (advisory — not scored); fix and re-scan to verify it clears.
AXR1 · Runtime accessibility (rendered)· WCAG 1.3.1 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface · ×1
WCAG 1.3.1 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface — axe-core rule(s) aria-hidden-body, aria-required-children, aria-required-parent, list, listitem failed on: .VulnerableApp-Facade-HomePage-Content-Header.rs-panel.rs-panel-default:nth-child(1) > .rs-panel-heading[role="rowheader"], .rs-dropdown.rs-dropdown-placement-bottom-start[role="menu"]:nth-child(4), .rs-dropdown.rs-dropdown-placement-bottom-start[role="menu"]:nth-child(6), .rs-navbar-right > ul, div[data-testid="HOME_PAGE_WARNING_CONTAINER"] > .rs-panel-heading[role="rowheader"]. Runtime evidence (advisory — not scored); fix and re-scan to verify it clears.
AXR1 · Runtime accessibility (rendered)· WCAG 2.4.2 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface · ×1
WCAG 2.4.2 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface — axe-core rule(s) document-title failed on: html. Runtime evidence (advisory — not scored); fix and re-scan to verify it clears.
AXR1 · Runtime accessibility (rendered)· WCAG 3.1.1 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface · ×1
WCAG 3.1.1 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface — axe-core rule(s) html-has-lang, html-lang-valid failed on: html. Runtime evidence (advisory — not scored); fix and re-scan to verify it clears.
AXR1 · Runtime accessibility (rendered)· WCAG 4.1.2 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface · ×1
WCAG 4.1.2 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface — axe-core rule(s) aria-command-name, aria-deprecated-role, aria-hidden-body, aria-required-attr, aria-roles, button-name, link-name, nested-interactive failed on: .mode-nav-item > .rs-nav-item-content[role="button"]. Runtime evidence (advisory — not scored); fix and re-scan to verify it clears.
SastBenchmarkStrategy.compare (cyclomatic 20) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/service/SastBenchmarkStrategy.java:50— SastBenchmarkStrategy.compare has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
PasswordReset.setResult (cyclomatic 18) src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/Common/PasswordReset.js:41— PasswordReset.setResult has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). Of this number, 16 points are the body's own statements and 2 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
SecurePasswordReset.setResult (cyclomatic 18) src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/LEVEL_9/SecurePasswordReset.js:41— SecurePasswordReset.setResult has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). Of this number, 16 points are the body's own statements and 2 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
AuthLoginService.authenticateInternal (cyclomatic 16) REDACTED:86— AuthLoginService.authenticateInternal has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· No Gemfile.lock committed by an application · ×1
No Gemfile.lock committed by an application — This repository declares 2 gem(s) across 1 Bundler manifest(s) and ships no application `.gemspec`, so it is an APPLICATION — but no `Gemfile.lock` is committed. Nothing records the versions a working build resolved to, so `bundle install` re-resolves against whatever rubygems.org serves today and two deploys of this commit are not guaranteed to be the same deploy. Run `bundle install` and commit the resulting `Gemfile.lock`. (A published GEM correctly omits its lock, which is why this is asked only of a repository that ships no .gemspec.)
Hotspot: src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/service/SastBenchmarkStrategy.java src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/service/SastBenchmarkStrategy.java:50— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/service/SastBenchmarkStrategy.java changed 2 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 20 in SastBenchmarkStrategy.compare at line 50. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-08-19..2026-11-17, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-19 11:40:05 +00:00' --until='2026-11-17 11:40:05 +00:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/service/SastBenchmarkStrategy.java`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
SastBenchmarkStrategy.compare (cognitive 30) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/service/SastBenchmarkStrategy.java:50— SastBenchmarkStrategy.compare has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (18 pts), loops 7 (9 pts), boolean chains 2, ternaries 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
DastBenchmarkStrategy.compare (cognitive 23) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/service/DastBenchmarkStrategy.java:83— DastBenchmarkStrategy.compare has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (17 pts), loops 3 (4 pts), boolean chains 1, ternaries 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
EndPointsInformationProvider.getSupportedEndPoints (cognitive 20) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/impl/EndPointsInformationProvider.java:68— EndPointsInformationProvider.getSupportedEndPoints has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 4 (12 pts), loops 4 (8 pts) (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This shape REPEATS in the file: one other method here (EndPointsInformationProvider.getVulnerabilityDefinitions) has the same decision points, in the same order, at the same nesting depths — so this is one pattern written twice rather than two separate problems. Splitting this body alone leaves the other exactly as it is. Where these are variations on one operation, the change that clears both is the shared one: lift the common shape into a single routine the variants call, parameterised by whatever genuinely differs between them, and keep in each method only the part that is not shared.
EndPointsInformationProvider.getVulnerabilityDefinitions (cognitive 20) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/impl/EndPointsInformationProvider.java:253— EndPointsInformationProvider.getVulnerabilityDefinitions has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 4 (12 pts), loops 4 (8 pts) (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This shape REPEATS in the file: one other method here (EndPointsInformationProvider.getSupportedEndPoints) has the same decision points, in the same order, at the same nesting depths — so this is one pattern written twice rather than two separate problems. Splitting this body alone leaves the other exactly as it is. Where these are variations on one operation, the change that clears both is the shared one: lift the common shape into a single routine the variants call, parameterised by whatever genuinely differs between them, and keep in each method only the part that is not shared.
vulnerableApp.genericResponseHandler (cognitive 16) src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:346— vulnerableApp.genericResponseHandler has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (15 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
vulnerableApp._buildSingleChallengeCard (cognitive 16) src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:483— vulnerableApp._buildSingleChallengeCard has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (9 pts), boolean chains 7 (nesting depth added 2). Most of this is not in the body itself: 7 of the 16 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 4 function items inside it that branch (_updateControlsAfterHint, a function literal at line 502, a function literal at line 529, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
D4 · Code Duplication· Near-duplicate member family (10 members, 24 shared lines) · ×1
Near-duplicate member family (10 members, 24 shared lines) REDACTED:232— REDACTED:232-271 | REDACTED:306-346 | REDACTED:381-421 | REDACTED:457-497 | REDACTED:591-629 | REDACTED:665-700 | REDACTED:735-775 | REDACTED:868-902 | REDACTED:935-976 | REDACTED:1084-1131 — These 10 members are variants of one another: a block of 24 lines reported below appears in every one of them, and the pairwise near-duplicate rows they would otherwise produce are collapsed into this row. Read them as one construct written 10 times. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Extracting the individual blocks below is not the same fix: it leaves every body in place and the next edit still has to be made 10 times.
D4 · Code Duplication· Near-duplicate member family (8 members, 21 shared lines) · ×1
Near-duplicate member family (8 members, 21 shared lines) REDACTED:170— REDACTED:170-210 | REDACTED:232-271 | REDACTED:306-346 | REDACTED:381-421 | REDACTED:457-497 | REDACTED:735-775 | REDACTED:935-976 | REDACTED:1084-1131 — These 8 members are variants of one another: a block of 21 lines reported below appears in every one of them, and the pairwise near-duplicate rows they would otherwise produce are collapsed into this row. Read them as one construct written 8 times. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Extracting the individual blocks below is not the same fix: it leaves every body in place and the next edit still has to be made 8 times.
D4 · Code Duplication· Members sharing a duplicated core (6 members, 50+ identical tokens) · ×1
Members sharing a duplicated core (6 members, 50+ identical tokens) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:277— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:277-295 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:315-334 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:354-373 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:393-413 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:433-453 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:474-493 — These 6 members share a duplicated core: a run of at least 50 identical tokens appears in every one of them. That run is NOT broken out as duplicated-block rows below — it is what admitted this row, and the blocks below cover only the part of it that clears the block floor, so they understate the correspondence. Read the members as one construct written 6 times. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Extracting the individual blocks below is not the same fix: it leaves every body in place and the next edit still has to be made 6 times.
D4 · Code Duplication· Members sharing a duplicated core (5 members, 50+ identical tokens) · ×1
Members sharing a duplicated core (5 members, 50+ identical tokens) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:135— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:135-147 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:173-185 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:211-223 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:250-262 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:392-404 — These 5 members share a duplicated core: a run of at least 50 identical tokens appears in every one of them. That run is NOT broken out as duplicated-block rows below — it is what admitted this row, and the blocks below cover only the part of it that clears the block floor, so they understate the correspondence. Read the members as one construct written 5 times. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Extracting the individual blocks below is not the same fix: it leaves every body in place and the next edit still has to be made 5 times.
D4 · Code Duplication· Members sharing a duplicated core (4 members, 50+ identical tokens) · ×1
Members sharing a duplicated core (4 members, 50+ identical tokens) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:135— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:135-146 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:171-183 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:206-219 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:245-259 — These 4 members share a duplicated core: a run of at least 50 identical tokens appears in every one of them. That run is NOT broken out as duplicated-block rows below — it is what admitted this row, and the blocks below cover only the part of it that clears the block floor, so they understate the correspondence. Read the members as one construct written 4 times. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Extracting the individual blocks below is not the same fix: it leaves every body in place and the next edit still has to be made 4 times.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (58 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (58 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/impl/EndPointsInformationProvider.java:68— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/impl/EndPointsInformationProvider.java:68-128 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/impl/EndPointsInformationProvider.java:254-311 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 58 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (42 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (42 corresponding lines) REDACTED:796— REDACTED:796-838 | REDACTED:1009-1050 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 42 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copies of one member (5 members, 35+ corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copies of one member (5 members, 35+ corresponding lines) REDACTED:81— REDACTED:81-115 | REDACTED:141-175 | REDACTED:202-240 | REDACTED:267-307 | REDACTED:314-357 — These 5 members are one piece of code written 5 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 35 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 5 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (27 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (27 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:224— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:224-250 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:287-320 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 27 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (30 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (30 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/idor/IDORVulnerability.java:151— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/idor/IDORVulnerability.java:151-180 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/idor/IDORVulnerability.java:200-229 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 30 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copies of one member (9 members, 36+ corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copies of one member (9 members, 36+ corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:117— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:117-154 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:174-210 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:230-265 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:285-321 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:341-378 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:398-433 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:453-491 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:511-549 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:569-611 — These 9 members are one piece of code written 9 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 36 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 9 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copies of one member (3 members, 20+ corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copies of one member (3 members, 20+ corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementService.java:100— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementService.java:100-120 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementService.java:123-144 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementService.java:147-166 — These 3 members are one piece of code written 3 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 20 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 3 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (33 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (33 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:65— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:65-97 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:622-670 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 33 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (28 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (28 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/ldapInjection/LDAPInjectionVulnerability.java:307— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/ldapInjection/LDAPInjectionVulnerability.java:307-334 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/ldapInjection/LDAPInjectionVulnerability.java:347-374 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 28 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copies of one member (3 members, 18+ corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copies of one member (3 members, 18+ corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java:97— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java:97-116 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java:144-161 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java:212-237 — These 3 members are one piece of code written 3 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 18 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 3 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copies of one member (3 members, 21+ corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copies of one member (3 members, 21+ corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/ldapInjection/LDAPInjectionVulnerability.java:119— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/ldapInjection/LDAPInjectionVulnerability.java:119-139 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/ldapInjection/LDAPInjectionVulnerability.java:158-178 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/ldapInjection/LDAPInjectionVulnerability.java:256-286 — These 3 members are one piece of code written 3 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 21 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 3 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copies of one member (3 members, 16+ corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copies of one member (3 members, 16+ corresponding lines) REDACTED:1172— REDACTED:1172-1189 | REDACTED:1212-1228 | REDACTED:1251-1266 — These 3 members are one piece of code written 3 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 16 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 3 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copies of one member (4 members, 17+ corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copies of one member (4 members, 17+ corresponding lines) REDACTED:245— REDACTED:245-262 | REDACTED:285-301 | REDACTED:323-341 | REDACTED:390-408 — These 4 members are one piece of code written 4 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 17 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 4 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copies of one member (4 members, 15+ corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copies of one member (4 members, 15+ corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:114— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:114-128 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:144-159 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:175-190 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:207-222 — These 4 members are one piece of code written 4 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 15 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 4 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copies of one member (6 members, 15+ corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copies of one member (6 members, 15+ corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementVulnerability.java:59— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementVulnerability.java:59-74 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementVulnerability.java:108-122 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementVulnerability.java:157-171 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementVulnerability.java:205-219 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementVulnerability.java:253-267 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementVulnerability.java:285-299 — These 6 members are one piece of code written 6 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 15 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 6 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (18 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (18 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/idor/IDORVulnerability.java:75— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/idor/IDORVulnerability.java:75-95 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/idor/IDORVulnerability.java:114-131 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 18 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (14 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (14 corresponding lines) REDACTED:130— REDACTED:130-143 | REDACTED:174-193 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 14 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (17 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (17 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/idor/IDORLoginService.java:86— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/idor/IDORLoginService.java:86-109 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/idor/IDORVulnerability.java:278-294 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 17 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copies of one member (3 members, 14+ corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copies of one member (3 members, 14+ corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java:240— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java:240-253 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java:256-269 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java:272-285 — These 3 members are one piece of code written 3 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 14 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 3 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copies of one member (3 members, 11+ corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copies of one member (3 members, 11+ corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:63— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:63-73 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:99-109 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:288-298 — These 3 members are one piece of code written 3 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 11 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 3 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copies of one member (3 members, 19+ corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copies of one member (3 members, 19+ corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/deserialization/InsecureDeserializationCookieController.java:37— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/deserialization/InsecureDeserializationCookieController.java:37-56 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/deserialization/InsecureDeserializationCookieController.java:65-83 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/deserialization/InsecureDeserializationCookieController.java:92-110 — These 3 members are one piece of code written 3 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 19 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 3 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (7 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (7 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/fileupload/UnrestrictedFileUpload.java:647— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/fileupload/UnrestrictedFileUpload.java:647-653 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/fileupload/UnrestrictedFileUpload.java:673-680 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 7 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copies of one member (3 members, 12+ corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copies of one member (3 members, 12+ corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:130— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:130-141 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:161-172 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:192-204 — These 3 members are one piece of code written 3 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 12 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 3 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copies of one member (3 members, 8+ corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copies of one member (3 members, 8+ corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/commandInjection/CommandInjection.java:150— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/commandInjection/CommandInjection.java:150-157 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/commandInjection/CommandInjection.java:177-190 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/commandInjection/CommandInjection.java:306-318 — These 3 members are one piece of code written 3 times and then edited apart: every two of them correspond over at least 8 lines, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below: the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain. Factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Left alone, the next edit has to be made 3 times and the copies will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (19 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (19 corresponding lines) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cachePoisoning/CachePoisoningVulnerability.java:314— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cachePoisoning/CachePoisoningVulnerability.java:314-333 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cachePoisoning/CachePoisoningVulnerability.java:356-374 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 19 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
Duplicated block (28–30 lines × 4) REDACTED:88— REDACTED:88-115 | REDACTED:148-175 | REDACTED:211-240 | REDACTED:278-307 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `REDACTED:88` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (24–25 lines × 2) REDACTED:671— REDACTED:671-695 | REDACTED:874-897 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/idor/IDORVulnerability.java:160— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/idor/IDORVulnerability.java:160-180 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/idor/IDORVulnerability.java:209-229 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/idor/IDORVulnerability.java:160` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:304— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:304-321 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:416-433 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/cryptographicFailures/CryptographicFailuresVulnerability.java:304` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (16–17 lines × 8) REDACTED:188— REDACTED:188-204 | REDACTED:250-265 | REDACTED:324-340 | REDACTED:399-415 | REDACTED:475-491 | REDACTED:753-769 | REDACTED:954-970 | REDACTED:1109-1125 — all 8 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `REDACTED:188` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:320— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:320-334 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:359-373 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:320` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12–13 lines × 11) REDACTED:248— REDACTED:248-259 | REDACTED:322-333 | REDACTED:397-408 | REDACTED:473-484 | REDACTED:605-617 | REDACTED:678-689 | REDACTED:751-762 | REDACTED:812-823 | REDACTED:881-892 | REDACTED:952-963 | REDACTED:1107-1118 — all 11 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `REDACTED:248` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. ★ These copies have DRIFTED, and that is worth reading before extracting anything: just before the matched lines, `REDACTED:1105` calls `warn` and `REDACTED:247` does not — after which the two agree again for 2 more lines. One of those two behaviours is the intended one and the other is what a copy-paste left behind, so decide which BEFORE unifying them: extracting the shared part will silently settle it, and if the copy that skips the call is the wrong one, that bug is already live.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 6) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:278— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:278-289 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:316-327 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:355-366 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:394-405 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:434-445 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:475-486 — all 6 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:278` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. ★ These copies have DRIFTED, and that is worth reading before extracting anything: just after the matched lines, `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:328` calls `getUrl`, `toString`, `contains` and `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:290` does not — after which the two agree again for 4 more lines. One of those two behaviours is the intended one and the other is what a copy-paste left behind, so decide which BEFORE unifying them: extracting the shared part will silently settle it, and if the copy that skips the call is the wrong one, that bug is already live.
Duplicated block (11–12 lines × 5) REDACTED:91— REDACTED:91-101 | REDACTED:151-161 | REDACTED:215-225 | REDACTED:282-292 | REDACTED:328-339 — all 5 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `REDACTED:91` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/ldapInjection/LDAPInjectionVulnerability.java:128— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/ldapInjection/LDAPInjectionVulnerability.java:128-139 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/ldapInjection/LDAPInjectionVulnerability.java:167-178 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/ldapInjection/LDAPInjectionVulnerability.java:128` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9–10 lines × 5) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:136— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:136-145 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:174-182 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:212-220 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:251-259 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:393-401 — all 5 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. ★ These copies have DRIFTED, and that is worth reading before extracting anything: just after the matched lines, `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:183` calls `put` and `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthenticationVulnerability.java:146` does not — after which the two agree again for 4 more lines. One of those two behaviours is the intended one and the other is what a copy-paste left behind, so decide which BEFORE unifying them: extracting the shared part will silently settle it, and if the copy that skips the call is the wrong one, that bug is already live.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 4) REDACTED:177— REDACTED:177-186 | REDACTED:239-248 | REDACTED:313-322 | REDACTED:943-952 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `REDACTED:177` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java:98— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java:98-106 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java:145-153 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java:166-174 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/impl/JWTValidator.java:98` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (7–8 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:173— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:173-179 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:247-254 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:173` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 6) REDACTED:171— REDACTED:171-177 | REDACTED:233-239 | REDACTED:382-388 | REDACTED:458-464 | REDACTED:736-742 | REDACTED:1085-1091 — all 6 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `REDACTED:171` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 4) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:136— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:136-142 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:172-178 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:207-213 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:246-252 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:136` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. ★ These copies have DRIFTED, and that is worth reading before extracting anything: just after the matched lines, `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:179` calls `startsWith` and `src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/openRedirect/Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection.java:143` does not — after which the two agree again for 4 more lines. One of those two behaviours is the intended one and the other is what a copy-paste left behind, so decide which BEFORE unifying them: extracting the shared part will silently settle it, and if the copy that skips the call is the wrong one, that bug is already live.
Duplicated block (14–15 lines × 2) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/commandInjection/CommandInjection.java:250— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/commandInjection/CommandInjection.java:250-263 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/commandInjection/CommandInjection.java:285-299 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 11) REDACTED:265— REDACTED:265-271 | REDACTED:340-346 | REDACTED:415-421 | REDACTED:491-497 | REDACTED:623-629 | REDACTED:694-700 | REDACTED:769-775 | REDACTED:896-902 | REDACTED:970-976 | REDACTED:1044-1050 | REDACTED:1125-1131 — all 11 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `REDACTED:265` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The `return` at the foot of the matched lines is the enclosing body's own terminal exit, not an early one: it moves with them unchanged, and each site calls the extracted unit from the position that `return` occupied — no decision has to be handed back and re-acted on.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 9) REDACTED:199— REDACTED:199-204 | REDACTED:260-265 | REDACTED:335-340 | REDACTED:410-415 | REDACTED:486-491 | REDACTED:764-769 | REDACTED:965-970 | REDACTED:1039-1044 | REDACTED:1120-1125 — all 9 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 5) REDACTED:88— REDACTED:88-93 | REDACTED:148-153 | REDACTED:211-217 | REDACTED:278-284 | REDACTED:380-385 — all 5 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `REDACTED:88` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) REDACTED:592— REDACTED:592-597 | REDACTED:666-671 | REDACTED:869-874 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `REDACTED:592` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 11) REDACTED:174— REDACTED:174-178 | REDACTED:236-240 | REDACTED:310-314 | REDACTED:385-389 | REDACTED:461-465 | REDACTED:594-598 | REDACTED:668-672 | REDACTED:739-743 | REDACTED:871-875 | REDACTED:940-944 | REDACTED:1088-1092 — all 11 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `REDACTED:174` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) REDACTED:77— REDACTED:77-81 | REDACTED:109-113 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `REDACTED:77` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/internal/utility/EncodingUtils.java:6— src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/internal/utility/EncodingUtils.java:6-12 | REDACTED:157-163 | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:79-85 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
End-of-life framework: Spring Boot 2 build.gradle:1— build.gradle depends on `org.springframework.boot` at a version that pins Spring Boot 2, and Spring Boot 2.x, open-source support ended 2023-11-24. The constraint cannot admit a different major, so this repository stays on it until the declaration is edited. An end-of-life framework receives no further releases, including security releases.
P12 · CI test-gate honesty· Coverage collected but not gated · ×1
Coverage collected but not gated — CI collects a coverage report but no step enforces a minimum — coverage could halve and CI stays green. Add a step that fails the build when coverage drops below a floor (your coverage tool's minimum-threshold flag, or a coverage-gate action) so the number guards something. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: this repository's CI files AND its coverage configuration — the well-known coverage and test-runner config files, read at the repository root and inside workspace package directories two levels down, so a floor declared beside the tests rather than in the pipeline is credited — matched against the threshold settings this check knows by name. A floor set in your coverage service's web UI rather than in a committed file, or under a setting whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
P12 · CI test-gate honesty· Test suite runs only after the merge · ×1
Test suite runs only after the merge — `REDACTED`, `REDACTED` run(s) the test suite, but no workflow that runs tests is triggered by a pull request (or a merge queue) — so the suite reports on code that is already on the default branch. A red build there blocks nothing and the only remedy is a revert. Add the pull-request trigger to the workflow that runs your suite so the gate applies before the merge, not after it.
P3 · Security & performance tooling· SAST runs, but gates no merge · ×1
SAST runs, but gates no merge — `REDACTED`, `REDACTED`, `REDACTED` run(s) a static-analysis scan, but no workflow that runs one is triggered by a pull request (or a merge queue, or an unfiltered push) — the scan fires on a schedule or a manual dispatch only. A vulnerable change therefore merges clean and is reported on the next scheduled run, by which time it is on the default branch and the only remedy is a follow-up fix. Add the pull-request trigger to the workflow that runs the scan so the finding arrives before the merge rather than after it.
No DR/backup evidence — A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
Duplication concentrated across 10 sibling directories (6 clone groups) src/main/resources/static/templates/BlindSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:1— 6 duplicated blocks under src/main/resources/static/templates/ have copies in at least two of the sibling directories BlindSQLInjectionVulnerability, CommandInjection, ErrorBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability, IDORVulnerability, LDAPInjectionVulnerability, PathTraversal (+4 more sibling(s) not listed) — 5 of them are reported below, and 1 is counted here but not reported individually: those copies match on shape but no longer clear R10's bar for an individually reported row — either they kept neither their own names nor their values, or what was copied is too small to stand on its own (it reports near-exact duplication only, and only of substantial extent). What this row states is the concentration, which the detector measured over all 6 and which does not depend on how exactly each block's copies still match. That concentration is one structural fact, not 6 local ones: the siblings replicate behaviour none of them owns, which is the shape of a missing shared module — a common library every sibling imports — rather than 6 separate extractions. Check first whether the siblings are deliberately standalone deliverables (scaffold templates, demo apps that must stay copy-pasteable); where they are, the duplication is the design and the per-block rows are the ones to act on.
Wholesale file copy (93 identical lines × 2 files) src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/Common/PasswordReset.js:1— src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/Common/PasswordReset.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/LEVEL_9/SecurePasswordReset.js:1 — these 2 files are line-for-line copies of one another — 93 lines are identical, in the same order, in every one of them — so this is one fact about the file set, not a block to extract. An edit made to one file and not the others changes behaviour silently, which is the failure a wholesale copy guarantees. Pick one file as the single source and derive the others from it (re-export it, spread it into the local overrides each variant genuinely needs, or generate the copies at build time) — the few lines that differ between the files are exactly the part each variant should still own. Check first whether the copies are deliberately standalone deliverables (a translation file seeded from its sibling and waiting to be translated); where they are, the duplication is the design, and the honest move is to mark the seeded file as untranslated rather than to let it pass as done.
Wholesale file copy (61 identical lines × 5 files) src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_1/IDOR.js:1— src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_1/IDOR.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_2/IDOR.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_3/IDOR.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_4/IDOR.js:1 · +1 more site(s) not listed — these 5 files are line-for-line copies of one another — 61 lines are identical, in the same order, in every one of them — so this is one fact about the file set, not a block to extract. An edit made to one file and not the others changes behaviour silently, which is the failure a wholesale copy guarantees. Pick one file as the single source and derive the others from it (re-export it, spread it into the local overrides each variant genuinely needs, or generate the copies at build time) — the few lines that differ between the files are exactly the part each variant should still own. Check first whether the copies are deliberately standalone deliverables (a translation file seeded from its sibling and waiting to be translated); where they are, the duplication is the design, and the honest move is to mark the seeded file as untranslated rather than to let it pass as done.
Duplicated block (52 lines × 2 locations) src/main/resources/static/templates/AuthenticationVulnerability/LEVEL_1/Auth.js:1— src/main/resources/static/templates/AuthenticationVulnerability/LEVEL_1/Auth.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/AuthenticationVulnerability/LEVEL_8/Auth.js:1 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another.
R10 · Code Duplication· Duplicated block with local edits (51 matched lines × 2 locations) · ×1
Duplicated block with local edits (51 matched lines × 2 locations) src/main/resources/static/templates/ClickjackingVulnerability/LEVEL_1/ClickjackingVulnerability.js:16— src/main/resources/static/templates/ClickjackingVulnerability/LEVEL_1/ClickjackingVulnerability.js:16 · src/main/resources/static/templates/ClickjackingVulnerability/LEVEL_4/ClickjackingVulnerability.js:9 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 311 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
Duplicated block (48 lines × 2 locations) src/main/resources/static/templates/InsecureDeserialization/LEVEL_1/InsecureDeserialization.js:1— src/main/resources/static/templates/InsecureDeserialization/LEVEL_1/InsecureDeserialization.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/InsecureDeserialization/LEVEL_4/InsecureDeserialization.js:1 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another.
R10 · Code Duplication· Duplicated block with local edits (47 matched lines × 2 locations) · ×1
Duplicated block with local edits (47 matched lines × 2 locations) src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/Common/SessionManagement.js:5— src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/Common/SessionManagement.js:5 · src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SessionManagement.js:1 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 295 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
R10 · Code Duplication· Duplicated block with local edits (22 matched lines × 2 locations) · ×1
Duplicated block with local edits (22 matched lines × 2 locations) src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_4/CachePoisoning.js:10— src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_4/CachePoisoning.js:10 · src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_5/CachePoisoning.js:11 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 105 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2 locations) src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_1/CachePoisoning.js:8— src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_1/CachePoisoning.js:8 · src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_2/CachePoisoning.js:8 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another.
Duplicated block (18 lines × 3 locations) src/main/resources/static/templates/InsecureDeserialization/LEVEL_1/InsecureDeserialization.js:1— src/main/resources/static/templates/InsecureDeserialization/LEVEL_1/InsecureDeserialization.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/InsecureDeserialization/LEVEL_2/InsecureDeserialization.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/InsecureDeserialization/LEVEL_4/InsecureDeserialization.js:1 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. There is one copy in each of 3 separate files rather than several in one place, so check first whether these are sibling modules that each declare their own version of one shape — one per entity, per provider, per language. Where they are, no single extracted module collapses them: each module still has to be written, and what recurs is the TEMPLATE. The moves that do collapse a template are to generate these modules from the set they enumerate, or to replace the repeated construction with one factory each site calls with its own values — and where the set is the point, each module pinning one distinct thing, the repetition IS the enumeration and there is nothing to delete.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) src/main/resources/static/templates/BlindSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:1— src/main/resources/static/templates/BlindSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/ErrorBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:1 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 3 locations) src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_1/JWT_Level1.js:15— src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_1/JWT_Level1.js:15 · REDACTED:14 · src/main/resources/static/templates/JWTVulnerability/LEVEL_2/JWT_Level2.js:14 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2 locations) src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSInImgTagAttribute/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:1— src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSInImgTagAttribute/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/XSSWithNullBytesImgTagAttribute/LEVEL_1/XSS.js:1 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) src/main/resources/sampleVulnerability/staticResources/LEVEL_1/SampleVulnerability.js:1— src/main/resources/sampleVulnerability/staticResources/LEVEL_1/SampleVulnerability.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/SampleVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SampleVulnerability.js:1 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 5 locations) src/main/resources/static/templates/BlindSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:1— src/main/resources/static/templates/BlindSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/CommandInjection/LEVEL_1/CI_Level1.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/ErrorBasedSQLInjectionVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SQLInjection_Level1.js:1 · src/main/resources/static/templates/PathTraversal/LEVEL_1/PathTraversal.js:1 · +1 more site(s) not listed — the 5 copies are spread across 5 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. There is one copy in each of 5 separate files rather than several in one place, so check first whether these are sibling modules that each declare their own version of one shape — one per entity, per provider, per language. Where they are, no single extracted module collapses them: each module still has to be written, and what recurs is the TEMPLATE. The moves that do collapse a template are to generate these modules from the set they enumerate, or to replace the repeated construction with one factory each site calls with its own values — and where the set is the point, each module pinning one distinct thing, the repetition IS the enumeration and there is nothing to delete.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 3 locations) src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_1/CachePoisoning.js:11— src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_1/CachePoisoning.js:11 · src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_2/CachePoisoning.js:11 · src/main/resources/static/templates/CachePoisoning/LEVEL_3/CachePoisoning.js:17 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:682— src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:682 · src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:699 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 3 locations) src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.js:100— src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.js:100 · src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/Common/PasswordReset.js:50 · src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/LEVEL_9/SecurePasswordReset.js:50 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. There is one copy in each of 3 separate files rather than several in one place, so check first whether these are sibling modules that each declare their own version of one shape — one per entity, per provider, per language. Where they are, no single extracted module collapses them: each module still has to be written, and what recurs is the TEMPLATE. The moves that do collapse a template are to generate these modules from the set they enumerate, or to replace the repeated construction with one factory each site calls with its own values — and where the set is the point, each module pinning one distinct thing, the repetition IS the enumeration and there is nothing to delete.
R10 · Code Duplication· Duplicated block with local edits (7 matched lines × 2 locations) · ×1
Duplicated block with local edits (7 matched lines × 2 locations) src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.js:74— src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.js:74 · src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.js:127 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 52 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both spans, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 6 locations) src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_1/IDOR.js:70— src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_1/IDOR.js:70 · src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_2/IDOR.js:70 · src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_3/IDOR.js:70 · src/main/resources/static/templates/IDORVulnerability/LEVEL_4/IDOR.js:70 · +2 more site(s) not listed — the 6 copies are spread across 6 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Complex function setResult (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 10) src/main/resources/static/password-reset/reset.js:93— setResult has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 10; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
R3 · Large Files· src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js · ×1
src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js: 642 lines of code src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js:1— src/main/resources/static/vulnerableApp.js has 642 significant lines (blank lines excluded), over the 400-line bar, and contains logic — a file this long is usually several responsibilities in one module.
Orphaned file src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementVulnerability.java:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementService.java:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/internal/utility/PasswordHashingUtils.java:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file benchmarks/ZAP/scripts/convert_zap_to_benchmark.py:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file REDACTED:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/controller/BenchmarkController.java:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/service/BenchmarkResultWriter.java:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/model/Finding.java:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Duplicated predicate src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/Common/SessionManagement.js:16— `data.content || "Unable to load profile."` appears character-identically in 2 files — src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/Common/SessionManagement.js, src/main/resources/static/templates/SessionManagementVulnerability/LEVEL_1/SessionManagement.js. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/Common/PasswordReset.js:25— `typeof valueText === "string" && /^https?:\/\//i.test(valueText)` appears character-identically in 2 files — src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/Common/PasswordReset.js, src/main/resources/static/templates/PasswordResetVulnerability/LEVEL_9/SecurePasswordReset.js. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
No ADRs found build.gradle:3— No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`. ADRs are expected here because `build.gradle` makes this repository a deployable product (line 3).
D21 · Naming Consistency· `createJWTHmacAlgoToJavaAlgoMapping` spells `Hmac` where 14 names in the project spell it `HMAC` · ×1
`createJWTHmacAlgoToJavaAlgoMapping` spells `Hmac` where 14 names in the project spell it `HMAC` src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/bean/JWTUtils.java:97— 14 of 15 names in project repository spell the token `HMAC` (14 of 15; unit: names in project repository containing `HMAC`). Peers: IJWTTokenGenerator.getHMACSignedJWTToken (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/IJWTTokenGenerator.java:64); IJWTValidator.customHMACValidator (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/IJWTValidator.java:26); IJWTValidator.customHMACNullByteVulnerableValidator (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/IJWTValidator.java:40); IJWTValidator.customHMACNoneAlgorithmVulnerableValidator (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/IJWTValidator.java:54); IJWTValidator.customHMACEmptyTokenVulnerableValidator (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/jwt/IJWTValidator.java:67). Rename to `createJWTHMACAlgoToJavaAlgoMapping`. [rule N6]
D21 · Naming Consistency· `getOtpHash` spells `Otp` where 21 names in the project spell it `OTP` · ×1
`getOtpHash` spells `Otp` where 21 names in the project spell it `OTP` src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPEntity.java:35— 21 of 23 names in project repository spell the token `OTP` (21 of 23; unit: names in project repository containing `OTP`). Peers: OTPService.createAndSaveOTP (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:54); OTPService.requestOTPLevel1 (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:114); OTPService.validateOTPLevel1 (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:130); OTPService.requestOTPLevel2 (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:144); OTPService.validateOTPLevel2 (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:161). Rename to `getOTPHash`. [rule N6]
D21 · Naming Consistency· `setOtpHash` spells `Otp` where 21 names in the project spell it `OTP` · ×1
`setOtpHash` spells `Otp` where 21 names in the project spell it `OTP` src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPEntity.java:63— 21 of 23 names in project repository spell the token `OTP` (21 of 23; unit: names in project repository containing `OTP`). Peers: OTPService.createAndSaveOTP (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:54); OTPService.requestOTPLevel1 (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:114); OTPService.validateOTPLevel1 (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:130); OTPService.requestOTPLevel2 (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:144); OTPService.validateOTPLevel2 (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/otp/OTPService.java:161). Rename to `setOTPHash`. [rule N6]
D21 · Naming Consistency· `getCweID` spells `ID` where 53 names in the project spell it `Id` · ×1
`getCweID` spells `ID` where 53 names in the project spell it `Id` src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/vulnerability/types/VulnerabilityType.java:93— 53 of 55 names in project repository spell the token `Id` (53 of 55; unit: names in project repository containing `Id`). Peers: Finding.getWascId (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/model/Finding.java:88); DastBenchmarkStrategy.normalizeNumericId (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/service/DastBenchmarkStrategy.java:292); AuthUser.getId (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthUser.java:50); AuthUser.setId (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthUser.java:82); IDORLoginController.setUserIdCookie (REDACTED:130). Rename to `getCweId`. [rule N6]
D21 · Naming Consistency· `getWascID` spells `ID` where 53 names in the project spell it `Id` · ×1
`getWascID` spells `ID` where 53 names in the project spell it `Id` src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/vulnerability/types/VulnerabilityType.java:97— 53 of 55 names in project repository spell the token `Id` (53 of 55; unit: names in project repository containing `Id`). Peers: Finding.getWascId (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/model/Finding.java:88); DastBenchmarkStrategy.normalizeNumericId (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/service/DastBenchmarkStrategy.java:292); AuthUser.getId (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthUser.java:50); AuthUser.setId (src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/authentication/AuthUser.java:82); IDORLoginController.setUserIdCookie (REDACTED:130). Rename to `getWascId`. [rule N6]
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
REDACTED
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1
Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 8 of 69 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated, example/demo and scaffolding-template trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 69 of the 160 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementVulnerability.java, src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/sessionManagement/SessionManagementService.java, src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/internal/utility/PasswordHashingUtils.java, benchmarks/ZAP/scripts/convert_zap_to_benchmark.py, REDACTED, src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/controller/BenchmarkController.java, src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/service/BenchmarkResultWriter.java, src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/benchmark/model/Finding.java. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
README/code drift benchmarks/w3af/README.md:11— benchmarks/w3af/README.md links to `w3af-results.json`, but `benchmarks/w3af/w3af-results.json` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
No dependency-update automation build.gradle:120— `build.gradle` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`.
No changelog — No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
X5 · Nullable reference types· Java packages are not null-marked everywhere · ×1
Java packages are not null-marked everywhere — 0/46 of this repository's Java package directories are under a non-null default: a `package-info.java` declaring `@NullMarked` (JSpecify) or `@NonNullApi`, `@ParametersAreNonnullByDefault`, `@NonNullByDefault`, `@DefaultQualifier(NonNull.class)`; a `module-info.java` declaring `@NullMarked`; every type in it `@NullMarked`; or a build that runs NullAway with the package in `AnnotatedPackages`, or the Checker Framework's `NullnessChecker`. Elsewhere every reference admits null and no checker warns on the dereference that throws a `NullPointerException`.
Silent fallback default on parse failure src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java:549— `getVulnerablePayloadLevel14` returns `false` when `InvalidPathException` is thrown, with no log or throw — a malformed value silently becomes that default. Log the input or fail validation. If that constant is the correct answer rather than a stand-in for a value that could not be read, say so in a comment in the catch or in the Javadoc, and the row stops firing.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
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Run 01a1ea75-bbf7-7714-8217-1a5a72b426e1 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 108 · Warnings: 298 · Recommendations: 34 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by the Canine Code Analyzer: deterministic code-health analysis. 17-11-2026 @ 17:02 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.