Executive summary
SYSTRAN/faster-whisper falls short of our standard for production because we found no automated security scanning of the code, its secrets or its dependencies. It scores 60 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, and all 14 of its critical findings are security problems.
Production Readiness, at 52, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step for the work it takes is having someone learn and document the four files no active contributor knows, worth about 3 points. Adding automated security scanning would lift Production Readiness itself, worth about 5 points. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 64.
Seven pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. Three pipeline steps install packages that can change without warning, and two settings leave the servers or containers unsafe. Pinning each tool to an exact version, pinning what the pipeline installs and correcting the unsafe settings would close these risks. Limiting each secret to its own step would fix the secret exposed to more of the pipeline than needed, and the place where the code runs text as code or as a command needs a direct call instead.
The product code is 3,098 lines, about €3,700 to rebuild.
If Production Readiness rose from 52 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 60 to about 64.
Rebuild cost: about €3,700 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €1,200 to €6,200, for 21 to 65 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.8 at a score of 60. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 3,098 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 (global) | 2 faster_whisper.feature_extractor | 3 faster_whisper.tokenizer | 4 faster_whisper.utils | 5 faster_whisper.vad | 6 faster_whisper | 7 faster_whisper.transcribe |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (global) | |||||||
| 2 faster_whisper.feature_extractor | |||||||
| 3 faster_whisper.tokenizer | |||||||
| 4 faster_whisper.utils | |||||||
| 5 faster_whisper.vad | |||||||
| 6 faster_whisper | 1 | ||||||
| 7 faster_whisper.transcribe | 2 | 1 |
6→3 faster_whisper uses faster_whisper.tokenizer✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in faster_whisper uses a type in faster_whisper.tokenizer.
- The types involved
faster_whisper.transcribe→faster_whisper.tokenizer.Tokenizer
- Direction
- faster_whisper uses faster_whisper.tokenizer, so a change to faster_whisper.tokenizer can break faster_whisper, while a change to faster_whisper can't break faster_whisper.tokenizer.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: faster_whisper uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
7→3 faster_whisper.transcribe uses faster_whisper.tokenizer✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in faster_whisper.transcribe uses a type in faster_whisper.tokenizer.
- The types involved
faster_whisper.transcribe.BatchedInferencePipeline→faster_whisper.tokenizer.Tokenizerfaster_whisper.transcribe.WhisperModel→faster_whisper.tokenizer.Tokenizer
- Direction
- faster_whisper.transcribe uses faster_whisper.tokenizer, so a change to faster_whisper.tokenizer can break faster_whisper.transcribe, while a change to faster_whisper.transcribe can't break faster_whisper.tokenizer.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: faster_whisper.transcribe uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
7→5 faster_whisper.transcribe uses faster_whisper.vad✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in faster_whisper.transcribe uses a type in faster_whisper.vad.
- The types involved
faster_whisper.transcribe.TranscriptionInfo→faster_whisper.vad.VadOptions
- Direction
- faster_whisper.transcribe uses faster_whisper.vad, so a change to faster_whisper.vad can break faster_whisper.transcribe, while a change to faster_whisper.transcribe can't break faster_whisper.vad.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: faster_whisper.transcribe uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2025 — Injection | 15 | High / Critical |
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 7 | Medium |
| A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration | 4 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing; Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them; Resolve the 4 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with feature_extractor.py, utils.py, memory_benchmark.py.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 4 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with feature_extractor.py, utils.py, memory_benchmark.py. | +3.1 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +5.4 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +5.3 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it. | +2.8 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release. | +2.8 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Resolve the 1 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with transcribe.py. | +1.1 pts | Medium | Churn × Complexity Hotspots |
| Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite. | +1.8 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +0.9 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.5 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.7 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| faster_whisper/transcribe.py | 6.0 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: HackComment |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| faster_whisper/feature_extractor.py | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: FeatureExtractor.stft (cyclomatic 30) |
| faster_whisper/vad.py | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: vad.get_speech_timestamps (cyclomatic 30) |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Mixed | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: REDACTED |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 39 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 39 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 50 of 61 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.py) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. This repository's 7 shipped Python distribution(s) across 2 manifest(s) WERE read; what went unanswered is the currency half, because it grades an EXACT pin against the newest release and every declaration here is a floor or a range — which installs the newest release it admits and so cannot be behind one. So pypi.org was never asked. This is a true statement about the repository, and the healthy one, NOT a gap on our side: no reader we could write would find a currency question here.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (REDACTED), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via REDACTED (REDACTED). the image ran but published no HTTP port — nothing to crawl (EXPOSE the web port to unlock runtime evidence).
- C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Rust was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Rust was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin or Rust was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala, PHP and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala, PHP or Rust was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript (Vue and Svelte components included), Java, Rust, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Rust, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and MSBuild project configuration, TypeScript source and its tsconfig files, Java source and its package and module declarations, PHP source and its PHPStan and Psalm configuration, Dart source and its pubspec language version, Ruby source and its Sorbet and Steep configuration, Scala source and its build's explicit-nulls, WartRemover and Scalafix settings, Kotlin source, and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, no TypeScript was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — we run the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
6 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was WhisperModel.generate_segments at 46.
What to do
- Bring the 1 body over 30 down to 30 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with WhisperModel.generate_segments (cyclomatic 46). — Refactoring it lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 5.6 to about 7.1/10.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
9 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was WhisperModel.generate_segments at 115.
What to do
- Bring the 2 bodies over 60 down to 60 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with WhisperModel.generate_segments (cognitive 115), vad.get_speech_timestamps (cognitive 63). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 2 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 2.2 to about 4.4/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 60; a cleaner split scores higher.
D3 · God Classes
1 over-large unit(s) detected — types, modules or files that carry too much.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with transcribe.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D4 · Code Duplication
1 duplicated block group(s) detected. 0.9 % of the production lines (28 of 3,098) are in a reported copy.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (14–16 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with transcribe.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 5 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D11 · Test Reliability
0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). Python (repository root, 3 test files): measured (0 flaky).
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 40 shipped Python distribution(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from PyPI over the distributions a consumer installs — this repository's 7 declared runtime requirement(s) closed transitively over each distribution's published `requires_dist` (33 reached that way). Requirements it states ONLY under an extra, a PEP 735 dependency group, a Poetry dev group or a dev-named requirements file are excluded: pip does not install any of them for a consumer. ★ This repository commits no dependency lockfile that this pass reads, so each licence is the one PyPI publishes for the distribution's CURRENT release rather than for a pinned version. 3 of them publish no licence on PyPI this pass can read; that is missing data, not a violation, and none of them is charged.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
Top hotspots: faster_whisper/transcribe.py (7×22=154)
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with transcribe.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D16 · Bus Factor
No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author. Counted over 8 of the 16 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D17 · Explicit Debt
2 deducted task-comment markers across 3098 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 9.9. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 HackComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with transcribe.py (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 2 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D27 · Navigability
72 % of calls cross a namespace and 0 % go through an interface, but 31 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Scattered collaborators finding(s) in Navigability. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
15 finding(s): 0 critical, 12 high, 3 medium, 0 low. 7 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 7 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D31 · IaC & Container Security
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 2 medium, 0 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
4 of 8 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is faster_whisper/feature_extractor.py. Counted over 8 of the 16 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 4 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with feature_extractor.py, utils.py, memory_benchmark.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 0 platform declaration(s) and 7 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P10 · Library API & versioning
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:9
- `REDACTED` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — REDACTED:1
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release. — REDACTED:87
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
X12 · Unreachable branch
X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard
- This condition tests `words` for emptiness and then indexes it on a branch that test does not reach. `words[0][ " " ]` is evaluated whenever the guarded half is false — which includes the case the guard exists to anticipate, `words` being empty — so an empty `words` indexes position 0 of nothing and throws. This same condition already shows the intended bracketing at line 1694: `words[1][" "]` sits INSIDE the guard. Either the guard is load-bearing, in which case this access escapes it and crashes, or `words` cannot be empty here, in which case the guard beside it is dead code — the condition is wrong under both readings. Move the parenthesis so the emptiness test brackets every access to `words`. — faster_whisper/transcribe.py:1688
- This condition tests `words` for emptiness and then indexes it on a branch that test does not reach. `words[0][" "]` is evaluated whenever the guarded half is false — which includes the case the guard exists to anticipate, `words` being empty — so an empty `words` indexes position 0 of nothing and throws. This same condition already shows the intended bracketing at line 1694: `words[1][" "]` sits INSIDE the guard. Either the guard is load-bearing, in which case this access escapes it and crashes, or `words` cannot be empty here, in which case the guard beside it is dead code — the condition is wrong under both readings. Move the parenthesis so the emptiness test brackets every access to `words`. — faster_whisper/transcribe.py:1691
What to do
- Each finding names the index access that escapes the guard and the line of the correctly bracketed access beside it. Compare the two: they differ only in where one parenthesis sits. Move it so the emptiness test brackets every access to that symbol — and if the value provably cannot be empty at this point, delete the test rather than leave a condition that guards one access and not its neighbour.
X3 · Exception handling
X4 · Structured logging
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 87% | Adequate — gated by D2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 96% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 55% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 52% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 65% | Adequate — gated by D29, D36 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 77 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's Python imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — No container singleton was found, so there is no shared instance for concurrent requests to race on. No function in this Python code is served by a threaded web framework (a Flask, Bottle or FastAPI route, a Django or Pyramid view), so no module is shared between request threads.
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — no interface, protocol or abstract type declares an operation an implementer must write
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — the image ran but published no HTTP port — nothing to crawl (EXPOSE the web port to unlock runtime evidence) This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — this repository registers no route and starts no server another machine can reach (no Flask/FastAPI/Starlette route, Django urlpatterns or class-based view, Tornado handler). Access control is therefore N/A here — a library or command-line tool is authorized by the application that serves it, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in a Django, SQLAlchemy, SQLModel, Peewee, Tortoise or MongoEngine model, a migration or a SQL schema — and no database or data-store client (Django ORM, SQLAlchemy, psycopg, PyMongo, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential on a Django, SQLAlchemy, SQLModel, Peewee, Tortoise or mongoengine model, in a migration or in a SQL schema — and no database or data-store client (django.db, sqlalchemy, psycopg2, pymongo, sqlite3, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential on a Django, SQLAlchemy, SQLModel, Peewee, Tortoise or mongoengine model, in a migration or in a SQL schema — and no database or data-store client (django.db, sqlalchemy, psycopg2, pymongo, sqlite3, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
- D10 Test Quality — ~387 lines of test source are present (.py) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency currency not established — no declaration carries an exact pin to grade
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (346 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only — this repository's production source is .py, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (3098 LoC, 23 module-visible types across 3 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this Python build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (5 value object(s))
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P2 Observability — This repository's Python source (1 module(s), 11 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the Python source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for a pytest-benchmark or pytest-codspeed dependency with tests taking the `benchmark` fixture, an asv.conf.json with its `time_`/`mem_`/`peakmem_` benchmarks, or a pyperf Runner, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: this repository declares no async functions, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Python was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Python request takes no token: asyncio cancels the task and trio or anyio the scope that made it, from outside the call, and requests, httpx, aiohttp and gRPC take a timeout, not a cancellation
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 14 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
Serious — 30 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- HackComment faster_whisper/transcribe.py:1641
- HackComment faster_whisper/transcribe.py:1683
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Index access outside its own emptiness guard faster_whisper/transcribe.py:1688
- Index access outside its own emptiness guard faster_whisper/transcribe.py:1691
- WhisperModel.generate_segments (cyclomatic 46) faster_whisper/transcribe.py:1139
- FeatureExtractor.stft (cyclomatic 30) faster_whisper/feature_extractor.py:68
- vad.get_speech_timestamps (cyclomatic 30) faster_whisper/vad.py:51
- WhisperModel.add_word_timestamps (cyclomatic 27) faster_whisper/transcribe.py:1603
- BatchedInferencePipeline.transcribe (cyclomatic 22) faster_whisper/transcribe.py:254
- WhisperModel.transcribe (cyclomatic 18) faster_whisper/transcribe.py:780
- Hotspot: faster_whisper/transcribe.py faster_whisper/transcribe.py:254
- WhisperModel.generate_segments (cognitive 115) faster_whisper/transcribe.py:1139
- vad.get_speech_timestamps (cognitive 63) faster_whisper/vad.py:51
- WhisperModel.add_word_timestamps (cognitive 60) faster_whisper/transcribe.py:1603
- FeatureExtractor.stft (cognitive 35) faster_whisper/feature_extractor.py:68
- BatchedInferencePipeline.transcribe (cognitive 34) faster_whisper/transcribe.py:254
- WhisperModel.transcribe (cognitive 27) faster_whisper/transcribe.py:780
- WhisperModel.generate_with_fallback (cognitive 22) faster_whisper/transcribe.py:1438
- WhisperModel._split_segments_by_timestamps (cognitive 17) faster_whisper/transcribe.py:1060
- WhisperModel.get_prompt (cognitive 17) faster_whisper/transcribe.py:1568
- FileTooLong: faster_whisper/transcribe.py faster_whisper/transcribe.py
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Duplicated block (14–16 lines × 2) faster_whisper/transcribe.py:531
Minor — 16 finding(s)
- Orphaned file faster_whisper/feature_extractor.py:1
- Orphaned file faster_whisper/utils.py:1
- Orphaned file benchmark/memory_benchmark.py:1
- Orphaned file benchmark/evaluate_yt_commons.py:1
- Scattered collaborators
- Orphaned files with no living knowledge
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- No ADRs
- No architecture diagram/doc
- No SAST REDACTED:9
- No dependency-update automation REDACTED:1
- No release approval gate REDACTED:87
- No changelog
Minor — 1 finding(s)
- Dependency hygiene PARTLY measured — Python dependencies read, no exact pin to grade for currency
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=0 --max-count=200" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-65258b8a26f740d3ba1575e5f133a8de/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --log-opts "--full-history --all --skip=200 --max-count=80" --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-65258b8a26f740d3ba1575e5f133a8de/history-1.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history-1.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-65258b8a26f740d3ba1575e5f133a8de/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 15 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 1 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 4 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 0 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |