Executive summary
RedisLabs/spark-redis is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, most of them in the packages it uses. Its score is held back because we found no recorded design decisions and no architecture document or diagram, and eight files are no longer known to anyone active in the project. It scores 63 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged.
Maturity, at 54, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first steps are having someone learn and document the eight files no active contributor knows and recording design decisions, each worth about 8 points. Raising Maturity to 70 would lift the score to about 70.
Seventeen known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Seven pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with, and four secrets can leak from the build pipeline. Updating the vulnerable packages, pinning each tool to an exact version and limiting each secret to its own step would close these risks. The pipeline step that runs a download without checking it needs each download checked against a known checksum first.
The product code is 2,902 lines, about €6,200 to rebuild.
If Maturity rose from 54 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 63 to about 70.
New since the last survey: 8 findings
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (21 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/rdd/RedisRDD.scala
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (19 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/redisFunctions.scala
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/rdd/RedisRDD.scala
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (10 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/redisFunctions.scala
- Code Duplication · Edited copies of one member (3 members, 10+ corresponding lines) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/rdd/RedisRDD.scala
- Code Duplication · Edited copies of one member (3 members, 10+ corresponding lines) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/redisFunctions.scala
- Code Duplication · Edited copy of a member (16 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/util/PipelineUtils.scala
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Fixed since the last survey: 1 finding
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
Rebuild cost: about €6,200 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €2,000 to €10,000, for 34 to 108 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.9 at a score of 63. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 2,902 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 com.redislabs.provider | 2 com.redislabs.provider.redis.ConnectionPool | 3 com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisReceiver | 4 com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.CollectionUtils | 5 com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.ConnectionUtils | 6 org.apache.spark.sql | 7 com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd | 8 com.redislabs.provider.redis.util | 9 com.redislabs.provider.redis | 10 com.redislabs.provider.redis.partitioner | 11 com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming | 12 org.apache.spark.sql.redis | 13 org.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream | 14 com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamReceiver |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 com.redislabs.provider | ||||||||||||||
| 2 com.redislabs.provider.redis.ConnectionPool | ||||||||||||||
| 3 com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisReceiver | ||||||||||||||
| 4 com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.CollectionUtils | ||||||||||||||
| 5 com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.ConnectionUtils | ||||||||||||||
| 6 org.apache.spark.sql | ||||||||||||||
| 7 com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd | 10 | |||||||||||||
| 8 com.redislabs.provider.redis.util | 2 | |||||||||||||
| 9 com.redislabs.provider.redis | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||
| 10 com.redislabs.provider.redis.partitioner | 1 | |||||||||||||
| 11 com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||
| 12 org.apache.spark.sql.redis | 1 | 1 | 3 | |||||||||||
| 13 org.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream | 3 | 1 | ||||||||||||
| 14 com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamReceiver | 1 | 1 |
7→9 com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd uses com.redislabs.provider.redis part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 10 pairs of types, where a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd uses a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.
- The types involved
com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd.Keys→com.redislabs.provider.redis.ReadWriteConfigcom.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd.Keys→com.redislabs.provider.redis.RedisNodecom.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd.RedisKVRDD→com.redislabs.provider.redis.ReadWriteConfigcom.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd.RedisKVRDD→com.redislabs.provider.redis.RedisNodecom.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd.RedisKeysRDD→com.redislabs.provider.redis.ReadWriteConfigcom.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd.RedisKeysRDD→com.redislabs.provider.redis.RedisConfigcom.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd.RedisListRDD→com.redislabs.provider.redis.ReadWriteConfigcom.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd.RedisListRDD→com.redislabs.provider.redis.RedisNodecom.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd.RedisZSetRDD→com.redislabs.provider.redis.ReadWriteConfigcom.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd.RedisZSetRDD→com.redislabs.provider.redis.RedisNode
- Direction
- com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd uses com.redislabs.provider.redis, so a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis can break com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd, while a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd can't break com.redislabs.provider.redis.
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
8→9 com.redislabs.provider.redis.util uses com.redislabs.provider.redis part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.util uses a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.
- The types involved
com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.ConnectionUtils→com.redislabs.provider.redis.RedisConfigcom.redislabs.provider.redis.util.PipelineUtils→com.redislabs.provider.redis.ReadWriteConfig
- Direction
- com.redislabs.provider.redis.util uses com.redislabs.provider.redis, so a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis can break com.redislabs.provider.redis.util, while a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis.util can't break com.redislabs.provider.redis.
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
9→7 com.redislabs.provider.redis uses com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis uses a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd.
- The types involved
com.redislabs.provider.redis.RedisContext→com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd.RedisKeysRDD
- Direction
- com.redislabs.provider.redis uses com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd, so a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd can break com.redislabs.provider.redis, while a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis can't break com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.redislabs.provider.redis uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
9→8 com.redislabs.provider.redis uses com.redislabs.provider.redis.util✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis uses a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.
- The types involved
com.redislabs.provider.redis.ConnectionPool→com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.Logging
- Direction
- com.redislabs.provider.redis uses com.redislabs.provider.redis.util, so a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis.util can break com.redislabs.provider.redis, while a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis can't break com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.redislabs.provider.redis uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
10→9 com.redislabs.provider.redis.partitioner uses com.redislabs.provider.redis✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.partitioner uses a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.
- The types involved
com.redislabs.provider.redis.partitioner.RedisPartition→com.redislabs.provider.redis.RedisConfig
- Direction
- com.redislabs.provider.redis.partitioner uses com.redislabs.provider.redis, so a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis can break com.redislabs.provider.redis.partitioner, while a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis.partitioner can't break com.redislabs.provider.redis.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.redislabs.provider.redis.partitioner uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
11→8 com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming uses com.redislabs.provider.redis.util✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming uses a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.
- The types involved
com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamReceiver→com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.Logging
- Direction
- com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming uses com.redislabs.provider.redis.util, so a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis.util can break com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming, while a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming can't break com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
11→9 com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming uses com.redislabs.provider.redis✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming uses a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.
- The types involved
com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamingContext→com.redislabs.provider.redis.RedisConfig
- Direction
- com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming uses com.redislabs.provider.redis, so a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis can break com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming, while a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming can't break com.redislabs.provider.redis.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
12→7 org.apache.spark.sql.redis uses com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in org.apache.spark.sql.redis uses a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd.
- The types involved
org.apache.spark.sql.redis.RedisSourceRelation→com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd.Keys
- Direction
- org.apache.spark.sql.redis uses com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd, so a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd can break org.apache.spark.sql.redis, while a change to org.apache.spark.sql.redis can't break com.redislabs.provider.redis.rdd.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: org.apache.spark.sql.redis uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
12→8 org.apache.spark.sql.redis uses com.redislabs.provider.redis.util✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in org.apache.spark.sql.redis uses a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.
- The types involved
org.apache.spark.sql.redis.RedisSourceRelation→com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.Logging
- Direction
- org.apache.spark.sql.redis uses com.redislabs.provider.redis.util, so a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis.util can break org.apache.spark.sql.redis, while a change to org.apache.spark.sql.redis can't break com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: org.apache.spark.sql.redis uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
12→9 org.apache.spark.sql.redis uses com.redislabs.provider.redis✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in org.apache.spark.sql.redis uses a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.
- The types involved
org.apache.spark.sql.redis.RedisSourceRelation→com.redislabs.provider.redis.ReadWriteConfigorg.apache.spark.sql.redis.RedisSourceRelation→com.redislabs.provider.redis.RedisConfigorg.apache.spark.sql.redis.RedisSourceRelation→com.redislabs.provider.redis.RedisNode
- Direction
- org.apache.spark.sql.redis uses com.redislabs.provider.redis, so a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis can break org.apache.spark.sql.redis, while a change to org.apache.spark.sql.redis can't break com.redislabs.provider.redis.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: org.apache.spark.sql.redis uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→8 org.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream uses com.redislabs.provider.redis.util✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in org.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream uses a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.
- The types involved
org.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream.RedisSource→com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.Loggingorg.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream.RedisStreamProvider→com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.Loggingorg.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream.RedisStreamReader→com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.Logging
- Direction
- org.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream uses com.redislabs.provider.redis.util, so a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis.util can break org.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream, while a change to org.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream can't break com.redislabs.provider.redis.util.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: org.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
13→9 org.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream uses com.redislabs.provider.redis✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in org.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream uses a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.
- The types involved
org.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream.RedisSource→com.redislabs.provider.redis.RedisConfig
- Direction
- org.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream uses com.redislabs.provider.redis, so a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis can break org.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream, while a change to org.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream can't break com.redislabs.provider.redis.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: org.apache.spark.sql.redis.stream uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
14→9 com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamReceiver uses com.redislabs.provider.redis✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamReceiver uses a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.
- The types involved
com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamReceiver.MessageHandler→com.redislabs.provider.redis.ReadWriteConfig
- Direction
- com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamReceiver uses com.redislabs.provider.redis, so a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis can break com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamReceiver, while a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamReceiver can't break com.redislabs.provider.redis.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamReceiver uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
14→11 com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamReceiver uses com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamReceiver uses a type in com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.
- The types involved
com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamReceiver.MessageHandler→com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.StreamItem
- Direction
- com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamReceiver uses com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming, so a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming can break com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamReceiver, while a change to com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamReceiver can't break com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.redislabs.provider.redis.streaming.RedisStreamReceiver uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 29 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 14 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Top priorities: Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them; Resolve the 8 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with RedisRDD.scala, RedisConfig.scala, RedisSourceRelation.scala; Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with redisFunctions.scala.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 8 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with RedisRDD.scala, RedisConfig.scala, RedisSourceRelation.scala. | +7.6 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +8.0 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with redisFunctions.scala. | +3.2 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. | +2.3 pts | Low | Bus Factor |
| Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +1.4 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 6 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (6). | +1.2 pts | Low | Dependency Vulnerabilities |
| Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite. | +2.4 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. | +1.2 pts | Low | Supply-chain Provenance & Signing |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 1.1 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.4 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 3.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/rdd/RedisRDD.scala | 7.1 | Mixed | Cognitive Complexity: RedisKeysRDD.scaleHostsWithPartitionNum (cognitive 16) |
| src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/redisFunctions.scala | 7.1 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (19 corresponding lines) |
| src/test/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/df/RedisDataframeSuite.scala | 7.3 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/util/ConnectionUtils.scala | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/util/PipelineUtils.scala | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (16 corresponding lines) |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 44 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
What we checked — 44 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 62 of 193 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT READ here — but this repository measures it: a coverage step in CI (`codecov/codecov-action`) shows that coverage is collected and tracked in your own CI. The built-in collector has no runner for this ecosystem (.scala), so the analyzer could not read the number — a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not an unmeasured repo. Not scored.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.scala) and this repository declares an sbt build (repository root, 69 test files), but it was not re-run: the analyzer environment could not run it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Currency was graded against Maven Central, but whether an artifact is DEPRECATED is not: Maven Central publishes no deprecation marker, exactly as rubygems.org does not. Whether one is UNMAINTAINED is not graded either — no registry publishes a maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Two of this dimension's four signals are therefore unread on a Maven tree, and its score reflects currency alone.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (REDACTED), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
- C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
- C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was RedisKeysRDD.scaleHostsWithPartitionNum at 16.
What to do
- Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with RedisKeysRDD.scaleHostsWithPartitionNum (cognitive 16). — Refactoring it lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.9 to about 10.0/10.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
4 duplicated block group(s) detected. 8.6 % of the production lines (251 of 2,902) are in a reported copy. A further 7 rows report members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Edited copies of one member (3 members, 10+ corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with RedisRDD.scala, redisFunctions.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (21 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with RedisRDD.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (19 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with redisFunctions.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D5 · Coupling
2 production modules (Maven+sbt), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; a dependsOn spread (deps: _*) and a project whose directory a helper computes are not visible there; 0 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 1 of the 2 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, declare types in source no model reads, or have no source directory of their own).
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 10 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
120 outdated artifact(s) of 131 resolved by the build, graded against Maven Central. 1 resolved artifact(s) could not be graded: Maven Central carries no such coordinate, or it publishes nothing but pre-releases. That is a definite answer and is counted, not charged. Whether any of these is DEPRECATED is not graded — Maven Central publishes no deprecation marker, exactly as rubygems.org does not. Whether any is UNMAINTAINED is not graded either: no registry publishes a maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Known CVEs in this graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 1 declared JVM dependency artifact(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from the POMs Maven Central publishes, over the coordinates this repository's 1 Maven/Gradle manifest(s) declare with a version resolvable from the manifest itself — the same declaration-site closure this analysis reads for dependency currency. The JVM has no lockfile a checkout is guaranteed to carry, so this is deliberately NOT the transitive closure. A further 7 coordinate(s) are not published to Maven Central — another repository (Google's Maven hosts androidx), a SNAPSHOT, or a private artifact — so their licences are not readable from here and they are outside this verdict.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
1 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/ConnectionPool.scala. Counted over 7 of the 33 production source files in this repository: 23 are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over, and the remaining 3 have no attributable history left to measure.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D17 · Explicit Debt
3 deducted task-comment markers across 2902 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.9. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with RedisDataframeSuite.scala (2), ConnectionUtils.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 11 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
14 finding(s): 0 critical, 12 high, 2 medium, 0 low. 7 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 1 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 7 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
21 finding(s): 6 critical, 11 high, 3 medium, 1 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 11 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (11). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
- Resolve the 6 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
9 of 10 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/redisFunctions.scala. Counted over 10 of the 33 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 8 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with RedisRDD.scala, RedisConfig.scala, RedisSourceRelation.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with redisFunctions.scala. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
1/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 8 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX6 · Interface segregation
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P10 · Library API & versioning
P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency but is not wired into CI — run it as a required step on push/PR (e.g. `composer phpstan` / `mix sobelow` / `bundle exec brakeman` / the spotbugs Gradle task / `sbt scalafixAll --check` / `golangci-lint run` / `rebar3 lint`) so a regression fails the build instead of relying on someone running it locally.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
P6 · Release Hygiene
X12 · Unreachable branch
X16 · Unfloored truncation loop
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation
X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated
X3 · Exception handling
X4 · Structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types
- No build over this repository's 32 Scala product file(s) passes `-Yexplicit-nulls`, enables WartRemover's `Null` wart or runs Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls`, so every reference type admits null and nothing reports a `null` written into the code or returned from a Java API — the first one to reach a method call is a `NullPointerException`. `Option` by convention is a habit no tool here holds the code to.
What to do
- On Scala 3, add `-Yexplicit-nulls` to `scalacOptions` so `String` and `String | Null` mean different things, and type each Java API's result as nullable where it can return null; on Scala 2 (or as a first step), enable WartRemover's `Null` wart (`wartremoverErrors += Wart.Null`) or Scalafix's `DisableSyntax.noNulls = true` so the code holds absence in `Option`. Then pay the assertions down rather than adding to them: each `.nn` is a null the compiler could not rule out — wrap the Java value in `Option(…)` at the boundary, pattern-match on `null` once there, or change the API so the null cannot arrive; an `unsafeNulls` import switches the checking off for everything after it.
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 73% | Adequate — gated by X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 54% | Adequate — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 70% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 66% | Adequate — gated by D29, D36 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — 1 observation(s) recorded · Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 70 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's Scala imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — No container singleton was found, so there is no shared instance for concurrent requests to race on. No class in this Java code is a Spring, JSR-330 or CDI singleton bean. No class in this Scala code is a Play controller, a Cask routes object, a Scalatra servlet, a Finatra controller, an Akka/Pekko HTTP routes holder or a JSR-330/Spring singleton, so no instance is shared between request threads.
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — This repository has nothing the runtime tiers could boot or serve — no markup, no UI framework or web-server dependency, no UI component source, no native UI project and no API definition — nothing here is a surface to boot — so runtime a11y/egress/header evidence has no subject here. Not applicable: this is neither a gap in the scan nor a finding about your code.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named column (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone_number, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, a MongoDB or Cassandra driver, JDBC) imported either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, JDBC, MongoDB, Cassandra, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a Slick table or in a SQL migration's CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store client (Slick, Doobie, Quill, ScalikeJDBC, Anorm, Skunk, JDBC, MongoDB, Cassandra, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
- D10 Test Quality — ~2574 lines of test source are present (.scala) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .scala suite was found but not re-run
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (624 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only — this repository's production source is .scala, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (2902 LoC, 64 module-visible types across 7 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
- D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.scala), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (1 of 2 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 11 value object(s)
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- P2 Observability — This repository's JVM source (1 module(s), 32 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JVM source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage not measured: this check compares the coverage of the analyzer's own test run across the domain and web layers, and that run measured none here — Test coverage (D8) says why
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `@Benchmark` in a Java, Kotlin or Scala file importing JMH or kotlinx-benchmark, Jetpack Benchmark's `measureRepeated` in a file importing androidx.benchmark, or JMH/kotlinx-benchmark/androidx.benchmark in a REDACTED, Gradle or sbt build, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: this repository declares no async functions, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface: 32 Scala file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source, disabled TLS certificate validation and obsolete TLS versions, and none was found. This repository serves no HTTP of its own — no HTTP-server artifact (akka-http, pekko-http, http4s, Play, Finagle, zio-http, cask, Scalatra, a tapir server, Jetty, Undertow, …) outside test scope in its build, and no server package imported or server bound in its production source — so HTTPS enforcement, HSTS, cookie flags and input validation are N/A here, as they are for a C# library or worker. If this codebase starts serving HTTP, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Scala was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Scala request takes no token: a Future cannot be cancelled, and cats-effect, ZIO and Monix interrupt the fiber that made the request from outside the call, not through a parameter
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 30 finding(s)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
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- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Orphaned knowledge src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/redisFunctions.scala:1
Serious — 26 finding(s)
- TodoComment src/test/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/df/RedisDataframeSuite.scala:54
- TodoComment src/test/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/df/RedisDataframeSuite.scala:63
- TodoComment src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/util/ConnectionUtils.scala:34
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Edited copies of one member (3 members, 10+ corresponding lines) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/rdd/RedisRDD.scala:61
- Edited copies of one member (3 members, 10+ corresponding lines) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/redisFunctions.scala:513
- RedisKeysRDD.scaleHostsWithPartitionNum (cognitive 16) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/rdd/RedisRDD.scala:214
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- Edited copy of a member (21 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/rdd/RedisRDD.scala:147
- Edited copy of a member (19 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/redisFunctions.scala:437
- Edited copy of a member (13 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/rdd/RedisRDD.scala:26
- Edited copy of a member (10 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/redisFunctions.scala:419
- Edited copy of a member (16 corresponding lines) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/util/PipelineUtils.scala:63
- Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/redisFunctions.scala:550
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/redisFunctions.scala:444
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/rdd/RedisRDD.scala:27
- Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/rdd/RedisRDD.scala:148
- Coverage collected but not gated
Minor — 17 finding(s)
- Orphaned file src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/rdd/RedisRDD.scala:1
- Orphaned file src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/RedisConfig.scala:1
- Orphaned file src/main/scala/org/apache/spark/sql/redis/RedisSourceRelation.scala:1
- Orphaned file src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/streaming/RedisStreamReceiver.scala:1
- Orphaned file src/main/scala/org/apache/spark/sql/redis/stream/RedisSource.scala:1
- Orphaned file src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/util/PipelineUtils.scala:1
- Orphaned file src/main/scala/org/apache/spark/sql/redis/stream/RedisStreamReader.scala:1
- Orphaned file src/main/scala/com/redislabs/provider/redis/streaming/redisStreamingFunctions.scala:1
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
- REDACTED
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- No ADRs
- No architecture diagram/doc
- Scala's null is not held to the type system everywhere
Minor — 120 finding(s)
- Outdated (provided): com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core
- Outdated (provided): com.clearspring.analytics:stream
- Outdated (provided): org.threeten:threeten-extra
- Outdated (provided): org.apache.avro:avro-mapred
- Outdated (provided): com.google.crypto.tink:tink
- Outdated (provided): org.glassfish.hk2:hk2-locator
- Outdated (provided): org.slf4j:slf4j-log4j12
- Outdated (provided): com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java
- Outdated (provided): org.glassfish.hk2:hk2-utils
- Outdated (provided): org.apache.zookeeper:zookeeper-jute
- Outdated (provided): jakarta.servlet:jakarta.servlet-api
- Outdated (provided): com.thoughtworks.paranamer:paranamer
- Outdated (provided): org.rocksdb:rocksdbjni
- Outdated (provided): org.apache.arrow:arrow-memory-netty
- Outdated (provided): org.json4s:json4s-jackson_2.12
- Outdated (provided): com.google.code.findbugs:jsr305
- Outdated (provided): org.apache.commons:commons-lang3
- Outdated (provided): org.apache.commons:commons-text
- Outdated (provided): jakarta.ws.rs:jakarta.ws.rs-api
- Outdated (provided): org.glassfish.hk2.external:aopalliance-repackaged
- Outdated (provided): org.apache.zookeeper:zookeeper
- Outdated (provided): org.apache.arrow:arrow-memory-core
- Outdated (provided): org.apache.parquet:parquet-column
- Outdated (provided): commons-codec:commons-codec
- Outdated (provided): commons-io:commons-io
- Outdated (compile): org.slf4j:slf4j-api
- Outdated (compile): redis.clients:jedis
- Outdated (compile): org.apache.commons:commons-pool2
- Outdated (test): org.scalatest:scalatest_2.12
- Outdated (test): org.scalactic:scalactic_2.12
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-ad77476eff0c49858f4bd0bc39e18837/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-ad77476eff0c49858f4bd0bc39e18837/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 14 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 21 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive --experimental-disable-plugins transitivedependency/requirements --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/csproj --experimental-disable-plugins dotnet/nugetcpm . | 0 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |