Public report of QuinntyneBrown/slackish-v2, published 7 November 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.11.2). Assert signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey → Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 7 November 2026, 21:38 UTC · Survey ID cd_51b380cb794b4fe49e9cf8011c4fd746

QuinntyneBrown/slackish-v2

Measured 7 November 2026, 21:38 UTC, at code version 05bd973

Test distribution is not measured: No automated tests.

IL efficiency is not measured: The target did not build.

CAI score 26out of 100 Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
Down 1 since the last survey

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

A small codebase: 3,752 lines of product code in 1 project, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: under 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Production Readiness, 8

Findings by how serious they are

20 critical 87 serious 40 minor

6 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, we either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard we look for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Assert small markCanine Code Analyzer
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Canine Code Analyzer engine 1.0.0
Measured
7 November 2026, 21:38 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds the Canine Code Analyzer. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today the Canine Code Analyzer is the only one that does.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. We work it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸

77of 77 dimensions measured by tools.
128of 147 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 19 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
77dimensions across 6 lenses, read from 3,752 lines of product code in 1 project.
Chapters

Executive summary

QuinntyneBrown/slackish-v2 falls short of our standard for production, in part because the project has no automated tests. It scores 26 out of 100 and is rated Weak, and ten of its 20 critical findings are security problems.

Production Readiness, at 8, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is adding automated tests, worth about 15 points. Fixing the password or key in the code comes next, worth about 11 points. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 42.

Four passwords or keys in the code's history and one in the code are open to anyone who can read the repository. Two known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers, and the project has no automated tests, so a change can break it without warning. Replacing each exposed password or key, adding automated tests and updating the vulnerable packages would close these risks. Hashing passwords with a password-hashing function such as Argon2, bcrypt or PBKDF2 would fix the two places where passwords are scrambled with a fast general-purpose hash, and loading the key from a secret store instead of the code would deal with the encryption key written into the code. The eight data fields that are written but never read need removing.

The product code is 3,752 lines, about €2,900 to rebuild.

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Production Readiness 8 · counts for 46%Maturity 31 · counts for 25%Security and Compliance 41 · counts for 14%Architecture 50 · counts for 8%Code Health 72 · counts for 4%Performance 100 · counts for 2%

If Production Readiness rose from 8 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 26 to about 42.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Business logic 10%Supporting code 90%
New since the last survey: 3 findings

These 3 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 21 October 2026.

We compare every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Rebuild cost: about €2,900 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild€970 to €4,700, for 16 to 50 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problemStandard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.7 at a score of 26. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeSmall: 3,752 lines of product code
Comment linesThe estimate prices 3,726 lines. Comment lines count towards the size of 3,752 lines but aren't priced as work.
What it is notNot a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one.

How the estimate is made: We price the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
Raises the score by about 15 points · Low effort · Test Distribution
2
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED.
Raises the score by about 11 points · Low effort · REDACTED Scanning
3
Resolve the 6 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with UnityConfiguration.cs, QueryStringBearerAuthorizeAttribute.cs, EncryptionService.cs.
Raises the score by about 6 points · Low effort · Knowledge Freshness

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €2,900 to build again, under 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 8 (Critical). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 15 points for low effort, because it clears the 1 Test Distribution findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

57 modules, with 44 dependencies between them. One loop runs through 3 of the modules, marked above the diagonal.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 17 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →1 ClientApp2 ClientApp.app.app_component3 ClientApp.app.app_module4 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-about_component5 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-detail-header_component6 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-detail_component7 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-header_component8 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-list_component9 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-messages_component10 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation_model11 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversations_module12 ClientApp.app.landing-page_component13 ClientApp.app.messages.message-form_component14 ClientApp.app.messages.messages_module15 ClientApp.app.profiles.profile_model16 ClientApp.app.shared.components.popover_component17 ClientApp.app.shared.services.login-redirect_service18 ClientApp.app.shared.services.storage_service19 Slackish.Data.Model20 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-list-header_component21 ClientApp.app.shared.services.auth-guard_service22 ClientApp.app.shared.services.http_service23 ClientApp.app.shared.services.signalr-message-queue-factory24 ClientApp.app.teams.discover-team-page_component25 Slackish.Data26 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversations_service27 ClientApp.app.profiles.profile_service28 ClientApp.app.shared.services.authentication_service29 ClientApp.app.teams.teams_service30 Slackish.Data.Migrations31 Slackish.Features.Core32 Slackish.Migrations33 Slackish.Security34 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-page_component35 ClientApp.app.profiles.login-page_component36 ClientApp.app.teams.create-team-page_component37 Slackish.Features.Messages38 Slackish.Features.Profiles39 Slackish.Features.Teams40 Slackish.Features.Conversations
1 ClientApp
2 ClientApp.app.app_component
3 ClientApp.app.app_module
4 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-about_component
5 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-detail-header_component
6 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-detail_component
7 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-header_component
8 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-list_component
9 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-messages_component
10 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation_model
11 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversations_module
12 ClientApp.app.landing-page_component
13 ClientApp.app.messages.message-form_component
14 ClientApp.app.messages.messages_module
15 ClientApp.app.profiles.profile_model
16 ClientApp.app.shared.components.popover_component
17 ClientApp.app.shared.services.login-redirect_service
18 ClientApp.app.shared.services.storage_service
19 Slackish.Data.Model
20 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-list-header_component1
21 ClientApp.app.shared.services.auth-guard_service11
22 ClientApp.app.shared.services.http_service2
23 ClientApp.app.shared.services.signalr-message-queue-factory1
24 ClientApp.app.teams.discover-team-page_component1
25 Slackish.Data14
26 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversations_service1
27 ClientApp.app.profiles.profile_service1
28 ClientApp.app.shared.services.authentication_service11
29 ClientApp.app.teams.teams_service1
30 Slackish.Data.Migrations2
31 Slackish.Features.Core1
32 Slackish.Migrations4
33 Slackish.Security1
34 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-page_component11111
35 ClientApp.app.profiles.login-page_component11111
36 ClientApp.app.teams.create-team-page_component11
37 Slackish.Features.Messages1231
38 Slackish.Features.Profiles2241
39 Slackish.Features.Teams112
40 Slackish.Features.Conversations11311
Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself
1 ClientApp2 ClientApp.app.app_component3 ClientApp.app.app_module4 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-about_component5 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-detail-header_component6 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-detail_component7 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-header_component8 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-list_component9 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-messages_component10 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation_model11 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversations_module12 ClientApp.app.landing-page_component13 ClientApp.app.messages.message-form_component14 ClientApp.app.messages.messages_module15 ClientApp.app.profiles.profile_model16 ClientApp.app.shared.components.popover_component17 ClientApp.app.shared.services.login-redirect_service18 ClientApp.app.shared.services.storage_service19 Slackish.Data.Model20 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-list-header_component21 ClientApp.app.shared.services.auth-guard_service22 ClientApp.app.shared.services.http_service23 ClientApp.app.shared.services.signalr-message-queue-factory24 ClientApp.app.teams.discover-team-page_component25 Slackish.Data26 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversations_service27 ClientApp.app.profiles.profile_service28 ClientApp.app.shared.services.authentication_service29 ClientApp.app.teams.teams_service30 Slackish.Data.Migrations31 Slackish.Features.Core32 Slackish.Migrations33 Slackish.Security34 ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-page_component35 ClientApp.app.profiles.login-page_component36 ClientApp.app.teams.create-team-page_component37 Slackish.Features.Messages38 Slackish.Features.Profiles39 Slackish.Features.Teams40 Slackish.Features.ConversationsClientApp1ClientApp.app.app_component2ClientApp.app.app_module3ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-about_component4ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-detail-header_component5ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-detail_component6ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-header_component7ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-list_component8ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-messages_component9ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation_model10ClientApp.app.conversations.conversations_module11ClientApp.app.landing-page_component12ClientApp.app.messages.message-form_component13ClientApp.app.messages.messages_module14ClientApp.app.profiles.profile_model15ClientApp.app.shared.components.popover_component16ClientApp.app.shared.services.login-redirect_service17ClientApp.app.shared.services.storage_service18Slackish.Data.Model19ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-list-header_component20ClientApp.app.shared.services.auth-guard_service21ClientApp.app.shared.services.http_service22ClientApp.app.shared.services.signalr-message-queue-factory23ClientApp.app.teams.discover-team-page_component24Slackish.Data25ClientApp.app.conversations.conversations_service26ClientApp.app.profiles.profile_service27ClientApp.app.shared.services.authentication_service28ClientApp.app.teams.teams_service29Slackish.Data.Migrations30Slackish.Features.Core31Slackish.Migrations32Slackish.Security33ClientApp.app.conversations.conversation-page_component34ClientApp.app.profiles.login-page_component35ClientApp.app.teams.create-team-page_component36Slackish.Features.Messages37Slackish.Features.Profiles38Slackish.Features.Teams39Slackish.Features.Conversations40111211141111121411111111111111231224111211311+17 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 72% · Strong ·

At a glance — Architecture · 50% · Weak · gated by D26, AX2, AX7 ·

At a glance — Maturity · 31% · Weak · gated by D34, M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 8% · Critical · gated by D8, D9, R4, R6, P1, P3, P7 ·

At a glance — Security · 41% · Weak · gated by C1, S1 ·

At a glance — Performance · 100% · Exemplary ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures6High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures4High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection3Medium

Roadmap

Top priorities: Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage; Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution; Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+15.0 ptsLowTest Distribution
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED.+11.1 ptsLowREDACTED Scanning
Resolve the 6 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with UnityConfiguration.cs, QueryStringBearerAuthorizeAttribute.cs, EncryptionService.cs.+5.7 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.+15.0 ptsHighCode Coverage
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.+4.4 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Resolve the 1 Projects may be oversized for their cohesion finding(s) in Project Cohesion — start with Slackish.csproj.+1.8 ptsLowProject Cohesion
Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.+1.8 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.+2.9 ptsMediumCI/CD gates

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 16 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 6% slop · 88% mixed · 6% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED2.7SlopDependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedREDACTED Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
Features/Core/RateLimit.cs4.9MixedExplicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
Security/QueryStringBearerAuthorizeAttribute.cs6.1MixedExplicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
REDACTED6.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedSecrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedSecrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED7.2MixedSecrets (history): REDACTED: REDACTED
Features/Core/Logger.cs7.6MixedExplicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
Features/Teams/AddOrUpdateTeamCommand.cs7.6MixedExplicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
Features/Teams/GetTeamByIdQuery.cs7.6MixedExplicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
Features/Teams/GetTeamByNameQuery.cs7.6MixedExplicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
Features/Teams/GetTeamsQuery.cs7.6MixedExplicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
Features/Teams/RemoveTeamCommand.cs7.6MixedExplicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
REDACTED7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
Slackish.csproj9.5Near-cleanProject Cohesion: Projects may be oversized for their cohesion

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 20

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 87

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 40

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 6

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 77 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.9, the weighted average across measured dimensions.

Every figure here is one of two kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10.

What we checked — 77 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D13D14D15D17D18D26D28D29D30D34D35D43D44AX10AX2AX3AX5AX6AX7AX9C1C2C3C4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3P1P3P7PF3R1R10R11R2R3R4R6R7R8R9S1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X2X20X21X22X23X24X25X26X27X28X29X3X30X32X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 128 of 147 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Canine Code Analyzer duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a1b7f2-9176-7406-b237-0b1b3a23ca49.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `dotnet list package` did not return usable output (restore or query failed); no outdated/vulnerable/deprecated data to assess. The tool said: error: The imported project "/usr/share/dotnet/sdk/10.0.400/Microsoft/VisualStudio/v18.0/WebApplications/Microsoft.WebApplication.targets" was not found. Confirm that the expression in the Import declaration "$(VSToolsPath)/WebApplications/Microsoft.WebApplication.targets", which evaluated to "/usr/….
  • D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its NuGet package dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
  • D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable (1 contributor(s) across 88 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). Concentration needs a team to concentrate: with one contributor there is nobody to spread the knowledge to, so there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
  • D17 Explicit Debt — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 9 deducted marker(s) and the 1.8/KLoC density on this row were taken over this repository's .NET projects ALONE: .ts (1,130 lines, 30% of production source) went unread, because every marker collector on this path is reached through a C# workspace. D17's marker collectors need a compiler we do not have for that language, so none of its nine marker kinds were read there. The debt in that source is UNMEASURED — its absence from the score above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that the code carries none.
  • D18 Solution Shape — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. `dotnet build` reported 1 error(s), and the diagnostics it printed were: MSB4019: The imported project "/usr/share/dotnet/sdk/10.0.400/Microsoft/VisualStudio/v18.0/WebApplications/Microsoft.WebApplication.targets" was not found. Confirm that the expression in the Import declaration "$(VSToolsPath)/WebApplications/Microsoft.WebApplication.targets", which evaluated to "/usr/share/dotnet/sdk/10.0.400/Microsoft/VisualStudio/v18.0/WebApplications/Microsoft.WebApplication.targets", is correct, and that the file exists on disk.. None of them is a .NET compiler diagnostic, which is the only signal this check reads as "the code does not compile", so the failure is recorded as a build-environment gap rather than a code defect. The usual causes are a project that targets a platform this run cannot build (a Windows-only target framework on a Linux worker) or a build step that shells out to a tool the image does not carry. Solution Shape is scored on structure and is NOT capped. Semantic analysis is independent of this build and covers every project that loaded — but a project whose restore did not complete has no resolved references, so treat its results as absent rather than clean. ★ The reach of that test, stated so this classification can be checked rather than taken on trust: it reads the C# (CS), Visual Basic (BC) and F# (FS) compiler series, and treats SDK, NuGet-restore and MSBuild codes (NETSDK, NU, MSB) as evidence that the build did not run rather than that the code is broken — read the diagnostics named above and judge for yourself. You can widen what we reach: if this build is meant to run off its own platform, without host tooling we do not carry, the diagnostics named above are what stopped it. If it is deliberately platform-bound — a Windows-only desktop product, say — there is nothing to do here: the note records our reach, not a defect in your build.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This kind did not reach the 95 % precision gate in three adjudicated runs (docs/plans/deterministic-engine/adjudication/D19-sample3-v3.md), so by the pre-registered fallback it publishes no row until a re-measurement shows it does. The candidates are counted here, not reported as findings, and the score does not include them.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The loaded project set declares no packable project and no `.Contracts` project, so there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan. 2 of 3 declared ecosystem(s) (npm,osv) WERE scanned and every vulnerability they reported is included in this result; nuget was not, so this dimension's score covers less than the dependency surface this repository declares, and nothing here is evidence that nuget is free of known-vulnerable dependencies.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. `dotnet build` exited 1 with a compiler/MSBuild diagnostic, so there were no assemblies to read IL from. The build itself is D18's row, with the ask; nothing further is charged here.
  • AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Subject: 19 markup document(s) — HTML, Razor, JSX, Vue, Svelte or server templates. The Runtime Evidence tier boots an app only via docker-compose, an Aspire AppHost, a Dockerfile, an npm dev script, a web service's own toolchain entry point (cargo, go, dotnet, Python, Spring Boot), or an Android app's own Gradle wrapper (run on an emulator); an Apple or Flutter app needs a host it lacks. None applied, so no live runtime a11y/egress/header evidence was collected. You can widen what we reach: add a docker-compose.yml (or an Aspire AppHost) that brings the app up with its dependencies. We then boot it in an isolated sandbox and gathers real runtime evidence — you change nothing in your pipeline (no CI step, no SDK).
  • P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside our isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
  • C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is read from the handler body and one hop below: a mutation is flagged only on structural double-apply evidence (a fresh-identity insert, an accumulation, a growing list, an unkeyed POST/send/charge), so a duplicate effect through a home-grown gateway two hops down, or an insert keyed on the message with no unique constraint, is not flagged but counted as not classified; a guard enforced by a database constraint or a broker's exactly-once delivery is invisible either way. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.6 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was QueryStringBearerAuthorizeAttribute.AuthorizeHubConnection at 20.

QueryStringBearerAuthorizeAttribute.AuthorizeHubConnection (cognitive 20)Security/QueryStringBearerAuthorizeAttribute.cs:23

What to do

  1. Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with QueryStringBearerAuthorizeAttribute.AuthorizeHubConnection (cognitive 20). — Refactoring it lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.6 to about 10.0/10.
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cognitive Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected. Measured on part of this repository only: .ts (30% of production source) was not exposed to THIS dimension's token comparison and is not in this count; duplication there is measured by R10 Code Duplication, the frontend lens's card running the same clone algorithm over the JS/TS token stream.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 9 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.

No automated tests

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Coverage in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test suite found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · REDACTED Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in REDACTED Scanning — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate REDACTED Scanning in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 98 packages use a banned license. The depth of this set was not established for this repository: the graded packages are what this pass resolved, and no lockfile was read, so it is not certified to be the full transitive closure. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's NuGet package dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares package.json, and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt6.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

9 deducted debt markers + 1 dead symbols across 2622 LoC in the .NET projects (1.8/KLoC) → score 6.3. Measured on the .NET source only: .ts (30% of production source) was not read, and carries at least 0 uncounted task marker(s) in 0 file(s).

WriteOnlyPrivateField · ×8Features/Core/Logger.cs:8
CommentedOutCodeFeatures/Core/RateLimit.cs:40
Dead code: GetClientIpFeatures/Core/RateLimit.cs:38

What to do

  1. Resolve the 8 WriteOnlyPrivateField finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Logger.cs, RateLimit.cs, AddOrUpdateTeamCommand.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 CommentedOutCode finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with RateLimit.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Dead code finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with RateLimit.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Explicit Debt in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 projects, 78 source files, 2622 hand-written lines of code (2622 production / 0 test — the split is derived per file: test is what its project, its own path, or a compile-guarded region marks as test, and a file carrying no test signal counts as production), 0 inter-project edges (build NOT measured — `dotnet build` did not complete in the analyzer, so the build half of this dimension is unmeasured rather than failed: the score above rests on structure alone and is not capped. The diagnostics that stopped it are named under Limitations.)

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 1 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

Projects may be oversized for their cohesionSlackish.csproj:1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Projects may be oversized for their cohesion finding(s) in Project Cohesion — start with Slackish.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 3 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities8.4 / 10Adequategated by 2 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): every row is a match against a vulnerability database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 2 medium, 0 low. Partial dependency scan: 2 of 3 declared ecosystem(s) were scanned (npm,osv), and the findings above are real and complete for them. nuget was not scanned (nuget: the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan), so this is not the whole dependency surface and the result is reported at reduced confidence.

REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 of 6 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is UnityConfiguration.cs. Counted over 6 of the 78 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Orphaned file · ×6UnityConfiguration.cs:1
Orphaned files with no living knowledge

What to do

  1. Resolve the 6 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with UnityConfiguration.cs, QueryStringBearerAuthorizeAttribute.cs, EncryptionService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Reported apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): the malicious-package feed is a database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 0 platform declaration(s) and 26 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX10 · Code composition8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 · Stateful singletons1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

  • `UnityConfiguration` keeps mutable `static` state — one slot for the whole process, shared by every thread that reaches the type however its instances are created — and mutates it outside any lock (_container; e.g. `_container` at line 21). Concurrent callers lose updates, and a collection that is not built for concurrent writers can corrupt. — UnityConfiguration.cs:15
  • `MemoryCache` keeps mutable `static` state — one slot for the whole process, shared by every thread that reaches the type however its instances are created — and mutates it outside any lock (_cache; e.g. `_cache` at line 39). Concurrent callers lose updates, and a collection that is not built for concurrent writers can corrupt. — Features/Core/MemoryCache.cs:6

What to do

  • A `static` field is one slot for the whole process, however its type is created: back it with a thread-safe type (ConcurrentDictionary, Interlocked), take a lock around every write, or move it into a registered singleton that does.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • The namespaces Slackish.Features.Conversations ↔ Slackish.Features.Messages ↔ Slackish.Features.Profiles depend on each other. The lightest dependency in the cycle is Slackish.Features.Conversations → Slackish.Features.Messages (Slackish.Features.Conversations.ConversationApiModel → Slackish.Features.Messages.MessageApiModel, 1 type pair(s)); cut that one first, e.g. by moving the shared type to a namespace both can use or inverting it behind an interface. — Features/Conversations/ConversationApiModel.cs:2

What to do

  • Break namespace cycles inside a project by moving the shared type to a namespace both sides can use, or by inverting the back edge behind an interface.
AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

AX7 · Slice cohesion1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.

Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.

  • `ConversationApiModel` (slice 'Conversations') depends on `ProfileApiModel` from slice 'Profiles'. — Features/Conversations/ConversationApiModel.cs:13
  • `ConversationApiModel` (slice 'Conversations') depends on `MessageApiModel` from slice 'Messages'. — Features/Conversations/ConversationApiModel.cs:14
  • `ConversationHub` (slice 'Conversations') depends on `BaseHub` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Conversations/ConversationHub.cs:12
  • `ConversationsController` (slice 'Conversations') depends on `BaseApiController` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Conversations/ConversationsController.cs:11
  • `GetByCurrentProfileQuery` (slice 'Conversations') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Conversations/GetByCurrentProfileQuery.cs:33
  • `GetMessagesQuery` (slice 'Messages') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Messages/GetMessagesQuery.cs:26
  • `MessageApiModel` (slice 'Messages') depends on `ConversationApiModel` from slice 'Conversations'. — Features/Messages/MessageApiModel.cs:12
  • `MessageHub` (slice 'Messages') depends on `BaseHub` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Messages/MessageHub.cs:10
  • `MessagesController` (slice 'Messages') depends on `BaseApiController` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Messages/MessagesController.cs:10
  • `GetCurrentProfileQuery` (slice 'Profiles') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Profiles/GetCurrentProfileQuery.cs:25
  • `GetOtherProfilesQuery` (slice 'Profiles') depends on `ICacheProvider` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Profiles/GetOtherProfiles.cs:27
  • `GetOtherProfilesQuery` (slice 'Profiles') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Profiles/GetOtherProfiles.cs:50
  • `GetUserQuery` (slice 'Profiles') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Profiles/GetUserQuery.cs:24
  • `ProfileApiModel` (slice 'Profiles') depends on `ConversationApiModel` from slice 'Conversations'. — Features/Profiles/ProfileApiModel.cs:13
  • `ProfileHub` (slice 'Profiles') depends on `BaseHub` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Profiles/ProfileHub.cs:10
  • `ProfilesController` (slice 'Profiles') depends on `BaseApiController` from slice 'Core'. — REDACTED:11
  • `AddOrUpdateTeamCommand` (slice 'Teams') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Teams/AddOrUpdateTeamCommand.cs:25
  • `GetCurrentTeamQuery` (slice 'Teams') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Teams/GetCurrentTeamQuery.cs:26
  • `GetTeamByIdQuery` (slice 'Teams') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Teams/GetTeamByIdQuery.cs:24
  • `GetTeamByNameQuery` (slice 'Teams') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Teams/GetTeamByNameQuery.cs:27
  • `GetTeamsQuery` (slice 'Teams') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Teams/GetTeamsQuery.cs:25
  • `RemoveTeamCommand` (slice 'Teams') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Teams/RemoveTeamCommand.cs:22
  • `SetCurrentTeamCommand` (slice 'Teams') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Teams/SetCurrentTeamCommand.cs:23
  • `TeamController` (slice 'Teams') depends on `BaseApiController` from slice 'Core'. — Features/Teams/TeamsController.cs:11

What to do

  • Keep slices independent: share cross-slice needs via an explicit contract/shared-kernel, not direct references between slices.
AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C1 · Data Protection3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
  • Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.
C2 · Access Controls7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.
  • This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable. (×4) — Features/Conversations/ConversationsController.cs:9, Features/Messages/MessagesController.cs:8, REDACTED:9, …

What to do

  • Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.
C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

  • An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an immutable audit-log / audit-trail type to write to, [Audited] per-entity coverage.

What to do

  • Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
C4 · Data Retention6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).

Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.

  • A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob), a documented retention period / data-expiry.

What to do

  • Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
ED5 · Idempotency10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers and message or event consumers) are idempotent, so an at-least-once redelivery or a client retry does not apply the effect twice.

Method: Roslyn (any mutation, ungated): each persistent write of a command handler or message/event consumer is idempotent when a guard is visible (an exists/dedup read that gates an exit, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox used in a condition or store call, versioned or fixed-value write, dedup envelope or pipeline), at risk only on positive double-apply evidence (a fresh-identity insert, an accumulation on a loaded and saved object, a growing member list, an unkeyed POST/SMTP send/Stripe charge), and otherwise not classified. Deterministic, no model; not scored when more than half are not classified. Advisory.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. Every mutation is classified exhaustively and deterministically: guarded, at risk on positive evidence, or not classified; the score is over the classified ones and is withheld when they are fewer than half.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

  • A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:38

What to do

  • Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • `GetClientIp` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:38
  • `Handle` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work. (×2) — Features/Messages/SendMessageCommand.cs:30, Features/Profiles/RegisterCommand.cs:32
  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×9) — Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:23, Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:24, Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:27, …

What to do

  • Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

  • The root README is 18 words, against a bar of 120. Of the three newcomer-critical sections this check looks for by heading, in the README and in the repository documents it links, it found no a build/run or getting-started section, no a testing section, no an architecture or project-map section. Sections are matched on HEADING text only, so material written under a heading this check does not recognise — or with no heading at all — is not seen and this row may understate what the document covers. — README.md:1

What to do

  • Expand the README with getting-started, architecture overview and a project map.
  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
  • Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
  • No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.

What to do

  • Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Start a test surface where your build system looks for one (tests/, test/, spec/, or your ecosystem's test source set) — the separation follows from putting the first tests in the right place.
P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

  • Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
  • `REDACTED` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — REDACTED:3

What to do

  • Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • `new HttpClient()` builds an outbound HTTP client and nothing bounds it: no timeout is set on it and no retry or resilience policy wraps its calls in the type that owns it. This codebase ships libraries/tools rather than a service it operates, so the failure lands as a hung caller — a build step, a CLI run, a UI thread — with no way out. — UnityConfiguration.cs:25

What to do

  • Give every outbound call a bound the caller can rely on: set an explicit `HttpClient.Timeout` (or pass a `CancellationToken` from a `CancellationTokenSource` with a deadline) and flow the caller's own `CancellationToken` through, so a slow endpoint fails fast instead of hanging.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from each language's code model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

R10 · Code Duplication9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.

Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Deterministic.

  • ClientApp/app/shared/services/http.service.ts:27 · ClientApp/app/shared/services/http.service.ts:65 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — ClientApp/app/shared/services/http.service.ts:27
  • ClientApp/app/shared/services/signalr-message-queue-factory.ts:47 · ClientApp/app/shared/services/signalr-message-queue-factory.ts:59 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — ClientApp/app/shared/services/signalr-message-queue-factory.ts:47

What to do

  • Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
R11 · Import Boundaries8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Conformance to the detected frontend architecture layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules (D-386).

Method: Conformance to the detected frontend layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules, over the module graph. Deterministic.

  • ClientApp/polyfills.ts:56 imports zone.js/dist/zone, reaching past a declared dependency's public entry into its build output — that path is the package's toolchain layout, not its API, and a minor version bump can relocate it with no semver signal. Import from the package's documented entry point instead. — ClientApp/polyfills.ts:56

What to do

  • Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • 0% of 45 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph — 'production' here is the RESIDUE: every source file left once tests, tooling, generated output, config, declarations and declaration-only modules, fixture corpora, type fixtures, behaviour-free data modules, re-export barrels, registration/constant data modules and service workers are set aside, so the percentage is taken over a smaller denominator than the workspace's file count

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✗ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.

What to do

  • Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) and eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 4 application, 3 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on `npm run watch` — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (4 application, 3 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make — ClientApp/app/shared/layout/index.ts
  • Nothing ultimately consumes this binding: its only referrer is the re-export in ClientApp/app/profiles/index.ts, whose re-exported name has no consumer either. Removing it is therefore not a one-file change — drop the re-export line in ClientApp/app/profiles/index.ts in the same commit, or the barrel will import a name that no longer exists. — ClientApp/app/profiles/register-page.component.ts:8
  • Nothing ultimately consumes this binding: its only referrer is the re-export in ClientApp/app/shared/events/index.ts, whose re-exported name has no consumer either. Removing it is therefore not a one-file change — drop the re-export line in ClientApp/app/shared/events/index.ts in the same commit, or the barrel will import a name that no longer exists. — ClientApp/app/shared/events/popover.events.ts:5
  • Nothing ultimately consumes this binding: its only referrer is the re-export in ClientApp/app/teams/index.ts, whose re-exported name has no consumer either. Removing it is therefore not a one-file change — drop the re-export line in ClientApp/app/teams/index.ts in the same commit, or the barrel will import a name that no longer exists. (×2) — ClientApp/app/teams/set-current-team-form.component.ts:8, ClientApp/app/teams/team-selector.component.ts:9
  • Nothing in its class reads or assigns this private field (for a constructor parameter property: it is stored and never read), and no string key or test reaches it by name. Remove it, or use it where it was meant to take effect. (×2) — ClientApp/app/shared/services/login-redirect.service.ts:7, ClientApp/app/shared/services/signalr-message-queue-factory.ts:67

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it. (×3)

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

S1 · Cryptographic Hygiene0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Cryptographic hygiene (weak hash/cipher, password key-derivation). This codebase has no web surface, so transport/header/cookie/CSRF controls are N/A and only crypto is scored.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

  • `algorithm.ComputeHash(…)` puts the password `password` through a fast general-purpose digest, so a stolen hash is guessed at billions of candidates a second whether or not it is salted — no key-derivation function (PBKDF2/scrypt/Argon2/bcrypt) stands between the password and the stored value. — Security/EncryptionService.cs:24
  • `user.Password == transformedPassword` checks a password against the stored one in plaintext, so the store holds the password itself and whoever reads it holds every account. Store a salted KDF hash (PBKDF2/scrypt/Argon2/bcrypt) and verify by deriving again. — Security/IsAuthenticUserQuery.cs:41
  • `_salt` is the key-derivation salt and is a compile-time constant, so the secret this operation depends on is published with the source. A key that ships with the source is not secret: every contributor, fork, mirror and released binary carries it, so anyone holding the repository can decrypt what any installation encrypted, and there is no way to invalidate what was already protected because every deployment built from this source shares the value. Where the constant is a password salt the consequence differs but is no smaller — one global salt means precomputation amortises across every installation, which is the property salting exists to destroy. Read the value from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager at startup and FAIL FAST when it is absent, so a missing key stops the process instead of silently falling back to a shared default; treat the committed value as disclosed and rotate it rather than only deleting the line. For a salt, generate a fresh random one per password and store it alongside the hash. — Security/EncryptionService.cs:29
  • This code fixes PBKDF2-SHA-1 at 1,000 iterations. A key-derivation function's only defence is the cost of ONE guess, and that cost is this number — the algorithm choice does not set it. Current OWASP guidance is 1,300,000 PBKDF2 iterations with HMAC-SHA1, 600,000 with SHA-256 and 210,000 with SHA-512; scrypt at N=2^17, r=8, p=1 (or an equivalent N·r·p product); Argon2id at 19 MiB of memory and 2 iterations (or an equivalent row); bcrypt at a work factor of at least 10. This figure divides the attacker's work by a factor of tens or hundreds against the same stolen hash, on hardware they already own. Where what is derived is short or low-entropy — a PIN, a numeric parental code, a four-character token — the whole keyspace falls in the time this parameter buys, and no salt or constant-time comparison changes that. Raise the count to the current published figure for the PRF you use, measure it on the slowest hardware that must run it (a target of roughly 100 ms per derivation is the usual budget), and read the value from configuration so a deployment can raise it again without a rebuild. Where the derived value must interoperate with a format someone else fixed, the count cannot move — derive a SEPARATE value for anything you own rather than inheriting the external format's price. (×2) — Security/EncryptionService.cs:46, Security/EncryptionService.cs:88
  • DES / 3DES / RijndaelManaged-bare is deprecated or broken. Use AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()` with explicit key/iv sizes. (×2) — Security/EncryptionService.cs:48, Security/EncryptionService.cs:90

What to do

  • Store passwords with a salted KDF — `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.PasswordHasher<T>`, `Rfc2898DeriveBytes` (PBKDF2), or BCrypt/Argon2 — and compare with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals`. (A fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim, is not password storage.) Start in `Security/EncryptionService.cs:24`.
  • Load cryptographic key and salt material from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager rather than fixing it in the source, and fail fast at startup when it is absent — a default that silently works is the one that reaches production. Rotate anything already committed: it must be treated as disclosed. Salts should be generated per password and stored with the hash, never shared across installations.
  • Raise the cost parameter to current guidance — PBKDF2 at 1,300,000 (HMAC-SHA1), 600,000 (SHA-256) or 210,000 (SHA-512) iterations; scrypt at N=2^17, r=8, p=1; bcrypt at a work factor of 10 or more — or move to a memory-hard KDF (Argon2id, scrypt) where the platform offers one. Read the parameter from configuration and tune it to roughly 100 ms per derivation on the slowest hardware that must run it, so the price can be raised again without shipping new code. This repository constructs a key derivation priced below the floor at 2 sites, not one: `Security/EncryptionService.cs:46` (PBKDF2-SHA-1, 1,000 iterations), `Security/EncryptionService.cs:88` (PBKDF2-SHA-1, 1,000 iterations). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place.
  • Replace DES/3DES (and bare RijndaelManaged) with AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()`. This repository constructs a broken or deprecated cipher at 2 sites, not one: `Security/EncryptionService.cs:48` (RijndaelManaged), `Security/EncryptionService.cs:90` (RijndaelManaged). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

  • `algorithm` is a `HashAlgorithm`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 23). Every use of it in `TransformPassword` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var algorithm = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw. — Security/EncryptionService.cs:23
  • `key` is a `Rfc2898DeriveBytes`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 46). Every use of it in `EncryptString` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var key = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw. — Security/EncryptionService.cs:46
  • `key` is a `Rfc2898DeriveBytes`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 88). Every use of it in `DecryptString` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var key = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw. — Security/EncryptionService.cs:88

What to do

  • Each finding names the value and the span that decides who owns it — the `new` that created it, or the constructor parameter that handed it over. Confirm ownership from that span, then make the disposal match it: release what this type created, leave what it was injected with to whoever created THAT, and drop a finalizer whose type holds nothing unmanaged to release.
X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X2 · Cancellation propagation4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 0/27 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×27) — Features/Conversations/ConversationsController.cs:20, Features/Conversations/GetByCurrentProfileQuery.cs:39, Features/Messages/GetMessagesQuery.cs:32, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X20 · Mistyped argument guard2.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `ArgumentNullException` tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

  • The guard on line 36 rejects `plainText` and line 37 reports that rejection as `ArgumentNullException` — but the condition's own test `string.IsNullOrEmpty(plainText)` is true of a value that is NOT null: it is satisfied by an EMPTY `plainText`, and on that path `plainText` was already proven non-null by the very expression that decided it (`||` short-circuits, so the null test to its left had to be false to get here). So a caller who passes a valid empty argument is told a parameter was null. That is not a wording problem: the exception type is the contract. A caller catching `ArgumentNullException` to handle a real null swallows this case with it, and whoever reads the stack trace later is told a failure the source disproves. .NET separates the two on purpose — `ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull` and `ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrEmpty` are two helpers because they are two failures. Throw `ArgumentException` (or `ArgumentOutOfRangeException` for a bound) for what the condition actually tests, or split the guard and throw each on its own condition. — Security/EncryptionService.cs:37
  • The guard on line 78 rejects `cipherText` and line 79 reports that rejection as `ArgumentNullException` — but the condition's own test `string.IsNullOrEmpty(cipherText)` is true of a value that is NOT null: it is satisfied by an EMPTY `cipherText`, and on that path `cipherText` was already proven non-null by the very expression that decided it (`||` short-circuits, so the null test to its left had to be false to get here). So a caller who passes a valid empty argument is told a parameter was null. That is not a wording problem: the exception type is the contract. A caller catching `ArgumentNullException` to handle a real null swallows this case with it, and whoever reads the stack trace later is told a failure the source disproves. .NET separates the two on purpose — `ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull` and `ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrEmpty` are two helpers because they are two failures. Throw `ArgumentException` (or `ArgumentOutOfRangeException` for a bound) for what the condition actually tests, or split the guard and throw each on its own condition. — Security/EncryptionService.cs:79

What to do

  • Each finding names the throw and the test in its own condition that is true of a NON-null value. Confirm from the two, then throw the exception that describes what was actually wrong: `ArgumentException` for a value that arrived empty, or the .NET 8 helpers that spell the whole guard in one line and pick the type for you — `ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrEmpty(s)` / `ThrowIfNullOrWhiteSpace(s)` for strings, `ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(x)` followed by `ArgumentOutOfRangeException.ThrowIfZero(x.Count)` for a collection. Splitting the two conditions is usually clearer than picking one exception for both: they are different failures and the caller may want to handle them differently.
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back. Also whether a `finally` that gives the primitive back unconditionally can run in a state where the method does not hold it: after a timed wait whose result was discarded, after an acquire inside the `try` that can fail, after the body already released it, or never, because a `return` left between the acquire and the `try`.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `foreach` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is enumerating invalidates the enumerator it is holding, so the next `MoveNext` throws `InvalidOperationException` and the remaining items are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X32 · Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a plugin lookup names the type it means — searching every assembly loaded into the process for a candidate whose SIMPLE name equals a string supplied at runtime, and taking the first one found, is decided by assembly LOAD ORDER rather than by this source, so the same name can resolve to a different type on the next run.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every invocation of `First`/`FirstOrDefault`/`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` whose OWN expression subtree contains both a `GetAssemblies()` call and a `GetTypes()`/`GetExportedTypes()` call — a single-element pick out of every type loaded into the process. A nested selector in the same chain sees no `GetAssemblies()` in its own subtree and is outside the population, so one lookup counts once however many links its chain has. A finding additionally needs both remaining halves: the selector must be `First`/`FirstOrDefault` (`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` reports the ambiguity rather than resolving it, and is counted and never reported), and the chain must carry an `==` comparison of `<lambda parameter>.Name` against something that is not a literal. The receiver must be a plain identifier bound by one of the chain’s own lambdas, which places `assembly.GetName().Name == "X"` outside the rule by construction. One exemption: a `.Name` test joined by `&&` to a `FullName`/`AssemblyQualifiedName` test on the same identifier is spared; joined by `||` it is not. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health72%StrongSolid.
Architecture50%Weak — gated by D26, AX2, AX7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity31%Weak — gated by D34, M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness8%Critical — gated by D8, D9, R4, R6, P1, P3, P7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security41%Weak — gated by C1, S1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Unscored — 2 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 2 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
  • X10 Duplicated predicate — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
Not included — 47 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a vertical-slice + CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
  • D11 Test Reliability — No test suite was found to re-run, so reliability couldn't be assessed. Two searches produced that zero and both came back empty: the classifier that reads the loaded workspace recognised no suite it could run, and a walk of the source on disk — which covers the JS/TS `*.test.*` and `*.spec.*` conventions and probes for a Pester suite — found no test source in any other ecosystem either. Neither search reaches a suite that is missing from the loaded workspace and carries no name either walk recognises, so this is 'no suite found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable
  • D19 Documentation Quality — D19 withholds "XML-doc coverage": 1 candidate(s) (1 of them low-coverage Warnings on library projects) were measured and not published.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (902 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — small single-context codebase (2,622 production LoC in the .NET projects) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — Too few judgeable comments (3 of at least 30); comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — IL not measured — the target did not build
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): a message-bus package; 1 CQRS handler(s)
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
  • M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 1 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks.
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
  • P2 Observability — This repo is a library, not a deployed service — it has no process to operate, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. A library may log via an injected ILogger, but the absence of operational telemetry is not a defect here. If it grows a host (web API, worker), the dimension reactivates.
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
  • R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D30 (Dependency Vulnerabilities), which answers every ecosystem
  • X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 20 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · WriteOnlyPrivateField · ×8
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField Features/Core/Logger.cs:8 — private ILoggerFactory _loggerFactory — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:61 — private int _maxRequestsHour — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField Features/Teams/AddOrUpdateTeamCommand.cs:50 — private ICache _cache — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField Features/Teams/GetTeamByIdQuery.cs:41 — private ICache _cache — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField Features/Teams/GetTeamByNameQuery.cs:44 — private ICache _cache — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField Features/Teams/GetTeamsQuery.cs:45 — private ICache _cache — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField Features/Teams/RemoveTeamCommand.cs:37 — private ICache _cache — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
  • WriteOnlyPrivateField Security/QueryStringBearerAuthorizeAttribute.cs:112 — private IAuthConfiguration _authConfiguration — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
D28 · Secrets (history) · REDACTED · ×4
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×2
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
S1 · Cryptographic Hygiene · Password hashing without a KDF · ×2
  • Password hashing without a KDF Security/EncryptionService.cs:24 — `algorithm.ComputeHash(…)` puts the password `password` through a fast general-purpose digest, so a stolen hash is guessed at billions of candidates a second whether or not it is salted — no key-derivation function (PBKDF2/scrypt/Argon2/bcrypt) stands between the password and the stored value.
  • Password hashing without a KDF Security/IsAuthenticUserQuery.cs:41 — `user.Password == transformedPassword` checks a password against the stored one in plaintext, so the store holds the password itself and whoever reads it holds every account. Store a salted KDF hash (PBKDF2/scrypt/Argon2/bcrypt) and verify by deriving again.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles · Namespace dependency cycle · ×1
  • Namespace dependency cycle Features/Conversations/ConversationApiModel.cs:2 — The namespaces Slackish.Features.Conversations ↔ Slackish.Features.Messages ↔ Slackish.Features.Profiles depend on each other. The lightest dependency in the cycle is Slackish.Features.Conversations → Slackish.Features.Messages (Slackish.Features.Conversations.ConversationApiModel → Slackish.Features.Messages.MessageApiModel, 1 type pair(s)); cut that one first, e.g. by moving the shared type to a namespace both can use or inverting it behind an interface.
D13 · REDACTED Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1
  • REDACTED
D8 · Code Coverage · No automated tests · ×1
  • No automated tests — No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository. Untested code is the largest single risk to changing it safely. Start with the code you change most often: add a suite in a framework a runner can collect (xUnit, NUnit or MSTest), and run it in CI so the gap cannot reopen.
S1 · Cryptographic Hygiene · Cryptographic key material is a compile-time constant · ×1
  • Cryptographic key material is a compile-time constant Security/EncryptionService.cs:29 — `_salt` is the key-derivation salt and is a compile-time constant, so the secret this operation depends on is published with the source. A key that ships with the source is not secret: every contributor, fork, mirror and released binary carries it, so anyone holding the repository can decrypt what any installation encrypted, and there is no way to invalidate what was already protected because every deployment built from this source shares the value. Where the constant is a password salt the consequence differs but is no smaller — one global salt means precomputation amortises across every installation, which is the property salting exists to destroy. Read the value from configuration, an environment variable or a secrets manager at startup and FAIL FAST when it is absent, so a missing key stops the process instead of silently falling back to a shared default; treat the committed value as disclosed and rotate it rather than only deleting the line. For a salt, generate a fresh random one per password and store it alongside the hash.
Serious — 87 finding(s)
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken · ×27
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GetByCurrentProfile Features/Conversations/ConversationsController.cs:20 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Features/Conversations/GetByCurrentProfileQuery.cs:39 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Features/Messages/GetMessagesQuery.cs:32 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Features/Messages/SendMessageCommand.cs:30 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Features/Profiles/GetCurrentProfileQuery.cs:31 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Features/Profiles/GetOtherProfiles.cs:33 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Features/Profiles/GetUserQuery.cs:30 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GetOtherProfiles REDACTED:21 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GetCurrentProfile REDACTED:27 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Register REDACTED:33 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Security/GetClaimsForUserQuery.cs:29 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Security/IsAuthenticUserQuery.cs:44 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Features/Teams/AddOrUpdateTeamCommand.cs:31 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Features/Teams/GetTeamsQuery.cs:31 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Features/Teams/GetTeamByIdQuery.cs:30 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Features/Teams/RemoveTeamCommand.cs:28 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GetCurrentTeam Features/Teams/TeamsController.cs:21 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: SetCurrentTeam Features/Teams/TeamsController.cs:27 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Add Features/Teams/TeamsController.cs:37 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Update Features/Teams/TeamsController.cs:46 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Get Features/Teams/TeamsController.cs:56 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GetById Features/Teams/TeamsController.cs:65 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: GetByName Features/Teams/TeamsController.cs:74 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Remove Features/Teams/TeamsController.cs:83 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • Async method without CancellationToken: Handle Features/Teams/GetCurrentTeamQuery.cs:32 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
  • + 2 more in this group — see findings.md.
AX7 · Slice cohesion · Cross-slice coupling · ×24
  • Cross-slice coupling: Conversations → Profiles Features/Conversations/ConversationApiModel.cs:13 — `ConversationApiModel` (slice 'Conversations') depends on `ProfileApiModel` from slice 'Profiles'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Conversations → Messages Features/Conversations/ConversationApiModel.cs:14 — `ConversationApiModel` (slice 'Conversations') depends on `MessageApiModel` from slice 'Messages'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Conversations → Core Features/Conversations/ConversationHub.cs:12 — `ConversationHub` (slice 'Conversations') depends on `BaseHub` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Conversations → Core Features/Conversations/ConversationsController.cs:11 — `ConversationsController` (slice 'Conversations') depends on `BaseApiController` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Conversations → Core Features/Conversations/GetByCurrentProfileQuery.cs:33 — `GetByCurrentProfileQuery` (slice 'Conversations') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Messages → Core Features/Messages/GetMessagesQuery.cs:26 — `GetMessagesQuery` (slice 'Messages') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Messages → Conversations Features/Messages/MessageApiModel.cs:12 — `MessageApiModel` (slice 'Messages') depends on `ConversationApiModel` from slice 'Conversations'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Messages → Core Features/Messages/MessageHub.cs:10 — `MessageHub` (slice 'Messages') depends on `BaseHub` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Messages → Core Features/Messages/MessagesController.cs:10 — `MessagesController` (slice 'Messages') depends on `BaseApiController` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Profiles → Core Features/Profiles/GetCurrentProfileQuery.cs:25 — `GetCurrentProfileQuery` (slice 'Profiles') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Profiles → Core Features/Profiles/GetOtherProfiles.cs:27 — `GetOtherProfilesQuery` (slice 'Profiles') depends on `ICacheProvider` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Profiles → Core Features/Profiles/GetOtherProfiles.cs:50 — `GetOtherProfilesQuery` (slice 'Profiles') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Profiles → Core Features/Profiles/GetUserQuery.cs:24 — `GetUserQuery` (slice 'Profiles') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Profiles → Conversations Features/Profiles/ProfileApiModel.cs:13 — `ProfileApiModel` (slice 'Profiles') depends on `ConversationApiModel` from slice 'Conversations'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Profiles → Core Features/Profiles/ProfileHub.cs:10 — `ProfileHub` (slice 'Profiles') depends on `BaseHub` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Profiles → Core REDACTED:11 — `ProfilesController` (slice 'Profiles') depends on `BaseApiController` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Teams → Core Features/Teams/AddOrUpdateTeamCommand.cs:25 — `AddOrUpdateTeamCommand` (slice 'Teams') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Teams → Core Features/Teams/GetCurrentTeamQuery.cs:26 — `GetCurrentTeamQuery` (slice 'Teams') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Teams → Core Features/Teams/GetTeamByIdQuery.cs:24 — `GetTeamByIdQuery` (slice 'Teams') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Teams → Core Features/Teams/GetTeamByNameQuery.cs:27 — `GetTeamByNameQuery` (slice 'Teams') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Teams → Core Features/Teams/GetTeamsQuery.cs:25 — `GetTeamsQuery` (slice 'Teams') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Teams → Core Features/Teams/RemoveTeamCommand.cs:22 — `RemoveTeamCommand` (slice 'Teams') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Teams → Core Features/Teams/SetCurrentTeamCommand.cs:23 — `SetCurrentTeamCommand` (slice 'Teams') depends on `ICache` from slice 'Core'.
  • Cross-slice coupling: Teams → Core Features/Teams/TeamsController.cs:11 — `TeamController` (slice 'Teams') depends on `BaseApiController` from slice 'Core'.
X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness · Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it · ×3
  • Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it Security/EncryptionService.cs:23 — `algorithm` is a `HashAlgorithm`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 23). Every use of it in `TransformPassword` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var algorithm = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw.
  • Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it Security/EncryptionService.cs:46 — `key` is a `Rfc2898DeriveBytes`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 46). Every use of it in `EncryptString` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var key = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw.
  • Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it Security/EncryptionService.cs:88 — `key` is a `Rfc2898DeriveBytes`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 88). Every use of it in `DecryptString` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var key = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw.
AX2 · Stateful singletons · Process-global static state · ×2
  • Process-global static state: UnityConfiguration UnityConfiguration.cs:15 — `UnityConfiguration` keeps mutable `static` state — one slot for the whole process, shared by every thread that reaches the type however its instances are created — and mutates it outside any lock (_container; e.g. `_container` at line 21). Concurrent callers lose updates, and a collection that is not built for concurrent writers can corrupt.
  • Process-global static state: MemoryCache Features/Core/MemoryCache.cs:6 — `MemoryCache` keeps mutable `static` state — one slot for the whole process, shared by every thread that reaches the type however its instances are created — and mutates it outside any lock (_cache; e.g. `_cache` at line 39). Concurrent callers lose updates, and a collection that is not built for concurrent writers can corrupt.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×2
  • REDACTED
  • REDACTED
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Fake-async · ×2
  • Fake-async — async method never awaits Features/Messages/SendMessageCommand.cs:30 — `Handle` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work.
  • Fake-async — async method never awaits Features/Profiles/RegisterCommand.cs:32 — `Handle` is declared `async` but never awaits anything, so it runs synchronously while pretending to be asynchronous. Drop `async` or do the real async work.
S1 · Cryptographic Hygiene · Password key derivation is priced too cheaply · ×2
  • Password key derivation is priced too cheaply Security/EncryptionService.cs:46 — This code fixes PBKDF2-SHA-1 at 1,000 iterations. A key-derivation function's only defence is the cost of ONE guess, and that cost is this number — the algorithm choice does not set it. Current OWASP guidance is 1,300,000 PBKDF2 iterations with HMAC-SHA1, 600,000 with SHA-256 and 210,000 with SHA-512; scrypt at N=2^17, r=8, p=1 (or an equivalent N·r·p product); Argon2id at 19 MiB of memory and 2 iterations (or an equivalent row); bcrypt at a work factor of at least 10. This figure divides the attacker's work by a factor of tens or hundreds against the same stolen hash, on hardware they already own. Where what is derived is short or low-entropy — a PIN, a numeric parental code, a four-character token — the whole keyspace falls in the time this parameter buys, and no salt or constant-time comparison changes that. Raise the count to the current published figure for the PRF you use, measure it on the slowest hardware that must run it (a target of roughly 100 ms per derivation is the usual budget), and read the value from configuration so a deployment can raise it again without a rebuild. Where the derived value must interoperate with a format someone else fixed, the count cannot move — derive a SEPARATE value for anything you own rather than inheriting the external format's price.
  • Password key derivation is priced too cheaply Security/EncryptionService.cs:88 — This code fixes PBKDF2-SHA-1 at 1,000 iterations. A key-derivation function's only defence is the cost of ONE guess, and that cost is this number — the algorithm choice does not set it. Current OWASP guidance is 1,300,000 PBKDF2 iterations with HMAC-SHA1, 600,000 with SHA-256 and 210,000 with SHA-512; scrypt at N=2^17, r=8, p=1 (or an equivalent N·r·p product); Argon2id at 19 MiB of memory and 2 iterations (or an equivalent row); bcrypt at a work factor of at least 10. This figure divides the attacker's work by a factor of tens or hundreds against the same stolen hash, on hardware they already own. Where what is derived is short or low-entropy — a PIN, a numeric parental code, a four-character token — the whole keyspace falls in the time this parameter buys, and no salt or constant-time comparison changes that. Raise the count to the current published figure for the PRF you use, measure it on the slowest hardware that must run it (a target of roughly 100 ms per derivation is the usual budget), and read the value from configuration so a deployment can raise it again without a rebuild. Where the derived value must interoperate with a format someone else fixed, the count cannot move — derive a SEPARATE value for anything you own rather than inheriting the external format's price.
S1 · Cryptographic Hygiene · Weak cipher · ×2
  • Weak cipher Security/EncryptionService.cs:48 — DES / 3DES / RijndaelManaged-bare is deprecated or broken. Use AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()` with explicit key/iv sizes.
  • Weak cipher Security/EncryptionService.cs:90 — DES / 3DES / RijndaelManaged-bare is deprecated or broken. Use AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()` with explicit key/iv sizes.
X20 · Mistyped argument guard · Argument guard throws the exception its own condition disproves · ×2
  • Argument guard throws the exception its own condition disproves Security/EncryptionService.cs:37 — The guard on line 36 rejects `plainText` and line 37 reports that rejection as `ArgumentNullException` — but the condition's own test `string.IsNullOrEmpty(plainText)` is true of a value that is NOT null: it is satisfied by an EMPTY `plainText`, and on that path `plainText` was already proven non-null by the very expression that decided it (`||` short-circuits, so the null test to its left had to be false to get here). So a caller who passes a valid empty argument is told a parameter was null. That is not a wording problem: the exception type is the contract. A caller catching `ArgumentNullException` to handle a real null swallows this case with it, and whoever reads the stack trace later is told a failure the source disproves. .NET separates the two on purpose — `ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull` and `ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrEmpty` are two helpers because they are two failures. Throw `ArgumentException` (or `ArgumentOutOfRangeException` for a bound) for what the condition actually tests, or split the guard and throw each on its own condition.
  • Argument guard throws the exception its own condition disproves Security/EncryptionService.cs:79 — The guard on line 78 rejects `cipherText` and line 79 reports that rejection as `ArgumentNullException` — but the condition's own test `string.IsNullOrEmpty(cipherText)` is true of a value that is NOT null: it is satisfied by an EMPTY `cipherText`, and on that path `cipherText` was already proven non-null by the very expression that decided it (`||` short-circuits, so the null test to its left had to be false to get here). So a caller who passes a valid empty argument is told a parameter was null. That is not a wording problem: the exception type is the contract. A caller catching `ArgumentNullException` to handle a real null swallows this case with it, and whoever reads the stack trace later is told a failure the source disproves. .NET separates the two on purpose — `ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull` and `ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrEmpty` are two helpers because they are two failures. Throw `ArgumentException` (or `ArgumentOutOfRangeException` for a bound) for what the condition actually tests, or split the guard and throw each on its own condition.
D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×1
  • CommentedOutCode Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:40 — 14 consecutive commented-code lines
D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×1
  • Dead code: GetClientIp Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:38 — Method GetClientIp — Roslyn's SymbolFinder walked every project the solution loads, including Slackish, and found no reference to it. That walk cannot see three kinds of caller, so check them before removing it: code outside the solution file (a solution is a curated list, not the repository — a sibling test tree with its own .sln is invisible), a call resolved by reflection or dependency injection from the symbol's name, and any project the workspace could not load. This is 'no caller found by this walk', not a verdict that the symbol is unused.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · QueryStringBearerAuthorizeAttribute.AuthorizeHubConnection (cognitive 20) · ×1
  • QueryStringBearerAuthorizeAttribute.AuthorizeHubConnection (cognitive 20) Security/QueryStringBearerAuthorizeAttribute.cs:23 — QueryStringBearerAuthorizeAttribute.AuthorizeHubConnection has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code · Unfinished stub · ×1
  • Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:38 — A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Unfinished stub · ×1
  • Unfinished stub — throws NotImplementedException Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:38 — `GetClientIp` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface.
P1 · CI/CD gates · No CI pipeline · ×1
  • No CI pipeline — No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience · Outbound HTTP without resilience · ×1
  • Outbound HTTP without resilience UnityConfiguration.cs:25 — `new HttpClient()` builds an outbound HTTP client and nothing bounds it: no timeout is set on it and no retry or resilience policy wraps its calls in the type that owns it. This codebase ships libraries/tools rather than a service it operates, so the failure lands as a hung caller — a build step, a CLI run, a UI thread — with no way out.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) ClientApp/app/shared/services/http.service.ts:27 — ClientApp/app/shared/services/http.service.ts:27 · ClientApp/app/shared/services/http.service.ts:65 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) ClientApp/app/shared/services/signalr-message-queue-factory.ts:47 — ClientApp/app/shared/services/signalr-message-queue-factory.ts:47 · ClientApp/app/shared/services/signalr-message-queue-factory.ts:59 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
R11 · Import Boundaries · Boundary violation [package · ×1
  • Boundary violation [package:third-party-deep-import] ClientApp/polyfills.ts:56 — ClientApp/polyfills.ts:56 imports zone.js/dist/zone, reaching past a declared dependency's public entry into its build output — that path is the package's toolchain layout, not its API, and a minor version bump can relocate it with no semver signal. Import from the package's documented entry point instead.
R4 · Test Coverage · Test Coverage · ×1
  • Test Coverage — 0% of 45 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph — 'production' here is the RESIDUE: every source file left once tests, tooling, generated output, config, declarations and declaration-only modules, fixture corpora, type fixtures, behaviour-free data modules, re-export barrels, registration/constant data modules and service workers are set aside, so the percentage is taken over a smaller denominator than the workspace's file count
R6 · Tooling · No test, lint or typecheck script · ×1
  • No test, lint or typecheck script — test ✗ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~1 LoC) · ×1
  • Dead file (~1 LoC) ClientApp/app/shared/layout/index.ts — no import path from any entry point (4 application, 3 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@angular/animations' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@angular/animations' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@angular/compiler' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@angular/compiler' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@angular/compiler-cli' · ×1
  • Unused dependency '@angular/compiler-cli' — Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene · NuGet dependencies are not locked · ×1
  • NuGet dependencies are not locked — No packages.lock.json and no central package management — restores aren't reproducible or pinned (SSDF PW.4.4). Enable <RestorePackagesWithLockFile>true</RestorePackagesWithLockFile> (commit the lockfile) or adopt Directory.Packages.props. Advisory — never scored.
SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene · JavaScript dependencies are not locked · ×1
  • JavaScript dependencies are not locked package.json:9 — package.json declares dependencies that no committed lockfile resolves — there is no package-lock.json / yarn.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml / bun.lock beside it, and no locked workspace above it names it — so its installs aren't reproducible (SSDF PW.4.4). Commit its package manager's lockfile (or add it to the locked workspace) and install from it (`npm ci`, `yarn --immutable`, `pnpm i --frozen-lockfile` or `bun i --frozen-lockfile`). Advisory — never scored.
Minor — 40 finding(s)
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs · Commented-out code · ×9
  • Commented-out code Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:23 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:24 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:27 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:29 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:32 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:35 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:47 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:48 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
  • Commented-out code Features/Core/RateLimit.cs:52 — A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned file · ×6
  • Orphaned file UnityConfiguration.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file Security/QueryStringBearerAuthorizeAttribute.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file Security/EncryptionService.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file Features/Teams/TeamsController.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file REDACTED:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
  • Orphaned file Data/SlackishContext.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
C2 · Access Controls · No named authorization policies · ×5
  • No named authorization policies — Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies Features/Conversations/ConversationsController.cs:9 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies Features/Messages/MessagesController.cs:8 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies REDACTED:9 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
  • No named authorization policies Features/Teams/TeamsController.cs:9 — This `[Authorize]` names no policy, role or scheme, so the rule it enforces (any authenticated caller) is implicit here and cannot be listed or tested apart from this attribute. Name the rule — `[Authorize(Policy = "…")]` over a policy registered with AddAuthorization — so the access rule set is reviewable.
C3 · Audit Trail · Partial audit-trail evidence · ×1
  • Partial audit-trail evidence — An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an immutable audit-log / audit-trail type to write to, [Audited] per-entity coverage.
C4 · Data Retention · Partial data-retention evidence · ×1
  • Partial data-retention evidence — A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob), a documented retention period / data-expiry.
D26 · Project Cohesion · Projects may be oversized for their cohesion · ×1
  • Projects may be oversized for their cohesion Slackish.csproj:1 — `Slackish` overshoots its size bounds (2622 LoC, 133 public types across 12 namespaces). 1 of 1 project(s) overshoot their size bounds, lowering Project Cohesion to 0.0/10. Review these for cohesion — draw the boundary inside the assembly first (group each responsibility into its own namespace/folder and keep the cross-boundary members internal), since splitting a published assembly moves types between packages and breaks consumers.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • REDACTED
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1
  • Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 6 of 6 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated, example/demo and scaffolding-template trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 6 of the 78 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: UnityConfiguration.cs, Security/QueryStringBearerAuthorizeAttribute.cs, Security/EncryptionService.cs, Features/Teams/TeamsController.cs, REDACTED, Data/SlackishContext.cs. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test suite could be collected — no discoverable tests to count. If this repository does test, wiring the suite to a framework a runner can collect (xUnit, NUnit or MSTest) is what makes it countable here; a pipeline step that invokes a runner is not evidence on its own, because a runner over an empty suite passes. Tests written as plain executables or shell/PowerShell harnesses are not collectible this way and are not scored here.
M1 · Documentation (README) · Thin README · ×1
  • Thin README README.md:1 — The root README is 18 words, against a bar of 120. Of the three newcomer-critical sections this check looks for by heading, in the README and in the repository documents it links, it found no a build/run or getting-started section, no a testing section, no an architecture or project-map section. Sections are matched on HEADING text only, so material written under a heading this check does not recognise — or with no heading at all — is not seen and this row may understate what the document covers.
M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1
  • No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
M2 · Architecture documentation · No architecture diagram/doc · ×1
  • No architecture diagram/doc — No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
M3 · Folder & project structure · No src/ separation · ×1
  • No src/ separation — Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1
  • No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · No dependency-update automation · ×1
  • No dependency-update automation REDACTED:3 — `REDACTED` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`.
R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'RegisterPageComponent' · ×1
  • Unused export 'RegisterPageComponent' ClientApp/app/profiles/register-page.component.ts:8 — Nothing ultimately consumes this binding: its only referrer is the re-export in ClientApp/app/profiles/index.ts, whose re-exported name has no consumer either. Removing it is therefore not a one-file change — drop the re-export line in ClientApp/app/profiles/index.ts in the same commit, or the barrel will import a name that no longer exists.
R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'PopoverEvent' · ×1
  • Unused export 'PopoverEvent' ClientApp/app/shared/events/popover.events.ts:5 — Nothing ultimately consumes this binding: its only referrer is the re-export in ClientApp/app/shared/events/index.ts, whose re-exported name has no consumer either. Removing it is therefore not a one-file change — drop the re-export line in ClientApp/app/shared/events/index.ts in the same commit, or the barrel will import a name that no longer exists.
R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'SetCurrentTeamFormComponent' · ×1
  • Unused export 'SetCurrentTeamFormComponent' ClientApp/app/teams/set-current-team-form.component.ts:8 — Nothing ultimately consumes this binding: its only referrer is the re-export in ClientApp/app/teams/index.ts, whose re-exported name has no consumer either. Removing it is therefore not a one-file change — drop the re-export line in ClientApp/app/teams/index.ts in the same commit, or the barrel will import a name that no longer exists.
R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'TeamSelectorComponent' · ×1
  • Unused export 'TeamSelectorComponent' ClientApp/app/teams/team-selector.component.ts:9 — Nothing ultimately consumes this binding: its only referrer is the re-export in ClientApp/app/teams/index.ts, whose re-exported name has no consumer either. Removing it is therefore not a one-file change — drop the re-export line in ClientApp/app/teams/index.ts in the same commit, or the barrel will import a name that no longer exists.
R7 · Dead Code · Unused private field '_route' · ×1
  • Unused private field '_route' ClientApp/app/shared/services/login-redirect.service.ts:7 — Nothing in its class reads or assigns this private field (for a constructor parameter property: it is stored and never read), and no string key or test reaches it by name. Remove it, or use it where it was meant to take effect.
R7 · Dead Code · Unused private field '_failedMessages$' · ×1
  • Unused private field '_failedMessages$' ClientApp/app/shared/services/signalr-message-queue-factory.ts:67 — Nothing in its class reads or assigns this private field (for a constructor parameter property: it is stored and never read), and no string key or test reaches it by name. Remove it, or use it where it was meant to take effect.
X10 · Duplicated predicate · Duplicated predicate · ×1
  • Duplicated predicate Features/Teams/GetTeamByIdQuery.cs:36 — `x.Id == request.Id && x.Tenant.UniqueId == request.TenantUniqueId` appears character-identically in 2 files — Features/Teams/GetTeamByIdQuery.cs, Features/Teams/RemoveTeamCommand.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
X2 · Cancellation propagation · Not all async methods take a CancellationToken · ×1
  • Not all async methods take a CancellationToken — Only 0/27 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-e423e00c952f4145a984eb1badb0929f/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .4artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/canine-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-e423e00c952f4145a984eb1badb0929f/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .1artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/canine-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt .3artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnuget—nuget: not applicable — nuget: the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan0—
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update4artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.0—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenance—provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json

Run 01a1b7f2-9176-7406-b237-0b1b3a23ca49 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 7 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by NAME, from the C# syntax tree, with a deliberately specific identifier classifier — the same one the C1–C5 compliance cards use to decide whether personal data is present, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip. Two caveats stated rather than glossed: those cards additionally require corroboration (a persistence/account signal, or two distinct PII categories) that this inventory deliberately does not, so it lists more than they gate on; and D32 Data Compliance shares nothing with it — that dimension is a separate semgrep ruleset for personal data leaking into logs, URLs and browser storage, and a clean D32 result says nothing about this list. Informational — it feeds no score.

Name — 5 field(s)
  • User.Firstname Data/Model/User.cs:25
  • User.Lastname Data/Model/User.cs:26
  • User.Fullname Data/Model/User.cs:27
  • UserApiModel.Firstname Features/Profiles/UserApiModel.cs:13
  • UserApiModel.Lastname Features/Profiles/UserApiModel.cs:14
Email — 2 field(s)
  • User.Email Data/Model/User.cs:18
  • UserApiModel.Email Features/Profiles/UserApiModel.cs:11

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md