Public report of MadsLorentzen/ai-job-search, published 15 November 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of
findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known
vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive reportMeasured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.11.4). Assert signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey →
Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 15 November 2026, 16:46 UTC · Survey ID cd_e537dfd5b72e42c3833310ac237e5717
MadsLorentzen/ai-job-search
Measured 15 November 2026, 16:46 UTC, at code version 0d0d1a9
CAI scoreAdequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
No change since the last survey
The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.
A small codebase: 5,211 lines of product code in 2 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Production Readiness, 48
Findings by how serious they are
4 critical66 serious19 minor
18 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, we either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard we look for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.
This survey was produced by
Canine Code Analyzer
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Canine Code Analyzer engine 1.0.0
Measured
15 November 2026, 16:46 UTC
A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number
together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee
the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds the Canine Code Analyzer. It is open to any tool that
implements it, and today the Canine Code Analyzer is the only one that does.
The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. We work it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸
39of 39 dimensions measured by tools.
83of 89 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 6 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
39dimensions across 5 lenses, read from 5,211 lines of product code in 2 projects.
MadsLorentzen/ai-job-search falls short of our standard for production, in part because we found no logging, tracing or health checks in the code. It scores 62 out of 100 and is rated Adequate, and all four of its critical findings are security problems in the build pipeline.
Production Readiness, at 48, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is adding a diagnostic log, worth about 10 points. Recording design decisions comes next, worth about 4 points. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 72.
Two pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with. One pipeline step installs packages that can change without warning, and one secret can leak from the build pipeline. Pinning each tool to an exact version, pinning what the pipeline installs and limiting the secret to its own step would close these risks.
The product code is 5,211 lines, about €20,000 to rebuild.
A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.
How the score is built: what each lens counts forThe lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
We compare every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.
Fixed since the last survey: 41 findings
These 41 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 3 November 2026, and are gone from this one.
Exception handling · Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) tools/verify_pdf.py
Rebuild cost: about €20,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild
€6,600 to €33,000, for 110 to 350 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem
Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor
×0.9 at a score of 62. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size
Small: 5,211 lines of product code
What it is not
Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one.
How the estimate is made: We price the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.
Top priorities
The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.
1
Write a diagnostic trail the user can hand back with a bug report: a log file under the platform's per-user data directory, switchable with a `--verbose`/`--debug` flag.
Start with the error paths that emit nothing — a discarded error is the failure the user cannot describe and you cannot reproduce.
Raises the score by about 10 points · Medium effort · Observability
2
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with package.json.
Raises the score by about 4 points · Low effort · ADR Quality
3
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.
Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €20,000 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 48 (Weak). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Write a diagnostic trail the user can hand back with a bug report: a log file under the platform's per-user data directory, switchable with a `--verbose`/`--debug` flag. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 10 points for medium effort. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort
What hard-to-read code costs each year · Cost
Four dimensions measure how easy the code is to work in: two measure how tangled its logic is, one how much of it is copied, and one how well each part sticks to a single job. In this codebase they average 7.4 out of 10. Code at that level is slower to change than clean code, and we estimate the extra work at 2% to 5% on every change. The history of the code shows how much it changes: about 29,588 lines over the last 90 days, which is about 119,996 lines a year. At that pace, the extra work comes to an estimated 6 to 40 engineer-days a year, and it grows as more code changes.
How this is estimated: The number of changed lines is measured from the history of the code. The rest rests on two assumptions of our own: code scoring 8 out of 10 or more adds no extra work, and each point below 8 adds 2.5% to 5.6% to every change, never less than 2% to 5% and never more than 40% to 60% in all; and an engineer changes 150 to 400 lines in a day. The result is a range for planning, not a measurement.
Based on: Cyclomatic Complexity · Cognitive Complexity · Code Duplication · Cohesion (LCOM4) · the code's change history
What to do: Start with the files listed under Churn × Complexity Hotspots, which change often and are hard to read, because that is where the extra work is paid most often.
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways, which only happens where the projects form a dependency cycle. A graph without cycles has none.
At a glance — Code Health · 89% · Adequate · gated by D2 ·
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2025 — Injection
19
High / Critical
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures
3
Medium
A01:2025 — Broken Access Control
2
Medium
Roadmap
Top priorities: Write a diagnostic trail the user can hand back with a bug report: a log file under the platform's per-user data directory, switchable with a `--verbose`/`--debug` flag. Start with the error paths that emit nothing — a discarded error is the failure the user cannot describe and you cannot reproduce; Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing; Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with package.json.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Write a diagnostic trail the user can hand back with a bug report: a log file under the platform's per-user data directory, switchable with a `--verbose`/`--debug` flag. Start with the error paths that emit nothing — a discarded error is the failure the user cannot describe and you cannot reproduce.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (16 corresponding lines)
tools/check_framework_version.py
7.8
Mixed
Code Duplication: Edited copy of a member (11 corresponding lines)
REDACTED
7.9
Mixed
Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED
7.9
Mixed
Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED
7.9
Mixed
Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED
7.9
Mixed
Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED
7.9
Mixed
Data Compliance (PII/GDPR): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED
7.9
Mixed
Data Compliance (PII/GDPR): Medium: REDACTED
tools/lint_skills.py
8.5
Near-clean
Code Duplication: Duplicated block (9 lines × 2)
tools/job_key.py
8.5
Near-clean
Code Duplication: Duplicated block (8 lines × 2)
tools/rank_state.py
8.5
Near-clean
Code Duplication: Duplicated block (7 lines × 2)
.agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/package.json
9.5
Near-clean
ADR Quality: No ADRs found
How the grades work
Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this
survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.
Critical — 4
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a
missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here
tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 66
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades
the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to
carry for two years either.
Minor — 19
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions.
Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 18
Something this survey could not settle
from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no
positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves
nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean
result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither
rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each
one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
This survey is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. All 39 evaluated dimensions are computed by tools and static analysis; no language model sets or judges any of them. Overall confidence is 0.8, the weighted average across measured dimensions.
Every figure here is one of two kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10.
What we checked — 39 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 83 of 89 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it: Roslyn, git or a scanner, not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: this repository's production source spans .py, and our analyzer cannot run the .py test suite(s) — so no coverage was collected for the repository as a whole. The JavaScript/TypeScript half did build and run, and its own line coverage came back at 74.9% — but that is a figure for one half of the product, and we do not publish a partial one as if it were complete. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero.
D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. No dependency manifest this pass reads for hygiene (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)) was found in this repository, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D30 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D14 License Compliance — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored — no dependency manifest this pass reads for licence data (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, an Elixir mix.exs/mix.lock (Hex), a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)) was found in this repository, so it declares no third-party dependency closure to grade. A gap in the analyzer, NOT a finding that this repository's licences are compliant: a manifest in an ecosystem outside that list, or third-party code copied into the tree, is not read — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (.agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/package.json), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict.
D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) (npm) WERE scanned and every vulnerability they reported is included in this result; osv was not, so this dimension's score covers less than the dependency surface this repository declares, and nothing here is evidence that osv is free of known-vulnerable dependencies. osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. This is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass. osv-scanner documents exit 128 as "no package sources found" — but this scan only invoked it because the tree declares a source it supports (`pom.xml` and the resolved lockfiles among them), so the tool's report and this repository disagree. Check that those sources are reachable from the directory the scan ran in before concluding anything is missing. If this tree really does commit only range-pinned manifests, commit the lockfile your package manager produces — but only where your ecosystem HAS one and commits it: Maven has none at all (osv-scanner reads `pom.xml` directly) and Gradle writes one only under opt-in dependency locking, while a published Composer package and a published Dart library both deliberately exclude theirs. In those three, generate one in CI before the scan instead — a resolved dependency list or an SBOM fed to the scanner.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. `REDACTED`, `REDACTED`, `REDACTED`, `REDACTED`, `REDACTED`, … (+1 more) produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
D43 Malicious Dependencies — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) (npm) WERE scanned and every vulnerability they reported is included in this result; osv was not, so this dimension's score covers less than the dependency surface this repository declares, and nothing here is evidence that osv is free of known-vulnerable dependencies. osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned. This is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass. osv-scanner documents exit 128 as "no package sources found" — but this scan only invoked it because the tree declares a source it supports (`pom.xml` and the resolved lockfiles among them), so the tool's report and this repository disagree. Check that those sources are reachable from the directory the scan ran in before concluding anything is missing. If this tree really does commit only range-pinned manifests, commit the lockfile your package manager produces — but only where your ecosystem HAS one and commits it: Maven has none at all (osv-scanner reads `pom.xml` directly) and Gradle writes one only under opt-in dependency locking, while a published Composer package and a published Dart library both deliberately exclude theirs. In those three, generate one in CI before the scan instead — a resolved dependency list or an SBOM fed to the scanner.
D44 Platform End-of-Life — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This dimension reads a project's own statement about the platform it runs on: a TargetFramework in a .NET project file, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain file or Cargo.toml rust-version, a .go-version, .java-version, .ruby-version, .tool-versions or .sdkmanrc, a go.mod go directive, a Maven or Gradle Java level or toolchain, a Gemfile's ruby directive, a mix.exs elixir requirement, a rebar.config minimum_otp_vsn, a pubspec.yaml SDK constraint, a build.sbt scalaVersion, or a framework major pinned by a dependency constraint. This repository carries none of them, so nothing about its platform was established. That is a gap in this analyzer's coverage, NOT a finding that the platform is supported — a language whose runtime is declared elsewhere (Package.swift, a Dockerfile) is simply not read here yet.
AXB2 Runtime readiness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `npm run` found no package.json in the folder where our sandbox ran it. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. (rule: no-root-manifest). The renderer reported: the dev server (`npm run start`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (our sandbox): `npm run` found no package.json in the folder where our sandbox ran it. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. Last output: "npm error code ENOENT / npm error syscall open / npm error path <repo>/package.json / npm error errno -2 / npm error enoent Could not read package.json: Error: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '<repo>/package.json' / npm error enoent This is related to npm not being able to find a file. / npm error enoent / npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: <path>" No runtime evidence was gathered.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DevServer (start). the dev server (`npm run start`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (our sandbox): `npm run` found no package.json in the folder where our sandbox ran it. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. Last output: "npm error code ENOENT / npm error syscall open / npm error path <repo>/package.json / npm error errno -2 / npm error enoent Could not read package.json: Error: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '<repo>/package.json' / npm error enoent This is related to npm not being able to find a file. / npm error enoent / npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: <path>" No runtime evidence was gathered.
C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Rust was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Rust was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — We measured this, but not all of it. What we did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin or Rust was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala, PHP and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala, PHP or Rust was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript (Vue and Svelte components included), Java, Rust, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Rust, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust, Go, Swift, Erlang, F# and Visual Basic source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — We could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and MSBuild project configuration, TypeScript source and its tsconfig files, Java source and its package and module declarations, PHP source and its PHPStan and Psalm configuration, Dart source and its pubspec language version, Ruby source and its Sorbet and Steep configuration, Scala source and its build's explicit-nulls, WartRemover and Scalafix settings, Kotlin source, and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, no TypeScript was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
We assess the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design we do not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — we run the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality checks the structure of the decision records present: it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and it does not judge how well a record argues its case. Records in a language the section lexicon does not cover are not evaluated.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR): PII/GDPR signals are heuristic pattern matches in code — they flag likely handling concerns, not legal compliance, and cannot trace where data actually flows at runtime.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Documentation accuracy checks links, versions and artefact counts against the tree: other claims (paths, commands, settings, routes) are read but not checked, and it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
Bring the 3 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with salary_lookup.collect_validation_issues (cyclomatic 26), salary_lookup.match_score_optimized (cyclomatic 24), salary_lookup.format_entry (cyclomatic 22). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 3 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 7.8 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Bring the 3 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with salary_lookup.format_entry (cognitive 49), salary_lookup.collect_validation_issues (cognitive 45), salary_lookup.match_score_optimized (cognitive 38). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 3 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 3.2 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: How much of the production code is copy-pasted: the share of production lines inside a reported copy (every copy of a duplicated block or of an edited member, each line once), 10 at none and 0 at a quarter of the lines.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), scored on the share of production lines inside a reported copy (each line once; 10 at none, 0 at a quarter). Deterministic.
6 duplicated block group(s) detected. 3.1 % of the production lines (163 of 5,211) are in a reported copy. A further 2 rows report members as variants of one another; the share counts each copied line once, however many rows cite it. 7 of the 8 are in trees this repository does not ship — vendored, example/demo, project-template, fixture and benchmark code — and are ranked below the shipped groups rather than excluded from them: the duplication there is real and is still counted in this dimension's score. The dimensions that publish a production-file census leave those trees out of theirs, so this count is deliberately drawn over the wider population.
+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (5 lines × 11) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with salary_lookup.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (16 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with fetch_page.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Edited copy of a member (11 corresponding lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with check_framework_version.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
2 production modules (source-import), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). No manifest declares this repository's modules, so the modules are its top-level source directories and the edges the imports between them; 0 module(s) off the main sequence.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.
Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.
0 flaky across 2 measured tier(s). JavaScript/TypeScript (bun:test via `npm install --ignore-scripts` (no lockfile) in .agents/skills/freehire-search/cli/ (125 tests); bun:test via `npm install --ignore-scripts` (no lockfile) in .agents/skills/jobbank-search/cli/ (63 tests); bun:test via `npm install --ignore-scripts` (no lockfile) in .agents/skills/jobdanmark-search/cli/ (75 tests); bun:test via `npm install --ignore-scripts` (no lockfile) in .agents/skills/jobindex-search/cli/ (78 tests); bun:test via `npm install --ignore-scripts` (no lockfile) in .agents/skills/jobnet-search/cli/ (79 tests); bun:test via `npm install --ignore-scripts` (no lockfile) in .agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/ (93 tests)): measured (0 flaky); Python (repository root, 70 test files): measured (0 flaky).
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Top hotspots: tools/convert_salary_excel.py (16×59=944); tools/rank_state.py (14×49=686); tools/security_guards.py (22×21=462) Repeated repair below the complexity floor: tools/job_key.py (9 of 9 changes were fixes); tools/verify_pdf.py (7 of 10 changes were fixes); tools/fetch_page.py (7 of 7 changes were fixes)
Resolve the 15 Repeated repair finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with REDACTED (4), cli.ts (4), job_key.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 warning-level).
Resolve the 12 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with cli.ts (2), REDACTED (2), convert_salary_excel.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
0 deducted task-comment markers across 5211 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Every README, docs/ document and root guide parsed by its markup and measured in Unicode letters. Published: a runnable or packaged .NET project whose README (or a document it links, or a root guide) shows no example, and a root README naming none of three or more projects. Overview, licence, boilerplate, wall-of-text, empty-section and XML-doc rows are measured and withheld (counted in gaps) after adjudication. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.
2 of 2 documentation facets pass in full. 11 document(s) read across 7 unit(s).
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Every ADR read by its section structure: nine located rules (a missing Decision, Context or Consequences section, a stale status, two records deciding the same question, a dangling supersede link, a number-only title, a single option, no named cost, no status where the log uses one, no enforcement field where the log adopted one), each a fixed deduction from 10; the score is the mean over evaluated records. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.
No ADRs found.agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/package.json:7
What to do
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with package.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
89 % of calls cross a namespace and 0 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
19 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 15 medium, 0 low. semgrep hit a parse error in 6 file(s) — `REDACTED` (line 312), `REDACTED` (line 231), `REDACTED` (line 156), `REDACTED` (line 260), `REDACTED` (line 92), … (+1 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 2 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.
Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): every row is a match against a vulnerability database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.
No known-vulnerable dependencies in the 1 ecosystem(s) that were scanned (npm). Partial dependency scan: 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) were scanned (npm), and the findings above are real and complete for them. osv was not scanned (osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned), so this is not the whole dependency surface and the result is reported at reduced confidence.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Likely personal-data (PII / GDPR) handling concerns — logging or storing data without safeguards.
Method: Heuristic PII/GDPR LEAK scan via semgrep across the repo, using our own ruleset: personal data crossing a boundary it should not — reaching a log/console sink, a URL or query string, or unprotected browser storage. Matches map to severity and a 0-10 wide normalizer. A clean sweep is unscored rather than an unearned 10, and is a statement about the leak paths checked only — this dimension does not inventory the personal data a repository holds (the personal-data map and the C1-C5 compliance cards do that), so it never reports that a repository has no personal-data surface. Reported LOUDLY as a measurement gap if the ruleset is missing from the analyzer image. Exhaustive over the leak paths, advisory-leaning; degrades on parse failure.
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 0 low. semgrep could not parse 6 file(s) — `REDACTED`, `REDACTED`, `REDACTED`, `REDACTED`, `REDACTED`, … (+1 more) — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real.
REDACTED
What to do
Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d32_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Reported apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.
Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. Advisory since rubric-2026.11.2 (CAI decision 0006): the malicious-package feed is a database that changes daily, so the reading is shown and never moves a scored dimension, lens or the headline.
No known-vulnerable dependencies in the 1 ecosystem(s) that were scanned (npm). Partial dependency scan: 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) were scanned (npm), and the findings above are real and complete for them. osv was not scanned (osv: the scanner produced no output at all, so no dependency was actually scanned), so this is not the whole dependency surface and the result is reported at reduced confidence.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository and its projects have a README, and whether it is substantive.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repository is organised deliberately: production code and tests are set apart in a way its ecosystem or the repository itself declares.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Most of the production code is in directories of its own, but 1 application file(s) sit at the repository root beside the build and tooling files (`salary_lookup.py`).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the project's current-state documentation describes the code that exists.
Method: Every current-state document's checkable claims looked up in the tree (links, versions, and artefact counts an order of magnitude off), plus two README checks: an advertised infrastructure product with no footprint, and a module the CHANGELOG records as removed. Deterministic, no model. Advisory.
No logging or diagnostics emission found. This repository ships a binary its users launch rather than a service you operate, so there is no operator to page — but when a run fails on a user's machine, neither they nor you have anything to read.
What to do
Write a diagnostic trail the user can hand back with a bug report: a log file under the platform's per-user data directory, switchable with a `--verbose`/`--debug` flag. Start with the error paths that emit nothing — a discarded error is the failure the user cannot describe and you cannot reproduce.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 3 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:32
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release. — .github/workflows/release.yml:88
What to do
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a `for` loop leaves the `dict`, `set` or `deque` it is walking alone — CPython's iterators over those check that the collection has not changed size since the loop began, so a body that removes from (or empties) the very collection the loop is walking makes the next step raise `RuntimeError: dictionary changed size during iteration` and the remaining items are never seen.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Unscored — 4 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 6 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
X10 Duplicated predicate — 10 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 73 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's Python imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
AX2 Stateful singletons — No container singleton was found, so there is no shared instance for concurrent requests to race on. No function in this Python code is served by a threaded web framework (a Flask, Bottle or FastAPI route, a Django or Pyramid view), so no module is shared between request threads.
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — no interface, protocol or abstract type declares an operation an implementer must write
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — the dev server (`npm run start`) exited before it served a page. Likely cause (our sandbox): `npm run` found no package.json in the folder where our sandbox ran it. This is a limit of our sandbox, not of your repository. Last output: "npm error code ENOENT / npm error syscall open / npm error path <repo>/package.json / npm error errno -2 / npm error enoent Could not read package.json: Error: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '<repo>/package.json' / npm error enoent This is related to npm not being able to find a file. / npm error enoent / npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: <path>" No runtime evidence was gathered. This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — this repository registers no route and starts no server another machine can reach (no Flask/FastAPI/Starlette route, Django urlpatterns or class-based view, Tornado handler). Access control is therefore N/A here — a library or command-line tool is authorized by the application that serves it, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in a Django, SQLAlchemy, SQLModel, Peewee, Tortoise or MongoEngine model, a migration or a SQL schema — and no database or data-store client (Django ORM, SQLAlchemy, psycopg, PyMongo, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential on a Django, SQLAlchemy, SQLModel, Peewee, Tortoise or mongoengine model, in a migration or in a SQL schema — and no database or data-store client (django.db, sqlalchemy, psycopg2, pymongo, sqlite3, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential on a Django, SQLAlchemy, SQLModel, Peewee, Tortoise or mongoengine model, in a migration or in a SQL schema — and no database or data-store client (django.db, sqlalchemy, psycopg2, pymongo, sqlite3, …) imported either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
D10 Test Quality — ~12663 lines of test source are present (.py) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — no supported dependency manifest was read
D14 License Compliance — No dependency manifest found — no declared dependency closure to grade for licences
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D21 Naming Consistency — N/A — too few peers to establish a naming convention (404 declarations, no unit with a dominant convention).
D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C#, Visual Basic, TypeScript and JavaScript comments only — this repository's production source is .py, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — This repository is one build unit, `(repository root)` (5211 LoC, 21 module-visible types across 2 directories), within the size bounds. Not scored: a single unit of this size gives project cohesion nothing to grade.
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D44 Platform End-of-Life — Platform end-of-life not assessed — this repository declares no platform this pass reads
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — polyglot repository, one half has no runner
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (1 value object(s))
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the Python source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present for 24 file(s), but no domain-layer files were identified: no covered file's path contains any of the markers this check keys on (/domain/, /aggregates/, /valueobjects/, /domainmodel/, .domain/, /entities/), which are matched case-insensitively anywhere in the path. With no domain partition there is nothing to compare the web/controller layer against — if this repository keeps its business rules under a folder named none of those, that naming is what the check cannot see, not the domain logic.
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for a pytest-benchmark or pytest-codspeed dependency with tests taking the `benchmark` fixture, an asv.conf.json with its `time_`/`mem_`/`peakmem_` benchmarks, or a pyperf Runner, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not scored: this check counted allocation-aware idioms (Span, pools, stackalloc) per line, which describes what kind of code a repository is rather than whether it has an allocation problem, so it was withdrawn. Nothing here is a finding about your code.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: this repository declares no async functions, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
X1 Async correctness — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X13 Undrained process stream — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X14 Bypassable address classification — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X19 Unrestored process-global state — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Python was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Python request takes no token: asyncio cancels the task and trio or anyio the scope that made it, from outside the call, and requests, httpx, aiohttp and gRPC take a timeout, not a cancellation
X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X22 Contradicted release guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X25 Inert configuration knob — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not applicable — the code was read and holds no site of this kind, so there is nothing for this check to judge
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
Repeated repair: tools/job_key.py tools/job_key.py:149— tools/job_key.py changed 9 times in last 90 days and 9 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 15 (its worst body is job_key.make_key at line 149), AT OR UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(scrape): keep C++, C# and C job titles distinct in dedup and keys (#830)”; “fix(job-key): fold Latin letters without an NFKD decomposition and add --audit --migrate (#637)”; “fix(job-key): report a non-string url in --audit instead of a traceback (#634)”; “fix(job-key): report a non-object state file in --audit instead of a traceback (#626)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- tools/job_key.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: tools/verify_pdf.py tools/verify_pdf.py:173— tools/verify_pdf.py changed 10 times in last 90 days and 7 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 13 (its worst body is verify_pdf._quantity_range at line 173), AT OR UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(verify_pdf): exclude currency amounts from ASCII date checks (#724)”; “fix(tools): confine verify_pdf --dump-text and drop the bare pdftotext allowance”; “fix(verify_pdf): --ascii-dates catches the 2016–17 form again (regression in #533) (#698)”; “fix(verify_pdf): --ascii-dates treats a numeric range as a date only when both ends are bare years (#533)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- tools/verify_pdf.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: tools/fetch_page.py tools/fetch_page.py:247— tools/fetch_page.py changed 7 times in last 90 days and 7 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 15 (its worst body is fetch_page.main at line 247), AT OR UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(fetch): compare --out against the repo by identity, not spelling (#742)”; “fix(fetch-page): drop unclosed script and template blocks from --text (#764)”; “fix(fetch-page): decode standard zlib-wrapped HTTP deflate (#711)”; “fix(fetch-page): pass --compressed only when curl supports it (#759)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- tools/fetch_page.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: .agents/skills/jobnet-search/cli/src/commands/search.ts .agents/skills/jobnet-search/cli/src/commands/search.ts:118— .agents/skills/jobnet-search/cli/src/commands/search.ts changed 7 times in last 90 days and 7 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 15 (its worst body is (anonymous) at line 118), AT OR UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(portals): keep hidden markup and invisible characters out of CLI output”; “fix(jobnet-search): keep canonical portal url and emit destination in applyUrl (closes #701) (#706)”; “fix(jobnet-search): filter search by the ESCO occupation that occupations prints (#649)”; “fix(jobnet-search): route external ads to jobAdUrl with http(s) validation and fallback (#538) (#557)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- .agents/skills/jobnet-search/cli/src/commands/search.ts`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: REDACTED REDACTED:61— REDACTED changed 9 times in last 90 days and 6 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 14 (its worst body is apiGet at line 61), AT OR UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(portals): keep hidden markup and invisible characters out of CLI output”; “fix(freehire-search): drop the github.com URL from the User-Agent (#689)”; “fix(freehire-search): reject detail URLs on other hosts instead of asking the API for their last segment (#622) (#623)”; “fix(freehire-search): emit the contract's YYYY-MM-DD date instead of the API's ISO timestamp (#621)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- REDACTED`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: tools/robots_check.py tools/robots_check.py:126— tools/robots_check.py changed 5 times in last 90 days and 5 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 15 (its worst body is robots_check._match at line 126), AT OR UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(robots_check): match wildcard rules in linear time and hand curl only http(s) URLs (#779)”; “fix(tools): force UTF-8 output on fetch_page & robots_check (closes #685) (#686)”; “fix(robots-check): unquote query strings and restrict '$' anchor to pattern end (#543) (#546)”; “fix(robots-check): stop a leading BOM or an undecodable rule from reading as allowed (#509)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- tools/robots_check.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: .agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/src/commands/detail.ts .agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/src/commands/detail.ts:46— .agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/src/commands/detail.ts changed 5 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 14 (its worst body is runDetail at line 46), AT OR UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(portals): keep hidden markup and invisible characters out of CLI output”; “fix(linkedin-search): reject detail URLs on other hosts instead of fetching the posting with that number (#500)”; “fix(linkedin-search): accept LinkedIn job URLs with trailing slashes in detail command (#411) (#412)”; “fix(linkedin-search): drop the never-delivered applyUrl detail field”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- .agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/src/commands/detail.ts`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: tools/install_portal_clis.py tools/install_portal_clis.py:50— tools/install_portal_clis.py changed 4 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 9 (its worst body is install_portal_clis.unsafe_reason at line 50), AT OR UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(install): find bun at standard install locations when PATH misses it (#762)”; “fix(guards): refuse a .npmrc beside a portal manifest, like bunfig.toml”; “fix(guards): read .gitignore like git, allowlist settings.json keys, refuse workspaces and bunfig.toml”; “fix(installer): disable dependency hooks explicitly across Bun versions”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- tools/install_portal_clis.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: REDACTED REDACTED:229— REDACTED changed 4 times in last 90 days and 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 10 (its worst body is visibleHtml at line 229), AT OR UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(portals): keep hidden markup and invisible characters out of CLI output”; “fix(portal-clis): reject foreign detail URLs in Jobbank and Jobnet (#672)”; “fix(portal-clis): accept full posting URLs in jobbank, jobdanmark, and jobnet detail commands (#430)”; “fix(jobbank-search)!: emit deadline as YYYY-MM-DD in search output”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- REDACTED`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: REDACTED REDACTED:154— REDACTED changed 3 times in last 90 days and 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 10 (its worst body is visibleHtml at line 154), AT OR UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(portals): keep hidden markup and invisible characters out of CLI output”; “fix(jobdanmark-search): back off on 429/5xx in detail instead of failing on the first attempt (#460)”; “fix(portal-clis): accept full posting URLs in jobbank, jobdanmark, and jobnet detail commands (#430)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- REDACTED`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: REDACTED REDACTED:90— REDACTED changed 3 times in last 90 days and 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 10 (its worst body is visibleHtml at line 90), AT OR UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(portals): keep hidden markup and invisible characters out of CLI output”; “fix(portal-clis): reject foreign detail URLs in Jobbank and Jobnet (#672)”; “fix(portal-clis): accept full posting URLs in jobbank, jobdanmark, and jobnet detail commands (#430)”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- REDACTED`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: .agents/skills/jobbank-search/cli/src/cli.ts .agents/skills/jobbank-search/cli/src/cli.ts:34— .agents/skills/jobbank-search/cli/src/cli.ts changed 3 times in last 90 days and 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 1 (its worst body is (anonymous) at line 34), AT OR UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(portal-clis): reject missing Danish option values before dispatch (#573)”; “fix(portal-clis): reject undefined single-dash flags in the unknown-flag guard (#428)”; “fix(portals)!: reject unknown flags in all six CLIs”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- .agents/skills/jobbank-search/cli/src/cli.ts`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: .agents/skills/jobdanmark-search/cli/src/cli.ts .agents/skills/jobdanmark-search/cli/src/cli.ts:37— .agents/skills/jobdanmark-search/cli/src/cli.ts changed 3 times in last 90 days and 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 1 (its worst body is (anonymous) at line 37), AT OR UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(portal-clis): reject missing Danish option values before dispatch (#573)”; “fix(portal-clis): reject undefined single-dash flags in the unknown-flag guard (#428)”; “fix(portals)!: reject unknown flags in all six CLIs”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- .agents/skills/jobdanmark-search/cli/src/cli.ts`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: .agents/skills/jobindex-search/cli/src/cli.ts .agents/skills/jobindex-search/cli/src/cli.ts:34— .agents/skills/jobindex-search/cli/src/cli.ts changed 3 times in last 90 days and 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 1 (its worst body is (anonymous) at line 34), AT OR UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(portal-clis): reject missing Danish option values before dispatch (#573)”; “fix(portal-clis): reject undefined single-dash flags in the unknown-flag guard (#428)”; “fix(portals)!: reject unknown flags in all six CLIs”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- .agents/skills/jobindex-search/cli/src/cli.ts`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Repeated repair: .agents/skills/jobnet-search/cli/src/cli.ts .agents/skills/jobnet-search/cli/src/cli.ts:36— .agents/skills/jobnet-search/cli/src/cli.ts changed 3 times in last 90 days and 3 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so repair is the majority of this file's churn. Its max cyclomatic complexity is 1 (its worst body is (anonymous) at line 36), AT OR UNDER the 15 threshold, so this is deliberately not filed as a churn × complexity hotspot — the difficulty here is in the behaviour the file has to get right, not in its control flow, and refactoring it for complexity would be the wrong move. The repairs counted were: “fix(portal-clis): reject missing Danish option values before dispatch (#573)”; “fix(portal-clis): reject undefined single-dash flags in the unknown-flag guard (#428)”; “fix(portals)!: reject unknown flags in all six CLIs”. Each one is a case this code did not handle. Before the next change lands here, check that every one of them is pinned by a test that fails without its fix; where the same area keeps coming back, the durable fix is usually at the interface that keeps being misused rather than at the line that was last corrected. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- .agents/skills/jobnet-search/cli/src/cli.ts`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: tools/convert_salary_excel.py tools/convert_salary_excel.py:167— tools/convert_salary_excel.py changed 16 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 59 in convert_salary_excel.parse_sheet at line 167. 15 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- tools/convert_salary_excel.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: tools/rank_state.py tools/rank_state.py:315— tools/rank_state.py changed 14 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 49 in rank_state.cmd_apply at line 315. 13 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- tools/rank_state.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: tools/security_guards.py tools/security_guards.py:492— tools/security_guards.py changed 22 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 21 in security_guards.check_permissions at line 492. 11 of those changes were fix/bug commits, and the other 11 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- tools/security_guards.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: .agents/skills/freehire-search/cli/src/cli.ts .agents/skills/freehire-search/cli/src/cli.ts:186— .agents/skills/freehire-search/cli/src/cli.ts changed 10 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 34 in main at line 186. 7 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- .agents/skills/freehire-search/cli/src/cli.ts`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: tools/posting_guard.py tools/posting_guard.py:201— tools/posting_guard.py changed 11 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 23 in posting_guard.clean_text at line 201. 11 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- tools/posting_guard.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: .agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/src/cli.ts .agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/src/cli.ts:77— .agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/src/cli.ts changed 5 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 41 in main at line 77. 5 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- .agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/src/cli.ts`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: salary_lookup.py salary_lookup.py:315— salary_lookup.py changed 9 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 22 in salary_lookup.format_entry at line 315. 9 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- salary_lookup.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: tools/upstream_triage.py tools/upstream_triage.py:150— tools/upstream_triage.py changed 6 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 25 in upstream_triage.main at line 150. 6 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- tools/upstream_triage.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: .agents/skills/jobnet-search/cli/src/commands/detail.ts .agents/skills/jobnet-search/cli/src/commands/detail.ts:69— .agents/skills/jobnet-search/cli/src/commands/detail.ts changed 5 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 29 in mapSearchAdToDetail at line 69. 5 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- .agents/skills/jobnet-search/cli/src/commands/detail.ts`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: tools/check_upstream_updates.py tools/check_upstream_updates.py:79— tools/check_upstream_updates.py changed 5 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 26 in check_upstream_updates.main at line 79. 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- tools/check_upstream_updates.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: REDACTED REDACTED:168— REDACTED changed 3 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 23 in parseDetailPage at line 168. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- REDACTED`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: REDACTED REDACTED:279— REDACTED changed 4 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 16 in parseJobDetail at line 279. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-08-14..2026-11-12, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-08-14 21:37:19 +01:00' --until='2026-11-12 21:37:19 +01:00' --full-history --no-merges -- REDACTED`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene· JavaScript dependencies are not locked · ×6
JavaScript dependencies are not locked .agents/skills/freehire-search/cli/package.json:16— .agents/skills/freehire-search/cli/package.json declares dependencies that no committed lockfile resolves — there is no package-lock.json / yarn.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml / bun.lock beside it, and no locked workspace above it names it — so its installs aren't reproducible (SSDF PW.4.4). Commit its package manager's lockfile (or add it to the locked workspace) and install from it (`npm ci`, `yarn --immutable`, `pnpm i --frozen-lockfile` or `bun i --frozen-lockfile`). Advisory — never scored.
JavaScript dependencies are not locked .agents/skills/jobbank-search/cli/package.json:15— .agents/skills/jobbank-search/cli/package.json declares dependencies that no committed lockfile resolves — there is no package-lock.json / yarn.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml / bun.lock beside it, and no locked workspace above it names it — so its installs aren't reproducible (SSDF PW.4.4). Commit its package manager's lockfile (or add it to the locked workspace) and install from it (`npm ci`, `yarn --immutable`, `pnpm i --frozen-lockfile` or `bun i --frozen-lockfile`). Advisory — never scored.
JavaScript dependencies are not locked .agents/skills/jobdanmark-search/cli/package.json:15— .agents/skills/jobdanmark-search/cli/package.json declares dependencies that no committed lockfile resolves — there is no package-lock.json / yarn.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml / bun.lock beside it, and no locked workspace above it names it — so its installs aren't reproducible (SSDF PW.4.4). Commit its package manager's lockfile (or add it to the locked workspace) and install from it (`npm ci`, `yarn --immutable`, `pnpm i --frozen-lockfile` or `bun i --frozen-lockfile`). Advisory — never scored.
JavaScript dependencies are not locked .agents/skills/jobindex-search/cli/package.json:15— .agents/skills/jobindex-search/cli/package.json declares dependencies that no committed lockfile resolves — there is no package-lock.json / yarn.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml / bun.lock beside it, and no locked workspace above it names it — so its installs aren't reproducible (SSDF PW.4.4). Commit its package manager's lockfile (or add it to the locked workspace) and install from it (`npm ci`, `yarn --immutable`, `pnpm i --frozen-lockfile` or `bun i --frozen-lockfile`). Advisory — never scored.
JavaScript dependencies are not locked .agents/skills/jobnet-search/cli/package.json:15— .agents/skills/jobnet-search/cli/package.json declares dependencies that no committed lockfile resolves — there is no package-lock.json / yarn.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml / bun.lock beside it, and no locked workspace above it names it — so its installs aren't reproducible (SSDF PW.4.4). Commit its package manager's lockfile (or add it to the locked workspace) and install from it (`npm ci`, `yarn --immutable`, `pnpm i --frozen-lockfile` or `bun i --frozen-lockfile`). Advisory — never scored.
JavaScript dependencies are not locked .agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/package.json:16— .agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/package.json declares dependencies that no committed lockfile resolves — there is no package-lock.json / yarn.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml / bun.lock beside it, and no locked workspace above it names it — so its installs aren't reproducible (SSDF PW.4.4). Commit its package manager's lockfile (or add it to the locked workspace) and install from it (`npm ci`, `yarn --immutable`, `pnpm i --frozen-lockfile` or `bun i --frozen-lockfile`). Advisory — never scored.
salary_lookup.collect_validation_issues (cyclomatic 26) salary_lookup.py:56— salary_lookup.collect_validation_issues has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
salary_lookup.match_score_optimized (cyclomatic 24) salary_lookup.py:213— salary_lookup.match_score_optimized has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
salary_lookup.format_entry (cyclomatic 22) salary_lookup.py:315— salary_lookup.format_entry has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
salary_lookup.format_entry (cognitive 49) salary_lookup.py:315— salary_lookup.format_entry has cognitive complexity 49 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14 (29 pts), ternaries 2 (10 pts), loops 3 (6 pts), boolean chains 4 (nesting depth added 26). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
salary_lookup.collect_validation_issues (cognitive 45) salary_lookup.py:56— salary_lookup.collect_validation_issues has cognitive complexity 45 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15 (32 pts), boolean chains 7, loops 2 (4 pts), error handling 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 20). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
salary_lookup.match_score_optimized (cognitive 38) salary_lookup.py:213— salary_lookup.match_score_optimized has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21 (31 pts), boolean chains 7 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 11) salary_lookup.py:415— salary_lookup.py:415-424 | tools/check_upstream_updates.py:72-76 | tools/convert_salary_excel.py:407-416 | tools/fetch_page.py:235-244 | tools/install_portal_clis.py:125-129 | tools/job_key.py:361-370 | tools/rank_state.py:521-530 | tools/robots_check.py:215-224 | tools/upstream_triage.py:46-55 | tools/verify_layout.py:430-439 | tools/verify_pdf.py:359-368 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 11 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 11 times.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (16 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (16 corresponding lines) tools/fetch_page.py:216— tools/fetch_page.py:216-231 | tools/posting_guard.py:76-100 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 16 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
D4 · Code Duplication· Edited copy of a member (11 corresponding lines) · ×1
Edited copy of a member (11 corresponding lines) tools/check_framework_version.py:68— tools/check_framework_version.py:68-80 | tools/check_upstream_updates.py:52-62 — These two members are one piece of code written twice and then edited apart: 11 consecutive lines correspond almost exactly, broken only by small local edits. Most of that correspondence is NOT reported as duplicated blocks below — the edits cut it into fragments and only the largest of them clear the block floor, so the rows below understate it. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation into one the two call with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic (an extra return value, one transport against another), generate one from the other. Left alone, the next edit has to be made twice and the two will drift further apart.
Duplicated block (16–18 lines × 2) tools/fetch_page.py:216— tools/fetch_page.py:216-231 | tools/posting_guard.py:83-100 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) tools/lint_skills.py:81— tools/lint_skills.py:81-89 | tools/security_guards.py:493-501 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) tools/job_key.py:311— tools/job_key.py:311-318 | tools/rank_state.py:104-111 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) tools/rank_state.py:355— tools/rank_state.py:355-361 | tools/rank_state.py:393-399 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. ★ These copies have DRIFTED, and that is worth reading before extracting anything: just before the matched lines, `tools/rank_state.py:353` calls `parse_iso`, `get` and `tools/rank_state.py:392` does not — after which the two agree again for 2 more lines. One of those two behaviours is the intended one and the other is what a copy-paste left behind, so decide which BEFORE unifying them: extracting the shared part will silently settle it, and if the copy that skips the call is the wrong one, that bug is already live.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) tools/check_framework_version.py:26— tools/check_framework_version.py:26-34 | tools/check_upstream_updates.py:41-45 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once. The `return` at the foot of the matched lines is the enclosing body's own terminal exit, not an early one: it moves with them unchanged, and each site calls the extracted unit from the position that `return` occupied — no decision has to be handed back and re-acted on.
No structured logging — No logging or diagnostics emission found. This repository ships a binary its users launch rather than a service you operate, so there is no operator to page — but when a run fails on a user's machine, neither they nor you have anything to read.
Duplicated predicate REDACTED:324— `!VOID_TAGS.has(tag) && !m[0].endsWith("/>")` appears character-identically in 6 files — REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate .agents/skills/jobbank-search/cli/src/cli.ts:69— `!token.startsWith("-") || token.includes("=")` appears character-identically in 4 files — .agents/skills/jobbank-search/cli/src/cli.ts, .agents/skills/jobdanmark-search/cli/src/cli.ts, .agents/skills/jobindex-search/cli/src/cli.ts, .agents/skills/jobnet-search/cli/src/cli.ts. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate REDACTED:111— `err instanceof Error && err.message.includes("NOT_FOUND")` appears character-identically in 2 files — REDACTED, REDACTED. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate REDACTED:396— `hasScheme || /^[a-z0-9.-]+\.[a-z]{2,}(\/|$)/i.test(trimmed)` appears character-identically in 2 files — REDACTED, .agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/src/commands/detail.ts. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate REDACTED:296— `name === "style" && /(?:^|;)\s*(?:display\s*:\s*none|visibility\s*:\s*hidden|mso-hide\s*:\s*all)\b/i.test(value)` appears character-identically in 6 files — REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate .agents/skills/jobbank-search/cli/src/cli.ts:76— `next === undefined || next.startsWith("-")` appears character-identically in 5 files — .agents/skills/jobbank-search/cli/src/cli.ts, .agents/skills/jobdanmark-search/cli/src/cli.ts, .agents/skills/jobindex-search/cli/src/cli.ts, .agents/skills/jobnet-search/cli/src/cli.ts. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate REDACTED:6— `params && Object.keys(params).length > 0` appears character-identically in 3 files — REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate REDACTED:82— `response.status === 429 || response.status >= 500` appears character-identically in 6 files — REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate REDACTED:172— `url.protocol !== "http:" && url.protocol !== "https:"` appears character-identically in 2 files — REDACTED, REDACTED. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate REDACTED:282— `value !== null && typeof value === "object" && Object.getPrototypeOf(value) === Object.prototype` appears character-identically in 6 files — REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
No ADRs found .agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/package.json:7— No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`. ADRs are expected here because `.agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/package.json` makes this repository a deployable product (line 7).
No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No src/ separation — Most of the production code is in directories of its own, but 1 application file(s) sit at the repository root beside the build and tooling files (`salary_lookup.py`).
No SAST REDACTED:32— No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add bandit, `semgrep --config=p/python`, or CodeQL's python pack as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 3 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
No release approval gate .github/workflows/release.yml:88— The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.
Silent fallback default on parse failure tools/security_guards.py:399— `_own_cli_grant` returns `set()` when `ValueError` is raised, with no log or raise — a malformed value silently becomes that default. Log the input or fail validation. If that constant is the correct answer rather than a stand-in for a value that could not be read, say so in a comment on the handler or in the docstring, and the row stops firing.
Subsumed condition operand .agents/skills/linkedin-search/cli/src/cli.ts:24— `a.startsWith("--")` can never decide this `||` — every value satisfying `a.startsWith("--")` also satisfies `a.startsWith("-")`, so the `||` chain is already decided by the latter. The expression is equivalent to the chain without it, which means it is wider than it reads. Delete the dead operand, or narrow the surviving one if IT is the accident.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
Run 01a1e01a-8092-767b-9b98-97e9c6c94ed5 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 4 · Warnings: 66 · Recommendations: 19 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by the Canine Code Analyzer: deterministic code-health analysis. 15-11-2026 @ 16:46 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.